ML18019A818
| ML18019A818 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Harris  |
| Issue date: | 05/14/1986 |
| From: | Zimmerman S CAROLINA POWER & LIGHT CO. |
| To: | Harold Denton Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| NLS-86-145, NUDOCS 8605200312 | |
| Download: ML18019A818 (289) | |
Text
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REQULAT XNFORNATION DISTRIBUTION BTEN (RIBS)
ACCESSION NBR: 8605200312 DOC. DATE: 86/05/14 NOTARIZED: NQ DOCVET 0 FACIL: 59-400 Bheav on Harl'35 Nucleal'DUJer Planti Un3t ii Cav olina 05000400 AUTH. NAME AUTHOR AFFILIATION ZINNERNANi S. R. Cav olina Poeer 5 Light Co.
RECIP. NANE RECIPIENT AFFILIATION DENTONi H. R. Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation. Div ectov (post 851125
~pl 5
SUBJECT:
Forwards addi info re input into final dv af t Tech Specs for facility. Info 0 justification provided for each item.
Marked-up Tech Specs encl.
DXSTRIBUTION CODE: B001D COPXES RECEIVED LTR ENCL SIZE TITLE: Licensing Submittal: PSAR/FBAR Amdts 8c elated Cov'v espondence NOTES: App l ication fov pev mi t v enewal f i l ed. 05000400 RECIPIENT COPIES RECXPXENT COP XES XD CODE/NANE LTTR ENCL ID CODE/NAl'fE LTTR ENCL PWR-A ADTS 1 1 PWR-A EB i.
PWR-A EICSB 2 2 PWR-A FOB 1 PWR-A PD2 LA 1 1 PWR-A PD2 PD BUCNLEY. B 01 2 2 PWR-A PBB 1 PWR-A RSB 1 1 INTERNAL. ADN/LFNB, 1 0 ELD/HDB1 0 XE FILE 1 IE/DEPER/EPB 36 1 XE/DGAVT/OAB 21 1 1 NRR BWR ADTS 0 NRR PWR-A'DTB 1 0 NRR PWR-B ADTS 0 NRR ROE>l). L 1 1 T/HFIB 1 NRR/DHFT/rtTB 1 1 04 RCN2 3 3 RN/DDANI/NXB 1 0 EXTERNAL: 24X 1 BNL(ANDTS ONLY) 1 1 DNB/DSS (Al'IDTS) 1 LPDR 03 1 NRC PDR 02 1 1 NBIC 05 1 1 PNL CRUELER 1 TOTAL NUl'1BER OF COPXES REQUIRED LTTR 34 ENCL 28
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$ ÃQP Carolina Power & Light Company SERIAL: NLS-86-105 MAY 14 tgsg Mr. Harold R. Denton, Director Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555 SHEARON HARRIS NUCLEAR POWER PLANT UNIT NO. 1 DOCKET NO.50-000 TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS
Dear Mr. Denton:
Carolina Power k Light Company (CPRL) submits additional information for input into the Final Draft Technical Specifications (TS) for the Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant. Attachment 1 provides the information as well as justification for each item.
Attachment 2 provides a marked-up copy of the affected TS pages.
The attachments include information for the lengthy tables in the TS that CPRL had previously proposed to control procedurally and administratively. CPRL will continue to participate in industry TS improvement programs with the objective of removing these lengthy tables.
If you have any questions, please contact Mr. Gregg A. Sinders at (919) 836-8168.
Yours very t y, S. R. Ztmmerman Manager Nuclear Licensing Section GAS/pgp (3780GAS)
Attachments cc: Mr. B. C. Buckley (NRC) Mr. Wells Eddleman Mr. R. A. Benedict (NRC) Mr. 3ohn D. Runkle Mr. G. F. Maxwell (NRC-SHNPP) Dr. Richard D. Wilson Dr. 3. Nelson Grace (NRC-RII) Mr. G. O. Bright (ASLB)
Mr. Travis Payne (KUDZU) Dr. 3. H. Carpenter (ASLB)
Mr. Daniel F. Read (CHANGE/ELP) Mr. 3. L. Kelley (ASLB)
Wake County Public Library 8b08200 >g2 8boppqpp 080 PQR 8 ~ F90OC5 411 Fayettevilte Street o P. O. Box 1551 ~ Raleigh. N. C. 27602
/
860540031 ClP'Bc,X Cloxnxnenta 2 SLAM'T X Px-os and Reviewer Techxucal Sgecif ications
. Record Number: 508 Comment Type: ERROR LCO Number: 3.01.01.03 Page Number: 3/4 1-4 Section Number: ACTION A.1 Comment; CHANGE "0 pcm/F" TO "restore the MTC to within the above 1imits"'.
Basis THIS CHANGE WAS INADVERTENTLY NOT INCLUDBD WHEN THE OTHER CHANGES WERE MADE TO THIS SPECIFICATION IN AN EARLIER REVISION.
GHNT P' x nnX a.net Ram9.ew Tea&n9.mal S ~a mid'xca.t,xnan a Record Number: 500 Comment Type: IMPROVEMENT LCO Number: 3.06.03 Page Number: 3/4 6-14,15,16 Section Number: TABLE 3.6-1 Comment:
INSERT TABLE 3.6-1 Basis THIS CHANGE IS MADE TO INCORPORATE THE CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVE LIST INTO THE TECH SPECS.
THIS TABLE DIFFERS FROM FSAR TABLE 6.2.4-1 IN THAT IT LISTS ONLY COMTAXNMENT ISOLATION VALVES AS INDICATED IN THE SECOND TO LAST COLUMN IN THE FSAR TABLE. SOME VALVE CLOSURE TXMES HAVE BEEN CHANGED FROM THE CURRENT FSAR VALUES. THXS XS BASED ON THE FACT THAT THE VALVES WERE NOT ASSUMED TO BE CLOSED FOR 60 SECONDS (AS PERMITTED BY THE SRP).
FORTY-FIVE (45) SECONDS WAS CHOSEN AS A CONSERVATIVE LIMIT TO ESTABLISH WITHXN THE ANALYSIS ASSUMPTIONS. A CHANGE TO THE FSAR IS IN PREPARATION TO REFLECT THE ANALYSIS VALUES. IN ADDITION, SOME VALVES, PARTICULARY IN THE SI AND CONTAINMENT SPRAY SYSTEMS, WHICH SHOW A RESPONSE TIME IN THE FSAR TABLE, ARE SHOWN WITH ISOLATION TIMES OF "NA" IN THE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION TABLE. THIS IS DUE TO THE. FACT THAT THESE VALVE DO NOT "ISOLATE", BUT OPEN UPON RECEIPT OF AN ACCIDENT SIGNAL. THE REMAINING DESCREPANCIES ARE THE RESULT OF CHANGES TO THE FSAR TABLE WHICH WILL BE FORMALLY DOCUMENTED IN AN UPCOMING LETTER.
s CP &.L Comments HNPP Proof and Review Technical Specifications Ri:.<..ovd Number: 501 Comme:: l. Type: IMPROVE!'IFX'f LCO Numbo> ~: .'>. 0 c ~ 10. 02 Pa>>i. Number: 3 1
il 7 "30, 31, 3" S<. ol ion Number': TABLE 3. 7-3 C vmm>'.u. t INSFRT '1'ABLE 3. 7 "3 Bas'HIS CHANGE IS MADE TO THE PREACT10N AND i~1ULT ICYCLE SPRINKLER TABLE INTO THE TECH SPECS.
THE ADDITION OF THE FOOTNOTE TO THE TABLE IS NECESSITATED BY THE FACT THAT THESE SPRINKLERS ARE ACTUATED BY THE INSTRUi4ENTATION OF TABLE 3. 3-.1 I.
SINCE THE INSTRUMENTATION IS NOT REQUIRED TO BF.
OPERABLE DURING THE TYPE A TESTS, THE SPRINKLERS SHOULD NOT BE.
CP S.L Coxnxnents HNPP Proof and Review Technical Specifications 1(<<..oi <3 Number: 502 Comm<..ut. Tyu<': I:.'41F'RO'CEMENT L(:0 Xumb<::v: 3. 0 ( . '.0. 03 Pa p'<= X umb <.. <': 3/4 7 "33,:?-), 3;i S<<. t i onXumh<": TABLE 3. 1-4 Commcu1 I.<SEHT TA,BI E 3. 7-4 BGS 1S THIS CHANGE IS TO INCORPORATE TABLE 3.7-4 ON FIRE HOSE STATIONS INTO THE TECH SPECS.
CPRL Coxaxnenta HNPP Proof and Review Technical Specifications f{eeovd Numbe;: 503 Commen t Type . IMPROVEMENT L('0 Xumi)~ <':,'(. 0! . 04. 01 Page Number: 3 '-I A- 17 k i '.>
Section Numbe.': TABLE 3. 8-I Commen t INSERT TABLE 3. 8-1 Bas:s THIS CHANGE IS MADF. TO INCORPORATE TABl.E 3.8-1 ON THE CONTAINMENT PENETRATION CONDUCTOR OVERCURREXT PROTF(:T IVF, DFVTCES INTO THF. 'l'ECH SPECS.
CPRL Coxnmenta HNP P P r oof an d Reviewer Tec h nical Specif ications Heooi d Numbe: ')04 Comment Type: [MPROVEMEXT LCO Xumj>ec: 3. 08. 04. 0" Pago Number': .'3i' 8 -"0 F. '
Sl!oi'on iXumbet': TABLE 3 8~
Comment:
I'ASEHT TABLF. 3.8-2 Basis T f1 IS CH KbIGE IS MADE TO INCORPORATE TABLE 3. 8 -2 O.'J MOTOR OPERATED VALVE TERMAL OVERLOAD PROTECTION
[770 THE TECH SPECS.
I k CP8c.L Coraments HNPP Proof and Review Technical Specifications Record Number: "05 Comment Type: I~!PROVEMENT
!.CO Number: 3. OU. 03. Ol Pa j~e Number: 3/ l 8-I' Sec t on Number:
~
- 3. 8. 3. I. g S: h Commen t ITE~! g INSERT T!IE WORDS 'and chargers l A-SA or LB-SA" AFTER TffE WORDS "Emerpency Bat'tery IA-SA".
ITEM h INSERT THE WORDS "and chargers IA-SB ocf IB-SB" AT THE END OF THE ITEN.
Basis Tf! IS CHANGE IS MADE FOR CONSISTENCY WITH SPEC I!'ICATION 3. 8 ~ 3. '-'
a CPKL Cornxnents HAPP Pr oof and Review Technical Specifications Record Number: 506 Comment Type: IMPROVEMENT LCO Number: 6.02.02 Page Number: *-1 Section Number: 6 '.2 '
Comment:
CHANGE THE SECOND SENTENCE TO READ A S FOLLOWS:
The Fire Brigade shall not include any members o$ the minimum shiest crew necessary %or the safe shutdown o$ the unit as specified in Table 6.2-1 nor any personnel required %or any other essential
$ unctions during a fire emergency; and Basis THIS CHANGE IS MADE TO CLARIFY THE NECESSARY PERSONNEL REQUIRED FOR SAFE SHUTDOWN AS DEFINED ELSEWHERE IN THE TECH SPECS.
1 g r
CPBcL Comxaents SHNPP Proof and Review Technical Specifications Record Number: 509 Comment Type: IMPROVEMENT LCO Number: 5.03.01 Page Number: 5-6 Section Number: 5.3.1 Comment:
DELETE THB FOLLOWING WORDING FROM THB SECTION:
"...and contains a maximum total weight of 1776 grams uranium. The initial core loading shall have a maximum enrichment of 3.5 weight percent U 235."
ALSO DELETE "...and shall have a maximum enrichment of 3.9 weight percent U 235."
Basis THE SPECIFIC VALUES IN THIS PARAGRAPH ARE NOT NBEDBD AND COULD RESULT IN UNECESSARY ADMINISTRATIVE WORKLOADS FOR BOTH CP&L AND NRC PERSONNEL TO PROCESS MINOR CHANGES. THE VALUE OF THB TOTAL GRAMS OF URANXUM PER FUEL ROD IS NOT USED IN ANY SAFETY ANALYSIS AND CAN BB AFFECTED BY MINOR CHANGES IN THE MANUFACTURXNG PROCESS. THE INCLUSION OF THE MAXIMUM ENRICHMENTS IS ALSO NOT NECESSARY SINCE THB SPECIFIC ENRICHMENTS TO BE PRESENT XN ANY FUEL CYCLE ARE EVALUATED FOR THAT CYCLE. THIS EVALUATION MUST ENSURE THAT ALL SAFETY CRITERIA ARE MET REGARDLESS OF SPECIFIC ENRICHMENT VALUES. DROPPING THESE VALUES FROM SECTION 5 WILL HAVE NO ADVERSE IMPACT ON PLANT SAFBTY OR REGULATORY CONCERNS AND WILL ELIMINATE UNNECESSARY TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION CHANGES'
C'P8r L Coxnxnents HNPP Proof and Review Technical Specifications Record Number: 507 Comment Type: IMPROVEMENT LCO Number: 5. 06. 03 Page Number: 5-7 Secti an Number: 5. 6. 3 Camment:
LINE, 2 DELETE THE WORDS "IN FIXED RACKS".
BBsi 8 THIS CHANGE IS PROPOSED TO CLARIFY THE DESCRIPTION OF THE TYPE OF RACKS USED AT SHNPP. THE RACKS USED ARE FREE STANDING AND ARE NOT "FIXED" TO THE POOL FLOOR OR WALLS (SEE FSAR SECTION 9. i)
(4"
SHNPP RFVlS!OX REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS i@1'86 PRQGI'NQ Ill.RB'I t,'QP'(
MODERATOR TEMPERATURE COEFFICIEHT LIMITING COHO ITION FOR OPERATION
- b. Less negative than -"42 pcm/'F for the all rods withdrawn, end of cycle life (EOL), RATED THERMAL POWER condition.
APPLICASILITY: Specification 3. 1. 1.3a.'- MODES 1 and 2" only"".
Specification 3. 1. 1.3b. - MODES 1, 2, and 3 only"".
ACTEQH:
- a. With the MTC more positive than the limit of Specification 3.1.1.3a.
above, operation in MODES 1 and 2 may proceed provided:
3.. Control rod withdrawal limits are established and maintained sufficient to restore the MTC to Hs~pos+tHv~Ma&~~
~,~,~< naos uni~s within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> or be in HOT STANDSY within %he next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />.
These withdrawal limits shall be in addition to the insertion limits of Specification 3.1.3.6;
- 2. The control rods are maintained within the withdrawal limits established above until a subsequent calculation verifies that the MTC has been restored 'to within its limit for the all rods withdrawn condition; and
- 3. A Special Report is prepared and submitted to the Commission, pursuant to Specification 6. 9. 2, within 10 days, describing the value of the measured MTC, the interim control rod withdrawal limni limits, and the predicted average core burnup necessary for restoring the positive MTC to within its limit for the all rods withdrawn condition.
- b. With the MTC more negative than the limit of Specification 3.1.1.3b.
above, be in HOT SHUTDOWN within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />.
THls Gf+fgg cP)L ~~R l <vie mp %o 707ii PATED i HER LAL POu i=/.
or V-23-8(
her~ g, QS- gg-pig ai 8 c ~ rc ~ii %re t
+4 i- p~i..~+ +~ +p. /imp i c ~ l 00 4 RA~+i ~HE~ q g p~ ~ ~ p "With k eff greater than or equal to 1.
""See Special Test Exceptions Specification 3. 10.3.
SHEARON HARRIS - UNIT,l 3/4 1-4
I <00~ ~'m ~atIEIIt t;~>~
CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS P&itglC)hJ 3/4. 6. 3 CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES mv 586 LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.6.3 The containment isolation valves specified in Table 3.6-1 shall be OPERABLE with isolation times as shown in Table 3.6-1.
APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4.
ACTION:
With one or more of the containment isolation valve(s) specified in Table 3.6-1 inoperable, maintain at least one isolation valve OPERABLE in each affected penetration that is opeq~and:.'"'
- a. Restore the inoperable valve(s} to OPERABLE status within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />, or
- b. Isolate each affected penetration within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> by use of at least one deactivated automatic valve secured in the isolation position, or
- c. Isolate each affected penetration within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> by use of at least one closed manual valve or blind flange, or
- d. Be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in COLO SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />.
SURVEILLANCE RE UIREMENT5 4.6.3.1 The isolation valves specified in Table 3.6-1 shall be demonstrated OPERABLE prior to returning the valve to service after maintenance, repair or replacement work is performed on the valve or its associated actuator, control or power circuit by performance of a cycling test, and verification of isola-tion time.
Cg ARE gCAVCRT SHEARON HARRIS - UNIT 1 '/4 6" 14
SHNPP RPlls3C) 8 M{lkfhf]3 3Blll lloI"l CONTAINMEHT SYSTEMS ~e $ 86 CONTAINMEHT ISOLATION VALVES SURVEILLANCE RE UIREMEHTS Continued 4.6.3.2 Each isolation valve specified in Table 3.6-1 shall be demonstrated OPERABLE during the COLO SHUTDOWN or REFUELING MOOE at least once per 18 months by:
~t
- a. Verifying that on a Phase "A" Isolation test signal, each Phase "A" isolation valve actuates to its isolation position; b.
V t<<
Verifying that on a Phase "8" Isolation test signal, each Phase "8" isolation valve actuates to its isolation position; and i ig actuates to its isolation position i
YFplMc8nod
~
signal, each normaliaad preentry purge makeup and exhausthvalve c g ~'IAl~m4 al~ &Pcs +w V.elie 5 4.6.3.3 The isolation time of each power-operated or automatic valve of Table 3.6-1 shall be determined to be within its limit when tested pursuant to Specification 4.0.5'.
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'SH RPP P~! tent&
TABLE 3.6-1 ON $ 86 CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES VALVE NO. MAXIMUM NETRATION CP&L ISOLATION APPLICABLE NO. (EBASCO) FUNCTION TIME (SEC) NOTES
- 1. PHASE A ISOLATION 1MS-25 MAIN STM LOOP A PRIMARY 45 1, 3)7 (MS-V122) SAMPLING PANEL 1MS-27 MAIN STM LOOP B PRIMARY 45 1, 3)7 (Ms-124) SAMPLING PANEL 1MS-29 MAIN STM LOOP C PRIMARY 1, 3)7 (MS-126) SAMPLING PANEL 1CS-7 CVCS NORMAL LTDN ISOL (0 (CS-V511) 1CS-8 CVCS NORMAL LTDN ISOL lo (Cs-V512) 1CS-9 CVCS NORMAL LTDN ISOL lo (CS-V513) 1CS-11 CVCS NORMAL LTDN ISOL lo (CS-V518) j 12 1CS-470 CVCS SEAL WTR RETURN & EXCESS NA (CS~V516) LTDN 12 1CS-472 CVCS SEAL WTR RETURN & EXCESS (Cs-V517) LTDN NA'3 1SP-209 GAS RETURN FROM P.A.S.S.
(SP-V4O8) SKID g2 33 1SP-208 GAS RETURN FROM P.A.S.S. SKID g2 4 (SP-V4O9) 37 1CC-176 CCW TO RCDT & EXCESS LTDN IO 1, 2 (CC-V172) HEAT EXCH'CW 38 1CC-202 FROM RCDT & EXCESS LTDN IO 1, 2 (CC-V182) HEAT EXCH'EACTOR 40 1RC-161 MAKEUP WTR TO PRT 45 (RC-D525) lED-121 RCDT PUMP DISCH. lO (WL-L600)
TABLE3"6-1 (PLP)
C TABLE 3.6-1 (Cont'd) SHNPP g? W/lPj~s,i CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES MAY 1986 VALVE NO. MAXIMUM NETRATION CP&L ISOLATION APPLICABLE NO. (EBASCO) FUNCTION TIME (SEC) NOTES 42 1ED-125 RCDT PUMP DISCH (WL-D650) 74 1ED-94 CTMT SUMP PUMP DISCH (MD-V36) 74 1ED-95 CTMT SUMP PUMP DISCH 45 (MD-V77) 76A 1SI-179 ACCUMULATOR FILL FROM RWST lO 3, 4 (SI-V554) 76B 1SI-263 ACCUMULATOR TO RWST 3, 4 (SI-V555) 76B 1SI-264 ACCUMULATOR TO RWST lo 3, 4 (SI-V550) 77A 1SI-287 N2 TO ACCUMULATORS IO 3, 4 (SI-V530) 77B 1RC-141 PRT N2 CONNECTION (RC-D528) j 77B 1RC-144 PRT N2 CONNECTION (RC-D529) 77C lED-164 RCDT H 2
SUPPLY lo
'(WG-D590) 77C 1ED-161 RCTD H SUPPLY 2
(WG-D291) 78A 1SP-948 RCS SAMPLE 45 (SP-V111) 78A 1SP-949 RCS SAMPLE 45 (SP-V23) 78B 1SP-40 PRESSURIZER LIQ SAMPLE 45 (SP-V11)
TABLE3-6-1 (PLP)
SHNVP TABLE 3.6-1 (Cont'd) Pwlteir ~r CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES hfAY >986 VALVE NO. MAXIMUM ENETRATXON CPGL ISOLATION APPLICABLE NO. (EBASCO) FUNCTION TIME (SEC) NOTES 78B 1SP-41 PRESSURIZER LIQ SAMPLE 45 (SP-V12) .
78C 1SP-59 PRESSURIZER STEAM SAMPLE (SP-Vl) 78C 1SP-60 PRESSURXZER STEAM SAMPLE 45 (SP-V2) 78D 1SP-78 ACCUMULATOR SAMPLE 45 (SP-V113) 1SP-81 ACCUMULATOR SAMPLE 45 (SP-V114) 78D 1SP-84 ACCUMULATOR SAMPLE 45 (SP-V115) 78D 1SP-85 ACCUMULATOR SAMPLE 45 (SP-V116) vw 79 1FP-35 FIRE ATER ST PXPE SUPPL 3f (FP-V 4) 80 1IA-216 INSTRUMENT AIR SUPPLY 45 NA (IA-V192')
88- 1SP-201 LIQUID SAMPLE RETURN FROM (SP-V406) PASS SKID gl 88 1SP-200 LIQUID SAMPLE RETURN FROM (SP-V407) PASS SKID 8'1 91 1SW-240 SERVICE WATER FROM NNS FAN 45 (SW-B89) COILS 91 1SW-242 SERVICE WATER FROM NNS FAN (SW-B90) COILS 92 1SW-231 SERVICE WATER TO NNS FAN 45 (SW-B88) COILS 105 1FP-347 FXRE WATER SPRINKLER SUPPLY 45 (FP- B l .-)
TABLE3-6-1 (PLP)
SHNPP TABLE 3.6-1 (Cont'd) A~/lc;!~4i CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES MAY 1986 VALVE NO. MAXIMUM ENETRATION CP&L ISOLATION APPLICABLE NO. (EBASCO) FUNCTION TIMa (SaC) eorEs 108 1AF-155 AUX. F.W TO S/G A 10 1, 3,7 (AF-V162) (HYDRAZINE) 108 1AF-153 AUX. F.W. TO S/G A (AMMONIA) 10 1~ 3i7 (AF-V163) 109 1AF-159 AUX. F.W TO S/G B 10 1, 3I7 (AF-V164) (HYDRAZINE) 109 lAF-157 AUX F.W TO S/G B (AMMONIA) 10 1, 3,7 (AF-V165) 110 1AF-163 AUX. F.W. TO S/G C 10 1, Big (AF-V166) (HYDRAZINE) 110 'AF-161, AUX. F.W. TO S/G C (AMMONIA) 10 1, 3,7 (AF-V167) 73A 1SP-12 RAD MONITOR & H2 ANALYZER (SP-V300),
1SP-915 RAD MONITOR & Hg ANALYZER 45 j2 (SP-V348) 1'3B 1SP-9't I RAD MONITOR & H2 ANALYZER 45 (SP-V301) 73B 1SP"917 RAD MONITOR & H2 ANALYZER (SP"V349) 86A 1SP-42 HYDROGEN ANALYZER 45 3, 4 (SP-V308) 86A 1SP-919 HYDROGEN ANALYZER 45 3, 4 (SP-V314) 86B 1SP-62 HYDROGEN ANALYZER 3, 4 (SP-V309) 86B 1SP-56 HYDROGEN ANALYZER 45 3, 4 (SP"V315)
TABLE3-6-1 (PLP)
SHNPp R&(jp tn~i TABLE 3.6-1 (Cont'd)
MAY >g86 CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES VALVE NO. MAXIMUM ENETRATION CP&L ISOLATION APPLICABLE NO. (EBASCO) FUNCTION TIME (SEC) Aov'Gs
- 2. PHASE B ISOLATION 35 1CC-208 CCW TO RCP IO NA (CC-V170) 36 1CC-297 CCW FROM RCP NA (CC-V184) 36 1CC-299 CCW FROM RCP NA (CC-V183) 39 1CC-249 CCW FROM RCP THERMAL BARRIERS /O NA (CC-V191) 39 1CC-251 CCW FROM RCP THERMAL BARRIERS JO NA (CC-V190)
- 3. SAFETY INJECTION ACTUATION
'7 1CS-238 (CS-V610) 1SI-3 CVCS NORMAL CHARGING SI TO H GH H COLD LEG NA (SI-V5O5) 17 1 -4 S 0 HIGH HEAD COLD L NA (SI- O6) 51 1BD-11 S/G A BLO OWN 45 1, 3)'7 (BD-V11) 1BD-30 S/G B BLOWDOWN 45 1, 3i7 (BD-V15) 53 ~
1BD-49 S/G C BLOWDOWN 45 1, 3)7 (BD-V19) 54 1SP-217 ,S/G A SAMPLE 45 1, 3i7 (SP-V120) 55 1SP-222 S/G B SAMPLE 11 3 7 (SP-V121) 1SP-227 S/G C SAMPLE 45 1, 3,7 (SP-V122)
TABLE3-6-1 (PLP)
SHNPP P Phl t)~hi TABLE 3.6-1 (Cont'd)
MAY 1986 CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES VALVE NO. MAXIMUM PENETRATION CP&L ISOLATION APPLICABLE NO. (EBASCO) FUNCTION TIME (SEC) NOT'ES
57 CP-B3 CONTAINMENT ATMOSPHERE PURGE 15 3, 6 (CP-B3) MAKEUP (42")
CP-B4 CONTAINMENT ATMOSPHERE PURGE 15 3, 6 (CP-B4) MAKEUP (42")
57 CP-B2 CONTAINMENT ATMOSPHERE PURGE 3.5 (CP-B2) & MAKEUP (8")
58 CP-B7 CONTAINMENT ATMOSPHERE PURGE 15 3, 6 (CP-B7) EXHAUST (42")
58 CP-B5 CONTAINMENT ATMOSPHERE PURGE 3.5
- (CP-B5)
EXHAUST (8")
CONTAINMENT ATMOSPHERE PURGE EXHAUST (42")
15 3, 6 58 CP-B6 CONTAINMENT ATMOSPHERE PURGE 3.5 (CP-B6) EXHAUST (8")
59 CB-B1 CONTAINMENT VACUUM RELIEF (CB-B1) 98 CB-B2 CONTAINMENT VACUUM RELIEF (CB-B2)
- 5. CONTAINMENT SPRAY ACTUATION 23 1CT-50 CONTAINMENT SPRAY fVA (CT-V21) 24 1CT-88 CONTAINMENT SPRAY (CT-V43)
TABLE3-6-1 (PLP)
SHNpp pgQtg)my~
TABLE 3.6-1 (Cont'd)
MAY 1986 CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES VALVE NO. MAX1MUM PENETRATION CPGL ISOLATION APPLICABLE NO. (EBASCO) FUNCTION TIME (SEC) NOTES
- 6. MAIN STEAM LINE ISOLATION 1MS-80 MSIV (S/G A) 1, 5 (MS-V1) 1MS-81 MSIV BYPASS 10 1,3,4)7 (MS-F1) pRblP TD Qp~~E p $ Gg 1MS-231 MS %0=8eNB; 45 1, 3)7 (MS-V59) 1MS-82 MSIV (S/G B) 1, 5 (MS-V2) 1MS-83 MSIV BYPASS 10 1, 3, 4,7 (MS-F2) 1MS-266 MS p~a x 4
$ 8=68ÃB
~ ~H'O CNS G~
45 1, 3)7 (MS-V60) 1MS-84 MSIV (S/G C)
(MS-V3) 1MS-85 MSIV BYPASS 10 1$ 3p 4 7 (MS-F3) 1MS-301 MS QQQZH
%MHBBB
~ Q,O~DChl SER 45 1, 3)7 (MS-V61)
(FW-V26) 1FW-307 FEEDWATER LOOP A BYPASS VALVE [O 1, 3)7 (FW-V123) 1FW-165 FEEDWATER LOOP A (HYDRAZINE) 45 .1, 3)7 (FW-V89)
TABLE3-6-1 (PLP)
8HNPP P&llel~e i TABLE 3.6-1 (Cont'd)
CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES MAY 1986 0 VALVE NO. MAXIMUM PENETRATION CP&L ISOLATION APPLICABLE NO. (EBASCO) FUNCTION TIME (SEC) NOTES 1FW-163 FEEDWATER LOOP A (AMMONIA) 1, 3)7 (Fw-V90) 1FW-277 FEEDWATER LOOP B 1, 3)7 (Fw-V27) 1FW-319 FEEDWATER LOOP B BYPASS VALVE Io 1, 3,7 (FW-V124) 1FW-279 FEEDWATER LOOP B (AMMONIA) 45 1, 3)7 (Fw-V91) 1FW-281 FEEDWATER LOOP B (HYDRAZINE) 1, 3)7 (FW-V92) 1FW-217 FEEDWATER LOOP C 1, 3)7 (Fw-vzs) 1FW-313 FEEDWATER LOOP C BYPASS VALVE lO 1, 3)7 (FW-V1Z5) 1FW-223 FEEDWATER LOOP C (AMMONIA) 45 1, 3)7 (FW-V93) 1FW-221 FEEDWATER LOOP C (HYDRAZINE) 45 1, 3)7 (FW-V94) 108
'AF-64 AUXILIARYFEEDWATER A 10 1, 3)7 (AF-V156) PREHEATER BYPASS 109 1AF-102 AUXILIARYFEEDWATER B 10 1, 3)7
('AF-V157) PREHEATER BYPASS 110 1AF-81 ~ AUXILIARY FEEDWATER C 10 1, 3)7 (AF-V158) PREHEATER BYPASS
- 8. REMOTE MANUAL VALVES 1MS-58 S/G PORV (S/G A) NA 1, y,g,-l (MS-P18) 2 1MS-60 S/G PORV (S/G B) . NA 1, 3,9,7 (MS-P19) 1MS-62 S/G PORV (S/G C) NA 1 p 3) 'l ) I (MS-P20)
TABLE3-6-1 (PLP)
SHNPP P Ml) Q) &bl TABLE 3.6-1 (Cont'd)
MAY $ 986 CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES VALVE NO. MAXIMUM PENETRATION CP&L ISOLATION APPLICABLE NO. (EBASCO) FUNCTION TIME (SEC) NOTES 1CS-341 CVCS SEAL WATER TO RCP A NA (CS-V522) 10 1CS-382 CVCS SEAL WATER TO RCP B NA (CS-V523) 1CS-423 CVCS SEAL WATER TO RCP C NA (CS-V524) 15 1RH-1 RHR PUMP SUCTION (TRAIN A) NA 1, (1RH-V502) 4'A 15 1RH-2 RHR PUMP SUCTION (TRAIN A) 1 t 4 (1RH-V503) 1 16 1RH-39 RHR PUMP SUCTION (TRAIN B) NA 1, 4 (1RH-V500) 16 1RH-40 RHR PUMP SUCTION (TRAIN B) NA 1; 4 (1RH-V501) 1SI-359 (SI-V587)
SI LOW HEAD TO HOT LEG NA 20 1SI-107 SI HIGH HEAD TO HOT LEG NA (SI-v5oo) 21 1SI-86 SI HIGH HSINGTO HOT LEG HEAD NA (SI-V501) 22 1SI-52 SI HIGH HEAD TO COLD LEG NA (SI-V502)
I 5$ -'3 t.fggg f-IEA'0 CoLP LG(j ~R (5g- vivos)
( ss -'I wo IIEbo Covg L+~
(Sg- V50la)
(g5- ~ a sMh !3m (g s-VS) O<P'n.>
9)~'@A <<5'%At ~g.B IW t=
'I R)7 I r 5-72 C. ~< P~) ~
V TABLE3-6-1 (PLP)
TABLE 3.6-1 (Cont'd) SHNPP P~)gt+Kl CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES MAY 1986 4
VALVE NO. MAXIMUM ENETRATION CPRL ISOLATION APPLICABLE NO. (EBASCO) FUNCTION TIME (SEC) NOTES 63 CM-B5 H2 PURGE EXHAUST (cM-a5)
- 9. MANUAL VALVES 17 1SI-43 SI-HIGH HEAD TO COLD LEGS NA 1, 4 (sx- vac) 34 U.v.-6 ILRT ROTOMETER (LOCKED NA 3 4 (LT-V2) CLOSED)-
41 1SA-80 SERVICE AIR (LOCKED CLOSED) NA 3,4 (SA-V14) 42 1ED-119 RCDT PUMP DISCH BYPASS NA 3 4 (wr.-o~J) (LOCKED CLOSED) 44 1SP-145 REFUELING CAVITY CLEANUP NA 3 4
(LOCKED CLOSED)
REFUELING CAVITY CLEANUP (LOCKED CLOSED)
A NA 3,4 45 1SF-118 REFUELING CAVITY CLEANUP NA ( ~i 4 (SP-D25) (LOCKED- CLOSED) 45 1SP-119 REPUELING CAVITY CLEANUP 3)4, (SP-D26) (LOCKED CLOSED)
'hL 61 CM-B6 H PURGE MAKEUP (LOCKED (GM-B6). C OEED) f t= P. f55 f-gg~ us~ SraPPOAe8'u A'< Y 3,9 (Fp vs~)
TABLE3-6-1 (PLP)
~l TABLE 3 '-1 (Cont'd) SHRPP P+\gig)~hl CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES MAY 1986 VALVE NO. MAXIMUM PENETRATION CP&L ISOLATION APPLICABLE NO. (EBASCO) FUNCTION TIME (SEC) NOTES 62 l L7- 10 ILRT (LOCKED CLOSED) NA 34 (LT-V4) 63 CM-B4 H2 PURGE EXHAUST (LOCKED NA (CM-B4) CLOSED) 90 1DW-63 DEMIN WATER SUPPLY (LOCKED NA 3q 4 (DW-V120) CLOSED) 96 ILRT (LOCKED CLOSED) NA 3) 4 (LT-Vl) lAF-174 WET LAY-UP TO STM GEN A AF NA l)3) 7
(,AF-V189) HEADER 109 1AF-173 WET LAY-UP TO STM GEN. B AF NA l,3,7
( AF-V190) HEADER 110 1AF-175 WET LAY-UP TO STM GEN. C AF NA l)3, 7 (1 AF-V191) HEADER 10 CHECK VALVES 8 1CS-477 CVCS NORMAL CHARGING NA NA (CS-V515) 12 1CS"471 CVCS SEAL WATER RETURN & NA NA'A (CS"V67) EXCESS LETDOWN 2'3 1CT-53 CONTAINMENT SPRAY TRAIN A NA (CT-V27)
,24 1CT-91 CONTAINMENT SPRAY TRAIN B NA NA (CT-V51)
TABLE3-6-1 (PLP)
3 HNP TABLE 3.6-1 (Cont'd) <!
F'w/tg,lc CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES MINNY 1986 VALVE NO. MAXIMUM NETRATION CPSL ISOLATION APPLICABLE NO. (EBASCO) FUNCTION TIME (SEC) NOTES 35 'cc-211 CCW TO RCP NA NA (CC-V171) 36 lcc-298 CCW FROM RCP NA NA (CC-V51) 39 lcc"250 CCW FROM RCP THERMAL BARRIER NA NA (CC-V50) 40 1RC-164 DEMIN WATER TO PRT NA NA (Rc-V525) 41 1SA-82 SERVICE AIR NA NA (SA-V15 )
59 CB-Vl CONTAINMENT VACUUM RELIEF NA NA (CB-Vl)
CM-Vl H2 PURGE MAKEUP NA NA (CM-Vl) 1SI-182 ACCUMULATORY FILL FROM RWST NA NA (SI-V150) 77A 1SI-290 N2 TO ACCUMULATORS NA NA
'Sr-V188) 79 1PP-357 FIRE WATER STANDPIPE SUPPLY NA NA (FP-V48) 80 "
1AI-220 INSTRUMENT AIR SUPPLY NA NA (1A-V33) 90 1DW-65 DEMIN WATER SUPPLY NA NA (DW-V121) 92 1SW-233 SERVICE WATER TO NNS PAN NA ~ NA (SW-V142) COILS 94A EXCESS FLOW CHECK VALVE NA (B) FOR CTMT VACUUM RELIEF SENSING 94B EXCESS PLOW CHECK VALVE NA (B) FOR CTMT VACUUM RELIEF SENSING TABLE3-6-1 (PLP)
~l TABLE 3.6-1 (Cont'd) SHNPP
@PAL/fc;)m~i CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES MAY $ 986 VALVE NO. MAXIMUM ENETRATION CP&L ISOLATION APPLICABLE NO. (EBASCO) FUNCTION TIME (SEC) NOTES 94C EXCESS FLOW CHECK VALVE NA (B) FOR CTMT VACUUM RELIEF SENSING 95A EXCESS FLOW CHECK VALVE NA (B) FOR CTMT VACUUM RELIEF SENSING 95B EXCESS FLOW CHECK VALVE NA (B) FOR CTMT VACUUM RELIEF SENSING 98 CB-V2 CONTAINMENT VACUUM RELIEF NA NA (CB-V2) 105 1FP-349 FIRE WATER SPRINKLER SUPPLY NA NA (FP-V46)
~ I TABLE3-6-1 (PLP) 3.6-1 (Cont'd)
SHNF P TABLE 8 <Vl l>w)
MAY i986
) Not subject to Type C leakage tests (2) This valve is not classified as a Containment isolation Valve because fission product release to the environment is prevented by both the closed system inside containment and the system pressure of 45 psig or more following a LOCA.
This valve is included in this table because it receives a Phase "B" isolation signal to close it following an accident and because it is the first valve outside the containment.
(3) The provisions of Specification 3.0.4 are not applicable.
(4) This valve may be opened on an intermittent basis under administrative control.
(5) The Main Steam Isolation Valves (MSIV's) are included for table completeness.
The requirements of Specification 3.6.3 do not apply because the OPERABILITY requirement for the MSIV's are governed by Specification 3.7.1.5.
(6) May be opened only as permitted by Specification 3.6.1.7.
(7) Fo< +l~~s votive J
+g~ close.d 5y 5+et'N ~4>c,4 i4 iQ loc.R+c.c~
+o ke aiJ OPENER'DL E isoln+io~ pa l ve 4o p, pug poSes
<<rnPlin~ce ~;fg gee, ACT'/on/ s+nken e<4, TABLE3-6-1 (PLP)
PE00F AHi3 P~PA:I flOPY PLANT SYSTEMS pFV)$,t~~i PREACTION ANO MULTICYCLE SPRINKLER SYSTEMS trav, 596 LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.7.10,2 The Preaction and Multicycle Sprinkler Systems listed on Table 3.7-3 shall be OPERABLE:
APPLICABILITY: Mhenever equipment protected by the Preaction and Multicycle Sprinkler System is required to be OPERABLE.
ACTION:
- a. with one or more of the above required Preaction and Multicycle Sprinkler Systems inoperable, within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> establish a continuous fire watch with backup fire suppression equipment for those areas in which redundant systems or components could be damaged; for other areas, establish an hourly fire watch patrol.
- b. The provisions of Specifications 3.0.3 and 3.0.4 are not applicable.
SURVEILLANCE RE UIREMENTS 4.7.10.2 Each of the above required Preaction
~ ~ and Multicycle Sprinkler Systems shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:
- a. At least once per 31 days by verifying that each valve (manual, power-operated, or automatic) in the flow path is in its correct position, .
- b. At least once per 12 months by cycling each testable valve in the flow path through at least one compl.ete cycle of full travel,
- c. At least once per 18 months:
- 1. By performing a system functional test which includes simulated automatic actuation of the system, and:
a) Verifying that the automatic valves in the flow path actuate to their correct positions on a thermal test and 'ignal, b) Cycling each valve in the flow path that is not testable during plant operation through at least one complete cycle of full travel.
2~ By a visual inspection of the dry pipe spray and sprinkler headers to verify their integrity; and By a visual inspection of each nozzle's spray area to verify the spray pattern is not obstructed.
SHEARON HARRIS " UNIT 1 3/4 7"30
Osl SHRPP P P>./) 0 ) &h.)
TABLE 3.7-3 PRE-ACTION AND MULTICYCLE SPRINKLER SYSTEMS/ZONES MAY $ 86 STEM/ZONE DESCRIPTION LOCATION/ELEVATION 1/A AIRBORNE RADIOACTIVITY REMOVAL CNMW/221 UNXTS lA & 1B SPRINKLER (1-C-1-CHFA &
1"C-1-CHFB) 1/B CONTAINMENT FAN COOLERS CNMW/236 1A-SA & 1B-SB SPRINKLER (1-C-1-BAL) 1/C CONTAINMENT- FAN COOLERS CNMT""/236 1A-SB & 1B-SB SPRINKLER (1-C-1-BAL)
'/D PRESSURIZER CABLE CONDUITS (1-C-1-BAL) CNMW/236 I
1/E PRESSURIZER CABLE TRAYS (1-C-1-RCP-1B) CNMW/236 1/F ELECTRICAL CABLE PENETRATION AREA 1A CNMW/261 SPRXNKLER (1-C-3-EPA)
ELECTRICAL CABLE PENETRATXON AREA 1B CNMW/261 1/G', SPRXNKLER (1-C"3-EPB)
CONDUIT AND CABLE TRAYS RC PUMP 1B CNMW/261 AREA (1-C-1-RCP-1B)
PRESSURIZER AREA (1-C-1-BAL) CNMW/286 CONTAINMENT SPRAY AND RHR PUMP RAB/190 ROOM 1A SPRINKLER (1-A-1-PA)
CONTAINMENT SPRAY AND RHR PUMP RAB/190 ROOM 1B SPRINKLER (1-A-1-PB) t/A MISCELLANEOUS PUMP AND EQUXPMENT RAB/216 ROOM SOUTH (1-A-2-MP) 4/B MISCELLANEOUS PUMP AND EQUIPMENT RAB/216 ROOM NORTH (1-A-2-MP)
S/A ACCESS CORRIDOR CABLE TRAYS (1-A-3-COR) RAB/236 S/B MECHANICAL PENETRATION AREA (1-A-3-MP) RAB/236 MHE SPRINKLER SYSTEMS LOCATED MITHIN THE CONTAINMENT BUILDING ARE NOT REQUIRED TO BE OPERABLE DURING THE PERFORMANCE OF TYPE A CONTAINMENT LEAKAGE. RATE TESTS.
TABLE3-7-3 (PLP)
I Osl SHNPP f PPQ(Q (~hl SYSTEM/ZONE DESCRIPTION LOCATION/ELEVATION 5/c AUX. FEED WATER PUMPS AND COMPONENT RAB/236 COOLING WATER HEAT EXCHANGER AND PUMPS SPRINKLER (1-A-3-PB) 5/E DECONTAMINATION AREA AND CORRIDOR CABLE RAB/236 TRAY SPRINKLER (l-A-3-COMB, 1"A-3-COME, 1-A-3-COMI) 6/A HVAC CHILLER EQUIPMENT AREA AND CABLE RAB/261 TRAY SPRINKLER (1-A-4-CHLR) 6/B CORRIDOR CABLE TRAY SPRINKLER RAB/261 (1-A-4-COMB & 1-A-4-COME) 6/C CHARCOAL FILTER ROOM lA & CORRIDOR CABLE RAB/261 TRAY SPRINKLER (1-A-4-COMI & 1-A-4-CHFA) 6/D CHARCOAL FILTER ROOM 1B SPRINKLER (1-A-4-CHFB) RAB/261 6/E ELECTRICAL PENETRATION AREA SA SPRINKLER RAB/261
'(1-A-EPA) 6/F ELECTRICAL PENETRATION AREA SB SPRINKLER RAB/261 (1-A-EPB)
CABLE SPREADING ROOMS A & B SPRINKLER RAB/286 (1-A-CSRA & 1-A-CSRB) 7/B HVAC UNITS E-17 & E-18 (12-A-5-CHF) RAB/286 8/A HVAC EQUIPMENT ROOM SPRINKLER (12-A-6-HV7) RAB/305 8/B HVAC UNITS E-19 & E-20 (12-A-6-CHF-1) RAB/305 EMERGENCY EXHAUST SYSTEM E-12 & E-13 FHB/261 (5-F-3-CHFA & 5-F-3-CHFB) 10 FUEL POOL COOLING HEAT EXCHANGERS AND PUMPS FHB/236 (5-F-2-FPC) 11/A DIESEL GENERATOR ROOM A 1A-SPRINKLER DGB/261 (1-D-1-DGA-RM) 11/B DIESEL GENERATOR FUEL OIL DAY TANK A ENCLOSURE DGB/261/280 1A-SPRINKLER (1-D-DTA) 12/A DIESEL GENERATOR ROOM B 1B-SPRINKLER DGB/261 (1-D-1-DGB-RM) 2/a DIESEL GENERATOR FUEL OIL DAY TANK 1B-SPRINKLER (1-D-DTB)
B ENCLOSURE DGB/261/280 TABLE3-7-3 (PLP)
Phl SHRPP p~S>tc)c,>>
( 1 SYSTEM/ZONE DESCR1PTION LOCATION/ELEVATION 3/A DIESEL OIL PUMP ROOM A DFOSB/242.25 1A-SPRINKLER (1-0-PA) 13/B DIESEL OIL PUMP ROOM B DFOSB/242.25 1B-SPRINKLER (1-0-PB)
TABLE3-7-3 (PLP)
PROOF AHH t,EV]DP 00?Y PLANT. SYSTEMS P RIVI%)~~i FIRE HOSE STATIONS MAY 1986 LIMITING CONQITION FOR OPERATION 3.7.10.3 The fire hose stations given in Table 3.7-4 shall be OPERABLE."
APPLICABILITY: Whenever equipment in the areas protected by the fire hose stations is required to be OPERABLE.
ACTION:
\
a~ With one or more of the fire hose stations given in Table 3.7-4 inoperable, provide gated wye(s) on the nearest OPERABLE hose station(s). One outlet of the wye shall be connected to the standard length of hose provided for the hose station. The second outlet of the wye shal'1 be connected to a length of hose sufficient to provide coverage for the area left unprotected by the inoperable hose station. Where it can be demonstrated that the physical
~
routing of the fire hose would result in a recognizable hazard to operating technicians, plant equipment, or the hose itself, the fire hose shall be stored in a roll at the outlet of the OPERABLE hose station. Signs shall be mounted above the gated wye(s) to identify the proper hose to use. The above ACTION requirement shall be accomplished within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> if the inoperable fire hose is the primary means of fire suppression; otherwise route the additional hose within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.
- b. The provisions of Specifications 3.0.3 and 3.0.4 are not applicable.
SURVEILLANCE RE UIREMENTS 4.7.10.3 Each of the fire hose stations given in Table 3.7-4 shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:
- a. At least once per 31 days, by a visual inspection of the fire hose stations accessible during plant operations to assure all required equipment is at the station.
- b. At least once per 18 months, by;
- 1. Visual inspection of the stations not accessible during plant operations to assure all required equipment is at the station,
- 2. Removing the hose for inspection and re-racking, and
"Fire
~
hose stations within the containment are required to be operable only during refueling and maintenance outages.
~
SHEARON HARRIS - UNIT 1 3/4 7-33
O'T L6AGT'uch PER Bpe4Rc, by ~
I. PARTIALL) oPmlQ+ EmR HOSS ~aZOH V ALVE TO VGRlF> YA~Y6 OPERk8lQ(Y f ~D No ~VJ 'BLoCV-@&2, MC',
Covuocwug w uosa sy~osr~vic. wesy a- p. wsssuae or !50 ~<g oa Kw cwaaw 50 Psiq weave, m<e H~xl4vH Ql gE MA~ad oPGF-ATIQQ PRCWQ)~, VJH'iCHCUGR fs G~t YE'R.,
I I Osl TABLE 3.7-4 FIRE HOSE STATIONS LOCATION ELEVATION HOSE RACK NO.
CNMT 221 221-C"4 CNMT 221 221-C-12 CNMT 221 221-C-19 CNMT 236 236-C-4 CNMT 236 236-C-12 CNMT 236 236-C-19 CNMT 261 261-C-4 CNMT 261 261-C-12 CNMT 261 261-C-19 CNMT 286 286-C-4 CNMT 286 286-C-12 CNMT 286 286-C-19 RAB ~ 190 190-G-16 RAB 190 190-G-38 RAB 216 216-G"16 RAB 216 216-Fz-27 RAB 216 216-G-38 RAB 216 216-Gy-13 RAB 236 236-Gy"13 RAB 236 236-G-16 RAB 236 236-Fz-27 RAB 236 236-D-27 RAB 236 236-G-38 RAB 236 236-Kz-31 RAB 236 236-C-39 RAB 236 236-Fw-43 RAB 236 236-Jz-43 RAB 236 236-E-15 RAB 261 261-Gy-13 RAB 261 261-E-15 RAB 261 261-G-16 RAB 261 261-D-27 RAB 261 261-Kz-31 RAB 261 261-G-38 RAB 261 261-C-39 RAB 261 261-Fw-42 RAB 286 286-C-15 RAB 286 286.-E-15 RAB 286 286-G"16 RAB 286 286-E-38 RAB 286 286-C-39 RAB 286 286-Jv-41 CNMT Containment Building FHB - Fuel Handling Building RAB Reactor Auxiliary Building DGB - Diesel Generator Building SHEARON HARRIS - UNIT 1 3/4 7-34.
S OS1 h X SHNpp TABLE 3.7-4 (Cont'd) RF+jg)Aa)
FIRE HOSE STATIONS MAY )gag LOCATION ELEVATION HOSE RACK NO.
286 286-Fw-42 RAB 261 261-Jz-43 RAB 261'05 261-Fw-43 RAB 305-C-39 RAB 305 305-I-41 RAB 305 305-Fw-43 RAB 236 236-JZ-45 RAB 286 286-JV-45 RAB 286 286-FW-44 RAB 305 305-I-45 RAB 324 324-I-41 RAB 324 324-I-45 FHB 236 236-L-41 FHB 236 236-L-45 FHB 261 261-L-41 FHB 261 261-L-45 FHB 286 286-L-27 FHB 286 286-N-36 FHB 286 286-L-43 FHB 286 286-N-51 FHB 286 286-L-65 FHB 286 286-N-71 FHB 286 286-L-75y FHB 216 216-L-41 FHB 216 216-L-45 FHB 216 216-L-71 FHB 236 236-L-71 FHB 261 261-N-73 FHB 261 261-M-75y DGB 261 261-C-2 DGB 261 261-C-4 DGB 261 261-B-1 DGB 261 261-B-2 DFOSB 261 1-4H NNS~
DFOSB 261 1-4V,. NNS~
ESWIS 261 1-4AJ NNS~
ESWISS 261 1-4AI NNS~
~Yard Hydrant CNMT Containment Building FHB Fuel Handling Building RAB - Reactor Auxiliary Building DGB Diesel Generator Building ESWIS Emergency Service Water EDWISS Emergency Service Water Intake Structure Intake Screening Structure DFOSB Diesel Fuel Oil Storage Building SHEARON HARRIS UNIT 3/4 7-35
PROOF AND REVlHY COPY ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS 3/4. 8. 3 ONSITE POWER DISTRIBUTION PP
'~ ~~)SION OPERATING MAY gag LIMITING CONDITION fOR OPERATION 3.8.3.1 The following electrical buses shall be energized in the specified manner with tie breakers open between redundant buses within the unit:
Division A ESF A. C. Buses consisting of:
- 1. [6900]"volt Bus '1A-SA.
- 2. [480]"volt Bus 1A2"SA.
- 3. [480]-volt Bus 1A3"SA.
- b. Division B ESF A.C. Buses consisting of:
- 1. .
[6900]-volt Bus 1B-SB.
- 2. [480]-volt Bus 1B2"SB.
- 3. [480]"volt Bus 1B3-SB.
C. [118]-volt A.C. Vital Bus 1DP-lA-SI energized from its associated inverter connected to 125-volt D.C. Bus DP-lA-SA*,
- d. [118]"volt A.C. Vital Bus 1DP-1A-SIII energized from its associated inverter connected to 125-volt D.C. Bus DP-1A-SA",
[118]-volt A.C. Vital Bus 1DP-1B-SII energized from its associated inverter connected to 125-volt D.C. Bus DP-lB-SB*,
[j18]-volt A.C. Vital Bus 1DP-IJ(-SIV energized from its associated inverter connected to 125-volt D.C. Bus DP-1B-SB",
- g. [125]"volt D.C. Bus DP-1A-SA energized from Emergency Battery 1A-SAp4a Q,bed'R /g -gg og /9-gag L125]"volt D.C. Bus DP-1B-SB energized from Emergency Battery 1B-SBa>>
&844'C< l8-SQ oX /4 -$ 8.
APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4.
"Two inverters may be disconnected from their 125-volt D.C. bus for up to 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> as .necessary, for the purpose of performing an equalizing char ge on their associated Emergency Battery provided: (1) their vital buses are ener-gized and (2) the vital buses associated with the other Emergency Bat ery are energized from their associated inverters and connected to their asso-ciated 125-volt D.C. bus.
SHEARON HARRIS - UNIT 1 3/4 8-14
I ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS pr-il)g)~a) 3/4.8.4 ELECTRICAL E UIPMENT PROTECTIVE DEVICES SAY CONTAINMEHT PENETRATION CONDUCTOR OVERCURREHT PROTECTIVE DEVICES LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.8.4. 1 All containment penetration conductor overcurrent protective devices given in Table 3.8-1 shall be OPERABLE.
APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4.
ACTION:
Mith one or more of the containment penetration conductor overcurrent protective device(s) given in Table 3. 8-1 inoperable:
Restore the protective device(s) to OPERABLE status or deenergize the circuit(s) by tripping the associated backup circuit breake~
or racking out or removing the inoperable circuit breaker within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />, declare the affected system or component inoperable, and verify the backup circuit breaker to be tripped or the inoper-able circuit breaker racked out or removed at least once per 7 days thereafter; the provisions of Specification 3..0.4 are not applicable to overcurrent devices in circuits which have their backup circuit breakers tripped, their inoperable circuit breakers racked out or removed, or
- b. Be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in COLD SHUTDOMN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />.
SURVEILLANCE RE UIREMENTS 4.8.4.1 All containment penetration conductor overcurrent protective devices given in Table 3.8-1 shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:
At least once per 18 months:
- 1. By verifying that the {6900-volt] circuit breakers are OPERABLE by selecting, on a rotating basis, at least 10K of the circuit breakers, and performing the following:
a) A CHANNEL CALIBRATION of the associated protective relays, b) An integrated system functional test which includes simulated automatic actuation of the system and verifying that each relay and associated circuit breakers and control circuits function as designed, and c) For each circuit breaker found inoperable during these functional tests, an additional representative sample of SHEARON HARRIS - UNIT 1 3/4 8-17
REVtStO~
MAY PRDOF AtID IIEVlnbt CDPY ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS ELECTRICAL E UIPMENT PROTECTIVE DEVICES CONTAINMENT PENETRATION CONDUCTOR OVERCURRENT PROTECTIVE DEVICES SURVEILLANCE RE UIREMENTS Continued 4.8.4. 1 (Continued) at least 10K of all the circuit breakers of the inoperable type shall also be functionally tested unti 1 no.more failures are found or all circuit breakers of that type have been functionally tested.
- 2. By selecting and functionally testing a representative sample of at least 10K of each type of lower voltage circuit breakers.
Circuit breakers selected for functional testing shall be selected on a rotating basis. Testing of these circuit breakers shall consist of injecting a current with a value equal to 30(C of the pickup of the long-time delay trip element and 150K of the pickup of the short-time delay trip element, and verifying that the circuit breaker operates within the time delay band width for that current specified by the manufacturer. The instantaneous element shall be tested by injecting a current equal to 120K of the pickup value of the element and verifying that the circuit breaker trips instantaneously with no intentional time delay. Molded case circuit breaker tes ing shall also follow this procedure except at time del a will be involved. Circuit breakers mo(c44 ~+sc found nopera e uring unctiona es ing shall be restored to
..OPERABLE status prior to resuming operation. For each circuit Cub 5aCakCaS ~ill breaker found inoperable during these functional tests, an
- < ~>>" ~'~ additional representative sample of at least 10K of all the iysQdkhucovs circuit breakers of the inoperable type shall also be function-
,s> +~,w+o ally tested until no more failures are found or all circuit
))Q floe breakers of that type have been functionally tested; and
- 3. By selecting and functionally testing a representative sample of each type of fuse on a rotating basis. Each representative sample of fuses shall include at least 10K of all fuses of that type. .The functional test shall consist of a nondestructive resistance measurement test which demonstrates that the fuse meets its manufacturer's design criteria. Fuses found inoper-able during these functional tests shall be replaced with OPERABLE fuses prior to resuming operation. For each fuse found inoperable during these functional tests, an additional representative sample of at least 10K of all fuses of that type shall be functionally tested until no more failures are found or all fuses of that type have been functionally tested.
- b. At least once per 60 months by subjecting each circuit breaker to an inspection and preventive maintenance in accordance with procedures prepared in conjunction with its manufacturer's recommendations.
SHEAR ON HARRIS - UNIT 1 3/4 8" 18
Cl SHNPP A~V)StO~
TABLE 3.8-1 MAY 95 CONTAINMENT PENETRATION CONDUCTOR OVERCURRENT PROTECTIVE DEVICES Item No. E ui ment Descri tion Primar Protection Secondar Protection MOV-2CT-V6SA-1 (Motor) 15 A Breaker 15 A Breaker (Isolation Valve)
MOV-2CT-V6SA-1 8 A Fuse 15 A Breaker (Valve Limit Switch Control)
MOV-2CT-V6SA-1 20 A Fuse 20 A Fuse (Valve Limit Switch-ANN)
MOV-2CT-V7SB-1 (Motor) 15 A Breaker 15 A Breaker (Isolation Valve)
MOV-2CT-V7SB-1 8 A Fuse 15 A Breaker (Valve Limit Switch Control)
MOV-2CT-V7SB-1 20 A Fuse 20 A Fuse (Valve Limit Switch-ANN)
MOV-2S -V571SA-1 30. A Breaker 30 A Breaker (Motor)
(Isolation Valve)
MOV-2SI-V571SA-1 8 A Fuse 15 A Breaker (Valve Limit Switch-IND & ANN)
MOV-2SI-V571SA-1 20 A Fuse 20 A Fuse (Valve Limit Switch-ANN) 10 MOV-2SI-V570SB-1 30 A Breaker 30 A Breaker (Motor)
(Isolation Valve)
K MOV-2SI-V570SB"1 8 A Fuse 15 A Breaker (Valve Limit Switch-IND & ANN) 12 MOV-2SI-V570SB-1 20 A Fuse 20 A Fuse (Valve Limit Switch-ANN)
3.8-1 8HNpp APlJ fq]pq TABLE CONTAINMENT PENETRATION CONDUCTOR MAY gag OVERCURRENT PROTECTIVE DEVICES Item No. E ui ment Descri tion Primar Protection Secondar Protection 13 Containment Fan Cooler 1600 A Switch 400 A Fuse AH-37 (1A-NNS) Gear Breaker 14 Containment Fan Cooler 1600 A Switch 400 A Fuse AH-38 (1A-NNS) Gear Breaker 15 Containment Fan Cooler 1600 A Switch 400 A Fuse AH-39 (1A-NNS) Gear Breaker Rod Control Drive 100 A Breaker 100 A Breaker Mech Fan E-80 (1A-NNS) 17 Rod Control Drive 100 A Breaker 100 A Breaker Mech Fan E-81 (1A-NNS) 1& J1B Crane (Receptacles) 60 A Breaker 60 A Breaker 19 Pressurizer Heater 90 A Breaker 100 A Fuse Back-Up (Group D)
Pressurizer Heater 90 A Breaker 100 A Fuse Back-Up (Group D) 21 Pressurizer Heater 90 A Breaker 100 A Fuse Back-Up (Group D) 22 Pressurizer Power 15 A Breaker 15 A Breaker Relief Isolation Valve MOV-1RC-V526SN-1 23 Pressurizer Power 15 A Breaker 15 A Breaker Relief Isolation Valve MOV1RC-V527SN-1 24 Full Length Rod Control (Control Bank A. Group 2)
Gripper 10 A Fuse 10 A Fuse Lift Coil 50 A Fuse 50 A Fuse 25 'Full Length Rod Control (Control Bank A. Group 2)
Gripper 10 A Fuse 10 A Fuse Lift Coil 50-A Fuse 50 A Fuse
Cl SHNPp TABLE 3.8-1 RPVjR,'A<J MAY ]986 CONTAINMENT PENETRATION CONDUCTOR OVERCURRENT PROTECTIVE DEVICES Item No. E ui ment Descri tion Primar Protection Secondar Protection 26 Full Length Rod Control (Control Bank A. Group 2)
Gripper 10 A Fuse 10 A Puse Lift Coil 50 A Fuse 50 A Fuse 27 Full length Rod Control (Control Bank A. Group 2)
Gripper 10 A Fuse 10 A Fuse Lift Coil 50 A Fuse 50 A Fuse 28 Pull Length Rod Control (Control Bank C. Group 2)
Gripper 10 A Fuse 10 A Fuse Lift Coil 50 A Fuse 50 A Fuse 29 Full Length Rod Control (Control Bank C. Group 2)
Gripper 10 A Fuse 10 A Fuse Lift Coil 50 A Fuse 50 A Fuse 30 Pull Lenght Rod Control (Control Bank C. Group 2)
Gripper 10 A Fuse 10 A Fuse
.Lift Coil 50. A Fuse 50 A Fuse 31 Pull Lenth Rod Control (Control Bank C. Group 2)
Gripper. 10 A Fuse 10 A Fuse
.Lift Coil 50 A Fuse 50 A Fuse 32 Full Length Rod Control (Shut Down Bank A. Group 2)
Gripper 10 A Fuse 10 A Puse Lift Coil 50 A Fuse 50 A Fuse 33 Full Length Rod Control (Shut Down Bank A. Group 2)
Gripper 10 A Fuse 10 A Fuse Lift Coil 50 A Fuse 50 A Fuse
SHgpp TABLE 3.8-1 RF~/)Q tnt)
.CONTAINMENT PENETRATION CONDUCTOR MAY ]ggg OVERCURRENT PROTECTIVE DEVICES Item No. E ui ment Descri tion Pzimar Protection Secondar Protection 34 Pull Length Rod Control (Shut Down Bank A Group 2)
Gripper 10 A Fuse 10 A Fuse Lift Coil 50 A Fuse 50 A Fuse 35 Full Length Rod Control (Shut Down Bank A. Group 2)
Gripper 10 A Fuse 10 A Fuse Lift Coil 50 A Puse 50 A Fuse 36 Full Length Rod Control (Shut Down Bank DE Group 1)
Gripper 10 A Fuse 10 A Fuse Lift Coil 50 A Fuse 50 A Fuse 37 Full Length Rod Control (Shut Down Bank D. Group 1)
Gripper 10 A Fuse 10 A Fuse Lift Coil 50. A Puse 50 A Fuse 38 Pull Length Rod Control (Shut Down Bank D. Group 1)
Gripper 10 A Fuse 10 A Fuse Lift Coil 50 A Fuse 50 A Fuse 39 Full Length Rod Control (Control Bank A. Group 1)
Gripper 10 A Fuse 10 A Fuse Lift Coil 50 A Fuse 50 A Fuse 40 Full Length Rod Control (Control, Bank A, Group 1)
Gripper 10 A Fuse 10 A Fuse Lift Coil 50 A Fuse 50 A Fuse
SHNPP TABLE 3.8-1 RF>jig t~<<
CONTAINMENT PENETRATION CONDUCTOR MAY $ 86 OVERCURRENT PROTECTIVE DEVICES Item No. E ui ment Descri tion Primar Protection . Secondar Protection Full Length Rod Control (Control Bank A. Group 1)
Gripper 10 A Fuse 10 A Fuse Lift Coil 50 A Fuse 50 A Fuse 42 Pull Length Rod Control (Control Bank A. Group 1)
Gripper 10 A Fuse 10 A Fuse Lift Coil 50 A Fuse 50 A Fuse 43 Full Length Rod Control (Control Bank C~ Group 1)
Gripper 10 A Fuse 10 A Fuse Lift Coil 50 A Fuse 50 A Fuse Full Length Rod Control (Control Bank C. Group 1)
Gripper 10 A Fuse 10 A Fuse Lift Coil 50' Puse 50 A Fuse 45 Pull Length Rod Control (Control Bank C. Group 1)
Gripper 10 A Fuse 10 A Fuse
. Lift Coil 50 A Fuse 50 A Fuse 46 Full Length Rod Control (Control Bank CD Group 1)
Gripper 10 A Fuse 10 A Fuse Lift Coil 50 A Fuse 50 A Fuse 47 Full Length Rod Control (Shutdown Bank A. Group 1)
Gripper 10 A Fuse 10 A Fuse Lift Coil 50 A Fuse 50 A Fuse
TABLE 3.8-1 SHNPP PP~I)C,'! ~kl CONTAINMENT PENETRATION CONDUCTOR OVERCURRENT PROTECTIVE DEVICES MAY $ 86 Item No. E ui ment Descri tion Primar Protection Secondar Protection 48 Full Length Rod Control (Shutdown Bank A. Group 1)
Gripper 10 A Fuse 10 A Fuse Lift Coil 50 A Fuse 50 A Fuse 49 Full Length Rod Contxol (Shutdown Bank A. Group 1)
Gripper 10 A Fuse 10 A Fuse Lift Coil 50 A Fuse 50 A Puse 50 Pull Length Rod Control
-(Shutdown Mn~. Group 1)
Gripper 10 A Fuse 10 A Fuse Lift Coil 50 A Fuse 50 A Fuse 51 Pull Length Rod Control (Shutdown Bank C. Group 1)
Gripper 10 A Fuse 10 A Fuse Lift Coil 5Q A Fuse 50 A Fuse 52 Pull Length Rod Control (Shutdown Bank C. Group 1)
Gripper 10 A Fuse 10 A Fuse Lift Coil 50 A Fuse 50 A Fuse 53 Pull Length Rod Control (Shutdown Bank CD Group 1)
Gripper 10 A Puse 10 A Fuse Lift Coil 50 A Fuse 50.A Fuse 54 Pull Length Rod Control (Shutdown Bank C. Group 1)
Gxipper 10 A Fuse 10 A Fuse Lift Coil 50 A Fuse 50 A Fuse
3.8-1 8HNpp TABLE REM)Stn~i CONTAINMENT PENETRATION CONDUCTOR MAY $ 86 OVERCURRENT PROTECTIVE DEVICES Item No. E ui ment Descri tion Primar Protection Secondar Protection 55 Full length Rod Control (Shutdown Bank D. Group 1)
Gripper 10 A Fuse 10 A Fuse Lift Coil 50 A Fuse 50 A Fuse 56 Containment Fan Cooler 225 A Breaker 1600 A Breaker AH-3 (1B-SA) 57 Containment Fan Cooler 225 A Breaker 1600 A Breaker AH-3 (1B-SA) 58 Containment Fan Cooler 225 A Breaker 1600 A Breaker AH-3 (1A-SA)
Containment Fan Cooler 225 A Breaker 1600 A Breaker AH-3 (1A-SA) 60 Containment Fan Cooler 225 A Breaker 1600 A Breaker AH-4 (1B-SB)
Containment Fan Cooler 225 A Breaker 1600 A Breaker AH-4 (1B-SB)
/
62 Containment Fan Cooler 225 A Breaker 1600 A Breaker AH-4 (1A-SB) 63 Containment Fan Cooler 225 A Breaker 1600 A Breaker AH-4 (lA-SB)
Full length Rod. Control (Control Bank B. Group 1)
Gripper 10 A Fuse 10 A Fuse Lift Coil 50 A Fuse 50 A Fuse 65 Full length Rod Control (Control Bank B. Group 1)
Gripper 10 A Fuse 10 A Fuse Lift Coil 50 A Fuse 50 A Fuse
TABLE 3.8-1 8HNPp p f-"(Cfc i~<<
CONTAINMEFZ:.!PENETRATION..CONDUCTOR OVERCURREMi97ROTECEIVBJINPfXCES MAY gag Item No. E ui ment Descri tion Primar Protection Secondar Protection 66 Full Length Rod Control (Control Bank B. Group 1)
Gripper 10 A Fuse 10 A Fuse Lift Coil 50 A Fuse 50 A Fuse 67 Full length Rod Control (Control Bank B. Group 1)
Gripper 10 A Fuse 10 A Fuse Lift Coil 50 A Fuse 50 A Fuse 68 Full Length Rod Control (Control Bank D. Group 1)
Gripper 10 A Fuse 10 A Fuse Lift Coil 50 A Fuse .50 A Fuse 69 Pull Length Rod Control (Control Bank D. Group 1)
Gripper '0 A Puse 10 A Fuse Lift Coil 50 A Fuse 50 A Fuse 70 Full Length Rod Control (Shutdown Bank B. Group 1)
Gripper 10 A Fuse 10 A Fuse Lift Coil 50 A Fuse 50 A Fuse 71 Full Length Rod Control (Shutdown Bank B. Group 1) r Gripper 10 A Fuse 10 A Puse Lift Coil 50 A Fuse 50 A Fuse 72 Pull Length Rod Control (Shutdown Bank BE Group 1)
Gripper. 10 A Fuse 10 A Fuse Lift Coil 50 A Fuse 50 A Fuse 73 Full Length Rod Control (Shutdown Bank BE Group 1)
Gripper 10 A Fuse 10 A Fuse Lift Coil 50 A Fuse 50 A Fuse
TABLE 3.8-1 SHNPP P ~lj)g t~<~
CONTAINMENT PENETRATION CONDUCTOR OVERCURRENT PROTECTIVE DEVICES MAY 586 Item No. E ui ment Descri tion Primar Protection Secondar Protection 74 Full Length Rod Control (Control Bank B. Group 2)
Gripper 10 A Fuse 10 A Fuse Lift Coil 50 A Fuse 50 A Fuse 75 Full Length Rod Control (Control Bank B. Group 2)
Gripper 10 A Fuse 10 A Fuse Lift Coil 50 A Fuse 50 A Fuse 76 Full Length Rod Control (Control Bank B. Group 2)
Gripper 10 A Fuse 10 A Fuse Lift Coil 50 A Fuse 50 A Fuse 77 Pull Length Rod Control (Control Bank B. Group 2)
Gripper 10 A Fuse 10 A Fuse Lift Coil 50. A Fuse 50 A Fuse 78 Pull Length Rod Control (Control Bank D. Group 2)
Gripper 10 A Fuse . 10 A Fuse Lift Coil 50 A Fuse 50 A Fuse 79 Full Length Rod Control (Control Bank D. Group 2)
Gripper 10 A Fuse 10 A Fuse Lift Coil 50 A Fuse 50 A Fuse 80 Pull Length Rod Control (Shutdown Bank BE Group 2)
Gripper 10 A Fuse 10 A Fuse Lift Coil 50 A Fuse 50 A Fuse
TABLE 3.8-1 SHNPP pp~s~pir ~i CONTAINMENT PENETRATION CONDUCTOR OVERCURRENT PROTECTIVE DEVICES MAY $ 86 Item No. E ui ment Descri tion Primar Protection Secondar Protection 81 Full Length Rod Control (Shutdown Bank B. Group 2)
Gripper 10 A Fuse 10 A Fuse Lift Coil 50 A Fuse 50 A Fuse 82 Full Length Rod Control (Shutdown Bank B. Group 2)
Gripper 10 A Fuse 10 A Fuse Lift Coil, 50 A Fuse 50 A Fuse 83 Full Length Rod Control (Shutdown Bank B. Group 2)
Gripper 10 A Fuse 10 A Fuse Lift Coil 50 A Fuse 50 A Fuse Reactor Coolant Pump Relay Trips Relay Trips Upstream (1A-SN) . Feeder Breaker Breaker 85 Reactor Coolant Pump Relay Trips Relay Trips Upstream (1A-SN) Feeder Breaker Breaker 86 Lighting Panel (LP-105) 70 A Breaker 150 A Breaker 87 Lighting Panel (LP-106) 50 A Breaker 50 A Breaker 88 Lighting Panel" (LP-101) 60 A Breaker 125 A Breaker 89 Lighting Panel (LP-102) 60 A Breaker 125 A Breaker 90'ressurizer Heater 90 A Breaker 100 A Fuse Back-Up (Group-A) 91 Pressurizer heater 90 A Breaker 100 A Fuse Back-Up (Group-A) 92 Pressurizer Heater 90' Breaker 100 A Fuse Back"Up (Group"A) 1 93 Pressurizer Heater ,.90 A Breaker 100 A Fuse Back-Up (Group-A)
Elevator Disc Switch 100 A Breaker 100 A Breaker SHg pp TABLE 3.8-1 p ~~l f 0 1M',(
CONTAINMENT PENETRATION CONDUCTOR MAY $ 86 OVERCURRENT PROTECTIVE DEVICES Item No. E ui ment Descri tion Primar Protection Secondar Protection 95 Po~er Receptacles 60 A Breaker 60 A Breaker 1-2 6 1-6 96 Power Receptacles 60 A Breaker 60 A Breaker 1-9 & 1-13 97 Power Receptacles 60 A Breaker 60 A Breaker 1-10 6 1-,14 98 Reactor Coolant Pump 30 A Breaker 30 A Breaker 1A"SN Oil BRG Lift Pump 99 Disk Switch for 5-Ton 50 A Breaker 50 A Breaker Monorail 100 Pressurizer Heater 90 A Breaker 100 A Fuse Back-Up (Group-A) 101 Pressurizer Heater 90 A Breaker 100 A Fuse Back-Up (Group-A) 102 Pressurizer Heater 90 A Breaker 100 A Fuse Back-Up (Group-A) 103 Pressurizer'Heater 90 A Breaker 100 A Fuse Back-Up (Group-A) 104 'ower Receptacles 60 A Breaker 60 A Breaker 1-1 6 1-5 105 Power Receptacles 60 A Breaker 60 A Breaker 1-17 6 1-74 106 Power Receptacles 60 A Breaker 60 A Breaker 1-18 & 1-75 107 Rod Position Indication 50 A Breaker 100 A Breaker Distribution Panel
~ 108 Pressurizer heater Control Group-C 90 A Breaker 100 A Fuse 109 Pressurizer Heater 90 A Breaker 100 A Fuse Control Group-C I
TABLE 3.8-1 SHg pp RF.>/)q! c g!
CONTAINMENT PENETRATION CONDUCTOR OVERCURRENT PROTECTIVE DEVICES MAY Item No. E ui ment Descri tion . Primar Protection Secondar Protection 110 Pressurizer Heater 90 A Breaker 100 A Fuse Control Group-C Pressurizer Heater'ontrol 90 A Breaker 100 A Fuse Group"C 112 Pressurizer Heater 90 A Breaker 100 A Fuse Control Group-C 113 Reactor Coolant Drain 50 A Breaker 50 A Breaker Tank Pump-1A 114 Pressurizer Heater 90 A Breaker 100 A Fuse Control Group"C 115 Pressurizer Heater 90 A Breaker 100 A Fuse Control Group-C 116 Power Receptacles 60 A Breaker 60 A Breaker 1-76 117 Containment Evacuation 3 A Fuse 20 A Fuse Horn 118 AOV-1RC-P527SN-1 5 A Fuse 5 A Fuse 119 Containment Circular 225 A Breaker 225 A Breaker Bridge Crane 120 IRVH Cable Bridge 15 A Breaker 15 A Breaker Hoist 121 AOV-1RC-P528SN-1 5 A Fuse 5 A Fuse (PCV-445-B) 122 AOV-1RC-P525SN-1 3 A Fuse 3 A Fuse.
123 AOV-1RC-P525SN-1 6 A Fuse 20 A Breaker 124 AOV-2RC-V504SN-1 (8032) 3 A Fuse . 3 A Fuse 125 AOV-1CS-L501SN-1 3 A Fuse 3 A Fuse (LCV-459) 126 'OV-2CS-V519SN-1 (8141A) 3 A Fuse 3 A Fuse I
TABLE 3.8-1 SHNPP REVtS)GN CONTAINMENT PENETRATION CONDUCTOR MAY f986 OVERCURRENT PROTECTIVE DEVICES Item No. E ui ment Descri tion Primar Protection Secondar Protection 127 AOV-2CS-V501SN-1 (8145) 3 A Fuse 3 A Fuse 128 AOV-2CS-V502SN-1 (8146) 3 A Fuse 3 A Fuse 129 AOV-2CS-V503SN-1 (8147) 3 A Fuse 3 A Fuse 130 AOV-7CS-D507SN"1 (8168A) 3 A Fuse 3 A Fuse 131 MOV-2SI-V537SA-1 3 A Fuse 15 A Breaker (8808A) Pos. SW. ANN 132 AOV-2SI-V532SN-1 (8875A) 3 A Fuse 3 A Fuse 133 AOV-2SI-V534SN-1 (8875C) 3 A Fuse 3 A Fuse 134 AOV-2SI-V534SN-1 (8877A) 3 A Fuse 3 A Fuse 135 AOV-2SI-V540SN-1 (8877C) 3 A Fuse 3 A Fuse 136 AOV-2SI-V551SN-1 (8878A). 3 A Fuse 3 A Fuse 137 AOV-2SI-V553SN-1 '(8878C) 3 A Fuse 3 A Fuse 138 AOV-2SI-V541SN-1 (8879A) 3 A Fuse 3 A Fuse 139 AOV-2SI-V543SN-1 (8879C) 3 A Puse 3 'A Fuse 140 Integrated Head 20 A Breaker 20 A Breaker Cooling, Fan E-.8 (1A-NNS) 141 Integrated Head 20 A Breaker 20 A Breaker Cooling Fan E"81 (1A-NNS) 142 AOV-2BD-F6SN-1 6 A Fuse 15 A Breaker (PCV-8400A) 143 Damper (CV-D9-1) 6 A Fuse 15 A Breaker 144 Damper (CV-D13"1) 6 A Fuse 15 A Breaker 145 AOV-1'CS-L500SN-1 3 A Fuse 3 A Fuse (LCV-460) 146 AOV-6WL-D640SN-1 (7127) 6 A Fuse ,6 A Puse 147 AOV-6WL-D649SN-1 (7144) 6 A Fuse 6 A Fuse p
E TABLE 3.8-1 SHNPp CONTAINMENT PENETRATION CONDUCTOR RFV )S! ~~>
OVERCURRENT PROTECTIVE. DEVICES MAY Sag Item No. E ui ment Descri tion Primar Protection . Secondar Protection 148 AOV-6WL-D648SN-1 (7143) 6 A Fuse 6 A Fuse 149 AOV-6WL-D647SN-1 (7141) 6 A Fuse 6 A Fuse 150 Con. Rod Drive Mech. 6 A Fuse 15 A Breaker Fan E-80 (1A"NNS) 151 Con. Rod Drive Mech. 6 A Fuse 15 A Breaker Fan E-81 (1A-NNS) 152 Reactor Coolant Pump 15 A Breaker 30 A Breaker (1A-GN) Space Heater 153 Inst. Rack Cl-Rl 20 A Breaker 20 A Breaker 154 AH-37 (lA-NNS) Motor 15 A Breaker 15 A Breaker Space Heater 155 AH-38 (1A-NNS) Motor 15 A Breaker 15 A Breaker Space Heater 156 AH-39 (1A-NNS) Motor 15' Breaker 15 A Breaker Space Heater 157 Elevator Equipment 20 A Breaker 20 A Breaker Room Fan (E-3) (1X-NNS) 158 SVT-SP-V334-1 15 A Breaker 15, A Breaker (Rad. Mon. Sampling Valves) 159 SV7-SP-V318-1 15 A Breaker 15 A Breaker 160 SV7-SP-V320-1 15 A Breaker 15 A Breaker 161 Containment Atmo. Rad. 15 A Breaker 15 A Breaker Mon. Valve (7SP-V322-1) 162 Containment Atmo. Rad. 15 A Breaker 15 A Breaker Mon. Valve (7SP-V324-1) 163 Containment Atmo. Rad. 15 A Breaker 15 A Breaker Mon. Valve (7SP-V326-1) A 164 Containment Atmo. Rad. 15 A Breaker 15 A Breaker Mon. Valve (7SP"V328-1)
TABLE 3.8-1 SHf']Pp R~V~Str~!
CONTAINMENT PENETRATION CONDUCTOR MAY Sag OVERCURRENT PROTECTIVE DEVICES Item No. E ui ment Descri tion Primar Protection Secondar Protection 165 Containment Atmo. Rad. 15 A Breaker 15 A Breaker Mon. Valve (7SP-330-1) 166 Containment Atmo. Rad. 15 A Breaker 15 A Breaker Mon. Valve (7SP-332-1) 167 AOV-2RC-D528-SA-1 (8047) 5 A Fuse 5 A Fuse 168 AOV2RC-D528SA-1 8 A Fuse 15 A Breaker (Limit Switch) 169 MOV-2CS-V516SA-1 (8112) 8 A Fuse 15 A Breaker (Limit Switch) 3.70 AOV-2CS-V511SA-1 5 A Fuse 5 A Fuse (Sol. Valve & Limit Switch) 171 AOV-2CS-V511SA-1 ~
20 A Fuse 20 A Fuse (Limit Switch) 172 AOV-2CS-V511SA-1 8 A Fuse 15 A Breaker (Limit Switch) 173 AOV-2CS-V511SA-1 5 A Fuse 5 A Fuse (Sol ~ Valve) (8149A) 174 AOV-2CS-V512SA-1 5 A Fuse 5 A Fuse (Sol. Valve 6 Limit Switch) 175 AOV-2CS-V512SA-1. 20 A Fuse 20 A Fuse (Limit Switch) 176 AOV-2CS-V512SA-1 8 A Fuse 15 A Breaker (Limit Switch) 177 AOV-2CS-V512SA-1 5 A Fuse 5 A Fuse (Sol. Valve) 178 AOV-2CS-V513SA-1 3 A Fuse 3 A Fuse (Sol Valve h Limit Switch) 179 AOV-2CS-V513SA-1 20 A Fuse 20 A Fuse
'(Limit Switch)
TABLE 3.8-1 SHNPP RFVISi~~~
~
-.CQNTAINMEKI';PENETRATION CONDUCTOR 1986 MAY
~>~EXNKRCURREZRG'PROXECZI VE~'DEVICES Item No. E ui ment Descri tion Primar Protection Secondar Protection 180 AOV-2CS-V513SA-1 8 A Fuse 15 A Breaker (Limit Switch' 181 AOV-2CS-V513SA-1 3 A Fuse 3 A Fuse (Sol. Valve) 182 MOV-2SI-V537SA-1 8 A Fuse 15 A Breaker (8808A) (Limit Switch) 183 MOV-2SI-. V535SA-1 8 A Fuse 15 A Breaker (8808C) (Limit Switch) 184 MOV-2SI-V555SA-1 3 A Fuse 3 A Fuse (8871) (Sol. Valve) 185 MOV-2SI-V555SA;1 " 8 A Fuse 15 A Breaker (Limit Switch) (8871)
MOV-2SI-V537SA-1 20 A Fuse 20 A Fuse (8088A) (Limit Switch) 187 MOV-2SI-V537SA-1 20 A Fuse 20 A Fuse (Stem. Oper. Pos. Switch) 188 MOV-2SI-V535SA-1 20 A Fuse 20 A Fuse (Stem. Oper. Pos. Switch) 189 AOV-2WL-L600SA-1 3 A Fuse 3 A Fuse (LCV-1003) (Sol.
Valve & Limit Switch) 190 AOV-2WL-L600SA-. 8 A Fuse 15 A Breaker 1'LCV-1003)..
(Limit Switch) 191 AOV-2WG-D590SN-1 (7126) 3 A Fuse 3 A.Fuse (Limit Switch &
Sol ~ Valve) 192 AOV2WG-D590-SN-1 (7126) 8 A Fuse 15 A Breaker (Limit Switch) 193 AOV-2SP-V300SA-1 6 A Fuse 20 A Breaker 194 AOV-2SP-V301SA-1 6 A Fuse 20 A Breaker SHNPP TABLE 3.8-1 pP)l jQ0~gl CONTAINMENT PENETRATION CONDUCTOR MAY $ 86 OVERCURRENT PROTECTIVE DEVICES Item No. E ui ment Des'cri tion Primar Protection Secondar Protection 195 MOV-'2CC-V184SA-1 (9481) 8 A Fuse 15 A Breaker (Limit Switch) 196 MOV-2CC-V191SA-1 (9483) 8 A Fuse 15 A Breaker (Limit Switch) 197 Service Water 6 A Fuse 6 A Fuse Containment Fan Cooler Isol. Valve (2SW-B89SA-1) 198 Hydrogen Purge 6 A Fuse 20 A Breaker (AOV-2CM-B5SA-1) 199 RA-1CR-3561A-SA 0.6 A Fuse. 15 A Breaker 200 RA-1CR-3561C-SA 0.6 A Fuse 15 A Breaker 201 SV-2RC-V281SA-1 & A Fuse 20 A Breaker 202 Reactor Support Cooling -'15 A Breaker 15 A Breaker Fan S-4 (1A-SA) Htr.
203 SV-2RC-V283SA-1 6 A Fuse 20 A Breaker 204 SV-2RC-V284SA-1 6 A Fuse 20 A Breaker 205 ~
Containment Atm. 6 A Fuse 20 A Breaker Rad. Mon. Valve 2SP-V405SA-1 206 AOV-2SP-V21SA-1 6 A Fuse 20 A Breaker 207 Containment Fan Cooler 6 A Fuse 20 A Breaker AH-2 Damper CV-D3SA-1 Position Switch 208 Cont. Pre-entry Purge 8 A Fuse -15 A Breaker Discharge Valve 2CP-B7SA-1 209 Cont. Pre-entry Purge 6 A Fuse 20 A Breaker.
Inlet Valve 2CP-B3SA-1 210 Cont. Pre-entry Purge 8 A Fuse 15 A Breaker Inlet Valve 2CP-B3SA-1
SHNPP 8~"Via'AN TABLE 3.8-1 MAY 3986 CONTAINMENT PENETRATION CONDUCTOR OVERCURRENT PROTECTIVE DEVICES Item No. E ui ment Descri tion Prima Protection Secondar Protection 211 AOV-2CP-B5-SA-1 6 A Fuse 20 A Breaker 212 Cont. H> Analyzer 20 A Breaker 20 A Breaker System Valve 2SP-V316SA-1 213 Cont. H> Analyzer 20 A Breaker 20 A Breaker System 9'alve 2SP-V386SA-1 214 Containment Fan 6 A Fuse 20 A Breaker Cooler AH-3 Damper CV-D5SA-1 Position Switch 215 Cont. H> Analyzer 20 A Breaker 20 A Breaker System Valve 2SP-V388SA-1 216 Cont. H> Analyzer 20 A Breaker 20 A Breaker System Valve 2SP-V390SA-1 217 Cont. H> Analyzer 20 A Breaker 20 A Breaker System Valve 2SP-V392SA-1 218 Cont. H> Analyzer 20 A Breaker 20 A Breaker System Valve 2SP-V394SA-1 219 Cont. Fan Cooler 15 A Breaker 15 A Breaker AH-2 (1A-SA)
Space Heate~
220 Cont. Fan Cooler 15 A Breaker 15 A Breaker AH-2 (1B-SA)
Space Heater 221 Cont. Fan Cooler AH-3 15 A Breaker 15 A Breaker (1A-SA). Space Heater 222 Cont. Fan Cooler AH-3 15 A Breaker 15 A Breaker (1B"SA) Space Heater I
M
TABLE 3.8-1 SHNPP R~>>t".-'r ~l CONTAINMENT PENETRATION CONDUCTOR MAY 1986 OVERCURRENT PROTECTIVE DEVICES Item No. E ui ment Descri tion Primar Protection Secondar Protection 223 Primary Shield Cooling 15 A Breaker 15 A Breaker Fan S-2 (lA-SA) Heater 224 Hydrogen Recombiner 125 A Breaker 125 A Breaker 225 Reactor Support 100 A Breaker 100 A Breaker Cooling Fan S-4 (lA-SA) 226 MOV-1RH-V501SA-1 15 A Breaker 15 A Breaker (8701B)
(Isolation Valve) 227 MOV-.2SI-V537SA-l 40 A Breaker 40 A Breaker (8808A) (Accumulator "A" Discharge Valve)
MOV-2SI"V535SA-1 . 40 A Breaker 40 A Breaker 228 (8808C) (Accumulator "C" Discharge Valve) ns MOV-2CS-V516SA-1 - 15 A Breaker 15 A Breaker (8812) (RCP Seal Mater Return Isolation Valve) 230 MOV-1RH-V503SA-1 15 A Breaker 15 A Breaker (8701A) (RHRS Inlet Isolation Valve) 231. MOV-2CC"V184SA-1 15 A Breaker 15 A Breaker (9481) (RCP Oil Heat Exchanger Isolation Valve) 232 MOV-2CC-V191SA-1 15 A Breaker 15 A Breaker (9483) (RCP Thermal Barrier Isolation Valve)
.233 MOV-2MD"V36SA-1 15 A Breaker 15 A Breaker (Cont. Sump Isolation Valve) 234 Primary Shield Cooling 100 A Breaker 100 A Breaker Fan S-2 (1A-SA) ns Reactor Coolant Pump Relay Trips Relay Trips (1B-SN) Feeder Brk. Upstream Brk, 8 HNP TABLE 3.8-1 F'F>>..~'ISIQW)
CONTAINMENT PENETRATION CONDUCTOR MAY 1986 OVERCURRENT PROTECTIVE DEVICES Item No. E ui ment Descri tion Primar Protection Secondar Protection 236 Reactor Coolant Pump Relay Trips Relay Trips (1B-SN) Feeder Brk. Upstream Brk.
237 Hydrogen Recombiner "B" 125 A Breaker 125 A Breaker 238 Primary Shield Cooling 100 A Breaker 100 A Breaker Fan S-2 (1B-SB) 239 Reactor Support Cooling 100 A Breaker 100 A Breaker Fan S-4 (1B-SB) 240 MOV-2SI-V536SB-1 40 A Breaker 40 A Breaker, (8088B) (Accumulator "B" Discharge VaLve) 241 MOV-1RH-V502SB-1 15 A Breaker 15 A Breaker (8702A) (RHR Inlet Isolation Valve) 242 MOV-1RH-500SB-l 15 A Breaker 15 A Breaker (8702B) (RHR Inlet Isolation Valve) 243 Valve 2BD-V2SB-1 6i'A Fuse 15 A Breaker
/
244 Valve 2BD-V5SB-1 6 A Fuse 15 A Breaker 245. Valve 2BD-V8SB-1 6 A Fuse 15 A Breaker 246 Valve 2BD-P6SB-1 6 A Fuse 15 A Breaker Valve 2BD-V2SB-1 8 A Fuse 15 A Breaker 248 Valve 2BD-V5SB-1 8 'A Fuse 15 A Breaker 249 Valve 2BD-V8SB-1 8 A Fuse 15 A Breaker 250 Valve 2BD-P8SB-1 6 A Fuse 15 A Breaker 251 Primary Shield 15 A Breaker 15 A Breaker Cooling Fan S-2 (1B-SB) Heater 252 Reactor Support .15 A Breaker 15 A Breaker Cooling Fan S-4 (1B-SB) Heater 6
3.8-1 SHNPP TABLE pt:,qg ~~~~
CONTAINMENT PENETRATION CONDUCTOR 1986 MAY OVERCURRENT PROTECTIVE- DEVICES Item No. E ui ment Descri tion Primar Protection Secondar Protection 253 Valve 2BD-P7SB-1 6 A Fuse 15 A Breaker 254 Cont. Fan AH-1 (1A"SB) 15 A Breaker 15 A Breaker Space Heater 255 Cont. Fan AH"1 (1B-SB) 15 A Breaker 15 A Breaker Space Heater 256 Cont. Fan Cooler AH-4 15 A Breaker 15 A Breaker (1$ -SB) Space Heater A
257 Cont. Fan Cooler AH-4 15 A Breaker 1'5 A Breaker (1B"SB) Space Heater 258 Valve 1CS-V510SB-1 3 A Fuse 3 A Fuse 259 AOV-1CS-V509SB-1 3 A Fuse 3 A Fuse (8154) 260 MOV-2SI-V536SB-1 .
8 A Fuse 15 A Breaker (8808B) 261 MOV-2SI-V536SB-1 20 A Fuse 20 A Fuse (8808B) 262 MOV-2SI-V536SB-1 20 A Fuse 20 A Fuse (Steam Oper. Pos. Switch) 263 AOV-2SP-V308SB-1 6 A Fuse 15 A Breaker 264 AOV-2SP-V309SB-1 6 A Fuse 15 A Breaker 265 Valve 2SP-V90SB-1 6 A Fuse 15 A Breaker 266 Valve 2SP-V85SB-1 6 A Fusd 15 'A Breaker 267 Valve 2SP-V80SB-1 6 A Fuse 15 A Breaker 268 Valve 2SP-V91SB-1 6 A Fuse 15 A Breaker 269 'alve 2SP-V86SB-1 6 A Fuse 15 A Breaker 270 Valve 2SP-V81SB-1 6 A Fuse 15 A Breaker 271 Valve 2SP-V1SB-1 6 A Fuse 15 A Breaker Cll SHNPP TABLE 3.8-1 PU~! j~~~Pib )
CONTAINMENT PENETRATION CONDUCTOR MAY 1986 OVERCURRENT PROTECTIVE DEVICES Item No. E ui ment Descri tion Primar Protection Secondar Protection 272 Valve 2SP-V11SB-1 6 A Fuse 15 A Breaker 273 Valve 2SP-VlllSB-1 6 A Fuse 15 A Breaker 274 Valve 2SP-V113SB-1 6 A Fuse 15 A Breaker 275 Valve 2SP"V114SB-1 6 A Fuse 15 A Breaker
'276 Valve 2SP-V115SB-1 6 A Fuse 15 A Breaker 279 Cont. Fan Cooler AH-1 5 A Fuse 20 A Breaker Damper CV-D1SB-1 Motor 280 Cont. Fan Cooler AH-1 6 A Fuse 20 A Breaker Damper CV-D1SB-1 Motor 281 Cont. Fan Cooler AH-1 6 A Fuse 20 A Breaker Damper CV-DlSB-1 Pose Swo 282 Cont. Fan Cooler AH-1 3 A Fuse 3 A Fuse Damper CV-D2SB-1
.Pos. Sw.
285 .Cont. Fan Cooler AH-4 5 A Fuse 20 A Breaker Damper CV-D7SB-1 Motor 286 Cont. Fan Cooler AH-4 6 A Fuse 20 A Breaker Damper CV-D7SB-1 Motor 287 Cont. Fan Cooler AH-.4 6 A Fuse 20 A Breaker Damper CV-D7SB-1 Pos. Sw.
TABLE 3.8-1 SHIPS CONTAINMENT PENETRATION CONDUCTOR p OVERCURRENT PROTECTIVE DEVICES MAY 1986 Item No. E ui ment Descri tion Primar Protection Secondar Protection 288 'ont. Fan Cooler AH-4 3 A Fuse 3 A Fuse Damper CV-D8SB-1 Pos. Sv.
289 RA-1CR-356 1B-SB 0.6 A Fuse 15 A Breaker 290 RA-1CR-356 1D-SB 0.6 A Fuse 15 A Breaker 291 Valve 2SP-V90SB-1 8 A Fuse 15 A Breaker 292 Valve 2SP-V91SB-1 8 A Fuse 15 A Breaker 293 Valve 2SP-V85SB-1 8 A Fuse 15 A Breaker 294 Valve 2SP-V86SB-1 8 A Fuse 15 A Breaker 295 Valve 2SP-V80SB-1 8 A Fuse 15 A Breaker 296 Valve 2SP-V81SB-1 8 A Fuse 15 A Breaker 297 Valve 2SP-V11SB-1 8 A Fuse 15 A Breaker 298 Valve 2SP-V1SB-1 8 A Fuse 15 A Breaker 299 Valve 2SP-VlllSB-1 8 A Fuse 15 A Breaker 300 Valve 2SP-V114SB-1 8 A Fuse 15 A Breaker 301 Valve 2SP-V113SB-1 '8 A Fuse 15 A Breaker 302 SV-2RC-V280SB-1 6 A Fuse 15 A Breaker 303 SV-2RC-V282SB-1 6 A Fuse 15 A Breaker 304 SV-2RC-V285SB-1 6 A Fuse 20 A Breaker 305 Cont H> Analyzer 20 A Breaker 20 A Breaker System 'Valve 2SP-V317SB 306 Cont. H> Analyzer 20 A Breaker 20 A Breaker System 'Valve 2SP-V387SB TABLE 3.8-1 8HNt j 'g j p
p C~'L > i~~ cy CONTAINMENT PENETRATION CONDUCTOR
-:,OVERCURREKZ.PROTECTIVE DEVICES MAY $ 986 Item No. E ui ment Descri tion Primar Protection Secondar Protection 307 Cont. H> Analyzer 20 A Breaker 20 A Breaker System Valve 2SP-V389SB 308 Cont. H> Analyzer 20 A Breaker 20 A Breaker System Valve 2SP-V391SB 309 Cont. H> Analyzer 20 A Breaker 20 A Breaker System Valve 2SP-V393SB C
310 Cont. H> Analyzer 20 A Breaker 20 A Breaker System Valve 2SP-V395SB 311 Valve 2SP-V22SB-1 6 A Fuse 15 A Breaker 312 Valve 2SP-V408SB-1 6 A Fuse 15 A Breaker 313 Valve. 2SP-V406SB-1 A Fuse 15 A Breaker 314 AOV-1RC-P529SN-1 5 'A Fuse 5 A Fuse (PCV-444B) 315 AOV-20S-W500SN-1 3 A Fuse 3 A Fuse (8143) 316 Incore Inst. Drive A 25 A Breaker 25 A Breaker Unit-TB 317 Incore Inst. Drive B 25 A Breaker 25 A Breaker Unit-TB 318 Incore Inst. Drive C 25 A Breaker 25 A Breaker Unit-TB 3.19 ~
Incore Inst. Drive D 25 A Breaker 25 A Breaker
--Unit-TB 320 Incore Inst. Drive E 25 A Breaker 25 A Breaker Unit-TB 321 Incore Inst.. Drive A 25 A Breaker 25 A Breaker Leak'Detection C
happ 8H TABLE 3.8-1 PP-~l j~-1p p,]
CONTAINMENT PENETRATION CONDUCTOR MAY fggg OVERCURRENT PROTECTIVE DEVICES Item No. E ui ment Descri tion Primar Protection Secondar Protection 322 Incore Inst. Drive A 25 A Breaker 25 A Breaker Path Insertion 323 Incore Inst. Drive A 25 A Breaker 25 A Breaker Leak Detection 324 Encore Inst. Drive B 25 A Breaker 25 A Breaker Path Insertion 325 Incore Inst. Drive C 25 A Breaker 25 A Breaker Path Insertion 326 Incore Inst.. Drive D 25 A Breaker 25 A Breaker Path Insertion 327 Incore Inst. Drive E 25 A Breaker 25 A Preaker Path Insertion MOV-2SI-V536SB-1 3 A Fuse 15 A Breaker (8808B)
Position Switch (ANN) 329 AOV-2SI-V533SN-1 3 A Fuse 3 A Fuse (8875B) 330 AOV-2SI-'539SN-1 3 A Fuse 3 A Fuse (8877B) 331 AOV-2SI-V552S¹1 3 A Fuse 3 A Fuse (8878B) 332 AOV-2SI-V542SN-1 3 A Fuse 3 A Fuse (8878B) 333 Integrated Head 6 A Fuse 15 A Breaker Cooling Fan E-80 (1B-NNS) 334 Integrated Head 6 A Fuse 15 A Breaker Cooling Fan E-81 (1B-NNS) 335 2SI-V631-SN-1 .3 A Fuse 3 A Fuse Va1ve Position Switch ass 2SI-V631-.SN-1 3 A Fuse 3 A Fuse Valve Position Switch 337 Damper CV-D20-1 6 A Fuse 15 A Breaker 8HMPP TABLE 3.8-1 CONTAINMENT PENETRATION CONDUCTOR MAY ]gag OVERCURRENT PROTECTIVE DEVICES Item No. E ui ment Descri tion Primar Protection Secondar Protection 338 2SI-V632-SN-1 3 A Fuse 3 A Fuse (Valve Position Switch) 339 2SI-V636-SN-1 3 A Fuse 3 A Fuse (Valve Position Switch) 340 2SI-V634-SN-1 3 A Fuse 3 A Fuse (Valve Position Switch) 341 2SI-V637-SN-1 3 A Fuse 3 A Fuse (Valve Position Switch) 342 2SI-V635-SN-1 3 A Fuse 3 A Fuse (Valve Position Switch) 343 2SI-V638-SN-1 3 A Fuse 3 A Fuse (Valve Position Switch) "
2SI-V626-SN-1'Valve 3 A Fuse 3 A Fuse Position Switch)
, 2SI-V628-SN-1 (Valve Position Switch) 3 A'use 3 A Fuse 346 2SI-V629-SN-1 3 A Fuse 3 A Fuse (Valve Position Switch) 347 2SI-V630-SN-1 3 A Fuse 3 A Fuse '
(Valve Position Switch) 348 RCP-IB-SN Space Heater 15 A Breaker 30 A Breaker 349. Integrated Head 20 A Breaker 20 A Breaker Cooling Fan E-80 (1B.-NNS) 350 Integrated Head 20 A Breaker 20 A Breaker Cooling Fan E-81 (1B-NNS) 351 AH-37 (1B-NNS). Motor 15 A Breaker 15 A Breaker Space Heater 352 (1B-NNS) Motor 15 A Breaker 15 A Breaker os'H"38 Space Heater AH-39 (1B-NNS) .Motor '15 A Breaker 15 A Breaker Space Heater
-26"
TABLE 3.8"1 SHE pp Rg;,~~ i~~pW p )
CONTAINMENT PENETRATION CONDUCTOR OVERCURRENT PROTECTIVE DEVICES MAY ]ggg Item No. E ui ment Descri tion Primar Protection Secondar Protection 354 CFC-AH-37 (1B-NNS) 1600 A Breaker 400 A Fuse 355 CFC-AH-38 (1B-NNS) 1600 A Breaker 400 A Fuse 356 CFC-AH-39 (1B-NNS) 1600 A Breaker 400 A Fuse 357 CRDM Fan E-80 (1B-NNS) 100 A Breaker 100 A Breaker 358 CRDM Fan E-81 (1B-NNS) 100 A Breaker 100 A Breaker 359 Reactor Coolant. Drain Tank Pump 1B
'0 A Breaker 50 A Breaker 360 Containment Building - 50 A Breaker 50 A Breaker Sump Pump 1B-NNS 361 Incore Instrument 15 A Breaker 15 A Breaker Drive Assemblies 362 MOV-1RC-V528SN-1 15 A Breaker 15 A Breaker (8000C) 363 Lighting Panel LP-104 70 A Breaker 150 A-Breaker 364 Lighting Panel LP-107 50 A Breaker 50 A Breaker (N/E)
IC0 365 Lighting Panel LP-103 50 A Breaker 440' Breaker 366 Lighting Panel LP-123 60 A Breaker 125 A Breaker.
367 Pressurizer Heater 90 A Breaker 100 A Fuse Back-up Group "B" 368 Pressurizer Heater 90 A Breaker 100 A Fuse Back-up Group "B" 369 Pressurizer Heater 90 A Breaker 100 A Fuse Back-up Group "B" 370 Pressurizer Heater 90 A Breaker 100 A Fuse Back-up Group "B" Po~er Receptacles 60 A Breaker 60 A Breaker f1-12, 1-16 TABLE 3.8-1 8HNPP ~
p g'~t ~
~
~
CONTAINMENT PENETRATION CONDUCTOR MAY <OSS OVERCURRENT PROTECTIVE DEVICES Item No. E ui ment Descri tion Primar Protection Secondar Protection 372 Power Receptacles 60 A Breaker 60 A Breaker
$ 1-3, 1-7 373 Power Receptacles 60 A Breaker 60 A Breaker gl"4, 1-8 g~R<a>9 374 RCP-1B-SN Oil Bridge 30 A Breaker 30 A Breaker Lift Pump 375 Pressurizer Heater 90 A Breaker 100 A Fuse Back-up Group "B" 376 Pressurizer Heater 90 A Breaker 100 A Fuse Back-up Group "B" 377 Pressurizer Heater 90 A Breaker 100 A Fuse Back-up Group "B" 378 Pressurizer Heater 90 A Breaker 100 A Fuse Back-up Group ".B"
~vs Digital Rod Position 50 A. Breaker 100 A Breaker Indication Cab "B" 120 V AC Supply 380 Power Receptacles 60 A Breaker 60 A Breaker f'1-11, 1-15 381 Power Receptacles 60 A Breaker 60 A Breaker
$ 1-77, 1-78 382 Stud Tensioner Hoist 15 A Breaker 15 A Breaker Motor (CRDM Terminal Box B1263) 383 RCP-1C-SN Relay Trips Relay Trips Feeder Bkr. Upstream Brk.
384 RCP-1C-SN Relay Trips Relay Trips Feeder Bkr. Upstream Brk.
385 Containment Fan Cooler 225 A Breaker 1600 A Breaker AH-2 (1A-SA) 386 Containment Fan Cooler 225 A Breaker 1600 A Breaker AH-2 (lA-SA)
CP 3HNi"'p TABLE 3.8-1 p ~~<)
CONTAINMENT PENETRATION CONDUCTOR MAY OVERCURRENT PROTECTIVEvDEVXCES Item No. E ui ment Descri tion Primar Protection Secondar Protection 387 Containment Fan Cooler 225 A Breaker 1600 A Breaker AH-2 (1B-SA) 388 Containment Fan Cooler 225 A Breaker 1600 A Breaker AH-2 (1B-SA) 389 Fan S-l (1A-NNS) 15 A Breaker 15 A Breaker Filtration Unit MIS-lAR-7644 390 RCP-1C-SN Space Heater 15 A Breaker 20 A Breaker 391 AOV-2CS-V521SN-1 3 A Fuse 3 A Fuse (8141C) 392 AOV-2CS-V514SN-1 3 A Fuse 3 A Fuse (8142) 393 Valve Position Switch 3 A Fuse 3 A Fuse SM-1-LCV-408 394 RCP-C Stand Pipe 3 A Fuse 3 A Fuse
'-LCV-408 395 AOV-ZCC-D224SN"1 3 A Fuse 3 A Fuse (9472) 396 Damper AR-D3-1 6 A Fuse 15 A Breaker (Sol. Valve FSE-AR-D3-1)
't 397 Damper AR-D3-1 3 -A Fuse 3 A Fuse Limit Switch 398 Charcoal Temp. 6 A Fuse 15 A Breaker Detection Fan S-1 (1A-NNS)
'399 Airborne 90 A Breaker 90 A Breaker Radioactivity Removal Unit S-1 (1A-NNS)
BcAai~g 400 RCP-1C-SN Oil Beikge 30 A Breakei 30 A Breaker Lift Pump
/
4
TABLE 3.8-1 SHE pp CONTAINMENT PENETRATION CONDUCTOR OVERCURRENT PROTECTIVE DEVICES MAY ]F6 Item No. E ui ment Descri tion Primar Protection Seconda Protection 401 Containment Building 50 A Breaker 50 A Breaker Sump Pump 1A-NNS 402 Airborne Radioactivity 90 A Breaker 90 A Breaker Removal Unit S-1 (1B-NNS) 403 Fuel Transfer Cont. 15 A Breaker 15 A Breaker Cab (Pump Motor) 404 RCC Change Fixt 15 A'Breaker 15 A Breaker (Gripper Hoist Ratio Motor) 405 Fuel Transfer 30 A Breaker 30 A Breaker Manipulator Crane
~'
Osl SHNPP RL.lfptr ~i 3.8-2 MAY Sg6 TABLE MOTOR OPERATED VALVES THERMAL OVERLOAD PROTECTION
~3'/55 g7Ellic i VALVE NUMBER FUNCTXON (YES / NO)
S 'll 2CS<<V522) RCP A SEAL ISOL YES I c 5'- 37Z CS-V523) RCP B SEAL ZSOL YES IcS- 9Zg 2CS-V524) RCP C SEAL ISOL YES lc5-I/2 2CS-V600) CSIP A MINZFLOW ISOLATION YES I 5-g I o (2CS-V601) CSXP C MINZFLOW ISOLATION YES I c5 I 9 g (2CS-V602 ) CSIP B MINIFLOW ISOLATION YES lcs-ASS 2CS-V609) CSIP TO RCS ISOLATION YES I II l 2CS-L521) c5- ZING'2CS-V585) VCT ISOLATION YES Ics- z'I2 (2CS-L522) RMST ISOLATION YES le&- CSIPS MINIFLOW ISOLATION YES I cS- j55(2CS-L520) VCT ISOLATION YES I cs- 2 9 I (2CS-L523) RMST ISOLATION YES I cs- 233'2CS-V610) CSIP TO RCS ISOLATION YES I c5- I 7 p (2CS-V587) CSIP SUCTION ISOLATION YES Ics- I&9(2CS-V589) CSIP SUCTION ISOLATION YES lcs- I7 I (2CS-V590) CSIP SUCTION ISOLATION YES les-lIo3 pcs-v588i CSIP SUCTION ISOLATION YES lcs- ~ IV PCS-V603) CSIP DISCHARGE ISOL YES ICS- 2 I7 (2CS-V604) CSXP DISGORGE ZSOL'SIP YES IcS- 2 i V'2CS-V605) DISCHARGE ISOL YES I c5- 2
>o t2CS-V606) CSXP DXSCHARGE ISOL YES lcs- 2 "IoQCS-V611~ SEAL WATER INJECTION YES
/c 5 g7 g(2CS-V586q BORIC ACID TANK TO CSIP YES CSIP MXN1FLOW YES l cg- 79/ pCS-V757( CSIP MINXFLOW YES Ics- 7/2(2CS-V759 I c5-7'2CS-V760 CSIP MINXFLOM YES I cS- 705 (2CS-V75 CSIP MXNIFLOW YES I cS- 472 (2CS-V517) RCPS SEAL MATER RETURN XSOL YES I cs- q7o (2CS-V516) RCP'EAL WATER ISOLATION YES S5. (2RH-V507~ RHR TO CSIP SUCTION YES I RH- 4$ (2RH-V506) RHR TO CSIP SUCTION YES I g H- 3 I (2RH-F513) RHR A MINX FLOW YES I gH- g9 (2RH-F512)
RHR B MINI FLOW YES
~
PIl- Z (lRH-V503) RHRS INLET ISOLATION YES I pic- u 0 (1RH-Vsol) RHRS INLET ISOLATION YES I~~- I (1RH-VSO@ RHRS INLET ISOLATION. YES IR Il- 3'9 (1RH-Vsoo) RHRS INLET ISOLATION YES I 5X - I t2SI-V503) BORON INJECTION TANK INLET ISOL YES I SS'- I (2SI-V506) BORON INJECTION TANK OUTLET ZSOL YES ISS- Z (2SI-V504 BORON INJ. TANK INLET ISOL YES I 5Z- 3 (2SI-V505 BORON INJ. TANK OUTLET ISOL YES 2,94 (2SI-V537 ACCUMULATOR A DISCHARGE ISOLATION YES 2 09 (2SI-V535) ACCUMULATOR C DISCHARGE ISOLATION YES 3 po (2SI-V571) CNMT SUMP TO RHR PUMP A ISOL YES (2SI-V573) CNMT SUMP TO RHR PUMP A ISOL YES,
~ Io
- 2. 97 (2SX-V536) ACCUM B DISCHARGE ISOLATION YES 3p I (2SI-V570) CNMT .SUMP TO RHR PUMP B ISOL .YES (2SI-V572) CNMT SUMP TO RHR PUMP B ISOL YES I gg 3 fI SHEARON HARRIS UNIT 3/4 8-21
OS1 SHNPP C 'i+
RP'>-"'r <<
TABLE 3.8-2 (Cont'd) MAY 3986 MOTOR OPERATED VALVES THERMAL OVERLOAD PROTECTION BYPASS DEVICE VALVE NUMBER FUNCTION (YES / NO)
I~j-- I07 (2SI-V500) HH SI TO RCS HL YES 52 {2SI-V502) HH SI TO RCS CL YES I '5$ 'P& (2SI-V501) HH SI TO RCS HL YES I SX-32 6 (2SI-V577) LH SI TO RCS HL YES I5y-3>7 (2SI-V576) LH SI TO RCS HL YES I Sj:- gqo (2SI-V579) LH SI TO RCS CL YES IM 3gI (2SI-V578) LH SI TO RCS CL YES (2SI-V587) LH SI TO RCS HL YES Igy- 32.2 (2SI-V575) RWST TO RHR A ISOL YES ISX- 2,3 (2SI-V574) RWST TO RHR B ISOL YES g
Icc - I2+ (3CC-B5) CCS NONESSENTIAL RETURN ISOL YES ICC. I27 (3CC-B6) CCS NONESSENTIAL RETURN ISOL YES q l (3CC-B19) CCS NONESSENTIAL RETURN ISOL YES ICc.- I t3 (3CC-B20) CCS NONESSENTIAL RETURN ISOL YES I CC- ( N7 (3CC-V165 ) RHR COOLING ISOL YES
( cc
- I 47 (3CC-V167) RHR COOLING ISOL YES ICc- I7 Q (2CC-V172 ) CVCS HX CNMT ISOLATION YES I cc
- po z (2CC-V182) CVCS HX CNMT ISOLATION YES ICC- >op (2CC-V170) CCW-RCPS ISATION YES 2"r 9 (2CC-V183) RCPS BEARING HX ISOLATION YES
] cc,- 25 I (2CC-V190 ) RCPS THER BARRIER ISOLATION YES Icc- zo7 (2CC-V169) CCW-RCPS ISOLATION YES I cc 2'I7 (2CC-V184 ) ~ RCPS BEARING HX ISOLATION YES I cc- s 1 9 (2CC-V191 ) RCPS THER BARRIER ISOLATION YES I C T - r oS (2CT-V6) CNMT SPRAY SUMP A RECIRC ISOL YES I cr- Io2. (2CT-V7) CNMT SPRAY SUMP B RECIRC ISOL YES I CT'- 2G (2CT-V2) CNMT SPRAY PUMP A INJECT. SUPPLY YES I C.T- 7 I (2CT-,V3 ) CNMT SPRAY PUMP B INJECT SUPPLY YES I C.T- g 0 (2CT-'V21) SPRAY HDR A ISOLATION YES
.Ic.7 I 2. (3CT-V85) NAOH ADDITIVE ISOLATION YES ICT- SF (2CT-V43) SPRAY HDR B ISOLATION YES IcT- Ir (3GT-V88) NAOH ADDITIVE ISOLATION YES Ic.7- L17 (2CT-V25) CNMT SPRAY HDR A RECIRC YES ICT- 2.'/ (2CT-V8) CNMT SPRAY PUMP A EDUCTOR TEST YES Ig- e5 (2CT-V49) CNMT SPRAY HDR-B RECIRC YES I
Cv" g> (2CT-V145) CNMT SPRAY PUMP B EDUCTOR TEST YES (3AF-V18 7) AFWP A RECIRC YES Iyp- gM (3AP-v188) AFWP B RECIRC YES InF- 55 (2AP-v10) AFW TO SG A ISOL YES I
a~- R3 (2AP-Vlg) AFW TO SG B ISOL YES I Ar 7'f (2AP-V23) AFW TO SG C ISOL YES (oF- I 37 (2AP-V116) AFWTD TO SG A ISOL YES I AF I "t 3 (2AF-V117) AFWTD TO SG B ISOL YES IA r= r 'I I (2AF-V118) AFWTD TO SG C ISOL YES 5 70 (2MS-V8) AFWTD STEAN B ISOLATION YES 5 - 7< (2MS-v9) AFWTD STEAM C ISOLATION YES
< ~a - 3 I (3SW-B5) NORMAL SW HDR'A ISOLATION YES SHEARON HARRIS UNIT 3/4 8-21A
v
~ f )
OS1 8HNPP Rp>,lie.,I +5 I TABLE 3.8-2 (Cont'd)
MAY 886 MOTOR OPERATED VALVES THERMAL OVERLOAD PROTECTION P PP/I55 @~V/C E VALVE NUMBER FUNCTION (YES / NO)
IS~-27@ (3SW-B8) NORMAL SW HDR A RETURN ISOL YES
~S>- 27O (3SW-B15) Sw HDR A TO AUX RSVR ISOL YES I5<- 90 t3SW-B6) NORMAL Sw HDR B ISOL YES Sw" 2,75 (3SW-B13) SW HDR A RETURN ISOL YES t
I Sw- g7 "/ (3SW-B14) 'w HDR B RETURN ISOL YES isw-2, 77 3SW"B16) SW HDR B TO AUX RSVR ISOL YES ts~- 3 3SW-B3 ) EMER SW PUMP 1A MAIN RSVR INLET YES ISQ- "I t3SW-B4) EMER SW PUMP 1B MAIN RSVR INLET YES IS<- I (3SM-Bl ) EMER SW PUMP 1A AUX RSVR INLET YES
>sw- 2. (3SW-B2) EMER SW PUMP 1B AUX RSVR INLET YES I Su)- g 2. (2SW-B46) Sw TO FAN CLR AH3 INLET YES ISd- ~7 2SW-B47 ) Sw TO FAN CLR AH3 OUTLET YES Isw-9 I 2SW-B45 ) SW TO FAN CLR AH2 INLET YES IS~- I O9 2SM"B49 ) SW TO FAN CLR AH2 OUTLET YES I5~- XU 2SW-B52) SW TO FAN CLR AH1 INLET YES IS<- 93 (2SW-B48 ) SW TO FAN CLR AH1 OUTLET YES
)su)- 2.2 7 (2SW-B5 1 ) SW TO FAN CLR AH4 INLET YES ISA I I O (2SM-B50 ) ,SW TO FAN CLR AH4 OUTLET YES
) gyp- I Z'f 3SW"B70 ) SW TO AFWTD PUMP YES i5w- l2.4 3SW-B71 ) SW TO AFWTDWUMP YES Is~- Ir'I (3SW-B73 ) SM TO AFMTD PUMP YES I 5Q- I a7 (3SM-B72 ) Sw TO AFMTD PUMP YES Isd I 23 (3SW-B75 3 SW TO AFW PUMP A SUPPLY YES ISw-lrI (3sw-B74) SW TO AFW PUMP A SUPPLY YES Is'w- I 32- (3SM-B77 ) Sw TO AFM PUMP B SUPPLY YES
'ls<- t3o (3SW-B76) SW TO AFM PUMP B SUPPLY YES ICD- 9g (2MD-V36 ) CNMT SUMP ISOLATION~ YES PEP- 'fs (2MD-V77 ) CNMT SUMP ISOLATION YES 3CZ-B5 RAB ELEC PROT INLET YES 3CZ"B6 RAB ELEC PROT INLET YES 3CZ-B7 RAB ELEC PROT EXHAUST YES 3CZ-B8 RAB ELEC PROT EXHAUST YES 3CZ-B32 RAB ELEC PROT PURGE MAKE-UP YES 3CZ-B33 RAB ELEC PROT PURGE MAKE-UP YES 3CZ-B34 RAB ELEC PROT PURGE INLET YES 3CZ-B35 3FV-B2 RAB ELEC PROT PURGE INLET FUEL HANDLING EXHAUST INLET ~
~
YES No+
3FV-B4 3CZ"B1
.3CZ-B3 FUEL HANDLING EXHAUST INLET CONTROL ROOM NORMAL SUPPLY ISOL CONTROL ROOM NORMAL EXHAUST ISOL
~ vo+
mo~
486- aO +
3CZ-B17 CONTROL ROOM PURGE MAKE UP /VO +
3CZ-B2 CONTROL ROOM NORMAL SUPPLY ISOL QQ+
3CZ-B'4 CONTROL ROOM EXHAUST ISOLATION VSe NO >
3CZ-B18 CONTROL ROOM PURGE MAKE UP %38 yg +
3CZ-B14 CONTROL ROOM PURGE EXHAUST 488. <O +
3CZ-B26 CONTROL ROOM NORMAL SUPPLY DISCH AS6 gO~
3CZ-B25 3CZ-B13 CONTROL CONTROL ROOM SUPPLY ROOM PURGE DISCHARGE-EXHAUST ~ uo~ PO+
SHEARON HARRIS UNIT 3/4 8-21B
OS1 8HNP P RPJ f8JP~!
TABLE 3.8-2 (Cont'd) ws $ 88 MOTOR OPERATED VALVES THERMAL OVERLOAD PROTECTION ypzss v>><<
VALVE NUMBER FUNCTION (YES / NO) 4.
3CZ-B12 CNTL RM EMER FLTR OUTSIDE AIR INTAKEf88 ~g 3CZ-B10 CNTL RM EMER FLTR OUTSIDE AIR INTAKE~
3CZ-B9 CNTL RM EMER FLTR OUTSIDE AIR INTAKE~ Vc ~
3CZ-B11 CNTL RM EMER FLTR OUTSIDE AIR INTAKESSS QG+
3CZ"B23 CONTROL ROOM EMER FLTR INLET ~g 4-3CZ-B21 CONTROL ROOM FLTR DISCHARGE 3CZ-B22 CONTROL ROOM EMER FLTR DISCHARGE do+
3CZ-B24 CONTROL ROOM EMER FLTR INLET AJO ~
3CZ"B19- CONTROL ROOM EMER FLTR DISCHARGE 'F88 nJo 3CZ-B20 CONTROL ROOM EMER FLTR DISCHARGE 425 3AV-B1 RAB EMER EXHAUST INLET YES 3AV-B2 RAB EMER EXHAUST OUTLET YES 3AV"B4 RAB EMER EXHAUST INLET YES 3AV-B5 RAB EMER EXHAUST OUTLET YES 3AV-B3 RAB EMER EXHAUST BLEED YES 3AV-B6 RAB EMER EXHAUST BLEED YES 3AC-82 RAB SWGR B EXHAUST YES 3AC-B3 RAB SWGR B EXHAUST YES 3AC-B1 RAB SWGR A EXHAUST YES
>acluclc' egg, C.Otnp1e+n4ss OP iy ~
<<<)o+J by nSS J +o $ 4 v( ce I5 A ccow pli gheJ by c)Pc~i ~
J<sl)n'HEARON HARRIS UNIT 1 3/4 8-21C
SHNPP REvlS)A"-'AY t'R00F 55'IBfH IOIy
$ 86 DESIGN FEATURES DESIGN PRESSURE AND TEMPERATURE
'd 5.2.2 ,The containment building is designed and shall be maintained for a maximum internal pressure of 45.0 psig and a peak air temperature of t~'F.
5.3 REACTOR CORE FUEL ASSEMBLIES 5.3.1 The core shall contain 157 fuel assemblies with each fuel assembly containing 264 fuel rods clad with [Zircaloy-4]. Each fuel rod shall have a nominal active fuel length of 144 inches. and-ee
~Wmnt df
~8'.
to the ini tial CONTROL ROD ASSEMBLIES cor e 1
@add oading dd 1 hi 5.3.2 The core shall contain 52 shutdown and control rod assemblies. The and rod assemblies shall contain a nominal 142 inches of absorber 'hutdown material.. The nominal values of absorber material shall be 80K silver, 15K indium, and SX cadmium, or 95K hafnium with the remainder zirconium. All control rods shall be clad with stainless steel tubing.
5.4 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM DESIGN PRESSURE AND TEMPERATURE 5.4.1 The Reactor Coolant System is designed and shall be maintained:
,a 0 In accordance with the Code requirements specified in Section [5.2]
of the FSAR, with allowance for normal degradation pursuant to the applicable Surveillance Requirements,
- b. For a pressure of 2485 psig, 'and
- c. For a temperature of 650'F, except for the pressurizer which is 680 F.
VOLUME 5.4.2 The total water and steam volume of the Reactor Coolant System is 9410 t 100 cubic feet at a nominal T of (588.8] F.
- 5. 5 METEOROLOGICAL TOWER LOCATION, 5.5. 1 The meteorological station shall be located as shown on Figure 5. 1-1.
d SHEARON HARRIS - UNIT 1 5" 6
~; ~
SHNF P tQV> ($ ~ >.~ ~ i PROOF AND BBSY COPY MAY .. Sg5 OESIGN FEATURES 5.6 FUEL STORAGE CRITICALITY 5.6. 1. The spent fuel storage racks are designed and shall be maintained with:
- a. A k ff equivalent to less than or equal to 0.95 when flooded with unborated water, which includes an allowance for uncertainties as described in Section f4..3. 2. 6] of the FSAR, and
- b. A nominal 10.5 inch center-to-center distance between fuel assemblies placed in the PMR storage racks and 6.25 inch center to center distance in the BMR storage racks.
5.6.1. The k ff for new fuel for the first core loading stored dry in the spent fuel storage racks shall not exceed $ 0.98j when aqueous foam moderation is assumed.
~
ORAINAGE 5.6.2 The new and spent fuel storage pools are designed and shall be maintained to prevent inadvertent draining of the pools below eleva'tion 277.
CAPACITY 5.6.3'he new and spent fuel storage pools are designed for a storage capacity 11RRRPIIRP 1 11 d* 1 1 1 PPllR and BMR storage spaces in 48 interchangeable 7x7 PMR and 11x11 BMR racks. These interchangeab1e racks will be installed as needed. Any combination of BMR and PMR ra'cks may be used.
5.7 COMPONENT CYCLIC OR TRANSIENT LIMIT 5.7.1 The components identified in Table 5.?-1 are designed and shall be maintained within the cyclic or transient limits of Table 5. 7-1.
SHEARON HARRIS " UNIT 1 5-7
SHNPP ip +$ /c ~
Nll03 klft) l'B)P('I fu3'f e<v 19
- 6. 0 ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROLS
- 6. 1 RESPONSIBILITY 6.1.1 The Plant General Manager shall be responsible for overall unit opera-tion and shall delegate in writing the succession to this responsibility dur-ing his absence.
6.1.2 The Shift Foreman (or, during his absence from the control room, a designated individual) shall be responsible for the control room command func-tion. A management directive to this effect, signed by the Vice President-Harris Nuclear Project shall be. reissued to all station personnel on an annual basis.
- 6. 2 ORGANIZATION OFFSITE 6.2. 1 The offsite organizatjon for unit management and technical support shall be as shown in Figure 6. 2-1.
UNIT STAFF 6.2.2 The unit organization shall be as shown in Figure 6.2-2 and:
- a. Each on-duty shift shall be composed of at least the minimum shift crew composition shown in Table 6.2-1;
' b. At least one licensed Operator shall be in the control room when fuel is in the reactor. In addition, while the unit is in MODE 1, 2, 3, or 4, at least one licensed Senior Operator shall be in the control room;
- c. An individual qualified as a Radiation Control Technician" shall be on site when fuel is in the reactor;
- d. All CORE ALTERATIONS shall be observed and directly supervised by either a licensed Senior Operator or licensed Senior Operator Limited
~
to Fuel Handling who has no other concurrent responsibilities during this operation;
- e. site Fire Brigade of at least five members" shall be maintained on ad)'embers ~
A h Fi Big of the minimum shift crew necessary for safe shutdown of the uni any personnel required for other essential functions during a fire emergency; and g~gg+/fp /Q 7~gg,g g. l-/ h5R "The Radiation Control Technician and Fire Brigade composition may be less than the minimum requirements for a period of time not to exceed 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />, in order to accommodate unexpected absence, provided immediate action is taken to fill the required positions.
SHEARON HARRIS - UNIT 1 6-1
TABLE 4.1.1-1 (continued)
REACTOR DESIGN COMPARISON TABLE VIRGIL C. SUMMER THERMAL AND HYDRAULIC DESIGN PARAMETERS SHEARON HARRIS NUCLEAR STATION
- 15. Average in Core 592.6 591. 2
- 16. Average in Vessel 588.8 589.0 HEAT TRANSFER
- 17. Active Heat Transfer, Surface Area, ft. 2 48,600 48,600
- 18. Average Heat Flux, BTU/hr.-ft.2 189,800 189,800
- 19. Maximum Heat Flux for Normal Operation, BTU/hr.-ft.2 440,400 <'~ 440,400
- 20. Average Thermal Output, kW/ft. 5.44 5.44
- 21. Maximum Thermal Output for Normal Operation, kW/ft. 12.6~ 12.6
- 22. Peak Linear Power Resulting From Overp'ower Transients, Operator Errors, Assuming a Maximum Overpower of 118 Percent kW/ft. 18.0~<~~ 18.0M
- 23. Heat Flux Hot Channel Factor, Fq
- 24. Peak Fuel Central Temperature at 100 Percent Power F 3250 3250
- 25. Peak Fuel Central Temperature at Maximum Thermal Output for Maximum Overpower Trip Point, F <4700 <4700
TABLE 4.1 ~ 1-1 (continued)
REACTOR DESIGN COMPARISON TABLE VIRGIL C SUMMER CORE MECHANICAL DESIGN PARAMETERS SHEARON HARRIS NUCLEAR STATION REFLECTOR'THICKNESS AND COMPOSITION
- 53. Top Water plus Steel, in. 10 HO 54 'ottom Water plus Steel, in. 10 HO
- 55. Side Water plus Steel, in. 15
- 56. H20/U Molecular Ratio Core, Lattice (Cold) 2.42 2.42 FUEL ENRICHMENT, W/0
- 57. Region 1 2. 10 2. 10 2
- 58. Region 2 2.60 2.60
- 59. Region 3 '3.10 3. 10
~ pePZ~
(x) ~ See Section 4.3.2 ~ 2.6.
Q) ~~ ~ ggg gl~k4IL pQ,
(~) ~ This is the value of F
~JIB~~ H<
n n pg
SHNPP FSAR finally, as previously discussed, this upper bound envelope is based on procedures of load follow which require operation within an allowed deviation from a target equilibrium value of axial flux difference. The procedures are detailed in the Technical Specif'ications and are followed by. relying only upon excore surveillance supplemented by the normal monthly full core map requirement and by computer-based alarms on deviation and time of deviation from the allowed flux difference band.
Allowing for fuel densification effects the average linear power at'2775 Mwt is 5.44 kW/ft. From Figure 4.3.2-2 the conservative upper bound value of normalired locaL power density is 2.32 corresponding to a peak linear power of
~
12.9 kW/Et. at 102 percent power.
~ ~
n../ 5 Z.WS Accident analyses f are presented in Chapter 15 of the FSAR. The results th analyses determined a limiting value of total peaking factor, FQ ~ of 2 ~ 32 under normal operat ion, inc 1 uding load fo 1 1 owing maneuvers ~ Thi s value is erived from the conditions necessary to satisfy the limiting conditions specified in the LOCA analyses of FSAR Sectio 15.6.5. As noted above, an upper bound envelope of F~ x Power equal to .32 x K(Z), as shown in FSAR Figure 4.3.2-21, results from operation in accordance with Constant Axial Offset Control procedures using ex-core surveillance only.
2..zS To determine reactor protection system setpoints with respect to power distributions, three categories of events are considered: namely rod control equipment malfunctions, operator errors of commission, and operator errors of omission. In evaluating the three categories of events, the core is assumed to be operating within the four constraints described above.
The Eirst category comprises uncontrolled rod withdrawal (with rods moving in the normal bank sequence) for full length banks. Also included are motions of the fuLL length banks below their insertion limits, which couLd be caused, Eor example, by uncontrolled dilution or reactor coolant cooldown. Power distributions were calculated throughout the occurrences, assuming short term corrective actions that is, no transient xenon effects were considered to result from the malfunction. The event was assumed to occur Erom typical normal operating situations which include normal xenon transients't was further assumed in determining the power distributions that total core power level would be limited by reactor trip to beLow 118 percent. Since the study is to determine protection limits with respect to power and axial offset, no credit was taken for trip setpoint reduction due to flux difference. Results are given in Figure 4.3.2-22 in units of kW/Et. The peak power density which can occur in such events, assuming reactot'rip at or belo~ 118 percent, is 4.3.2-11 Amendment No. 21
TABLE 4 ~ 3+2-2 NUCLEAR DESIGN PARAHETERS First Cycle Core Avera e Linear Power kW/ft includin densification effects 5.43 Total Heat Flux Hot Channel Factor, F Nuclear Enthalpy Rise Hot Channel Factor, F" AH 1. 55 Reactivit Coefficients+ Desi n Limits Best Estimate Doppler-only Power, -19.4 to -12.6 -14.2 to -10.5 Coefficients, pcm/X Power (upper limit)
(See Figure 15~0.4-1), Lower Limit -10 2 to -6.7 -11.5 to -8.2 Doppler Temperature Coefficient, pcm/F -29 to-1 ~ 4 -2.1 to -1 4 Hoderator Temperature Coefficient, pcm!F <0 -0 to -35 Boron +efficient, pcm/ppm -16 to -7 -13 to -9 Rodded Hoderator Density Coefficient pcm/gm/cc <0.43 x 105 <O.27 x 1O5 Dele ed Neutron Fraction and Lifetime g ff BOLi (EOL) 0.0075 (0.0044)
, BOL, (EOL) p sec. i9.4 (ia.i)
Control Rods Rod Requi.rements See Table 4.3.2-3 Haximum Bank Worthy pcm~ <2000 Haximum E)ected Rod Worth See Chapter 15
(
Boron Concentrations (PPH)
Zero Powers keff ~ 1.00, Cold, Rod Cluster Control Assemblies Out, 1X h> Uncertainty Included 1430
48/76/17545.1 2.4 2.3 2.2 2.1 2.28 AT AT 0'.28 AT 6'.14 2,0 10.87'.50 AT 1.9 O 1.8 X
107 12'.3 a
1.6 1.4 1.2 1.0 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 BOTTOM CORE HElGHT (FT) TOP Figure 4.3.2-21. Maximum FQ x Power Versus Axial Height During Normal Operation
SHNPP FSAR 4.4. 2. 11.4 Surface Heat Transfer Coeffici'ents The fuel rod surface heat transfer coefficients during subcooled forced convection and nucleate boiling are presented in Section 4.4.2.7.1.
- 4. 4. 2. 11. 5 Fuel Clad Temperatures The outer surface of the fuel rod at the hot spot operates at a temperature of approximateiy 660F for steady state operation at rated power throughout core life due to the presence of nucleate boiling. Initially (beginning-of-life),
this temperature is that of the clad metal outer surface.
During operation over the life of the core, the buildup of oxides and crud on the fuel rod, surface causes the clad surface temperature to increase.
Allowance is made in the fuel center melt evaluation for this temperature rise. Since the thermal-hydraulic design basis limits DNB, adequate heat transfer is provided between the fuel clad and the reactor coolant so that the core thermal output is not limited by considerations of clad temperature.
4.4.2. 11.6 Treatment of Peaking Factors ~ g.g'he total heat flux hot channel factor, Fq, is defined as he ratio of the maximum to core average heat flux. The design value' F0 as presented in Table 4.3 '-2 and discussed in Section 4.3.2.2.6', is . for normal results in a peak linear power of 2.o W/ft. at full power operation. This kW/fthm conditions.
lz.4 As described in Section 4 ~ 3.2.2.6, the peak linear power resulting from overpower transients/operator errors (assuming maximum overpower of 118 percent) is 18.0 The centerline temperature kW/ft must be below the U02 melt temperature over the li ctime of the rod, including aLLowances The fuel temperature design basis is discussed in fot'ncertainties Section 4.4.1 ~ 2 and results in a maximum allowable calculated centerline temperature of 4700F. The peak linear power which would result in centerline meir, is >18.0 kW/ft. The centerline temperature at the peak linear power resulting from overpower transients/operator errors (assuming a maximum overpower of 118 percent) is below that required to produce melting.
- 4. 4. 2-15
SHNPP FSAR TABLE 4.4.2-1 (continued)
THERMAL AND HYDRAULIC COMPARISON TABLE Desi n Parameters Shearon Harris V. C. Summer Heat Transfer Active heat transfer, surface area (ft.2) 48,600 48,600 Average heat flux (Btu/hr.-ft.2) 189,800 189,800 Maximum hest flux for normal
'operation (Btu/hr.-ft. 2) 440,400(a) 440,400 Averge linear power (kM/ft.) 5e44 5. 44 Peak linear power for normal operation (kM/ft.) 12.6(a) 12. 6 Peak linear power resulting from overpower transients/operator errors, assuming a maximum overpower of 118X (kV/ft ) 18. 0 18. 0 Peak linear power which would result in centerline melt (kW/fthm) >18. 0 >18. 0 Power density (kR per liter of cote) (d) 104. 5 104. 5 Specific power (kM per kg. uranium (d) 38.4 38. 4 Fuel Central Tem erature Peak at peak linear power for prevention of centerline melt (F) <4700 <4700 Pressure Drop (e)
Across core (psi) 23.4 + 2.3 23 ' + 2 '
Across vessel, including noszle (psi) 41 ~ 0 + 4.1 40.7 + 4 '
6pW IT
~~
NOTES; Q,I 7a) This licit is asseeiatad with the value ef Pq 2.32.
g5 4lv&J fH ~ $ P~ f.
(b) See Section 4.3 ~ 2.2.6 (c). See Section 4.4.2.11.6 ~
~w (d) Based on cold dimensions and 95 percent of theoretical density fuel.
(e) Based on best estimate reactor coolant flow rate as discussed in Section 5~ 1~
4.4.2-17
6,2,1.5 Minimum Containment Pressure Anal sis for Performance Ca abilit Studies of Emer enc Core Coolin S stem The containment backpressure used for the limiting case CD=0.Q, DECLC break for the ECCS analysis presented in Section 15.6.5 is pre'sented in.
Figure 6.2. 1-302. The containment backpressure is calculated using the methods and assumptions described in "Westinghouse Emergency Core Cooling System Evalulation Model - Summary," WCAP-8339, Appendix A. Input parameters including the containment initial conditions, net free containment volume, passive heat sink materials, thicknesses, surface areas, starting time, and number of containment heat removal systems used in the analysis are described belov.
The anaylsis vas performed assuming the loss of offsite power as the most limiting condition. As indicated in WCAP-8471, the three loop plant limiting case break (CD = 0.4 DECLC) yields lower calculated PCT values with offsite po~er available (reactor coolant pumps run case) than if offsite power is lost (reactor coolant pumps trip case). This results Erom core thermal hydraulics during blowdovn and is true even 'though calculated containment pressure may be lowerin the offsite power available case due to Easter actuation of the engineered sefeguards. The applicability of the generic conclusion regarding offsite power status to the Shearon Harris ECCS analysis is presented in detail below.'
review'of the original three-loop plant generic sensitivity runs demonstrated the large benefit in calculated clad temperature vhich exists at.
end oE blovdown in the offsite pover available case. Calculated clad temperature at end of bLovdovn at the limiting fuel rod elevation (7.25 ft) is 1528 F vith offsite power lost; vith offsite pover available, the calculated clad temperature at the equivalent location is only 1453 F at end of blovdovn. Hence, the blovdovn performance calculated vith offsite pover available produces a clad temperature result at end of blovdown vhich is 75 F better than with loss of offsjte power assumed. This benefit will remain in effect throughout the core reflood transient, during vhich time the PCT is calculated. During the core refLood transient the reactor coolant pumps are assumed to be in the Locked-rotor configuration independent oE the availability of oEfsite power.
The impact oE containment pressure on ECCS performance is important only during the core reflood transient. If offsite power is presumed available,the start times oE the containment fan coolers and sprays at Shearon Harris vill be reduced by ten seconds. The ten seconds of additional heat removal by these systems vill reduce calculated containment pressure during ref lood by less than 0.4 psi; the impact of this pressure reduction on calculated PCT is less than 25 F.
Overall, then, the total effect of assuming offsite power to be available during a large break LOCA event at Shearon Harris is to obtain a more favorable result. The Westinghouse ECCS performance analysis generic assumption of loss of offsite po~er is Limiting for Shearon"Harris, and the results presented in the FSAR demonstrate compliance vith 10 CFR50.46 for this limiting case.
6.2.1-26b
6.2.1.5.1 Mass snd Energy Release Data The mass/energy r'eleases to the Containment during the blovdown and ref lood portions of the limiting break transient are presented in Tables 6.2.1-59 through 6.2.1-61.
The mathematical models vhich calculate the mass and energy releases to the Containment are described in Section 15.6.5. Since the requirements of Appendix K of 10CFR50 are very specific in regard to the modeling of the RCS during blovdovn and the models used are in conformance vith Appendix K, no alteracions to those models have been made in regard to the mass and energy releases. A break spectrum analysis is perEormed (see references in Section L5.6.5) that analyzes various break sizes, break locations, and Moody discharge coefficients Eor the double ended cold leg guillotines which do affect the mass and energy released to the Containment. This effect is considered for each case analyzed. Dur'ing refill, the mass and energy released to che Containment is assumed to be zero, vhich minimires the containment pressure. During reflood, the effect of steam-water mixing betveen the safety injection water and the steam flowing through the RCS intact loops reduces the available energy released to the containment vapor space and therefore tends to minimize containment pressure.
6.2.1.5.2 Inicial Containment Internal Conditions The folloving initial values were used in the analysis'.
Containment pressure 14.7 psia Containment temperature 90 F RWST temperature 40 F Service water temperature 3g M F Outside temperature -2 F Initial Relative Humidity 100 X The initial temperature condition that may be encountered under limiting normal operating conditions used in the ECCS performance analysis was assumed to be 90 F. An evaluation determined that the containment cannot Eall below 80 F, and the normal expected average containment temperature estimated at 100 F. The 90 F value vss chosen because it vas shown to be a conservatively lou value 'consistent uith representative normal full paver operar.ion oi other nuclear piancs. The normal operating range ior containment pressure is expected to be betveen negative 1 inch vg to positive 4 inch vg vith the nominal pressure expected to be slightly positive. The value of 14.7 psia vas assumed for the ECCS performance analysis. The containment is the atmospheric type per Item d of SRP 3.8. The normal containment purge and makeup systems along vich che containment cooling system vill maintain the containment vithin the normal operating range. The Normal Containment Purge Exhaust is Eirst adjusted to sllov the system to draw down the containment atmosphere to a slight negative pressure (to prevent outleakage). Mhen the containment pressure is reduced to -0.25 in. vg, one of the tvo 100 percent capacity makeup fans vill automatically start. The static pressure controller vill regulate the respective supply fsn inlet damper to modulate snd maintain the containment pressure setpoint. The pressure transmitter for controlling this 6.2.1-26c
)) The Frictional r<<s(sLa<:ce assnciaterl with duct e<t(ra<>c.. <<>xir asses, f (it.ers, duc(w>rk bends and skin fric:(<<n has nnt. been cons(d.red.
c) No fa. c<)as(down ef fec( ar; considered ~
d) in>>rtia is cor.s(dered ~ St.eady sta(e flow ouL Lhe p<<<rg>>~stem d<<" t.-
is es(ahl ~ hed (m.".ed'a'el: at. t.he t.ime of t.he LOC>>.
A m(x(ure of s earn a>ro<<<;h L<<<<<
purge lines duri Lhe 6.r)3 seconds that. invest Lhe is <lat(nn >al ves are assume l L~
remain open. The 'ect. nf t.he compos((ion nf t!te ~ being exhausted or, cur ta(nme< L pressur>> as b>>u". bound>>d by (.tpt (r.g t.he two ex(rem>> cas< s, a(r alo".e and steam alo e ~ 'M(Lh(n several seco 8s of th ~ incept.ion of t.he LOCK, con(aianenL pressur will have increas .< tn the point, that crit(cal F(nw will occur in the p<<rg lin< y ~ Tn bo<<rd L e calo<<lat. d gas mixture exha<<<s(ud t.hriu"h t.he purge lines, t,he Xr( ical f w ra(es of stean and air wer~
calc<<la(ed d <ring t.he first 6.03 s o s F t.he CD~0.4 OFCLG break t.ransient. Using Lttesn flow raLe<t, r tical flow was then c<<nservaL(ve'.y assumed to b>> ir. effect. from Lim~ rn. Fquation 4.18 in Reference 6.2.1-13 was employed t.n cal ulzte t.he 'califl rat.e of air Lhro<<<gh the purge lines. Fig<<re 14 of Ref>>re 6.2.1-14 was plied to compute Lhe criLical flow ra(e of st.earn t.hruu e purge lines. T. tntal mass released during the 6.03 seconds Lha( t<, valves are presume<1 <>pe is calculated as 331 lhm a(r or 239 ibm st.ea .~he impact or. containment pr sure at 6.03 sec<)nds result.ing frnm t. 1'oss of air or steam is less than .05 psi in either case. The eff t of a contai.nment pressure reduction o this magnitude nn t.h.
calculated p k cla9 temperature (PCT) is less Lhan 1 deg- The PCT fnr Lh<
DECLG $ 0=0 case is 2181 deg-F aL an Fg of 2.11- Therefore, there is no FQ penal(i( nd margin w(th respect. Lo (OCFR50.46 PCT requirement.s o<
- Enthalpy of accumulator water is 59.6 Btu/ibm.
- 2. f. Ot'0 IC S P.z.~ + z'rc p'- Z7 ZC o(o ~4 Z P./< P 7 dC'7.ZZ Z<.o/o / ~ ~f-7f ~s g7p.iv P-ohio Z7. o I o /7lc.< F 3 /P3 cM l5 5< gz Zgio/'b /fZ. sY j5-5-~, o z.
- .I'I I ~ ji ~ 11;:
- f)os my sl j."
- lli os I-
- 1st
- Il I Is i' 'li Z :: I I
- i: jli::llr
- I 11
- l I' I ill
- Ii
- sl o i I ~
- d. Analysis based upon rated poMer average reactor coolant system vessel temperature of 588.8 F. ~
- e. LOCA analysis performed at best-estimate T (590.0 F).
- Additional information is contained in the TNI Appendix, I
- 1) The spilLing ot the broken loop accumulator directly to containment.
- 2) The spillina of the safety injection Line attached to the broken cold Lee.
- 3) A single"tailure condition such that onLy one train ot saiety injection pumps operates
- 1) blovdoun, 2) refill, and 3) reflood. There are thz'ee distinct transients analyxed in. each phase, including the thermal-hydraulic transient in the RCS, the pressure and temperature transient vithin the Containment, and the fuel and clad temperature transient of the hottest fuel rod in the core. Based on these considerations, a system of inter@elated computez codes has been developed for the analysis of the LOCA.
- 3) sh ws that e to th hjgh 'tial re rynsients xg res 15.6 e 0. .4ECLC 1 ds t. the m
- re ood. e ho 'ssembly calc ations al o ref ct the arne riatio of i xtia1 cl d 'erature w reak size. How er', the ari'on of a clad t eeyerstur r the het sejnhly tel~let e ~i'ess se ' I~nf 15.6.5-9
- 1) Reactor trip signal; steam generator throttle valve closed signal; turbine trip signal
- 2) SI signal (on high containment pressure) (19.2 psia)
- 3) Accumulator injection
- 4) Safety injection begins
- 5) Containment fan coolers begin
- 6) Containment spray begins Reactor Tri Si nal - occurs on compensated pressurizer pressure signal (1860 psia)
- 2X is added to this power level to account for calorimetric error.
- 50. 4 5Oe f ~57
- 1) Break occurs (3" small break) 0.0
- 2) Reactor Trip Signal; steam generator throttle valve 18. 5 signal
- 3) Steam generator throttle valve closed (0.5 sec delay) 19. 0
- 4) Reactor trip occurs (4.2 sec delay) 22.7
- 5) Normal feedwater floy begins to decrease 23. 5
- 6) Sl signal setpt. reached 27.8
- 7) Normal feedwater flow stops 28.5
- 8) Steam generator safety valve low opening pressure 28. 3 reached
- 9) SI begins 52. 8
- 10) huxiliary feedwater flow begins 78. 5
- 11) accumulator in)ection begins 1380. 0 No containment heat removal systems are modeled since a small break exhibits choked flow and thus the containment conditions would have no affec on the RCS.
REFERENCES:
SECTION 15o6o 15.6.1-1 Burnett, T.
T W.~ T.~ ~ et e al.,
a ~ ~ "LOFTRAN Code Descziption, WCAP-7907, June 1972.
15+6.5-1 "Acceptance Criteria for Emergency Coze Cooling Systems for Light Water Cooled Nuclear Power Reactors," 10 CFR 50.46 and Appendix R of 10 CFR 50. Federal Register, Volume 39, Number 3, January 4, 1974.
15 '.5-2 Reactor S a fe tyy Study - hn Assessment of Accident Risks in U. S.
Re Commercial Nuclear Power Plants," WASH-1400, NURE C 75/014 g i October, 1975.
15.6.5-3 Bordelon, F. M., Massie, H. W. and Zozdan, T. A., Westinghouse ECCS Evaluation Model - Summary," WCAP-8339 (Non-Proprietary),
July, 1974.
15.6.5-4 Bordelon, F..M., et al., SATAN-VI Program: Comprehensive Space-Time Dependent Analysis oi Loss of Coolant," WCAP-8302, June, 1974 (Proprietary) and WCAP-8306, June, 1974 (Non-Proprietary) ~
15i6 ~ 5-5 tally, R. D. et al., Calculational Model for Core Reflooding After a Loss of Coolant Accident (WREFLOOD Code)," WCAP-8170, June, 1974 (Proprietary) and WCAP-8171, June, 1974 (Non-Proprietary) 15e6o5-6 Bordelon, F. M. and Murphy, E. T"Containment Pressure Analysis Code (COCO)," WCAP-8327, June, 1974 (Proprietary) and WCAP-8326, June 1974 (Non-Proprietary) ~ ~
15 ' '-7 F M t al LOCTA-XV Program: Loss of Coolant Transient Analysis'CAP 8301 ~ June)y 1974 (Proprietary) and a WCAP-8305, June, 1974 (Non-Proprietary) ~
15+6.5-8 PWR FQCHT final Report, WCAP-7931, October 1972.
15.6.5-9 Bordelon, fe Mo ~ et al i Westinghouse ECCS Evaluation Model "
Supplementary Inforastion," WCAP-8471-P-A, April, 1975 15+ 6 ~ 5-10 Westinghouse ECCS Evaluation Model October 1975 Version, WCAP-8622, November 1975 (Proprietary) ~ and WCAP-8623, November
)975 (Non-Pr'prietary)).
15@6+5 11 Letter from C. Eicheldinger of Westinghouse Electric Corporation to D. Bi Vassallo of the Nuclear Regulatory Coaaiseionf Letter Number NS-CE-924 dazed January 23, 1976.
15e6.5-12 Eicheldinger, C., Westinghouse ECCS Evaluation Model, februarY 1978 Version," WCAP-9220-P-A (Proprietary Version), WCAP-9221-h (Non-Proprietary Version), february 1978.
REFERENCES:
SECTION 15.6 {Cont'd) 15.6.5-13 Letter from T. M. Anderson of Westinghouse Electric Corporation to John Stole of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Letter Number NS-TNA-1981, November 1, 1978.
- 15. 6. 5-14 Letter from T. M. Anderson of Westinghouse Electric Corporation to to John Stole of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Letter Number NS-TMA-2014, December 11, 1978.
15,6.5-15 Porsching, T. A., Murphy, J. H., Redfield, J. A., and Davis, V.
C., "FLASH-4: A Fully Implicit FORTRAN-IV Program for the Digital Simulation of Transients in a Reactor Plant," WAPD-T.'i-840; Bettis Atomic Power Laboratory (March, 1969).
15.6.5"16 Esposito, V. J., Kesavan, K. and Maul, B. A., "WFLASH-A FORTR'N IV Computer Program for Simulation of Transients in a Multi-Loop PWR," WCAP"8280, Revision 2, July, 1974 (Proprietary) and WCAP-8261, Rdbision 1, July, 1974 (Non-Proprietary).
15.6.5-17 Skwarek, R., Johnson, W. Mayer, P., "Westinghouse Emergency Core Cooling System Small Break October 1975 Model," WCAP-8970-P-A (Proprietary) and WCAP-8971 (Non-Proprietary), hpril 1977.
15.6.5-18 Letter from T. M. hnderson of Westinghouse Electric Corporation to John Stole of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Tatter Number NS-TMA-20'30, January, 1979.
15.6.5-19 "Westinghouse ECCS Evaluation Model Sensitivity Studies," %CAP-8341, July, 1974 (Proprietary), WCAP-8342, July, )974 (Non-Proprietary).
15.6.5-20 Julian, H. V., Tabone, C. J., Thompson, C. M., "Westinhouse ECCS Three Loop Plant (17 x 17) Sensitivity Studies," WCAP-8853, September, 1976 (Non-Proprietary).
15, 6. 5-21 Salvatori, R., "Westinghouse ECCS - Plant Sensitivity Studies,"
MCAP-8340, July, 1974 (Proprietary) and WCAP-8356, July, 1974
{Non-Proprietary).
15.6.5-22 Buterbaugh, T. L., Julian, H. V., Tome, h. E., "Westinghouse ECCS Three Loop Plant (17 x 17) Sensitivity Studies," WCAP-8572, July, 1975 (Proprietary) and WCAP-8573, July, 1975 (Non-Proprietary).
) 5. 6. 5-23 Murphy, K. G., Compe, K. M., Nuclear Power Plant Control Room Ventilation System Design For Meeting General Criterion, 13TH hEC hir Cleaning Conference (1973) ~
15.6.5-24 Stole, J. F., Letter to T. M. hnderson (Wescinghouse), Transmitting Safety Evaluation Report of Westinghouse ECCS Evaluation Model, February, 1978 Version, August 29, 1978.
15.6.5-25 Stole, J. F., Letter to T. M. hnderson (Westinghouse), Transmitting Safety Evaluation of Wesginghouse ECCS Small Break, October, 1975 Model, June 8, 1978.
REFERENCES:
SECTION 15.6 (Cont'd) 15.6.5-26 HcFetridge, R. H., D. C. Carner, "Study of Reactor Vessel Upper Head Region Fluid Temperature," WCAP-9404, Rev. 1, December 1978.
15.6.5-27.
~ ~ Letter from P.~ Rahe of Westinghouse Electric Corporation to R.~ Tedesco of the Nuclear Regularory Commission, Letter Number NS-EPR-2538, December 12, 1981.
15.6.5-28 "Report on Small Break Accidents for Mestinghouse NSSS," MCAP-9600.
15.6.5-29 MASH 1258."Numerical Guides for Design Objective and Limiting
'onditions for Operation to Hect the Criterion As Lou As Practicable for Radioactive Material in Light"Water-Cooled Nuclear Power Reactor Effluents." Volume 2, July 1973, U.S. Atomic Energy Commission.
15.6.5-30 ORNL-TH-21?, Part IV, "Design Considerations of Reactor Containment Spray Systems.~ Calculation of Iodine-Mater Partition Coefficients." L. F. Parsly, January 1970, U.S. Atomic Energy Commission.
15.6.5-31 Collier, C., et.al., "BART-Al: A Computer Code for the Best-Estimate Analysis of Ref lood Transient," WCAP-9561, January 1980.
(Westinghouse Proprietary).
15.6. Kab i, J R., g al ~, "BASH' teg'rated o e and Ref l C e for aly s of P R.Loss- -Co l ht cid ts," CA -10 6, 984 (Mes in ouse Pro rie'. y).
0
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~/1 c',trig WOOF >m tZme un 3/4.2.1 AXIAL FLUX DIFFERENCE FES $ 86 LIHITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.2.1 The indicated AXIAL FLUX DIFFERENCE (AFO) shall be maintained within the following target band (flux difference units) from the target AFO value:
a. ooo b.
~k 5X for core MWO/MTU;
+ 3X, "12K average accumulated burnup and for core of less than or equal to average accumulated burnup of greater than brac 3888.
MWO/MTU. The indicated AFO may deviate outside the above required target band at greater than ar equal to 50K but less than 9(C of RATED THERMAL POWER provided the indi-cated AFO is within the Acceptable Operation Limits of Figure 3.2-1 and the cumu-lative penalty deviation time does not exceed 1 hour during the previous 24 hours.
'he indicated AFD may deviate outside the above required target band at greater than LSX but less than 50K of RATED THERNL POWER provided the cumulative .
penalty deviation time does not exceed 1 hour during the previous 24 hours. APPLICABILITY: MODE 1, above 15K of RATED THERNL POWER." ~ ACTION: With the indicated with POWER, THERMAL POWER within AFQ greater than or equal to 15 minutes either: 9'f outside of the above requfred target band RATED THERNL and
- 1. Restore the fndicated AFD to within the target band limits, or
- 2. Reduce THERNL POWER to less than 90% of RATED THERNL POWER.
- b. With the indicated AFD outside of the above requfred target band for more than 1 hour of cumulative penalty deviation time during the previous 24 haurs or autsfde the Acceptable Operation Limits of Figure 3.2-1 and with THERMAL POWER less than 9(C but equal to or greater than SCAN of RATED THERMAL POWER, reduce:
- 1. THERNL POWER to less than 5QX of RATED THERNL POWER ~ithin 30 minutes, and
- 2. .The Power. Range Neutron Flux&% - High Setpofnts to less than or equal to MC of RATED THERMAL POWER within the next 4 hours.
"See Special Test Exceptions Specification 3.10.2.
""Survef11ance testing of the Power Range Neutron Flux Channel may be performed pursuant ta Specfffcatfon 4.3. L. 1 provider.'he indicated AFO is maintained within the Acceptable Operation Limits of Figure 3 2-1. A tatal of 16 hours operation may be accumulated with the AFO outside of the above required target band during testing without penalty dev4atfon. SHEARON HARRIS - UNIT 1 3/4 2-1
~ >E",
~ ~
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PROOF AND RDtH 0uPY POWER OISTRIBUTION LIMITS 3/4.2.2 HEAT FLUX HOT CHANNEL FACTOR - F (Z) LIMITING CONOITION FOR OPERATION 3.2.2 F~(Z) shall be limited by the following relationships: 28 F~(Z) < [2.4C] [K(Z)] for P > 0.5 Fq(Z) < t,(4v64)l EK(Z)3 for P < 0.5 Where: THERMAL POWER , and RATEO THERMAL POWER K(Z) "-the function obtained from Figure 3.2-2 for a given core height location. APPLICABILSTY: MOOE 1. ACTION: With F~(Z) exceeding its limit:
- a. Reduce THERMAL POWER at least IX for each IX F~(Z) exceeds the limit within 15 minutes and similarly reduce the Power Range Neutron Flux-High Trip Setpoints within the next 4 hours; POWER OPERATION may proceed for up to a total of 72 hours; subsequent POWER OPERATION may proceed provided the Overpower hT Trip Setpoints have been reduced at 1east I.".
for each 2X F~(Z) exceeds the limit.
- b. Identify and correct the cause of the out-of-limit condition prior to increasing THERMAL POWER above the reduced limit re-quired by ACTION a., above; THERMAL POWER may then be increased provided F~(Z) is demonstrated through incore mapping to be within its limit.
SHEARON HARRIS - UNIT 1 3/4 2-5
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PROOF AHO IIEjjEN COPY 3/4. 2 POWER DISTRIBUTION LIMITS BASES The specifications of this section provide assurance of fuel integrity during Condition I (Normal Operation) and II (Incidents of Moderate Frequency) events by: (1) maintaining the minimum ONBR in the core greater than or equal to 1.30 during normal operation and fn short-term transients, and (2) limiting the fission gas release, fuel pellet temperature, and cladding mechanical proper ties to within assumed design criteria. In addition, limiting the peak linear power density during Conditfon I events provides assurance that the initial conditions assumed for the LOCA analyses are met and the ECCS acceptance criteria limit of 2200oF is not exceeded. The definitions of certain hot channel and peaking factors as used in these specifications are as follows: F~(Z) Heat Flux Hot Channel Factor, fs defined as'the maximum local heat flux on the surface of a fuel rod at core elevation Z divided by the average fuel rod heat flux, allotting for manufacturing tolerances on fuel pellets and rods; Nuclear Enthalpy Rise Hot Channel Factor, is defined as the ratio of the integral of linear power along the rod with the highest integrated power'to the average rod power; and F (Z) Radf'al Peaking Factor, is defined as the ratio of peak power density to average power densfty in the horizontal plane at core elevation Z. 3/4. 2.1 AXIAL FLUX DIFFERENCE The limits on AXIAL FLUX DIFFERENCE (AFQ) assure that the F~(Z) upper bound a.a 8 envelope of 400& times the normalized axial peaking factor fs not exceeded during either normal operation or in the event of xenon redistribution following power changes. Target flux difference (TARGET AFD) is determined at equilibrium xenon condi-tions.. The rods may be positioned within the core in accordance with their respective insertion lfmits and should be fnserted near their normal position for steady-state operation at high power levels. The value of the target flux difference obtafned under these conditfons divided by the fraction of RATED THERMAL POWER fs the target flux difference at RATED THERMAL POWER for the associated core burnup conditions. Target flux differences for other THERMAL POWER Ie'vels are obtained by multiplying the RATED THERMAL POWER value. by the appropriate fractfonal THERMAL POWER level. The periodic updating of the target flux difference value fs necessary to reflect core burnup considerations. SHEARON HARRIS - UNIT 1 8 3/4 2-1
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READABILlTYOF THE MCB SLBs, BPSLBs, AND TSLBs I Based upon the MCB profile and the NUREG-0700 anthropometric criteria, a fifth percentile female (eye height at 56.5 inches above the floor) would have a viewing distance to the top lens of the various light boxes (LB) that would be the hypoteneuse of a right triangle with side A equal to 83 inches minus 56.5 inches and side B equal to 25.5 inches. The top lenses of the LBs are located 83 inches from the floor. Top LB Lens A = 83-56.5 ~ 26.5 C Eye B = 25.5 The hy'poteneuse, C,.equals the square root of the sum of A-squared and B-squared. C = (26.5 + 25.5 ) T 36.8 inches A viewing distance of 36.8 inches would normally require a character height of 36.8 times .000 equals 0.107 inches for adequate discrimination. Characters in the LBs are currently engraved at 0.125 inches in height. This is approximately 85% of the recommended height (l5% under size). Readability of the LBs was reviewed by operators and human factors personnel and it was felt that, given adequate control over the other readability requirements of width, stroke width, spacing, and transluminance, the lenses were accurately readable from the normal operating positions. (3705ANS/ccc)
READABILITYOF THE MCB MLBs Characters within the Monitor Light Boxes (MLB) are below criteria; character height is ~ 093. Based on the uses of the MLBs in the CR the HEDAT feels they are adequate.
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Operations views these lights to verify valves are properly actuated on SI signal. When an SI signal is actuated a bank of lights for each function will go on. The operators verify that all lights in each bank are on. Any light that is not on will be readily apparent to the operator. The primary indication of these valves is the position indication associated with each valve switch for every MLB status light in the control room. (37p5AWS/ccc)
SHEARON HARRIS NUCLEAR POWER PLANT COLOR CODING MATRIX COLOR MCB ACP AEP-1 BACKPANELS OPEN g RUNNING g BREAKER CLOSED ERROR i POWER ON g DANGER i FIRST OUT i ALARMg RESET RED ALERT SHUT i STOP g BREAKER TRIPPED POWER ON GREEN CAUTIONS POST ACCIDENT WARNING MONITORING Y'ELLOW/AMBER/ ORANGE INFORMATION I NF ORMATI ON 4 POWER ON WHITE/BLUE
AEP-I REVIEW A review of Emergency Operating Procedures was conducted by plant operations personnel to determine which steps require actions on the part of an operator to interface with the AEP-l. Each action was then reviewed to determine the necessity of using the AEP-l (e.g., are other controls or indicators used) and whether there were any consequences of either misuse or nonuse of the AEP-l controls or indicators. In addition, a review of all AEP-l indicators and controls was conducted to determine safety consequences of nonuse or misuse and whether the AEP-I control or indicator was the primary control or indicator for the required actions. For all AEP-I controls or indicators, excluding the reactor vessel and pressurizer vent valve controls, no safety consequences from misuse or nonuse were discovered. The reactor vessel and pressurizer vent valve controls are well labeled, demarcated, and are physically separated from the rest of the AEP-l controls. Additional enhancement/demarcation of the reactor vessel and pressurizer vent valve controls is under consideration. Attached are the results of this AEP-I review. (3750AWS/pgp )
AEP-I LIGHT BOXES ALB-023 (Annunciator Light Box) has coordinate axis labels and will be read from directly in front. Operations has no trouble reading it. DRPI (Digital Rod Position Indication) will be used during rod motion to recover dropped control rods and to verify a reactor trip. In all of the cases DRPI will be the secondary source of information, with the primary source being the ERFIS computer. SLB-08 (Status Light Box) B Train indication of RAB HVAC damper position. These dampers are slaved to the two RAB normal supply fans which trip on a SI signal. During normal fan operation, the ERFIS computer will be used to verify the damper positions as the fans are started. The Status Light Box indications will be used as a secondary indication. If the damper position is misread on a fan start, temperature alarms on the ERFIS computer and/or alarms on the RMS computer would indicate the problem. If such an alarm is received, the damper will be locally checked before any action is taken. There is no safety consequence of error from misreading any damper position. The same actions are taken on a SI signal, except it is for a fan stop and damper closure. SLB-10 A Train, same as SLB-08. SLB-09 B Train, indication of chilled water valves, HVAC dampers in the ESW intake structure, and HVAC dampers in the Fuel Handling Building (FHB). The indication will be used to verify proper automatic actions (open dampers or valves) during normal operation. There are no safety consequences from a misreading of the SLB since the indications have ERFIS temperature alarms to alert the operators that the automatic actions did not occur. If the alarms are received, the dampers or valves will be locally checked before any action is taken. SLB-I 1 A Train, same as SLB-09. (3705AMS/pgp)
SLB-l2 Indication of HVAC dampers in the RAB. SLB-Ol2 provides indication of inlet and outlet dampers for various fans throughout the plant. These indications would be used to verify automatic actions during normal fan starts. Fourteen of these status lights are backups to the air flow indication of the AEP-Ol. The rest of the lights have trouble alarms that annunciate if the proper automatic actions do not occur. In either case, the only consequence of these automatic actions not occurring would be a fan trip. This would also give an alarm in the Control Room. If a fan does trip, it would be monitored upon fan restart. There is no safety consequence of an incorrect reading of these indications. (These indications are not used in the EOPs). (3705AM S/pgp )
AEP-l CONTROLS Sample Isolations (Steam Generator, Accum., RCS, PRZ, CNMT atmos, and CNMT sump) - All sample lines have redundant isolation valves so there are no consequences from opening the wrong isolation valve. The sample isolation valves are normally open with the only consequence of an inadvertent closure being a small delay in obtaining a sample. There are no safety consequences from inadvertently operating the control of a sample isolation valve. The sample isolation valves receive a Phase A cnmt. isolation signal. The primary means of verifying the Phase A closure is on the ERFIS computer. The back up means is with an extra operator in the control room after the initial phases of the transient are over. Post Accident Sample System (PASS) - The PASS is only mentioned once in the Emergency Operating Procedures (EOPs). This is in EOP-020 Step 7. This step says "Initiate Evaluation of Plant Status: ... Obtain samples of RCS, SG, and CNMT Sump." The sample of the RCS would be obtained with the PASS. If the operator does not properly line up the PASS valves from the Auxiliary Equipment Panel One (AEP-OI), the result would be that the Chemist would not be able to draw his sample without delay. The Chemist would then notify the Control Room of his inability to draw the sample. Upon receiving this information, the operator would correct his valve line-up at AEP-Ol and the Chemist would then draw his sample. The basis for this procedure step (from the V/estinghouse Owners'roup) states "Since an evaluation of plant status may require some time to complete... it is initiated early in the recovery..." This sample would be used to help determine the long-term recovery actions. Should it require two hours (twice the normal time) to obtain this sample, it would still be completed before plant recovery was delayed. There is, therefore, no safety consequence from incorrect operation of this control. Stm Gen Bldn Isol - Same as the sample isolations except these receive a SI signal instead of a Phase A isolation. (3705AMS/pgp )
Chem Add to Stm Gen These isolation valves must be opened and the ammonia and/or hydrazine metering pump locally started to add chemicals to the steam generators. If a valve is accidentally closed, the only consequence would be a delay in adding chemicals to the stm gen. There are no safety consequences from incorrectly operating the controls to these valves. These valves receive a feedwater isolation signal or a SI signal and are verified the same way as the sample isolation valves. RCDT - These are redundant isolation valves like the sample isolations and also receive a Phase A isolation which is verified in the same manner. Cnmt Fan Clrs These valves isolate normal service water to the non-safety cnmt fan coolers. The only consequence for inadvertently closing one of these valves would be the loss of cooling water to the non-safety fan coo1ers. This would be detected by a cnmt ambient temperature alarm. These are redundant valves, so there would be no affect from inadvertently opening one of these valves. There is no safety consequence from incorrectly operating a control of the Cnmt fan coolers. These valves receive a Phase A signal and would be verified in the same manner as the sample isolation valves. Fuel Pool Cooling Pumps - Inadvertent stoppage of a pump would be immediately detected by a low flow annunciator. There would also be a high temperature annunciation before there was any danger of the pool overheating. If a pump was inadvertently started, the only consequence would be an increase in pool cooling flow. There are no safety consequences from incorrectly operating the controls of a fuel pool cooling pump. Chilled Water Isolation Valves - These normally-open valves isolate the non-essential portion of the chilled water system from the essential portion. The only consequence of inadvertent closure of a valve would be a high temperature alarm on the ERFIS computer. These valves close on a SI signal and will be verified in the same manner as the sample isolation valves. The operator must accidentally open (3705AWS/pgp )
four valves before there is any potential for a problem. There is no safety consequence. from incorrectly operating the controls of the chilled water isolation valves. Essential Chillers and Expansion Tanks - There are two redundant 100% capacity chillers and associated expansion tanks. If make up water is inadvertently stopped or started to either expansion tank, the results 'will be a hi-hi or lo-lo level alarm. The affect of inadvertently stopping the running chiller would be the activation of several annunciators and eventual initiation of high area temperature alarms on the ERFIS computer. If an idle chiller is inadvertently started, the chiller's automatic control system would shut it off because there would be no service water to cool the chiller. There are no safety consequences from incorrectly operating the controls of a chiller. Both chillers start on a safety injection signal and would be verified in the same manner as the sample isolation valves. RAB HVAC - Local Air Handling Units (AHU) - These are two 100% capacity automatic cooling trains. There will normally be one train in operation with each AHU cycling on and off from the ambient temperature in each area. If a fan is inadvertently stopped, the'result would be a computer high temperature alarm for the respective area or the area fan automatically starting. If a fan is inadvertently started, the result would be the fan automatically stopping or extra cooling in a room in the plant. There are no safety consequences from incorrectly operating the controls of one of the AHUs. Both trains of the AHUs start on a SI signal and would be verified in the same manner as the sample isolation valves. RAB HVAC - Normal Supply and Exhaust Fans - There are two 100% capacity supply fans and four 50% capacity exhaust fans. Each fan has flow instrumentation and flow alarms that will alert the operator if the wrong fan is inadvertently stopped. Both supply fans and/or all four exhaust fans must be stopped for a period of time before there is any potential for a problem. If a fan is inadvertently started, the only (3705AWS/pgp)
consequence would be an increase in the air flow through the RAB. There are no safety consequences or potential for radiation release from incorrectly operating the control of a fan. These fans stop on a SI signal and would be verified in the same manner as the sample isolation valves. il RAB HVAC - Emergency Exhaust Fans - These are two 100% capacity exhaust fans used during emergency operation. Both fans must be stopped for a period of time before there is any potential for a problem. If a'fan is inadvertently started during normal operation, the only result would be an increase in the air flow through the RAB. There are no safety consequences from incorrectly operating the controls of the emergency exhaust fans. Both of these fans start on a Sl signal and would be verified in the same manner as the sample isolation valves. RAB HVAC - Room Exhaust Fans Each room has two 100% capacity exhaust fans. Both fans must be stopped for a period of time before there is any potential for a problem. The only consequence of inadvertently starting a fan would be an increase in the air flow through the individual room. There are no safety consequences from incorrectly operating the control of a fan. RAB HVAC - Smoke Purge Fans - There are two smoke purge fans which are used after a fire is extinguished to assist in the recovery effort. During fan use, only fire brigade personnel will be in the affected area. The result of accidentally stopping a smoke purge fan would be an increase in the time needed to remove the smoke. If a fan is inadvertently started, the only result would be an increase in air flow through the RAB. There are no safety consequences from incorrectly operating the control of a smoke purge fan. Fuel Handling Building HVAC There are two parallel trains of normal HVAC for the FHB. If a fan is inadvertently stopped, there is a high temperature annunciator for the spent fuel pool (SFP) area and ERFIS alarms for the SFP pump room temperatures. Accidental starting will only result in an increased air flow. There are no safety consequences of incorrectly operating the controls of the fans. (3705AWS/pgp)
ESW Intake Structure HVAC - There is one train of HVAC for each train of ESW. These fans are used when the associated ESW pump is running or the room temperature is above 90'F. No single failure can disable both trains of HVAC. If one train is inadvertently stopped, it would be detected by an auxiliary operator on his normal rounds or by a high temperature alarm on the ERFIS computer. Continuous operation of these fans is not required so it is acceptable for these fans to be stopped until the operator makes his next set of rounds. If a fan is started, the only consequence would be an increased air flow through the building. There are no safety consequences from incorrectly operating the control of one fan. These fans start on a SI signal and would be checked in the same manner as the sample isolation valves. Diesel Fuel Oil Pump Exhaust Fan - There are two exhaust fans in each train. Both fans in one train must be stopped before there is any potential for a problem. If one fan is inadvertently stopped, it would be detected by an auxiliary operator on his normal rounds or by a high temperature alarm on the ERFIS computer. Continuous operation of these fans is not required so it is acceptable for these fans to be stopped until the operator makes his next set of rounds. There is no safety consequence from incorrectly operating the control of one of these exhaust fans. These fans start on a SI signal and would be checked in the same manner as the sample isolation valves. Pressurizer and Reactor Head Vent Valves - During normal operation, if these valves were incorrectly opened (two series valves must be open for an RCS release path), the Control Room would receive an alarm. This alarm would either be immediate or within approximately 30 minutes depending on which valves were opened. In either case, the alarm would be received before any action would need to be taken to correct the situation. The vent valves can be aligned to discharge to two different locations. The preferred location is to the Pressurizer Relief Tank (PRT). When there is vent flow to the PRT, there will be a "REACTOR VESSEL VENT FLOW" alarm on the main (3705AWS/pgp )
control board. This alarm will be used to verify flow and, therefore, a proper valve line-up. The second location, which should only be used if the PRT cannot be lined up, is to discharge to the CNMT atmosphere. EOP use of the head vent valves occurs in two different ways. The first use is as an RCS bleed path, that is to deliberately create a controlled hole in the RCS. The EOPs tell the operator to open all pressurizer (PRZ) PORVs and vent valves. If the vents are not properly lined up to the PRT and there is no flow, the flow alarm will not be received. If the vents are supposed to be discharging to the CNMT atmosphere (secondary source), but are not, the error would be comparatively insignificant because the PORVs should have about 25 times the flow as the vents. The second use of the vents is to release a gas bubble from the RCS (increase the water level in the vessel). Implementation of this procedure would be a very slow and deliberate process in which the water level in the vessel will be constantly monitored. If the valves are not properly lined up, the operator monitoring the vessel level will notice it is not increasing and stop the venting process to check the valve line-up for the vents. (3705AMS/pgp)
EMERGENCY OPERATING PROCEDURES ACCESSING AEP-I CONTROLS AND ANNUNCIATORS PATH I/30 FRP J.I/01 EPP 01/19 "Verify"or "Check Phase A Isolation" The primary means of verifying or checking a proper Phase A isolation is on the ERFIS computer. The back up means is with an extra operator checking each valve position indication in the control room. EPP 01/09 EPP 13/01 EPP 10/00 EPP 15/02 "Check" or "Verify SG status...blowdown...sample line isolation Closed" or "check any valves...as a possible coolant loss flow path" or "Check Secondary Pressure Boundary...blowdown...sample...hydrazine and ammonia-Closed". The primary means of verifying these automatic isolations is with the ERFIS computer. The back up means is with an extra operator checking each valve position indication in the control room. FRP C. I/10 FRP C. I/IS FRP C.2/03 FRP C.3/03 FRP H.l/15 FRP I.3/19 EPP Ol/03 Close "Reactor vessel vent...PRZ vent valves" or "Open reactor...PRZ vent valves" or "Align one reactor vessel vent..." These controls are well labeled, demarcated, and are physically separated from the rest of the . controls of AEP-OI. (3705AMS/ccc)
FRP C.3/02 FRP C.3/03 CAUTION EPP 01/27 EPP 20/02 Statement removed. FRP 3.2/02 "Sample Sump V/ater for Activity Level, If Possible" It will take approximately 60 minutes to draw the sample and analyze it for activity. If the operator unisolates the wrong line, the chemist will call the control room and notify the operator that he can not draw a sample. The operator will then unisolate the sump sample lines. There is no urgency in drawing the sample and no safety consequence if the operator does not open the proper valves. EPP 01/22 "Isolate CNMT" This is in EPP 01, which is only used during a loss of all AC power. The primary means of checking the CNMT isolation valves is with the ERFIS computer (operating on batteries). If a valve is found open, it will be checked against any control room indication (if operable w/o AC power) then locally closed in the plant. EPP-15/30 "Realign Plant Systems for Normal Operations, As Appropriate" This step is performed after the accident has been terminated. It is the initial step in returning the plant systems to their normal status. EP P-16/01 "Identify Ruptured SG" using steamline radiation monitor, sample for activity levels, unisolate blowdown and check for high radiation. The steamline monitors are the primary source of information to determine which SG has the ruptured tubes. The secondary means is by sampling for gross activity. It will take approximately 60 minutes to draw a sample and analyze it. If the operator unisolates the wrong sample line, the chemist will call the control room and tell the operator to unisolate the correct sample line. There is no urgency in drawing the sample and no safety consequence if the operator does not open the proper valve. (3705AWS/pgp)
EPP-20/07 "Initiate evaluation of plant status...obtain samples of RCS, S/Gs and CV sump as needed" It will take approximately 60 minutes to draw and analyze each of these samples. These samples will help determine the plant's long term recovery method. There is no urgency in obtaining these samples if the plant Technical Support Center feels they are necessary, and there is no safety consequence in delaying the sample. (3705AWS/pgp )
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