ML19261D820
| ML19261D820 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Trojan File:Portland General Electric icon.png |
| Issue date: | 06/22/1979 |
| From: | Broehl D PORTLAND GENERAL ELECTRIC CO. |
| To: | Schwencer A Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| TAC-07551, TAC-11299, TAC-7551, NUDOCS 7906260456 | |
| Download: ML19261D820 (42) | |
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c-June 22, 1979 Trojan Nuclear Plant Docket 50-344 License NPF-1 Director of huclear Reactor Regulation ATTN:
Mr. A.
Schwencer, Chief Operating Reactors Branch #1 Division of Operating Reactors U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D. C. 20555
Dear Sir:
Enclosed are responses, prepared by Bechtel Power Corporation, to 20 of the 50 questions submitted in your letter of May 18, 1979.
In accordance with our discussion with your staff, we expect to transmit additional responses to you next week and to have all questions answered by July 6.
This will also confirm that, as part of the modification program, the new wall along column line N will be modified in the following respects:
1.
A 4 ft x 4 ft opening will be provided at Elevation 65 ft to provide access for switchgear and cabinet removal for maintenance during the life of the Plant. This opening will normally be kept closed by a sliding steel door similar to the one presently at the opening in the wall.
2.
The new reinforced concrete wall aill be extended to Elevation 93 ft.
The thickness of the new wall will be 2 ft 0 in. froa approximately Elevations 65 ft to 77 ft, and 1 ft 0 in, from approximately Elevations 77 ft to 93 ft.
The modification in thickness and extent of the new wall results from the performance of further iterations of the STARDYhE analysis to develop floor response spectra, as discussed in Appendix B.
The above modifications will be discussed in detail in PGE-1020, Rev. 2, which we will file shortly af ter we have responded to the 50 questions.
Sincerely,
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< 9 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD In the Matter of
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Docket 50-344 PORTLAND GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY,
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et al
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(Control Building Proceeding)
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(Trojan Nuclear Plant)
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I hereby certify that on June 22, 1979, Licensee's letter to the Director of Nuclear Reactor Regulation dated June 22, 1979 and an attachment entitled " Request for Additional Information, Trojan Nuclear Plant, Proposed Control Building Design", have been served upon the persons listed below by depositing copies thereof in the United States mail with proper postage affixed for first class mail.
Marshall E. Miller, Esq., Chairman Joseph R. Gray, Esq.
Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Counsel for NRC Staff U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Co= mission U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D. C.
20555 Washington, D. C.
20555 Dr. Kenneth A. McCollom, Dean Lowenstein, Newman, Reis, Axelrad &
Division of Engineering, Toll Architecture and Technology 1025 Connecticut Avenue, s. W.
Oklahoma State University Suite 1214 Stillwater, Oklahoma 74074 Washington, D. C.
20036 Dr. Hugh C. Paxton Richard M. Sandvik, Esq.
1229 - 41st Street Assistant Attorney General Los Alamos, New Mexico 87544 State of Oregon Department of Justice Atomic Safety and Licensing Board 500 Pacific Building Panel 520 S. W. Yamhill U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Portland, Oregon 97204 Washington, D. C.
20555 William Kinsey, Esq.
Atomic Safety and Licensing Appeal Bonneville Power Administration Panel P. O. Box 3621 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Portland, Oregon 97208 Washington, D. C.
20555 Docketing and Service Section Office of the Secretary 2312 011 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Coc=lssion Washington, D. C.
20555 s em
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE Ms. Nina Bell Mr. Eugene Rosolie 728 S. E. 26th Avenue Coalition for Safe Power Portl.ind, Oregon 97214 215 S. E. 9th Avenue Portland, Oregon 97214 Mr. John A. Kullberg Route 1, Box 250Q Columbia County Courthouse Sauvie Island, Oregon 97231 Law Library Circuit Court Room Mr. David B. McCoy St. Helens, Oregon 97051 348 Hussey Lane Grants Pass, Oregon 97526 Ms. C. Gail Parson P. O. Box 2992 Kodiak, Alaska 99615 lU.
f hnson Ronald W.,'ttorney Corporat-Portland General Electric Company Dated:
June 22, 1979j} Qj] 4kk66.27B8
REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION TROJAN NUCLEAR PLANT PROPOSED CONTROL BUILDING DESIGN Q. 1. Page 1 of 4 pages The footnote on page 1-7 which defines " safety related" implies that there may be a difference between this and the original definition of the term. Provide a list of any equipment, components, and piping which were originally designated as " safety related" but are no longer being considered as such and corresponding justifications for no longer considering them as " safety related." Answer: The Trojan FSAR contains in a number of sections identifi-cation (in accordance with then-applicable standards) of equipment, components and piping to be seismically qualified. (See, e.g., FSAR Section 3.2, submitted with Amendment 3, September 1973.) Since the original submittal of various porti ons of the FSAR, more detailed guidance has become available from the NRC concerning the appropriate identification of systems or parts of systems which should be seismically qualified. Such guidance is now available in Reg. Guide 1.29, Rev. 3, which, among other things, defines as safety-related those systems whose failure could result in potential offsite doses exceeding 0.5 rem whole body (paragraph C.l.p) and in Reg. Guide 1.26, Rev. 3. In preparing PGE-1020, we considered it appropriate to update the definition of systems to be seismically qualified so as to conform to current NRC guidance, as set forth above. 2312 013
Q. 1. Page 2 of 4 pages Accordingly, the definition of " safety-related" in PGE-1020 is derived from Reg. Guide 1.29, Rev. 3, and Reg. Geide 1.26, Rev. 3. Under such definition some systems or portions of systems that were originally seismically qualified are not required to be seismically analyzed or qualified. The use of the referenced definition of " safety-related" does not require addition of any items to the list of equipment, components and piping to be evaluated. The current criteria set forth in these Regulatory Guides do impose additional requirements that are not presently part of the operating license. For example, the latest revision of Pegulatory Guide 1.29 requires seismic support of non-seismic items in the control room whose failure could rcsult in incapacitating injury to occupants therein. Even though requirements such as this were not in force when Trojan was designed, their merit was recognized at that time. As a result, the designer employed criteria similar to those expressed in the latest version of these Regulatory Guides. Additionally, Trojan undergoes a program of con-tinuous improvement to meet the intent of many new criteria even though they may not be formally required. Recent surveys have confirmed Trojan's compilance with the intent of the requirements expressed in Regulatory Guide 1.29, Rev. 3. The only equipment, components and piping previously seis-mically qualified in accordance with the FSAR which are not required to be re-evaluated with response spectra for the modified Complex, and the corresponding justification therefor, are as follows: 2312 014
Q. 1. Page 3 of 4 pages A. CVCS: Mechanical Equipment T-210 A & B CVCS Mixed Red Demineralizers T-211 CVCS Cation Bed Demineralizer T-219 A, B, &C CVCS Evap. Feed Ion Exchangers F-206 Ion Exchange Filter P-213 Holdup Tank Recirc. Pump P-214 A & B Gas Stripper Feed Pump Piping Ion Exchanger Piping to the first Isolation Valve Holdup Tank Piping after the first Isolation Valve Gas Stripper Piping. Piping associated with the above listed equipment. Justification Calculated potential offsite doses resulting from postulated failures of the listed portions of CVCS do not exceed the 0.5 rem to the whole body as specified in paragraph C.l.p of Reg. Guide 1.29, Rev. 3. B. WASTE GAS SYSTEM: Mechanical Equipment C-301 A & B Waste Gas Compressor T-314 Waste Gas Surge Tank VF-307 Gas Collection Header Exhaust Filter 2312 015
t Q. 1. Page 4 of 4 pages Piping Decay Tank Piping down stream of the first isolation valve and piping associated with the above equipment Justification The radioactive gaseous waste system is not covered by Reg. Guide 1.29, Rev. 3. C. SAMPLING SYSTEM: The Seismic Category I designed sample system lines, except containment isolation valves and piping for first seismic anchor beyond, and the Containment Hydrogen Sampling System. Justification The sampling system is not covered by Reg. Guide 1.29 Rev, 3 and can be categorized as a Quality Group D system under Reg. Guide 1.26 Rev. 3. The Waste Gas Surge Tank had been conservatively included on the lie of equipment seismically evaluated in connection with interim operation in lieu of performing the radiological assessment of potential offsite doses that would have been required to exclude such equipment. Now that the assessment has been completed, it is no longer necessary to retain such equipment on the safety-related list. 2312 016
Q. 2. (a) verify that closely spaced modes resulting from the modal analysis of the building complex are being considered in accordance with the criteria delineated in BC-TOP-4A. Answer: The closely spaced modes are combined in accordance with the criteria set forth in SC TCP 4A, Rev.3, Section 4.2.1, as ~ follows: Starting with the fundamental mode, the modes are divided into groups such that the highest medal frequency exceeds the low-est modal frequency by no more than ten percent of the lowest frequency. Within a group, the intramodal responses are com-bined by the " absolute-sum" method. The absoluto sums from the groups are then combined by the " square-ecot-sum-of-the-squares" method to produce the total expected response for a given direction of base motion. The results frcm STARDYNE have been checked by hand calculations to verify that this method was successfully executed. 2312 017 e 5,s G a e ew, em. h - em
O. 2. (h) Additionally, Joscribe what the bedia elements in the S'2ARDYNM tinite clement mesh represent. Answer: Beam elements have been used to represent frec-standing columns and diagonal bracing. In addition, beam elements have ceen used in cases where the local stiffncus proper-ties could be better modeled with beams than with other types of finite eluments. 2312 018 m -. moo== 4
Q. 4. Page 1 of 3 pages Verify that the applicable requirements of ACI 318-77 for the modifications are the same as those of ACI 349-76 as supplemen-ted by Regulatory Guide 1.142. Identify any differences and justify the acceptability of the ACI 318-77 requirements in lieu of those contained in ACI 349-76 and Regulatory Guide 1.142. Answer: There are a number of differences between the applicable require-monts of ACI 318-77 and these of ACI 349-76, as supplemented by negulatory Guide 1.142. The applicablo sections of ACl 349-76, as supplemented by Regulatory Guide 1.142, where differences from ACI 318-77 occur, are summarized belcw: ACI 349-76 Paragraph Item No. No. Section et ACI 349-76 1 1.5 Cuality Assurance Program 2 3.2.3 Cements 3 3.3.3 Aggregates 4 3.5.1 Metal reinforcement 5 3.6.5 Admixtures 6 3.7 Storage 7 4.2.4 & 4.2.7 Selection of concrete proportions 8 5.3.3 Conveying 9 5.4.4 Cepositing 2312 019 O m- - - - - = - = m
Q. 4. Page 2 of 3 pages ACI 349-76 Paragraph Item No. No. Secticn of ACI 349-76 10 S.5.1 & 5.5.2 Caring 11 S.6 Cold weather requirements 12 5.7 Hot weather requirements 13 6.3.3 Conduits and pipes embedded in concrete 14 6.4.1 Construction joints 15 7.3.2 Tolerances 16 7.5.5 Splicos in reinforcement - General 17 7.5.6 Splices in reinforcement - General 18 7.6.4 Splices in tension 19 8.1 Design methods 20 9.3 Required strength 21 9.4 Design strength for reinforcement The provisions of ACI 349-76 and Regulatory Guide 1.142 are not directly applicable to Tro]an. Nevertheless, in addition to fulfilling the applicable requirements of ACI 318-77, the design of the modification complies with the foregoing require-ments of ACI 349-76, as supplemented by Regulatory Guide 1.142, except as discusse' below. 1. The design of the new walls complies with the requirements of Sec. 7. 5.5 ACI 349-76 (item No. 16 above) except at the interface between the new walls and the existing walls. 2312 020 O 6
Q. 4. Page 3 of 3 sec. 7.5.5 of ACI 349-76 requires that positive connections be staggered if the maximum computed design load stress in the bar equals or exceeds 0.5f Sec. 7.5.5 of the Com=en-tary on ACI 349-76 indicates tha t the requirement of stag-gering the positive connections is designed to avoid a re-duction in the ultimate moment capacity of the member at the splice location and to avoid larger than normal cracks at the splice location for members subject to tensile forces. At the interface between the new wall and the existing wall, the non-staggered positive connections carrying design load stresses in excess of 0.Sf are not subject y to significant bending moments or tensile forces. The predominant nature of the load is diagonal tension which acts on a plane inclined to the vertical while the posi-tive connections lie in a vertical plane. The diagonal tension plane does not engage all of the positive connections and the requirement of staggering would not achieve the result intended by ACI 349-76. Since staggering of the connections is unnecessary it will not be utilized, particularly since under these circumstances it would require additional exposure of the existing walls beyond the limited exposure needed for nonstaggered connections. 2. Section 9.3 of ACI 349-76 as supplemented by Regulatory Guide 1.142 specifies a load factor of 1.9 for the CBE. The load factor used in the design of the modifications of L.4 is based on the Trojan FSAR and is consistent with the design of other Plant Category I structures. 2312 021 -e. wee w --an e- -e.-- - = = m--
Q. 5. Provide the basis for your determination in Section" 3. 2.3 of PCE-1020 that the allowance for future addition of equipment will have an insignificant effect on the seismic analysis. Answer: In the scismic analysis performed for the modified Complex, it has been calculated that the mass of equipment (piping, components, e tc. ) in the Complex amounts to about 3% of the total mass of the Ccmplex. In view of the large amount of existing equipment and the remaining space ;ivailable, it will not be possible to add a large amount of equipment in the future. Assuming that future additions would reach as much as 25% of the mass of the existing equipment, the projected addition will only be.25 x.03 =.007, or less than 1% of the total mass. This small percentage of increase in mass would have an insignificant effect on the seismic analysis. 2312 022
Q. 7. Page 1 of 3 pages For the " Criteria for Studs", provide the basis for the design value being one-half the values given in Table 15 of the Nelson Division of TRW, Inc. publication, " Design Data 10 - Embedme nt Properties of Headed Studs." Include a discussion of what is indicated in this table (e.g. maximum or minimum ultimate), and the statistical variation in the testing which established these values, if appropriate. Answer: The values given in Table 15 of the Nelson Division of TRW, Inc. publication " Design Data 10 - Embedment Properties of Headed Studs" are ultimate shear capacities for ASTM A-108 headed studs embedded in concrotc, given by the lesser of the following: f'c ' Ec' ) Sue " 90u = 9 ( 1.10 6As S, = 0.9A f 3 3
- whcrc, S
= concrote shear capacity of headed studs in kips, uc modified by the capacity reduction f actor, 9 Q = concrete shear capacity of the headed studs in u kipt 2312 023 - - - = =. -... - - - - - + - - -=e-me..
Q. 7. Page 2 of 3 pages 9 = ctpacity reduction f actor = 0.85 S = the ultimate embedded shear capacity of a ue headed stud, which cannot exceed 0.9 A f 3 3 A = cross-sectional arca of the stud shank s f'c = 28 day concrete compressive strength, ksi E = modulus of elasticity of concrete per c ACI 318-77, Sec. 8.5.1, kai f = minimum tensile strength of stud = 60 ksi 3 The formula for the concrete stud capacity, S is derived uc, from the recommendation from " Shear Strength of Stud Con-nectors in Lightweight and Normal-weight Concrete" by
- Ollgaard, J.G.,
- Slutter, R.
G. and Fisher, J.W., A.I.S.C. Engineering Journal, Vol 8, No. 2, April 1971, pp 55-64. 1.106 This paper recommends the concrete stud capacity, Q = y 0 44 A f'e.3 E The values obtained by this equation are g c neither maximum ultimate nor minimum ultimate values. They are ultimate values best fitting the test results and they are obtained from the test results by performing multiple re-gression analyses (least squares fit). The coefficient cf correlation is 0.89. 2312 024 G ama.-e -.- --
=e e.
Q. 7. Page 3 of 3 pages The basis for the dccign value being one-half the values given in Table 15 is as follows: The factor of safety for shear transCer through studs shculd be at least equal to the f actor of safety implied in the overall design of the shear walls in accordance with: U = 1.4 (D + L + C). Therefore, based en the concrete capacity, the factor of saf ety required is 1. 4, and based on steel, the factor of safety required against the yield stress of 50 ksi is 60 ks4 1.4 x 1.68. = 50 ksi Accordingly, the f actor of safety of 2 used in establishing the design values is conservative. 2312 025 + = = =. -. ...--...---..w.--
Q. 9. Previde a discussion of the type and the extent of the non-destructive examinations which will be performed on the plate welds, a4cng with detailed Justifications. Answer: The non-destructive examination will be magnetic particle ex-amination on the final completed weld surfaces using A-C yoke and dry powder. A volumetric examination is not required since these welds are not pressure retaining and leak tightness is not required. The prime conaideration is to detect ra]or defects which could exist in the weld or heat-affected zone. This type of defect, if present, would propagate to the surface and would be detected by the magnetic particle surface examination which is a widely used technique for this type of examination. 2312 026
C. 10. Describe the decoupling criteria for equipt.ent, compon-ents, piping, etc. whose mass was lumped into that of the structural system and verify that it is met everywhere. A ns ?a g '. The decoupling criteria used is that given in BC TOP 4A, Rev. 3, Section 3.2. 'fhese criteria permit decoupling in cases where the weight of equipment, a component, or a sub-system ( takwr iridividually) is less than tnree percent of the effective weignt of the fundamental structural mode. For the modified Complex, the smaller of the two fundamental modes has an effective weight of about 30,000 kips, thus al-lowing decoupling for equipment, components, and subsytems weighing less than 900 kips. This allows all equipment, components and subsystems to be decoupled for the dynamic analysis of the modified Complex since each of these weighs less than 900 kips. 2312 027 ..-.--e me.
Q. 15. Provide the basis for the 30% amplification factor assumed in the vertical cirection. Answer: As indicated in Responso 6 of the " Response to Cetober 31, 1978 Questions from the Nuclear Regulatory Commission" the vertical frequencies or the Ccmplex were 20.7, 24.6 and 31.0 cps in the Contrc1, Auxiliary and Fuel Buildings, respectively. The modifications will stiffen the Control Building, resulting in an increase in the vertical frequency. For the purpose of analysis, the vertical amplification was conservatively assumed as 30 percent. Later, using the model developed for Response 6 and making the necessary changes to reflect the modifications to the Control Building, a response spectrum analysis was per-formed which indicates that the maximum vertical amplification in the Control Building for an 0.15g OBE is 16 percent or less. Us; of the higher amplification factor results in a propor-tionate decrease in the dead Icad and hence a conservative assessment of the shear capacities of the Ccmplex walls. The wall added at column line N' his no adverse effect on the vertical amplification of the slab at elevation 65. This slab was constructed from 12 inches thick precast panels 4 feet wide spanning 31 feet which results in essentially one way slab action. The amplification of the panels directly attached to the new wall will be greatly reduced and the other panels will be essentially unchanged. 2312 028
Q. 18. In Table 3.3.-1 the sum of the effective weights in the N-S direction does not add up to your indicated total. Please clarify. Answer: There are two typographical errors in Table 3.3-1. In line 3 of the Table change 528 to 14,528 and in li r.e 6 change 404 to 1,404. 2312 029 7 L.
Q. 21. In section 4.2.4 you discuss the removal of part of the con-crete boam along the R line between columns 41 and 46. What was the original structural function of this beam? Verify that removal of part of the beam does not ccmpecmise its structural integrity or its structural functions. Specifi-cally, what impact will this have on the masonry blocks supported above the beams? Answer: 4 The element referred to consists of a steel beam encased in concrete at approximate elevation 65' at column line R. The portion of the ccncrete to be removed was not considered in the original design to contri]ute to the vertical load carrying capacity of the steel beam along column line R or the lateral load capacity of the Ccmplex. The concrete to be removed had no structural function. The masonry wall is supported by the concrete slab over the steel beam. 2312 030 9 -m -e---
O. 22. Page 1 of 2 pages Provide a summary of the load ccmbinations and the maximum forces which will be developed for the bolts and the shear studs and locally'in the existing elements. Indicate where the Nelson shear studs will be used. Also, discuss the shcar transfer mechanism between the steel plate and existing walls in detail. Answer: The load combination used in the design of the bolts is D + L +To + E where, Dead Load D = Livo Load L = Thermal Loads due to thermal gradient across the T = o wall and different coefficient of expansion for steel and concrete Cperating Basis Earthquake (CBE) E = in some areas the bolts will carry a maximum force of 52 kips. The maxianum allowabic load (after losses have been considered) Ddsed on the formula given in Section 3.2.4.2 of PGE-1020 is 52.5 kips. The load co.nbination used in the design of the studs is D + L + E. The maximum force on the 1/2" dia. stud is 3.5 kips and on the 5/8" dia, stud is 5.5 kips. These values are one-tnird of tne values given in Table 15 of the Nelson Division et TRW Inc., publication, " De s ign Data 10 - Embedment Proper-ties of Ecaded Studs". The shear studs will be welded to all exposed existing beams and columns for load transfer. (See response to Cuestion No. 3 for sketches.) 2312 031 ~
Q. 22. Page 2 of 2 pages Locally, the force the bolts will impose on the existing walls is a through plane compressive force near the bolts. (For furtner discussion see response to Question No. 6b.) Response to Question No. 3 indicates where the Nelson studs will be used. Shear will be transferred between the existing walls and steel plate by means of friction at the plate / wall interface created by the compression from the postensioned bolts. Further discussion about the shear transfer mechanism will be provided in response to Question No. 6. 2312 032 G 9
Q. 23. Gescribe and Justify the design criteria for the rail stop being added in the Turbine Building. Answe r: A ' bumping post" type stop, which would engage the coupler and draft gear of a moving railcar, will be provided to pro-tect the new reinforced concrete wall along Column line R from damage that could result from accidental or unauthorized movement of a railcar beyond the spotting position in the Turbine Building railroad bay. The 3 top will be located just west of the new wall at the terminacion of the existing rail. The spotting position for railcars servicing the Turbine BuiJding will be beneath the crane bay which is centered approximately 65 feet west of the new west wall. Railcar movement will not ce conducted in close proximity to the Con-trol Building west wall, and the stop will not be used for normal railcar spotting. Although a Burlington Northern Railroad Company standard general service capacity bumping post would provide adequate protection for accidental impact, the largest capacity Burlington Northern standard bumping post available, fitted with a high onergy absorbing impact face, will be used for maximum protection. Thu operational procedures for ralicar handling on site to-gether with the conservative bumping post installation provido adcquato assurances that the new Control Building
- cst wall will not be damaged by a railcar.
2312 033 4 .e.- .-e.
O. 24. Explain why the finite element representation of the new wall along column line N' does not duplicate the wall as depicted in Figures 3.1-2 and 3.2-1. Answer: In PGE-1020 Figures 3.1-2 and 3.2-1, the new wall along column Line N' is shown with door openings at clovat' ions 45 ft and 55 ft. Even though the shaded area superimposed on the finite element representation of Figure 3.3-7 coes not show these openings, they were considered in developing the stiff-ness of the finite elements. O 2312 034 e a 9 4 4 9 e G h
Q. 28. tescribe the procedures used to remove'the rock during re-location of the railroad spur (e.g. blasting) and verify that there will be no impact on plant safety resulting from the removal of the rock. Answer: Hydraulic or air operated hammer.'s will -e used to break the rock. Once becken, the rcck will be loaded manually or by a small front end loader and placad in dump trucks. No bJmat-ing will be done. Experience at the Trojan site has shewn that rock removal in this manner creates neither excessive vibration nor F.ust in the buildings. No safuty-related utilitics will be crossed. The conventional backfill surrounding the fire lincs will be removes by light hand tools, such as shovels. If removal of any.ccx around the fire lines (ccmposed of ductile iton) is required, light power tools will be used. The fire lines under the new railroad spur will be sleeved by a metal casing to facilitate any future requirement to remove them. The firo lines over which the new railroad spur will run will remain approximately 4-1/2 feet below the surface. Therefore thu fire lines will not be affected by loads imparted by the railcars. 2312 035
Q. 35. Provide the basis for your determination that the connection of the guide columns between the Control and Turbine Buildings will not significantly effect the behavior of either structure during a scismic event. Answer: More recent detailed evaluations, as supplemented by site surveys, have led to the conclusion that the installation of guide columns would be 12npractical. Due to the redundancy provided by the hoisting apparatus, the guide columns between the Control Building and Turbine Building are not necessa ry in order to provide adequate protection to the cables below and, therefore, they will not be installed for the steel plaen oractinn. a forthcoming revicion to PoE-1030 that will explain :ninor changes to the pecposed modification program will also reflect this change. 2312 036 G ....-.-ee- =* - - - - =.--
- 0. 36.
Page 1 of 2 pages Provide the basis for your determination that removal of por-tions of the Turcine Building will not affect the analysis cwfurred to in Section 2 nor significantly affect its seismic capability. Answer: The portions re:..ove d from the Turbine Building are shown en the attached figures and are described below. The modification at Elevation 69'-0" is the removal of an 18-1/2" portion of the Turbine Building floor slab, as shown in the attached sketches, along line S from line 41 to lino 46. This portion of slab does no'. contribute to the lateral load carrying capacity of the Turbine Building. The loads as specified in the original design are supported by the steel beam supporting the Elevation 69'-0" slab. The capacity of that beam will be unaffected by the edge portion to be removed. The modifications at Elevation 93'-0" consist of the removal of a 3" portion of the floor slab and 2" from the top and bottom flanges of tne existing steel girder. The slab and flange removal will be along line S from line 41 to line 46. The web of the steel girder will also have 4-1/2" diameter holcs which will clso be provided in the web of the steel 2312 037 m. ..___-..n__.. .m-....
Page 2 of 2 pages ( girder at the location of the new bolts. (See the attached sketches). The girder is adequate, after the mcdiftcations, to carry the design loads. The slab at Elevation 93'-0" has 8 til diaphram chord bara near the edge of the slao. It is possible that 2 411 reinforcing bars will be cut. An addi-tional 2 til reinforcing bars will be added in a concrete curb above the slab to replace the cut reinforcing bars. This concrete curb wili be connected to the existing slab by dowels which can develop the capacity of the chord bars. The rencrete slab will not Oc cut until the design strength of the concrete curb has been attained. Theretocc, the modifications to the Turbtno Building will not aftcet its coismic response and will not signiticantly affect its capantiity to carry the design loads. 2312 038
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......e-- 6 R {B"coHC. SLA B ic BE REMOVED ADD G'HIGH CURS m W/7N 2 # // W \\ l \\y\\- i i l N TURBINE BLDG. s5 we-3 N y'-..e.-.'9 y; 8eNT' 6 TEEL PC A~~ 6/. 9 3L0"Im' '-i i E E,d hN I 9 +-_ _ _ _._ 7 ij, + i ^ 'g ]f-~ '[ \\ h 7 --if s: l-v;s i N f if ~ - - '" l N k s i.N \\'s. s ,s s' ~ i \\' .iN' l "i 7"h8.F'LG'$.' ro es REMovCD SECTION A7^ UNE (k) EL. 93'-O c sneer e ce 2 m cuesnew us an 2312 040 eem .e. e, empae -e e - em-e te em-m e i w ee h-e e a em -m+ em,e .-e.e me m-wa-e_4e
Q. 33. Oiscuss tne behavior of tne test wails vs. those of the actual walla censidering the largo d1CCerences in the H/T and L/T ratios. Provide the basis for your response. Anower: As explained in section 1.4.1, Appendix A of PGC-1020, the test specimens were proportioned to nave tnc same aspect ratio (H/L) and the same thickneus ratio be. tween the concrete core and the masonry blocks as these of the actual wall panels. Doch the capacities of the tcut specimens and their stittacs-zwu acu ovaiwatod as funce.inna of the unit ahese atroam and axial utree.s in the specimens. The unit shear stress and the stiftness et the test cpecimens were based on the flexural uchavior which is predominantly a tunction of the percentage of vertical reinforcing steel in the specimens. Accordingly, increasing the thickness of the specimens did not indicate any appreciabic change i.a either the unit capacity or the stif f-neau. Therefore variation in the H/T or L/T ratio between j the test specimen $ and the actual wall panelo would not affcct the interpretation of the test results in the assessment of the bchavior of the walls. 2312 041 8
Q. 42. Page 1 of 2 pagos Discuss the basis tor your statements regarding the strength differences between L1 and L2 in more detail. Include further discussion of the effects of the shear studs i.1 L1 sinco they were only at the basu as indicated in Figure A 3-2. For all specimens, incicate the reinforcement anchorage details in the upper and lower beams. Answer: The test specimens L1 and L2 with embedded steel columns had classic uhear mode of f ailure with many ma]or diagonal cracks as shown in Figures AS-42 and A3-43 of PGE-1020. The ultimate shear capacities were 428 psi for L1 and 367 psi for L2. The differenec of 61 psi is due to the core reinforcement, inclu-ding shear studu, in Ll. There was no core reinforcement in L2. The corn reinforcement haa provided additional clamping force so that the extra shear capacity could develop through shcar friction along the diagondi cracks. As explained in Section 3, Appendix A of PGE-1020, the upper construction Joint of the test specimen L1 had a 1" deep key in the core concrete and in tne grout space inside the mason-ry blocks. The masonry portion of the lower construction joint was prepared using a steel brush and cleaned before the construction or the masonry. In adoition, the core portion of the 1swer construction joint had 3/4" x 8" stcol studs extending into the coro as shown in Figure A3-2 of PGC-1020. 2312 042
Q. 42. P=ge 2 ud 2 pages The studs were attached to a 3/4" x 6" steel plate anchored to the bottom beam. The vertical core reinforcemont was em-bcdded into the top beam and lapped with the studs at the bottom. The studs provided a goed cncar transfer :cechanism across the lower construction joint. A lso, the studs helped the vertical core reinforcumunt to develop its full strength through tne S" lap. The lapping of vertical coru reinforcement with shoar studs was made to simulate similar conditions in some of the major shear walls in the Complex. The strain measurement in the vertical core rebar in specimen L1 chowcd that they approach-ed yield at the lapped end thereby catablishing that the vertical rebars were fully mobilised. The vertical reinforcing stoel of all test speci=cnc was em-bodded in top and bottom beams except specimen G1 where the reinforce =cnts were discontinuous. 2312 043 = - - - - -. -
C. 48. Provide the SSE and the CBE ficor response spectra for all elevations in the complex. Answer: The ficor response spectra are obtained from the STARDYNE model which is currently undergoing minor revisions. The response spectra which reflect all the structural modifica-tiens will be supplied at a future date. In lieu of these, the actual response spectra at the nodal points used to develop the design ficor response spectra are supplied in Figures 48-1 to 48-6. These response spectra are developed frcm the N-S component of the SSE for equipment damping of 0.5, 2.0 and 5.0 percent. The nodal points referred to are the same as used in October 27 submittal to NRC staff technical questions of Cetober 16, 1978. 2312 044 4-. A
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Q. 50. Verify that the original FSAR pipe break criteria are not impacted by the new analysis. Answer: The original pipe break criteria and its plant evaluation is contained in PGE-1004, revision 2, Analysis of Pipe System Breaks, Cutside Containment, August, 1975. There are two piping systems in the Complex which require evaluation for pipe break effects. They are: CVCS letdown line in the Auxiliary Building (2"-CS601R-4) and the CVCS charging line also in the Auxiliary Building (3" CS-2501R-5, 3" CS-2501R-28) The modification program has not resulted in either a sig-nificant increase or a redistribution of stresses in either of these two systems due to any modification resulting in the Complex. Therefore, the previous evaluation of potential pipe break locations remains unchanged. 2312 051 -.emm.. ..-me--.
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