IR 05000346/1987026

Insp Rept 50-346/87-26 on 871001-1115.No Violations or Deviations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Licensee Actions on Previous Insp Findings,Operational Safety,Maint, Surveillance,Emergency Preparedness,Qa & Security

ML20237E347
Person / Time
Site:	Davis Besse
Issue date:	12/18/1987
From:	Defayette R NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III)
To:
Shared Package
ML20237E335	List: IR 05000346/1987026 ML20237E334
References
50-346-87-26, IEIN-87-004, IEIN-87-008, IEIN-87-010, IEIN-87-012, IEIN-87-10, IEIN-87-12, IEIN-87-4, IEIN-87-8, NUDOCS 8712280283
Download: ML20237E347 (15)

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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION III

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Report No. 50-346/87026(DRP)

Docket No. 50-346 Operating License No. NPF-3 Licensee: Toledo Edison Company Edison Plaza 300 Madison Avenue Toledo, OH 43652 Facility Name: Davis-Besse 1 Inspection At: Oak Harbor, Ohio Inspection Conducted: October.1 through November 15, 1987 Inspectors: Paul M. Byron Don C o1 Approved By: N e, Chie /

eacto- rojectsSectio 2B Date /

Inspection Summary Inspection on October 1 through November 15, 1987 (Report No. 50-346/87026(DRP))

Areas Inspected: Routine, unannounced inspection by resident inspectors of Ticensee action on previous inspection findings: operational safety; maintenance; surveillance; emergency preparedness; IE Information Notices; cold weather. preparations; quality assurance; and securit Results: No violations or deviations were identifie ,

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DETAILS Persons Contacted ' Toledo Edison Company (TED) I D. Shelton, Vice President, Nuclear

1. • L. Storz, Plant Manager

1. • N. Bonner, Assistant Plant Manager, Maintenance 1

• R. Flood, Assistant Plant Manager, Operations

1. E. Salowitz, General Superintendent Outage and Program Management L. Ramsett, Quality Assurance Director i.

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S. Jain, Independent Safety Engineering Director i D. Briden, Chemistry Program Manager G. Grime, Industrial Security Director

• Beyer, Nuclear Projects Director M. Stewart, Nuclear Training Director

1. M. Schefers, Information Management Director T. Myers, Nuclear Licensing Director J. Scott-Wasilk, Nuclear Health and Safety Director P. Hildebrandt, Engineering General Director J. Wood, Systems Engineering Director G. Gibbs, Performance Engineering Director V. Watson, Design Engineering Director  !

J Wilczynski,istry R. Scott, Chem SuperintendentConfiguration Management Program

1. • G. Honma, Compliance Supervisor

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R. Schrauder, Nuclear Licensing Manager i

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1. • D. Haiman, Engineering General Manager-D. Erickson, Radiological Control' Superintendent R. Donnellon, Mechanical Superintendent R. Butler, I&C Superintendent i T. Haberland, Electrical Superintendent- l

• C. Daft, Technical Planning Superintendent  !

• D. Lightfoot, Outage and Program Management Superintendent L. Young, Licensing, Fire Protection J. Moyers, Quality Verification Manager S. Zunk, Nuclear Group Ombudsman

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1. • D. Harris, Manager Quality Systems  !

J. Sturdavant, Licensing Principal l K. Updike, Metrology Laboratory Manager j G. Skeel, Nuclear Security Operations Manager  !

L. Wade, Quality Control Supervisor i U.S. NRC

1. • P. Byron, Senior Resident Inspector  !

• D. Kosloff, Resident Inspector

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• Denotes those personnel attending the October 30, 1987, exit l meeting.

1. Denotes those personnel attending the November 17, 1987, exit meetin . Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings (92701) (Closed) Vinlation (346/85030-01A (DRP)): Inadequate design control measures to verify or check design specifications established in 1983 for the setting of Limitorque motor-operated valve torque switch bypass settings. This item is closed, see Violation  !

(346/85030-02A (DRP)) below for a description of inspection i activitie (Closed) Violation (346/85030-02A (DRP)): Auxiliary Feedwater System preoperational test failed to assure that valves AF599 and AF608 would satisfactory perform under potential service conditions and a surveillance. test failed to identify improperly set torque switch bypasses for valves AF599, AF608, and M510 The licensee combined its response to these two violations. The licensee tested all of its motor operated valves (MOV's) using equipment and techniques developed by MOVATS, In Adjustments were made to the valves based on the results of the M0 VATS testin The licensee also sample tested M0V's with full differential pressure across the valve. Maintenance Procedures MP1411.04, .05, and .07 which are the Limitorque operator maintenance and repair procedures, were revised to include improved maintenance instructions. Formal training programs were instituted for maintenance, testing and operations personnel. The MOVATS Program also has been documented in numerous NRC inspection reports. In addition, the inspectors verified the licensee's corrective action. These items are close (Closed) Violation (346/85030-01B (DRP)): Design control measures had failed to reveal design deficiencies associated with the crossover main steam piping associated with the auxiliary feedwater (AFW) syste The crossover steam supply piping was susceptible to the formation of condensation in a quantity that would adversely affect the AFW turbine The licensee's investigation revealed that a water slug caused the overspeed trip of the AFW turbines. The licensee's corrective action was to add air-operated steam admission valves near the turbines allowing the crossover supply lines to remain hot, thus reducing the potential for excessive condensation. The Woodwar governor for AFW turbine No. I was changed from a Model PG-PL to Model PGG for increased reliability. Steam traps were added to the steam supply piping. The inspectors have verified that these changes were made. The inspectors have also witnessed surveillance tests for AFW operability. This item is close _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ - -

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. (Closed) Violation (346/85030-02B.1 (DRP)): Steps 7.3.1 and 7. of Maintenance Procedure 1410.32, " Removal and Repair of Limitorque Valve Controls," Revision 2, dated June 4, 1982, were not appropriate to the circumstances in that the instructions for setting the torque bypass switch were inadequate. The licensee issued Revision 8 to MP 1410.32, " Testing of Motor Operated Valves-Using MOVATS," on November 21, 198 Revision 8 was a complete rewrite and includes instructions on setting the torque bypass switch utilizing data obtained from MOVATS testing. .This item is close e. .(Closed) Violation (346/85030-02B.2 (DRP)): A 15 amp control power fuse was used for valve MS 106 rather than the 10 amp fuse required by Drawing E46B, sheets 54A and 54B, Revision 3. This violation was closed in Inspection Report 50-346/87008. However, it was inadvertently listed as Violation 346/85030.II. (Closed) Violation (346/85030-028.3 (DRP)): Administrative Procedure AD1844.00, " Maintenance," Revision 13, dated November 28,

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1984, Section 5.3.1, " Skill of the Craft," requires that activities such as the installation of locknuts to be performed with the " Skill of the Craft". However, trouble shooting performed by the licensee revealed that the spring pack locknut on valve'AF599 was installed backwards and with excessive torque which compressed the spring pack assembl The locknut on valve M5106 was not installed flush

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with the spring pack of the torque switch causing the valve to go closed with a torque less then specified by design. The licensee j initiated a " Maintenance Improvement Program," which included '

continuous training, INP0 accreditation, a training foreman for.each shop, and AD 1844.00 was upgraded. The licensee has better defined work instructions ano there is additional quality control surveillance. This item is close (Closed) Violation (346/85030-02C (DRP)): Active valves were identified as passive and were not tested as required by Section XI of the ASME code. The licensee failed to exercise valves AF599 and AF608 as required by the code. The classification error had been :

previously identified but not incorporated into the Inservice i Testing (IST) Progra The licensee reviewed its IST Program and the identified errors and inconsistencies have been corrected with -l the issuance of Drawing Number 12501-M-651, Revision 1, "ISI Program !

Section 1" and Drawing Number 12501-M-652, Revision 1, "ISI Program !

Section 2". This was accomplished under Facility Change: Request N i

.86-032 This item is close , (Closed) Violation (346/85030-02D (DRP)): . Failure to determine cause of conditions adverse to quality and inadequate corrective action to preclude repetition. This violation included four examples, listed belo i

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(1) Valve AF599 failed to open from the control room on March 3, 1984, during plant recovery from a reactor trip. The licensee's corrective action did not. identify the improper torque switch and torque switch bypass switch setting Determination of the cause of the failure and adequate corrective action could have prevented the failure of the valves AF599 and AF608 to open on June 9, 198 The licensee enhanced its Motor Operated Valve (MOV) Program by testing all safety related MOV's using MOVATS test equipmen A formal training program was instituted for personnel .i performing maintenance on Limitorque valve operations and personnel operating and analyzing data from M0 VATS test equipmen The licensee's actions in this area have been documented in several inspection reports. In addition, the j licensee initiated root'cause analysis training which the

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inspectors attended. This item is close ,

(2) Source Range Monitor NI-2 failed to indicate proper neutron "

level on March 25 and April 13, 1985, and inadequate corrective action was taken to prevent recurrenc (3) Spiking and erroneous count rates were experienced from January 1 through June 9,1985, on Source Range Monitor NI- Five maintenance work orders were initiated to correct these problems. The technical specification surveillance test was performed and the system declared operable in each case, but inadequate corrective action was taken to prevent recurrenc The licensee replaced the Amphenol penetrations with Conax penetrations utilizing MWO's 2-85-0184-01 and 2-85-0184-0 Cable and blue ribbon connectors and seal and plate gaskets were replaced. This' work was performed under MW0's ,

1-85-2890-00 and 1-85-3289-00. Procedures were issued or '

revised to include installation of the connectors, penetrations and Raychem insulation. This area was addressed in NUREG 1177 ;

Section 3.2.1.8, " Source Range Nuclear Instruments" and found i to be acceptable. All work has been performed and there have I been no recurrences since restart. These items are close )

(4) Steam and Feedwater Line Rupture Control System (SFRCS) half '

l channel actuation trips were received on April 24, 1985, and June 2, 1985. The cause of these conditions. adverse to quality i had not been determined resulting in inadequate corrective !

actio The licensee took several actions to eliminate spurious SFRCS !

trips. Facility Change Request (FCR) No.85-161 was issued to !

adjust the time constants for the steam generator water level- l signals. The work was performed under MW0's 2-85-0161-01 ;

through 04. FCR 84-102 was issued to provide SFRCS cabinet- j

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cooling and the work was performed under MW0's 2-84-0102-01 through 06. The licensee also issued FCR 85-0103 to change out the standard 10 HZ low pass filters to 0.4 Hz filters to dampen the reactor coolant flow signal. In addition the licensee revised ST's 5031.14, .23, .24 and .25 which provide input signals to the SFRCS. The licensee has completed this action and the inspectors have verified these actions. This item is close (0 pen) Violation (346/85030-02E (DRP)): The single failure of an auxiliary feedwater (AFW) containment isolation valve to reopen -

in response to an SFRCS actuation signal following a main steam line break accident which initially depressurizes both steam generators below the SFRCS setpoint would prevent either AFW train from feeding the unaffected steam generator. The licensee denied the violation on the basis that it provided a detailed analysis in Appendix IV.C 3.3 of the Course of Action which demonstrates it met the single failure criteria for SFRCS and the AFW Syste The Safety Evaluation Report, NUREG 1177, dated June 1986, page 3-42, states that the licensee had committed to submitting a technical-specification change to require the turbine stop valves closing l

times not exceed one second. The licensee submitted its request fo this technical specification amendment on March 23, 1987'(serial 1354).

The Appendix to the " Order Imposing Civil Penalties", dated February 12, 1987, denies the licensee's assertion that the violation did not occur because the licensee did not provide an adequate basis for denial of the violation. This violation will remain open pendin issuance of the technical specification amendment and resolution of the Order s comment regarding an adequate basi (Closed) Violation (346/85030-02F(DRP)): Training provided to the auxiliary operators on resetting the auxiliary feedwater pump turbine (AFPT) overspeed trip mechanism (OTM) was not adequate in that the operators had not been trained to reset the overspeed trip device under operating conditions. The licensee took numerous corrective actions involving the AFPT Trip Throttle (T&T) valves and l the OT These actions included improved. classroom training, hands-on training of all. operators in properly resetting of OTM and T&T valve reset under actual operating conditions, improved operating procedures,. addition of a GAITRONICS communications unit at each AFPT, local simplified operating instructions, local position indication for T&T valves, and color coded T&T valve latch l

L up lever, trip hook, connecting rod and manual trip lever. The inspectors observed the hands on training prior to restart and also verified that the physical work was complete. The licensee'has completed 54 of the 57 specific action items for this item. The .-

inspectors have verified'and/or observed many of the completed actions. This item is close _ _ _ _ _

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k. (Closed) Violation (346/85030-03(DRP)): This violation included three parts; A., B.1., and B.2., which are described belo One of the two AFW flow rate instruments, FI 4521, was improperly wired and, as a result, was inoperable from April 1 to June 2, 1985. The unit was in a mode requiring the instruments to be operable from April 13 to June 2, 1985, which resulted in exceeding a Limiting Condition for Operatio B.1 On March 26, 1985, an I&C technician removed FI 4521 from the control room to repair the indicator and did not tag the-disconnected electrical lead as required by Administrative Procedure AD 1823.00, " Jumper and Lifted Wire Control Procedure". As a result, FI 4521 was incorrectly reinstalle !

B.2 MWO-1-85-1149-01 was inadequate in that post maintenance l testing performed on April 1, 1985, did not detect that FI 4521 was not receiving the required signal from the AFW flow rate transmitte The licensee's corrective action for this violation was to issue a new procedure, AD 1844.02, " Control of Work (MW0)". This procedure was issued to clarify' and expand the procedural requirements for the control of MWO's which had been previously controlled by AD 1844.00,

" Conduct of Maintenance". The licensee also rewrote Administrative Procedure, AD 1844.11, " Post-Maintenance Testing Requirements," to strengthen the control of post-maintenance testin The inspectors reviewed AD 1844.02, Revision 2, dated August 8, 1986 and AD i

1844.11, Revision 2, dated June 5, 1987. The revised crocedures I

improve the control of MWO's and post-maintenance testing. These

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items are close . (Closed) Violation (346/85030-04A(DRP)): This violation included three parts, which are described belo (1) Twelve pipe supports installed on the AFPT steam supply system l were not installed in conformance with design drawings though l

inspections were performed in 1980 in accordance with Procedure PDP- In addition, these inspections discovered that the Quality Control Program in place as early as 1976 during plant construction did not provide verification of pipe su) port location, configuration, and orientation to assure tie installation was in accordance with desig (2) The licensee used controlled sketches to document damaged Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Turbine (AFPT) Steam Supply hangers rather than nonconformance reports as require (3) Individual and collective assessment of hanger failures by the licensee was inadequate to assure evaluation of the root causes I of the problems and to ensure that systems were operable when substantial defects were identified in the AFPT Steam Supply pipe hangers.

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The licensee walked down and inspected all Seismic Category I Piping Systems. Resulting nonconformance reports (NCR's) are in the process of being evaluated and corrective action taken. Region III issued Confirmatory Action Letter (CAL) 85-13 dated October 17, 1985, which documented the corrective action to be taken by the licensee. The licensee's efforts have been documented in Inspection Reports 50-346/85033, 50-346/85035, 50-346/86004, 50-346/86019, 50-346/86033 and 50-346/87010. Inspection Report 50-346/86019 closed out those items of the CAL required to be completed prior to l restart. This violation is closed and the remaining CAL items will be tracked by the CA (Closed) Violation (346/85030-04B (DRP)): The total extent of i degradation of piping suspension systems installed on the AFPT Steam i

Supply piping and on the AFP discharge piping that resulted in a

! condition that was outside the design basis of the plant and was not reported to the NRC within 30 days from the time it was known to the license The licensee revised procedure NFEP-060, " Processing Nonconformance Reports, Supplier Deviation Reports, and supplier Deviation Disposition Requests", to require reporting to the NRC (pursuant to 10 CFR 50.73) for those piping systems which are determined to be inoperable as well as those which are determined to be within interim allowable operability guidelines. Region III review of this revision is documented in Inspection Report 50/346/8503 The licensee also instituted a single method for documenting deficiencies known as the Potential Condition Adverse to Quality (PCAQ) Repor This method is governed by Procedure NG-QA-702,

" Potential Condition Adverse to Quality Reporting". PCAQ's are ,

reviewed, root cause determined, corrective action listed and '

adverse conditions trended. The inspectors have reviewed the PCAQ program and find it to be effectiv This violation is close !

No violations or deviations were identified in this are l I

3. Operational Safety Verification (71707)

The inspectors observed control room operations, reviewed applicable logs and conducted discussions with control room operators during the months j of October and Novembe The inspectors verified the operability of selected emergency systems, reviewed tagout records and verified proper return to service of affected component Tours of the auxiliary, turbine, water treatment and service water l' buildings were conducted to observe plant equipment conditions, including j potential fire hazards, fluid leaks, and excessive vibrations and to ;

l verify that maintenance requests had been initiated for equipment in need

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of maintenance. The inspectors by observation and direct interview verified that the physical security plan was being implemented in accordance with the station security pla _- -

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The inspectors observed plant housekeeping and cleanliness conditions and verified implementation of radiation protection controls. During the months of October and November, the inspectors walked down the accessible portions of the Auxiliary Feedwater, Main Feedwater, Reactor Protection Anticipatory Reactor Trip, Service Water, Emergency Diesel Generator, Essential 120 Volt AC, Essential 4160 Volt AC, Essential 480 Volt AC, Essential 125 Volt DC, Component Cooling Water and Control Room Emergency Ventilation Systems to verify operabilit The inspectors reviewed licensee reports prepared in accordance with the licensee's Potential Condition Adverse to Quality (PCAQ) reporting sy ste These reviews and observations were conducted to verify that facility operations were in conformance with the requirements established under technical specifications, 10 CFR, and administrative procedure While reviewing licensee PCAQ reports the inspectors identified the following items that will require followup inspection:

• In 1987 there have been three reports of missed fire watche Each case appeared to of minor safety significance. This is an Unresolved Item (346/87026-01(DRP)) pending completion of the inspectors' review of this repetitive proble *

PCAQ report 87-494 documented a length of class 1E conduit that was improperly supported, improperly identified and located on the wrong (turbine building) side of the wall between the turbine building and the auxiliary building. The cable in the conduit provides signals to the Reactor Protection Syste The inspectors reviewed the safety evaluation (SE) prepared by the licensee to justify continued operation with the conduit in the existing location. The inspectors informed the licensee that the SE did not address potential damage due to internally generated missiles. The licensee revised the SE and the inspectors reviewed the revised SE. The information in the revised SE evaluation appears to justify continued operation. The licensee will determine if other class IE conduits are incorrectly locate This is an Unresolved Item (346/87026-02(DRP)) pending the inspectors' review of the licensee's corrective actions and analyse * PCAQ report 87-530 identified a failure to follow the overtime i requirements of Technical Specification 6.2.3. This is an Unresolved Item (346/87026-03(DRP)) pending the inspectors' review of the licensee's corrective action and corrective actions for previous violations of this requiremen ___ _ _ - _ _ _ _ ..

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PCAQ report 87-572 documented a missing U-bolt on a seismic support for the motor operator for valve CV 5010D. CV 5010D is a containment isolation valve on a one inch containment atmosphere sampling line. This is an Unresolved Item (346/87026-04(DRP))

pending the inspectors' review of the licensee's evaluation of this conditio *

PCAQ report 87-574 identified an apparent failure to perform a Technical Specification (TS) surveillance test (ST) of the containment hydrogen monitors on a " staggered test basis" as required by the TS. The inspectors verified that the hydrogen monitors were operable, however the licensee's historical evaluation of this practice and the licensee's review of other ST's was not yet complete. Also, there is potential conflict between the TS 1.21 definition of " staggered test basis" and the TS 4.0.2 allowances for extensions of surveillance intervals. The inspectors requested that the Licensing Project Manager inform them of how these two TS requirements relate to one another. This information is necessary for the inspectors to evaluate the licensee corrective action This is an Unresolved Item (346/87026-05(DRP)) pending completion the the licensee's evaluation and the inspectors' review of that evaluatio * PCAQ reports87-581 and 87-584 identified fourteen snubbers that had not been tested. The licensee later determined that one snubber, located inside containment, had been tested independently from Technical Specification (TS) Surveillance Requirements. Although the fourteen snubbers do not support safety-related piping, the licensee determined that the snubbers must be tested in accordance with TS Surveillance Requirement 4.7.7. TS 4.7.7 requires that all safety related snubbers be tested and the Basis for TS 3/4. states that some nonsafety related snubbers must also be teste Prior to the issuance of Amendment No. 94 to facility Operating License No. NPF-3 on April 24, 1986, TS 3/4.7.7 included a list of snubbers requiring testing. The fourteen snubbers identified in the PCAQ reports were not in the list. The inspectors reviewed the licensee's remedial actions and walked down the thirteen locations outside containment where untested snubb"s had been replaced with tested snubbers. Discussions with the licensee revealed that the thirteen untested snubbers had been successfully tested after they were removed. This is an Unresolved Item (346/87026-06(DRP) pending a review of the licensee's corrective actions by Region III inspector No violations or deviations were identified in this are L____-_-_-___-___-_________-_-_______ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

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. Monthly Maintenance Observation (62703)

Station maintenance activities of safety related systems and components listed below were observed / reviewed to ascertain that they were conducted in accordance with approved procedures, regulatory guides and industry codes or standards and in conformance with technical specification The following items were considered during this review: the limiting conditions for operation were met while components or systems were removed from service; approvals were obtained prior to initiating the work; activities were accomplished using approved procedures and were inspected as applicable; functional testing and/or calibrations were performed prior to returning components or systems to service; quality control records were maintained; activities were accomplished by qualified personnel; parts and materials used were properly. certified; radiological controls were implemented; and, fire prevention controls l

were implemented.

I Workrequestswerereviewedtodeterminestatusofoutstandingjobsand to assure that priority is assigned to safety related equipment maintenance which may affect system performanc The following maintenance activities were observed / reviewed:

• Modification of Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Turbine governor valv * Emergency Diesel Generator Maintenance Outag *

Circuit card replacement and calibration in the Control Room Emergency Ventilation System Radiation Detector.

• Installation of Temporary Security Barrie Following completion of maintenance on the Emergency Diesel Generator and I the Auxiliary Feedwater System, the inspectors verified that these systems had been returned to service. properl No violations or deviations were identified in this are . Monthly Surveillance Observation (61726)

The inspectors observed technical specifications required surveillance testing on the Anticipatory Reactor Trip System (ARTS), DB-MI-3001.05,

" Channel Functional Test of PSL-4534A, Main Feed Pump 2 Turbine Hydraulic'.

Oil Trip, ARTS Channel 1" and the Steam and Feedwater Line Rupture Control System (SFRCS), ST 5031.24.02, "SFRCS Steam Generator Level'

Inputs Monthly" and verified that testing was performed in accordance-with adequate procedures,.that test instrumentation was calibrated, that i limiting conditions for operation were met, that removal and restoration l, of the affected components were accomplished, that test results conformed with technical specifications and procedure requirements and were-reviewed by personnel other than the individual directing the test, and that any deficiencies identified during.the testing were properly reviewed and resolved by appropriate management personne '

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The inspectors also witnessed portions of the following test activities:

• ST 5030.12 Channel Functional Test of Reactor Trip M<riule

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• Si 5030.20 Reactor Trip Breaker Response Time Test

• ST.5042.02 RCS (Reactor Coolant System) Water Inventory Balance '[ ?

No violations or deviations were identified in this are s 6. IE Information Notice Followup (92701) t

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The inspectors periodically reviewed the licensee'D I ritsi i b mmitment a ..

Tracking System and Station Review Board minutes to i sSre  !

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licenseehasaprograminplacereviewandevaluateNRCIEIformation Notices (IEN). /

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Each of the following IEN's was reviewed by the reside t' inspectors toi N

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verify that: 1) the information notice was received, licensee management, 2) a review for applicability was performed, av.d 3) if the information notice was applicable to the facility, applicable actions i were teken or were scheduled to be taken.

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No. 87-04: Diesel generator fails test becayse of degraded fuel. The inspectors verified that the licensee has a program to periodically test fuel. The inspectors found that fuel analysis by the licensee disclosed

! an impurity in the fuel. The licensee not prevent proper operation of the Eni, determined ergency that the impurity Diesel Generator The would licensee has modified the fuel. storage system and constructed a portab h filtration unit which will allow the' fuel to be filtered, independent.of s

L 3 3 the permanently installed fuel line filtkrs, whevvr any impurities are D found in the fue The fuel has not yet'been filt'er'ed with the new '

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No. 87-08: DegradedmotorleadsinLimitorquel mot.or operators. The licensee determined that the IEN was not app 7.' gaol A to Davis-Besse because the three DC Limitorque motois at theylant were tianufactured before 198 s p

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No. 87-10: Potential for water hammer during restart of.residt.al heat removal pump::. Although this IEN was addressed on,1y tg fiWR Ucensee's, the licensee 4 engineering department evaluated the High Pressure Injection,Dece hammer and the'y Heat Removal, Mcensee's and Containment Independent Safety Engineering Spray Systems for water Group reviewed the enginefrien Vepartment's evaluation. No detrimental effects were identifie ~

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, Vi No. 87-12: Potential problems with metal clad circuit breakers,' neral. :%Jd Electric Type AKF-2-25. The. licensee determined Vat Davis-Beste oes~ 4=  ;

not use Type AKF-2-25 breakers. The licensee (' W red that,it d a uset, Lf

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Type AK breakers and that the maintenance depar Ne.d uti7izes thef 7 appropriate recommendations in GE Service'Inforrhtion Letter Numbel 44 ]; ..

No violations or deviations were identified in this,are 'N ,,

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. Emergency Preparedness (82701)

On October 22, 1987, the licensee held an t.nannounced emergency drill .

during the off hours. The licensee had previously reviewed its qua'rterly emergency drill schedule with the inspectots. During this review the inspectors stated that an unannounced backshift drill might identify a weaknesses that would require corrective action. They discussed the advantages of holding an unannounced drill. Weaknesses would be identified very quickly and corrective action initiated in a timely manne During the drill the licensee identified several weaknesses incicding ,

notification response and staffing. The drill was temporarily terminated so that two drill participants could respond to ao apparent heart attack of a contractor. The drill resumed after the vk. Lim was taken to the hospital by ambulance. The licensee deterra',ned that it had gained a great deal of information from the drill and plans to have additional -

unauounced drill No violations or deviations were identified in this are . Quality Assurance (35741)

The inspectors reviewed Procedure NG-AV-1E , " Preparation & Control of Nuclear Group Division & Department Procedures", while evaluating PCAQ 87-322. Section 5.3.1 of NG-AV-115 states the QA Director shall be responsibleforreviewingandapprovingDivision/Departmentandstation procedures as identified in the Test and Procedures Index (TPI). The TPI lists if the applicable procedure is safety related and if it requires Station Review Board (SRB) and QA Director s approval; 'The TPI is not controlled. The inspectors' evaluation revealed that the TPI was a Quality document. The inspectors brought their concern to QA and asked if it came to the same conclusion. QA concluded that the TPI is a Quality documen M: :: an Unresolved Item (346/87020-07(DRP)),

pending completion at it; licensee's revie The TPI is a computer based document and since it is not controlled '

i there were no retention requirements plned on it. The inspectors  !

have had several discussions with the licensee-regarding retention '

and retrievability of electronically stered dacuments. The licensee is in the process of increasing the amount of data which is electronically stored such as computer assisted drawings (CAD) and the configuration management progra The licensee, as a result of tbne discussions, is going to review its program for electronic data storage in light of the retention and retrievatility re 45.2.9-197 This it an Open Item (346/87026-08(DRP)quirements U This issue is ofnot ANSI site tpecific. The inspectors believe that this problem should be addrersed and is a' result of the standards not being upgraded to accommodate technological advance No violations or deviations were identified in this are "

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- e Cold Weather Preparations (71714)

The inspectors verified that the licensee has inspected systems susceptible to freezing to ensure that appropriate heating systems are available and ready for service. The inspectors verified that the modified space heating system in the Emergency Diesel Generator Rooms is heating the room No violations or deviations were identified in this are . Securig (81074)

The ir.coectors have observed a number of apparently empty or very lightly baden vehicles entering the protected area. The inspectors believe that increased vehicular traffic entering and exiting the protected area increases the probability that the licensee may reduce the quality of its inspections. The inspectors have discussed their concern with Region III and the F censee. The licensee is reviewing its vehicular program and studying impr:ned ways of moving small packages in and out of the protectet are This is an Open Item (346/86026-09(DRP)).

No violations or deviations were identified in this are . Onsite Followup of Events (62702 and 93702)

During the inspection period, the licensee experienced several events, some of which required prompt notification of the NRC pursuant to

'10 CFR 50. 72. The inspectors pursued the events onsite with licensee and/or other NRC officials. In each case, the inspectors verified that the notification was correct ard timely, if appropriate, that the licensee was taking prompt and appropriate actions, that activities were conducted within regulatory requirements and that corrective actions would prevent future recurrence. The specific events are as follows:

+ Loss of Essentfa! Instrument AC Bus Y l

Partial Loss of Electric Power to the Main Turbine Electrohydraulic Control (EHC) System.

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l No violations or deviations were identified in this are i

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12'. ' Mana,gement Meeting j On November 13, 1987, licensee management met with NRC management and their respective staffs to discuss the scope of work proposed for the fifth refueling outape. The licensee has increased the duration of the outage to 26 weeks because of the amount of work to be performe lurbine generator and SFRCS modifications are the critical path tasks which govern the outage duration. The outage is scheduled to start on February 15, 198 _____ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ - -

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The licensee also discussed its prioritization of work committed to in the Course of Action (C0A). Confirmatory Action Letter (CAL)

R-III-87-018 (AIT) required the licensee to review its C0A prioritization based on operating experience gained since restar . Team Inspections Three supplemental team inspections were performed during the inspection perio An Operational Safety Team Inspection (OSTI) was performed from September 28 through October 9, 1987. The team was made up of people from NRR and various Regions. The purpose of the inspection was to observe operations and the operator-management interface. 1he results of this inspection will be documented in Inspection Report 50-346/8702 A special inspection was performed on October 6 and 7, 1987, by NRR to review the operation and reliability of the auxiliary feedwater pump turbine The results of this inspection will be documented in Inspection Report 50-346/87031 (DRP).

A special maintenance inspection was performed on November 2 through 6, 1987, by Region III to make a determination of the material condition of the plant. The results of this inspection will be documented in Inspection Report 50-346/87030 (DRS).

1 Unresolved Items Unresolved items are matters about which more information is required in order to ascertain whether they are acceptable items, items of noncompliance, or deviations. An unresolved item disclosed during the inspection is discussed in Paragraph 3 and . Open Items Open items are matters which have been discussed with the licensee, which i will be reviewed further by the inspectors, and which involve some action on the part of NRC or licensee or both. Open items disclosed during the inspection are discussed in Paragraph 8 and 1 . Exit Interview (30703)

The inspectors met with licensee representatives (denoted in Paragraph 1)

throughout the month and at the conclusion of the inspection and summarized the scope and findings of the inspection activities. The licensee acknowledged the findings. After discussions with the licensee, the inspectors have determined there is no proprietary data contained in this inspection repor _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _