ML19259B350
| ML19259B350 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Trojan File:Portland General Electric icon.png |
| Issue date: | 01/15/1979 |
| From: | Axelrad M, Rachel Johnson LOWENSTEIN, NEWMAN, REIS, AXELRAD & TOLL, PORTLAND GENERAL ELECTRIC CO. |
| To: | |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 7901260264 | |
| Download: ML19259B350 (12) | |
Text
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,A PUBLIC DOCUMENT Rom W
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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA g
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' NUCLEAR lEGULATORY C0:U11SSION
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EEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING APPEAL BOARD Y
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In the Matter of
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Docket 50-344 PORTLA::D CENEPJ.L ELECTRIC CC:iPANY,
)
et al
)
(Control Luilding Proceeding)
)
(Trojan 1;uc2 car Plant)
)
CELT!PICATE OP E"'llCE 1 herchy cenify that cn January 15, 1979:
- 1) Ansver of Licensee in Opposition to Petition for Stay Filed by Coalition for Safe Pouer; and m
- 2) Motion to Strike Docunents Accompanying Petition for Stay Filed by Coalition for Safe Power have been cerved upon the persons listed below by aepositin<; copics thereof in the United States nail with proper p';tage affixed for first class nail.
lir. Alan S. Rosenthal, Chairman Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Atomic Safety and Licensing Appeal Panel lioa rd U. S. Iuclear Regulatory Co. mission U. S. Neclear Regulatory Cocaission Washington, D. C.
20555 Washington, D. C.
20555 Atonic Cafety acA Licensing Appec1 Marshall E. Miller, Esq., Chairman Board Panel (5)
Atomic Safety and Licensing board U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Cc=cission U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D. C.
20555 Washington, D. C.
20555 Robert M. Johnson, Esq.
Dr. Kenneth A. McCollom, Dean Assistant Attorney General Division of Engineering, 100 State Office Building Architecture and Technology Salca, Oregon 97310 Oklahoma State University Stillwater, Oklahoma 74074 Lowenstein, Newman, Reis, Axelrad & Toll 1025 Connecticut Ave., N. W.
Dr. Ilup,h C. Paxton Suite 1214 1229 - 41st Street Washington, D. C.
20036 Los Alar..os, New !!exico 87544 Mr. Eugene nosolie Joseph R. Gray, Esq.
Coalition for Safe Power Counsel for NRC Staff 215 S. E. 9th Avenue U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Portland, Oregon 97214 Washington, D. C.
20555 7 9012 6 0 Alpf
l CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE Columbia County Courthouse Ms. C. Cail Parson Law Library P. O. Box 2992 Circuit Court Roon Kodiak, Alaska 99615 St. llelens, Oregon 97051 Mr. Stephen M. Willingham Ms. Nina Bell 555 N. Tomahawk Drive 632 S. E.
18th Street Portland, Oregon 97217 Portland, Oregon 97214 John 11. Socolof sky, Esq.
Colunbia Environnental Council Assistant Attorney General P. O.
Box 611 Of Attorneya for the State 01 Oregon St. 11clens, Oregon 97051 100 State Office Building Salcu, Oregon 97310 Mr. Jchn A. Kullberg Itoute 1, Box 250Q Willinn Kinecy, Esq.
Sr.uvie Island, Oregen 97231 Bonneville Fower Adainistration P. O. Box 3621 Mr. David B. McCoy Portland, Oregon 97208 348 Ilussey Lane Grants Pass, Oregon 97526 Docketing and Service Section Office of the Secretary U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Comnission Washington, D. C.
20555 OL Y 61 nona d W. gdhnson Corporate Attorney Portland General Electric Company Dated: January 15, 1979 4kk66.19B1
UtiITi'D STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
_DEFORE ONE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSIt:G APPEAL BOARD In the Matter of
)
)
PORTLAND GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY)
Docket No. 50-344 et al.
)
(Control Building Proceeding)
)
January 15, 1979 (Trojan Nuclear Plant)
)
)
ANSL'ER OF LICUNSEE IN OPPCSITION TO PETITION FOR ST/sY FILUD BY C07.LITION F03 S/JE POh'E R This proceeding arises from the discovery in early 1978 of certain design deficiencies in the walls of the Control Building of the Trojan Nuclear Plant (the " Plant").
After revicw of information provided by the Portland General Electric Company
(" Licensee"), the NRC Staff concluded that the Plant continued to satisfy design criteria for the 0.25g Safe Shutdown Earthquake
("SSE") but that its ability to meet the design criteria for the 0.15g Operating Basis Earthquake ("OBE") had been reduced.
Accordingly, the NRC Staff issued on May 26, 1978 en Order for Modification of License, which required modification of the Plant and permitted interin operation.
The May 26, 1978 Order was to become effective 30 days later unless a request for a hearing was received during that period.
As a result of requcsts filed by several petitioners, including Coalition for Safe Power ("CFSP"), hearings were convened before an Atomic Safety and Licensing Board (the " Board").
The scope of the hearings was limited to two issues: (1) whether interim operation should be permitted, and (2) whether the scope and timelessness of the modifications were adequate from a safety
2 standpoint.
By ord.er of Argust 25, the Board granted Licensee's motion to bifurcate the hearings into two phases.
The first phase culminated in the Partial Initial Decision of December 21 (the "11ecision"), in which the Board found, inter alia, that the Control Building has adequate capacity to safely withstand the 0.25g SSE, concluded that interim operation of the Plant can be conducted without endangering the public health and safety, and authorized an appropriate amendment to Operating License NPF-1.
On January 4, 1979, CFSP filed a 9-page Petition f or Stay (the " Petition") pursuant to 10 CFR 52.708, accompanied by a 4-pcge exhibit (" Exhibit #1") and a 16-page Supporting Memorandum (the
" Memorandum").
Notwithstanding the prolixity of these documents, it is striking that CFSP does not allege error as to any of the basic findings in the Decision concerning the seismic capability of the Plant and the safety of interim operation.
This is not surprising, however, since the record is uncontroverted and every witness
- presented testimony consistent with the Board's findings in favor of resumption of operation.
In any event, as we show below, CFSP completely fails to demonstrate that application of the four governing criteria set forth in 32.788(e)** would warrant the grant of a stay.
Thus, the Petition should be summarily denied.
- Licensee, the NRC Staff and the State of Oregon presented expert witnesses.
The intervenors did not present any testimony.
- These are:
(1)
Whether thc moving party has made a strong showing that it is likely to prevail on the merits; (2)
Whether the party will be irreparably injured unless a stay is granted; (3)
Whether the granting of a stay would harm other parties; and (4)
Where the public interest lies.
3 Likelihood of Prevailing on the Merits CFSP fails to make a " strong showing" that it is likely to prevail on the merits on any issue.
This dictates denial of a stay since, as we show below, the other three criteria also weigh against granting the desired relief.
CPSP's principal allegations on the merits appear to be that the Board: (1) limited itself to an improperly " narrow scope of inquiry" and, as a result, numerous issues relating to the safe interim operation of the Plant have been left unresolved (Petition, pp. 2-4); (2) erred in not ordering preparation of an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) (Petition, pp. 5-9); (3) erred in not requiring Licensee "to prove the need for power" (Memorandum, pp. 2-5); and (4) failed to consider fully the issues raised in the limited appearance statement of Robert Pollard (Petition,
- p. 6; Memorandum, pp. 9-13).
CFSP's argument as to the Board's scope of inquiry mischaracterizes what the Board in fact reviewed.
It reviewed in detail the seismic design and reevaluation of the seismic capability of the Control Building Complex; the capability of safety-related equipment to withstand earthquakes up to and including the SSE of 0.259; the adequacy of instrumentation and procedures to assure a safe shutdown in the event of an SSE; NRC Staf f procedures following a seismic event; and questions raised by Mr. Pollard concerning fire protection equipment and seismic goalification of equipment.
The Board thus fully and properly considered all matters relating to the issue of whether interim operation of the Plant should be permitted.
4 In alleging generally that the Board should have inquired into additional matters, CFSP neglects the fact that the proceeding does not pertain to the issuance of an operating license, and that the Board cannot " expand the issues beyond these related to the design deficiencies that resulted in the notice of hearing which described the issues lit is] empovered to consider."*
In a proceeding involving a proposed change in an operating license, contentions are limited to those "which arise as a direct consequence or necessary inplication of the proposal."**
There must therefore be some cogni::able nexus bctween any matters sought to be raised by an intervenor and the issue before the Board.
The specific matters complained of by CFSP at pages 2-4 of the Petition are either beyond the scope of this proceeding er were fully and adequately addressed.
Thus, for example, no relationship between the design deficiencies in the Control Building walls and the functioning of the DBA sequencers was shown, and even the present Petition fails to allege a current safety problem concerning this equipment, let alone a nexus with the subject matter of this proceeding.***
As to the alleged error in failing to require that an EIS be Irepared CFSP misunderstands the law, the NRC regulation and
- Decision, p.
49, citing Public Service Co. of Indiana, Inc.
(Marble 11111 Nuclear Generating Station, Units 1 and 2),
ALAB-316, 3 NRC 167, 170-71 (1976).
- Similarly, no proper issue or relationship is shown by the Petition on such disparate matters as a radiation overexposure, alleged excessive rates of equipment failure and personnel errors, and the exemption granted to the Plant with respect to ECCS (fn - cont'd next page)
5 the facts.
NRC Staff testimony is uncontroverted that, since interim operation of the Plant will r.ot result in environmental effects or impacts that dif f er f rom those previously evaluated at the operating license stage, authorizing such operation falls under 10 CPR 551.5(d)(4) and preparation of an EIS is not necessary.
(Tr. 2126; NRC Staff, Exh. 8).
The intervenors did not cross-examine on these conclusions.
There is ample support for the Doard's determination that an EIS is not needed.*
Similar3y, there is no merit in CFSP's allega tion tha t the board erred in not requiring Licensee to prove *need for power."
The Plant's benefits would need to be determined only if a cost-benefit analysis were necessary; and this in turn is required only if an EIS had to be prepared, i.e., if the license amendment "would bring about significant environmental consequences beyond those previously assessed."**
As we discuss above, the Board properly determined no EIS was required.
Finally, CFSP alleges that the Board failed to fully consider the issues raised in Mr. Pollard's limited appearance statement.***
To the contrary, the Board vent to extraordinary lengths to (in cont'd) calculations (which was contained in a document outside of the record where the NRC Staff explicitly stated that "this matter is completely unrelated to the issues before the Licensing Board").
Alleged design deficiencies in fire protection equipment are discussed below.
- See cases cited in the Decision, p.
48 at n.9.
See also Boston Edison Co. (Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station, Unit No. 1),
LBP 74-57, 8 AEC 176, 184 (1974).
- Northern States Power Co.
(Prairie Island ?!aclear Generating Plant, Units 1 and 2), ALAB 455, 7 NRC 41, 46 at n.4 (1978).
- The Board's refusal to cell Mr. Pollard as its witness was within its " sound discretion."
Consa.,ers Power Co. (Midland Plant, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-382, 5 NRC 603, 608 (1977).
6 consider matters he raised.
liis statement was received after the testimony of all parties had been heard and concluding arguments presented (Tr. 2649).
Nevertheless, excercising its discretion, the Board requested Licensee and the NRC Staff to provide expert witnesses to respond to questions which it viewed as appropriate for further inquiry (Tr. 2716-20, 2723-29, 2736, 2742-44).
The hearing was protracted for two additional days for this sole purpose.
The Licennee presented nine witnesses concerning the detailed criteria, methods and procedures utilized in qualifying safety-related equipment (Tr. 2753-2856), fire protection (Tr. 2856-69) and certain maintenance activities (Tr. 2870-79).
The NRC Staff presented five witnesses to address the foregoing questions, as well as additional questions relating to approval methods for equipment, guidelines for review of specific electrical equipment, and the absence of any relevant unresolved safety issues (Tr. 2386-2994).
There is thus ample basis in the record for the Board's determination that the matters raised in Mr. Pollard's statement have been satisfactorily resolved. (Decision, pp. 37-40, 51.)
Irreparable Injury to CPSJ Of the four criteria, a showing of irreparable injury to the petitioner is the most critical.
If no such injury exists, there is little reason why a petitioner should not wait until his claims can be fully evaluated on the merits, and thus a stay will not ordinarily be granted.*
- See, e.g., Public Service Co. of Indiana (Marble Hill Nuclear Generating Station, Units 1 and 2), ALAN-437, 6 NRC 630,632 (1977).
7 CFSP has submitted no affidavits demonstrating irreparable injury.
Instead it merely asserts that operation prior to resolution of alleged " deficiencies" creates "a continuing grave danger of irreparable injury."
Not only are these allegations wholly untrue,* but they involve the sheerest speculation as to hou such " deficiencies" could result in any impcet upon CFSP.
Obviously, unsupported concerns that some unspecified contingencies may occur at some unknown future time cannot satisfy the irreparable injury requirement.**
CPSP also argues that failure to grant a stay vill somehou work "an irreparable injury to intervenors' right to appellate review."
The argument appears to be simply that no decision should become effective until after judicial review is complete.
Obviously if there were such a rule there would be no need for the criteria set forth in !2.788.
Harn to Other Parties In contrast so the lack of injury to CPSF, it is uncontestable that issuance of a stay would inflict substantial harm on Licensee and on Bonneville Power Administration (BPA),*** and those that
- The alleged " deficiencies" relate to seismic qualification of sa fety-related equipment, fire protection equipment, ECCS equipment, and DBA sequencers.
As discussed above, the record is uncontroverted that there are no " deficiencies" in such equipment affecting the safe operation of the Plant.
- See, e.c.,
Toledo Edison Co. et.al.,
(Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station, U,its 1, 2 ano 3), ALAb-3J3, 5 NRC 621, 626-29 (1977).
- Licensee is entitled to 67.5% of the electricity produced by the Plant.
The city of Eugene, Oregon, is entitled to 30%,
which it has sold to BPA.
Pacific Power & Light Company is entitled to the remaining 2.5%.
8 they serve.
As more fully set forth in the attached affidavit of Glen E.
Bredemeier of Licensee, the Plant is presently performing an indispensable function in supplying needed power for Licensee and the Pacific Northwest.
Weather conditions have resulted in unusually heavy regional loads this vinter. In the case of Linensee's system, energy load in December 1978 was 16% above that of December 1977, and for the first week in January 1979 Joad requirements have been 33% greater than for the same week in 1978.
Peak load this year has already exceeded that forecast for calendar year 198], and Licensee's share of power from the Plant supplied approximately 25% of that peak load.
It was difficult and extremely costly to replace the power which the Plant would have produced in normal operation during the fall and winter of 1978.
Licensee estimates its excess costs were approximately $25 million.
The cerrent incremental costs of nome of Licensee's sources of energy are 10 times that of the Plant.
The last of the provisional agreements for receipt of power terminates on January 15.
In addition to meeting its oun system necds, Licensee has incurred obligations to replace power supplied during the shutdown, including 200,000 MWh due between mid-January and March 31, and 400,000 MWh due by June 30.
Although Licensee's ability to perform would be facilitated by an improvement in weather conditions followed by an adequate regional supply of hydroelectric energy, current forecasts indicate that the prospective hydroelectric energy supply will be significantly lower than in a normal year.
9 As set forth in the attached af fidavit of Hector Durocher of DPA, during the shutdown of the Plant BPA replaced energy from the Plant by withdrawing for its own use a portion of the output of the Hanford Plant, which is otherwise made available to its direct service industrial customers.
This replacement energy costs BPA approximately 9-11 mills /kWh, as compared to the Plant's incremental costs of 3 mills /kWh.
In turn these direct service industries were left to replace the energy withdrawn by BPA through the purchase of power from other higher cost sources.
With the Plant's return to operation, BPA has indicated that it will once again make Hanford's output available to the direct service industries.
However, if the Plant were again shut down, BPA would again need to withdrau Hanforcl power, resulting in increased costs to those industries and/or layof f of those industries' employees.
Thus, not only would granting of the stay result in the idling of an energy resource with a value of more than $460 million at a great economic impact to Licensee and BPA, but it would seriously impact Licensce's ability to meet the needs of its system and wonld impact upon BPA's ability to serve certain industrial customers.
The Public Interest The injuries to the public interest that would result from the grant of a stay are manifold. We have already pointed out the financial costs that would result from the enforced i6 ling of a large energy resource.
In addition, a stay wo,uld threaten Licensee's ability to meet current and future power needs.
10 The shutdoun of the Plant would also have the impact on BPA's industrial custooers noted above.
That the public interest requires that there be no interruption of Plant operation is emphasized by the statements supporting immediate resumption of operation presented in this proceeding on behalf of both the covernor of the State of Oregon (Tr. 297) and the State of Washington (Tr. 302).
!!oreover, the State of Oregon has actively participated as an interested State throughout the proceeding and recommended authorization of interim cperation (Tr. 2585).
~
That there is no public interest basis for granting the stay in evident in the unmn'woverted record concerning the safety of interin operation nr.d the lack of environmental irpact.
In light of the serious adverse effects of Plant shutdoun and thc lack of any adverse impacts of Plant operation the public interest can only to served by denia) of the stay.
1:espectfu11y submitted, r
41 M:V liSis1d,;. Johnson,, pit.
Portland Generzil El'octric Company 121 S.W.
Salmon Street Portland, Oregon 92704 fAMaAC<_
Aff 0 _ ',
7 11aurice Axcirac, Esq.
/
(/
Lovenstein, ::ewm an, Peis, Axelrad & Toll 1025 Connecticut Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.
C.
20036 Attorneys for Portland General Electric Company
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING APPEAL BOARD In the Matter of
)
)
PORTLAND GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY)
Docket No. 50-344 et a].
)
(Control Building Proceeding)
)
January 15, 1979
(' trojan Nuclear Plant)
)
)
MOTION TO STRIKE DOCUMENTS ACCOMPIsNYING PETITION FOR STAY FILED BY COALITION FOR SAFE POWER On January 4, 1979, Coalition for Safe Power ("CFSP"), an intervenor in this proceeding, filed a 9-page document entitled
" Petition for Stay Pending Appeal of the December 21, 1978 Partial Initial Decision of the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board" (the
" Petition") pursuant to 10 CPR S2.788.
Notwithstanding the
. requirement of S2.788(b) that an application for a stay shall be no longer than 10 pages, exclusive of affidavits, the Petition was accompanied by a 4-page exhibit ( " E::h ib i t il") and a 16-page Supporting Memorandum (the " Memorandum").
Portland General Electric Company (" Licensee") moves the Appeal Board to strike Exhibit #1 and the Memorandum for the reasons set forth below.
Exhibit #1 and the Memorandum are clearly intended by CFSP as additional grounds for, and arguments in support of, its application for a stay.
These documents represent a blatant attempt to circumvent the 10-page limitation on applications
2 for stays imposed by S2.78 8 (b).
- Under such circumstances, the striking of the offending documents is an appropriate remedy.
See Toledo Edison Co.,
et.al. (Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station),
ALAB-430, 6 NRC 4 57, 458 (1977).
Violations of s2.788(b) should not be condoned.
The rule is intended to assure that a party seeking the extraordinary remedy of a stay vill state concisely the specific matters upon which it relies, without extraneous legal argument.
Adherence to that rule by a petitioner is essential in order that other part!.es may be able to respond within the time fra:ae (10 days) and pagi limitation (10 pages) imposed upon them, as well as to inform the Appeal Board of the crux of the matters allegedly warranting a stay and to enable the Appe.
Board to act expeditiously on the petition.
In the instant proceeding the unauthorized documents filed by CFSP resulted in a rambling, disjointed discussion extending over the 25 pages of the Petition and the Memoranoum.
In the Answer being filed by Licensee today it was perforce required to address in some fashion the contents of all of the documents, even though it was extremely difficult to ascertain the precise points relied upon by CFSP.
Moreover, in light of the 10-page limitation set forth in S2.788(d) it was impossible to refute specifically all of the extraneous matters raised by CFSP in what constituted essentially a brief, rather than a petition.
Licensee is confident,
- Since CFSP cites S2.788 at several parts in its filings (e.g., Petition, pp. 1,5; Memorandum, p. 1), it is apparent that it was well aware of the 10-page limitation.
3 however, that its Answer adequately demonstrated that the Petition is without merit a.id should be denied.
The instant Petition is obviously belt the first of a number of filings by CFSP in the course of its appeal from the Partial Initial Decision.
In addition, the second phase of the proceeding relating to modifications of the Control Building is continuing before the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board.
Licensee respectfully requests that the Appeal Board make clear to CPSP at the outset that it is c):pec ted to adhere to the rules of practice applicab7.e to all parties to 1;nC proceedings.
Respectfully submitted, 9tf
../
Ronald W. Johnnon, Esq.
Portland Genendl Electric Company 121 S.W. Salmon Street Portland, Oregon 92704 i
(M!MhL
$d b kW,)
y Maurice Axelrad, Esq.
V Lowenstein, Newman, Reis, Axelrad & Toll 1025 Connecticut Ave., N.W.
Washington, D.C.
20036 Attorneys for Portland General Electric Company
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION BEFORE Ti!E ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING APPEAL BOARD In the Matter of
)
)
Docket No. 50-344 PORTLAND GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY, )
et al.
)
(Control Building Proceeding)
)
January 15, 1979 (Trojan Nuclear Pltnt)
)
AFFIDAVIT OF GLEN E. BREDEMEIER Glen E. Eredcucier, being duly suorn, says:
1.
1 am Vice President-Power Operations of the Portland General Electric Company ("PGE").
I am submitting this Af fidavit in support of Licensce's Answer to CFSP's Petition for Stay in this proceeding.
2.
The purpose of this Affidavit is to explain the importance of the operation of the Trojan Nuclear Plant (Trojan) to meet the demands of PCE's system and those of the Pacific Northwest region and to describe the harm that would occur to PCE and its customers if the Petition for Stay were granted. Trojan is currently operating at full power after having been cut of service from March 1978 throech December 1978. Trojan is needed to supply firm baseload power both to PGE's service area and the Pacific Northwest region.
Because of record high demands for electricity in PGE's service area, severe weather conditions through the Pacific Northwest region, anticipated low water flows in the region, and the need to repay energy borrowed from other utilities while Trojan was out of service, the generating capacity of Trojan is critical to PGE, its customers, and the region, particularly in the short term.
3.
PCE owns 67.5 percent of the Trojan plant.
30 percent is owned by the City of Eugene, Oregon, and the remaining 2.5 percent by Pacific Power & Light Company.
The three owners are each entitled to share in the electricity pro-duced by Trojan in the same proportion as their ownership.
The share of the City of Eugene, Oregon, has been sold to the Bonneville Power dministration.
The capital cost of the Plant, which went into cenmercial operation in May 1976, exceeded $460 million.
4.
In a normal year, PGE's share of energy production from Trojan accounts for about one-third of the energy annually supplied to our customers.
Since the Pacific Northwest, including PCE, is still on a predominately hydrcelectric base, firm energy to meet load is a basic concern. That is, while the regional capacity (i.e., hydro facilitics and associated generating equipment) to meet peak load may be adequate, during periods of low streamflow conditions the shortage of available water necessitates use of base load thermal plants, such as Trojan, to produce the required additional energy to meet customers' needs.
5.
Trojan was out of service from March 1978 through Deccaber 1978.
During that time, PGE experienced considerable dif ficulty and substantial additional expense in meeting the needs of our customers.
k'a had to purchase replace-ment power, on a short-term basis, from other Northwest utilities and ue had to enter into short-term transactions with other utilities by which we were abic to " borrow" energy.
Had we been unable to purchase or borrow replace-ment energy during the time Trojan was out of service, we would not have been aile to serve our loads.
6.
The financial consequences of these measures were signifi-cant. The incremental cost uf energy produced from Trojan is approximately 3 mills per kWh.
The incremental cost of
_2-
energy purchased to replace '. hat power ranged up to over 20 mills per kWh, and energy from oil-fired combustion turbines cost in the range of 25 to 35 mills per kWh.
My best estimate is that it cost PGE, from August 1 to Trojan's startup in January, over $25 million in added to replace Trojan generation. This includes the cos 4
estimated replacement cost of borrowed energy.
In fact, if it had not been for the cooperative attitude of other utilities who appreciated our dilemma and extended credit to us by lending us energy, which must of course te returned, we might have been unabic to meet the require-ments of our customers.
7.
The power supply situation on our systen over tha next few conths, even with Trojan in service, is quite serious.
Trojan is a major part of our system resources, necessary to meet our customers' needs during this time.
Setere wenther conditions have resulted in unusually heavy loads throughout the Pacific Northwest this winter.
In our ca se, the energy load on PCE's system in December 1978 was 16 percent greater than that in December 1977.
For the first week in January, our system's load requirements were 33 percent greater than those for the same week last year.
PGE's hourly system peak load to date of 2954 MW reached on January 8, 1979 not only exceeds the peak load pre-viously forecast for 1979, but even exceeds that forecast for calendar year 1981. Our share or Trojan--which is now operating at full capacity -supplied 25 percent of that peak load. Even with Trojan back in operation at full power, our present system requirements have been so great that we have continued to borrow and purchase energy from other utilities, as well as operate our system's high-cost facilities, to meet our system needs, The incremental cost of energy from some of these sources (approximately 30 mills per kWh) is 10 times that of the incremental cost of energy produced by Trojan.,
4 8.
The critical demand situation which we are noe experiencing on our system is exacerbated by two factors.
- First, because of the severe weather and high demand in the Pacific Northwest region, it is difficult to purchase sufficient energy produced in the region.
Second, as I noted above, we were able to enter into short-term arrange-nents with other utilities to " borrow" energy while Trojan was out of service. The last of these arrangements ends today. These arrangements provided for an exchange of energy "in kind".
That in PCE must pay back to the lending utility, often with interest, the quantities of energy which it borrowed when Trojan was out of service.
While some of the energy which was advanced to us does not have to be returned for several years, subste.ntial obligatione exist over the next few months.
For example, under one agreement we must return 200,000 Trai between mid-Janut ry and March 31.
We also have an obligation to return an additional 400,000 MWh by June 30.
9.
These demands on our system could be cased by an end to the exceptionally cold weather in the Pacific Northwest, which accounts for a portion. of our present high load.
In addition, an adequate supply of hydroelectric energy in the region would of fer us some relief.
However, the likelihood of this happening is not encouraging. The January 1 snow surveys--from which the first predictions of annual spring runoff are made--indicate the probable spring runoff on the Columbia River system at well below normal. There is no present indication that this situation will improve, and thus it appears that the regional output of hydroelectric energy may be below that normally available.
10.
If Trojan were to be unavailable to meet load over the next few months, PGE would again be forced to attempt to obtain replacement energy from other utilitics, and continue to operate its high-cost combustion turbines to meet its system.
c
demands.
Given the heavy current demand in the Pacific Northwest, and the uncertain availability of normal hydro-electric capacity in the spring, there is no assurance that PGE would be able to purchase and generate sufficient energy to replace Trojan if it were to be shut down.
Even if sufficient energy were available for purchase, its cost would be far in excess of the incremental cost of energy from Trojan.
11.
As noted above, it was difficult and expensive to meet our customers' needs while Trojan was out of service.
The demand and supply situatica which PGE now faces makes it clear that we need every resource available to us if wa a.e to continue to ccet our customers' needs and our obligations to other utilities.
Trojan is an integral part of those resources.
If Trojan does not remain in service, the customers of PCE will be severely penalized.
' Glen E. Bredemeier Vice President-Power Operations Portland General Electric Company Dated:
January 15, 1979 Subscribed and sworn to before ne this 15th day or January 979.
th'
_/l V
Notary Public Oregon Cohtm.'SS hf ll~ V~S2 4kk66.19B3
i n
1 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 2
BEFORE Tile ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING APPEAL E0ARD 3
4 In the Matter of
)
)
5 PORTLAND GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY,
)
)
(Control Building)
)
(Trojan Nuclear Plant)
)
7 U
AFFIDAVIT Of IIECTOR J. DUROCl[TA 9
I, Ucetor J. Durocher, being first duly sworn, depose and say:
10 1.
I am the Assistant Adn.,ist ator for Pouer Management of the Bonneville 11 Po cr Administration (IIPA).
In this position, I am responsible for administration 12 of BPA functions respecting the marketing, exchange, and deliverr of electric 13 power.
14 2.
BPA is a regional market,ing agency within the Federal Department of 15 Energy.
It markets energy produced by 30 Federal hydroelectric projects 16 constructed and operated by the Corps of Engineers and the Bureau of Reclamation 17 in the Pacific Northwest.
In addition, BPA has acquired rights to and markets 10 output from the City of Eugene, Oregon's 30-percent share of the capability of 19 the Trojan Nuclear Pl. int, the Hanford generating plant of the Washington Public 20 Power Supply System (WPPSS) and, when completed, will market output from all or 21 parts of three additional nuclear plants under construction by WPPSS.
22 3.
The Coalition for Safe Power's Petition for Stay Pending Appeal of the 23 December 21, 1978, Partial Initial Decision of the Atomic Safety and Licensing 24 Board asserts that a need for the power produced by the Trojan Nuclear Plant did 25 not and does not exist. This claim is false.
0 4.
The need for power produced by Trojan continues to the same degree as 27
- t. hat expressed in my affidavit of June 14, 197.8, which is attached to BPA's 20 1etition for Leave to Intervene, and my testinony that was made available to the rmm cmo183 AFFIDAVIT OF HECTOR J. DUROCHER 128 is sm)
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1 Atomic Safety and Licensing Board in the event that it desired to receive 2
evidence respecting the need for power. 1/
3 5.
With the advent of cold weather, the public's demand for power has 4
increased, not decreased.
Consumption of power marketed by BPA has hit 5
successively higher record levels on November 3 and 4, December 7, 8, 29, 30, and G
31, 1978, and January 1, 1979.
As is explained in more detail in the documents described in paragraph 4, 7
6.
O the follouing adverse results wil'1 occu-i' Trojan is not allowed to operate:
As a result of the shutdoen of Trojan in May 1970, BPA did not have O
a.
10 sufficient fira energy to satisfy its firm pcwer ccmmitmente.
It, therefore, 11 exercised its rights to use power produced by the Hanford Nuclear Plant, which 12 f t had previously sold, subject to such withdrawal by BPA, to its industcial 13 customers. Because the Decenber 21, 1978, Partial Initial Decision of the Atomic BPA has offered to return 14 Safety and Licensing Board allowed Trojan to restart, 15 the Hanford power to its industrial customers and expects that the industries 1G will accept this offer. However, if the Petition for Stay Pending Appcal is 17 granted, BPA will again have to withdraw its power.
10 b.
The Hanford power is core expensive than Trojan power and, if used 19 to replace Trojan power, it would represent an additional cost to BPA of $18-22 70 million over a year.
Withdra tal of Haaford power would compel BPA industrial customers 21 c.
22 to seek and, if availabic, acquire power from'other sources at costs higher than 23 the cost of power that could be supplied to them by Hanford. This additional 24 25 1/ This testimony appears as one of several documents sent with a Certificate 26 of Service by Ronald W. Johnson of Portland General Electric Company dated 27 October 3, 1978.
It was not additted into evidence.
28 AFFIDAVIT OF HECTOR J. DUROCHER roren encas3 Page Two nals nos
e
,s
~s.
1 demand for power from other sources would increase the likelihood of utility 2
shortages and higher consumer costs. To the extent that replacement power is 3
available, the extra cost to the industries is estimated to be 11-13 mills per 4
kilowatthour.
5 d.
If replacement power is not available for the industries, or if the G
industries are unable economically to pay the price necessary to acquire 7
additional energy, they will have to curtail production earlier than would 11 otherwise be necessary.
Such a c'urtailment will result in loss of jobs, loss 9
of production, and shutdown and startup costs.
10 11 12 af
,,., u / t 2, llECTOR 1. DUROCHER 13 Assistant Administrator for Power Management 14 Bonneville Power Administration 15 16 Subscribed and Sworn to before me this day of 2am.
, 1979.
17 n
19 Af Notary Public for Orego/n
,b -
[
20 My Commission expires
/
21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 AFFIDAVIT OF llECTOR J. DUROCIIE!.
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