IR 05000346/1987022

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Insp Rept 50-346/87-22 on 870801-0930.No Violations or Deviations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Licensee Action on Previous Insp Findings,Operational Safety,Maint,Lers, Surveillance,Onsite Followup of Events & TMI Action Items
ML20236G012
Person / Time
Site: Davis Besse Cleveland Electric icon.png
Issue date: 10/20/1987
From: Defayette R
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III)
To:
Shared Package
ML20236G007 List:
References
50-346-87-22, NUDOCS 8711020377
Download: ML20236G012 (10)
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p l; < U.' S.' NUCLEAR' REGULATORY COMMISSION

' REGION'III a

Report.No. 50-346/87022(DRP)-

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Docket No. 50-346 Operating License No. NPF-3 '

l y' Licensee: Toledo. Edison' Company .

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, Edison Plaza, 300. Madison Avenue Toledo, OH .43652 Facility Name: Davis-Besse 1 .]

Inspection.At: Oak' Harbor, Ohio Inspection Conducted: August 1,!1987 to September.30, 1987- -

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-l Inspectors.: - ~ M. Byron l

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D. C. Kosloff M. J. Farber  !

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' Approved By: R. DeFaye

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, Chief- /9e v Bo / 9B'7 i

LReactor Projects Section 28 Date

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. Inspection Summary-

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~I Inspection on August 1, 1987 through September 30, 1987 Report- t

.No. 50-346.87022(DRP)) j Areas' Inspected: Routine, unannounced inspection by the resident inspectors u

.and-a region-based inspector of licensee action on previous inspection  ;

findings: operational safety; maintenance; surveillance; licensee event reports; onsite followup of events; quality assurance; training effectiveness; '

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and~TMI Action-Item Results: No violations or deviations were identified in the areas inspected.

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y DETAILS , Persons Contacted Toledo Edison Company (TED)

D. Shelton, Vice President, Nuclear W. Rowles, Senior Staff Consultant

+*L. Storz, Plant Manager

  • N. Bonner, Assistant Plant Manager, Maintenance

+*R. Flood, Assistant Plant Manager, Operations

+E. Salowitz, General Superintendent Outage and Program Management

L. Ramsett, Quality Assurance Director

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S. Jain, Independent Safety Engineering Director D. Briden, Chemistry Program Manager I G. Grime, Industrial Security Director B. Beyer, Nuclear Projects Director

+M. Stewart, Nuclear Training Director

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M. Schefers, Information Management Director T. Myers, Nuclear Licensing Director .

J. Scott-Wasilk, Nuclear Health & Safety Director P. Hildebrandt, Engineering General Director J. Wood, Systems Engineering Director G. Gibbs, Performance Engineering Director J. Chlapowski, Design Engineering Director D. Wilczynski, Configuration Management Program Manager R. Scott, Chemistry Superintendent

+*G. Honma, Compliance Supervisor R. Schrauder, Nuclear Licensing Manager D. Haiman, Engineering General Manager D. Erickson, Radiological Control Superintendent R. Donnellon, Mechanical Superintendent R. Bultler, I&C Superintendent '

T. Haberland, Electrical Superintendent C. Daft, Technical Planning Superintendent

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_ Lightfoot, Outage and Program Management Superintendent L. Young, Licensing, Fire Protection J. Moyers, Quality Verification Manager S. Zunk, Nuclear Group Ombudsman D. Harris, Manager Quality Systems J. Sturdavant, Licensing Principal K. Updike, Metrology Laboratory Manager G. Skeel, Nuclear Security Operations Manager L. Wade, Quality Control Manager USNRC

+*P. Byron, Senior Resident Inspector

+^ Kosloff, Resident Inspector M. Farber, Reactor Inspector

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  • Denotes those personnel' attending.the September 3, 1987 exit meetin + Denotes'those personnel attending the October 1, 1987 exit meetin .. .-

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2. -Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings (92701) 11 :(Closed) Open Item (346/83019-06(DRP)): Some positions under the  !

station superintendent'do not have defined training programs. 'The  !

licensee developed a matrix which lists the training requirements j

'for' technical staff and management personnel. . In addition, the l licensee' issued Training Procedure NG-NT-600, " Indoctrination, Traini'ig, and Qualification of Nuclear Group Personnel", dated j October 14, 1986. :The procedure and matrix' adequately defines.the training ~ program. This item is close b .' - (Closed) Open-Item (346/85004-11(DRP)): Further development of

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' nonoperatortrainingp'rocedures. The licensee issued Nuclear Group Procedure NG-NT-600, Indoctrination, Training and Qualification of Nuclear Group Personnel", which lists the training requirements. In

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addition, the: licensee received INP0 accreditation for its I&C Technicians Electrical and Mechanical Maintenance personnel training l programs.on December 11, 198 In view of the licensee's-training

. procedure and achieving INP0' accreditation of their maintenance : l training program this item is' close !

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L l(Closed) Open Item (346/85022-01(DRP)): ' Reactor Coolant' System  !

(RCS)' flow transmitters exhibit high electronic noise. level Additional; investigation of this issue revealed that the indicated flow fluctuations were^not the result of electrical noise. The fluctuations.resulted from the use of flow transmitters with a higher. sensitivity _to random pressure variations in the RCS flow strea The licensee issued Facility Change Request (FCR)

'No. 85-0103 ti change.the 10 Hz low pass filter to 0.4 Hz signal filtering for the Foxboro modules. The work was performed under MWO No. 2-85-0103. - The MWO was closed out in November 198 While the plant was operating the inspectors observed the RCS flow indication

'in'the reactor protection system cabi' nets and. verified that

. fluctuations in indicated flow had'been significantly reduced. This item is close (Closed).0 pen Item >(346/85037-02(DRP)): Completion of Kepner-Tregoe training for' maintenance management personnel. The licensee has iisted Kepner-Tregoe training as a requirement on page 31 of the Maintenance Management Training Boo The addition of this training l satisfies the concern and this item is close '(Closed) Violation (346/86016-01(DRP)): Load dispatcher's failure

, to notify the station of a tornado warning as required by Administrative Procedure AD 1827.06. The licensee initiated annual training for load dispatchers on the requirements of Emergency l Procedure HS-EP4100, " Tornado". The initial training was given on  !

May 20, 1987. The inspectors verified that the load dispatchers were making the proper notifications by reviewing the unit lo This item is close .

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J, (0 pen) Violation (346/87014-02B(DRP)):

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Verbal changes in procedurally defined responsibilities of the Operations Superintenden The licensee's corrective action for this violation was to formally  !

delete those responsibilities which required _a Senior Reactor  :

Operator (SRO) license. ~The-inspectors informed the licensee that they considered that it's review lacked dept The licensee is committed to ANSI 18.1-1971, " Selection and Training of Nuclear Power Plant Personnel" as stated in Section 2 of the Nuclear Quality Assurance Manual-(NQAM). -Section 4.2.2 of ANSI 1 ,

requires that the operations manager hold an SR0 license at the time  !

of appointment to the active position. Section 4.3.1 of ANSI 1 requires that supervisors requiring a license shall have the license at the time of appointment. Subsequent to the discussion the

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licensee issued a memorandum which stated that the position of *

Operations-Superintendent would remain open and the Assistant Plant Manager-0perations -would take on an additional responsibility as the acting Operations Superintendent. The previously appointed individual would be the designee for the position and assume the  !

duties after receipt of an SR0. license. The licensee's corrective action for the appointment was adequate. This item will remain open pending receipt of the licensee's response and the inspectors'

review of.the corrective actio f No violations or deviations were identified in this are . Operational Safety Verification (71707) l The. inspectors observed control room operations, reviewed applicable logs and conducted discussions with control room operators during the months .

of August and Septembe The inspectors verified the operability of 4 selected emergency systems, reviewed tagout records and verified proper

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s return.to service of affected component ;

Tours of the auxiliary, turbine, water treatment and service water buildings were conducted to observe plant equipment conditions, including potential fire hazards, fluid leaks, and excessive vibrations and to verify that maintenance requests had been initiated for equipment in need i of maintenance. The inspectors by observation and direct interview verified that the physical security plan was being implemented in ,

accordance with the station security plan, j The inspectors observed plant housekeeping and cleanliness conditions and  !

verified implementation of radiation protection control During the <

months of August and September, the inspectors walked down the accessible portions of the Auxiliary Feedwater, Main Feedwater, Reactor Protection l Anticipatory Reactor Trip, Steam and Feedwater Line ' Rupture Control, Service Water, Emergency Diesel Generator, Essential 120 Volt AC,

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Essential 4160 Volt AC, Essential 480 Volt AC, Essential 125 Volt DC, 1 Component Cooling Water and Control Room Emergency Ventilation systems

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to verify operabilit ,

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These reviews and observations were conducted to verify that facility operations were in conformance with the requirements established under

. technical specifications, 10 CFR, and administrative procedure No violations or deviations were identified in this are ; Montnly Maintenance Observation (62703)

Station maintenance activities of safety related systems and components listed below were observed or reviewed to ascertain that they were conducted in accordance with approved procedures, regulatory guides and industry codes or standards and in conformance with technical  !

specification ;

The following items were considered during this review: that limiting conditions for operation were met while components or systems were i removed from service; approvals were obtained prior to initiating the '

work; activities were accomplished using approved procedures and were inspected as applicable; functional testing and/or calibrations were performed prior to returning components or systems to service; quality control records were maintained; activities were accomplished by qualified personnel; parts and materials used were properly certified; l radiological controls were implemented; and, fire prevention controls were implemente j Work requests were reviewed to determine status of outstanding jobs and j to assure that priority is assigned to safety related equipment maintenance which may affect system performance, i

The following maintenance activities were observed or reviewed: i

  • Temperature setpoint change for Component Cooling Water (CCW) pump i room ventilation control {
  • Modification of control air tubing to the SW flow control valves for

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the SW/CCW heat exchanger ,

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  • Adjustment of essential inverter output voltag :

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Following completion of maintenance on the Component Cooling Water and

. Main-Steam systems, the inspectors verified that these systems had been returned to service properl No violations or deviations were identified in this are . Monthly Surveillance Observation (61726)

The inspectors observed technical specifications required surveillance testing on the Safety Features Actuation System (SFAS), ST 5031.01,

"SFAS Monthly Test" and the Auxiliary Feedwater System, ST 5071.22,

" Auxiliary Feedwater Train 1-2 Quarterly Valve Test" and verified that testing was performed in accordance with adequate procedures, that test instrumentation was calibrated, that limiting conditions for operation were met, that removal and restoration of the affected components were accomplished, that test results conformed with technical specifications and procedure requirements and were reviewed by personnel other than the individual directing the test, and that any deficiencies identified during the testing were properly reviewed and resolved by appropriate management personne The inspectors also witnessed portions of the following test activities:

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  • ST 5042.02 RCS (Reactor Coolant System) Water Inventory Balanc * ST 5043.03 Secondary Coolant System Radiochemistr During maintenance on the CCW. Pump Room Ventilation Systems the inspectors noted that when the licensee made one ventilation system inoperable the nearest CCW loop was declared inoperable and the Technical Specification Action Statement (3.7.3.1) for one operable CCW loop was entered. There is no specific TS Action Statement for the CCW Pump Room Ventilation Systems. The inspectors contacted the NRR Licensing Project Manager and requested that he determine if the licensee's practice was appropriate. This is an open item (346/87022-01(DRP)).

No violations or deviations were identified in this are . Licensee Event Reports Followup (92700)

Through direct observations, discussions with licensee personnel, and review of records, the following event reports were reviewed to determine that deportability requirements were fulfilled, immediate corrective action was accomplished, and corrective action to prevent recurrence had been accomplished in accordance with technical specifications.

l LER 87-10 (0 pen): Unit Trip From Full Power During A Severe Thunderstorm. The inspectors noted an apparent contradiction in the analysis of the post-trip Feedwater (FW) contro The analysis states u

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I that the post-trip FW control functioned as designed and that the control

[ room operator actions to take manual control of FW was timely and appropriate. The inspectors' discussions.with operations personnel revealed that they thought that the Rapid FW Reduction (RFR) subsystem response was slow. The inspectors' discussions with the engineering

staff revealed that they thought that the RFR had functioned correctly i and that no operator intervention was required. The analysis does not  ;

clarify the conflicting evaluation Following the trip the unit l experienced a rapid decrease in RCS temperature and pressure caused when steam flow to one Moisture Separator Reheater was not automatically  ;

isolated. The isolation did not occur because pressure switch PS 9806  !

failed to provide a closing command to main steam valve MS 199 and pressure control valve MS 338 was open in manual control. The inspectors jl observed PS 9806 after it had been repaired, noted water dripping from it and reported this to appropriate licensee personnel. At the end of the inspection period the leak in PS 9806 had not been repaired due to the i lead time required to obtain a replacement part. The root cause and l interim repair of PS 9806 are not discussed in the corrective action k description and the information presented implies that the repair was  ;

complete. No corrective action was presented for the controller problem which had caused MS 338 to be in manual contro The LER did not address I whether or not the observed grid response confirmed the grid stability  ;

analysis presented in the USA The deficiencies noted above must be resolved and the licensee's review of overcooling events discussed in the corrective action description must be reviewed by the inspectors before

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i this LER can be closed, j

No violations or deviations were identified in this are ,

7. Onsite Followup of Events (62702 and 93702) f During the inspection period, the licensee experienced several events, some of which required prompt notification of the NRC pursuant to ,

10 CFR 50.72. The inspectors pursued the events onsite with licensee and/

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or other NRC officials. In each case, the inspectors verified that the notification was correct and timely, if appropriate, that the licensee ,

was taking prompt and appropriate actions, that activities were conducted '

within regulatory requirements and that corrective actions would prevent future recurrence. The specific events are as follows:

  • Reactor trip on August 21, 1987, due to lightning strike on power gri * Reactor trip on September 6, 1987, due to operator error, followed by multiple equipment failure !
  • RPS trip during surveillance testing on September 10, 1987, with  !

plant shutdown and all rods inserte A brief description of the September 6 event, including several equipment ['

malfunctions which occurred after the shutdown and the corrective actions taken by the licensee follo . _ _ - _ _ _ _ .

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At 11:42 a.m. the Reactor Protection System (RPS) tripped the reactor o overpower when. indicated reactor power reached 104% after a Feedwater

.(FW) flow transmitter-failed to an intermediate value. Since indicated FW flow was less than required, the Integrated Control System (ICS)

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increased FW flow. This caused a slight overcooling of one Steam Generator (SG), slightly increasing reactivity. The operator manually inserted.the control rods to prevent a trip. Howm/er, Group 6, the Axial Power Shaping Rods-(APSR's), was selected for manual operation rather than the Group 7 control rods. Movement of the APSR's added reactivity and

. changed the flux profile. Indicated reactor power increased to 104% which '

initiated an RPS trip of the uni Several equipment malfunctions i occurred shortly after the tri A transfer breaker failed to operate which would have transferred power from the unit or station transformer to the'startup transformer. Power was lost to both essential and nonessential busses. Two of the four Reactor Coolant Pumps (RCP's) were deenergized. Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) No. 1 started and restored  !

power to the deenergized essential bus Service Water Pump No. 1 failed to automatically restart when the EDG repowered the essential bus. Steam flow was not automatically isolated j to Moisture Separator Reheater (MSR) No. 1 which contributed to the cooling of the RCS. Main Steam Safety Valve (MSSV) SP 1783 failed to fully reseat; however, the operators were able to control plant cooldow Steam Generator level control was maintained by use of the main FW pumps and the startup FW control valves in the automatic mode. Subsequent to l these eyents a reactor operator inadvertently tripped an RCP while 1 resetting the two tripped RCP's. The error was immediately identified '

and RCP was restarted within a minute, ,

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Approximately two hours after the event the Motor Driven FW Pump (MDFP) I was placed in service in accordance with the trip recovery procedur Placing the MDFP in service caused FW system pressure to increase about 400 psi. The increased differential pressure caused a rapid increase in  ;

the level of SG No. 2. The startup FW control valves were isolated and 4 SG water level was manually controlled locally by use of the " mini-feed" '

bypass lines. Approximately 4 1/2 hours after the trip turbine; bypass i valve SP 13A3 failed open. Operators were not stationed at the l

" mini-feed" bypass valve and were unable prevent a Steam and Feedwater l Line Rupture System actuation due to low SG 1evel. The auxiliary FW l pumps started and were stopped after sufficient SG 1evel was attaine l Later, two additional malfunctions were observed while the Decay Heat Removal (DHR) system was being placed in service. Service water >

temperature control valve SW 1434 for Component Cooling Water Heat Exchanger No. 2 failed to open either locally or remotely. Because of a nitrogen bubble in the DHR discharge piping, pressurizer level dropped a total of 16 inches when a DHR system valve was opene On September 8, 1987, Region III dispatched an Augumented Inspection Team ,

(AIT) to the site. The AIT arrived on site September 9 and concluded its onsite inspection September 11, 1987. The AIT inspection is documented in Inspection Report No. 50-346/87025. Region III issued Confirmatory i Action Letter (CAL) No. RIII-87-0018 (AIT) dated September 9,198 The

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1, CAL required certain actions to be completed by the licensee prior to restar Those actions were completed on September 15, 1987. Region III issued the restart letter on September 16, 1987, and the unit was-restarted at 8:13 p.m. ED The generator was' synchronized to the grid on September 17, 198 Prior to restart the licensee repaired all failed components or made system adjustments to preclude recurrence and determined the cause of the  ;

failure The failed MSSV and MSSV SP 1781, which showed signs of  ;

excessive wear,.were removed. Prior to restart the inspectors reviewed the material condition of the plant and verified that the licensee had completed all corrective actions required prior to restart. The inspectors reviewed the maintenance backlog for the Auxiliary FW, Main FW, Station Air, Integrated Control, Seal Oil and Hydrogen Systems. All six systems were then walked down to verify that there were no significant material deficiencies that were not already included in the maintenance backlo The licensee is operating with one MSSV removed from each steam line and is limited to 95% power by Technical Specification 3.7. l Management Meetings On September 15, 1987, senior licei.see and NRC management met at NRR to  ;

discuss the. Course of Action (CCA) commitments and their relationship to the' events surrounding'the trip. The licensee was directed to review the prioritization of the C0A commitments and include operating experiences since restart. Following the review, the l'censee will determine if current commitments need to be reprioritized. Another management meeting is tentatively scheduled ~for early November to discuss the results of the 11censee's revie ' Qu'ality Assurance (36700)

On March 5, 1980, the NRC issued an order to the licensee which modified operating license (NPF-3). The order was effective immediately and '

required the licensee to return six qualified Equipment Operators (E0),

who were in the operator license training program, to regular shif t work in order to have two fully qualified E0's for each operating shift, provide one additional person on each day shift to relieve the shift supervisor of non licensed administrative duties, and to expedite on the job training for existing unqualified E0' The licensee was directed to staff each operating shift with a complete complement of fully trained personnel in accordance with the staffing and qualification levels set forth in draft ANSI Standard 3.1 prior to return to operation from the next refueling outage. Later discussions and correspondence between the  ;

licensee and the NRC established that the 1977 draft of ANS 3.1 was the '

correct standard and determined which sections of ANS 3.1 were applicabl The applicable sections which the licensee is required to adhere to q are 4.1, 4.3.1.2.a through c, 4.5.1.1.a through d, 4.5.1.2.a through c '

and 5.2.1.8.

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jf During a review of operator training requirements the inspectors were unable to find any reference to draft ANS 3.1 - 1977. In addition l Section 2 of_the Nuclear Quality Assurance Manual does not list this standard. The' inspectors verified that the licensee was implementing the requirements. The inspectors brought this concern to the licensee. A review was performed by the licensee and it was determined that draft ANS'3.1 - 1977 was not appropriately referenced. This'is'an open item (50-346/87022-02(DRP)).

1 Training Effectiveness (41400)

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The licensee developed a training program for root cause determination due.to. uneven performance of root cause' analyses. The training program includes an engineering course and a QA course. The inspectors observed the entire QA course on two separate occasions. The course appears adequate and the inspectors have observed an improvement in the quality of root cause analyse . TMI Action I,tems (25565)

'(Closed) II.B.2.3, Radiation Qualification of Safety-Related Equipment:  !

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The inspectors reviewed a letter to the licensee dated August 8, 1983, n_ .from J. F. Stolz, NR The letter stated that the NRC review of the environmental qualification of equipment would be included under l Multiplant Action Item B-60, " Environmental Qualification of Electrical i Equipment for Nuclear Power P1 ants". The implementation of the licensee's  !

EQ program is documented in Inspection Report No. 50-346/8602 This item is close No violations or' deviations were identified in this are s 1 Open Items Open items are matters which have been discussed with the licensee, which

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will be reviewed further by the inspectors, and which involve some action '

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on the part of NRC or licensee or both. Open items disclosed during the inspection are discussed in Paragraph 5 and '

1 Exit Interview (30703)

The inspectors met with licensee representatives (denoted in Paragraph 1)

throughout the month and at the conclusion of the inspection and .

summarized the scope and findings of the inspection activities. The j

. licensee acknowledged the findings. After discussions with the licensee, the inspectors have determined there is no proprietary data contained in

,this inspection repor i

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