ML17334A967

Forwards Summary of Open Item Resolution & Supporting Documentation Re Equipment Environ Qualification Files Audit,Per NRC Request for Addl Info

ML17334A967
Person / Time
Site:	Cook
Issue date:	05/29/1986
From:	Alexich M INDIANA MICHIGAN POWER CO. (FORMERLY INDIANA & MICHIG
To:	Harold Denton Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Shared Package
ML17324A922	List: ML17324A921 ML17334A967
References
AEP:NRC:0775AE, AEP:NRC:775AE, NUDOCS 8606030012
Download: ML17334A967 (353)

Text

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86060800IB DOO. DATE. 86/08/BB

'l IgPQRNATIQN DIBTRIBUZIOfYBTENi,(R IDES NOTARIZED. NO FACIL: 50-315 Donald C. Cook Nuclear Power Planti Unit ii Indiana 50-31h Donald C. Cook Nuclear Power Planti Unit 2i Indiana DOCKET 4 0500031 5 0500031 6 AUTH. NANE AUTHOR AFFILIATION ALEXICHil't.P. Indiana 5 Nichigan Electric Co.

RECIP. NANE RECIPIENT AFFILIATION DENTONi H. R. Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulationi Director (p ost 851125

SUBJECT:

For(wards summary of open item resolution Zc supporting documentation re equipment environ qualification fi les auditi per NRC request for addi info.

~pg ENCL SIZE:

DISTRIBUTION CODE: A048D COPIES RECEIVED: LTR TITLE: OR/Licensing Submittal: Equipment Qualification NOTES:

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INDIANA & MICHIGAN ELECTRIC COMPANY P.O. BOX 16631 COLUMBUS, OHIO 43216 May 29, J986 AEP:NRC:0775AE Donald C. Cook Nuclear Plant Unit Nos. 1 and 2 Docket Nos. 50-315 and 50-316 License Nos. DPR-58 and DPR-74 EQUIPMENT 'ENVIRONMENTAL'QUALIFICATION-AUDIT Mr. Harold R. Denton, Director Office Nuclear Reactor Regulation U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commissi'on Washington, D.C. 20555

Dear Mr. Denton:

During the April 30, 1986 exit interview following audit of the D. C.

Cook Plant Equipment Qualification files, twelve items were identified which required futher information. Pursuant to discussions with members of your staff as well as Mr. Taylor's staff, I&HECo has reviewed available information. Based on our understanding of the items, we are providing the requested additional information as attachments to this letter. A summary of the resolution of these items is given in Attachment 1, and the supporting documentation is provided in Attachments 2 through 9.

This document has been prepared following Corporate procedures which incorporate a reasonable set of controls to insure its accuracy and completeness prior to signature by the undersigned.

Very truly yours, M. P. Al ich Vice Pr sident ~'6 MPA/rjn cc: John E. Dolan W. G. Smith, Jr. - Bridgman R. C. Callen G. Bruchmann G. Charnoff NRC Resident Inspector - Bridgman 1t~

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qualification Test Program for Terminal Blocks TEST REPORT 45603-1 NUCLEAR EMVIRGMMEM7AL QUAI IFICATIGH Prepared for

&&AC IPJ fPÃh I:

P.O. Box 468 8owllng Green, Ohio 43402 (414) 3S? -VQd I FEB., 1982 Prepared by WYLE LABORATORIES

Page No. XII&

Report No. 45603-1

(:if ication Plan No. 45386-1 Page No. 1 REVISIO~ A SCOPE This document has been prepared by Wyle. Laboratories for Marathon Special Products, hereinafter referred to as the equipment supplier, for equipment used in various nuclear power generating stations,

~0b ect<ves The purpose of this gualification Plan is to present the approach, methods, philosophies, and procedures for qual i fying Fixed Barrier Terminal Blocks (Series 1500 NUC and 1600 NUC) and Power Stud Blocks (Series 142 NUC), assembled and/or manufactured by Marathon Special Products, for use in various nuclear power generating stations. The devices shall be qualified for use with metallic terminal lugs (uninsulated) and housed in a metal enclosure with a gasketed door.

Nuclear environmental qualification of any safety-related device to meet the intent of IEEE 323-1974 is usually a three-step process, i.e., 1) radiation exposure; 2) aging; and 3) design basis event qualification (seismic, and, for equipment inside containment, LOCA). The purpose of the first two steps is to put the sample equipment to be used for qualification into a condition that represents the worst state of deterioration that a plant operator will permit prior to taking corrective action, i.e., its end-of-qualified-life condition. The next step demonstrates that it still has adequate integrity remaining to withstand the added environmental stresses of specified design basis events and still perform its safety-related functions.

It is incumbent on the equipment supplier to assure that the components and materials contained in the equipment actually placed into service are the same as those qualified.

Ap licable uglification Standards S ecifications and Oocuments IEEE 323-1974, "IEEE Standard for Oualifying Class 1E Equipment for Nuclear Power Generating Stations" IEEE 344-1975, "IEEE Recommended Practices for Seismic gualification of Class 1E Equipment for Nuclear Power Generating Stations" NUREG 0588 Reg. Guides 1.89 and 1.100 "Beaver Valley Power Station - Unit No. 2, J.O. No.

12241 - O.F.E. No. 10080 - C.O. No. 6289, Ouquesne Light Company, Environmental gualification Testing of 'marathon 1500 Series Terminal Blocks," Letter, S.

, L. Chapin, Jr. (Stone 0 Webster) to-. H. Black (Marathon), dated August 22, 1980 FQNI 110$ g lVr Oct 1t WYLR LABORATOAlKS KuntiwlH FsCttity

~ Report No. 45603-1 Ouali', >tion Plan 'No. 45386-1

. Page No. 2 REViSiON A SCOPE (CONTiNUEO)

Applicable gualif ication Standards, Specif ications, and Oocuments Continued Oocument No. 251/140, "Aliens Creek NGS Unit No. 1, Class 1E Terminal Blocks Test'Condition," Letter, J.

Tana (EBASCO) to H. Black (Marathon), dated October 1, 1980 "Beaver Valley Power Station - Unit No. 2, J.O. No.

12241 - O.F.E. No. 10080 - C.O. No. 6289, Purchase Order No. 2BY-821, Terminal Block qualification Testing,'etter, S. L. Chapin, Jr . (Stone Webster) to J. Keglewitsch (Marathon), not dated Oocument No. AC-ES-MA-01, 'Aliens Creek NGS Unit No.

1, Class 1E Terminal Blocks, Revision Seismic Spectra,'etter, J. Tana (EBASCO) to H. Black (Marathon),. dated October 14, 1980 Comtonwealth Edison Environmental Accident Profiles and Seismic Curves, Letter, 0. C. Lamken (CoIIIon-wealth Edison) to C. G. Poplin (Wyle), dated October 14, 1980 Commonwealth Edison Test Parameters for Joint quali-fication Program, Marathon Terminal Blocks, dated September 11, 1980 Letter, 0. C. Lamken, Cotnnonwealth Edison, to G.

Endicott, Wyle, dated February 9, 1981 E ui ment Oescri tion The test specimens to be supplied by the equipment supplier shall consist of three (3) Terminal Block Assemblies, each consisting of the following items:

o Two (2) Marathon Fixed Barrier Terminal Blocks, Series 1600 NUC, Type 1612929, 600 Volts, 75 Amperes, 12 Point Oimensions: 9"L x 2"W x 1-3/16"H Weight: Approximately 1 pound o Two (2) Marathon Fixed Barrier Terminal Blocks, Series 1500 NUC, Type 1512929, 600 Volts, 75 Amperes, 12 Point Oimensions: 8-1/4'L x 2"W x 1-3/16"H Weight: Approximately 1 pound WYLILABORATORIES f0'1N 0 hsv Ocl )0 ttuntavllle FICtttty

Page No. XII-8 Report: Ho. 45603-1 Qual i stion Plan No. 45386-1 Page No. 3 REVISION A SCOPE (CONTINUED)

Equi ment Oescri tion (Continued) o Two {2) Marathon Power Stud Blocks, Series 142 NUC, Type 1423589, 600 Volts, 3 Circuits, 1/4-20 Studs Dimensions: 2-3/4"L x 2-7/8"W x 1-3/4"H Weight: Approximately 1 pound o One {1) Type 4 NEMA Enclosure, Hoffman, Single-Ooor, Part No. A20H20ALP Dimensions: 20' 20" x 6" Weight: 38 pounds o One (1) NEMA Mounting Panel, Hoffman, Part No. A-20P20 Dimensions: 17" x 17" Weight: 9 pounds o Cable conduit (2), metallic, 1-1/2" I.O., 90o bend, mounted to the top panel of the NEMA enclosure o Cable, Oelco, 88 AWG, Teflon insulation, 4-inch sections (not to be qualified, for test purposes only) o Te'rminal Lugs, ring-tongue, copper/tin plated, uninsulated, 48 AWG barrel:

1) For 1512929 and 1612929 Blocks: .190-inch hole

2) For 1423589 Blocks: .270-inch hole The Terminal Block Assemblies shall be preassembled by the equipment supplier per the following:

Jumper wi~es shall be prepared, using cereercially available crimping machinery, to assure uniform termin'al lug/cable connection. Each end of each 4-inch cable section shall be stripped t'o bare wire per standard ccamercial practice. Uninsulated metallic terminal lugs shall be attached to each bare end of each wire.

2) The terminal blocks and power stud blocks shall be attached to the appropriate mounting panel, using ceanercially available bolts, nuts, and washers, as shown in Figure 2.

RNQ iiNRM Ocilt

Page No., XIZ-9 Rcport No. 45603-1 gua11't~on rian rro. 4>aur$ -i Page No. 4 REYISION A SCOPE'CONTINUEO)

Equi ment Oescri tion (Continued)

3) Each Type 1512929 or 1612929 terminaI block sha11 require ten (10) pumper w1res. Each Type 1423589 power stud block shall requ1re one (1) pumper wire.

The wires shall be installed on each block per the wiring di agr am(s) depicted in Figure 1. When

. connected as shown, two (2) separate series circuits occur through each block. These circuits parallel each other for the entire length of each block (1.e., one circuit utitlizes odd-numbered terminals, the other circu1t ut111zes even-numbered terminals). During install at1on, terminal screws/nuts shall be tightened in accordance w1th the equipment supplier's recormendations, as follow, to simulate actual 1nstallat1on procedures.

o Even number series circuit (reference Figure 1) shall be torqued to 25 (tO, -5) 1nch-pounds.

o Odd number series circuit (Reference F1gure 1) shall be hand tightened until snug, then tightened an additional 1/8 to 1/4 turn.

4) The cable condu1ts shall be aff1xed to the top panel of. the NEN enclosure, using standard condu1t mounting hardware.

5) Two (2)'/O-inch drain holes shall be drilled in the bottom panel of the NEN enclosure in diagonally opposite corners.

In add1t1on to the 1tems specif1ed above, the equ1pment supp11er shall furn1sh the following:

o Three (3) "dunrfty" NEHA enclosures shall be required to allow for acc1dent (LOCA) chamber calibrat1on.

o 'erminal lugs, r1ng-tongue, copper/tin plated, un1nsulated, f8 AWG, uncrimped, quantity (T80)*

• TBD ~ To 8e Determ1ned WYLKLASQQATONEO fgI$ $ $ 0fr ~ OtllS Nontaxable SacNty

page No. XZZ-10 Report No. 45603-1 guali'ation Plan No. 45386-1 Page No. 5 REVISION A SCOPE (CONTINUED)

(uglification Se uence gualification shall be performed in the following sequence. It is con-sidered that the radiation exposure and the aging effects on the equipment are cumulative and result in the same effects as simultaneous exposure experienced while operational in a nuclear power plant.

o Sasel inc Functional Tests o Radiation Exposure o Functional Test o Thermal Aging o Functional Test o Vibration Aging o Functional Test o Seismic gualif ication o Functional Test o Accident qual i fication o Functional Test o Post-Test Inspection Radiation prior to thermal aging is normally a more severe test sequence.

Tests sponsored by the NRC and reported by Sandia Laboratories in Report No. SANO-79-092CK have shown that radiation may sensitize some polymers, which causes them to degrade to a greater extent when followed by thermal aging. The report states that the mechanistic postulate is that radiation-cleaved bonds, in the form of radicals, react with oxygen to give degradation products, including peroxides. The peroxides are chemically weak links which are susceptible to thermal cleavage. This thermal peroxide cleavage gives more radicals which, in the pr esence of oxygen, lead to more degradation and more peroxides.

Test S ecimen Confi urations The test specimens shall be received by Wyle Laboratories in the configuration presented in Paragraph 1.3. At various stages of the test program, minor modifications to the initial configuration shall be required. The following presents these modifications as they apply to the test sequence.

Confi uration A Functional Tests Vibration A in Seismic ualif ication and Accident ualif ication This designation prefers to the original test specimen configuration, as descr ibed in Paragraph 1.3.

fgtS 1 I tw 2 IIv Oct t9 QgYLI LABOAATOAlES Hiintanllo Facility

Page No. X'LZ D Report No. 45603-1

(:ification Plan No. 45386-1 Page No. 6 REYISION A SCOPE (CONTINUED)

Configuration 8 {Radi atf on Exposure The pumper wires installed on each Terminal Block Assembly shall be removed and replaced by unfnsulated metallic terminal lugs uncrfmped) which are identical to those used on the pumper wires. Appropriate terminal screws/nuts shall be tightened to the torque values specified fn Paragraph 1.3.

Confi uration C Thermal A fn Same as Configuration B, except all mounting panels (with terminal blocks attached) shall be removed from their respective enclosures.

Each vacant enclosure and each.terminal block/mountin anel combination s a cons u e a su asse WYL5 lABOAATORlES fOW EEOft APN OCT 70 NuntaNeEEE Faculty

Page No. XZZ-18 Report No. 45603 1 Oualif fcatfon Plan Ho. 45386-1 Page Mo. I3 REVISION 8 3.0 UALIFICATION PROGRAM (CONTINUEO) 3,4 ~Afn The desired qualified life of the subject equipment is 40 years. The desired qual1ffed lffe for components is also 40 years. Mhere 40-year qualified life for conqonents fs not demonstrated during the test pro-f gram, a shorter qual 1 fed 1 1 fe shal 1 be established and the component assigned a maximum mafntenace-replacement interval no greater than its qualif fed life.

Each component fn the subject equipment has been reviewed for function and age-related faf lure mechanisms which could affect fts function. A matrix, Table I, has been prepared which defines the components, manu-facturer ratings, materia'ls, service conditions, and aging mechanisms.

A literature search of Myle's Aging Library has been utilized to obtain audftable aging data. This data was used to define artificial aging procedures. The aging mechanisms to be addressed for this equipment are time-temperature effects and humidity effects.

3.4.1 Time-Tem erature Effects For many materials normal temperature conditions coupled with time create an aging mechanism known as tfme-temperature effects. The sign1ffcance of these effects fs strongly dependent on the type of material under consfderatfon.

In general, materi al s may be cl assi f ed 1 in one of three br oad categor 1es:

1) Organic materials (f.e., polymers, lubricants, etc.)

2) Inorganic. materials (f.e., ceramics, minerals, etc.)

3) Metallfc materials It can be shown that the deteriorat1on due to time-temperature effects is fnsfgnfficant for inorganic materials since these materials exhibit no permanent changes in geometry or properties for the time period under consideration (Reference 1). Similarly, time-temper ature effects are judged to be insignificant for metallic materials during the same t1me frame.

In contrast, it is known that time-temperature aging effects can result in significant deterioration of many organic materials. As noted in Reference 2, "The exposure of polymers to the influence of envfronmental factors over a period of time generally leads to deter1oration fn physical properties."

WYLE LABQAATQAlES Huntavlllo Foetllty

page No. xzz-19 Rcport No. 45603-1

ification Plan No. <53B6-I Page No. 14.

REVISION A 3.0 UALIFI CATION PROGRAM (CONTINUEO) 3.4,1 Time-Tem erature Effects (Continued)

The present state-of-the-art will allow for artificial acceleration of the time-temperature effects associated with organic mater ials by increasing the temperature. Therefore, the aging of these components shall be based on their organic materials.

For many organic materials, it is known that the degradation process can be defined by a single temperature-dependent reaction that follows the Arrhenius equation (References 3 and 4):

k A exp (-(Ea/kB T))

where, k ~ reaction rate A ~ frequency factor exp exponent to base e Ea

• activation energy kB Boltzmann's Constant T

• absolute temperature It is further noted that, for many reactions, the activation energy cari be considered to be constant over the applicable temperature range.

Equation (1) can be transformed into a form which yields an acceleration factor, The acceleration factor is defined as tp/t1.

The equation is:

tZ/t1

• exp (-(Ea/kB)(1/71 - 1/Tp))

where, t1 accelerated aging time at temperature T1 tp normal service time at temperature Tp exp exponent to base e Ea ~ activation energy (eV) kB

• Boltzmann's Constant (8.617 x 10-6 eV/0()

T1 ~ accelerated aging temperature (%)

Tp .normal service temperature (os)

The transformation of the reaction rate form of the Arrhenius equation to an acceleration form is accomplished as follows:

WYLS LABORATOillES FOttQ 1 1N t isa Oct t0 HuntavNt Faclllty

paga No. xII-zo Report No. 45603-1 if ication Plan No. 45386-1 Page No. 15 REVISION A 3.0 UALIF I CATION PROGRAM (CONTI NUEO) 3.4.1 Time-Tem erature Effects (Continued)

Life is assumed to be inversely proportional to the chemical reaction rate (References 3 and 4). In terms of life, and after converting to Napierian base logarithms, Equation (1) becomes:

ln (life) (Ea/kg)(l/T) + Constant (3)

Equation (3) has the algebraic form:

y~mx+b (4) where, y ~

i ln (life) x 1/T m

• Ea/k8, constant For single dominant reactions b

• constant The constants, m and b, can be estimated by fitting the experimental data in the form of ln (life) versus 1/T into the above simple linear relationship.

The derivation of an acceleration factor is accomplished by taking the difference between any two points of the linear relationship.

Thus, if we substitute t for life into Equation (3), we obtain:

In t * (Ea/k8)(1/T) + Constant (5)

For the set of points (t1, T]), Equation (5) becomes:

ln t1 ~ (Ea/k8)(1/T1) + Constant (6)

For the set of points (tp, TZ), Equation (5) becomes:

ln tp * (Ea/k8)(1/Tg) + Constant (7)

Subtracting Equation (6) from Equation (7) yields:

ln tp - ln t1 (Ea/k8)(1/Tp) + Constant

- (Ea/k8)(1/T1) - Constant (8)

Simplifying and rearranging of Equation (8) yields:

ln (tp/t1) * -(Ea/k8)(1/T1 - I/Tp)

WYLILASQRATORlES f0%I le% l llew Oct 11 Huntawlle FIC>sty

Report No. 45603-1 lification Plan No. 45386-1 Page No. 16 REVISION A UAL;FICATION PROGRAM (CONTINUEO)

Time-Te erature Effects (Continued)

Taking antilogarithms yields:

t2/t1

• exp (-(Ea/kg)(1/TI - 1/T2)) (10)

Equation (10) is the same as Equation (2).

The acceleration factor (t2/t1) is the reciprocal of the time compres-sion factor, (t1/t2). Takfng the reciprocal of. Equation (10) yields:

t1/t2

• exp ((Ea/kg)(l/T1 - 1/T2))

Solving Equation (ll) for t1 yields:

t1 t2 exp ((Ea/ka)(1/T1 - 1/T2)) (12)

Equation (12) can be used to derive the accelerated aging times for materials .with known activation energies. In many cases, it is not practical to independently accelerate the time-temperature effects of each organic material. In this case a determination i m material has the lowest ac va on ener . e ti -t ra a acce era e ase u on the lowes activation ener for I " '1 material is accelerated to at least the equivalent degradation as that to be encountered during the qualified life.

The conservatism of basing accelerated aging on the lowest activation energy is demonstrated as follows:

The acceleration factor (t2/t1) of Equation (10) is greater than 1, for a constant activation energy, when the acceler ated aging temperature T1 is greater than the normal service temperature T2.

lith T1 greater than T2, the term (1/T1 - 1/T2) is negative. This negative multiplied by the negative in the exponent results in a positive exponent. A positive exponent, in turn, results in an acceleration factor greater than 1.

The acceleration factor versus (1/T) for various activation energies is plotted in Figure 45. Since the slope of each plot is proportional to the activation energy, per Equation (4). it is shown that a lower activation energy causes a lower slope. Thus, for a given accelerated aging temperature, different activation energies cause different acceleration factors, assuming that the normal service temperature is the same. This is demonstrated in the following example.

r WYLR LABQRATOAlES fOOI11NRIsv 05ll Huntsville Facilily

Page No. XII-22 Report No. 45603-1 lification Plan No. 45386-1 oage No. 17 REVISION A 3.0'ALIF ICATION PROGRAM (CONTINUED) 3.4.1 Time-Tem er atur e Effects (Continued)

EXAMPLE: Assume that a system consists of four (4) materials which have 0.8,'.0, acatavat on energies of 0.4, and 2s0 egs It is assumed that each materfal is normally at a service temperature of 30oC for a quali-fied life of 40 years. It fs fur ther assumed that accelerated thermal aging shall be performed at 50oC.

If the accelerated aging program is based upon the material with an activation energy of 1.0 eV, the following results:

The relatfonship for the curves of Figure 1 is generated from Equation (10) and is defined as:

t2/t1 exp (-(Ea/k8)(1/T1 - 1/T2)) (13)

Substituting Ea 1.0 eV, T1. 323oK, T2 ~ 303oK, into Equation (13) yields an acceleration factor of approximately:

t2/t1 ~ 11 (14)

Thus, for a normal service time of 40 years (t2

• 40), the accelerated aging time from Equation (14) is:

t1 40/11 3.64 years (15)

Therefore, using the accelerated thermal aging program of 50oC for 3.64 years, the equivalent demonstrated normal service times at 30oC for the other materials with activation energies of 0.4, 0.8, and 2.0 eV can be calculated using Equation (13).

Thus, for Ea

• 2.0 eV, t2 3.64 exp (-(2.0/8.617-5) (1/323 - 1/303) ) (16) t2 - 418 years (17)

For Ea 0.8 eV, t2 ~ 3.64 exp (-(0.8/8.617 x 10-5)(1/323 - 1/303)) (18) t2

• 24.3 years (19)

For Ea 0.4 eV, t2 3.64 exp (-(0.4/8.617 x 10-5)(1/323 - 1/303) (20) t2 tt 9.4 years (21)

IhNLE LABORATOAlES frilllINg lieu Otl 10 Hsssttavtil0 f0Cslity

Page No. XlI-23 Report Ho. 45603-l

".~'~ation >>an No. a5386 1

?aoe No. 18 REVISION A UALIFICATION PROGRAM". (CONT INUEO)

Time-Tem erature Effects (Continued)

Thus, it is seen that materials with activation energies 1ess than 1.0, upon which the aging program was based, are underaged by the accelerated aging of 50oC for 3.64 years.

In order to assure the demonstration of a 40-year service time for all materials, the lowest activation energy should be chosen.

Basing the accelerated aging program on the lowest activation energy of 0.4 eV results fn the following:

Substftutfng Ea

• 0.4 eV, T1

• 323oK, TZ ~ 303oK, into Equation (13) yields an acceleratfon factor of approximately t2/t1 ~ 2 6 (22)

Thus, the aging time fs:

t1 ~ 40/2.6 ~ 15.4 years (23)

Recheckfng the other materials for adequate aging results in the follow-ing for an accelerated aging program of t1

• 15.4 years, T1

• 323oK, TZ ~

303oK For Ea 0.8 eV, t2

• 103 years (24)

For Ea

• 1.0 eV, t2 ~ 165 years (25)

For Ea 2.0 eV, t2 ~ 1,768 years (26)

Thus, ft has been demonstrated that basing an accelerated thermal aging program on the lowest. activation energy, when the baseline temperatures are ceanon, provides the conservatism desired.

END OF EXAMPLE For components with tfme-temperature-r elated aging mechanisms, the aging was based upon available .audftable aging data.

Where adequate information was available, a determination of age sensf-tivfty was performed to determine the qualified life goal. Those items found to be age insensitive are noted fn the column entitled "Aging NYLON LASORATCRt6$ f0'll.2 Kv Ocl 1%

Huntavillo FsOhly

Page No. XII-24 Report No. 45603-1 lification Plan No. 45386-1 Page No. 19 REVISION A 3.0 UALIFICATION PROGRAM (CONTINUED) 3.4.1 Time-Tem erature Effects (Continued)

Mechanisms, Time-Temperature Effects," Table I. A reference was made for the conclusion of age insensitivity. These references are to para-graphs 1n this document which )ustify the conclusion, reference docu-ments, or other basis, such as 1norganic materials.

For organic materials, a determinat1on was made as to whether the material can be qualified for a 40-ye'ar life. This was done by using the normal service temperatures for the baseline temperature. for each organic material, the applicable Arrhenius uation was evaluated using the basel1ne temper ure, as emons ra e y e o ow ng example:

The Arrhenius equat1on, Equation (3), is repeated:

ln (life) ~ (Ea/k8)(l/T) + Constant (27)

A substitution shall be made for the applicable slope 'and constant and the equation evaluated, e.g., for laminate XXX, Item 1.1.6, Table. I, for mechanical properties, the Arr en us curve s:

ln (life) 14101.11669 (1/T) - 24.3612882 (28)

For a baseline temperature of 135oF (57.2oC):

T ~ 57.2oC + 273oC > 330.2oK (29) life ~ greater than 10,000 years (30)

It is concluded that this laminate, XXX, can be qualified for 40 years at a baseline temperature of 57.2oC.

8ased on a baseline temperature of 135oF, which shall be experienced for over 99K of the desired qualified life, pro)ected lives of the remaining organic materials considered in th1s qualification program are:

Material Pro ected Life Years Phenolic (Genal 4000) 1.47 million Phenolic (G.E. 12968) 2.75 million Neoprene 42.2 The applicable Arrhenius equation refers to the equation which is most appropriate to the material application when more than one equation is known.

For components with time-temperature-related aging mechanisms, the aging was based upon avai lable auditable aging data, as noted in Table I.

VVYLE LASOAATOAIES f/'1M.g ttee Ott ) t Huntawlle Saaltty

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Page No. XII-25 Beccr No. 45603-1 lification Plan No. 45386-1 Page No. 20 REVISION A 3.0 UALIFICATION PROGRAM (CONTINUED) 3.4.2 E<<

• Humidity effects are not considered to be an aging mechanism for terminal block assemblies. The ability of the equipment to perform within its relative humidity environment shall be demonstrated when safety-related functions ace tested during the design basis accident.

3.5 A in Anal sfs 3.5.1 Time-Te erature Effects The time-temperature effects can be accelerated by increasing the temperature, as explained fn Paragraph 3.4.1. A review of the materials indicates that the neoprene gasket utflfzed fn the Type 4 NEMA enclosure will require the greatest amount of thermal aging. In order to avoid excessive thermal degradatfon of the terminal block specimens, the mountfn panels (with terminal blocks attached) shall be removed from e r respec ve enc osures an erma a nde endent of the vacant enclosures. This corresponds to on gurat on , escr e n aragrap It is desirable to thermally age the equipment fn one (1) environmental chamber. Therefore, the maximum a in t er ature has been based on the rated tern erature or neo rene em . . . a e 'owest 3.5.1.1 NEMA Encl osur e Subassembl fes For the vacant NEMA enclosures, a review of the materials indicates that the material with the lowest activation ener is the neo rene Item 1.4.2, Table I, with a va ue o . e, ase on mec an ca properties (Reference 8). Calculations based on this value, the baseline temperatures presented in Paragraph 2.1.1, and a pro)ected qualified life of 40 years, yield a thermal aging time of 44 da s 1 056 hours6.481481e-4 days <br />0.0156 hours <br />9.259259e-5 weeks <br />2.1308e-5 months <br /> at 1200C.

3.5.1.2 Terminal Block ountfn Panel Subassemblies For the terminal block/mountfng panel subassemblies, the material with the lowest activation ener is the NEMA Grade XXX laminate, Item 1.1.6, a e c as a va ue o . , ase on mec an cal properties' erence . a cu at ons based on this value, the baseline temperatures presented in Paragraph 2.1.1. and a pro)ected qualified life of 40 years yield a thermal agfng time of 18.5 days (443 hours0.00513 days <br />0.123 hours <br />7.324735e-4 weeks <br />1.685615e-4 months <br />) at 120oC.

3.5.2 Functional Test The equipment shall be converted to Configuration A, Paragraph 1.5.1, and functionally tested per Paragraph 3.2.

WYLILASQRATQAKS Ra> 2>N ta 002 t1 Huntnhue SedNy

tABLE 1. AGING HATRIX AGING HECHAN I 5%

HANUFACTURER'S RATING EN V IROHHOITAL ACTIVATION TIHE- RADIAT ION 1 tea AHD EHERGY TEHPERATURE OAHAGE Ho. ITEN AHO HAHUFACTURER OPERATIONAL HATER IALS (eV) APPLICATION EFFECTS THRESINLO 1.0 Asscebly, Harathon Terainal Blocks, HEHA type 1 Enclosure, Teroinal Lugs, Cable Condui ts (2) terlinal Blocks (2) ~ Harathon Fixed Barrier, Series 1500 HUC (Nuclear Grade), Type 1512929, 12-Point, 600 Volts, 75 Aapcrcs Holded Block, P/N 9783612 150oC Cellulose Phenolic, G.E. 1.59(R@f 5) 2.7 x 106 Type P-4000 (Ref 6) 1.1.2 iIO-32 Insert, P/N 9743805 Brass, COA Alloy 360 NAS(Para 3.3 1 ~ 1.3 Connector, P/N 9061121 Brass, COA Alloy 260

)IO-32 Masher-Head Hachine Brass, COA Alloy 360 Screw, P/H 9743307 1.1.5 i4-40 Pan-Head Screw Stainless Steel 1.1.6 Harking Strip, .060 Thick, 140oC . NEHA Grade XXX Laninatc 1.21(Ref 7)

P/H 9795012 1.2 terlinal Blocks (2), Harathon 150oC SANE AS ITEN 1.1 Fixed Barrier, Series 1600 HUC (Nuclear Grade), Type 1612929, 12-Point, 600 Volts, 75 Aapcrcs 1.2.1 Holded Block, P/N 9710612 150oC LEGEND: HAS Hot Age Sensitive; X Ha rial is scnsiti e to the aging cechanisa.

~~ ~

TABLE I. AGING HATRIX (CONTINUED AGING KECHAHI5.'IS KANUFACTURER'S RAT IIIG ENVIROtgIENTAL ACTIVATION TIKE- RAOIATION l tea AHO ENERGY TEKPERATURE OAKAGE No. ITEN ANO NAHUFACTURER OPERATIONAL HATER IALS (eV) APPLICATION EFFECTS THRESHDl U 1.2.2 l10-32 Insert, P/H 9743805 Saae as Itca 1.1 1.2.3 Connector, P/N 9064121 1.2.4 ilO-32 Masher-Head Nachlne Screu, P/N 9743307 1.2.5 H-40 Pan-Head Screw, P/H 9784035 1.2.6 Narklng Strip, .060 Thick, 140oC P/H 9795112 1.3 Teralnal Blocks (2), Narathon 150oC Pouer Stud Block, Series 142 NUC (Nuclear. Grade), Type 1423589, 3 Circuits 1.3.1 Nolded Block, I'/N 97D3613 ISDoC G.E. f12968 General Purpo 1.67(Raf 5) 2.7 x IO~

Phenolic Ho)d I ng Compound {Rer 6) 1.3.2 Screu, Self-Tapping, NAS(Para 3.3 1)

P/N 97825DB 1.3.3 Connector Asseebly, P/H 9513130

).3.3.1 Stud. 1/4-20 NC Thread, Brass P/N 9711606 1.3.3.2 Connector, P/H 9513113 Copper, COA Alloy 260 'V 0 0

)

~

g M

go H Ul Vl lJ LEGEND: NAS Not Age Sensltlve; X ~ Ka ariel Is sansltI ~ to the aging emechanisw.

TABLE I. AGIN6 HATRIX (CONTINUEO AGlNG HECHANlSffS HANUFACTURER'S RATING EN V IRONNENTAL ACTIVATlON TIHE- RADIATION AKO EKE RGV TEHPERATNE OANAGE I TEH AND HAKUFACTURER OPERATIONAL HATER IALS (eV) APPLl CAT ION EFFECTS THRESHOLD hsseahly Enclosure, Hoffaan, NEHA Type 1, Sfngle-Door, 20" x 20" x 6", P/N A20IQOALP Body, Door, Hfnges, Hfnge Pfns, NAS(Para 3.

Claeps, Claep Screws, Hasp, Staple. 6asket Retafnfng Strfp, Feet Gasket Neoprene 1.05(Rer e) 2 x 106 (Ref 6)

Gasket hdhesfve Not Safety Related Pafnt hcryl fc Enclosure Hountfng Panel, Steel NAS(Para 3.3 Hoffean, 17 x 17",

P/N h-20P20 Terafnal Lugs, f8 hff6, Natal l fc Uninsulated Cable Condufts (2),

909Bend, l-l/2'.D.

wH I

Ol W 00 NAS Not Age Sensftfve; x ~ Ha rfal is sensftf e to the agfng cochanfsa. I

TASLE l. AGlNG HATRIX (CONTTHXD AGING HEOQNI S%

HANUFACTURER'S RATlNG ENVlRONHQITAL ACTlVATlDN TIHE- RADlATlON ltea AND ENERGY TEHPERATURE DAHAGE No. lTEH AND HANUFACTURER OP ERAT lOKAL HATER IALS (eV) APPLlCATlON EFFECTS TIIRESNk D 2.0 Asseably, Harathon Terainal SAHE AS lTEH 1.

Blocks, NEHA Type I Enclosure, Cable Teralnal Lugs, Cable Condults (k) 3.9 Asseebly, Harathon Teralnal SANE AS lTOI 1.

Blocks, NEHA Type 1 Enclosure. Cable, TeraInal Lugs, Cable Conducts (2)

LEGEND. NAS Not Age SensStlveI X ~. Ha rla'l Is sansStI to the aging siechaniaa.

to AEP:NRC:0775AE SCEW Sheet TC-13 Revisions

ER)CAN Et EC)

"Ic AMERICAN ELECTRIC POWER SERVICE CORPORATION OWER SVSTEN May 21, 1986 SUSJECTc D. C. Cook Units 1 5 2 SCEW Sheet TC-15 Revisions IIROMi R. G. Heurich TOi CEEQF 'POOOOA The following changes were made to SCEW sheet TC-13, for both units, as a result of the NRC audit.

Added Penn Union and Marathon as the manufacturer.

These are the two types of terminal blocks used at D. C.

Cook

2) Added model numbers a) 6000 series (Penn Union) b) 1600 series (Marathon) list".

' 3) 4)

Changed system from "various" to "see attached The attached list contains all the device systems where the marathon and Penn Union terminal blocks are found.

Deleted qualification document reference CEEQFg63K.

Test report lasts longer than what the TB's will see in an accident outside containment

5) Added qualification document reference CEEQF845C.

CEEQFP45C contains the qualification test report for Marathon terminal blocks.

6) Added qualification document reference CEEQF846.

CEEQFg46 replaces CEEQFg45 for Penn Union terminal blocks. Conax report IPS-349 (846) includes radiation while. Conax report IPS-359(045) does not.

7) For aging, changed qualification document reference CEEQF8177 t'o 8177A (Penn Union) and to 845C (Marathon).

8) For qualified environmental temperature, "384 o F"tt was added for Marathon Terminal Block.

9) For qualified environmental pressure, "94.7" PSIA qas added for Marathon terminal block.

10) For qualified environmental chemical spray, "2000ppmB pH 8.5-10.5" was added for Marathon terminal block.

IHTRA SYSTEM

11) For qualified environmental radiation dosage, "200 Mrad was added for Marathon terminal block.

12) Changed qualification method from "combination" and "simultaneous" to "sequential" (for perating time to radiation)

.Deleted the following outstanding items.

a) "see Ref. 63K" for operating time b) "see Ref. 72" for chemical spray

14) Add CEEQFP45 as a supplementary information packet (along vith CEEQFP45A).

The procedure 3 for the Marathon Terminal Block Qualification Test Report explains each environmental qualification category.

All other changes are administrative.

R. G. Heurich Approved R. C. Carruth RGH:rd:52.27 Attachments cc. W/0 Attachments T. 0. Argenta/S. H. Horovitz L. F. Caso/J. V. Ruparel D. N. Turnberg/J. R. Anderson K. J. Munson

SCEW Sheet P Unit Revt.sion No. . Date TC-13 1 5 May 21, 1986 TC-13 2 4 May 21, 1986

DONALD C. COOK NUCLEAR PLANT UNIT NO. 1 DOCKET NO. 50-315 LICENSE ENVIRONMENT DOCUMENTATION EQUIPMENT DESCRIPTION REF QUALIFICATION OUTSTANDING r PARAMETER SPEC. QUAL SPEC. QUAL METHOD ITEMS SYSTEM: d)g~ gypit/Pg c,r~r Operallng Time I Io ~C 5 ~>l NOMIC PLANT ID NO: IV 0 Temperature . r jo7 ~,

l t.e vrn$

('F) a (

~

Q COMPONENT: eABLE Pressure a) IZ.).7 4>4 f.';

Tkrtrr))Ne >Ohg Z4. 2 )o p f5g UARUFACTURER:rhea Pcn~ 0'v' (PSIA) I)q .g ybt~rgkkee lj(

Relative J MODEL NUMBER: @ (utXOSerh&

Humidity (%) )OO joy $ 5c

6) le OO<cc'Ed FUNCTION: GASLIT IyT fhe4~fI~ C

. CONN g A)E OC jd cr i oN Chemical Q Ph').P-IP.

&0AE-ACCURACY: SPEC: NR Spray N/I w~gp~ g Q.5- Oig DEMON:NR Radiation aQ ZC SERVICE: /dc'PTTA&~4 (106 rads) b)zoo szsr Aging q)iv ~ rrtb E<4hkr LOCATION: o vrsIo< (years) nlh, b)p fJ r ~ F' Cp rhI r4re Fret'IrI7 FLOOD LEVEL ELEV: WA Submergence ABOVE FLOOD lEVEL: nJ4

'DocumenlaUoa

References:

Ir Notes: , , <,. ( I <. .... -( ~(

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rr g-r/ Walrm 4 ~ "l / - /: i Q pi~ Y She eartrocaeatal tualtfteattoo permtohu proride4 oa thte SCN hare boca

~ btataod froa rofereaoo doouoeato, ouch aa teat reporta ao4 tbe paha. the Wattaehweo Ouaera Oroup (lOO) hae ua4ertekea a protraa to e4dreee

~ oteatial auperheated ateas releuea outei4e

~ eep4ttoa Coatiauod Che VOO ~ Chhdp opratioa of tho

~ ffurt haa boca beatified these oeatatcweat ao ~ reeult of a

~ata aCeaa lioe break Arith ateaa aeaerater u-tube uaoorert of protero aay upon retuire rerieroa.

O, C. Coot pleat peadiad ooapletioa of tbie bp letter ue. ttfhatehorrSK, 4ete4 tuduet 3, 196I

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fKo po aloateh ILKCCe) to No ao Oeatoa ruC)).e

Unit P1.

SCEW Sheet: TC-13 Function: Control Cable Termination at Terminal Box Device Served ~MEL P Device Served ~MEL P FMO-211 17 IMO-275 67 FMO-212 18 IMO-360 68 FMO-221 19 IMO-361 69 FMO-222 20 IMO-362 70 FNO-231 21 IMO-310 79 FMO-232 22 IMO-312 80 FMO-241 23 IMO-314 81 FMO-242 24 IMO-320 84 FRV-210 25 IMO-322 85 FRV-220 26 IMO-324 86 FRV-230 27 IMO-330 89 FRV-240 28 IMO-331 90 WMO-711 30 IMO-340 91 WNO-713 31 IMO-350 92 WMO-723 32. IMO-210 101 WMO-725 IMO-211 102 WMO-715 35 lMO-220 103 WNO-717 36 IM0<<221 104 WMO-721 37 IMO-212 105 WMO-727 38 IMO-222 106 IMO-910 41 IMO-215 107 IMO-911 42 IMO-225 108 QNO-225 43 ICM-250 204 QMO-226 44 ICM-251 205 CMO-419 49 ICM-260 206 CMO-429 50 ICN-265 207 IMO-255 61 ICM-305 208 IMO-256 62 ICM-306 209 IMO-262 64 ICM<<311 210 IMO-263 65 ICM-321 21 l INO-270 66

c c

~ .r

'"..',v DONALD C. COOK NUCLEAR PLAIIT UtIIT NO. 2 DOCKET NO. 50-318 LICENSE NO. DPR-ll I

EIIVIROHMEHT OOCUh1EHTATION

'"ggUIPMENT gESCRIPTION

. REF o QUALIFICATION OUTSTANDING PARINETER SPEC. QUAL SPEC. QUAL. 'ETHOD ITEIIS r(@ec<.SCfE'9lg$ sk'rd Operattng. vC Tiara oS p!(ioS /)0 5C -+-l NoNE Teaperature ~) z$ $

J ~

(4F) Iyv I -c COIPOXENT:CctHT54 auus Vm'RNNAAoH Pressure )Jz<7 MANUFACTURER:.

'bg tV)e ~cb<

(PSIA) 6 47 Relative mOOEL NUIIBER: Wh Ioo /e7 5g 64m~')

gpoOWief IIun!Idlty (%)

FUNCTION:Cwr~

AT QLRgclrAI yLOCIC

~~ Cheatcal ggOdC rs(eM 8 t-JC ACCURACY: SPEC:gA Spray DEMON: IIA Radlatloa cs) ~CC SERVICE: Q'f '78C44 p (106 rads) c<)z~ g pqu&ITiM NOHF <<

Ocr ~

Aging a i LOCATION: 44A40F (years) tR+QINHtN it'AIA

~

C0NBxn)87x'cd Roily E a<i FLOOD LFVEL ELEV:, HA Subsrergeace ABOVE FLOOD LEVEL: HA ;HA NA QA I < I

~ DecuaeetaUea Reteleaces: Notes:

i) C4 7~<<<<<I <'r<1 4(O< ~a<<<I<I<</ gf<g.

/;-'c<IIII!Itc Ivlthk<<cI( ~4 Lf<<III,!'I<'w'P<I< 4< 3 "6y C 9EO< dy~ fcpi 4 sc Qf Ch+StotC CHAL eII/.( <<~e ~e O'iW- CAet+i~+'Ke Z. FgnTl'<V., ~eec~dg( Sue; ~F=+I.~iq Pc'g UHI <I<c cPc<I< F<~ Q '(<<

f" c

Ths eavtcoueatal Soatlffaatlos paraseters provlde4 oo this ECCIC have bees obaalsed froa refereeoe doouoeets, svoh as tut reports ao4 the fdaa. The

,nP~ 4< ) 4'e) t<,,Q +r '.S-.,

' . ~,  ! Croetlaghouso Ovoera ureup rNO) hu oodertekea a progrsa to address poteatlal superheated stoaa roloues outside ooatatooeot asia aloha lies keek ccjth stoea geaerator 4-tube uooovorg. upoa u a result of ~

I hl

'i I eeap4c4a ef che col scud@ chose parameters sep re<cucre c'evlsloo.

t-]</8

~

~ I'I coat4asd operatloa of 4e e c. cook pleat poodle oospletloo of thrs

~ frhrt has bees Jestlf led bg letter Eo. EapcatccalrSCC< dste4 dudust 3, Csll (Cl<< ti llealeh (rHECo) te t, ~. bootes {WK)l.e Pnge

Unit P2 SCEW Sheet: TC-13 Function: Control Cable Termination at Terminal Box Device Served ~MEI P Device Served ~MEL P FRV-210 17 IMO-360 71 FRV-220 18 IMO-361 72.

FRV-230 19 IMO-362 73 FRV-240 20 IMO-310 82 FNO-211 25 IMO-312 83

'FMO-212 26 IMO-31 4 84 FMO-221 27 IMO-320 91 FMO-222 28 IMO-322 92 FMO-231 29 IMO-324 93 FNO-232 30 IMO-330 96 FMO-241 31 IMO-331 97 FMO-242 32 INO-340 98 WMO-712 34 IMO-350 99 WMO-714 35 INO-212 108 WMO-724 36 IMO-222 109 WMO-726 37 IMO-221 110 WNO-716 39 IMO-220 111 WMO-718 40 IMO-210 '12 WMO-722 41 INO-211 113 WMO-728 42 IMO-215 114 IMO-910 44 IMO-225 115 IMO-911 45 ICM-250 '107 QMO-225 46 ICM-251 208 QNO-226 47 ICM-260 209 CMO-419 52 ICM-265 '10 CMO-429 53 ICM-305 211 IMO-255 64 ICM-306 212 IMO-256 65 ICM-311 213 IMO-262 67 ICM-321 214 IMO-263 68 MCM-221 215 INO-270 69 MCM-231 216 IMO-275 70 52.27 to AEP:NRC:0775AE Conax Electrical Penetration

oiIe ENGINEERING OEPT.

EHEEF~OFM

. roam AMERICAN ELECTRIC POWER SERVICE CORP.

OAT CPM cx I~L 1 RIVERSIDE PLAZA COMPANY '.O.

COLUMBUS, OHIO PLANT SUBJECT ~+

C7

~p/

was o4le ENGINEERING DEPT. SHEET + OF~

AMERICAN ELECTRIC POWER SERVICE CORP. DAT 1 RIVERSIDE PLA2A COMPANY 0.0.

COLUMBUS, OHIO PLANT SUBJECT

AMER!CAN ELECTRlC POWER Service Corporation 1 Riverside Plaza . 1'614) 223-1000 P. O. Bo.v 16631 Columbus. Ohio 43216-6631 May 13, 1986 Mr. S. J. Medwid Conax Corporation 2300 Maiden Avenue Buffalo, NY 14225 RE: D. C. Cook Nuclear Plant Penetration Equipment Qualifications

Dear Mr. Medwid:

Please provide a quotation to provide documentation vhich certifies the penetrations purchased on our purchase order 06878-821-1 (copy attached) to Conax test report IPS-234.

The purchase order vas for equipment shroud penetration assemblies per Conax sketch 2SK-665-03. These assemblies are similar to the containment penetrations proVided by Conax in that similar parts and pressurizing capability vere provided vith the shroud assemblies.

Test report IPS-234 is used to establish the environmental qualification of our containment penetrations.

If there are any questions, please let me knov.

Very truly yours, f Ne,+~~

i L. P. DeMarco Generation and Telecommunication Division Approved

. C. Carrut LPD:rd:50.90'c.

T. 0. Argenta/S. H. Horovitz L. F. Caso J. V. Ru arel urn erg . . n erson K. J. Munson to AEP:NRC:0775AE Penetration Wire Similarity

<p<C*N EI.gc>

AMERICAN ELECTRIC PO>ER SERVICE CORPORATION P

owf a svstE+

t April 26, 1986 SU8JECTc Environmental Qualification of Kapton Insulated Wire Pene..ation Feedthrough Extension Wire FROMc J. h. Pria t TO> CEEQF 813 Penetration feedthrough extension wire at DCC Nuclear Pover Plant includes power, control and instrument cable. The feed trough extension vire is all manufactured by Haveg and supplied to us by Conax Corporation (the manufacturer of DCCNP electrical penetrations) .

The feedthrough extension. vire is a stranded Kapton insulated wire. A stranded gIOAWG Haveg, Kapton insulated penetration extension wire vas tested under Westinghouse test report CWAPD-332 (CEEQF 8'13)..

' Kapton feedthrough wires in Conax penetrations were also tested under Conax test reports IPS-234 (CEEQF g1) a penetration with 37

$ 10 AWG conductors, and IPS-62 (CEEQF g2) ten penetrations with conductor sizes ranging from f10 AWG to 1000MCM.

Haveg Kapton insulated .wires are part of the Conax Seal Assemblies (pigtails) and have been tested (24 f12 AWG, 20 f16 AWG, 8 f18 AWG) under Conar test reports IPS-409 and IPS-409.1 (CEEQFl jj75).

Foxboro instrumen s w'h Conax seal assemblies equipped with J16 AWG Kapton insulated wire instrument cable pigtails have been tested under Wyle test report 45592-4 (CEEQF f149).

IMTRA SYSTEM

Based on the r esults of test reports referenced above and the variety of the samples tested we, therefore, -conclude, that the power, control and ins t rumen t Kap ton insula ted pene t ra t ion extension wire installed at DC Cook plant. are environmentally qualified.

A. Pria Approved QE ~edv-r R ~ C ~

el+

Carruth JAP:rd:50.21 cc. T. 0. Argenta/S. H. Horowitz LP. Caso/J. V. Rupa&el'1 D. HE Turnberg/J. R. Anderson

Attachment 7 to AEP:NRC:0775AE Foxboro Transmitter Test Configuration

~giCAN E i.gg~

"ic AMERICAN ELECTRIC POWER SERVICE CORPORATION OWER SYSTEQ BAT& May 14, 1986 SUB JECT$

D. C. Cook Units 1 & 2 Technical Review of Differences in Tested and Installed Configuration of Foxboro Pigtails FROM>

K. J. Munson - EGS TOR R. G. Vasey - NS & L During the recent NRC audit of the DCCNP Environmental Qualification Program, it was noted that the DCCNP installed configuration of the Foxboro instrument pigtail condulet per PDS-1341 under RFC-01-2827 & 02-2828 was physically different than the tested configuration by the vendor in Wyle Test Report 45592-4. The tested configuration utilized a small 1/4" weep hole at a low point on a flexible metal conduit protecting the Foxboro instrument seal assembly pigtails. The weep hole was used to drain condensation near the instrument which may have accumulated inside the flex conduit during the simulated DBA test (see attached sketches).

. The DCCNP installed configuration incorporated the use of a sealtite flexible conduit plus the sealing of both the entrance and exit of the flexible conduit with an RTV silicone sealant.

No provisions for a weep-hole were made for the DCCNP specific design. The applicable plant design standard for the of the instrument, pigtails, flex conduit, splice

'nstallation box, and pigtail splices is shown on drawing PDS-1341 (attached).

The sealtite flexible conduit used in the installation is tradenamed Liquatite and manufactured by the Alflex Co. The plastic covering over the flexible metal conduit is made of a Polyvinyl Chloride (PVC) material. According to the manufacturer, the Liquatite flex conduit has not been environmentally qualified.

The hypothesized failure mode of the D. C. Cook configuration is that the PVC jacket on the flex conduit may fail during an accident near any elevated point on the conduit and allow steam to enter and condense. The condensation would them "pool" at the conduit low points, thereby subjecting the pigtails to possible submergence-. .The following paragraphs of this memo address this concern.

IHTRA SYSTEM

Through conversations with Foxboro, it has been determined that the 'intent of the weep-hole was to avoid the "backing-up>> of condensate from the chemical spray into the Integral Junction Box used in one of the two tested configurations. The integral junction box houses a terminal block which is known to be susceptible to leakage currents when exposed to chemical spray

.solution. The weep-hole design was carried-over to the second configuration which was used at D. C. Cook. The second configuration incorporates an internal instrument splice to a Conax seal assembly with no Integral Junction Box or terminal block installed. Therefore, the "backing-up" of condensate near the instrument seal assembly in the D. C. Cook configuration was of no significant concern.

Additionally, in both tested configurations the metal flex conduit looped back up after the weep hole and was routed down to a penetration at the bottom of the test chamber. The bottom end of the flex conduit was sealed which created a potential for the "pooling" of chemical spray condensate during the test. In this respect, the tested configuration is similar to what is hypothesized in the D. C. Cook Plant configuration.

The potential for pigtail submergence failure is much less of a concern for the D. C..Cook configuration due to the following reasons:

1) It is not likely that the D. C. Cook sealed flex conduit configuration would fail in such a way as to create a harsher chemical submergence environment for the pigtails than what was tested. 'he type of submergence in the speculated D. C.

Cook case involves a steam condensate and is not associated with containment flooding conditions. The steam condensate .

should theoretically be at a pH value which is less severe than the chemical spray exposure during the test.

2) The Kapton-insulated pigtail wires of the Conax Seal assembly are individually protected by the application of a heat shrinkable polyolefin jacket. The heat shrink tubing jacket significantly improves the ability of the pigtail wires to withstand chemical submergence by adding a protective layer of material over the Kapton insulation. Where applied, the protective layer of heat shrink reduces the exposure of the Kapton insulation to the condensate. The typical failure of Kapton insulated wire is due to an abrasion of the insulating material during installation combined with the effects of the chemical solution. The potential for abrasion or other mechanical damage of the Kapton insulation during installation at D. C. Cook has been essentially eliminated by the application of the heat shrink jacket.

3) The test report configuration, which-exposed the Kapton

.insulated pigtails to .the test chamber environment via the 1/4inch weep hole, demonstrates the ability of the pigtail wires to withstand harsh chemical conditions even without a protective heat shrink jacket.

In conclusion, we believe that the omittance of the weep-hole in the flex conduit near, the instrument in the D. C. Cook configuration does not have a detrimental impact on the environmental qualification of the instrument, seal assembly or seal assembly pigtails. In addition, we believe that there is no significant functional difference between the tested and the D.

C. Cook installed configurations of the foxboro instrument pigtail conduits.

K. J. MUNSON Approved I ru R. C. Carruth KJM:rd:50.95 cc. T. 0. Argenta/S. H. Horowitz L. F. Caso/J. V. Ruparel D. N. Turnberg/J. R. Anderson J. G. Feinstein - NS 5 L R. Shoberg/M. G. Sotos I & C NCk No. REE-86-07-1/Reslog 860501

Page No. II-21 Report No.. 45592-4 PAGE NO 16 TEST PAOCEDUAE NO. 45592-2 Revision A 1

2 ~ Q TRANSMITTER E:=~RICAL/NECKWNICA INTERFACES

12. 1 Reauir ements

12. 1. 1 Electrical In er=ac'na The Kapton.pigtails protruding from the Conax stainless steel feed-through shall be. protected using 1/2" flexible metal conduit. The conduit shall be attached to the transmitter interface by means of the conduit interface connector on each of the conductor seal assem-blies. The unattached end of the conduit shall be permanently affixed to the side of the mounting bracket assembly to minimize any delete-rious effects on the interface due to handling.

CAUTION: When connecting the flexible condui to the midlock cap, Do Nor allow the cap to rotate. notation will damage itengrity od the midlock cap seal.

The three (3) transmitters supplied with integral junction boxes shall be ecgxipped with 18" of flexible metal conduit in the same manner as those fittings with the Foxboro-supplied Conax electrical conductor seal assemblies. However, the conduit will not be installed until the pre-LOCA transmitter test setup.

In addition, a 1/4" weep nole shall be dr'1'ed in the condu't at the lowest point o" its arc to 'fac'litate drainace of accumulated cheaical spray, stew c"ndensat'on, etc., during the acc'dent simulat'or..

12.1.2 Aecharical In=erfac'nc Inlet suoply pressure adaptors shall be pemaently at ached tc the transmitters usi:.g the Swagelok fittings supol'ed by the manufactu er.

The supply 'ines s';all be made rom 3/8" sw'"'ess steel t'wing one end flared ard ect'ipped with an AN 'are 't"'ng..he cpoosite end shall be "ebu"red an" 1 f" urtouched o acce"t Ne Swa-elok comp"ession "'".g.

12.2 Procedures 12.2.1 Electr'cal Interfacxn A. Direct Transmitter In ut

12. 2. l. 1 Cut a piece of 1/2" flexible metal conduit approximately 18" in leng h.

12.2.1.2 Install two (2) straight flexible conduit fi. ings, one (1) on each end of the conduit.

NOTE: The fitting at the end farthest from the midlock cap should also contain a strain relief adaptor.

WYLE LABOAATOAlES FQRQ 10$ d t tteg Oct ."J Huntsgtll ~ F actlt ty

Page Ho. 'll-22 Report No. 45592-4 pp,M NC. ~-:.

Page No. II p3 Report Ro. 45592-4 PAGE NO. J,. A TEcT PPOCE-. UP~ NQ. 4 532-2 LNTZGBA:

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Page No. Il-24 Report No. 45592-4 page No. DB Test Procedure No. 45592-2 This page intenticnally lert blank.

Paae No. II-25 Report No. 45592-4 This page intentionally left blank.

WYRD LABORATORIES HuntSwllo Faeillty

sage >~0. II-26 REPor t No. 45592-4 PAGE MO '3 TEST PAOCEOUAE NO. 4559 TRAN i4fZTTER E=ECTRICA=, NECHANI"A:. =NTERZACES (Con nued)

.2.1.3 Grill a 1./4" veep ho'e approximately 9" from the transmit er inter=ace connector.

NOTE: Be erence r gure 2 for the remaining steps.

12.2.1.4 Drill a 6/32 sczew clearance hole in the mounting bracket assembly as shown.

12. 2. 1. 5 Place a 4" piece o Ravchem sleeving over the Kapton pigtails approx-mately 16"-20" from the transmitter to ac- as a strain relief point.

12.2. 1.6 Carefully feed the pictails and C6nax stainless steel feedthrpugh into the flexible conduit.

12.2.1. 7 Attach the conduit fitting to the Conax interface fit ing., Before tightening the interface, zotate the conduit until the weep hole-is positioned as shown.

12. 2.1.8 Tighten the interface connections and arc the flexible conduit around to the mount'ng bracket, while insuring tha - the ECSA is not disturbed.

)2. 2.1. 9 Attach the concuit to the mounting bracket assembly isinc 6/32" hardware (screw, nut and lock washer) and a conduit mounting strap.

Tighten the stra'n reef adaptor around the Raychem sleeve installec in step 12.2.1.5.

12.2.1.10 Photograph the transmitter to document the installation of the electrical interface protection.

12.2.1.11 Repeat steps 12.2.1.'hrough 12.2.1.10 .'or each "ansmitter.

B. Intecral Junction Box Input 12.2.1.1 Cut a piece of 1/2" flexible metal concuit approximately 18" in length.

'2.2.1.2 Install tvo (2) straight flexible conduit fittings, one (1) on each end of the conduit.

NOTE: The fitting at he end farthest rom the =-box input snould a'so contain a strain relief adaptor.

12.2.1.3 Orill a 1/4" weep ho'e approximately 9" from the ""ansmittez inter-face connector.

12.2.1.4 Dzill a 6/32" screw clearance no' in the mount'ng bracket assemb'y.

12.2.1.5 Place a 4" "'ece of Fa.oh~~ sleevng over the Kapton pigtails approxi-matelv 16"-20" from the transmit".er to act as a stra'.". reli.ef point.

N YLE LABORATORIES f QAM Igni 7 Rye ~ 7, Hur<svate Face>ty

Page No. Il-27 Report No. 45592-4 PAGE NO 19 TEST PROCEDURE NO.

L~ ~ TRANSMITTER ELECTRICAL '))ZCFSI CAL I.')."=RFAC S (Continued) 1 A

~

A Q ~

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A~ At ach he conduit fi ting to the J-box input. Before tighteninc the interface, rotate the conduit until the weep hole is positioned a-F the lowest point of the arc.

1".2.1.7 Carefully feed the pigtails into the flexible conduit until thev ente" the J-box. Install a noninsulated crimp spade lug to each lead and connect them to the + terminal within the J-box.

12.2.1.8 Tighren the interface connections and arc the flexible conduit around to the mounting bracket.

12.2.1.9 Attach the conduit to the mounting bracket assembly using 6/32" hardware (screw, nut and lock washer) and a conduit mounting strap.

Tighten the strain relief adaptor around the Raychem sleeve installed in step 12.2.1.5.

12.2.1.10 Photograph the transmitter to document the installation of the electrical interface protection.

12.2.1.11 Repeat steps 12.2.1.1 through 12.2.1.10 for each transmi ter with integral junction box inputs.

12.2.2 Mechanical Inter acin

12. 2. 2 Cut a piece of 3/8" stainless steel tubing and debur" each enc.

12. 2. 2. 2 F'are one end and slip on a 3/8" stainless steel "B" nut.

12.2.2.3 Bend the tubing as shown in Figure 2.

12. 2. 2. 4 Place the Swagelok ccmpress'on nut and fitting ove" "he unflared end of the tubing. Connec the tubing to the remaining section of the Swagelok fitting mounted on tne inlet por" (s) of ".'.".e transmit=e as shown in Figure 2 using standard Swagelok procedures.

1~ ') 41

%40~ F 'osition the tubing as shown in Figure 2 and tighten "'".e itting!s) .

12.2.2.6 Attach the tubing to t'e mounting bracket assembly using 6/32 hardware (screws, nuts and lock washers) and a 3/8" tube mount'ng szrao.

12 ~ 2 2 ~ 7 Photograph each transmitter to document the installation of the mechanical inter face.

12. 2.2. 8 Repeat steps 12.2.2. 1 t.""ough 12.2.2. 7 for each transmitter.

WYLE LABORATOA)ES FOAM >OSi r ac Oc~:

U*,AII

Repor t No. 45592-4 PAGE NO TEST PROCEDURE 40 45" 32

"-R=SSwRK 'LEAK TES Reauizements

".- essure Tes" A Pressure Test shall be "erfor,,ed =n each tzansmitt r to ' if,.

pressuze integrity of the seals. A "ressure medium of dzy gaseous nitrogen shall be applied to the transmittez input pressure ports using a high-pressure regulator as shown in Figures 3 and 3A. The applied pressure shall be monitored using a 0.1\ F.S. pressure gauge. Duxing his test, voltage shall not be applied to the transmitter.

The applied pressures shall be supplied to the transmitters in the following manner for a duration of not less than 1 minute:

o The differentia'1 pressure transmitter shall have both pressure input ports pressuri ed simultaneously to the corresponding ovexpressure listed below:

Model No. Overoressure ( si )

N-E13DM-IIM1 3000 N-E13DH-HI.'il 4"00 N-E13DH-I Hl 4:00 o The gauge pressure transm- ezs shall have their single pressure input por= pressurized to the corresponding overpressuze listed below:

Model No. Cveroressuze (csia)

N-EllGi4-HIE2 4000 N-EllGH IIM2 4500 All body seals shall be leak checked using chlorine-free bubble solution, and any seal leakage from a t"ansmitter shall be evaluated by tne Lead Customer.

Leak Test A Leak Test shall be pe formed, where specified, during all with the exception of the 3aseline and Post-LOCA Tests. To ver.=Funct'ona'ests fy the pressure integrity of the seal, a pressure medium of dry gaseous nitrogen shall be appl'ed to he t arsm'tter input "zessuze port(s) using the Marotta System as snowr. in Figuxe 4. The applied pressure shall be monitored usinc a 0.1s F.S. "zessure gauge. Du 'n. this est, input voltage sha 'ct be a""ed to the t a.".smit=er.

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INSTRUCTIONS PREPARATION

1. Confirm that the kit selected is designated for the intended terminations (STP or STQ). Ensure that the cable and feedthrough conductor diameters aMe within the ranges specified in Table A of this PDS or the kit's label.

2 ~ Remove all ielted asbestos or braided )acketing material from the insulation in the splice area. Splice sealing sleeve (part J) will not seal to braided or woven surfaces, 3~ Cut the end of the cable off square. Remove )acket material, tapes', fillers, shield foil and binders for a length of 3.5 inches from the end.'ut the end of the feedthrough .wire off square. 'ngwist,the wires as required'o install'ubing.

5 Remove'dirt; grease and other contarlinants from'he oabl'e-.packet and all insulated conductor areas which will make contact with components of the kit with a rag dampened, but not saturated, in an approved solvent such as alcohol or acetone..

INSTALLATION

1. Slide the conductor shimsg Part R (not shown in Fig. A) over the Kapton insulated wires.-

Align with the insulation cutback, SHRINK IN PLACE.

2. When cable )acket shim,'art G, is supplied, install shim over the multi-conductor c~CCe )acket. Align to within 1/4" of the cable )acket cutback. SHRINK IN PLACE.

3. Slide the outer sealing sleeve, Part K, over the multi-conductor cable )acket. DO NOT SHRINK.

4.-. Thread each Kapton'insulated conductor through. a leg of. the ,.

Conductor Sealing Breakout, Part, E. Ensure that the large open end faces the splice area. DO NPg SHRINK.MNI~I'@~+@II> i/v>~4 p/Z >4 ~/if 484+8'8 cE J'Pc/g. 0'dA Ph'cwrc ur Ik F ( y,.< Z~+r'~. ~

5. Slide one spljce sealing sleeve, Part J, over each Kapton insulated conductor except for the cCraan conductor. DO HOT SHRINK.

NOTE: Splice sealing sleeves are not used on the drain wire.

6. Strip 1/4" of insulation from 'the end of the cable conductors, shield wire and feedthrough wires.

a cVF (> rvccCc'NC'ltlr P'+c.

INDIANA8 MICHIGANELECT Co. D.C. COOK NUCLEAR PLANT PDs-/3+)- I APP 0,,

ELECTRICAL. PLANT SECTION AMERICA PLANT DESIGN STANDARD DR R Y I I I- I0-.85

&fgaEy p'8FPifs TiQNZ~ij 7eR CH. 55 DATE rr-8'-F> Cy+rv'c'C7

/CN pp Tp O' LECTRIC POWER SERVICE CORP. COLUMBUS)OH I-2 EDS-ZfZ-I SH. Q OF 6

~ '7. Complete crimp connections between the cable conductors and the feedthrough wires using a Burndy YSV14 connector and the appropriate crimping tool, Ensure that wire is visible through holes in sleeve. Examine each connection area for sharp edges and protruding wire strands. Remove....

these with abrasive cloth or a. file.

8. Center splice .sealing sleeves, Parts J, over each connection area. SHRINK IN PLACE.

9. Slide the breakout body over the splice sealing sleeves.

Ensure that Parts J do not protrude into the breakout legs. SHRINK IN PLACE.

10. Center the outer sealing sleeve, Part K, over the assembly such as that it covers the breakout and overlaps the cable

)acket by 3" or overlaps the shim, when used. SHRIN.". IN PLACE.

s CAUTION: UO NOT FLEX UNTIL COMFORTABLE TO TOUCE.

KlT REM6VM INSTRUCT10NS'

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If the installed kit must be removed, the following procedure may be used to prevent, conductor damage:

Harm the" outer"sealing.sleeve with..a,torch or heat gun. .Using;..

a razor or sharp Reive, score Part I longitndianally over its entire length at a depth of approximately 50 to 75t of Do not scar cable acket, its'hickness, 2 ~ Gradually heat the entire surface of the sleeve. Using pliers, peel away sleeve along the mt area while continuing to apply heat.

3 ~ This process can be repeated for each component of the Raychem splice kit~ however, care must be taken not to damage the cable.

Remove,as much installating of the old adhesive

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Ou4P'NDlANA COOK NUCLEAR PLANT PDS-r9 fJ-ELECTRICAl PLANT SEC710N WR Sc REV1SlO 8 (r-8-I'<domoAd+'g 1

PLANT DESlGN STANDARD /li' II l0.85 F R, ereJ'JP44/Pl/T7 APP D DR. CH. DATE C<af)P C=C tA'Ci AMERlCAN ELECTRlC POWER SERVICE CORP. COLUMBUS)OH. l-2-EDS-3'-1 SH. 5 OF (

RFC Nos. DC<<01-2827 a X-02-2828 A licable Instruments BLP-110 NLP-151 NPP-151 BLP-111 NLP-152 NPP-152 BLP-112 NLP-153 NPP-153 BLP-120 NPS-153 BLP-121 BLI-110 BLP-122 BLI-120 NPS-121 BLP-130 BLI-130 NPS-122 BLP-131 BLI-140 BLP-132 MPP-.210 BLP-140 FFC-210 MPP-211 QLP-141 FFC-211 MPP-220 BLP-142 FFC-220 MPP-221 FFC-221 MPP-230

" MFC-3:10'. ~

i FPC 230" ""- MPP-.231.

MFC-111 FFC-231 MPP-240 MFC-120 FFC-240 MPP-241 MFC-121 FFC-241 MPP-212 MFC-130 'PP-222 MFC-131.. IFZ-051'IFI-052 MPP.-23$

MFC-14'0 MPP-242 MFC-141 IFZ-053 ZFZ-054 ZFZ-310 ZFZ-320 fbi'y i'I, ~

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FOR USE, IN NUt:LEAR P-AN7. ONLY INDIANA8 MICHIGANELECT Co. D.C. COOK NUCt.EAR PLANT Pos- I34I-I ELECTRICAL PLANT SECTIOttl REVIS10 POXBURO NE SERIES PLANT DESlGN STANDARD ll-IO-8 TRANSMITTER APP zn DR. S. Z CH DATE 4-19-85

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CONNECTION DETAILS AMERICAN ELECTRlC POWER SERVICE CORP. COLUMBUS,OH. i-a-EDS->43-I SH.6 OF6 to AEP:NRC:0775AE 1.imitorque Issues

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AMERICAN ELECTRIC POWER SERVICE CORPORATIOH D

owe~ syst'E OATEN April 18, 1986 SUBJECT) Donald C. Cook Nuclear Plant Unit No. 2 Condition Reports 2-3-86-295, 310', and 323 Limitorque Internal Wiring Jumpers FROMM D. E. van Deusen TO! B. A. Svensson The subject Condi,tion Reports (C/Rs) point out the use of jumper wires which were not qualified for harsh environment, and were located inside Limitorque switches.

A review was performed by the Electrical Generation Section (memo from K.

J. Munson to J. G. Feinstein dated 4/09/86) with the following key findings:

1. The unqualified jumper wires removed from 2-WM0-714, -724, and -726 have been identified as outdoor control wire taken from cable having item numbers 314, 315, or 316, purchased under specification DCCEE-159-QCiV.

2. All three valves (green (A) train) listed in (1) have redundant back-up valves (2-WM0-718, -722, and -728, respectively) in the red (B) train. All of the jumper wires in the back-up valves were inspected and found to be fully qualified.

3. Valve 2-WMO-714 and its back-up (2-WMO-718) are located in an area which will not be affected by a HELB. These valves are to be removed from the Environmental Qualification List.

It should be noted that the plant has replaced these Class IE jumper wires (specified in the subject C/Rs) with Class IE wires qualified for harsh environment.

Based on the study performed on a HELB outside containment (FSAR section 14.4), there are no breaks postulated in the section of the Steam Supply to Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Turbine piping which is located in the same compartment as valves 2-WMO-724 and -726. As such, these valves will not be subjected to the harsh environment of a pipe break during a postulated HELB outside containment.

IHTRA SYSTEM

Based on this information, we believe that the Class IE jumper wires in question did not pose a threat to the health and safety of the public, nor did it create an unreviewed safety question as defined in 10 CFR 50.59. It is concluded, therefore, that this situation is not reportable under 10 CFR 50.73.

D. E. van Deusen Approved by.

J. G. Feinstein, Manager Nuclear Safety & Licensing pm cc: M. P. Alexich/J. G. Feinstein/R. G. Vasey R. C. Carruth/L. F. Caso/K. J. Munson J. C. Jeffrey/R. L. Shoberg/W. G. Sotos A. A. Blind - Bridgman J. D. Allard - Bridgman DC-N-6947 AEP:NRC:9470 MEMOSB:LIVJ.mern

gRICAN 4 LECP

"'c CORPORATIOH AMERICAH EI.ECTRIC POWER SERVICE OWKR SYSTEM DATIt March 21, 1986 OCC FB.E ppp Nfc<W~

SU SJ'ECTt D. C. Cook Units 1&2 t b~

IE Notice 86-03, C/R 2-03-86-295, AIT No. 9445 ~ OAT D

MOV Operability with Control Mire EQ Uncertaintieac.

ta PROM< K. J. Munson - EGS

)Fatuus TO< D. E. VanDeusen - NS&L gG$ - JUG IE Notice 86>>03 identifies potential problems with the environmental qualification of the internal control wiring in the limitorque motor operators. C/R 2-03-86-295 reports that a jumper wire was found during the MOV walkdown which was not listed as an acceptable environmentally qualifiedmemo wire in my memo to the plant dated 1/9/86. The purpose of this is to determine typical valve operability in light of the control wire qualification uncertainties.

The co'ntrol wiring in question is located completely within the L<mitorque operator's limit switch compartment and is used to interconnect torque and limit switches. For D. C. Cook, terminal blocks are not installed or used inside the compartment.

Instead, field cable is directly terminated onto the switches with internal jumper wiring providing any additional interconnections. The MOV control circuit voltage is ungrounded 220VAC or 250VDC.

The postulated control wire failure modes are open-circuits, single-wire grounds and wire-to-wire shorts which, depending on the circumstances explained below, may cause inadvertent or incorrect operation of the associated MOV.

Open circuits or high resistance connections are normally attributed to incorrect termination of the control circuit wiring and will generally not occur as a result of extreme environmental conditions. The internal wiring of an MOV is protected by the limit switch compartment cover from direct spray impingement during an accident which could theoretically loosen a control wire and create an open circuit.

Circuit shorts and grounds (including both high impedance/leakage current or low impedance/direct short conditions) may hypotehtically occur as a result of gross electrical insulation breakdown or as a result of insulation leakage currents sufficient to cause misoperation of the valve control circuit.

For the DCCNP control voltage levels, gross electrical breakdown could only occur on direct conductor-to-conductor or conductor-to-ground contact. Electric arc-over is highly unlikely at low voltage levels during normal operation of the MOV. Direct shot ts are possible only where conductor breakthrough occur s as a result of 'severe cable insulation IllT RA SYSTEM t ~

damage. S uc h d amage age could only occur when substantial insulation co embrittlement due to high radiation doses combines with mechanical wear or when extremely high tern'peratures softens the insulation to t'e point of conductor exposure. Based on the generic properties of possible jumper wiring at DCCNP, we believe that this type of extreme degradation .".hould not occur under specified accident conditions.

The configuration of the individual control wires within the li m it s witch compartment greatly minimizes the probability of the individual conductors achieving contact with grounded componen ts or other exposed conductors. Host jumpers are less than a few i h s long especially between limit switch termination points.

Excess wire is normally kept to a minimum with the majori t y o f wires taking a direct path between terminal points thus reducing the likelihood of electrical contact. The general construction.

of the limit switch and torque switch insulating blocks also

'educes the exposure of possible electr ical contacts with receded terminal points.

Although conduct, or breakthrough should not occur, sufficient insulation degradation may cause changes in the individual wire insulation resistances for severe environments. While such changes could result in the wire's inability to adequately pass a high voltage withstand test performed as part of the qualification (e.g. IEEE-383), these changes are unlikely to cause significantly low conductor-to-conductor or conductor-to-ground insulation Resistance (IR) values necessary to cause HOV failure or misoperation. The physical wire separation mentioned above creates long leakage current paths which effectively insure that low IR valves will not occur.

Further reducing the probability of HOV misoperation during an accident is that a large percentage of installed jumper wiring is environmentally qualified wire as explained in my memo to A. A. Blind - DCCNP dated l/9/86. (Attached)

Additional justification for safe continued operation is the fact that the DCCNP HOV control circuit voltages are ungrounded.

Ungrounded or "floating" voltage systems typically allow a single conductor to ground fault without having an impact on the control C ircuit. ~ Only when two simsultaneous conductor-to-ground (i.e.

conductor-to-conductor) faults occur would there be a chance fo r misoperation of the HOV.

The possibility of spurious operation of MOV's due to short circuits is also minimized by AEP's design philosophy of double breaking of the control circuit. The double break concept requires control contacts to be located at both polarities of the actuating circuit. With this configuration and ungrounded control voltages, a short circuit to ground of a single internal jumper wire of the HOV cannot cause a spurious operation of the valve.

Finally, it should be noted that in the unlikelY event that wire degradation effects MQV operability, remote valve repositioning can be accomplished from the valve control center. Manual actuation of the motor contactor can adequately reposition the affected valve assuming the VCC is accessible 0uring the post-DBE.

K. J. Munson K JM/r is/.47. 3

~ ~

Approved / ~

C; arruth w/Attachments cc. T. 0. Argenta/S. H. Horowitz L. F. Case/J. V. Ruparel D. N. Turnberg/J. R. Anderson J. G. Feinstein/D. VanDeusen - NS8 L R. F. Kroeger/D, Cooper - QA IE Notice 86-03/AEP:NRC:9419 File

gglCAN %LEO)

"<c AMERICAH ELECTRIC POWER SERVICE CORPORATIOH OWER systf.i'anuary A

9, 1986 suumcvi D C. Cook Units 1 h 2 Limitor que Yalve M. 0. Jumper Wiring Environmental Qualification K. J. Munson - EGS A. A. Blind - D. C. Cook We have been notified of a potential unresolved problem at other utilities with the environmental qualification of jumper wiring inside the limit/torque switch compartment of limitorque motor operated valves.

The normal procedure during installation at DCCHP was to use a qualified wire, however this practice was not sufficiently documented; Therefore, some uncertainty exists as to the type and manufacturer of the internal jumper wiring. Since all qualified components are required to be fully documented, an inspection of the jumper wiring of all limitorque valves that are on the EQ list is necessary.

The inspection involves noting the gauge of the wire and the type of .

insulating material. It is suspected that most jumper wires will be a solid 812 Awg wire with an asbestos braided material surface taken from the older control cables having item nos. 3092, 3093, 3119 through 3123.

Exceptions to this wire type and descriptions need to noted. Pending the outcome of the inspection, it may be necessary to replace the existing jumper wiring with a single known qualified wire which can be better documented for qualification purposes.

Me have identified 78 MOV's {14 inside containment) in Unit and 72 1

MOV's {13 inside containment) in Unit 2 which are EQ listed and need to be addressed. Attached is a listing of these MOV's including plant locations.

Requested is the inspection of these valves and an estimate of the manhours it will take to r eplace the existing jumper wiring with a single known qualified wire if necessary.

If you have any questions, please call me at extension 2158 or

+ 'p'.

K JN/r is/ <3 95 Approved R, . Carr uth cc' ~ O. Argenta/S. H. Horowitz J ~ R. Anderson/D. N. Turnberg L~ F. Case/J. V. Ruparel R. Kroeger/D. Cooper J~ Feinstein W. G. Smith, Jr . - Bridgman J ~ Allard - D. C. Cook -)pQA $ v$ +f

ggicAN 'EL% cp "ie AMERICAH ELECTRIC PO~ER SERVICE CORPORATIOH "ONER SVSTf.lh DATKs April 9, 1986 Sub JKCT) D. C. Cook Units 1 E 2 Limitorque MOV Malkdown C/R Nos. 2>>03-86-295/310/323 FROMc K. J. Munson - EGS TOt J. G. Feinstein - NSAL The jumper wires removed from 2-WM0-714, -724, -726 have been identified as outdoor control wire taken from cable having item nos. 314, 315 or 316 purchased under specification DCCEE-159-QCN.

These are a 4, 7 or 12 conductor cables having 7 strands of 818 Awg. wire with a nominal 20 mils of clear polyethylene insulation and 10 mils of color-coded PVC conductor jacket material applied directly over the polyethylene insulation. The wires and cable are rated for continual use at 75 C. The cables were purchased N-grade from either Triangle/Plastic Wire 5, Cable, Essex, Collyer Wire 8 Cable or Paige Electric.

Three individual jumper wires were taken from each valve and were used in an identical wiring application as follows:

Point-to-Point Wirin A rox. Len th a) 46 to 56 4 to 5 1/2 inches b) 53 to 58 11 inches c) 43 to 57 6 1/2 to 8 inches The three jumper wires are shown marked-up on the attached wiring drawing which is typical for all three valves. Jumper wire denoted a) above connects two limit switch contacts at the low-side polarity of the control voltage bus. Jumper wire denoted b) above connects a torque switch contact with a limit switch contact near the high-side of the control voltage bus.

Jumper wire denoted c) above connects a torque switch contact with a limit switch contact at the high-side of the control voltage bus. See the attached copy of valve circuit elementary dwg. which is typical for all three valves.

2-MMO-724 and 2-WMO-726 are green (A) train valves which feed essential service water to the 2-AB and 2-CD emergency diesel generators, respectively. These valves open automatically when the EDG is running or can be opened by control switch. The redundant back-up to these two valves are red (B) train valves 2-WMO-722 and 2-WMO-728 which provide essential service water to the 2-AB and 2-CD EDG's, respectively. All four valves are IHTRA SY STEM

located i.n an HELB area pipe tunnel north of the 2-CD EDG.

2-WMO-714 is a green (A) train exit valve from the 2E containment spray heat exchanger. The redundant back-up is a red (B) train valve from the 2W Containment Spray Heat Exchanger. Both of these valves are located Just east of the passenger elevator at elev. 621 ft. in the aux. buiZ'ding at approximately 30ft. north of an HELB area pipeway which is on the opposite side of a poured concrete wall. 2-WMO-714 and 2-WMO-718 are not in an HELB area and are to be removed from the list of equipment required to be environmentally qualified.

Dur ing the walkdown of valves 2-WM0-718, 2-WMO-722 and 2-WM0-728, no unqualified jumper wires were found. Therefore, the opposite train valves of 2-WM0-714, 2-WMO-724 and 2-WMO-726 were fully qualified with no jumper wire qualification uncertainties.

Additionally, all of the above valves are located outside containment and could be subjected'o a HELB which peaks at 230 F and would have a duration of only'econds. Radiation doses are low and are not a concern. A'ccording to one wire manufacturer, polyethylene is extruded at temperatures above 300 F which can be considered the approximate melting point of this material. This is in agreement wi)h the )ypical temperature specifications for polysthylene of 75 C (167 F) normal continuous operation, 90 C (194 F) emergsncy opsration for 36 hours4.166667e-4 days <br />0.01 hours <br />5.952381e-5 weeks <br />1.3698e-5 months <br /> per year over several years and 150 C (302 F) short-circuit operation for very short durations in seconds or less. Therefore, it is highly unlikely that the polyethylene insulation on the found jumper wires would melt and expose their conductors when subjected to an outside-containment HELB temperature environment.

K. J. Munson KJM/ris/49.23 Approved

.-Carruth w/o Attachments cc. T. O. Argenta/S. H. Horowitz L. F. Caso/J. V. Ruparel D. N. Turnberg/J. R. Anderson IE Notice 86-03/AEP:NRC:9419 File (w/attach.)

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M~H HOMI LIMITORQUE OPERATES

~QUE ttt Limitorque is far more than a valve actuator. It also Thc controls and limits thc opening and closing travel of the tlecls I

ibility. Basically, it is a any position or location and can readily be adapted to valve, Proper valve seating is very important in automatic be mcl

d device. It controls all egisting equipment. It can bc actuated by many power valve operation bceausc -most valves are damaged when source t shipboard water-tight sources includinlt electricity, hydraulic prcssure, air, or they are improperly seated, or by meeting a foreign obstruc- this m;I

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AMERICAN ELECTRIC POWER Service Corporation I Rivcrsidt Plaza (614) 223- l000 P.O. Box16631 Columbus, Ohio 432 I 6-663 1 May 6, 1986 Mr. Joe Drab Limitorque Corporation 5114 Woodall Road Lynchburg, Virginia 24506

Dear Mr Drab:

hs we have previously discussed, one of the latest environmental qualification uncertainties involves the use of "T-drains" on Limitorque actuator motors'eeded from Limitorque is a clarification on the qualification requirements for the use of T-drains. Specifically, the follow1ng concerns need to be addressed:

1. In which Limitorque environmental qualification teat reports were T-drains installed on motors?

2. What are the T-dra1n requirements with respect to inside versus outside containment building valve motor operators?

We understand that Limi'torque has qualified actuators with and without T-drains installed in the motors'o you consider the T-drains to be an absolute qualification requi ement or a design enhancement, especially since some actuators were qualified without T-drains? If required, do you recommend that all actuator motors have T-drains installed, even where T-drain holes are not available?

4- What are the specific technical reasons for the installation of T-drains? Can there be plant-specific actuator configurations in which T>>drains are not required. For example, would it be possible for the condensate to drain off through other avenues.

response.

223-2158 Approved

's Please provide us with as much detail If C arrut K. J.

AEPSC unson possible in you" you have any questions, give me a call a. (6.14)

Assoc. Engineer KJM:rd : 50. 62 cc T 0. Argenta/S.

~ ~ H. Horowits L~ 7. Caso/J. V. Ruparel D ~ N. Turnberg/J. R. Anderson A~ A. Blind - Bridgman J~ Allard/L. Van Ginhaven - Bridgman M. Marracco - MED to AEP:NRC:0775AE Cable Acceptance Criteria

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~ic AMERICAH ELECTRIC POWER SERVICE CORPORATIOH "0+as sos'~~

oAvac May 16, 1986 subJEcTc Insulation Resistance on EQ Instrument Cables FROiis M. J. Finissi TO< R. L. Shoberg/E. K. Legg, Jr.

As a result of the recent NRC audit on our Equipment Qualification (EQ) files, ve must document the minimum insulation resistance on our EQ instrument cables to ensure that the leakage current vill not adversely affect the current loop during an accident. The Electrical Generation Section is supplying the I 5 C Section vith the insulation resistances such that the effects from the leakage current can be determined. Attached is a table containinig the minimum insulation resistances gathered from the appropriate EQ test reports. This listing of instrument cables is not complete and as the information is obtained, forvarded to the I 5 C Section for reviev.

it vill be If you have any questions, please call.

M. J Finissi Approved Approved y/".i/

J. . Anderson ASK R.. Carruth MJF: rd:52.9 cc. T. 0. Argenta/S. H. Horovitz L. F. Caso/J. V. Ruparel D. N. Turnberg/J. R. Anderson K. J. Nunson

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1 RIVERSIDE PLAZA COMPANY 8.0.

COLUMBUS, OHIO PLANT SUBJECT e oA KQ ghee.

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ATTACHMENT 1 ~ 0 TO AEP: NRC: 0585H RESPONSES TO NRC QUESTIONS RELATED TO SELECTION OF TRANSIENTS AND VALVE INLET CONDITIONS (QUESTIONS. 1-4)

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Attachment 1.0 AEP:NRC:0585H Results from the EPRI tests on the Crosby 6M6 safety valve indicated that the 'test blowdowns exceeded the 5'b value given in the valve specifications. If the plant-specific expected blowdowns also exceed 5%, the pressure might be sufficiently decreased such that adequate core cooling might not be achieved for decay heat removal. Expected blowdowns for, cook 1 and 2 at their current ring settings were not provided. Discuss the consequences of potentially higher blowdowns.

Discuss the adequacy of'ecay heat core cooling at the expected reduced pressures.

Expected blowdown for Cook 1 and 2 pressurizer safety valves at their current ring settings is 5% or less of the set pressure. The initial factory tests were performed to meet age requirements of the ASME Code,Section III, which allows a maximum blowdown of 5%. Ring settings are often changed during set-pressure testing to achieve a crisper "pop" and to preclude damage of the valves'eating surfaces during limited steam flow and restricted lift. The ring settings are restored to the original factory settings each time the valves areiset<<pressure tested.

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Attachment 1.0 AEP:NRC:0585H Question 2:

The Westinghouse Inlet Fluid Conditions Report states that the conditions resulting from cold overpressure transients were presented for only those plants for which Westinghouse performed the specific design and analysis for their cold overpressurization protection system.

Cook 1 and 2 were not among the plants which had their cold overpressurization protection systems designed and analyzed by Westinghouse. Cook 1 and 2 do, however, use the PORV's for cold overpressure protection. The report, further states that the fluid conditions for the cold overpressurization event may vary between steam and water. The submittal did not state the expected steam and water.

The submittal did not state the expected inlet fluid conditions for the cold overpressurization event.

Discuss the range of expected fluid conditions for the varying types of fluid discharge and identify test data demonstrating operability over the range of expected conditions. ~

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+

Response 2:

following response follows the suggested approach given in Appendix n

The F of EPRI Interim Report, July 1982, entitled "EPRI PWR Safety and Relief Valve Test Program Guide for Application of Valve Test Program Results to Plant-Specific Evaluations".

The D. C. Cook Nuclear Plant cold overpressurization protection system includes the following:

- Two Masoneilan Series 20,000 Control Valves (PORV)

- PORV opening set points are reduced from 2335 psig to 435 psig whenever the reactor coolant system liquid temperature is below 188'F (Unit 1) or 152'F (Unit 2). (Ref. Tech. Spec. Pages 3/4 4-31 and 3/4 4-29)

The plant cold overpressurization event analysis~ indicates that:

- The design basis event is starting a reactor coolant pump when steam generator temperature is 50'F greater than RCS temperature.

The pressurizer generally has a steam bubble but can be water solid for low reactor cooling system temperatures.

- The PORV at 435 psig.

The peak pressurizer pressure is 499 psig.

• Two design basis events were analyzed: Heat input and mass input.

The heat input event is based on starting a reactor coolant pump when steam generator temperature is 50'F greater, than RCS temperature.

The mass input event is the result of inadvertent starting of a charging pump. Since the analysis indicated a higher peak pressure for the heat input event, basis event.

it was selected as the limiting design

E Attachment 1.0 AEP:NRC:0585H Res onse 2 (cont. ):

Based on the plant analysis, the expected ranges of fluid inlet condition resulting from cold overpressurization events are as follows:

- Maximum Pressure ~ 499 psig

- Actuation can be on steam or water Maximum Liquid Temperature 470'F (Saturation at 499 psig)

- Minimum Lipoid Temperature = Approximately 100'F (At temperatures below 1004, the reactor vessel head is generally off or the reactor coolant system is open for maintenance.)

The comparison of plant conditions to tested conditions for the Masoneilan PORV is as follows:

EPRZ In>>Plant Tested Test No.

Max. Pres. - Steam 499 psig 2750 psig 52 Max. Pres. Water 499 psig 2657 psig 62 Max. Temp. at Max. Pres. 470~ F 6830F 52 Min. Temp. at Max. Pres. 1004F 101o F 58 Based on the above comparison, it is concluded that the tested copditions are representative of expected conditions for cold overpressurization events at D. C. Cook Nuclear Plant.

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Attachment 1.0 AEP:NRC:0585H The Westinghouse Inlet Fluid conditions Report stated that liquid discharge through both the safety and relief valves is predicted for an FSAR feedline break event. The Westinghouse report provided expected peak pressure and pressurization rates for specific plants having an FSAR feedline break analysis. The Cook unit 1 plant was not included in this list of plants having such an FSAR analysis. The Cook unit 2 plant was included in the list of plants having an FSAR feedline break analysis. The plant submittal did not discuss the feedline break event.

The NUREG-0737, however, requires analysis of accidents and occurrences referenced in Regulatory Guide 1.70, Revision 2, and one of the accidents so required is the feedline break. Provide a discussion on the feedwater line break event for Cook 1 and 2 identifying the fluid pressure, pressurization rate, fluid temperature, valve flow rate, and time duration for the event. Assure that the fluid conditions were enveloped in the EPRE tests and demonstrate operability of the safety and relief valves for this event. Further, assure that the feedline break event was considered in analysis of the safety/relief valve piping system.

Response 3:

Results of the feedline break accident analysis for D. C. Cook Units 1 and 2 have shown that the pressurizer will not go water'olid before the operator can take corrective action. Therefore, the pressurizer safety and relief valves will not pass water under a feedline break event and consequently this question is not applicable to the D. C. Cook Nuclear Plant. The results for the feedwater line break for both units will be included in the 1985 Updated FSAR.

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Attachment 1.0 AEP:NRC:0585H The Westinghouse valve inlet fluid conditions report indicates that a spurious initiation of high pressure injection at power is expected to result in water discharge through the safety valves for four-loop Westinghouse plants., The analysis presented in the submittal, however, considered only steam discharge through the safety valves. Justify one of the following: (a) that the safety valves will indeed discharge only steam, or (b) that a steam discharge will result in more severe dynamic loads than a water discharge transient.

We have reviewed the accidents and transients included in our FSAR and concluded that only three could result in water discharge from the pressurizer. These events are spurious initiation of the safety injection system, reactivity additions due to either rod movement or boron dilution, and the feedwater line break. In all cases, our evaluation has shown the pressurizer will not become filled with water before a least 10 minutes following the event, thus 'allowing sufficient time for the operator to take appropriate action to terminate the filling of the pressurizer. Thus the only event(s) which can result in solid water discharge from the pressurizer .is a cold overpressurization due to heat and mass additions to the primary system. Current Technical Specifications prevent the loads on the safety valves and associated piping from exceeding the design basis under cold overpressurization conditions. On this basis, analysis has been performed for only a steam discharge through the safety valves for accidents and transients which occur when at power.

ATTACHMENT 2. 0 TO AEP:NRC:0585H RESPONSES TO NRC QUESTIONS RELATED TO VALVE OPERABILITY

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(QUESTIONS 0-10)

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Attachment 2.0 AEP:NRC:0585H The Cook 1 and 2 plant safety valves are Crosby 6M6 and were tested by EPRI. EPRI testing of the 6M6 was performed at varying ring settings.

The submittal did not provide details discussing the applicable EPRI tests which demonstrates the operability of the plant safety valves.

The submittal did not provide the present Cook 1 and 2'afety valve ring settings. If the plant current ring settings were not used in the EPRI tests, the results may not be directly applicable to the Cook 1 and 2 safety valves. Identify the Cook 1 and 2 safety valve ring settings.

If the plant specific ring settings were not tested by EPRI, explain how the expected values for flow capacity, blowdown, and the resulting backpressure corresponding to the plant-specific ring settings were extrapolated or calculated from the EPRI test data. Identify these values so. determined and evaluate the effects of these values on the behavior of the safety valves.

Response 5:

The Cook Units 1 and 2 pressurizer safety valves (PSVs) are Crosby style HB-BP-86-6M6. Three valves are installed in each unit. EPRI tested this style Crosby valve, and the results are discussed in Section 3.5 of their test report (NP-2628-SR). 'The valves have two adjustable rings, the nozzle (lower) ring and the adjusting (upper) ring. The nozzle ring controls the crispness of the pop, and the adjusting ring is used to control the valve blowdown. Raising the adjusting ring decreases blowdown. Ring settings are determined by factory test prior to valve shipment and each valve's ring settings are unique. Valve capacity and backpressure are not affected by ring adjustments.

The EPRI t.est valve ring settings are representative of the Cook valve ring settings as shown in the following table. All nozzle ring settings were the same, namely -18. The EPRI adjusting ring position is shown relative to "top-most" ring position. The positions shown in the report

(-71 and -77) for tests 929 thru 1419, which are relative to the bottom of the disc ring, were converted to -221 and -227 by adding the "level position" of the adjusting ring (-150) to the ring settings shown to get the settings relative to "top-most" position. The level position of the tested valve was determined from conversation with Crosby's chief engineer. Six (6) of nine (9) Cook valves (including three spares) have adjusting ring settings very close to those of the tested valve. In the few instances where the ring settings are different (-200, -310, -295) from the tested valve, the differences are not significant since all valves have exhibited acceptable blowdown characteristics in factory tests and independent laboratory tests.

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Attachment 2.0 AEP:NRC:0585H Res onse 5 (cont.):

COMPARISON OF RING SETTINGS BETWEEN EPRI TEST VALVE AND COOK PLANT PRESSURIZER SAFETY VALVES CROSBY STYLE HB-BP-86-6M6 EPRI Test Cook Unit 1 Cook Unit 2 Cook Spare Numbers EPRI Valve Valves Valves Valves A.R. N.R. A R. N. R. A. R. N. R. A.R. N R.

929- 932 -221 -18 -200 -18 -225 -18 -225 -18 1406-1419 -227 -18 -225 -18 -225 -18 -230 -18

-225 -1g+ -310 -18 -295 -18

'I A.R. = Adjusting, ring setting relative to top-most position N.R. = Nozzle ring setting relative to top-most position

fl I Attachment 2.0 AEP:NRC:0585H The EPRI Inlet Fluid Justification Report suggested a method for demonstrating safety valve stability. This method compares the total pressure drop for the in-plant safety valves and piping to the applicable EPRI test safety valve and piping combinations. The total pressure drop is composed of a frictional and acoustic wave component evaluated under steam conditions. The Cook 1 and 2 plant submittal did not provide pressure drop calculations or any other methods to demonstrate safety valve stability. Provide the necessary documentation and discussion demonstrating stability for the Cook 1 and 2 plant safety valves at the expected inlet conditions, ring settings and inlet piping configuration.

A comparison was made between the EPRI inlet piping configuration "G" used for testing the Crosby 6M6 safety"waive and the Cook Plant PSV inlet piping. The pressure drop was eRtimated for both piping configurations based on rated steam flow and inlet conditions.

The pressure drop fox the Cook piping was estimated to be 1.4 psi higher than that of the EPRI piping arrangement (15.8 psi versus 14.4 psi).

This difference is judged to be insignificant relative to the set pressure (2485 psig). To assess the effect of this higher pressure drop on valve stability, the concept of valve blowdown must be considered.

By definition, valve blowdown is the difference between actual piping pressure and actual reseating pressure expressed as a percentage of set pressure. The design blowdown of the subject valves is 5%. Since the set pressure is 2485 psig, the design blowdown is 124 psi.

According to EPRI Report NP-2628-SR, Safety and Relief Valve Test Report, stable valve operation is defined as when "the valve opens, remains open and closes without flutter and/or chatter." Chatter is defined as "rapid reciprocating motion of movable parts in which the disc contacts the seat." Flutter is defined the same as chatter without the disc making contact with the seat. Since the valve inlet pressure will decrease only 15.8 psi below the popping pressure after rated flow is reached, there will be no tendency for the valve disc to move towards the closed position. Inlet pressure would have to drop 124 psi for that to occur. Therefore, the valve will not exhibit flutter or chatter.

Based on the above logic, it is concluded that the stability of Cook PSVs was demonstrated during the EPRI Test Program.

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Attachment 2.0 AEP:NRC:0585H The Cook Units 1 and 2 were modified by draining the loop seals, such that steam is present at the valve inlet. The Crosby 6M6 safety valves for the Cook Units 1 and 2 were designed for loop seal operation and as such have valve internals compatible for water at the valve inlet. Are the Cook 1 and 2 safety valves internals to be modified to steam internals versus loop seal internals? If no change is planned, discuss valve operability with the loop seal internals on steam.

Valve inventory at the D. C. Cook Nuclear Plant includes nine (9) pressurizer safety valves. Six (6) valves have been modified to the "soft seat" design> i.e., 316 S.S. nozzles without stellite facing and "flexidisc" geometry Inconel disc inserts. Three (3) of these valves have been in service in Cook Unit 1 since January of 1985. The three (3) modified spare valves are schedule&to be installed in Cook Unit 2 during the last quarter of 1985, replacing the three (3) remaining "hard seated" valves currently in service in Unit 2. The existing Unit 2 valves will then be converted to the "soft, seat" design and retained as spares.

Attachment 2.0 AEP:NRC:0585H guestion 8:

During testing of the Masoneilan 20,000 series PORV, stroke time was found to be sensitive to actuator supply pressure and actuator supply line size. To achieve the 2 second stroke time requirement, the line size was increased and the actuator supply pressure was increased to 60 psig. Review of the EPRZ Safety and Relief Valve Selection and Justification Report for the Masoneilan PORV (Drawing A 8529, Revision B) indicated that a maximum of 55 psig is allowed to the actuator to prevent component damage. Provide a discussion on the action being taken by Cook 1 and 2 to assure the required stroke time will be achieved without potentially damaging components.

Response 8:

Cook Plant PORV actuators are rated for a maximum air pressure of 60 psig (Ref: Masoneilan Technical Data Supplement No. 700). Normal supply air is regulated to 57 psig. Two (of three) valves which are used for low temperature overpressure protection (LTOP) are equipped with a back-up air supply (storage bottles) which are regulated to 55 psig. Stroke time is verified by periodic testing. The Cook opening time is approximately 5 seconds as established during PORVs'equired hot functional testing. All air tubing has been enlarged from 1/4" to 1/2" size and air receiver tanks were added near the valves to serve as accumulators to maintain pressure to the actuator during stroking.

p'4 Attachment 2.0 AEP:NRC:0585H Question 9:

The Westinghouse Valve Inlet Fluid Conditions Report states that liquid discharge could be expected through the safety valves for both the feedline break and extended high pressure injection events. During some tests, the EPRI 6M6 test safety valve experienced some chatter and flutter while discharging liquid. Testing was terminated after observing chattering to minimize valve damage. Inspection revealed some valve damage which was presumably caused by the valve chatter and flutter. Liquid discharge for Cook 1 and 2 may conceivably occur for longer periods of time than the EPRI testing. Thus longer periods of valve chattering may cause severe valve damage. Discuss the implications this may have on the operability and reliability of the Cook 1 and 2 safety valves. 1dentify any actions that will be taken to inspect for valve damage following safety valve lift events.

Review of the transients resulting froth a feedline break, spurious safety injection and slow and fast rod 'withdrawal at full power have shown that the pressurizer will not completely any of these events.

fill with water during (See response to Question 4 for discussion of this issue.) The valve loop seals are drained and the valves are exposed only to steam. Therefore, Question 9 is not applicable to the D. C.

Cook Nuclear Plant.

l Attachment 2.0 AEP:NRC:0585H NUREG-0737 Item II.D.l requires'hat the plant-specific PORV control circuitry be qualified for design-basis transients and accidents. Please provide information which demonstrates that this requirement has been..

fulfilled.

For those events described in the FSAR which require the PORV to function, the control circuitry should not be subject to an environment significantly different than its normal environment. Procedures used in the design, procurement, test and maintenance of the circuitry are considered sufficient to ensure qualification to these expected plant conditions.

ATTACHMENT 3.0 TO AEP:NRC:0585H RESPONSES TO NRC QUESTIONS RELATED TO THERMAL HYDRAULIC ANALYSIS (QUESTIONS . 11-13)

~~

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Attacment 3.0 AEP:NRC:0585H guestion 11.

A single pressurizer pressure-time history was provided to TES by the American Electric Power Service Corporation for use in the subject, analysis. As a result, it was not possible to evaluate the appropriateness of the selected valve inlet conditions with respect to those discussed in the EPRZ Valve Inlet Conditions Report for Westinghouse Designed Plants (EPRI-NP-2296). The selection of the pressurizer-time history should be justified in relationship to the EPRZ report.

Res onse 11.

EPRI report No. EPRZ-NP-2296 entitled "Valve Inlet Fluid conditions For Pressurizer Safety and Relief Valves in Westinghouse-Designed Plants" prepared by Westinghouse Corporation presents the expected range of fluid inlet conditions for pressurize~safety and relief valves utilized in Westinghouse plants. The objective of this report was to demonstrate that the fluid conditions under which the valves were tested represented the expected fluid conditions during the .assumed transients. In the above analyses, to determine the valve inlet. conditions, Westinghouse determined that for a steam discharge, i.e., without a loop seal, Loss of Load and Locked Rotor events described in the FSAR as the most limiting events in determining the inlet fluid conditions for PORV and safety valves. The limiting conditions are the peak pressurizer pressure and the rate of pressurization reached during the course of the transients.

Westinghouse also performed an evaluation of the performance of the safety and relief valve observed during the EPRI testing and compared the test results to the assumed valve performance during the transients analyses. The results of this comparative evaluation is published by Westinghouse Corporation in WCAP report No. WCAP-10105 entitled, "Review of Pressurizer Safety Valve Performance as Observed in the EPRI Safety and Relief Valve Test Program" dated June 1982. The effect of the FSAR transient and time delay in safety valve opening (observed during testing) on the Reactor Coolant System overpressure is evaluated in Section 4-1 of the WCAP. The above analyses utilized the limiting overpressure transients for Condition II (Loss of load) and Condition IV (locked rotor) events. Other transients are expected to be conservatively bounded by these two transients. Based on a parametric study of the critical parameters such as power rating, fuel stored energy, RCS temperature and volume, safety valve capacity etc. a W-reference plant was selected which could represent the most severe conditions for the safety valve. A four loop plant was most limiting for the loss of Load transient and a two loop plant was most limiting for a Locked rotor transient. In the above analyses, the maximum RCS pressure peaks 8 2700 psig (Fig. 4-2 and 4-3 of WCAP) for the loss of load event and 2750 psia for the (Fig. 4-6) Locked Rotor event. As such among these two transients locked rotor event enveloped the loss of load event.

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Attachment 3.0 AEP:NRC:0585H Res onse ll (cont.):

The RCS pressure-time history for locked rotor transient given in Fig.

4-6 of WCAP-10105 peaked at 2750 psia and that given in D. C. Cook Plant FSAR (Fig. 14.1.6-13) peaked at 2633 psia. Therefore the WCAP curve was overlapped onto the D. C. Cook Plant FSAR Curve and a single curve was derived which enveloped the boundaries of both curves conservatively.

This enveloped curve represents the results of EPRI valve testing, results of the Westinghouse reference plant evaluation based on EPRI valve test results and the Donald C. Cook Plant FSAR transient analyses.

The enveloped curve shown in the attached figure was given to Teledyne for the evaluation of the discharge piping systems.

Attachment 3.0 Response 11 (cont-): AEP:NRC:0585H 28oo 7'aia 270O r ~ r P.

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~ 1 >ogp loops operating, one locked rotor (Unit 2 FSAR Fig. 14.1.6-13)

O2: Locked (NCAP rotor pressure transient, 1.0 10105, Figure 4-6) second delay opening tir'e O 3  : Envelope Curve (recottmended)

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Attachment 3.0 AEP:NRC:0585H Overpressure transients cause the pressurizer sprays to activate which adds moisture to the steam volume. When the safety or relief valves open they would thus pass a steam-water mixture. The hydrodynamic effects of the water slug discharge case for the safety valves was analyzed in the original TES reports (TR-5364-3 and TR<<5364-4). It has been concluded that the steam-water mixture conditions is enveloped by the steam and loop seal discharge cases and need not be addressed.

However, it was not clear in the submittal if the relief valve piping analysis included the relief valve opening on water at the expected overpressure and temperature condition. The piping analysis report contained in the submittal does not present a description or results of the PORV fluid transient analysis. Provide an explanation of whether this steam-water case was considered in selecting the transients that produces the maximum loading on the PORV piping system.

Response 12:

Included as Attachment 3.1 to this submittal is the preliminary response from Teledyne Engineering Sexvices regarding their previous analysis discussed in Question 12.

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Attachment 3.0 AEP:NRC:0585H The REPIPE momentum equations contain an acceleration term which, when used with RELAPS results, commonly introduces spurious spikes into the calculated fluid forces for liquid discharge situations. These spikes can. be avoided by using a large time step in the REPIPE calculations, but this may result in losing the peak force values. In the event that liquid discharge resulting from cold overpressurization transients needs to be considered, an assessment of the use of REPIPE in conjunction with RELAPS should be provided.

Included as Attachment 3.2 to this submittal is the preliminary response from Teledyne Engineering Services regarding their previous analysis discussed in Question 13.

e ATTACHMENT 3.1 TO AEP:NRC:0585H TELEDYNE INPUT (QUESTION 12) r+

r+

E ENQmEaRNG Samos tabb flCORtb RVtstVI WAVNltj4, MASSLCHU3 CTT5 00254 i4tTa4%04440 lWCtttOa341 NOO June 20, 1985 6233-19 American Electric Power Service Corp, 1 Riverside Plaza Columbus, Ohi o 43216-6631 Attention:

~S~b eot: llRC Uoasttons Relattve to She 0. C. Cook Units l and R PQRU/St D)scharge Pipfng Analysis

Reference:

guest<on Ho. 12, PORY Fluid Transients Gentlemen:

Attached you will find a copy of our response to question 12 for your review. This is not a formal transmittal and therefore, this package should be considered preliminary until officially transmitted through our Document Control Department.

Very truly yours, TELEDYNE ENGINEERIN6 SERVICES Lenin 8. Semprucci Pro)ect Hanager LBS/lh Attachment

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Attachment to 6233-19 Page 1-HRC guestion 12 (Reference 1) states in part that ... "it was not clear in the submittal if the relief valve piping analysis included the r elief valve opening on water ... The piping analys1s report contained in the subm1ttal does not present a description or results of the PQRY fluid transient analysis. Provide an explanation on whether this steam-water case was considered in selecting the transients that produce the maximum load1ng on the PORV piping system."

The pressurizer safety and relief valve discharge piping analysis for the D..C. Cook Units 1 and 2 plants was presented in four reports:

TR-5364-1. 2, 3 and 4 (References 2, g, 4 and 5). Reports TR-5364-1 and 2 contained the details of the PORV analysis for Units 1 and 2, respectively.

Reports TR-5364-3 and 4 contained the details of the safety valve anlays1s for Units 1 and 2, respectively. The support loads, nozzle loads, valve end moments and valve accelerations from PQRY discharge are summa ized fn TR-5364-3 and 4. However the PORY pipe stresses are not included in TR-5364-3 and 4.

The 0. C. Cook Unit 4 safety and relief valve discharge piping was analyzed for two cases of relief valve operation. The first case was the rel1ef valve opening on steam followed by steam discharge. The second case is the relief valve open1ng on water followed by water discharge. For both cases the pressurizer pressure was assumed to follow the envelope curve (Figure 1) provided by AEPSC (Reference 6) which is based on the Unit 2 FSAR Figure 14.1.6-13 and Westinghouse Report MCAP 10105, Figure 4-6.

The pressurizer steam in Case 1 is assumed to be saturated at the pressures specified in Figure i. The subcooled water in Case 2 1s assumed to be at 400 F as specif1ed in the AEPSC directive shown in Table 1 and obtained from Reference 6.

Cases 1 and 2 ware run on a RELAP 5 mod 1 model of 0. C. Cook Unit 1 as is descr ibed in detail in Reference 2. For ce time histories of both cases

It Attachment to 6233-10 Page 2 I

were.developed ustng RKP?Pf (Reference 7), These force-time histories were submitted to the structural dynamic program THRSAP (Reference 8), lt was determined that Case 2 produced the bounding loads and therefore pipe stresses and loads were ~eported for this case. Based on the Unit 1 analysis only Case 2 was considered for Unit 2.

PORV discharge is taken to be an upset condition PORV discharge is included in the following load coebinations specified $ n Reference 6 and labeled 82 and B3 for stress combinations and 02 for support load combina-tions.

B2: PORV transient pr assure + deadweight w OBK 2 t PORV 2I" < !.2 Sh 83: PORV thermal stress range < !.2S 5 + .25 Sh 02: PORV transient + PORY transient + (OBE) + (PORV)

Height Thermal Blowdoxn The results of the stress analysis, support loads, nozzle loads, valve end moments and valve accelerations for Case 2 of the PORV discharge are reported in TES Technical Reports TR-5364-1 and 2 for D. C. Cook Units

! and 2. respectively.

S~vcss Attachment to 6233-lS Page 3 .

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. mao POSTVLATEC U 3KST SAFET SCXNnRIO EVEotT Ao USE CIKVC 03 LS Zi'IPUI'OX SarXTT Var VS TaaSSZENT 21 4o 2O40 0 s io Tn~ t3CC4~Oe)

~FG VII rotor (Untt Fto It.l.e-t.e Q: Fnnr loner oenrt:ine, loneeeone 2 Feelt 1.0 second daisy open<~ t)ne

.0:2: Locked roar pressure trsns1ent, tKAP 14145, Figure c-5) 3: Knvelope Curve + (i/:g/ge.

Attachment to 6233-1$

Page 4 Table 1 AIat ~ 9MKET 5 of

~SFIXITION L4 ~ AaaZTI'5~$ TO ~QLES I A4O II V PORV oa LC)

Is a SV ".le e

~ 9'BOCK CMrT01ne row

'iping stresses and support he time-his ory dynamic structural analysea of the piping system using .he forcing functions obtained from the Theral-Hydraulic transient anelyeee ~

These analysei shall assume the: largest piping atreaee4 and S'ppOrt leads Vill OCCu Vhen either 3 O Vee diS"har the reape tive transient anocKS ~

2. 'Ihe 4 types of transients tO be investigated shall inoludes pot/ ~~Ns! NS

a. Condensate slugs of vatar followed hy steam discharge, frccL Qpaat prest~re rises' continuoua varTs Vater discharge from shut-dovn abnor..;al events 'lamp. ~ 400eP.

a. Condensate sluga of vatar folloved by staam disoha gep from emergency p assure risaeg see sheet 6 for postu-lated vorat scenario event.

NOTES:

1. The POAY discharge p)p)ng was analyzed for the transients described in AEP directive dated November 29, 1982.

2. The condensate slugs refer ed to ln PORV transient "a'bove are due to the fact that the PQRV fnlet pfpfng for D. C, Cook Units 1 and 2 is sl ) ghtly sl oped tmard the PORY', therefore a smal l slug of condensate ls formed before each of the valves.

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Attachment to 6233-19 Page 5.

REFERENCES

1. NRC Questions Relatfve to 9. C, Cook Units 1 and 2 Pressurizer PORV/SV Ofscharge Analysfs, Transm)tted to TES in AEP Letter Gated Parch 25, 1985 frea Osman Yasfn to L. B. Sempruccf.

2. TKS Technical Report TR-5364-1, D. C, Cook Nuclear .Generating Plant, Analysts of Pressurizer Safety/Relfef Valve Oischarge Pfpfng System per NUREG 0737, II.O.Z Unit 1, June 6, 1983.

3. TES Technical Report TR-5364-2, D. C. Cook Nuclea~ Ganeratfng Plant, r+

Analysis of Pressurfzer Safety/4lfef Valve Ofscharge Pfpfng, System per HUREG 0737, 11.0.1 Unft 2, June 6, 1983.

4, TES Technical Report TR-5364-3, D. C. Cook Nuclear 6eneratfng Plant, Analysis of Pressurizer Safety Valve Dfscharge Pfping System vtfth Drained Loop Seals per NUREG 0?3?, II.0.1 Unit 1, July 18, 1983.

5. TES Technical Report TR-5364-4, D. C. Cook Nuclear Generating Plant, Analysis of Pressurizer Safety Valve Discharge Pfpfng System fifth Grained Loop Seals per NUREG 0737, 11.0.1 Unit 2, July 18, 1983.

6. AEPSC directive on transients to be analyzed and load combinations, letter dated November 29, 1982 from Sam Ulan (AEPSC} to L. B.

Sempruccf (TES).

REPIPE Computer Program, Control Oata Corporation. A computer program to develop forces from RELAP output.

8. TNRSAP: A computer program to perform structural dynamic analysis of ptp<ng systees ~ copyright 1976 by Teledyne Materials heseanch

ATTACHMENT 3 ~ 2 TO AEP:NRC:0585H TELEDYNE INPUT (QUESTION 13)

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&Gmaama sKRvCES s30 IECONO AVENR/E WAUSRRRR. RRA$ 4ACSRV jl~ 0$ 1SI

,OSVSaOOuca VVaaRso RRR RR/Sat June 20, i985 6233 20 Aaarfcan Electr fc Power Servfce Corp.

1 Rfversfde Plaza Col uebus, Ohf o i3216-6631 Attantfon:

~Sub ect: RRC Ruestkons Relative to the'. C. Cook Units l and R PORV/SV Dfscharge Pfpfng Analysis

Reference:

gestfon No. 13 ~ RKPIPE Calculations Senti caen:

Attached you will ffnd a copy of our rosponsa to guestfon 13 for your revfew. TMs fs not a formal transafttal and therefore, this package should be consfdered prelfmfnary until offfcfally transmftted through our Oocunent Contr ol Oepar trent.

Very truly yours, TELEOYME ENGINEERING SERVICES L.enin 8. Scepru Prospect Nanagar l.sS/1 h Attachment

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Attachment to 6233-20 Page 1 NRC guestfon l3 states:

"The REPIPE momentum equations contain an acceleration term which, when used wfth RELAPS results. con+only introduces spurious spikes into the calculated flufd forces for liquid discharge situations, These spikes can be avoided by using a large t1me step fn the RKPIPK calculations, but thfs say result in losing the peak force values. In tht event that liquid discharge resulting Crom cold overpressurfta-tfon transients needs to be considered, an assessment of the use of

. REPIPE fn con)unction with RELAPS,should be provided.'+

Teledyne Engfeerfng Servfces'esponse to this questfon 1s as follows:

The REPIPK tfm step used in the 5/RY analys1s was equal to 0.0Ql seconds and was not increased to avoid spurfous spikes, This time step was based upon tho crfterfa that ft should be less than or equal to 1/10th of the period of the highest significant natural frequency of the piping systea.

Spurious spfkes 'were observed in some of the fluid forces generated by REPIPK. Mhen these spikes occurred they were investigated to deter-mine their source It was found that these spikes. resulted from fluctuat1ons fn the RKLAP lass flowrate, The fluctuations wer e due to sudden changes in the sonic veloc1ty calculated by the two-phase choked flee correlatfons contained in R'ELAP.

In conclusion, the force calculation time step was based upon the piping system response characteristics, and not incr eased to avoid spurious spikes. Therefore, the "peak force values" have not been lost.

ATTACHMENT 4 ~ 0 TO AEP:NRC:0585H RESPONSES TO NRC QUESTIONS RELATED TO THE STRUCTURAL ANALYSIS (QUESTIONS 'l4-18)

vl,

Attachment 4.0 AEP:NRC:0585H Bending moments 'are induced on the safety and relief valves during the time they are required to operate because of discharge loads and thermal expansion of the pressurizer vessel and inlet piping. The Teledyne Engineering Services (TES) Report (TR-5364-3 a TR-5364-3) provided the bending moment components for the safety and relief valves. Hake a comparison of the predicted Cook 1 and 2 safety and relief valve bending moments to the tested valve bending moments to demonstrate that the operability of the valves are not impaired.

Included as Attachment 4.1 to this submittal is the preliminary response from Teledyne Engineering Services regarding their previous analysis discussed in Question 14.

PR 4

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Attachment 4.0 AEP:NRC:0585H According to results of EpRZ tests, high frequency pressure oscillations of 170-260 Hz typically occur in the piping upstream of the safety valve while loop seal water passes through the valve. An evaluation of this phenomenon is documented in the Westinghouse report. WCAP 10105 and states that the acoustic pressures occurring prior to and during safety valve discharge are below the maximum permissible pressure. The study discussed in the Westinghouse report determined the maximum permissible pressure for the inlet piping and established the maximum allowable bending moments for Level C Service Condition in the inlet piping based on the maximum transient pressure measured or calculated. While the internal pressures are lower than the maximum permissible pressure, the pressure oscillations could potentially excite high frecgxency vibration modes in the piping, creating bending moments in the inlet piping that should be combined with moments from other appropriate mechanical loads.

Provide one of the following: (1) a comparison of the expected peak pressures and bending moments with the allowable values reported in the WCAP report or (2) justification for other alternate allowable pressure and bending moments with a similar comparison with peak pressures and moments induced in the plant piping.

Response 15:

The pressurizer safety valve loop seals at the D. C. Cook Nuclear Plant have been drained and are maintained in a drained condition. Therefore, the cpxestion does not apply to this installation. (Refer to response for Question 9.)

yl g1 VJ

Attachment 4.0 AEP:NRC:0585H Further information is required to evaluate the structural analyses of the safety valve and PORV piping systems. The submittal states that the TMRSAP computer program was used to perform the structural analyses.

Provide a description of the methods used in this program and explain how the program has been verified for the type of transient analyzed.

Describe the methods used to model the connections to the pressurizer and relief tanks and the safety valve bonnet assemblies and PORV actuators. Also the submittal presents the calculated values for forces and moments on the pressurizer and quench tank nozzles and moments on the valve flanges. It does not, however, present a statement on the acceptability of these forces and moments. Provide a statement regarding the acceptability of these nozzle loads.'

Included as Attachment 4.2 to this submittal is preliminary input from Teledyne Engineering Services regarding their previous analysis discussed in Question 16. The nozzle loads calculated by Teledyne for the pressurizer and pressurizer relief tank are in some instances higher than the nozzle umbrella loads furnished in the pressurizer equipment specification. We have reviewed these calculated forces and moments and have judged that the increases in magnitude are sufficiently low, that, the allowable stress levels in the nozzles will not be exceeded. We have, however, transmitted these revised loads to Westinghouse Electric Corporation for review.

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Attachment 4.0 AEP:NRC:0585H The piping analysis report presents calculated pipe stresses for load combinations corresponding to emergency conditions and states that normal and upset conditions were shown to be acceptable in TES Technical Reports TR-5364-3 and TR-5364-4. The loading combinations used for the emergency condition are identified in the submittal and are in accord with recommendations of the EPRI PWR Safety and Relief Valve Test Program Guide for Application of Valve Test Program Results in Plant-Specific Evaluation, March 1982. Specify which load combinations and stress limits were used for the normal and upset conditions. The EPRZ Guide also recommends that the Class 1 portion of the piping be analyzed for a faulted condition where SSE and fluid transient loads are combined. Provide justification for not including the recommended load combination for faulted condition in the Class 1 portion of the piping.

Plants with an FSAR can use their original design basis in conjunction with the appropriate system operating transient definitions given in Appendix E, Table 3 of the "EPRI PWR Safety and Relief Valve Test Program Guide for Application of Valve Test Program Results to Plant Specific Evaluation," Interim Research Report V-102 Rev. 2, dated July 1982. (Reference Table 1, Note 1) As such in conformance with the D. C. Cook Plant FSAR - Table 2.9-2, Part B, "The Loading Conditions and Stress Limits for Pressure Piping" have been utilized.

The piping is assumed to be in the elastic range for the safe shutdown of the plant and an inelastic analysis with higher yield strength allowables is not needed. The Cl emergency stress load combination (Ref. Section 6.1, Teledyne Report TR-5364-3, Book 2 of 3) therefore includes a design basis earthquake load. However, the likelihood of an SSE earthquake concurrently occurring during an SRV event seems highly remote and was henceforth not included in the C2 emergency load combinations (Ref. Section 6.1, Teledyne Report TR-5364-3, Book 2 of 3).

The evaluation of a faulted load event such as a DBE in the Cook emergency load combinations with a lesser allowable stress is conservative relative to present nuclear industry codes and standards.

v Attachment 4.0 AEP:NRC:0585H The analysis report lists the load combinations that were considered for the pipe supports. The load combinations listed meet recommendations for the EPRI Guide except that they do not include a combination for a faulted condition nor do they identify acceptance criteria used.

Justify not including a faulted condition in the evaluation of the pipe supports and explain what acceptance criteria were used to evaluate support adequacy.

Plants with an FSAR can use their original design basis in conjunction with the appropriate system operating transient definitions given in Appendix E, Table 3 of the EPRI PWR Safety and Relief Valve Test Program Guide for Application of Valve Test Results to Plant Specific Evaluation," Interim Research Report Program V-102 Rev. 2, dated July 1982.

(Reference Table 1, Note 1) As such in conformance with the D. C. Cook Plant FSAR - Table 2.9-2, Part C, "The Loading Conditions and Stress Limits for Equipment Supports" have been utilized.

Since our supports are required to remain within the elastic range for the safe shutdown of the plant, an inelastic analysis with higher yield strength allowables is not needed. The El emergency support load combination (Ref. Section 6.2, Teledyne Report TR-5364-3, Book 2 of 3) therefore includes a design basis earthquake load. However, the likelihood of an SSE earthquake concurrently occurring during an SRV event seem highly remote and was henceforth not included in the E2 emergency load combinations (Ref. Section 6.2, Teledyne Report TR-5364-3, Book 2 of 3). The evaluation of a faul'ted load event such as a DBE, in the Cook emergency load combinations assuming permanent support deformation is conservative relative to present nuclear industry codes and standards.

ATTACHMENT 4. 1 TO AEP:NRC:0585H TELEDYNE INPUT (QUESTION 14)

iE TELEDYNE Et K:lNEERlNG SERVtCES 130 SECONO AVENUE WA1.THAM. MASSACHUSETTS 02251 (617) 890.3350 TVTX11101 32'508 June 7, 19B5 6233-17 American Electric Power Service Corp.

1 Riverside Plaza Columbus, Ohi o 43216-6631

Subject:

NRC questions Relative to the D.C. Cook Unit 1 and 2 PORV/SV Discharge Piping Analysis Oear ~

Reference:

guestion No. 14 Valve End Moments Enclosed you will find a copy of our response to guestion 14 for your review. Thi s i s not a formal transmittal and therefore, thi s package should be considered preliminary until Sfficially transmitted through our Document Control Department.

Very truly yours, TELEDYNE ENGINEERING SERVICES Lenin B. Semprucci Project Manager LBS/cbw Enclosure ci'!Gli~!EERS AND iYETALLVRGISTS

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ATTACHMENT 4. 2 TO AEP: NRC: 0585H TELEDYNE INPUT (QUESTION 16)

pl f,g <<<< ~ is TELEDYNE ENQINEERINQ SERVICES 130 SECONO AVENUE WALTHAM.MASSACHUSETTS 022SA lElq89O3350 TWX<7>0l32R.T50$

June 12, 1985 6233-18 American Elect ic Power Service Cor p.

1 Riverside Plaza Columbus, Ohio 43216-6631 Attention:

~Suh ect: RRC Ouestlons Relative to the O. C. Cook Units 1 and 2 PORV/SV Discharge Piping Analysis

Reference:

question No. 16 Gentlemen:

Enclosed you will find a copy of our response to guestion 16 for your review. This is not a formal transmittal and therefore, this package should be considered preliminary until officially transmitted through our Document Control Department.

Very truly yours, TELEDYNE ENGINEERING SERVICES Lenin B. Semprucci Project Manager LBS/lh Enclosure

".'<<Gl".!=ERS AND <<Y<<ETALLURGISTS

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E Technical Report SERVICES TR-5872-1 &33&

g, '3 8,O OYNAHIC ANALYSES In dynamic response analysis, the solution of the equations

~4 Mu + Cu + Ku > R(t) (15) is required, where R(t) can be a vector of arbitrary time varying loads or of effective loads which result from ground motion. Specifically, in the case of ground motion, if it is assumed that the structure is uniformly sub)ected

~ 0 to the ground acceleration ug (Ref. 5), the equi libr ium equations considered are:

~m ~ ~ r~

Mur + Cur + Kur = -Mug (16)

Mhere ur is the relative displacement of the structure with respect to the gl ound~ i ee ~ p ur u uge The program can carry out a history analysis for solution of Eqs. (15) or (16), or a response spectrum analysis for solution of Eq. (16). The history analysis can be carried out using mode superposition or direct integration. The response spectrum analysis 'necessitates, of course, first the solution of the required eigensystem.

8.1 Res onse H.istor Anal sis b Mode Su er osition In e mode superposition an'alysis, i is assumed t t the structural esponse can 5e described adequately y the p lowest vibrati modes, ere p (< n. {)sing the gt nsformati u = ij) X, wher the col mns in , are the p M-Frthonormal ed eigenve ors, Eq. { 15) ca be writt n as gi X+QX+fl4 = gfR 7)

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F

I=

ENGINEERING SERMCES Technical Report TR-5872-1 34 or t(,

where

, (18)

In q. {18), it is assumed that the p mping matrix C s tisfies the modal thogonality condition r

)T'c))=0 (iPj) (1g Equatiojn '(ll) therefore represents p uncoup'led second order ifferential.

equations. These are olved in the progr using the Milson-9 method, which is a unconditionall stable step-by-st integration scheme (Refs. 5 and 6).

+r Th same time step >s used in the inte ratldn of all equations to simplify the ga'Icu)ation of tress components at pre-selected times; the case of prescribed ground motion = $ X and in q. ( 17),

)n the righ hand side

. if givey by - T Hug, where the ground acc eration is considored as the sum of (he components in the 7 Y, and E irections as desc )bed in Section 8. .

8.2 Re onse Histor Anal sis b Direct Integration The solution of the equations of motion, Eqs. {15) and (16), can be obtained by direct integration (Refs. 5 and 6). In the program the MHson-9 method is used, which is unconditionally stable. The algorithm employed is summarized in Figure 8-1. It need be noted that Rayleigh damping is assumed; i.e., C = A M + p K (Ref. 5). This form of damping is easily taken account of

>n the analysis, because no storage and no multiplications for a damping matrix are required.

/

8.3 Res onse 5 ectrum Anal sis In thi s .anal ys i s, th ground accel erat ion vector in Eq. (lj6) 'is as:

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4.14 A 4 S 0 amic Anal sis of a Three-Oimensional Pi in S stee Sub ected to Time Var. in Loads - FTNS1 FTDIl f FTMS120 Introduction - A dynamic analysis is performed with the piping system shown in Figure 4.14-1 using the STAROYNE program and the TMRSAP program with analysis types, NOYN = 2; Dynamic Response Analysis for arbitrary time de-pendent loads using mode superposition. (Problem 4.14A)

NDYN =.4; Dynamic Response Rgylysis for arbitrary time de-pendent loads using step-by-step integration.

(Problem 4.148)

Problem Oescri tion - The computer model is shown in Figure 4.14-1 and is composed of sections of straight pipe, curved pipe (elbows) and a valve with a concentrated weight. Nodes 1 and 48 are fully fixed and therefore, are prevented from having any displacement or rotation. The time varying loads applied to the nodal points on the structure are shown in Figure 4. 14-2.

Propertv Data (a) Member Properties FROM TO 0.0. t Wt.

NODE NODE ~(i n. ~in. ~lb/in Comments 1 42 1".0 0.562 8.71 42 46 Z4.0 2.0 39.12 5000 lb.concen-46 '8 16.0 0.50 6.89 t.rated weight at node 44

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{b) ~6eametr NOOK COORDINATES*

NO. Y 1 0 0 0 8 0 0 -10.752 10 0 27.000 -37.752 14 0 90.277 -37.752 16 0 117.275 -64.474 22 0 118.638 -196.736 24 0 126.545 -215.549 28 0 136.858 -225.862 30 -26. 728 154.13S -244.764 42- -327.240 160.392 -244.764 44 -347.244 160.680 -244.764 46 -347.244 144.672 -244.764 48 -347.244 135.732 -244.764 (c) S stem Restraints Nodes 1 and 48 are fully fixed Time Var in Load In ut (LBS) t (Sec)

FIGURE 4.14-2 "Note: There are slight differences in the coordinates of previous publication of this problem (ref. '.2,'ue tn changes in formats on this version of the code.

A 4

8 TELEDYNE ENGlNEERNQ SERVCES cF <6 N0OAL LOAOS Node F,LS F;CK F )LE.

44 0.0 0.05 -34,460.6 30 . 01993 .06993 33,200.7 28 .01993 .06993 23,476.4 -23,476.4 24 .02303 .07303 -23,058'9 23,058.9

.02303 .07303 -32,61 0.2

.03310 .08310 31,664.7

.03310 .08310 31,664.7 10 .04004 .09004 -30,543.6

.04004 .09004 -30,543.6

)11 E ENGINEERING SERVCES Z]d 4F ZC Problem 4.14A Mode Superposition Parameters for TMRSAP Number of Modes, NF Damping ~ 0.005 Solution Time Step = 0.002 sec Oisplacement 5 Stress Print Time Step 0.01 sec Note: The maximum and minimum displacements and pipe end loads are obtained from the solution time step.

Computer Reference 0'14 Problem 4.148 Oirection Integration parameters for TMRSAP a, Mass Factor, = .256 B , Stiffness Factor, = .0000395 Solution time step, OT = 0.002 sec Print Interval Time Step = 0.01 sec Computer Reference F15

I I

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SERVICES 4'/

Results The selected responses from TMRSAP and STAROYNE are plotted in Figures 4.14-3 through 4.14-8.

Cosssents The My bending respnse for superposition at Element f12, Node 48, doesn't agree very well initially with the STAROYNE results. This can be attributed to the following:

1. STAROYNE uses a different integration technique; this is ex-pected to have a small effect.

2. STAROYNE calculated the response by a technique that uses star static. The elements'esponse plotted is not a summation of the elements modal'response. Instead, the modal nodal acceleration responses are summed and converted into equivalent force vectors at each time step and added to the external load vector. This force vector is statically applied to the entire structure resulting in displacements that may be different than those obtained by mode superposition alone. Since the displacements are different, then the element load can be expected to be different. This method approximates treating the higher modes (the modes not considered) statically.

Item 2 can be tested by running TMRSAP with more modes and observing if the responses from STAROYNE are in closer agreement. It would also be expected if damping is not a significant factor, that the responses from direct integration would be closer to the TMRSAP's mode superposition.

This 's indeed the case, the initial My response by mode superposition for 20 modes is plotted in Figure 4. 14-9 and shows closer agreement to STAROYNE results and TMRSAP direct integration results. The results are obtained from Computer Referen = F16.

I I

\

Zi lg 4 TMRSAP i%DE or Lg ELEMENT 8 tlODE 28 SUPER OSITrot<

x STARDYtIE MODE>>

SUP ERPOS I TIDE TMRSAP DIRECT I tITEG RATION TIttE (SEC) 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 lC Fioure 4.14-3 Tine Ris:~ry Res~ rse .',ode 28 - To. sion T

I 0

'I

Mo/3 <<g gg lcm)cas 20 ELEMENT 8 NODE 28 10 b

0 TIME (SEC) 0.2 O.a 0.5 06, 0I 0

-10

-15 TNRSAP BODE - SL~PERPOSITIOtl STAROYNE tC~P.,= SUPERPOS ITIC[i 0 TllRSAP OIR:CT I'iT GRATIQN

-20 Fioure 4.14-4 Time History Response t(ode 28 - Pendino H I

I 0

Ql 4 I': $ I:

ELEMEtlT 8 tlODE 28 z )+

I TIME (SEC) 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.

0 0

4 Tt/RSAP MOOE-S~JPER. OSITIO x STARD'itlE tlat".DE-SUPl:RPOSITI o TMPSAP DIRECT IllTCGRATIOfl Fiaure 4.14-5 Time History Response Node 28 - Berdino M.

t 0

0

X 50 0 ELE"iENT 12 NODE 48 Tt<RSAP HOOK - SUPERPOSITION x STAROYNE HOOK - SUPERPOSITION 40 o THRSAP DIRECT INTEGRATION 30 0

20 TIHE (SEC)

CO 0 0.1 0. K 0 3 >0.4 a 0.5 0.6

-10

-20

-30 x

b

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I S

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.3 0

-20 0

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-80 a - SUP.?":)SITIOl)

TMRSAP MODE x STAROYttE HiDE - SU~ i.?POSITION o TtlRSAP DIR CT Ili<.rGRAT.'Ott Figure 4. 14-7 inc Hi s.or@ Resoonse Node 46 -:ending <

+ ~

l ly e%

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X 0

0 0.2 0. 0.4 0.5 0

-5

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-15 TMRSAP MODE - SUPERPQSITTON1 x STARDYtlE PQDE - SUPERPOSITIOH o TMRSAP DIRECT I'lTEGRATIOH

-20

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-80 4 TMRSAP MODE - SUPERPOSITION x STARDYNE NODE - SUPEPP"StTiptt o TMRSAP DIRECT IftTEGRA.:""

0 PlRSAP BODE - SUPERPOS!Tlp'i - ZO NODES - REF. COMPUTER RUt( l6

1 J

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'I I'

E ENQ)NEER!NQ SERVK ES

~ gg or K Force Transformation - Rode Su er o<<t<<n A sample calculation of the global forces is shown for element $ 6 (Elbows) to show the correctness of the global forces. This calculation is made at only one time step. The method used in this hand calculation is not the method used in the TNRSAP program, but should yield identical results.

ELBtENT f6 Node 22 to 24 global axis - x-out of page Coordinates of TI X = 0 0 y = l 1 o. '"~Z z = -207.:"56 from Computer Re essence 414

ENGNEERiNQ SERV1CM g)g P or 4C Coordinates of Node, 22 r - o.o

~ 118.6384 y

z -196.7355 Coordinates of Node 24 x, ~ 0 y 126.5451 L  % -215.5491 Oirection of Xl Vector Coordinates of Tl - Coordinates of 22

0. -0 0.0 118.752 - 118.6384 0.1136

-207.756 - -196.7355 -11.0205 Unit vector of Xl 0.0 0.010307

-.9999468 Vector from 22 to 24, YZ YZ = 0. - 0.0 0.0 126.5451 - 118.6384 7.9067

-215.5491 - -196.7355 -18.8136 Oirection of X3 ( 1ocal Z axis)

X3 ~ Xl X YZ 7.7123 0.000 0.000

SHVACES Unit Vector X3 1.0 0.

0.

X2 Vector (local Y Axis)

F

X2 > X3 X X 0.0

.9999468 0.010307 FG L 1 local axis forces L - Transformation matrix L-1 = Xl:X2: X3 0.0 0.0 1.0 0.010307 .9999468 0.0

-.9999468 .010307 0.0 At t = 0.74 sec FI -3952

-3082

+629.8 FG=L-1F'29.8

-3122.56 3920.0

/y SERVICES 7 > pt~1 <C M' 8328.

N' Local axis moments

-120949 HG

- Global axis moments 34840 MG ~ L-1g<~ 3480.

-120183.

-9575.7 J-end Calculation Oirection of X1 vector coord. of 24-Tf 0.0 7.7931

-7.7931 Unit vector of Xl 0.0 0.707106

-.707106 Unit vector of X3 is the same as at 1 end X3 = 1.0 0.0 0.0 X2 vector ( local- y ax i s at J-end)

X2 = X3 X Xl 0.0

.707106

.73?106

E

~72~ ENQlNEERNG SERVlCES g,Jg srcg

"'jend 0.0 0.0 1.0 0.707106 .707106 . 0.

-.707106 .707106 0.

at t=0.74 sec F'jend 4980.

-563.7

-629.8 FG =L'f'~ -629.8 3122.79

-3919.98

" jend = 7393.0 80420.

-62600.

G. = L'M'. = -62600.

Gjend 109141.8 4589.11 Check of REsultant Moment (RMS) t= 0.74 sec, element 0'6, J end 2 ~ M2 + 2 "RMs = MZ

( (62,600)2 + (109,141.8)Z + (4589.11)2)4 125,903 lb-in The foregoing values agree with the TMRSAP co.-... '.o." outout problem FTMS1.

J f

~ "I

0

~ ~

ENQNEERINQ SERV)CES g)$ 4fia 4< C3 r

Check of Stress Suaear Stress is calculated at a selected point to show the method of the stress calculation in time history analysis. The method is identical to the static analysis method, but the user should be aware that the maximum bending and torsional moments are used.

flement fl I End Tmax > 109) 000 lb- in Computer Reference f14 Hy > 78910 lb-in MZ>> 561400 lb- in p,o 18>> tw = .562" (wall thickneQ)

I = 1172.78m S = 130.19 in> J 2343.5in4 Torsion T>> Tc = {109 QQQ 9 418.6 psi J

In-Plane, out of lane "out of plane>> 2 2 My + MZ = 566918.6 lb-in.

= = 566918.6 4354.5 Psi 8 out of plane M T3KT9 Combine Stress 2 2 T2 + My +MZ = 577302.1 1b-in

= 577302-12 comb ined = 4434 3

~ ~

Tn:-se values agree with tne TMRSAP computer output, problem FTMS1.

ci e

k

74' SERVlCES Z 8~~ i FORCE TRAN5FORNATION - DIRECT INTEGRATION A sample calculation of the global forces is shown for element No. 6 (elbow) to demonstrate the correctness of tAe global forces. This calcu-lation is made at only one time step. The method used in this hand calculation is not the method used in the TNRSAP program, but should yield identical results. The transformation matrices are the same as

.those used for the hand calculation of global forces for the mode super-position analysis, page 70 .

I end T = 0.74 sec

-4098.

-3710.

.-30.02 I

F G

=L1F -30.02

-3751.92 4059.3

-3975. *

-103700 18800 G

18800.

-103735.4 2905.95

• Note: The sic.'. rv n'.inn is reversed for local forces at the I end.

ip,

)It E

-75<< ENGtNEERNQ SERVK ES g,gg ~F 4 g end ,

T

• o ~ ><

F'524. -217.7 Ml 75670.

71900 30.02 -57290 F L F' M =L M' F 30.02 -57290.

'752.1 104347.6

-4059.99 -2665.79 Check of Resultant Moment 8 t = .74, element No. 6, I end

= Mx + My + Mz = 119070.16 MRM<

These values agree with the TMRSAP computer output, problem FTOIl.

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b c'~+~>>%~re Enclosure I ATTENDANCE AT 6/26/85 MEETING P. Barrett AEP, Safety and Licensing P. Infanger AEP, Safety and Licensing M. Imhoff AEP, Safety and Licensing B. Svensson Cook Plant J. Feinstein AEP, Nuclear Safety 8 Licensing D. Kahn MDPH - Rad. Health Div.,

St. of Michigan D. Wigginton NRC - NRR - ORB¹1 R. Emch NRC - TSIP J. Heller Resident Inspector A. Auvil AEP, Safety 8 Licensing W. Smith, Jr. Cook Plant K. =-Baker Cook Plant M. Ackerman AEP, Safety & Licensing E. Witaker Cook Plant D. Butterfield CECo*

S. Wigginton USNRC

• Chairman of the Westinghouse Owners Group

Enclosure 2 OUIDELINES FOR SIMPLIF)CATION.

AND MODIFICATION OF. THE

-TECHNICAL SPECIFJCATIONS.FOR. THE DONALD C. COOK NUCLEAR PLANT

~ REGULATORY AND lNDUSTRY lNPACT ON FORMAT

~ CONTENT OF REVLSED TECHNlCAL SPEClFlCATlONS

~ 1HPLENENTAT10N OF PROGRAN

~ MRlTER S 6UlDE

TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION CATEGORIES REQUIRED. SY 10 CFR SO.3e:

/

I[

1) DEFINITIONS .

2) QFETY LIMITS AND LIMITBIG SAFETY SYSTEM SETTINGS

3) LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION

4) SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

5) DKSIGN FEATURES

6) ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROLS BASES SECTION NAY CQJ4TAIN:

1) INTERPRETATIONS OF TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS

2) ALTERNATVIES TO SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

3) LISTS OF EQUIPMENT AND INSTRUMENTS

0) LISTS OF SUPPORT SYSTEMS

5) SETPOINTSp INSTRUMENT RANGES'TCsp TO SPKCIFY ACCEPTABLE PERFORMANCE

5%ROOSE OF THE BASES SECTION:

1) DKSCRlBE SAFETY 1N'ORTANCE OF THE PlECK OF EOUlPNENT AND PLACE lT lNTO ONE OF THE FOUR SAFETY CATEGORlESo

2) STATK E5f THE SAFETY PERFORNANCE lS TO SE HKASUREDp lNCLUDINS REASONS FOR SPEClFlC PARANETERSe

3) DKSCRlBE ALTERNATlVE METHODS OF DBQRSTRATlNG SAFETY')

PROVlDE OTHER 1NFORHhTlON USKFUL 1N 1NTERPRETlNG TKCHNlCAL SPKC 1 F 1 CATlONS e

E REORGANIZING THE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATI0NS:

PiNBLEN: REQUIREMENTS FOR A SINGLC SYSTEN ARE OFTEN SCATTERED THROUGHOUT THE DOCLNENTa SOLUTIONS ORGANIZE THE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS Ok THE BASIS OF EQUIPMENT, ADVANTA6ES: 1) SAVE TINE FOR USERS OF THE DOCLNENTs

2) HELP IN RBOVING OVERLAPPING REQUIRENENTS,

SAFETY CATEGORIES ALL EQUIPMENT FALLS INTO ONE OF THE FOLLOHING CATEGORIES'

~

l. Equipment which is absolutely essential for safety, as described in the Safety Limits section of our present T/S's. Deletion of requirement for this equipment could result in an unreviewed safety question.

I

2. Equipment for which sufficient redundancy exists so .that multiple failures of the same equipment nnfst occur in order to create a safety problem.

Repair time for equipment in this category would usually be one week.

3. Equipmeng whoie failure alone would not create a safety problem. However, a safety'problem could result from a combination of 1) a design-basis accident and 2) an additiona1 outside'event such as fire, severe natural phenomena, loss of offsite power, or an NUREG-0737-type accident. Repair time for equipment in this category would usually be one month.

4 ~ Equipment that does not constitute a basis for safety and for which no specific action is required. Failure of equipment in this category will not result in a safety problem ~less accompanied by 1) a low-probability event and 2) failure of redundant equipment. Repair .ti'me fo'

.- equipment in this'ategory shall be based on agreements between the plant operators and regulatory authorities.

T/S 3.4.6-2 ~ RCS--OPERATIONAL LEAKAGE T/S 3.4.').3 OVERPAE SSUAE PAOTKCTION SYSTKNS T/S 3.4.11 RELIEF VALVES OPEAATIttC THERE ARE 5 ITE))S REFKRENCED FOR SYS 12 HCttDO lTECH SPEC/FSAR) INDKX REFKRKNCED SYSTEtl IS:

13 STEAN GENERATORS SIGNIF. ITEH NO. REFERENCED ITEH i R T/S 1.6. DEF. OF OPKRADLE R T/S 3.0.5 LIH!T!NC CO)IDITIOttS/APPLICABILITY-"NOPONE R R T/S 3.3.3.9 RADIOACTIVE LICUZD EFFLUENT INSTRUNENTATION T/S 3.4.1.1 RCS LOOPS";STAATUP At)D POHKA OPERATIC)l T/S 3.4.1.2 RCS LOOPS--HDT STANDBY T/S 3.4.1.3 RCS LOOPS -SttUTDGttt(

T/S 3.4.1~4 RCS LOOPS"TTHAEE LOOP OPERATZON T/S 3.4.5 STEAH GENfRATORS R T/S 3.4.6.2 RCS--OPERATIO)lAL LEAKAG'E R T/S 3.6.3.1 COt)TAINttENT ISOLATIt)lt VALVES R . T/S 3.7.1.1 SECONDARY SAFETY VALVfS R T/S 3.7.1.2 AUXILIARY FEED)tATER SYSTEH R T/S 3.7.1.5 STEAtl GENERATOR STOP VALVES T/S 3.7.2.1 STEAH CBlKRATOR PAESSURE/TENPEAATURE LIHITS R T/S 3.7.7.1 SQ/DSERS THERE AAE 15 ITEtlS RKFEAKNCED FOA. SYS 13 NOttDO )TECH SPEC/FSAR) INDEX REFEREttCED SYSTEN IS:

14 REACTOR COOLAtlT Ptk)PS SIGttIF o ZTKH NO. REFEACNCED ITEH R T/S 1.6 OKF. OF OPE))ABLE R T/S 3.0.5 LIHITINC CO)tDITIONS/APPLICABILITY-~PONER 2 Tls 3.1.1.3 BOROtl DILUTION T/S 3.1.3.4 TINE R

'/S 3.4.1.1 ROD DROP RCS LOOPS-STARTUP AND PMR OPERATION T/S .3.4.1.2 RCS LOOPS-'-HOT STANDBY T/S 3.4.1.3 RCS LOOPS-SIIUTDOltN T/S 3.4.1.4 RCS LOOPS THREE LOOP OPERATION R T/S 3.4.6.2 RCS--OPERATIONAL LEAKAGE R T/S 3.4.10.1 RCS--STAUCTUAAL ItlTEGRZTY lAStlf CLASS Z>2y3)

R T/S 3 6.3.1 CONTAIN)Kt)T. ISOLATION VALVES R ~

T/S 3.7.1.1 SECOttDAAY SAFETY VALVES R T/S 3.7.7.1 StlBERS R T/S 3.7.9.2 SPRAY At)D/OR SPRINKLER SYSTEHS R T/S 5.7.1 CO)IHNKttT CYCLIC OR TRAttSIEtlT l.IHIT THKRK ARE 15 ITKHS AEFEREttCED FOR SYS. 14 HONDO lTKCH SPEC/FSAA) INDEX REFERENCED SYSTEH IS:

15 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTKH VEtlTS SIGNIF. ZTKN NO. RCFERfNCEO ITKH

. TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION -CLARIFICATION

\

I) NEET WITH NRC TO DISCUSS PROPOSED GUIDELINES<

2) COMPILE .A CROSS-REFERENCE LISTi

5) SUBMIT A TABLE OF CONTENTSe f) RRITE SAMPLE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS AND BASEST

5) HRITE ALL LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION AND BASES ~

6) HRITE SAMPLE ACTION STATEMENTS AND SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS')

REWRITE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION SECTIONS j.-Si T

8) DEVELOP PROGRAM FOR ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROLS SECTION<

~ ~

PURPOSE OF THE WRITER'.GUIDE P

1) OBSERVE PRlNClPLES lN THK 601DELlNESo

2) PRODUCE A 'CLEARS COHKRENT SET OF TECHNlCAL SPKClFlCATlONSo

3) KRlTE TECHNlCAL SPEClF1CATlONS THAT KNSURE SAFETY SUT ARE NOT MRDKNSOHEe

• ~

STEALS iN aKwRTINO IKDiVINJALSpKCIFICATIOM

1) ENNlNE ALL EXlSTlNS SPEClFlCATlONS PERTAlklNQ TO NK PlKCK OF EQUlPNENTe

2) DESCRIBE l%THODS FOR DBKNSTRATINS HOW THAT PlECK OF EQULPNKNT BETS 1TS SAFETY REQUlREHENTSo

3) NklTE LlNlTlks CONDlTlON FOR OPKRATlOki 1NlCH NOQIALLY DEFlNKS THK SAFETY IASlS lk THE OPERATOR S TERllS, II

0) LlST SUPPORT SYSTBQ lk ORDER TO DEFlNK THE OPERAI1LlTY- OF THE lASK SYSTEMS I '

5) MRLTK ACTlON STATB%NTS AND SURVElLL'ANCE RKQUlRB%NTSe /ANY DETAlLS OF THE SURVElLLANCE REQUlREMENTS ltlLL IE PLACED lk OTHER DOCLNKNTS e

p SCHEDULE FOR TECHHICAL SPECI TIOil SIt'1PLIFICATION PROGNN SUBMIT SAMPLE SUBMIT DRAFT T/S TO PLANT T/S TO PLANT NS + L REVIEW btS+L 2 MP, SUBMIT SAMPLE 6 MO. SUBMIT DRAFT ~ MO T/S TO NRC T/S TO NRC AEP REVIEW AEP PRELIMINARY PLANT REVIEW REVIEW PLANT REVIEW

)5)T 1 MOe 2 MOo NRC REVIEW NRC REVIEW HRC NRC APPROVAL OF SAMPLE T/S MEETING GUIDELINES APPROVED

Enclosure 3 DRAB'uidelines For Sim lification And Modification of the Technical S ecifications for the Donald C. Cook Nuclear Plant Unit Nos. 1 and 2

Table of Contents I. Purpose and Scope A. Introduction B. Regulatory and Industry Zmpact on Format

1. Regulatory Impact on Format

2. Industry Activities

3. Regulatory Guidance

4. Approval Requirements for Revised T/S's C. Content of Revised Technical Specifications

1. Definitions

2. Safety Limits and Limiting Safety System Settings

3. Limiting Conditions for Operation and Surveillance Requirements

4. Design Features

5. -

Administrative Controls

6. Bases D. Proposed Method for Reorganization of Technical Specifications II. Implementation of Program Current Status and Future Steps in the Program III. Writer's Guide A. Introduction B. Style and Mechanics C. Guidelines for Writing Definitions D. Guidelines for Writing Individual Technical Specifications . Technical Specification Revision Checklist . Definitions . Cross-Reference List for Technical Specifications

Z. Purpose and Scope A. Entroduction The purpose of this document is to provide administrative and technical guidance for the preparation and proposed modification of Technical Specifications for the Donald C. Cook Nuclear Plant. The regulatory requirements for Technical Specifications are contained in Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations, Part 50.36. The guidance provided herein is to be consistent with 10 CFR 50.36, and is intended to form a coherent basis for the simplification of the Technical Specifications for the Donald C. Cook Nuclear Plant.

The Technical Specifications should represent the minimum requirements necessary to ensure the common defense and security, the continued health and safety of the public, and the protection of the environment. The simplified Technical Specifications must meet the requirements of all published regulations, and do so in such a manner that there is a common level of understanding between the plant designers, operators, and regulators as to the meaning of each individual specification.

B. Re lato and Indust Im act on Format The purpose of this section is to provide general information regarding the anticipated format of the revised Technical Specifications. Specific information is provided later in a section entitled "Writer's Guide."

1. Re lato 1m act on Format The generic categories required by 10 CFR 50.36 are:

- Definitions

- Safety Limits and Limiting Safety System Settings

- Limiting Conditions For Operations

- Surveillance Requirements

- Design Features

- Administrative Controls In addition to the above, the T/S's are accompanied by a Bases section, which, in accordance with 10 CFR 50.36, is not officially a part of the Technical Specifications. The Bases are approved by the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, however, and thus form an integral part of the licensing and compliance basis with the Technical Specifications and Plant Operating Procedures. As such, the Bases section is a summary statement of the bases or reasons for the Technical Specifications, and may contain:

- interpretations of T/S's

- alternatives to T/S Surveillance Requirements (only if allowed by the specific T/S),

- lists of equipment, components, and/or instruments directly subject to the specific T/S requirement,

- lists of attendant systems, components, and/or instruments required to function in order to ensure safety not clear from the specification itself, if that is

- explanation, justification, or purpose of the T/S's,

- setpoints, instrument ranges, performance necessary curves, etc, to specify acceptable performance or capability, if

- additional information that may clarify the T/S's.

2. Indust Activities The Westinghouse Owners Group (WOG) is currently working with proposed changes to the format and content of Technical Specifications.

Although AEP is currently working closely with the WOG, this activity is considered separate from that effort. However, it is noted that this document may be revised based on WOG-associated activity.

3. Re lato Guidance NUREG-0452, Rev. 4, "Standard Technical Specifications for Westinghouse Pressurized Water Reactors," provides specific guidance on the currently acceptable format for preparing and modifying Standard Technical Specifications (STS). Revision 5 has been issued for comment and may provide additional guidance as appropriate. From time to time, the NRC will issue additional guidance documents on preparation of Technical Specifications.

These guidance documents are handled on a case-by-case basis in responding to the NRC concern. The revision to the D. C. Cook Plant's T/S's will incorporate many but not all of the features of the STS's.

4. A royal Re irements for Revised Technical S ecifications In order to be useful, the revised T/S's must be consistent with the construction, design, and operation of the pi,ant.

Technical Specifications that are generic in nature, but do not have clear and specific applicability to the Donald C. Cook Nuclear Plant, must be changed as necessary for this purpose. .Both plant personnel and regulatory authorities must clearly understand the meaning of the document.

In order to provide a coherent set of guidelines, the Technical Specifications, the Bases, and existing plant procedures must be well integrated. The requirements for safety, as defined in the Bases, will match on an item-by-item basis the individual T/S's. The Limiting Conditions for Operation will state minimum conditions expected for component operation. If an alternative method of meeting an LCO is stated in the Bases, then meeting this alternative is considered acceptable. The same logic is true for Surveillance Requirements. All Surveillance Requirements are implemented by plant procedures, and are considered sufficient to demonstrate compliance with the LCO's. If an alternative to the-LCO or surveillance is required, it is expected that a plant procedure can be written to implement the alternative. The utility can determine the basis for that procedure as meeting the minimum requirements for safety without prior NRC approval. Although changes to the Bases require NRC approval, they are not considered license amendments, as are T/S changes.

This table summarizes the types of approval required for changes to the following documents:

T/s's Bases Procedures Subject to Inspection and Enforcement Require Prior NRC Approval Require Formal License Amendment

C. Content of Revised Technical S ecifications

1. Definitions Technical Specification definitions provide a common reference for operators, engineers, and regulatory authorities. Definitions must be written with sufficient clarity so that anyone in any of these categories will interpret them in the same way. Special emphasis should be placed on providing clear and precise definitions for words and phrases that are commonly used by one of these groups but whose meaning may not be immediately clear to other users of the T/S document.

Defined words, when used as defined in the Definitions, are written in all capital letters in the T/S's. When a defined word is not written in all capital letters, its meaning is defined in the context.

2. Safet Limits and Limitin Safet S stem Settin s 10 CFR 50.36(c)(1) (i)(A) states:

"Safety limits for nuclear reactors are limi3s upon important process variables which are found to be necessary to reasonably protect the integrity of certain of the physical barriers which guard against the uncontrolled release of radioactivity. If any safety limit is exceeded, the reactor shall be shut down. The licensee shall notify the Commission, review the matter and record the results of the review, including the cause of the condition and the basis for corrective action taken to preclude reoccurrence. Operation shall not be resumed until authorized by the Commission."

In accordance with the Regulation,

exceeded, if any of these limits are the reactor must be shut down (the Action Statements require this), a review performed and recorded which includes the cause and corrective action, and operation not resumed until the approval to do so is provided by the Commission.

In general, the equipment described in the Safety Limits corresponds to Safety Category 1, defined in Attachment 2.

Specific plant numbers, limits, settings, etc. for this section must appear in the T/S's. This section of the T/S's has a Basis, but it is cprrently reserved for a statement of the reason for the specification. However, we plan to move such data as setpoints from this section to the Bases.

3. Limitin Conditions For 0 eration (LCO's) and Surveillance 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2) states in part:

"Limiting conditions for operation are the lowest functional capability or performance levels of equipment required for safe operation of the facility. When a limiting condition for operation of a nuclear reactor is not met, the licensee shall shut down the reactor or follow any remedial action permitted by the technical specification until the condition can be met. The licensee shall notify the Commission, review the matter, and record the results of the review, including the cause of the condition and the basis for corrective action taken to preclude reoccurrence."

10 CFR 50.36(c)(3) states:

"Surveillance requirements are requirements relating to test, calibration, or inspection to assure that, the necessary quality of systems and components is maintained, that facility operation will be within the safety limits, and that the limiting conditions of operation will be met."

In accordance with 10 CFR 50.36, our present T/S Section 3/4 includes the following required parts:

1. Title

2. Limiting Conditions for Operation

3. Applicability (specific> usually the appropriate mode)

4. Action

5. Surveillance Requirement The General Applicability Section is divided into those related to LCO's (3.0.1 thru 3.0.5) and those related to Surveillance Requirements (4.0.1 thru 4.0.5) . Hodifications to General Applicability sections are uncertain at this time. As the T/S clarification sections also.

program proceeds, it may be necessary to modify these The titles in total represent the equipment required for safe operation of the facility. Together with the Limiting Conditions for Operation, they represent the lowest functional capability or performance levels required.

The STS's further divide the combined section into twelve subsections covering a variety of areas. Since this necessarily results in multiple T/S's for the same equipment in different sections, it leads to confusion. In light of our proposed system-oriented approach it is anticipated that, if subgrouping is required, it will not follow the STS format but will be as follows:

1. Requirements in modes 1 - 6.

2. Special test exceptions.

3. Specifications required at all times.

To the extent possible, the following principles should be observed in preparing and modifying the T/S's:

Technical Specifications for systems should include all related T/S requirements together without further need to cross-rAerence to other sections.

Limiting Conditions for Operation define the minimum requirements for safety. Compliance with these minimum requirements can be demonstrated by alternative methods described in the Bases.

- Applicability or modes should be limited to the LCO.

- Action Statements should address actions associated with an LCO to ensure that safety requirements can be maintained.

The Action Statements will not require placing the plant in an unsafe condition.

Action Statements allow time to return the system to service or take some action intended to return the level of safety lost by the failure. Reductions in power or plant shutdown are transients which depend upon equipment to start and operatex unwarranted transients are therefore to be avoided.

Time to implement Action Statements will be commensurate with the safety function and level of risk to the public health and safety. Guidelines for acceptable times are discussed in Attachment 2 under "safety categories."

- If alternative actions are available and have been approved by the NRC, an "or equivalent" statement will be included in the corresponding Bases section. The T/S should be worded or annotated to indicate that alternatives are available. Plant procedures will detail how the alternative is to be carried out. NRC approval of the procedures is not a usual practice.

- Lists of equipment, instruments, etc. should be included in the Bases section or be referenced in that section to another document.

With regard to instrumentation, the Technical Specification will, in general, state the limit to be read by the operator on an instrument. The Basis will state the minimqm requirement for safety without taking uncertainties into account. The Basis will also account for differences between the LCO and the minimum requirement for safety. If the Limiting Condition for Operation (actual reading) has been exceeded, but the minimum requirement for safety (as stated in the Basis) has not, then plant safety shall not be considered compromised.

To the extent possible, Surveillance Requirements are not to duplicate other programmatic requirements (e.g.,Section XI of ASME Boiler 8 Pressure Vessel Code for ISI and IST) requirements are covered by other T/S provisions.

if these Surveillance intervals should be consistent with safety concerns but may be established in conjunction with proven maintenance intervals, scheduled outages such as refueling, or as may be determined by risk analyses or safety importance.

Every effort will be made to maintain consistent safety intervals for similar safety functions.

Surveillance Requirements relate to test, calibration, or inspection to ensure that the quality of the system is maintained, that operation is within safety limits, and that LCO's will be met. Acceptance criteria for the test, calibration, etc. may be included in the Bases section since these vary with plant modifications, new or different equipment, or approved changes in analysis or operation which could affect the acceptance criteria. Changing these values does not constitute a change in the Surveillance Requirement (to test, calibrate, inspect) of the T/S's.

- Surveillance intervals should be addressed only in the Surveillance Requirements section and not in the Action Statements section.

10

4. Desi n Features 10 CFR 50.36(c)(4) states in part:

"Design features to be included are those features of the facility such as materials of construction and geometric arrangements, which, if altered or modified,.would have a significant effect on safety and are not covered in the Safety Limits and Limiting Safety System Settings, LCO's or Surveillance Requirements."

Et is not anticipated that changes will be necessary to these T/S's; therefore, no additional guidance is needed at this point.

Nevertheless, this section will be reviewed once the LCO program is under way.

5. Administrative Controls 10 CFR 50.36(c)(5) states:

"Administrative controls are the provisions rhlating to organization and management, procedures, recordkeeping, review and'audit, and reporting necessary to assure operation of the facility in a safe manner."

This section is to be dealt with at a later stage in this program.

12

6. Bases For each piece of equipment described in the Technical Specifications, there will be a corresponding Basis section which not only states the function of the piece of equipment but also explains how it performs its function. The Basis will also describe the safety importance of the piece of equipment in tezms of the safety analysis and place it in one of the four safety categories defined in Attachment 2 of this document.

Futhermore, the Basis shall state how the safety performance is to be measured. The reasons for specific safety parameters are to be described and details of surveillance methods are to be provided. The Basis will describe the main methods of demonstrating that the piece of equipment meets its safety requirements, and it will also define alternative methods for demonstrating compliance, which are to be used when the main methods cannot be employed.

The Basis section may also contain other information which will be .useful in interpreting the T/S to which corresponds.

it 13

D. Pro sed Method for Reor anization of Technical S ecifications One problem with the current T/S's is that requirements for a single piece of equipment are often scattered throughout thh document.

In order to make the document easier to use during operations, we propose to reorganize the T/S's on the basis of equipment.

Consolidating all the T/S requirements for a single system in a single section of the document will result in two principal advantages: 1)

Users of the document will save time otherwise lost in searching through it for related requirements. This is particularly important under emergency or accident conditions. 2) Juxtaposing all the requirements for a single system will help in removing competing and overlapping requirements.

One way to achieve this system-oriented organization is to reduce the current divisions of Section 3/4 to a single section listing all the systems and their T/S's. The Bases will be reorganized in an identical manner.

While many factors will have to be taken into consideration in developing a comprehensive list of systems for such a T/S reorganization, a sample list based on the current T/S organization follows.

Pro osed List of Technical S ecification S stems 1 REACTOR CORE 2 MOVABLE CONTROL ASSEMBLIES 3 FUEL ASSEMBLIES'OD 4 POSITION INDICATOR (RPZ) INSTRBKNTATION 5 MOVABLE IN-CORE DETECTORS 6 THERMOCOUPLES 7 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM 8 REACTOR PRESSURE VESSEL 9 PRESSURIZER 10 PRESSURIZER RELIEF TANK (PRT) 11 SAFETY VALVES 12 RELIEF VALVES 13 STEAM GENERATORS 14 REACTOR COOLANT PUMPS 15 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM VENTS 16 EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEM 17 ACCUMULATORS 18 , BORON INJECTION TANK 19 REFUELING MATER STORAGE TANK 20 CENTRIFUGAL CHARGING (CC) SYSTEM EAST 21 CENTRIFUGAL CHARGING (CC) STSTEY.WEST 22 SAFETY INJECTION (SZ) SYSTEM- NORTH 23 SAFETY INJECTION (SZ) SYSTEP.-MOUTH 24 RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL (RHR) SYSTEM-EAST 25 RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL (RHR) SYSTEM WEST 26 CHEMICAL AND VOLUME CONTROL SYSTEMS (CVCS) 27 CVCS BORON MAKE-UP 28 CVCS BORON HOLD-UP 29 CVCS BORIC ACID EVAPORATOR PACKAGE NORTH QQ CVCS BORIC 'ACID EVAPORATOR PACKAGE -SOUTH CVCS REACTOR LETDOWN AND CHARGING 32 VOLUME CONTROL TANK (VCT) 33 CVCS COOLANT DEMZNERALZZATZON 34 WASTE DISPOSAL SYSTEM 35 NORMAL SAMPLING SYSTEM 36 POST-ACCIDENT SAMPLING SYSTEM 37 SECONDARY STEAM CYCLE SYSTEMS 38 TURBINE AUX. COOLING SYSTEM 39 SECONDARY SAFETY VALVES 40 CONDENSATE STORAGE TANK (CST) 41 STEAM GENERATOR STOP VALVES (MSIV'S) 42 MAIN FEEDMATER SYSTEM -EAST 43 MAIN FEEDMATER SYSTEM- WEST AUIo FEEDWATER SYSTEM (MD) -EAST 45 AUI. FEEDMATER SYSTEM (MD)--WEST AUI. FEEDMATER SYSTEM (TURBINE DRIVEN) 47 CONDENSERS 48 SECONDARY VENT AND DRAIN SYSTEM 15

49 CHEMICAL FEED SUB-SYSTEM 50 SERVICE MATER SYSTEMS 51 ESSENTIAL SERVICE WATER (ESW)- NORTH 52 ESSENTIAL SERVICE WATER (ESW) SPUTA 53 NON-ESSENTIAL SERVICE WATER (NESW)--NP~

54 NON ESSENTIAL SERVICE WATER (NESW) 55 COMPONENT COOLING WATER (CCW) 56 COMPONENT COOLING WATER (CCW) STSTEH 57 MAKE-UP WATER SYSTEM 58 PRIMARY WATER SYSTEM--NORTH 59 PRIMARY WATER SYSTEM 60 CphZROL ROOM EMERGENCY VENTILATION SYSTEM 61 ESF VENTILATION SYSTEH- AES-1 62 ESF VENTILATION SYSTEM-AES 2 63 HYDRAULIC SNUBBERS 64 RADIATION SHIELDING 65 FIRE SUPRESSION SYSTEHS 66 FIRE SUPPRESSION WATER SYSTEM 67 SPRAY AND/OR SPRINKLER SYSTEMS 68 LOW PRESSURE C02 SYSTEHS 69 HALON SYSTEM

'70 PENETRATION FIRE BARRIERS 71 FIRE RATED ASSEMBLIES 72 FIRE HOSE STATIONS 73 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEHS 74 4160 VOLT SYSTEM-T11A dc T11B 75 4160 VOLT SYSTEM--T11C 5 T11D 76 600 VOLT SYSTEM-11A 4 11B 77 600 VOLT SYSTEH 11C 5 11D 78 69 KV MANUAL ALTERNATE RESERVE SOURCE 79 DIESEL GENERATORS-AB 80 DIESEL GENERATORS CD 81 120 VOLT AC SYSTEH C1 82 120 VOLT AC SYSTEM.--C2 83 120 VOLT AC SYSTEH C3 84 120 VOLT AC SYSTEM C4 85 250 VOLT DC SYSTEH>>-AB 86 250 VOLT DC SYSTEM;-CD 87 250 VOLT BATTERY N SYSTEM 88 REFUELING OPERATIONS 89 SPENT FUEL POOL 90 SPENT FUEL COOLING AND CLEANUP SYSTEM 91 REFUELING CANAL DRAIN 92 SPENT FUEL POOL VENTILATION SYSTEM 93 REFUELING WATER PURIFICATION 94 MANIPULATOR CRANE 95 SPENT FUEL CASK HANDLING CRANE 96 CONTAINMENT SYSTEHS 97 CONTAINMENT VENTILATION SYSTEHS 98 CONTAINMENT VENTILATION SYSTEM 99 CONTAINMENT AIR RECIRCULATION SYSTEH-CEQ-1 100 CONTAINMENT AZR RECIRCULATION SYSTEM CEQ-2 101 CONTAINMENT PRESSURE RELIEF SYSTEH 102 CONTAINMENT PURGE AND EXHAUST SYSTEH 103 CONTAINMENT AUX. CHARCOAL FILTER SYSTEH 104 HOT SLEEVE VENTILATION SYSTEH 105 ZCE CONDENSER 16,

106 ZCE BED 107 ZCE CONDENSER DOORS LOMER INLET 108 ZCE CONDENSER DOORS-INTERMEDIATE DECK 109 ZCE CONDENSER DOORS TOP DECK 110 ZCE CONDENSER DRAIN 111 REFRIGERATION SYSTEM 112 INSULATED DUCT PANELS AND INSULATION:

113 DIVIDER BARRIER SEALS 114 CONTAINMENT PENETRATIONS 115 PERSONNEL AND EQUIPMENT HATCH 116 CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES 117 CONT. PENETRATION 5 MELD CHANNEL PRESSURIZATION 118 CONTAINMENT STRUCTURE 119 DEPRESSURZZATION AND COOLING SYSTEMS 120 SPRAY ADDITIVE SYSTEM 121 CONTAINMENT RECIRCULATION SUMP 122 CONTAINMENT SPRAY SYSTEM-EAST 123 CONTAINMENT SPRAY SYSTEM -MEST 124 COMBUSTIBLE GAS CONTROL 125 HYDROGEN ANALYZERS 126 HYDROGEN RECOMBINERS-HR-1 127 HYDROGEN RECOMBZNERS HR-2 128 DISTRIBUTED IGNITION SYSTEM 129 ZNSTRUMENTATZON AND CONTROL SYSTEMS 130 MANUAL REACTOR TRIP 131 NEUTRON FLUX (POWER RANGE) 132 NEUTRON FLUX (INTERMEDIATE RANGE) 133 NEUTRON FLUX (SOURCE RANGE) 134 OVERTEMPERATURE DELTA T 135 OVERPOWER DELTA T 136 PRESSURIZER PRESSURE 137 PRESSURIZER MATER LEVEL 138 LOM REACTOR COOLANT FLOW 139 SAFETY INJECTION ZNSTRUMENTATZON 140 TURBINE-GENERATOR 141 STEAM GENERATOR WATER LEVEL 142 CONTAINMENT SUMP INDICATION 143 CONTAINMENT HUMIDITY INDICATION 144 CONTAINMENT TEMPERATURE INDICATION 145 CONTAINMENT PRESSURE 146 CONTAINMENT RADIATION 147 ZCE CONDENSER TEMPERATURE MONITORING INST.

148 ZCE CONDENSER DOOR POSITION INDICATORS 149 SEALED SOURCE CONTAMINATION 150 FIRE DETECTION EQUIPMENT 151 METEOROLOGICAL ZNSTRUMENTATZON 152 SEISMIC MONITORING 153 ~ REFUELING MATER STORAGE TANK LEVEL INDICATORS 154 LIQUID EFFLUENT RADIATION MONITORING 155 GASEOUS EFFLUENT RADIATION MONITORING 156 RESISTANCE TEMPERATURE DETECTOR (RTD) -T HOT 157 RESISTANCE TEMPERATURE DETECTOR (TRD) -T COLD 158 AUX. FEEDMATER (AFW) FLOW RATE 159 RCS SUBCOOLZNG MARGIN MONITOR (SMM) 160 PORV INDICATION 161 BLOCK VALVE INDICATION 162 ACOUSTIC MONITOR 17

163 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM T AVG.

164 AXIAL FLUX DIFFERENCE (AFD) INDICATION 165 STEAN/FEEDWATER FLOW MISMATCH 166 REACTOR COOLANT PUMP BUSES 167 REACTOR COOLANT PUMP BREAKER POSITION 168 REACTOR TRIP BREAKER 169 STEAM LINE DELTA P 170 STEAM FLOW 171 STEAM LINE PRESSURE 172 4 KV BUS LOSS/DEGRADED VOLTAGE 173 LOSS OF MAIN FEEDWATER 18

ZZ. Zmplementation of Progzam 19.

Current Status and Future Steps in the Program

l. A sample T/S has been prepared and will soon be submitted to the NRC. The HRC's approval of our approach is required before we make a major commitment to the program.

2. The first step in making a T/S cross-reference list has been completed, and is included as Attachment 3.

3. The new Table of Contents of the T/S's will probably be similar to the, list of systems in the Format section of these guidelines, once the list is finalized.

4. We will submit an example of a new T/S Table of Contents to the NRC and await their approval.

5. Upon approval of the example Table of Contents, a few T/S's and Bases will be written to determine whether our approach is acceptable to the NRC. These will include only LCO's and Bases. Action Statements and Surveillance Requirements are not to be included at this time.

6. Upon NRC approval of Step 5, we will write LCO's and Bases for all new T/S's.

7. Upon NRC approval of the results of Step 6, we will prepare a few sample Action Statements and Surveillance Requirements.

8. Upon NRC approval of Step 7, we will begin an iterative process that will provide new T/S's to replace entire existing Sections 1-5 of T/S's as well as Bases.

9. Once all of the above is completed, a separate program for simplifying administrative T/S's will be initiated.

20

III. Writer's Guide for Technical S ecifications 21

A. Introduction The purpose of this Writer's Guide is to aid in rewriting the Technical Specifications in accordance with the principles explained in the Guidelines.

It is recognized that the initial review of the modified T/S's must be perfozmed by engineers and operators to ensure that the document is technically correct. At the same time, the document must be reviewed by technical writers, whose language skills will enable them to ensure that it is written in clear, precise English and that wording and sentence structure are never a source of ambiguity or misinterpretation.

This Writer's Guide should assist the reviewer in achieving the following goals of the program:

- Rewrite Sections 1 through 4 of the T/S's in ordez to produce an understandable, coherent document that 1) ensures that the plant is operating safely, 2) is easily enforceable, and 3) does not. burden the plant staff with unnecessary surveillances.

- Rewrite administrative T/S's so that basic administrative'safety concerns are addressed, but unnecessary paperwork and items unimportant to safety are eliminated.

- Rewrite T/S Bases so that the function and relevance to safety of each piece of equipment are clearly understood.

22

B. St le and Mechanics The two most important principles to be observed in rewr'iting the Technical Specifications are clarity and consistency.

For the sake of precision and clarity, choose the simplest and most direct words possible. For example, "in the event" or "with" should not be used where "if" will do.

Action Statements and Surveillance Requirements that deal with time limits or intervals must be written in such a way that no confusion is possible. Time limits should have precise beginnings and endings.

Correct and consistent grammar and punctuation must be used for the sake of clarity. References such as The Gre Manual and the Westinghouse En ineerin Writin Guide should be used for these points, with special attention to features that contribute to clarity. For example, hyphenating compound modifiers "power-operated relief valves,"

"three-loop operation" can make long sentences more readable and help eliminate ambiguity.

A list of all abbreviations and acronyms used in the T/S should be added to the Definitions Section of the T/S. Tn addition, these should be spelled out with their first use in each section. Letters used in equations should also be defined.

Symbols (for example, > ,~ , A , 4 ) that cannot easily be typed should be spelled out. This procedure will reduce mistakes, since >~ is easier to misread the "greater than or equal to." An exception to this principle is tables, in which format requires symbols rather than words.

When subscripts, superscripts, or equations are used, line spacing should be adjusted for the sake of legibility.

Consistency should be maintained in as many ways as possible. The content of the T/S's f'r the two units of a plant should be the same whenever appropriate, and the wording should be identical whenever possible. Spelling, punctuation, use of abbreviations, and format should be consistent throughout the document. One method that writers can use to achieve this consistency is to keep a running list of all cases in which one alternative was chosen over another.

Zt is important to make the numbering sequence for the two units identical, even if this means issuing T/S's to point out that no T/S is applicable.

The Limiting Conditions for Operation and Surveillance Requirements will be combined into a single Section 3. Section 4 will be Design Features, and Section 5 will be Administrative Controls.

Page numbers will begi.n with a section number followed by a hyphen and will be sequentially ordered by section.

23

C. Guidelines for Writin Definitions All words not included in the Definitions section of the T/S's or in the definitions in Attachment 2 of this guide must have:meanings that are clear to all three groups of T/S users: operators, inspectors, and engineers. Some words will need to be defined in context rather than globally. Words and phrases that have been the source of ambiguity may need to be defined in context or replaced with less troublesome words.

Words will be defined as needed for a particular T/S section. The existing definitions as well as those in Attachment 2 will serve as a starting point. Attachment 2 also contains a description of the four safety categories.

Definitions should be organized alphabetically, and a list of abbreviations should be added. Defined words may be used in the T/S's with meanings different from those in the Definitions section. In this case, they should not be written in all capital letters.

24

D. Guidelines for Writin Individual Technical S ecifications The first step in this process is to examine the existing applicable T/S's for that piece of equipment. The writer will determine the purpose and safety basis for the T/S. The basis for the T/S will be compared with the minimum safety requirements of the equipment as determined by a review of the safety analysis documentation, including the FSAR.

The next step is to describe the methods for demonstrating that the piece of equipment meets its safety requirements. Alternative methods of demonstrating safety functions should be listed in case the primary method is not available. Any possible tradeoffs in the Limiting Conditions for Operation should be indicated in case the main component is out of service.

All of the above constitutes the Basis for that particular T/S.

The writer examines this Basis and writes the LCO for the T/S. The LCO defines the safety basis in terms of the values measured or seen by the operator unless indicated otherwise. The T/S Revision Checklist (Attachment 1) may be used to assist the reviewer throughout this process.

The writer then lists all the support systems required to make the system functional. Operability will be determined by a combination of the base system and the support systems which are necessary to meet the requirement of the safety basis.

After the LCO's have been defined, the Action Statements and Surveillance Requirements are written. The equipment referred to in the Action Statements should then be placed in one of four groups, corresponding to the four safety categories. The proposed times to be allowed by the Action Statements are as follows:

1. Immediate action

2. Action within 1 week

3. Action within 1 month

4. Action based on agreement between operators and regulatory authorities The NRC should be consulted to confirm that the Actions and time limits meet the requirements of the regulations.

Since many SR's are performed by personnel other than operators, a minimum level of detail should be put in the T/S. The details of the surveillance should be placed in other documents, such as plant procedures, and should only be referred to in the T/S. As part of the SR, a list of essential support equipment (listed in the Bases) will also be required operable.

25

In addition to normal management review, there will be a thorough review for consistency and clarity of language. This review will also ensure that the principles of this Writer's Guide are adhered to. As a final check a simulated walk-through at the plant will be cpnducted to ensure the feasibility and practicality of the T/S.

26

Attachment 1 Technical Specification Revision Checklist 27

The purpose of this checklist is to provide a list of questions to use as a guide when evaluating the need to incorporate the existing T/S with respect the new revised format. Each question or set of questions should identify whether a particular T/S should be incorporated, revised or deleted with regard to the simplified T/S.

The T/S checklist includes general questions and some specific to sections of the T/S's (Definitions, Systems, Limiting Conditions for Operation, Applicability, Action, Surveillance Requirements and Bases).

This checklist will be an aid in rewriting each of the specified sections. However, several sections of the T/S's will not undergo this rewrite. One such section is Section 2.1, Safety Limits. Section 2.2 of this section will be incorporated in the appropriate T/S's associated with the instrumentation. The trip setpoints will be moved to the Bases, as will information such as the algorithm used to determine overtemperature T.

Sections 3/4.0 and 3/4.1 should not be rewritten until after the other sections of 3/4 are completed since changes to these sections will rely heavily on the changes to later sections.

28

a. Are all parts of the T/S still applicable?

b. Have any parts of the T/S been superseded by changes in 10 CFR or industry standards?

c. Can the numbering or organization be simplified'?

d. Are the T/S's for the two units consistent where possible?

e. Do the Westinghouse Standard T/S's, NUREG-0452, Revision 4 or Revision 5, offer any insight to improve the T/S?

f. Are universal statements (e.g., "at all time," "continuous operation") used correctly? Is there a more accurate way to word the T/S taking into account possible exceptions?

g. Are the punctuation and symbols used correctly and consistently?

h. Place all reporting requirements in a single location the Administrative Controls section of the T/S's.

i. Make a list of all abbreviations and words requiring definitions used in the T/S.

29

DEFINITIONS

a. Is the definition correct?

b. Is the definition used consistently throughout the T/S's?

c. Is the definition too vague/too specific?

d. Is the definition clear, or can it be interpreted several ways?

e. Is the definition needed in this section? Is it used in the T/S's?

f. Do other words need to be defined in this section'? Note:

Wordiness and awkwardness of some T/S's can+be reduced by the use of a well&efined word or phrase.

g. Definitions should be reorganized alphabetically,'nd a list of acronyms and abbreviations should be added.

30

The following set of questions is designed for use in the review of Section 3/4 of the T/S's.

1. SYSTENS

a. Is the system needed in the T/S's? Specifically,. is this system required by the control room operator for the safe operation of the plant?

b. Is knowledge of this system's operability essential for everyday or accident operations?

c. Is the description of the system too specific/too general'?

d. Can several sections be reduced into one?

e. Can one T/S function better than two or more T/S's? That is, can two or more T/S's be reduced to one requirement?

31

2 LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATIONS ~LCOss)

a. Zs the justification for the 4

LCO explained in the T/S or Basis'

b. Does the LCO correspond to the number the operator will actually read?

c. Zs the LCO needed for safe operation of the plant?

Zf not, should it be in the T/S's?

d. Zs adherence to the LCO sufficient to ensure safe plant operation?

e. Can this LCO be interpreted to require more/less than is intended?

f. Does this LCO affect an LCO of a different system? Zs this LCO affected by any of the other systems listed in the Basis for this T/S?

g. Does the LCO accurately reflect our plant design?

h. Zs the LCO written in such a way as not to require entry into an Action Statement unless there is an equipment failure?

Can the LCO be consolidated with other LCO's to simplify the T/S?

32

3 APPLICABILITY

a. Are all the required modes or plant conditions needed?

b. Are the bases for modes listed understood?

c. Is the basis for the excluded modes understood?

33

4. ACTION

a. Does completion of the Action restore the plant to safe operating status?

b. Does the Action address all failure possibilities?

c. Zs the Action too strictg e.g., require plant shutdown for failure of systems not required for safe plant operations?

d. Zs the Action "reasonably achievable"?

e. Does the Action contain a surveillance interval, that could be placed in the Surveillance Requirements?

f. Zs the Action Statement clearly written so that it cannot be misinterpreted?

g. Zs the Action consistent with other actions that may be required of equipment in the same safety category?

h. If the Action is not obvious, is its purpose explained in the Basis?

i. Does the Action Statement in itself place the plant in a more hazardous condition than if the Action had not been taken?

34

5. SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (SR')

a. Does the SR demonstrate directly or indirectly the capability of the system to perform its minimum safety function?

b. If the relation between the SR and the safety function of the equipment is not obvious, is,its purpose explained in the Basis?

Co Does the SR frequency involve excessive or destructive testing of equipment? Zf so, can the surveillance interval be reduced by comparison to newer requirements allowed by the NRC?

d. Zs the basis of.SR understood vendor recommendation, PRA, ASME, Industry practice, engineering analysis?

e. Are alternates to performing these SR's discussed in the Bases? Should they be'?

f. Can the surveillance be done with a reasonable amount of manpower?

g. Are surveillance intervals adequate in light of the safety importance of the equipment?

h. Is the SR written in a manner that both the plant operators and regulatory authorities will understand it to mean the same thing?

i. Is the SR clear and not subject to misinterpretation?

j. Can the details of the SR be moved to the Bases?

35

6. BASES

a. Does the Basis contain minimum requirements for Safety associated with the equipment?

b. Does the Basis discuss why specific values for parameters are required (in terms of the safety analysis or accident scenario)?

c. Are the numbers reported in the Basis the actual numbers from the FSAR?

d. Does the Basis contain direction on how to perform SR for the system as well as alternative methods should the main method become unavailable?

e. Is there a Basis for each T/S?

f. Does the Basis contain a listing of other equipment required to support the particular T/S?

g. Does the Basis explain any SR's that are not obvious?

h. Does the Basis define the appropriate safety category for the equipment?

i. Is the Basis written in a manner that can be understood by a person not technically familiar with that piece of equipment?

36 Definitions 37

NOTE: Many of these definitions are copied or adapted from the Writer' of the Westinghouse Owners Group Emergency Response

'o Guide Guidelines.

actuate put into action or motion. Commonly used to refer to automated, multi-faceted operations.

align to arrange components into a desired configuration.

Examples: Align the system for normal charging. Align valves as appropriate.

at (in reference to process parameters read from control room instruments) "at a value" means closer to that value than to any other that can be reasonably read from the available scale.

automatic actions preprogrammed sequence of actions performed by electronic or mechanical means once initiated.

block to inhibit an automatic actuation.

Example: Block SI actuation.

check to note a condition and compare with some requirement.

close to change the physical position of a mechanical device.

Closing a valve prevents fluid flow. Closing a breaker allows electrical current flow.

design-basis accident one that is reviewed in Chapter 14 of the FSAR.

determine to calculate or evaluate using formulae or graphs.

energize to supply electrical energy to (something) . Commonly used to describe an electrical bus or other dedicated electrical path.

enter 1) to go into

2) begin compliance with the conditions of. Example:

Enter the Action statement.

establish to bring about a stated condition.

38

evaluate to examine and decide equalize to make the value of a given parameter equal to the value of another parameter.

initiate to take the steps that begin a process.

inoperable refers to a structure, system, or component that cannot meet its minimum requirement for safety.

intended design function the capability of a structure, system, or component to perform the minimum requirements for safety.

load to connect an. electrical component or unit to a source of electrical energy. May involve a "start" in some cases.

local refers to an action performed by an operator at the physical location of some component (as opposed to operating from a remote control room).

maintain to control a given plant parameter to some requirement continuously.

manual performed by hand. Refers to operator actions performed in the control room as distinguished from from automatic actions performed without operator intervention or from actions performed locally.

monitor 1) a device that continuously measures a specified parameter

2) to observe the output of a measuring device at designated intervals.

normal refers to plant conditions that are routine, that is, not emergency, transient, or accident conditions.

open to change the physical position of a mechanical device to the unobstructed position. Opening a valve permits fluid flow. Opening an electrical breaker prevents electrical flow.

operable refers to a structure, system, or component that is capable of meeting its minimum requirement for safety.

operate to turn on, turn off, or otherwise control as necessary to'chieve the stated objective.

out of service refers to an active system that is incapable of performing its safety function, but that can be placed in a condition in which its minimum requirement for safety can be met.

39

reset to remove an active output signal from a retentive logic device even with the input signal still present.

Commonly used in reference to protection/safeguards logics in which the actuating signal is "locked in."

The reset allows equipment energized by the .initial signal to be de-energized.

record to document specified characteristics.

safety category All equipment falls into one of the following categories:

1. Equipment which is absolutely essential for safety, as described in the Safety Limits section of our present T/S's. Deletion of requirement for this equipment could result in an unreviewed safety question.

2. Equipment for which sufficient redundancy exists so that multiple failures of the same equipment must occur in order to create a safety problem.

Repair time for equipment in this category would usually be one week.

3. Equipment whose failure alone would not create a safety problem. However, a safety problem could result from a combination of 1) a design-basis accident and 2) an additional outside event such as fire, severe natural phenomena, loss of offsite power, or an NUREG-0737-type accident. Repair time for equipment in this category would usually be one month.

4. Equipment that does not constitute a basis for safety and for which no specific action is required. Failure of ecpxipment in this category will not result in a safety problem unless accompanied by 1) a low-probability event and 2) failure of redundant equipment. Repair time for equipment in this category shall be based on agreements between the plant operators and regulatory authorities.

sample to take a representative portion for the purpose of examination. Commonly refers to chemical or radiological examination.

shutdown the condition of a reactor core when it cannot sustain a chain reaction (subcritical) support equipment equipment associated with a structure, system, or component and necessary for its minimum safety requirements.

40

throttle to operate a valve in an intermediate position to obtain a certain flow rate.

trip to manually actuate a semiautomatic feature~ Commonly, "trip" refers to component deactuation.

to make a continued effort when success may not be immediately obtainable.

unreviewed safety question defined in 10 CPR 50.59.

verify to observe that an expected characteristic or condition exists. Typically the expectation comes from some previous automatic or operator action. The appropriate contingency, either stated or implied, is to establish the expected condition. The means of verification must be stated in the T/S's or the Bases, or the plant procedures.

Attachment 3 Cross-Reference List for Technical Specifications

IIIOEX REFEREtlCED SYSTEtl 1S:

1 REACTOR CORE SIGNIF. ITEII tto, REFERENCFO I'lftt R T/S 1.2 OEF. OF THEf!IIAL PCWER R T/S 1.3 DEFi OF RA1ED TIIERIIAL POWER R T/S I6 OEF. OF OPERATIONAL tlOOE R T/S 1.6 DEF. OF OPERAOLE R T/S 1.12 D'EF. OF CO!IE ALTERATINt R T/S 1.13 OEF ~ OF SIIUroo!at NARCIN R T/S 1.18 OEF. OF QUAUIlANI POIIER TILT RATIO R T/S 1.24 OEF. OF AXIAL FLUX DIFFEREIXE R T/S T/S 1.25 2.1.1 f OEF i OF PHYSICS 1 sl S SAFETY LIIIITS IIEACTOR CORF.

R T/S 3.0.5 LIMITIIIGCNtOITIOWS/APPLICABILITY-IIOPCIIER T/S 3.1.1.1 BOIIATIQt/SIIUrootat t!ARGIII--T AVG > 200 DEG. F T/S 3.1.1.2 OORATION/s!lurotaat IURGLII T AVG ( 2Uo orG. F R T/S 3.1.1.% tlooERATOR TEI!PERATURE COEFFIClrllr R T/S 3.1.1.5 IIINIIIUIITEIIPERAZURE FO'2 CRITICALITY R T/S 3.1.2.5 BOI?IC ACID TRAIGFER PIXIPS--SlsUIONtN R T/S 3.1.2.6 OOIIIC ACID TRANSFER PUIIPS--OPERATIIIG R T/S 3.1.2.7 BCRATEO ltATER SOURCE S SIIUTOO!at T/S 3.2.1 AXIAL FLUX OIFFEREIICE T/S 3.2.2 IIEAT FLUX HOT CHAhtIEL FACTOR T/S 3.2.% QUADRANT PNIER TILT RATIO R T/S 3.2.5 DI48 PARAIIETERiS T/S 3.2.6 AXIAL POIIER DISTRIBUTION R T/S 3.3.3.2 ttovAOLE It.'cor;E of rfcToos R T/S 3.3.3.7 AXIAL Po!IER DISTAIBUFION tIONITORIIIG SYS R T/S 3.6.8 RCS--SPECIFIC Acl'IVITY R T/S 3.5Ã. 1 BORON I!LIECTIOtt TAIK 2 T/S 3.9.2 REFUELIN OPERATIC:t IIISTRUIIEttTATION R T/S 3.9.3 REFUELItlG OPERATINls--OfCAY 1 IIIE T/S 3.10.1 TEST EXCEPl ION SIIUTOO! al tlARGIN T/S 3.10.2 TEST EXCEPTINI HCIGIII'IISER1INt,POWER DIST.

T/S 3.10.3 TEST EXCEPrIO!l-PIIYSICS TESTS R T/S 3.10.5 TEST EXCEPTION- POSITION IIIDICATOR CIIANIIELS T/S 5.3.1 FUEL ASSftatLIES T/S 5.3.2 CONTROL Roo ASSE HOLIES THERE ARE 35 ITEHS REFERENCED FOR SYS 1 tÃNOO ITECH SPEC/FSARI INDEX REFERENCED SYSTEN IS:

2 tIOVABLE CONTROL ASSEtIBLIES SIGNIF. ITftt NO. REF fRftICED ITEN R T/S 1.6 OEF. OF OPERABLE R T/S 1.12 DEF. OF COI?E ALTERATION R T/S 1.13 DEF. OF SIIUTOONI IIARGIII R T/S 3.0.5 LltlITItlGCONOITIN2l/APPLICABILITY--ttoPOWER T/S 3.1.3.1 NOVADLE Co!ITROL A Et%LIES R T/S 3.1.3.2 POSITION ItlolCATOR CIIAIalELS--OPERATING 2 T/S 3.1.3.3 POSITION ItloICATOR CIIAlatELS--SIIUTDNal Tjs 3.1.3.6 ROD Cl?OP TINE T/S 3.1.3.5 sIIUtoo!Ct ROD IN~ERTIDII LIIIIT

THERE AAE 15 ITE)IS REFERENCED FOR SYS NOHDO I TECH SPEC/FSAA) It)DEX AEFEREHCED SYSTEN IS-5 IIOVADLE IN"CORE DETECTORS SIGtlIF. ITEN IIO. REFERENCED ITEN R T/S 1.6 DEFT OF OPERABLE R T/S 1.12 OEF. OF COAE ALTERATIOt)

R T/S 1.25 DEF. OF PHYSICS TES1S R T/S 3.0.5 LItlITIHG COtIDITIOtIS/APPLICABILITY-HO POICR R T/S 3.1.3.1 HOVABLE COII)AOL ASSEIISLIES R T/S 3.1.3.2 POSITIOtl IHDICA)OR CHAI'-'IELS-OPERATING T/S 3.2.2 HEAT FLUX HOT CHAINEL FACTOR T/S 3.2.3 RCS FLOH RATE At(0 R R T/S 3.2.6 QUADRANT POIIER TILT RATIO T/S 3.2.6 AXIAI. POtIER OISTAIGurXe)

R T/S 3.3. l. 1 REACTOR TAIP SYSfEN It)STRUIIENTATIOH T/S 3.3.3.2 IIOVAGLE IHCOAE GElECTOAS T/S 3.3.3.7 AXIAL POIXR 01STAIGUTION tIOHITORIHG SYS R T/S 3.6.3.1 COHTAIICL:HT ISOLATIOH VALVES R T/S 3.10.2 TEST EYCEPfIL'I HEICHT,IHSEATIOt),POHER DIST.

R T/S 3.10.3 TEST EXCEPTION-"PIIYSICS TESTS THCAE AAE 16 ITENS REFEREtlCEO FOA SYS 5 tiOHDO )TECH SPEC/FSAR) INDEX REFERENCED SYSTEN IS-6 TIIERIIOCOUPLES SIGNIF .. ITEN NO. REFEAENCED ITEN R T/S 1.6 DEF. OF OPERABLE R T/S 1.12 DEF. OF CORE ALTERATION R T/S 3.0.5 LltIITIIQCOIIDITIOI)S/APPLICABILITY--NOPOHER THERE AAE 3 ITENS REFERENCED FOR SYS &

tIOHDO ITECII SPEC/FSAR) INDEX REFERENCED SYSTDI IS:

7 REACTOR COOI.Atff SYSTEN SICIIIF. ITEN NO. REFEREt)CED ITEN R T/S 1.2 DEF. OF THEA)IAL POIIER R T/S 1.3 DEF. OF RATED TtIERNAL POHER R T/S 1.6 DEF. OF OPERABLE R T/S 1.12 DEF. OF CORE ALTEAATIOH R T/S 1.14 DEFi OF IDClll'IFIED LEAKAGE R T/S 1.15 GEF. OF UIIIDENTIFIED LEAKACE R T/S 1.16 DEF. OF PAESSUAE BOUNDARY LEAKAGE R T/S 1.17 GEF. OF CO!)TROLLED I.EAKACE T/S 2.1.2 SAFETY LIIIITS-ACP PAESSUAE R T/S 3.D.5 LIIIITIIICCOIIGITIOI)S/APP LICABILITY HO POHER T/S 3.1.1.1 GOAATIOII/SIIUTGOIIIIIIAAGIII"-TAVG ) 200 DEG. F T/S 3.1.1.2 GOIIATIOII/SIIUTDOIfitIARGIN T AVG < 200 DCG F T/S 3.1.1.3 BOAOtl OILUTIOII T/S 3.1.1.0 tIODEAATOR TEI'IPEIIATUAE COEFFICIL'Nl'

~ ~

TIIERE ARE 12 ITEt'G REFEREhCED fOR SYS 8 HONDO I TECtl SPEC/FSAR l INDEX REI ERENCEO SYSTEII IS:

9 PRE~UltIZER SIGNIF. ITEN IIO. REFERENCED ITCH R T/S 1.6 DEF OF OPERABLE 2 T/S 2.1.2 SAFETY LIMITS--RCP PRESSURE R T/S 3.0.5 LIHITING CO!IOITIONS/APPLICABILITY--NOPOtIER R T/S 3.2.5 DIIB PARAHETERS T/S 3.4.4 PRESSURIZElt R T/S 3.4.9.1 RCS-PRESSURE/TEtlPERATURE LIMITS T/S 3.4.9.2 I RESSURIZER TL'll ERATURE LIIIITS R T/S 3.4.9.3 OVERPRESSUIIE I'ROTECTION SYSTEIK R T/S 3.6.3.1 CONTAItCIENT ISOLATION VALVES R T/S 3.7.7.1 St N3BERS T/S 5.4.1 RCS DESIGti PRE~RE AND TE>tlPERATURE TtlERE ARE ll ITEMS REFERENCED FOR SYS 9 tINIDO lTECH SPEC/FSAR) INDEX REFERENCED SYSTEII Is:

10 PRESSURZZCR RELIEF TANK lPRTl SIaGF. ITEN NO. REFERENCED ITEN R T/S 1.6 DEF. OF OPERABl.E R T/S 3.0.5 LlttITIIIGCG:IDITIOtts/APPLICABILITY-NOPONLR 2 T/S 3.4.9.3 OVERPRESSUllE Ply T ECTION SYSTLHS R T/S 3.6.3.1 CO:ITAltLIENf ISOLATION VALVES R T/S 3 '.7.1 SIAKIBERS THERE ARE 5 ITEM REFERENCED FOR SYS 10 HONDO l TECH SPEC/FSAR l ItiDEX REFEREttCEO SYSTEIl ZS:

ll SAFETY VALVES SIGNIF ZTEtl NO. REFERENCED ITEN T/S 1.6 DEF. OF OPERABLE T/S 3.0.5 LIMITING COIIDITIOtK/APPLICABILITY NO POHER T/S 3.4.2 PRESSURIZf R SAFETY VALVES SIIUTDOtIN T/S 3.4.3 PRESSUIIIZER SAFETY VALVES-Ol>ERATING T/S 3.4.6 ' RCS--OPERATIOIIAL LEAKAGE T/S 3.4.9.3 OVERPRESSURE PROTECTIOll SYSTEMS THERE ARE 6 ZTEtlS REFERENCED FOR SYS 11 HO/DO ITL'CH SPEC/FSAR l INDEX REFERENCED SYSTEM IS:

12 RELIEF VALVES SIGNIF. ITEH NO. REFERENCED ITEM R T/S 16 PEF. OF OPERABLE R T/S 3.0.5 LItlITIt'G Ct>NDITIOIK/APPLICABILITY"-NOPr>'>:R

0

~

I

~~ I 1.6 DEF. OF OPERABLE 3.0.5 LIIIITING CONDITIOIIS/APPLICABILITY--NOPOKIER T/S 3.% 9i3

~ OVERPRESSUR P'iIOTECTION SYSlf t'ai THERE ARE 3 ITCIIS REFERENCCO FOR SYS 15 flOHDO tTEClt SPEC/FSAR) INDEX REFEREIICED SYSTEH IS:

16 EHERGCNCY CORE COOLING SYSTEH SIGIIIF. ITEtt HO. REFEREttCEO ITEtt R T/S 1.6 DEF. OF OPERABLE R. T/S 3.0.5 LIIIITINGCONDITIONS/APPLICABILITY-IIOPOHER R T/S 3.5.1 ACCNIULATORS R T/S 3.5.2 ECCS SUBSYSTEI'IS T AVG > 350 DCG F R T/S 3.5.3 FCCS SUDSYSTEFL T AVG c 350 DEG F R T/S 3' q 1 BOROII IHJECTIOII TAMC R T/S 3.5.%.2 HCAT TRACING FOR BORON ItLIECTION TAIK R T/S 3.5;5 REFUELING )IATER SlO (AGE TAIK R T/S 3 '.3.1 CONTAItCIENT ISOLATION VALVES THERE ARE 9 ITClIS REFEREIICED FOR SYS 16 ttOhDO I TECH SPEC/FSAR I INDEX REFEREHCED SYSTEtl IS:

17 ACCT IULATQRS SIGtIIF. ITEII HO. REFERCNCED ITEII R T/S 1.6 DEF. OF OPCRABLE R T/S 3.0.5 LIIIITItlGCOIIDITIO5/APPLICABILITY--IIOPOINTER T/S 3 5.1 ACCUIIULATORS R T/S 3.6.3.1 COHTAIIOIEIIT ISOLATION VALVES THERE ARE 4 ITEM RCFERENCED FOR SYS 17 INHDO ITECH SPEC/FSARI INDEX REFERENCED SYSTEH IS:

18. BOROII INJECTION TAIK SIGNIF. ITEN HO. REFERENCED ITEII T/S 1.6 DEF. OF OPERABLE T/S 3.0.5 LIHITING CONDITIOIIS/APPLICABILITY-HOPOHER T/S 3.5.2 ECCS SUBSYSTEIIS T AVG > 350 DEG F T/S 3.5.3 ECCS UDSY TEIIS T AVG < 350 DEG F T/S 3.5Ã.l BORON IttJECTION TAIIX T/S 3.5A.2 HEAT TRACING FOR DOROH INJECTION TAIS T/S 3.6.3.1 CONTAIIIHENT ISOLATIGH VALVES T/S 5.2.2 CUIIFAINfiENT DESIGN PRESSURE AND TEIIPERATURE THERE ARE 8 ITEIG REFERENCED FOR SYS 18 IIOIIOO ITECH SPEC/FSAR I INDEX REFERENCED SYSTEH IS:

19 REFUEI.ItIG HATER STORAGE TAtK SIGNIF. ITEN NO. REFCRENCED ITCH

2 S FCfY ItLiECTIUN l I) YSTEtt-Q)RTH SIGttIF o ITEtl ttOo REFEREttCL'0 ITEtt T/S 1.6 DEF. OF OPERABLE T/S 3.0.5 LItlITiltGCOtlllITIUttS/APPLICABILITY"-tSPOttER T/S 3.1.2.3 BORATIOtl SYS/CtIARGING PUtlP SIFUfDCl0l T/S 3.3.2.1 ESF ACTUATIOtt SYSTCll IltSTtllPXttTATION T/S 3.%.1.% RCS LOOPS--THREE LOOP OPERATION T/S 3.5.2 ECCS SUDSYSTEt5 T AVG > 350 DEG F T/S 3.5.3 ECCS SUDSYSTEtG--T AVG < 350 DCG F T/S 3.6.3.1 COttTAItNEt4T ISOLATIOl4 VALVES T/S 3.7.6.1 ESF VCNTILATIOlt SYSTEll T/S 3.7.7.1 SNUDBERS T/S 3.7.9.2 SPRAY AND/OR PRItKLER SYSTEtfS THERE ARE 11 ITEltS REFERENCED FOR SYS 22 tNltDO lTECH SPEC/FSAR) INDEX REFEREttCED SYSTEtl IS-23 SAFETY INJECTION lSI) SYSTEtt-MJTH SICNIF. ITEtt ND. REFERENCED ITEtt R T/S 1.6 DEF. OF OPERABLE R T/S 3.0.5 LIttITIttG COttDITIOttS/APPLICABILITY NO Pa4ER R T/S 3.1.2.3 BORATION SYS/CHARGING Pu:0 SHUl oo:04 2 T/S 3.3.2.1 ESF AC1UATION Y TEll IN TllUttEttTATIOt4 R T/S 3.6 ~ 1.6 RCS LOOPS--TIIRCE LOOP OPEAATIOtt T/S 3.5.2 ECCS SUDSYSTEtfS T AVG > 350 DFG F T/S 3.5.3 ECCS SLQSYSTEltS T AVG g 3r0 DEG F R T/S 3.6.3,1 I CO:trAItatCttr OLATICN VALVES 2 T/S 3.7.6.1 ESF VEtlTILATIOt4 SYSTEtl R T/S 3.7.7.1 St4UB BE RS R T/S 3.7.9.2 SPRAY AND/OR SPRINKLER SYSTEHS THERE ARE ll ITEtfS REFERENCED FOR SYS 23 NONDO (TECH SPEC/FSARl INDCX REFERENCED SYSTEtt IS:

2% RESIDUAL HEAT REttOVAL IRIIRl SYSTEtt EAST SIGNIF. ITEt4 NO. REFERENCED ITEN R T/S 1.6 DEF. OF OPERABLE R T/S 3 '.5 LIHITItlG COt40ITIONS/APPLICABILITY NO POt4ER 2 T/S 3.1.1.3 BOttOtt DILUtIOll 2 T/S 3.3.2.1 ESF ACTUATIOlt SYSTEtt INSTRUHENTATION T/S 3.%.1.3 RCS LOOPS--SIIUTDOtsl T/S 3A.I.O RCS LOOPS--THREE LOOP OPERATION 2 T/S 3.0. 2 PRESSUttIZER SAFETY VALVE --SIIUTDDt4N R T/S 3.4.6.2 RCS--OPERATIOtlAL LMAGE R T/S 3+6.9.3 OVERPRESSURE PROTECTIOtl SYSTEtlS T/S 3.5.2 ECCS SUBSYSTEIG--T AVG > 350 OEG F T/S 3.5.3 ECCS SUDSYSTEHS--T AVG < 350 DLG F R T/S 3.6.3.1 COttfAII0:EltT ISOLATIOt4 VALVES 2 T/S 3.7.6.1 E F VENTILATION SYSTEN R T/S 3.7.7.1 St tUDOERS T/S 3.9.8.1 RllR AND COOLANT CIRCULATIOtt CORE ALTERATIONS T/S 3.9.8.2 LOll HATER LEVEL REFUELItlG OPERATIOttS

T/S 3.10.1

~ ~ TEST EXCEP)IOII-SIIUTOOI04 HARGIN THCRE ARE 27 ITB)S REFERENCED FOR SYS 26 HOIIL'0 ITECH SPEC/FSAR I IIIDCX REFERENCED SYSTEII IS:

27 CVCS BORON HAKE-UP SIGNIF ~ ITBI t'O. REFERENCKD IT'EH R T/S 1.6 OEF. OF OPERABLE R T/S 3.0.5 LIHITII)G COIIr) ITIONS/APPLICABILITY->>NOPOtIER T/S 3.1.2.1 BORATIOII SYS/FLOrl PATHS--SIIUTOOllt T/S 3.1.2.2 DORATIOI) SYS/FLO:I PATIIS--OPERAfING T/S 3.1.2.5 BORIC ACID TRAIISFFR PIE)PS SHUTDO! Jt T/S 3.1.2.6 BORIC ACID 1RAI)SFER PC)PS--OPEltATING T/S 3.1.2.7 DORATED )ABATER SOURCES Sl)UTDC:~I T/S 3.1.2.8 DORA'fEO HATER SOURCES OPERATII'EAT 2 T/S 3.5.6.2 TRACING fOR OCROII IILIECTIOII TANC TIIERC Al'E 9 ITCHS REFERKIXEO FOR SYS 27 HLIDO ITECH SPEC/FSAR) INDEX REFEREttCEO SYSTKtl IS-20 CVCS BORON HOLD-UP SZGIIIF I'fEH NO. REFERKt)CEO ITEN R T/S 1.6 OEF. OF OPERABLE R T/S 3.0.5 LIMITING COttOITIOtlS/APPLICABILITY--ttOPWER 2 T/S 3.5.6.2 HEAT TRACIIIG FOR DODO)l INJECTIOII TAtlC THERE ARE 3 ITEHS REFEREI'CEO FOR SYS 28 tlONDO ITECH SPEC/FSAR) ItlDEX REFERENCED SYSTEH IS:

29 CVCS BORIC ACID EVAPORATOR PACKAGE--NORTH SIGIIIF. ITEN NO. REFERCNCCO IIEH R T/S 1.6 DEF. OF OPERABLE R T/S 3.0.5 LIHITItlG CO)IDITINS/APPLICABILITY--NOPOHER 2 T/S 3.5.4.2 tlEAT TRACING FOR BORON It)JECTION TANK THERE ARE 3 ITEttS REFERENCED FOR YS 29 t)ONDO ITECI) SPEC/FSAR) ItIDEX REFERENCED SYSTEI4 IS:

30 CVCS DORIC ACID EVAPORATOR PACKAGE SOUTH SIGNI F. ZTEH NO. REFERCNCEO ITEH R T/S 1.6 DEF. OF OPERABLE R T/S 3.0.5 LIHITING COIIOITIOI)S/APPLICABILITY--NOPOHER 2 T/S 3.5.9.2 IIEAT TRACIIIG FOR DORO:t It)JCCTIOII TatZC THERE ARE 3 ITEHS REFEREtlCED FOR SYS 30 HOIIDO ITECH SPEC/FSAR) IIIDKX REI'CRCNCED SYS1Etl IS:

~ ~

T/S 3.11.2.3 ASSOATED RADIOACTIVE STUFF Iti THE AIR--

T/S 3.11.2.4 GasEDUs RnoxasfE TAEATtIENT T/S 3.11.2.5 ENILDSIvE Gas NIXTUAE T/S 3.11.2.6 GAS SlOAAGE TAG:S T/S 3.11.3 OLZD AADIOACTlVC IIASTE T/S 3.11.4 RADIOACTIVE EFFLUEIITS TOTAL DOSE THERE AAE 21 ITEtIS REFEREIICED FOR SYS 34 IIONDO ITECH SPEC/FSARI INDEX REFERENCED SYSTEN IS:

35 th3AIIAL SANPLIIIG SYSTEN SIQIIF. ITEtl tIO. REFERENCED ITEN R T/S 1.6 DEF ~ OF OPERABLE R T/S 3.0.5 LINITING COIIDITZQ5/APPLICABILITY NO POtIER THERE ARE 2 ITENS REFERENCED FOR SYS 35 fIOXDO ITECH SPEC/FSAR) INDEX REFEREtKEO SYSTLN IS:

36 lOST-ACCIDENT SAIL"LItfG SYSTEtl SIGtlZF. ITEN NO. REFERENCED ITEN R T/S 1.6 DEF. OF OPERABLE R T/S 3.0.5 LIZIZTING COHDITIOttS/APPLICABILITY NO PONER THERE AAE 2 ITDG REFERENCED fOR SYS 36 NOtIDO ITECH SPEC/FSAR I IIIDEX REFEREtKED SYSTEtl IS-37 SECONDARY STEAN CYCLE SYSTEI&

SIQlIF. ITEN IIO. AEFERENCED ITCH R T/S 1.6 DEF ~ OF OPCAADLE R T/S 3.0.5 LIIIZTIIIGCOIiDZTIQ5/APPLICABILITY HO POHER R T/S 3.7.1.1 sLccxoaAY saFETY YALvE" R T/S 3.7.1.2 AUXILZARY FEECIIATEA SYSTEN R T/S 3.7.1.3 coHDEHsaTE roAAGE Tale R T/S 3.F 1.4 SECCIDARY COOLANT SYSTEtl--ACTIVITY R T/S 3.7.1.5 STEAII GEttERATOA STOP VALVES R T/S 3.7,2.1 STEAN GCNEAATOA PRESSURE/TEHPEAATUAE LINITS R T/S 3.7 7.1 SNUBBEAS T/S 5.7. 1 COIZPOIIEIIT CYCLIC OR TRAtfSIENT LINIT THERE ARE 10 ITENS REFEREIKED FOR SYS 37 NO.'IDO ITECH SPEC/FSAR) INDEX REFEREtKED SYSTEN IS:

3B lUABINE AUX. COOLING SYSTEN SIGtIIF. ITEN NO. RCFEREtKEO ITEN R T/S 1.6 DEF. OF OP BABLE A T/S 3.0.5 LINITItlG COtIDITZONS/APPLICABZLITY NO POXER THERE ARE 2 ITCNS AEFEAENCED FOA SYS 30

T/S 3.7.7.

~ ~ ~ 1 SINBDEAS TIICRE AAE 0 ITEIIS REFERENCED FOR SYS 63 tIOt!00 ITECH SPEC/FSAA) IIIDKX RECERBICEO SYSTEtl IS:

AUX. FEEDNATEA SYSTEH lHD I--EAST SIGNIF. ITEtl tIO. REFERENCED ITEH T/S 1.6 DEF. OF OPERABLE T/S 3.0.5 LIHITING COIIDITIOtts/APPLICABILITY--NOPOHER T/S 3.3.2.1 ESF ACTUATIOII YSTEH IIISTAIAXNCATION T/S 3.0.1.3 RCS LOOPS SIIUTDQ:QI T/S 3.7.1.2 AUXILIARY FEED!IAlEA SYSTBI

. T/S 3.7.1.3 CONDENSATE STORAGL'AIÃ THERE ARE 6 ITEHS REFERENCED FOR SYS tlONDO ITFCH SPEC/FSAR) IttDEX REFEAENCEO SYSTI:H IS:

65 AUX. FEEDHATER SYSTEH IHD l HEST SIGNIF. ITEH hO. REFEAEt,'CED ITEH R T/S 1.6 DEF. OF OPEAABLE R T/S 3.0.5 LIH1TIIIG COIIDITION"/APPLICABILITY--IIOPOHER 2 T/S 3.3.2.1 ESF ACTUATION SYSTEtl II)STAIAICNTATION A T/S 3.%.1.3 RCS LOOPS SIIUTDOlCI T/S 3.7.1.2 AUXILIARY F E EDIIATER SYSTEH R T/S 3.7.1.3 CONDEIISATE STORAGE TAIIK THERE ARE 6 ITEHS REFERENCED FOR SYS 65 tIONDO I TECH SPEC/FSAR) INDEX REFERENCED SYSTEH IS:

IG AUX. FEEDHATEA SYSTEH ITUABINE DRIVEN)

SIGNIF. ITEH NO. REFEAENCED ITEH R T/S 1.6 DEF. OF OPERABLE R T/S 3.0.5 LIHITIITG COIIDITIOI5/APPLICABILITY-HO POHER 2 T/S 3.3.2.1 ESF ACTUAT'ION SYSTBI IWTAUHENTATION R T/S 3A.1.3 RCS LOOPS SIIUTDOICI T/S 3.7.1.2 AUXILIARY FEEDIIATER SYSTEH R T/S 3.7.1 ' COIIOBISATE STOAAGE TAWK 2 T/S 3.7.10 FIRE RATED A SEI'3LIES 2 T/S 3.8.2.5 D.C. DISTAIDUT'ION OPERATING TRAItl N BATTERY THERE ARE 8 ITEHS REFERENCED FOR SYS 66 HOIIDO lTECH SPEC/FSAR) INDEX REFERENCED SYSTEH IS:

67 CONDEtlSERS SIGWIF. ITEH NO. AEFEAE)ICED IT'EH T/S 1.6 DEF. OF OPERABLE T/S T/S 3 '.5 3.3.3. 10 LIHITIIIG CONDITIONS/APPLICABILITY-NOPOHER .

RAD. GAS. PIIOCESS AND EFFLUENT t!ONTIOAIIIG INST.

T/S 1.6 CEF. OF OPERABLE T/S 3.0.5 LIIIITING CO,)DITIOIIS/APPLICABILITY NO POWER T/G 3.3.Z.l EGF Ac)UAT)OW SYGTE)i Il)GTRUIIEIITATIOII T/G 3.7.1.3 CCNDEI!GATL STOPACE TAt!X T/S 3.7.6.1 ESGC!ITIAL GEI!VICE IIA)FH GYGTEtl T/S 3. 7.5 CONTROL ROON EIIERGCtlCY;VEWIILATIOtlGYSTEN THERE ARE 6 ITEtls REFEREtKEO FOR GYS 5Z tlONDO ITECH SPEC/FGAR) INDEX REFERENCED SYSTEII IS:

53 hN-ESSENTIAL SERVICE HATCR INESH)--NORTH SIGNIF. ITEN IO. REFERENCED ITEN R T/S 1.& DEFo OF OPERABLE R T/S T/S 3 '.5 3.6.3.

LIHITIIIG COtIDITI$5/APPLICABILITY NO PO)IER R 1 CONTAI)IWENT ISOLATIOtl VALVCS THERE ARE 3 ZTE)G REFEREtKEO FOR SYS 53 HONDO ITECH SPEC/FSAR) INDEX REFEREIKED SYGTEN IG:

5% tOIi"ESGEIITIAL SCRVICE HATER INESH) SOUTH SIGNIF. ITEN NO. REFEREIKED ITEN R T/S 1.6 DEF. OF OPERABLE R T/S 3-0.5 LIIIITIt)GCOtIDITIONS/APPLICABILITY-WOPOWER R T/S 3.6.3.1 COWCAIIRIEIIT ISOLATION VALVES TIIERE ARE 3 ITE)IS REFEREtKED FOR SYS 5%

tONDO ITECH SPEC/FSAR I INDEX REFERENCED SYSTEN IS:

55 COIIPOWCNT COOLING IIATER I CCHl SYSTEH--EAST SIGNIF. ITEN NO. REFEREtlCED ITEN R T/S 1.6 DEF. OF OPERABLE R T/S 3.0.5 LIIIITIttGCOtlDIl IONG/APPLICABILITY-tiOPO)IER R T/S 3.6.3.1 COWTAIIIIIENr IGOI.ATION VAI.VES Z T/S 3.6.5.6 CONTAINIIENT AIR RECII!CULATION SYSTE)IS T/S 3.7.3.1 COIIPOWEtIT COOLItlG tlATER SYGTEN R T/S 3.7+7.1 SHUDDERS THERE ARE 6 ITEHS REFERCtlCED FOR SYS 55

)10tIDO I TECH SPEC/FSAR) INDEX REFERENCED SYSTCN IS:

56 COIIPOIIENT COOLIttG HATER ICCH) SYSTEH HEST SIGNIF. ITEN NO. RFFERENCED ITEN T/S 1.6 DEF. OF OPERABLE T/S 3.0.5 LINITItlG COWDITIOIIS/APPLICABILITY--NOPOWER T/S 3.6.3.1 COW)'ADL'IEtli'SOLATIOWVALVLG T/G 3.6.5.6 CO:I TAT)II:Ctlr AIR RECIIICULATION SVSTEIIS T/S 3.7.3*1 CO:IPOWEWT COOLIh'G IIATEH SYGTEN

T/S 3.7.9.2

~ ~ ~ SPRAY AND/OR SPRINKLER GYG)EIK Tl)ERE ARE 6 ITEtlS REFERENCED FOR SYG 61 t)OtiDO lTECH SPEC/FSAR) IhDCX REFERENCED SYGTEH IS:

62 ESF VEt)TJLATION SYSTEH-AES-2 GIGNIF. I'TEH ttO. REFERENCED ITEN R T/S 1.6 DEF. OF OPERADLE R T/S 3.0.5 LIHITItlO COttDITIONS/APPLICABILITY NO POWER R T/S 3.3.3.8 FIRE DETECTIO)I It)GTltUtiLtl)ATION R T/S 3.3.3.10 RAO. GAS. PROCESS At)D EFFLUCNF ttO)ITIORIt)O INST.

2 T/S 3.7.6.1 ESF VK))TILATIONGYS) El'l R T/S 3.7.9.2 SPRAY AND/Oll GPRItXLEtt SYGTEI)G THEM ARE 6 ITKNS REFERFNCED FOR SYS 62 t'.Ol)00'TECH SPEC/FSAR) INDEX REFERKI)CED GYG)K)l IS-63 )IYORAULIC GNUMKRG SIC)IIF. IT'EH NO. REFERFNCKD ITEN R T/S 1.6 DEF. OF OPERABLE R T/S 3.D.5 LIttITING CONDITIDNS/APPLICABILITY-NOPO)tER T/S 3.7.7+1 StAJBDERS THERE ARE 3 ITEHS REFERK))CED FOR SYS 63 HONDO ITECII SPEC/FGAR) ItlBEX REFEREtlCED SYSTE)t IS:

66 RADIATION SHIELDING SIGNIF. ITEH NO. REFERENCED ITEN R T/S 1.6 OEF. OF OPERABLE R T/S 3.0.5 LIHITIttB COl )BITIO)G/APPLICABILITY NO POWER THERE ARE 2 ITEtlS REFERENCED FOR SYS t)OttDO (TECH SPEC/FGAR) INDEX REFERENCED SYSTEH IS:

65 FIRE ~RRESSIOH SYSTEHS SICNIF. ITEN NO. REFEREttCED ITCH R T/S 1.6 DEF. OF OPERABLE R T/S 3.0.5 LIHITING CCstDITI~/APPLICABILITY NO POWER R T/S 3.'3.3.8 FIRE DFTECTION INSTRUt!ENTATION T/S 3.7.9.1 FIRE SUPPRESSION IlATKR SYGTEH T/S 3.7.9.2 SPRAY ANO/OR SPRINKLER SY TEt)S T/S 3.?.9.3 LOll PRESSURE C02 GYSIKttG T/S 3. 7. 9.6 IIALON GYSTEH T/S 3.7.9.5 FIRE llOGE STATION."

R T/S 3 7.10 FIRE RATED AGGEllBLIES THERE ARE 9 ITEtlS REFERENCED FOR GYG 65

.E ARE 6 ITEt)S REFERftKED FOR SYS 69 IIOIIDD ITECII SPEC/FSARI INDCX REFERENCED SYSTEH IS:

70 PEIIETIIATION FIRC BARRIERS SIQIIF. ITEtl NO. REFEREtKEO ITEH R T/S 1.6 DEF ~ OF OPERAOIE R T/S 3.0.5 LIIIITING CONDITIONS/APPLICABILITY--IIOPOKER T/S 3.7.10 FIRE RATED ASSEIZLIES THERE APE 3 ITCIIS REFERENCED FOR SY" 70 HOIIDO ITECK SPEC/FSAR) INDEX REFCREtKED SYSTEtl IS:

71 FIRE RATED A SE)IBLIES SIGNIF. ITEtl tlO. REFERENCED ITEN R T/S 1.6 DEF. OF OPERABLE R T/S 3.0.5 LIHITItlG COIIDITIOttS/APPLICABILITY NO POHER T/S 3.7.10 FIRE RATED ASSEISLIES TKERE ARE 3 ITE)IS REFERENCED FOR SYS 71

)IOttDO ITECII SPEC/F AR) INDEX REFERENCED SYSTEH IS-72 FIRE tlOSE STATIOID SIQlIF. ITEH NO. REFEREtKED ITEH R T/S 1.6 OEF. OF OPCRAOLE R T/S 3.0.5 LIIIITIttGCGIIOITION"/APPLICABILITY--NOPOIIER T/S 3.7.9.1 FIRE SUPPRES IGN HATER SY TEtl R T/S 3.7.9.2 SPRAY At)0/Olt PRII2ILER SYS)EIK R T/S 3.7.9.3 Loll rnESSURE CO2 SYSTEIIS R T/S 3.'7.9.v tIALON SYS)EH T/S 3.7.9.5 FIPE NOSE STATI~

TKERE ARE 7 ITEHS REFEREtKED FOR SYS 72 HO'IOO ITECII SPEC/FSAR) INDEX REFERENCED SYSTEH IS-73 ELECTRICAL PDHCR SYSTEttS SIQIIF. ITEH NO. REFERCIKED ITEN R T/S 1.6 OEF. OF OPERABLE R T/S 3.0.5 LIHITING CONDITIOI)S/APP LICADILI)Y--NOPOKER R T/S 3.3.3.8 FIRE OETECTIOtl IIISTRIRIEIITATION R T/S 3.6.% PRESSURIZER T/S 3.8.1.1 A.C. SOURCES DPCRATIHG T/S 3.8.1.2 A.C. SOURCES-SKUTOO)OI T/S 3.8.2.1 A.C. DISTRIOUTIDN OPERATING T/S 3.8.2.2 A.C. 01STRIOUfIt~t--SKUTOOI~)

T/S 3.8.2.3 D.C DISTRIOUTIOII--OPEI?ATIttG T/S 3 '.2.% O.C. DISTR IOUTIOII--Stiltf DO)III T/S 3.8.2.5 O.C. DISTRIOU'fIOII-OPERATItIG TRAIN tl BATTERY T/S 3.8.3.1 ALTCRNATIVC A.C. PO)IER SOURCES

~ ~

~~ I ttottOO I TECH SPEC/FSAR) IttOEX REFEflENCED SYSlEtt IS-77 600 VOLT SYSTCH llC 4 llD SIGttIF. ITEtl NO. REFERENCED ITEI4 T/S 1.6 DEF. OF OPFRABLE T/S 3.0.5 LIHITING CottOITLOtfS/APPLICABILITY--NOPOHER T/S 3.7.9.3 LOH PRESSURL'OZ SYSTEl'IS T/S 3.7.9.5 FIRE HooiE STATIOtlS T/S 3.8.1.1 A.C. OUPC E OPERATING T/S 3.8.1.2 A.C. OullCES- IIUTOOtfl T/S 3.8.2.1 A.C. OISTRIOuflolt--OPF RATING T/S 3.8.2.2 A.C. DISTRIBUII4t SliufOOià THERE ARE 8 ITEttS REFERENCED FOR SYS 77 ttoilOO lTECH SPEC/FSAR) INDEX REFERENCED SYSTEll IS:

78 69 KV ttANUAL ALTERNATE RESERVE MVRCE SIGNIF. ITEtt NO. REFEREttCED ITEI1 R T/S 1.6 DEF. OF OPERABLE R T/S 3.0.5 LII.IITING CONDITIONAL/APPLICABILITY"-NOPOHER R T/S 3.7.9.3 LOll PRESSURE COZ SYSTEtfS T/S 3.8.3.1 ALTERNATIVE A.C. Pot(ER SOURCES THERE ARE 6 ITEttS REFERCttCED FOR SYS 78 tnt tDO I TECH SPEC/FSAR ) INDEX REFERENCED SYSTEtl IS:

79 DIESEL GEttERATORS AB SIGtlIF. ITEN NO. REFERENCED ITEN R T/S 1.6 OEF. OF OPERABLE R T/S 3.0.5 LIHITItlG COt tol TIDttS/APPLICABILITY ttO POHER 2 T/S 3.1.2.3 BORiATIOll SYS/CtlARGItiG PLZtP SIIUTooltN 2 T/S 3.3.2.1 ESF ACTUATION SYSTEll Itt"TotAtEttfATIOtt R T/S 3 '.3.8 FIltE DETECTIOtl Itiot RutlEttTATIOtt R T/S 3.%.11 RELIEF VALVES OPERATIt!G R T/S 3.7.9.3 LOll PRESSURE C02 SYSTEHS R T/S 3.7 '.5 FIRE HOSE STATIONS T/S 3.8.1.1 A.c. souRcEs--opEllATING T/S 3.8.1 2 ~ A.Ci SOURCL'S-SHUTDO! Rt 't<

2 T/S 3.8.2. 1 A.C. DISTRIOUTIO!l--OPERATING ~ ~

2 T/S 3.8.2.2 a.c. oISTRIourzo."l stturoo:w 2 T/S 3.0.2.3 D.C. DISTRIBUTION Oi"ERATING 2 T/S 3.8.2.4 o.c. oI"tnIDUTIDN-stturootat R T/S 3.8.2.5 D.C, DISTRIBUTION--OP"RATIttG TRAIN N BATTERY THERE ARE 15 ITEttS REFEREhCEO FOR SYS 79 tNÃtOO lTECH SPEC/FSARt INDEX REFERENCED SYSTEtl IS-80 DIESEL GENERATORS CD SIGttIF. ITEH tto. REFEtlEllCED ITEtt

T/S 3.8.2.2

~ ~ ~ A.C. DISTltIDUTIOH-SHUT0$4t THERE APE 6 ITEHS REFEREII"CD FOR SY" 8 IICIIDO I TECH SPEC/FSAR I INDE'X RFFEREttCED SYSTEII IS-8% 120 VOLT AC SYSTEII-C%

IGNIF. ITEtl tm. REI'EREttCEO ITEIt T/S 1.6 DEF. OF OPERAQLC T/S 3.0.5 LItlITING COIIUITIOIIS/APPLICABILITY--IIOPOHER T/S 3.8.1.1 A.C. SOURCE --OPIIIATIIIG T/S 3.0.1.2 A.C ~ SOUI:CES--CHUI'0$ 5'I T/S 3.8.2.1 A.C. DIS1RIBUI'MI OPERATlNG T/S 3.8.2.2 A.C DISTRLOUfION SHU100: Jt THERE ARE 6 ITEttS REFERENCED FOR SYS 84 tt$ ICO 11ECH SPEC/FSAR I INDEX REFERENCED SYSlFtl IS:

C5 250 VOLT DC SYSTEII--AB SIGNIF. ITEtl NO. REFERENCED ITEN R T/S 1.6 OEF. OF OPERABLE R T/S 3.0.5 LIIIZTING COtlDZ110NS/APPLICABILITY HO PO'rlER R T/S 3A.II RELIEF VAI.VES OPERATING T/S 3.8.2.3 D.C. DISTRICUTIQI OPERATING T/S 3.8,ZA D.C. DISTRIDUTI$1 SHUT0$ 0I THERE ARE 5 ITEltS REFERENCED fOR SYS 85 HONDO I TECH SPEC/FSAR I ItIDEX REFERENCED SYSTEII IS:

86 250 VOLT DC SYSTEtl CD SZGNIF. ITEII NO. REFERENCED ITEtl R T/S 1.6 DEF. OF OPERABI.E R T/S 3.0.5 LI11ITIItG COttDITIOttS/APPLICABILITY HO POIIER R T/S 3.0.11 RELIEF VALVES OPEItATING T/S 3.8.2.3 D.C. DISTRIDUTIOtl OPERATING T/S 3.8.2A D.C. DISTRICUTION SI UTDOtIN THERE ARE 5 ITEHS REFEREHCED FOR SYS 86 H$ tDO tTECH SPEC/FSARI INDEX REFEREtICED SYSTEtl ZS:

87 250 VOLT OC BATTCRY N SYSTEH SIGtIIF ~ ITEtl ttO. REFERENCED ITEN R T/S 1.6 O'EEL OF OPERABLE R T/S 3.0.5 LIHITING COIIDITIOIIS/APPLICABILITY-NOPOHER R T/S 3.6.11 RELIEF VALVES OPERATIIIG T/S 3.8.2.5 O.C. DISTRIBUTION--OPNATING TRAIN N BATTERY THERE ARE 0 ITEHS REFERENCED FOR SYS 87

T/S 1.6 DEF. OF OPERABLE R T/" .0.5 LItllTIttG COlSITIOVMAPPLICABILITY--NOPOttER TllERE ARE 2 ITEtG REFERENCED FOR SYS 90 ttO.'tDO ITECH SPEC/FSAR) IhDEX REFt;REttCEO SYSTEtl IS:

91 REf UELING CANAL DRAIN SIGNIF. ITEN ttO. REFERENCED ITEN R T/S 1.6 DEF. OF OPERABLE R T/S 3.0.5 LIHITIttG COltOITIOttS/APPLICABILITY--NOPONER R T/S 3.5.2 ECCS SUBSYSTEIL"--T AVG > 350 DEG F R T/S 3.5.3 ECCS UDSYSTEltS T AVG ( 350 DEG F T/S 3.6.5.8 REFUELING CAtlAL DRAItlS TllERE ARE 5 ITEHS REFERENCED FOR SYS 91 ttO..DO lTFCH SPEC/FSAR l INDEX REFEREttCED SYSTEH IS-92 SPEttf FUEL POOL VENTILATION SYSTEH SIGNIF ITEH NO. REFERENCED ITEH R T/S 1.6 OEFo OF OPERABLE R T/S 3.0.5 LItlITING COttDITIOttS/APPLICABILITY NO PONER T/S 3.9.12 STORAGE POOL VLNTILATIOilSYSTEtl TllERE ARE 3 ITEHS REFEREhCEO FOR SYS 92 llOKDO t TECll SPEC/FSAR l INDEX REFEREt'CED SYSTEtl I 93 REFUELING HATER PURIFICATION SIGNIF. ITEH NO. REFEREttCED ITCH R T/S 1 6 DEF. OF OPEttABLE R T/S 3.0.5 LIttITIttG CCtlDITIOt6/APPLICABILITY--NOPOttER R T/S 3 '.9 COttfAlltttEttT AND EXllAUST ISOLATION ALTERATIONS THERE ARE 3 ITEHS REFERENCED FOR SYS 93 HERO tTECN SPEC/FSARl INDEX REFERENCED SYSTEtl IS:

9% HANIPULATOR CRANE SIGNIF ITEH NO. REFERENCED ITEN T/S 1.6 DEF. OF OPERABLE LItlITING COt'DITIONS/APPLICABILITY R

R T/S 3.0.5 'ttO POWER R T/S 3.9<<3 REFUELIttG OPERATION --DECAY TItkE T/S 3.9.6 HANIPULATOR CRANE DURING CORE ALTERATIOt&

THERE ARE 6 ITEt& REFERENCED FOR SYS 94 HOtlDO ITECtt SPEC/FSAR) ItlDEX REl'ERFNCEO SYSTEII IS:

95 SPENT FUEL CASK tlAtlDLING CRANE

SIGN . ITEtl N). REFERENCED ITCH R T/S 1.6 DKF. OF OPERABLE R T/S 3.0.5 LIHITltIO COWDI I IOC/APPLICADILITY NO POHER TIIERE ARE 2 ITEttS REFERENCED FOR SYS 98 NOitDO I TECH SPEC/FSAR l INDEX REFERENCED SYSTFII IS:

99 COIITAINIIENT AIR RECIRCULATIOtl SYSTEH--CEO-I SIGWIF. ITFN NO. REFERENCED ITEN R T/S 1.6 DEF. OF OPERADLC R T/S 3.0.5 LItlITING CUNDI TIONMAPPLICADILTTY--NOPOHER 2 T/S 3.3.2.1 KSF ACTUATIOV SYSTCH It&TPUIIKNfATIOII T/S 3.6.5.6 COIITAItttIENT AIR RECIRCULATICII SY TEllS TIIERE ARE 6 ITENS REFEREIKED FOR SYS 99 HOWDO ITECII SPEC/FSAR) INDEX RCFEREtKEO SYSTEtl IS:

100 COIITAItttICIIT AIR RECIRCULATIOtl SYSTEH-<<CEO-2 SIGNLF. ITEH NO. REFEREtKEO ITEN R T/S 1.6 DEF. OF OPERABLE R T/S 3.0.5 LIIIITII!GCOI'IDITIONS/APPLICABILITY--IIOPOHER 2 T/S 3.3.2 1 CSF ACfUATION SYS1EIl Itt01RUHEtITATIOII T/S 3.6.5.6 COttraltalENr AIR RECIIICULATIOII YSTEIIS THERE ARE 6 ITKHS REFEREtKED FOR SYS 100 HOIIDO I TECH SPEC/FSAR I ItIDEX REFEREtKED SYSfEH IS:

101 COIITAINItCWT PRESSURE RELIEF SYSTEH SIGNIF. ITEH NO. REFERENCCD ITEH R T/S 1.6 DCF. OF OPERABLE R T/S 1.30 DEF. OF VENTING R T/S 3.0.5 LItIITIWG COttDITIOIK/APPLICABILITY-NOPONER R T/S 3.6.3.1 COItTAIMIEtlf ISOLATION VALVES THERE ARE 0 ITEHS REFERENCED FOR SYS 101 HOttDO I TECH SPEC/FSAR l ItIDEX REFERENCED SYSTEH IS-'02 COttfAIQIENT PURGE AtID ENIAU T SYSl'EH SIGNIF ITEH NO, REFERENCED ITEN T/S 1.6 DEF. OF OPERABLC T/S 1.33 DEF. OF PURGE-PURGING T/S 3.0.5 LINITIttG CO:IDITIOlIS/AtiPLICADILITY NO POt!ER T/S 3.3.2.1 E F ACTUATIOW SYS1KH IIISlRUIIENTAfION T/S 3.3.3.10 RAD. GAS. PIIOCKSS AtID CFFLUEtlf t!OWTIORItIG INST+

T/S 3.6.1.7 CottraltuIEIIT VEIITILATIOW SYSTCH T/S 3.6.3.1 COIITAIIIIIEIITISOLATION VALVES

t)OIIDO I TECH SPEC/FSAA) ItlDEX R DANCED SYSTEI) IS-'07 ICE COIIDEIGER DOOR LOIIER Itll.ET SIGNIF. ITEtl tIO. ACFEAENCEO ITEH R T/8 1.6 DEF. OF OPERABLE R T/S 3.0.5 LItlITING COhDI)IOI5/APPLICABILITY--hOPOHER 2 T/S 3.6.5.1 ICE BED R T/S 3 6 5.2 ICE BED TENPERATVAE HOtlITOAING SYSTEII II T/S 3.6.5.3 ICE CCIIDENSEII DOCAS R T/S 3.6.5.% ItlLET DOOR PO'ITIGN IIOIIITOAIIIGSYSTTN THERE ARE 6 ITEIIS REFEAENCED FOA SYS 107 NCIDO ITECH SPEC/FSAR) INDEX REFERENCED SYSTEH IS:

108 ICE CONDECER DOORS IIITERHEOIATE DECK SIGtlIF. ITEN NO. REFERENCED ITEH T/S 1.6 DEF. OF OPERABLE T/S 3.0.5 LIIIITING CONDITIOtIS/APPLICABILITY--NOPONCR T/S 3.6.5.1 ICE BFD T/S 3.6.5.2 ICE BED TEHPEAAI)lAE NONITORItIG SYSTEH T/S 3 '.5.3 ICf COIIDEIISER DOORS TtIEAE ARE 5 ITEHS REFERENCED FOR SYS 108 NONDO ITECH SPEC/FSAAl IIIDEX REFEREIICEO SYSTEII IS:

109 ICE CONDENSEA DOORS T07 DCCK SIGNIF. ITEtl tIO. REFE RftICED ITEH R T/S 1.6 DEF. OF OPERABLE R T/S 3.0.5 LIlllTItIGCONDIl IONS/APPLICADILI1'Y NO POHER 2 T/S 3.6.5.1 ICE OEO

.R T/S 3.6.5.2 ICE BEO TftlPERATUAE )ILIITORING SYSTEH T/S 3.6.5.3 ICE CÃIDEIISER DOORS THERE ARE 5 ITEIIS REFERENCED FOA SYS 109 HONDO I TECH SPEC/FSAR) INDEX REFEREIICED SYSTEN IS:

110 ICE CONDCNSER DRAIN SIGNIF, ITEH NO. REFERENCED ITEN R T/S 1.6 DEF. OF OPERABLE R T/S 3.0.5 LltIITItlGCOIIDITlONS/APPLICABILITY--NOPOHER R T/S 3.6.3.1 CONTAltaIENT ISOLATION VALVES 2 T/S T/S 3.6 '.1 3.6.5.7 ICE BED FLOOR DAAItIS THERE ARE 5 ITEHS REFERENCED FOR SYS 110 NOIIDO I TECH SPEC/FSAR) INDEX REFERENCED SYSTEII IS-ill REFRICf RATION SYSTE tl

SIGI . ITEtt IIO. REFEREtKED ITEtl lt T/S 1.6 OEF. OF OPERtDLE R T/S 1.8 OEF. OF CO:ITAItd!LIIT ItllFGRITY R T/S 3.0.5 LIIIITING CO.'IDI fI ol IS/APPLICABILITY--NO POHER T/S 3.6.1.1 CQITAII4IENf ItlfEGRITY T/8 3.6.1.2 COIITAIILIENT LEAKAG~

T/S 3.6.1.3 CotffAIIIIIEIITAIR LOCKS T/S 3.6.5.5 PCRSONIEL AIIO EIIUIPIIENT HATCH

~ T/S 3.9.0 CQITAIIIIIENT OLPC. PEtlE fRATIONS--REFUELItIG R T/S 3.9.8.1 RIIR Atto COOLANI'IRCULATION CORE ALTERATIONS THERE ARE 9 ITEIIS REFEREtKED FOR SY 115 ttOMOO ITECH SPEC/FSARI INOEX REFERENCED SYSTEH IS-116 CQIfAIQIENT ISOLATION VALVES SIGIII. ITEII IN. REFERENCED ITEN T/S 1.6 DEF. OF OPCRABLE T/S 1.0 DEF. OF CCIITAItllEIITItlTEGRITY T/S 3.0.5 LItlITING COIIDITJONS/APPLICABILITY- tm POHER T/S 3.3.2.1 ESF ACTUATION SYSTEN INSTRNIENTATION T/S 3.6.1.1 CQITAINIIENT INTEGRIT'Y T/S 3.6.1.2 CQITAIINIEIIT LEAKAGE T/S 3.6.3.1 CUNTAI18IENT ISOLATION VALVES T/S 3.8.2.3 O.C. OISTRIBUTIOII--OPERATItlc T/S 3.8.2A D.C. DISTRIBUTIQI--SHUTOO:-I T/S 3. 9.0 CO:IfAJt "IEtlf DLDG. PEtIET(IATIOIIS--REFUELING T/S 3.9.8.1 RHR Al!0 COOLAllf CIRCULATIOtl COPE ALICRATI~

THERE ARE ll ITEHS REFEAEIKCD FOR SYS 116 ttotIOO ITECH SPEC/FSARI INDEX REFERENCED SYSTEII IS:

117 CQif. PENETRATION A HELD CHA!RIEL PRESSURIZATION SIGNI F. ITEN IIO. REFEREtKED ITEII T/S 1.6 DEF. OF OPERABLE T/S 1.8 DEF. OF ColITAItCIEIIT INfEGRITY T/S 3.0.5 LIIIITItlG CQIDITIOIIS/APPLICABILITY-NOPOHER T/S 3.6.1.1 CQITAINIEflf INTECRITY T/S 3.6.1 2 C04TAIIIHIEttf LEAKAGE T/S 3.6.3.1 CQITAItfr!CNT ISOLATIOtl VALVES T/S 3.9.% CottfaltCIE!4T BLOC. PENETRATI04"-REFUELING THERE ARE 7 ITEHS REFEREtiCED FOR SYS 117 HONOO I TECH SPEC/FSAR) INDEX REFERENCED SYSTEI1 IS-118 CONTAINHENT STRUCTURE SIGIIIF. ITEN NI. REFERENCED ITEN R T/S 1.6 DEF. OF OPERABLE R T/S 1.8 OEF. OF CQITAIIIIIENT INfEGRITY R T/S 3.0.5 LItlITItlGCONDITIONS/APPLICADILITY-NO PO'IFR

3.6.2.1 COt)TAINtlKNT SPRAY SYSTEH 3.6.2.2 SPRAY ADDITIVE SYSlEtl R T/S 3.6.5.8 RKFUCLI)tG CAt)AL DRAIt)S R T/S 3.7.7.1 S)V'CEPS TIIERE ARE 7 ITEt& REFERKt)CEO FOR SYS 122 HOttDO tTECH SPEC/FSARl INDEX REFERENCED SYSTEH ISt 123 CO))TAIN))ENT SPRAY SYSTFH HEST SICNIF. ITEN ND. REF ERKt)CED ITEN R T/S 1.6 DEF. OF OPERABLE R T/S 3.0.5 LItlfTING COt)DIT) Ot)S/APPLICABILITY--NO PO)IER 2 I/O 3.3.2.1 ESF ACTUATIO!l Y")Elt It TRU)IKt)FATIOtt T/S 3.6.2.1 CONTAIQIKNT SPRAY SYSTC)t R T/S 3.6,2.2 SPRAY ADDITIVE SYSTEH R T/S 3.6.5.8 REFUELING CAllAL DRAINS R T/S 3.7.7.1 StmDDERS TIIERE ARE 7 ITEI)S REFEREtlCED FOR SYS 123 MOl)DO lTECll SPEC/CSAR) It)DEX RKFFRENCED SYSTEll IS:

126 COtSUSTIBLE GAS COttTROL SIGt)IF. ITEtl NO. REFEREttCED ITEH R T/S 1.6 DEF. OF OPERABLE R T/S 3.0.5 LltllTIttG COl!DITIONS/APPLICABILITY--NOPOttER R T/5 3.6.e. I NYORCCCtt AttrLVZEL" R T/S 3.6.0,2 ELECTI)IC IIYDRCCEtt RECOt)DIttEllS TIIERE ARE 4 ITElt" REFERENCED FOR SYS 12%

HONDO lTECH SPEC/FSAR) INDEX REFERE))CED SY TEH IS-125 HYDROGEN ANALYZERS SIGNIF. ITEH NO. REFERENCED ITEH R T/S 1.6 DEF. OF OPERABLE R T/S 3.0.5 Lit)ITIttG CO)tDITIOt!S/APPLICABILITY NO POHKR R T/S 3.6.3.1 COt)TAItC)K)tr ISOLATIOtl VALVES T/S 3.6A.l IIYDROGEtl ANALY2ERS THERE ARE 0 ITEHS REFERENCED FOR SYS 125 HOMDO lTECll SPEC/FSAR) It)DEX REFERK))CED SYSTEH IS:

126 ttYDROGKN RECDt)BINERS llR-1 SIGNIF. ITEH NO. REFERENCED ITCH R T/S 1.6 DEF. OF OPERABLE R T/S 3.0.5 ).ItlI'TItS CO)IDITIOtlS/APPLICABILITY-NO PO)tER T/S 3.6.6.2 ELECTRIC t)YDROCEtt RECOtazttERS Tt)ERE ARE 3 ITEHS REFERENCED FOR SYS 126

~~

NCED SYSTCH IS:

1>> tlANUAL REACTOR TRIP SIGNIF. ITEtl tlO. AEFEAEHCED ITCH R T/S 1.6 DEF ~ OF OPERADLF.

R T/S 1.9 DEF. OF CIIAtf!EL CALIDAA7ION A T/S 1 ~ 10 DEF ~ OF CllhtÃICL CIICCK A T/S 1.11 DEF. OF CIIAIRICL FUI!CTIOIIAL TEST R T/S 1.22 DEF. OF REAClOA TAIP SY 'TEH AE PONSE TIHE T/S 2.2.1 RLACTOA TAIP Y IEII Itl'T. SETPOINTS R T/S 3.0.5 LIMITIIIGCOI!DITIOIIS/API'LICADILITY--ItOPONER T/S 3.3.1.1 REACTOR TRIP SYSTCtl IN"TRUIIL'tITATION TIICRE AAE 8 ITEtts REFEREtKED FOR SYS 130 NOHDO !TECH SPEC/FSAItt INDEX REFERCHCED SYSTEH Is:

131 NCUTAON FLUX IPOtIER RANGE I SIGIIIF. 11EII IIO. REFERENCED ITEN R T/S 1.4 DFF. OF OPERATIOtlAL HODE R T/S 1.6 DCF. OF OPERABLE R T/S 1.9 DEF ~ OF CIIAICIEL CALIBRATION R T/S 1. 10 DEF. OF CIIANNEL CIIECK R T/S lail DLFi OF CIIAttNEL FUIKTIONAL TEST R I/S 1.18 DEF. OF QUADAAIIT POIIER TILT RATIO R T/S 1.22 DEF. OF REACTOR TIIIP SYSICN AESPOIKE TINE R T/S 1.24 DEF. OF AXIAL FLUX DIFFEPEIKE R T/S 1.25 DEF. OF PIIYSICS TESTS R T/S Z.l.l SAFETY LIIIITS AEACTOR CORE T/S 2.2.1 REACTOR TRIP SYSSEII ItlST. SETPOINTS A T/S 3.0.5 LIIIITIttGCOtIDITIOIIS/APPLICABILITY--ttOPOHER 2 T/S 3.1.1.4 ttODEAATOR TEIIPEAATUAE COEFFICICNT R T/S 3.1.3.1 HOVADLE COtTAOL ASSEtSLIES R T/S 3.1.3.2 POSITION INDICATOR CHAICIELS OPERATIIIG 2 T/S 3.2.1 AXIAL FLUX DIFF CAEIKE 2 T/S 3.2 ' I!EAT FLUX IIOT CIIAIEIEL FACTOR T/S 3.2.4 QUADAAtlT POF!CA TILT RATIO R T/S 3.2.5 Dt& PAAAtIETEAS R T/S 3.2.6 AXIAL POKIER DISTRIBUTION T/S 3.3.1.1 AEACTOA TRIP SYSTCtl IttsTAUHLNTATION R T/S 3.3.2il E F ACTUATION SYSTEH IIGTAUIIENTATIOH R T/S 3.3.3.2 tIOVADLE DKOPE DETECTORS R T/S 3.4.1.4 RCS LOOPS TIIAEE LOOP OPEAATIO!t R T/S 3.7.1.1 SECONDARY SAFETY VALVES R T/S 3.10.2 TEST EXCEPTIOII--IICIGIIT ItGCATIOH POtIER DIST, T/S 3.10.3 TLST EXCEPTIOtl--PIIYSICS TESTS TIIERE ARE 27 ITEHS REFEAENCED FGA SYS 131 NOtlDO ITECII SPEC/FSAA) IIIDEX REFEREtKED SYSTEII IS:

132 tlCUTRON FLUX IIMTERt!EDIATE RAtiGE I SIGtlIF . ITEN NO. REFEREtKEO ITEtl T/S 1.4 DEF. OF OPEAATIOtlAL t!ODE T/S 1.6 DEF. OF OPERABLE

~~

T/S 1.9 DEF ~ OF CHAN)EL CALIBRATION T/S 1.10 Df;F. OF CllattttEL CIILCK T/S li)1 DEF. OF CI!Al"!EL FUilCTIONAL TEST T/S 1.22 DCF ~ OF REACTUtt 'lRIP SYSTEH RESP')E TI)lE I/S 2.2.1 REACTOR 'lRIP YSTE)l It)ST. SF1Polllf T/S 3 '.5 3.3.1.1 LItlITING CetDITIOtts/At'PLICADILITY--hOPot!ER T/S REACTOR TRIP <<Y )Elt III )RU'i"NfATIOtt T/S 3.0.1.0 Rcs Loops--11!REE Loop opLRATIct THERE ARE 9 ITEHS REFERENCED FOR SYS 130 Hot)00 lTECH SPEC/FSAR) INDEX REFEREttcED SYSTEtl IS:

135 OVERPOHER DELTA T SIGttIF. ITEN tlo. REFERENCED ITEN R T/S 1.6 OEF. OF OPERABLE R T/S 1.9 DEF. OF CHAtflEL CALIBRATIOtl R T/S 1.10 DEF. 0F cHattttEL cHEcK R T/S 1.11 DEF. OF CHAIItEL FUttcTIOliAL TEsf R T/S 1.22 DEF. OF REaCTOR TklP SYSTEll RESPON"E TIliE T/S 2.2.1 REACTOR TRIP SYS1EH Itrf. SETI'illtlf R T/S 3.0.5 LltlITIttG Cot!DITIO!ts/APPLICADILI'lY NO POHER 2 T/S 3.2.2 HEAT FLUX HOT Ct)ANttEL FACTOR T/S 3.3.1.1 PEACTOR TRIP SYSTEH ItlS)RNXNTATION R T/S 3.6.1.4 RCS LOOPS TtlREE LOOP OPEI!ATION THERE ARE 10 ITEHS REFERENCED FOR SYS 135 Hol'DO ITECH SPEC/FSAR) ItiDEX.

REFERENCED SYSlEH IS:

136 PRES"URIZER PRESSURE SIGt tIF. ITEH NO. REFERENCED ITEH R T/S 1.6 DEF. OF OPERABLE R T/S 1.9 DEF ~ OF Cltatw)EL CALIBRATION R T/S lilo DEF. OF Cllatf!EL CHECK R T/S 1.11 DEF. OF CHattitEL tUNCTIONAL TEST R T/S 1.22 DEF. OF REACTOR TRIP SYSTEH RESPOt5E TIHE R T/S Z.l.l SAFETY LIIIITS--REACTOR CORE R T/S 2.1.2 SAFETY LIHITS RCP PRCSSUPE T/S 2.2.1 REACTOR TRIP SYSTEH ItlST. SETPOItlTS R T/S 3.0.5 LIttITIttG Col!DITIO!ts/APPLICABILITY--NOPOHER T/S 3.2.5 DNB PARA!lETERS T/S 3.3.1.1 REACTOR TRIP SYSTEtl IH~TRUitEttTATIOtl T/S 3.3.2.1 E F ACTUATION SYslEtt IN TRNIEtlfATION T/S 3.3.3.5 REtlof E SHUT DOHN INSTRN!ENTATION T/S 3.3.3 ' POST-ACCIDENT ItCiTRNIEttfATION R T/S 3.6.7 RCS--CHEHISTRY R T/S 3.%.9.1 RC --PRESSURE/TEHPERATURE LItlITS R T/5 3.6.9.2 PRESSURIZER TEHiPERATURE LItlITS R T/S 3.5.1 ACCNIULATORS R T/S 3.5.2 ECCS SUBSYSTEHS--T AVG > 350 DEG F R T/S 3.5.3 ECCS SUDSYSTElts-"T AVG < 350 DCG F R T/S 3.7.2.1 STEAN GEtlERATOR PRESSURE/TEllPLRATURE LIHITS R T/S 5.%.1 RCS DESIGN PRESSURE AtlD TEtlPERATUAE R T/S 5.7.1 CCIPOt)EtlT CYCLIC OR TRANSIENT LI!lIT

T/S 3.0.5 LIt!ITItfGCONDITIONS/APPLICADILZTY -tIO POI 3.3.1.1 REACTOR TRIP SYSTEN IIIGTRUIIEI'fATION T/S 3.3.2.1 EGF AClUATION GYGTEH IIGTRCIEIITATIOtl R I/S 3.5.1 ACCUIIJLAIORG R I/G 3.7.3.1 CO tl 0:ICIIT CDOLlttG tlATER SYGTEII R T/S 3.7.%.1 EGGFtlfIAL SEI,'YICL NA'ICH GYGICII R T/S 3.7.5 CONTROL ROOII CIICf!GEtl"Y VCtlTILATION SYSTEH R T/S 3.8.1.1 A.C. SOURCES--OPEI:ATItlG R T/S 3.0.1.2 a.c. SOURCES--G!luroft:ct TIIERE ARE 16 ITEHS REFERENCED FOR SYS 139 tIOtIOO ITECH SPEC/FSAR) ItlDEX REFERENCED SYSTEtl IG:

liO TURBINE~NERATOR SIGNIF. ITEH tl0. REFERENCED ITEtl R T/S 1.6 OEF. OF OPERADLE R T/S 1.9 DEF. OF CHAt"!CL CALIBRATION R T/G 1.10 OEF ~ OF CHAI"IEL CHECK R T/5 1.11 OEF ~ OF CIIAtoolCL Fut!CTIOIIAL TEST R T/S 1.22 OEI . OF RCACTOR TRIP SYSTEI'I REGPOtKE TINE R T/G 1.23 OCF. OF ESF REGPOIL E Tlt!E T/S 2.2.1 REAC10R TRIP SYSTKN ItFiT. GETPOINTG R T/S 3.0.5 Llt!ITINS COIIDITIOITS/APPLICABILITY--NOPOHER T/S 3.3.1.1 REAcTDR TRIp GYsrE!4 IttsTRUIIEIITATIG:4 T/S 3.3.2.1 ESF ACTUATION SYSTEtl It!GTRUIIEtlfATION THERE ARE 10 ITEHS REFERENCED FOR SYS 140 HONDO ITECH SPEC/FSARI INDEX REFERENCED SYSTEH IS:

lhl STEAN GENERATOR I!ATER L'EVEL SIGNIFY ITEN NO. REFEREIICED ITEN R T/S 1.6 DEF, OF OPERABLE R T/S 1.9 OEF. OF CHAIIHEL CALIBRATION R T/S 1.10 DCF. OF CHAttHEL CHECK R T/S 1.11 DEF. OF CIIAIII!EL FIL','CTIO!4AL TEST R T/S 1.22 OEF. OF REACTOR TRIP SYGTEH REGPOtGE TIHE R T/S 1.23 OEF. OF EGF IlEGPOIGE TIIIE T/S 2.2.1 REACTOR TIIIP SY TCII INST. SETPOINTS R T/S 3.0.5 LIHITING COtlDITIOits/Al'PLICABILITY--IIOPOHER T/S 3.3.1 1 REACTOR TRIP GYSTEIt It&TRNIEIITATIOI!

T/S 3.3.2.1 EGF. AC TUATION SYSTCN II4STRUI IEIITATION T/S 3.3.3.5 REIIOTE SI!uf OOI4tt IIISTRUIIEIITATIOI4 T/S 3.3.3.6 PO T-ACCIOENf IICiTRN!cttTATION THERE ARE 12 ITENS RFFERENCED FOR SYS 1%1 NOIIOO ITECH SPEC/FGARI INDEX REFERENCED SYGTEI4 IS:

162 CONTAIttHENT StRIP IIIDICATION SIGNIF. ITEN NO. REFERENCED ITEN R T/S 1.6 DEF. OF OPERABLE R T/G 1 9 DEF. OF CIIAILICL CALIORATIOI4

T/S 3.6.2 2~ SPRAY ADDITIVE SYSTftl T/S 3.7.6.1 ESF VEtlrILATIONSYSrfH R T/S 5.2.2 CG))l'AltC)ft)T DESICtl Ft)ESMRE AND TEHPERATURE THERE ARE 15 ITEtl REFERft)CEO FOR SYS 145 t10ti00 tTEC)) SPEC/FSAR) INDEX REFERENCED SYS)'Etl IS:

146 CONZAItR)fNT RADIATION SIGNIF. ITEH t)0. REI ERENCED ITEH T/S 1.6 DEF ~ OF OPERABLE T/S 1.9 DEF. OF CIIAlRlfL CALIBRATION T/S 1.10 DEF ~ OF CHAIRIEL CIIECK T/S 1.11 DEF. OF C)IA))t)EL CU')ClICt)AL TEST T/S 1.23 DEF. OF ESF RCSPO))"E TI)lE T/S 3.0.5 LItlITING CONDITIOtts/APPLICABILITY--NOPOHER T/S 3.3.2.1 ESF ACTUATION SYSTQI IWS)RUt)EIJTATION T/S 3.3.3.1 RADIATION t)0)IITORIIIG SYSTEll T/S 3.4.6.1 RCS LEAKAGE BETE CTIOtl SYSTft'G T/S 3.4.6.2 RCS--OPERATIO)IAL LEAKAGE T/S 3.6.1.7 CO)ITAItRlfNF VfWTILATIOtl YSTE H T/S 3.6.3.1 COtlTAltllft)T ISOLATIOll VALVES T/S 3.9.9 CCtt) AINtIENT A)$ EXllAUST ISOLATION ALTERATIONS THERE ARE 13 ITEHS REFERENCED FOR SYS 146 tlONDO )TEC)) SPEC/FSAR) It)DEX REFERENCED SYSTft) IS-147 ICE CO)tDEt)"ER TftlPERASU)tf HOflITORING INST.

SIGNIF. ITEH t)0. REFERENCED ITEN R T/S 1.6 DEF. OF OPERABLE R T/S 1.9 DEF. OF Ct)A)efL CALIBRATION R T/S 1 '0 DEF. OF CI)A)RIEL CIIECK R T/S 1.11 DEF. OF CIIA)R>EL FUt)CTIONAL TEST R T/S 3.0.5 Llt)ITIWG CONDITIONS/APPLICABILITY--NOPO)(f R 2 T/S 3.6.5.1 ICE BED T/S 3.6.5.2 ICE BED TEtlPERATURE HOWITORItlG SYSTEH R T/S 3.6.5.3 ICE CONDENSER DOORS 2 T/S 3.6.5.4 INLET DOOR POSITIOll HONITORING SYSTEH THERE ARE 9 ITEHS REFERENCED FOR SYS 147 HGttDO )TECII SPEC/FSAR) INDEX REFERENCED SYSTEH IS:

148 ICE CONDENSER DOOR POSITIOti INDICATORS SICNIF. ITEH tl0. REFERENCED ITEH R T/S 1.6 DEF ~ OF OPERABLE R T/S 1.9 DEF. OF CIIAWtlfL CALIBRATION R T/S 1.10 DEF. OF CIIAtllfL CHECK R T/S 1.11 DEF. OF Ctlht)WEL FUttCTIOWAL TEST R T/S 3.0.5 LIt)ITING CO))DITIO)ls/APPLICABILITY--t)0POt)ER 2 T/S 3.6.5.1 ICE BED R T/S 3-6.5.2 ICE BED TftlPERATURE HOt)ITORIt)G SYSTEH T/S 3.6.5.3 ICE CO))DfttsfR DOORS

T/S 1.6 DEF. OF OPERABLE 1'rs 1.9 OFF. OF CHrtSIEL CALIGAATIOH T/S 1.10 OEF. OF CHAI"IKL CIIECK T/S 1.11 DEF. OF CIIAI."ICL fUXCTIOtlAL TEST T/S 3.D.5 LIHITZIIG COIIDITIOIIS/APPLICABILITY"-NOPONER T/S 3.3.3.3 SEISIIIC INC)AUtiCIIIATIOIt T/S 5.7.1 COIIPOIIENT CYCLIC Olt TAAIISIENT LIHIT THERE AAE 7 ITEI)S REFERENCED FOR SYS 152 tIONDO ITECH SPEC/FSAR) ItlDEX REFERENCED SYSTEI) IS:

153 AEFUELING HATER Sl'ORAGE TAlK LEVEL INDICATOAS SICHIF. ITEN I). REFERENCED ZTEII R T/S 1.6 DEF ~ OF OPERABI.E R T/S 1.9 DEF. OF CHANNEL CALIGAATIOH A T/S 1.10 DEF. OF CIIAIIIIKLCHECK R T/S 1.11 GEF. OF CHAI)I!EL FUHCTIOtIAL TEST R T/S 3.0.5 LIIIITING COIIDITIOIIS/APPLICABILITY NO PO!IER R T/S 3.1.2.7 GOAATK0 HATER SOURCES SIIUTDCIDI R T/S 3.1 ~ 2.8 GOAATKD HATER SOURCES OPERAT1NG T/S 3.3.3.6 POST-ACCIDENT INSTRNtKNTATIOtt THERE ARE 8 ITEttS REFEABtCEO FOR SYS 153 IIONDO ITECH SPEC/FSAR) IHDEX REFERENCED SYSTKH IS:

154 LIQUID EFFLUENT RADIATION NONITORING-SIGNIF . ITEtt tlo. REFEAB'CEO ITEtt R T/S 1.6 DEF. OF OPERABLE R T/S 1.9 DEF. OF CHAtIIEL CALIBRATION R T/S 1.10 DEF. OF CIIAIIIIEL CIIECK R T/S 1.11 DEF. OF CIIAtL'lL'L FUlICTIOIIAL TEST R T/S 1,30 DEF. OF OFFSITE DO"E CALCULATION ttlAIUAL R T/S 3*0.5 LItlITIttG COIIDITIOIIS/APPLICABILITY--ISPONER T/S 3.3.3.9 AADIOACTIVE LIQUID EFFLUEHT INSTRUHEIITATZON R T/S 3.7.1.4 SKCotlDARY COOLANT SYSTEN--ACTIVITY T/S 3.11.1.1 RADIOACTIVE LIQUID EFFLUKNTS-COIICENTRATION R T/S 3.11.1.2 RADIOACTIVE LIQUID EFFLUKNTS DOSE R T/S 3.11.1.3 RADIOACTIVE LIQUID HASTE--TAEAltlKNT R T/S 3.11 '.4 RADIOACTIVE LIQUID HOLDUP TANKS R T/S 3.12.1 ENVIAOINIEIITALRADIATIotl lioNITOAING R T/S 3 '2.2 LAtlD USE CEHSUS R T/S 3.12,3 INTER LABORATORY CONPAAISOH PROGAAtl R Tr's 5.1.3 SIlE DOL'IDAAY FOR EFFLUKNTS THERE ARE 16 ITEHS REFERENCED FOR SYS 154 tKNOO ITECH SPEC/FSAR) INDEX REFEREHCED SYSTEtl IS:

155 GASEOUS EFFLUENT RAOIATIOH IIONITOAING SICNIF ~ ITEII NO. REFEAENCEO ZTEtl A T/S 1.6 DEF. OF OPERABLE

Hewn ITEcH SPEC/FsaR ) IIIDEX REFERENCED SYS)Etl ls:

156 AESISTANCE TEHPEAATUAE DCTCCTOR IRTD)-T HOT SIGNIF. ITEN No. PCFERENCED ITE)I R T/S 1.2 DFF. OF 'tHEAI)AL POIIER R T/S 1,3 DEF. 0F RATED t)IEI:IIAL pot)ER R T/S 1.% OEF OF OPEAATIOIIAL t)ODE R T/S 1.6 DEF. OF OPERABLE R T/S 1.12 DEF. OF CURE ALTEAATIotl R T/S 1.13 OEF. OF S)IUTOOl-"t IlarGItl R T/S 1.18 DEF. OF QUADnatlr I'WER l'ILT RATIO R T/S 1.2% OE F. OF AXIAL r LC; Ox F F E AC NC E R T/S 1.25 OEF. OF P.'IYSIC 1CST t/S Z.l.l SAFETY LlNIls--REACTOR CORE R T/S 3.0.5- LIHITING COIIDITIOIG/APPLICABILITY--NOPOHER T/S 3.1.1.1 BOAATION/SHUTDOIN IIAAGI)l--T AVG > 200 OEG. F T/S 3.1.1.2 Oonatxo)4/SHUTDOIIII IIAAGItl- T AVG < 200 DCG ~ F R T/S 3.1.1.4 t!ODEAATOR TE)IPEAA)UAE COEFFICIEtlr R T/S 3.1.1.5 t)INI)IUI) TEtlPEAATUAE For. cltxtxcaLITY R T/S 3.1.2.5 BOAIC ACID tna)GFEA PUIIPS--SIIUlooXII A T/S 3.1.2.6 oonxc acxo TnansrEn pU)~s--or Enarl)IG R T/S 3.1.2.7 BOAATED )tAtER SOUACES SIIUTDCL't T/S 3.2.1 AYIAL FLUX DIFFEREt'CE T/S 3.2.2 HCAT FLUX HOT Ctfa)NEL FACTOR T/S 3,2A I)UADAAIIT POIIER TILT RATIO R T/S 3.2.5 DIG PAAANCTEAS T/S 3.2.6 AXIAL POIIER OISTRIOUTIotl R T/S 3.3.3.2 )IOVADLE IIICOAE DETFCTOAS R T/S 3.3.3.7 AXIAL PIYi)EA DISTAXGUI'Iotl l)ONITOAING SYS R T/S 3.6.8 ACS--SPECIFIC ACTIVITY R T/S 3.5.0.1 BORON INJCCTION Tal "(

2 T/S 3.9.2 REf UCI.I¹ OPERATIO! r"-xtrtnU!'ENTATIOV R T/S 3.9.3 REFUELItio OPERATIC!5--DECAY Til)C T/S 3.10.1 TCST EYCEP'IION--S!PJTDOell HAAGItl T/S 3.10.2 TEST EYCEPTIOII-HCIGHr ICERTIOII Po)IER DIST.

T/S 3.10.3 1E T EXCEPTIotl-PHYSIC TE tS R T/S 3.10.5 tcsr EVCEptxo:I-roslrxoN xtloxcaton cl)atwELS T/S 5.3.1 FUEL ASSEIIDLIES T/S 5.3.2 CC)TRQL Aoo ASSE)IDLIES THERE AAE 35 ITEHS REFEAE)ICED FOR SYS 156 t%NOO )TECH SPEC/FSAR) INDCX REFERENCED SYSTEN IS-157 RE ISl'ANCE TEIIPERATUAE DETECTOR IATD ) T COLD SIGNXF. ITEtl t)O. REFERENCED ITEII R T/S 1.6 OEF. OF OPERABLE R T/S 1.12 OEF. OF CORE ALTERATION R T/S 1.13 DEF ~ OF SIIUTDOI)N HAAGIN R T/S 3.0.5 LltlxTING CCIIDITIQ!ts/APPLICABILITY No POHER T/S 3.1.3.1 )IOVADLE CotlfROL ASCEIDLIES R T/S 3.1.3.2 posxtxot) xnoxcaton c))a)~IELs--opEnaixtr 2 T/S 3.1.3.3 POSITiON IIIDICATOA CHA:NELS--SIIUT00'iO T/S 3.1.3.% RDD onop TIIIE T/S 3.1.3.5 SHU'roc)IN AOD INSEATIOtl LIt)IT

!ERE AAE 15 ITEI!5 AEFEAEIKED FOR SYS 159 IZNDO !TECH SPEC/FSAA) INDEX REF EAEI!CED SYSTEII IS:

160 POAV It!DICATION SIGNIF ~ ITEtl IIO. REFERENCED ITEN R T/S 1.6 DEF. OF OPERACLE R T/5 1.12 DEF. OF CORE ALTEAATION R T/5 1.25 DEF. OF PHYSICS TESTS A T/5 3.0.5 Clice"!E LI!IITINGCOIIDITIOtQ/APPLICABILITY--N POHER R T/S 3.1.3.1 NOVABLE CO!!THOL AS".,'!@LIES R T/5 3.1.3.2 POSITICtl IIIDICATOA LS--OPERATING T/5 3.2.2 HEAT FLUX HOT CIIAI"!CL FAC1CA T/S 3.2.3 RCS FLOtl RAIE AII9 A R T/S 3.2.4 QUADRANT POIIEA TILT AATIO T/S 3.2.6 AXIAL POIIER DISTAIDUTIOII R T/S 3.3.1.1 REACTOR TRIP SYSTEII It TAUXEIITATION T/5 3.3.3.2 t!OVADI.E IIICOAE DETECTORS T/5 3.3.3.7 AXIAL PLIER DISIAICUfIO!ltIONITOAIIIG SYS R T/5 3.6.3.1 CO!IfAINIEIITISDLAlION VALVES A T/5 3.10.2 TE" T EXCEPTIOI4--IIEIGIIT INSERTION,POtIER DIST.

R T/5 3.10.3 TE T EXCEPTION PHYSICS TESTS THERE AAE 16 ITEttS REFERENCED FOR SYS 160 NOt!DO ITCCH SPEC/FSAA I ItiOEX AEFEAEIICED SYSTEN IS:

161 BLOCK VALVE INDICATIO!I SIGNIF. ITEN ttO. REFEAENCCO ITEN R T/5 1.6 DEF. OF OPEAADLE R T/5 1.12 DEF. OF CO!!E ALTEAATIOtl R T/S 3+0.5 LI!IITING CCIIDITICIIS/APPLICABILITY NO POIIER THERE ARE 3 ITEltS REFERENCED FOA SYS 161 ICFtDO !TECH SPEC/fSAA) ItlDEX REFERENCED SYSlEN IS:

162 ACROSTIC NONITOA SIGI(IF. ITEN IIOo REFERENCED ITEN R T/S 1.2 OEF. OF TIIEAtIAL POIIER R T/S 1.3 DEF. OF RATED THEAIIAL PONEA R T/5 1.6 DEF ~ OF OPEAADLE R T/5 1. 12 DEF. OF COI!E ALTEAATION R T/5 1.14 DEF. OF IDEIITIFIEO LEAKAGE R T/5 1.15 DEF. OF UtlIOEIITIFIED LEAKAGE R T/5 1.16 DEF. OF PAESSUAE BOUNDAPY LEAKAGE R T/5 1.17 DEF. OF COtlfAOLLED LEAKAGE T/5 T/5 2 '.2 3.0.5 SAFETY Ll!IITS--ACP Pl'ESSUAE R LIIIITINGCOIIDITIOIIS/APPLICABILITY-NO POllER T/5 3.1.1.1 BOAATION/SIIUTDOICI tlAAGlN T AVG > 200 OEG, F T/5 3.1.1.2 DOAATIOtt/SIIUTDOtttt IIAAGI!l T AVG < 200 DEG. F T/5 3.1.1.3 DOAOtt DILUTIOtl T/5 3.1.l.h NODEAATOA TENPERATUAE COEFfICIENT

EAE AAE 12 ITEM RCFCAEtfCED FOA GYG 163 t)0.')00 ITECII SPEC/FGARI It)DCX REf'ERE)ICED SYGTL'll IS-16% AXIAL FLUX DIFFEREIICE IAFD) IHDICATIOH SIGHIF. ITEN NO. AEFEREtlCEO ITEN T/S 1.6 DEF. OF OPERABLE T/S 2.1.2 SAFETY LItfllS--ACP PRESSURE T/S 3.0.5 Lll)ITING COI:DI TIea/APPLICABILITY HO POHER T/S 3.2.5 DHB PAAAtlETEAG T/S 3.0.% PAES URIZCA T/S 3.6.9.1 RCS--PAL'SGUAE/TEHPEAATUIIE LIt)ITG T/S 3.<i.9.2 PAESSUAIZCR TE:IPEAATU.".E LIII)TG T/S 3.Q.9.3 OVEAPRES"URE PAO) ECTIO:.I GYSfEI)S T/S 3.6.3.1 COIITAIIIIIEtlTISOLATIOtl VALVES T/S 3.7.7.1 SIIUDDEAS T/S 5.0.1 RCS DE IGtl PAC GUAE AtlD 1EIIPERATURE THL'RE AI,E ll ITElts AEFERENCCD FOR SYS 16'>

)IO.'IDO tTECII SPEC/FGAft) IfiDEX REFERENCED SYGTEII IG:

165 STEAI)/FEEDHATER FLO)I )IIQIATCII SIGIIIF. ITEtl HO. REFEAENCEO ITEtf R T/S 1.6 DEF. OF OPCIIABLE R T/S 3.0.5 LIN1TIHG COtlDITIOHS/APPLICABILITY NO POIIER 2 T/S 3.6.9.3 OVEAPRE UAE PROfEC)ION YSTCt)G R T/S 3.6 '.1 CONTAIICIEI)F ISOLATION VALVFS R T/S 3.7.7.1 SIIUOBERS THERE ARE 5 ITECIS REFERENCED FOR SYS 165

)IONDO tTECII SPEC/FSAR) I)IBEX REFERENCED SYGTEN IS:

166 AEAC)OR COOLANT PQIP BUSEG SIGNIF. ITEN t)0. REFEAEHCED ITEN A T/S 1.6 DEF. OF OPEAABLE R T/S 3.0.5 LII'IITING CONDITIONS/APPLICABILITY PO)IEA T/S 3.0.2 PAESSUAIZCA SAI'ETY VALVES SHUTDOttHNO T/S 3A.3 PAESGUAIZLA SAFETY VALVES OPEAA)'lllG R T/S 3.6.6.2 ACS--OPEAATIOIIAL LFAVAGE T/S 3.%.9.3 OVERPIIESSUAE PROTECTION) SYSTEtfs THEAE ARE 6 ITEtfS REFERENCED FOR GYS 166 tfOIIDO ITECH SPEC/FGAR) ItIDEX AEFEREttCEO SYSTEN IS:

167 REACTOR COOLANT PUIIP BREAKER POSITION SIGtlIF. ITEtl HO. REFEAEIICED ITEII R T/S 1.6 DEF. OF OPERABLE A T/S 3.0.5 LIIIITIhG COIIDITIGIIS/APPLICABILITYNO POHER

I/S 1. 6 DEF. OF Ol'CRARLE T/S 3.0 5 LltlITIttG CollOITIOt6/APPL!CABILITY--NOPOttER T/S 3.6.9.3 OVERPRC""URE PRO1ECT10ll SYSTEtlS THERE APE 3 ITEt& REFEREttCED FOR SYS 170 I~DO lTECtl SPEC/FSARl IttDEX REFERENCED SYSTEtl IS:

171 STEAN LINE PRESSURE SIGt<IF. ITEN No. Rf FERENCED ITEN R T/S 1.6 DEF. OF OPERADLE R T/S 3.0.5 LlHITING CONDITIOttS/APPLICABILITY-NOPOHER R I/S 3.5.1 ACCUltULATORS R T/S 3.5.2 ECCS SUDSYSTEllo T AVG > 350 Dio F R T/S 3.5.3 ECCS SUDSYSTEttS--T AVG < 350 DEG F R. T/S 3.5.0.1 BORON INJECTIO.'l TANK R T/S 3.5.6.2 lliAT TRACIttG FOR BORON INJECTION TANK R T/S .3.5.5 REFUELING ttATER STORAGE TAIX R T/S 3.6.3.1 CottTAIttttENT ISOLAl'ION VAI.VES THERE ARE 9 ITEltS REFEREttCEO FOR SYS 171 ttnttDO lTECH PEC/FSAR l INDEX REFERENCED SYSIEH IS:

172 0 KV DUS LOSS/DEGRADED VOLTAGE IMIF. ITEH NO. REFERENCED ITEH R T/S 1.6 DEF. OF OPERABLE R T/S 3.0.5 LIHITItt CC:tDITIOtD/APPLICABILITY-ltO PnttER T/S 3.5. 1 ACCUttULATORS R T/S 3.6.3.1 CONFAItttlCttT ISOLATIOll VALVE THERE ARE 6 ITEHS REFERENCED FOR SYS 172 YANDO lTECll SPEC/FSAP.l INDEX REFERENCED SYSTEll IS:

173 LOSS OF HAIN FEEDttATER SIGttIF. ITEN NO. REFERENCED ITEH T/S 1.6 DEF. OF OPERABLE T/S 3.0.5 LItlITIttG CONDITIONS/APPLICABILITY--NoPnttER T/S 3.5.2 ECCS SUBSYS1EttS T AVG > 350 DEG F T/S 3.5.3 ECCS SUBSYSTEHS--T AVG c 350 OCG F T/S 3.5A.1 DOPON INJECTIOll TANK

~ ~

T/S 3.5A. 2 tlEAT TRACItte FOR OOROtl INJECTION TAta T/S 3.6.3.1 CottTAIttttfltT ISOLATION VALVES T/S 5.2.2 COttTAIMENT DESIGtl PRESSURE AttD TEHPERATURE THERE ARE 8 ITE1& REFEREttCED FOR SYS 173 HOMCO lTECII SPEC/FSAR) INDEX REFEREttCED SYSTEH IS:

17% AXIAL PottER DISTRIDUTIOtl ttONITORING SYSTEH SIGNIF. ITEH No. REFERENCED ITEH Is