IR 05000346/1987016

Insp Rept 50-346/87-16 on 870706-10.No Violations,Deviations or Deficiencies Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Emergency Preparedness Program,Including Activations of Emergency Plan,Changes to Program & Shift Staffing & Augmentation

ML20236H742
Person / Time
Site:	Davis Besse
Issue date:	07/30/1987
From:	Patterson J, Ploski T, Snell W NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III)
To:
Shared Package
ML20236H685	List: IR 05000346/1987016 ML20236H682
References
50-346-87-16, NUDOCS 8708050318
Download: ML20236H742 (16)

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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

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REGION III

Report No. 50-346/87016(DRSS)

Docket No. 50-346 License No. NPF-3 Licensee: Toledo Edison Company Edison Plaza 300 Madison Avenue Toledo, OH 43652 Facility Name: Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1 Inspection At: Davis-Besse Site, Oak Harbor, Ohio Inspection Conducted: July 6-10, 1987

Inspectors: Thomas Ploski 7/bo,b7 vate frnseo h

@ James Patterson f# 7 Date w $ 's Approved B William Snell, Chief ho/F7 fEmergencyPreparednessSection Date

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Inspection Summary Inspection on July 6-10,1987(ReportNo. 50-346/87016(DR$$))

Areas inspected: Routine, unannounced inspection at the tollowing areas of the licensee's emergency preparedness program: activations of the emergency plan; operational status of the emergency preparedness program; emergency detection of classification; notifications and communications; changes to the rogram; shift staffing and augmentation; knowledge and performance of duties p(training); licensee audits; and status of offsite emergency planning item The inspection involved two NRC inspectors Results: No violations, deficiencies, or deviations were identifie i

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l 870B050318 B70730 PDR ADOCK 05000346 G PDR

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DETAILS Persons Contacted

• Shelton, Vice President Nuclear

• J. Scott-Wasilk, Nuclear Health and Safety Director

• S. Smith, Assistant Plant Manager, Maintenance

• L Ramsett, Quality Assurance Director

• B. Cope, Onsite Emergency Planning Supervisor

• J. Wood Sys

• M.Schefers,temsEngineeringDirectorInformation' Management Director

• J. Syrowski, Acting Training Director

• C. Malley Industrial Safety and Hygiene

• D. Hughes,, ManagerActing6perationsTrainingManager

• S. Goldstein, Systems and Procedures Manager 1

• C, Bramson Nuclear Records Mana j

• G.Homma,domplianceSupervisor,gerLicensing

• S. Hook, Associate Nuclear Technologist l

• J. Lietzow Licensing Principal

/W. Comings,, Emergency Medical Coordinator

• R. 2hrauder, Nuclear Licensing Manager

• J. Sturdavat, Licensing Staff T. Myers, Nuclear Licensing Director

, B. Geddes, Senior Quality Assurance Auditor D. Gordon, Nuclear Technologist M. Findla Nuclear Specialist M. Teal, NyIiclear Specialist D. Wallace G. Anderson,, Senior NuclearLeadNuclearProectsManaker echnical ssistant b

• Indicates those who attended the July 10, 1987 exit intervie . Emergency Plan Activations BasedonreviewsofLicenseeEventReports(LERs)andotherdocumentation, !

the licensee has had no abnormal situations since the last inspection (April 1987) which would have required an emergency plan activatio Bued on the above findings, this portion of the licensee's program is acceptabl . Operational Status of the Emergency Preparedness Program (82701) l EmergencyPlanandImplementingProcedures(also82204)  !

The currently a) proved revision to the Station's Emergency Plan is i Revision 10. T1e Emergency Planning (EP) staff was preparing

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aroposed Revision 11, and was e'xpected to submit it to the Station ,

Review Board in August 198 ;

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The EP . staff has completed its program to substantially revise the overall organization, the Station's' Emergency Planinternal formatting,Procecures (EPIPs).and Implementing The cuality current EPIPs have been divided into three volumes. Volume A containedtheEmergency'ActionLevels(EALs)andtheprocedures summarizing the Station s responses for each of the four emergency-classe Volume B contained procedural guidance on specific i

emergency Facility ERF)(organization activation andpositions; operation individual offsite dose Emergency assessment;Response  !

protective accountability andaction reccomendation evacuation; search and rescue;formula; tion; onsite ass emergency wor .

exposure concerns ; and re-entry / recovery. The third volume, titled

"Off-Normal Occurrence. Procedures," contained procedures addressing the Statica's responses to such natural events as tornadoes and ,

earthquakes, plus such man-made situations as oil spills, toxic gas  !

releases, and onsite medical emergencies. The third volume's procedures and accidents miso addressed involving containment the transport evacuation,ive material. station isolat of radioact The inspector reviewed the Document Control staff's distribution-records of changes to the )lan and EPIPs. -A sample of records were examined to determine whetier such revisions had been properly sent to the NRC within 30 days of final internal approval. No discrepancies were identified in the distribution records that were examine Based Wn the above findings, this portion of the licensee's program is ac;eptabl EmergencyFacilities,(also82204)

l The inspectors toured the licensee's Emergency Response Facilities n

(ERFs)tiesappearedadequatelymaintainedandreadyforuse.,

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The which we 1 '

TheRadio1ngicalTestingLaboratory(RTL),locatedoutsidethe

)rotected areaasinathe las been u:cd Davis-Besse staging Administration area for th'e Buildingk licensee's offsi (DBAB),

e survey teams and f 6f teams which would survey the Technical Su) port Center (licensee'sE0:)whichare

<(TSC) and Emergency also located Control Center '(ECC)l samples would in the 08M. Environmanta also bl l and prepared for shipment to offsite: analytical laboratories at the )

RTL, Since the last routine inspection, the licensee has initiated several upgrades to the RTL. isniintercom has been installed and made operable to allow communications between RTL staff and offsite ,

dose assessment staff in the ECC. The RTL has also been equipped I with a public address outlet so that RTL staff can listen to status briefing being given in the ECC oriTSO.'

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As recently as the March 1987 exercise, the RTL was minimally equipped with work tables and counter tops upon which RTL staff could perform their gross sample analysis and sample packaging tasks. While the facility was adequately equipped with Health Physics supplies and relevant procedures, such items were kept in l large storage cabinets. Durire this inspection, the licensee was in 1 the latter stages of installing non-porous, stainless steel-topped I tables, and storage cabinets along three walls of the RT Wall-mounted storage shelves and additional electrical outlets were also beir.g installed above the new cabinets. Basically, the RTL was being transformed from being primarily a staging area with minimal other capabilities into a suitably equipped, low-level sample handling and packaging laboratory which would also serve as a staging area for survey team As described in various 1986 and 1987 Inspection Reports, the licensee has transformed the former Central Alarm Station (CAS)

located within the Control Room emergency ventilation system's envelope into a " Satellite TSC" (STSC), which would be the duty station for the Emergency Assistant Plant Manager (EAPM), the Emergency Chemistry and Health Physics Superintendent (ECHPS),

and up to two support staff. The use of the STSC was demonstrated during the 1986 and 1987 exercises. During normal plant operations the STSC was to be utilized as the Assistant Shift Supervisor's office. However, the inspectors understood that it has been utilized as a study area by onshift personnel, as the Assistant Shift supervisors tended to find other deskspace for performing their administrative dutie During the last 18 months, the licensee has done several feasibility studies regarding the construction of an adequately shielded and ventilated TSC within the protected area, in place of the DBAB's TSC that is located roughly 2100 feet from the Control Room and outside the protected area. The goal of having an adequate TSC within the protected area in lieu of the DBAB's TSC has been verbally expressed to Region III staff on various occasions by such senior licensee managers as the Vice President-Nuclear, Assistant Vice President-Nuclear, Plant Manager, Nuclear Health and Safety Director, and the EPM. However, as pointed out by the licensee's Nuclear Licensing Director, the licensee has never made a written commitment to the NRC to construct a new TSC within the protected area. Nevertheless, in view of the ongoing feasibility studies on TSC relocation and the '

expressed desires of some senier licensee management to relocate the j facility, Region III staff has considered the STSC as an interim ERF i pending some final conclusions from the licensee's TSC relocation feasibility studie I

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Based on discussions with the Resident Inspectors, various licensee personnel, and a review of internal licensee correspondence, the inspector concluded that the licensee is about to propose a solution to the TSC relocation issue. The week of August 24, 1987 has been suggested by the inspectors as an appropriate time for-the licensee to 3 resent and discuss the onsite, unshielded Plant Control Center ()CC) as a TSC-type emergency response facilit Based on discussions with various licensee supervisory personnel and a review of internal documentati r the inspectors concluded the following regarding the proposed ccC: Due to budgetary constraints, the licensee has concluded that it is not feasible to construct a TSC within the protected area that would remain habitable in the event of a design basis accident. Such a facility would cost about two to three times as much as the proposed PCC. Internal re-evaluation of preliminary e.1gineering calculations indicated that the weight of an adeguately shielded TSC could not be supported on the Turbine Deck, which was the licensee's preferred onsite location for a shielded TSC. Budgetary constraints eliminated any other shieldedTSClocationswithintheprotectedarea,suchasadjacentto the third floor of the western wall of the Plant Support Facility, from further consideration. Although the unshielded PCC would have to be evacuated under certain radiological conditions and in the event of a main steam line break in its proximity, the licensee perceives several advantages to constructing this facility, including:

acceptable cost; im) roved onsite support ca) ability to the Control and t1e PCC's close proximity Room to than is the Control availa)le Room, STSCfrom the STSC;ional Support Center (OSC)

and Operat when compared to the DBAB,s TS The inspector learned these details about the propos'd PC It would be a pre-fabricated, acoustically shielded structur .1aving about 2000 square feet of floorspace. It would be located on a platform about 15 ieet above the Turbine Desk, and above an existing Battery Roo One benefit of its being elevated would be that there would still be component laydown space beneath it on the Turbine Desk during plant outages. The PCC would have multiple power supplies and the various communications lines and computer terminals as found in the DBAB's TSC. If necessary, the PCC would be equipped with its own area radiation monitor. The PCC would contain a wor (space with TSC-type status boards, a large conference room, a computer terminal workroom, an NRC Site Team office, and a document and records storage are The inspector understood that the DBAB's TSC and ECC would continue to be activated following any Alert or higher class of emergency declaration. Should PCC evacuation be required, the DBAB's TSC and ,

the STSC would remain operable. The licensee indicated that facility evacuation criteria and evacuation destinations for key )

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managers had yet to be finalize It appeared that some individuals maintained that the Emergency Plant Manager and the ECHPS would evacuate with several staff to the STSC in addition to the Emergency AssistantplantManager(EAPM). The licensee was unclear regarding what monitoring and decontamination provisions for PCC evacuees would be established at the CR/STSC entrance. The RTL would be utilized as a contamination control point for PCC staff evacuating to the DBA Based on the above findings, this portion of the licensee's program is acceptable; however, the following items should be considered for improvement (assuming that the PCC concept is acceptable to the NRC):

• The licensee should ensure that adequate personnel have been trained to staff both the TSC and PCC for 24-hour operation of both facilities.

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• The Emergency Plant Manager and Emergency Chemistry and HP Superintendent should relocate to the DBAB's TSC instead of the STSC so that they could better fulfill their emergency duties outside of the congested CR/STSC workspac * Contamination control provisions for PCC evacuees would have to be proceduralized for both the RTL and the CR/STSC.

l * PCC activation, facility operation, plus staff evacuation and relocation should be objectives of t1e first exercise following construction of any PCC facilit c. Emergency Equipment and Supplies (also 82204)

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The inspector examined a sample of four kits of emergency equipmen These were located in the Plant Processing Facility (gatehouse), the Turbine Building, and the Radiation Access Control Area (RACA). The contents of these kits were spot checked versus the equipment lists in Administrative Procedure HS-EP-600. Chemistry and Health Physics l

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(C and HP) staff were responsible for periodically inventorying these 1'

particular supplies. Inventory records were then sent to the Central Records staff. EP staff would have to obtain the inventory checklist from Central Records to assure themselves that the inventories had been adequately completed witnin the required frequenc l Two kits were examined at RAC One was in a cabinet marked

" Decontamination Cabinet." A first aid kit also found in this cabinet did not have an associated inventory checklist readily available so that persons wishing to inventory the first aid supplies would know what the kit should contai The inventory l

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checklist only indicated that a first aid kit was to be located inside this particular cabinet. No other discrepancies or flaws were identified in the examination of the four sets of emergency supplie The ir,spectors determined that the licensee had procured three four-wheel drive vehicles that would be available for use by offsite radiological monitoring teams. The vehicles' equipment included multiple radios and power supplies for air sampling egui) men During normal plant operations, the vehicles were ava11aale for use but were to by the Nuclear remain Health within about 30and Safety minutes Director's driving staff,he time from t Statio Based on thehowever, is acceptable; above findings,following the item should be considered forthis 1mprovement:

• Inventory checklists, which included a first aid kit should also identify the contents of the first aid kit so th,at depleted first aid supplies can be identified and replenishe d. Organization and Management Control (also 82204)

The licensee's entire emergency planning staff has been based at the plant site for a number of years. Until recently, the Emergency Preparedness Manager (EPM) reported to the Vice President - Nuclear through the Nuclear Health and Safety Director and the Assistant Vice President - Nuclear. However, the Assistant Vice President - Nuclear has been removed from this reporting chain due to his assuming new responsibilities with Centerior Corporatio The EPM had managed onsite and offsite emergency planning groups which were led by emergency planning supervisors. In late June 1987, the EPM's staff was reorganized into three groups, with the addition being a technical services supervisor and staff who were responsible for all onsite and offsite facilities and equipment concerns which were previously handled by the onsite and offsite group The individual who had been the EPM accepted a position with an Eastern nuclear utility in early June 1987. An outside candidate accepted the licensee's EPM offer in mid-July, and was expected to begin work in August. The three emergency planning supervisor onsite,offsite)werecurrently positions (technicalservices,fpositionshadalsorecentlybecome filled. Although several staf vacant, the licensee )lanned to add two staff members to each of the three groups managed )y the EP l L_ _ _ ____ .

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As described in previous Inspection Reports,-'the licensee had developed and implemented a compute_ed Emergency Planning Activity Scheduling System (EPASS) as a tracking system for all the '

activities of the EP staf the tracking system had i been . refined so that periodic In early tasks 1987, such as drills, inventories, and l equipment tests would be tracked using a Recurring Activitie :

TractingSystem(RATS),whiletheEPASSwouldbeutilizedtotrack-

.primarily one-time tasks such as actions taken on internal or external audit findings, and drill = critiques. Anothertracking systa refinement has been the elimination of a " points system of ;

'rewaros for completing tasks in relation.to established due dates- !

The licensee had concluded that some personnel.had become overly- :

concerned with maximizing the performance points they could more ;

easily earn, rather than dealing with more. involved assignments-which may have earned less. point The inmectors reviewed current outputs'of the EPASS'and RATS and conclu d that both were'being effectively utilized as tracking systems by the EP staf Periodic summar supplied to management so that.the sstaff'y reports progress were also being could be adequately monitored and problem areas better identifie Based on the above findings, this part'on of the licensee's. program 1s acceptable Training (also82206)

The ins)ector determined that all required emergency preparedness drills lad been conducted and critiqued since the April 1986 routine inspection. The drills were adequately documented. The EPASS had been satisfactorily utilized to track corrective actions on improvement items identified during the critiques,-based on a spot check performed by the inspecto The inspector also reviewed the emergency preparedness training records of 26 randomly selected members of the emergency response organization. Training on the licensee's revised emergency organization had begun in August 1986. Records of eight lersons-required additional clarification and evaluation before tie inspector could evaluate the completeness of-their training versus the matrix of training requirements. The inspector eventually determined that three of these eight persons had completed all but one training course. However, two of the three had participated in practice drills prior to the September 1986 exercise, while the-third individual had participated in an Operational Support Center (OSC) walkthrough and two drills in early 1987. That person was-also scheduled to attend the classroom course on OSC activities during the third calendar quarter of 1987. The-inspectors concluded that, although these three persons had completed all but one of i

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several training courses, they had obtained essentially the same information needed to understand their emergency duties by-participating in 3ractice drills or facility walkthrough training sessions. The su)stitution of drills and walkthroughs for certain classroom training sessions was allowed in the licensee's program for a period following the settlement of a labor dis)ute and

. implementation of a revised EP organization in the tiird quarter of 198 The inspector also determined that the Station's required reading 3rogram included provisions for including EPIP revisions which may 3e approved inbetween annual training session Based on the above findings, this portion of the licensee's program is acceptable, IndependentReviews/ Audits (also82210)

The inspector reviewed records associated with Quality Assurance (QA)Departmentauditsandsurveillancesoftheemergency preparedness program which were conducted since the April 1986 i routine inspection. The inspector also discussed these activities withQADepartmentstaf Departmental guidelines require a minimum of one audit per year which must be adequate to satisfy the requirements of 10CFR50.54(t),plusonesemi-annualsurveillanceoftheprogram which can be planned or unplanne The audited group.is required to provide a written response within 30 days of the audit conclusion on all identified def'iciencies and observations, which are analogous to the NRC's open item and improvement item categorization Approval from the Vice President - Nuclear is required in order to allow an identified deficiency to remain uncorrected beyond 120 day The 1986 audit of the emergency preparedness program was conducted in October 1986. The audit checklist contained approximately 80 items, and required the auditors to evaluate aspects of the emergency plan versus regulatory guidance; review selected EPIPs for adequacy; tour selected ERFs; verify that certain equipment tests and inventories had been performed; examine onsite and offsite support agency training records examine drill records and letters ofagreement;andevaluatethe$Pstaff'suseoftheEPASS. Audit records were complete and readily available. The audit was adequate in scope and depth to satisfy 10 CFR 50.54(t) requirements. The EP staff responded to the four deficiencies and six observations in a timely and non-argumentative manner. Corrective actions were appropriate and were all completed in a timely manner. The 1987

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annual audit was scheduled for late July. Since the audit checklist was still under preparation, it was not reviewed for adequacy by the inspecto Four auditors also evaluated activities associated with the September 1986 exercise. Topics addressed in this mini-audit included: internal scenario review and approval; timeliness of submittals to the NRC; controller training selected exercise participant actions; post-exercise critique;s; .and restoration of facilities, equipment, and supplies to pre-exercise con'dition This audit was adequately documented, with timely corrective action completed on the one observatio The inspector reviewed adequately detailed, complete records of four surveillance of the emergency, preparedness program which were conducted since mid-1986. Topics addressed in these evaluations included: the EP staff's activities in a periodic fire drill; the timeliness of the collection and transport of a reactor coolant sample, with subsequent analyses at a vendor's out-of-state laboratory; and, corrective actions taken on two findings from an INP0 assistance visi As required by 10 CFR 50.54(t), the licensee provided October 1986 audit findings relevant to the adequacy of its interface with State and Country agencies to the ODSA, Ottawa County DSA, and the Lucas County Civil Defense organization. The November 1986 correspondence to these agencies included the entire audit documentation package, and not just those checklist items dealing with offsite agency interfac Based on the above findings, this portion of the licensee's program is acceptabl . EmergencyDetectionandClassification(82201) i Since the April 1986 routine inspection, the licensee has completed a two '

l stage review and reorganization of the Station's EALs. The review adequately addressed five specific NRC concerns that had been tracked as OpenItems(Nos. 346/86007-01 through 05 (DRSS)), as evidenced by the closing of these Items in Inspection Report No. 346/87008(DRP). The EAL revision effort, begun in the Spring of 1986, was intended to reorganize the EALs in a more user friendly manner; to re-evaluate the operating mode applicability of certain EALs; and to improve the cross-referencing of different categories of potentially related EALs (for example, adding a cross-reference to the loss of coolant accident EALs category by the loss of fission product barrier EALs category). The revised and reformatted EALs were approved as Revision 0 to Procedure No. EP-1500, Emergency Classificatio In response to the aforementioned Open Items and some additional internal comments, the EALs were again revised. As had taken l 10

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place earlier in 1986, the EP staff distributed the proposed EALs for internal comment in. November 1986 to Station Operations, Technical Support, Chemistry and Health Physics, and Quality Assurance Departments. By January 1987, all internal comments were resolved and the proposed EAls were submitted for. Station Review Board approva The Plant Manager approved the revised EAls, as Revision 1 to Procedure No. EP-1500, in February 1987.

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Based on the above findings, this portion of the licensee's program is acceptabl .l S. NotificationsandCommunications(82203).

The inspector reviewed records of monthly,, quarterly, and annual communications equipment tests performed since the last routine inspection and determined that all were satisfactorily complete Any identified problems were corrected in a timely manne In response to Open Item No. 346/86007-06(DRSS), the licensee has revised the initial' notification message form to State and County officials with the intent of better describing the circumstances which resulted in an emer;ency plan activation. The initial notification message forms for the Lnusual Event through General Emergency classifications were found in implementing Procedures EP-1600 through 1900, respectivel The forms require the licensee to include an EAL identification number, obtained from the EAL table in Procedure 1500. The EP staff indicated thatbothcounties' Sheriff'sdispatchoffices(wherenotification messages from the Station are received) have been provided with a chart that contains the EAL' numbering scheme and a concise, verbal description of the EAL condition. The aforementioned Open Item was closed in Inspection Report No. 346/87008(DRP).

The licensee has essentially completed its upgrading of the EPZ's prompt notification (siren) syste System upgrades include: improved electronics to make siren activation by unauthorized persons much more difficult; increasing the number of sirens to 54, due to the recent enlargement of the EPZ; improved electronics to allow remote interrogation of selected siren components by County of ficials, or by licensee personnel in the Emergency Control Center; and the ca activate sirens in both counties from either county's Sheriff'pability s offic to Based on the above findings, this portion of the licensee's program is acceptabl l l

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. ShiftStaffingandAugmentation(82205)

The-licensee has continued to meet the minimum shift staffing and augmentation capabilities in accordance with Tabla B-1 of NUREG-0654, Revision 1. During the March 1987 exercise, the evaluation of which was documented in Inspection'Re) ort No. 346/87006(DRSS),thelicensee successfully demonstrated tie capability to promptly activate its emergency response organization through the use of the Com)uterized AutomaticNotificationSystem(CANS),whichhasbeeno)eraalesinceabout September 1986. -The system's features include: the a)ility to identify which personnel have not acknowledged the notification for a given emergency class declaration within a specified time period; and the-ability to automatically initiate notification of alternates to such non-responder In addition to the March 1987 exercise, the inspector determined that-the licenset had conducted off-hours augmentation drills in October 1986, April.1987, and May 1987. The successful, May 1987 drill was conducted as a result of the failures of several personnel to res)ond to the notification call during the previous month's drill. T1e quality of the augmentation drill records has improved since the 1986 routine inspection. The documentation now clearly states whether or not the drill was successful, what problems were identified, and what corrective actions were take Based on the above findings, this portion of the licensee's program is  !

acceptabl . Offsite Emergency Preparedness Issues Development Following the Emergency Evacuation Review Team (EER1) Heport On January 7, 1987, the EERT submitted to the Governor of Ohio its report on offsite emergency response plans for the Perry and Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Stations. Since March 1987, the licensee has been meeting with State and County officials, and representatives from Ohio Edison and the Cleveland Electric Illuminating Com)any, with the goal of reaching agreement on mutually accepta>le courses of action in response to the EERT's findings and recommendation These findings and recommendations have evolved into a list of twelve Resolution Items. The inspector understood that, following a suspension of meetings during much of June, the parties have begun meeting on remaining issues at a planned frequency of once or twice per month. The apparent goal of the Ohio Disaster Services Agency (0DSA) is to have all aarties agree to a course of action on each Resolution item, altlough all items are not equally relevant to each party. As of July 1987,-the majorityofthetwelveitemshavebeenresolved. While the parties 12 i

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are still working on resolving the remaining items, no target date has apparently been set for completing discussions on those item OutstarJing issues include: fundings for the development and implementation of "all hazards emergency plans" for the State, and those counties within at least a 10 mile radius of the nuclear plants; the possible need for bus drivers to sign " oath cards" power of allegiance to the State, so that they all will be legally categorized as emergency workers for liability purposes per the provisions of State law; and the State's intent to. periodically test the promp' public notification systems for the Emergency Planning Zone around each )lant. The licensee also indicated that a ,

subcommittee has Jeen formed to better define the type of computer l link, related software, backup power supplies, and support personnel that would be needed to provide the State with direct information about and interpretation of reactor conditions at the Davis-Besse Statio Based on the above findings, this portion of the licensee's program is acceptabl b. Offsite Support Organization Training Efforts I

The inspector discussed with offsite-emerg'ency planning staff the scope and magnitude of various training efforts in which the licensee had become involved. The inspector also reviewed relevant records. The inspector det.armined that annual training to State and County officials on the Station's emergency classification definitions and EAls had been conducted in late April 198 Copies of the Station's EAls were also made available to the attendees, who represented Ottawa and Lucas Counties the ODSA, the l OhioDepartmentofHealth,andthePublicUtilitiesdommissio !

Annual training to local electronic and print media was offered l within one month prior to the September 1986 and the March 1987 exercises. The training addressed nuclear plant fundamentals, basic rerHation principles, and emergency planning. A Joint Public h Msatior Center (JPIC) orientation training session was offered ia february 1987 to members of the State's and Counties' public i information staff !

During 1986, the licensee assisted State and County officials in the creation of a Lucas County Emergency Plan and prcredures, plus revisions to the State and Ottawa County Emergency Plans and procedures. Since late 1986, the licensee's emergency planning staff, augmented by contractors, has been heavily involved with State and County officials in providing relevant nuclear plant emergency response training to law enforcement personnel; fire fighters; emergency medical services personnel; county emergency operations center staff; school administrators; school bus drivers; ,

and school custodial and food services staffs. The licensee t

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estimated that its staff and several contractors devoted approximately 4000 hours0.0463 days <br />1.111 hours <br />0.00661 weeks <br />0.00152 months <br /> of time in assisting State and County official in lesson plan development and in conducting training for both Ottawa County and Lucas Count Records indicated that the approximate numbers of county workers who received training relevant to their emergency responsibilities were as follows: Ottawa County (875); Lucas County (450); and Erie County (100).

The inspector reviewed' matrices.which indicated that training modules and procedural training was relevant to specific offsite emergencyworkerjobtitles. The inspector also reviewed sample lesson topics: plans utilized nuclear power in theemergency plant training effort that included preparedness these relative to ;

the plant, State, and County; fundamentals of radiatior: '

dosimetry; protective action recommendation alternatives; personal radiation exposure control principles; emergency notification methods to State and local officials and the public; and the roles of the varicus types of county emergency response personne Based on the above findings, this portion of the licensee's program l 1s acceptabl c. Offsite Medical Support Organization Training (also 82206)

The inspector discussed recent training efforts and future training issues with cognizant licensee staff. At present,.the licensee has letters of agreement with three local hospitals to provide care and treatmentforcontaminated/injuredlicensee3ersonnel. Efforts were i underway to add a fourth loca hospital to tais list. The inspector ]

determined that the staff of the primary and secondary hospitals had i received training from the licensee's medical contractor in i October 1986 and March 1987. . Staff of the tertiary hospital had 1 received similar training in mid-1986. Annual training of staff )

from the tertiary hospital and proposed fourth local hospital had been tentatively scheduled for the Fall of 198 The licensee had a current letter of. agreement with one local l ambulanceserviceforthetransportofcontaminated/injuredonsite '

personnel to a local hospital. The licensee's contractor had provided training to that organization, and to two other local ambulance services that routinely serve as backups to that organization, in March 1987. The contractor had also provided training in the first quarter of 1987 to two other local ambulance services outside of Ottawa County The licensee was in the process of determining whether letters of agreement were needed with other than the primary ambulance service, in view of that organization's existing arrangements for mutual support with the aforementioned other local ambulance service _____ _ _ _ _ - - _ - _ _ _ _ __

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In view of the number of local hospitals and ambulance services whichcouldbecomeinvolvedindealingwithacontaminated/ injured onsite individual, the licensee was also determining to what extent the various organizations needed to participate in a periodic medical drill in addition to receiving annual classroom trainin Since the Fall of 1985, all three hospitals have participated in one j medical drill involving the transport of a simulated victim from the

> plant site. The primary ambulance service was utilized in all but one of these drills, the exception being that a backup ambulance service was utilized on one occasio The licensee also indicated that is was re-evaluating its onsite medical procedures in response to the NRC's and other comments received following the March 1987 exercise. Although proposed procedure revisions were not available for ieview, the inspector understood that planned improvements were te address plant security staff interface with the ambulance crew and improved contamination control provisions for the interior of the vehicle. While the Plant Processing Facility andprotectivecloth(gatehouse)wasequippedwithdosimetrysupplies ing articles to be given to arriving ambulance crews, it was uncertain who would be procedurally responsible for zeroing pocket dosimeters or at least recording the devices'

readings, prior to issuance. The licensee a concern in the procedure revision process. greed to consider that The licensea also indicated that several types of first aid training had been given to about 150 em)loyees in 1986 and 1987. A local Advanced Emergency Medical Tec1nician had provided the trainin Also in 1987, the licensee's medical contractor had conducted about eleven 3-hour training sessions dealing with onsite contaminated /injuredpersonnel. Approximately 20 Chemistry and HealthPhysics(CandHP)Techniciansandabout40otheraersonnel had received this training. The inspector was informed tlat most of the C and HPs were also shown the treatment areas and special supplies that would be available at the three local hospitals, in the event that they would accompany a contaminated / injured person to a local hospita Based on the above findings, this portion of the licensee's program is acceptabl d. PublicInformationBrochures(82209)

The licensee had gone through with its plans to convert its emergency information brochure from a pamphlet to a booklet with a detachable calendar and a "We Have Been Notified" poster which an EPZ resident would display in a window to inform local officials i that the residence had been evacuated per instruction !

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The licensee's offsite emergency planning staff indicated that work was in progress to issue a similarly designed emergency information

)ublication in the Fall of 1987. The language of the publication las already been discussed with county officials. The licensee in cooperation with Ottawa County LucasCounty,andStateofficials were already conducting a wildlife photograph contest, with winning entries to be used in the 1988 calenda Based on the above findings, this portion of the licensee's program is acceptabl . Exit Interview On July 10 1987, the inspectors met with those licensee representatives listedinkaragraph1topresenttheirpreliminaryinspectionfindings' .

The licensee indicated that none'of the matters discussed were l proprietary in natur i l

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