IR 05000344/1988051
| ML20247B939 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Trojan File:Portland General Electric icon.png |
| Issue date: | 03/09/1989 |
| From: | NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION V) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20247B919 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-344-88-51, NUDOCS 8903300080 | |
| Download: ML20247B939 (42) | |
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DRAFT SALP BOARD REPORT
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O. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION,V
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SYSTEMATIC ASSESSMENT OF LICENSEE PERFORMANCE',
FOR PORTLAND GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY TROJAN NUCLEAR PLANT REPORT NO. 50-344/88-51 EVALUATION PERIOD:
12/1/87 - 12/31/88 SALP BOARD ASSESSMENT CONDUCTED:
FEBRUARY 9, 1989
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SUMMARY (12/1/87 - 12/31/88)
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TROJAN NUCLEAR PLANT
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Inspections Conducted Enforcement Items Inspection *
Percent Severity Level **
Functional Area Hours
.of Effort 1 II III IV V 'Dev 1.
Plant Operations 1142 21.9%
0
4 0
2.
Radiological Controls 282 5.4%
0
3 1
3.
Maintenance /
Surveillance 1654 31.7%
0
9 1
4.
Emergency Preparedness 112 4.1%
0
0 0
5.
Security 301 5.8%
0
7 0
6.
Engineering /
Technical Support ***
184 3.5%
0
0 0
7.
Safety Assessment /
Quality Verification 1441 27.6%
0
2 0
TOTAL 5216 100%
0 1 25 2
Allocations of inspection hours to each functional area are
approximations based upon NRC Form 766 data.
Severity levels are in accordance with NRC Enforcement Policy (10 CFR
Part 2, Appeadix C).
Two violations were proposed in the Engineering / Technical Support
functional area, and the severity levels are yet to be determined.
Data reflects Inspection Reports 87-42 through 88-51.
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TABLE 2
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TROJAN NUCLEAR PLANT ENFORCEMENT ITEMS
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Inspection Severity-Functional-t
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_ Report No.
Subject
. Level Area 88-01 Quality' records for ASME Section IV
XI. testing were filed without'
proper review and signatu a af
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the appropriate plant engineer t
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88-04
. Radiological hot spots were V
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not posted properly
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88-05 Failure to provide IV
the required level of
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illumination in all' exterior areas of the protected area.
88-13 Inadequate 10 CFR 50.59 review IV
Failure to follow locked IV
controlled valve procedure and license conditions Inservice testing'ASME Code IV
'3 Class 1 valves indicated degraded stroke times, and required additional surveillance testing not performed Incomplete evaluation of failed IV
Code Class 1 inservice testing 88-16 Failure to secure floor panels IV
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providing direct access to a vital area.
Failure to provide an IV
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adequate search for
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Failure to properly screen IV 5 ).
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personnel granted unescorted
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access to the protected area.
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-2-Inspection Severity Functional Report No.
Subject Level Area 88-17'
Fire detectors not installed as IV
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required for 93 foot elevation of fuel building
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88-20 Incomplete radiation dose IV
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assessment as required by
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88-24 Plant management failed to IV
control overtime of workers e
performing safety related maintenance
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88-26 Wrong acceptance criteria used IV
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for ASME Section XI inspection of pipe supports No documented instruction or IV
procedure prescribing the engineering evolution process for ASME Section XI inspections of pipe supports 88-27 Written safety evaluation for IV
radioactive materials being stored outside the protected area was not performed.
88-30 Pretest calibrations were not V
performed, and post maintenance testing records were not maintained for ASME Section XI inservice tests Plant management failed to IV
control overtime of workers performing safety related maintenance Control access procedures and IV
survey procedures for radiological controlled area not complied with, Procedural compliance per IV
10 CFR 50 Appendix B Criterion V not complied with
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-3-Inspection Severity Functional Report No.
Subject Level Area 88-33 Failure to provide IV
the required level of illumination in all exterior areas of the protected area.
I 88-34 Safe shutdown emergency lighting IV
not installed for three areas of intake structure and circulating building 88-36 Seismic Class I instrumentation Deviation
not installed for condensate storage tank level as per Reg. Guide 1.97.
88-40 Procedure violation for a IV
ladder improperly stored in a safety related switchgear room Incomplete maintenance request IV
that did not provide appropriate work instructions to return safety related equipment to service following repair.
88-43 Procedure violation of quality IV
assurance procedures for failure to document a non-conforming maintenance activity
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l 88-45 Failure to properly compensate III
for a degraded security barrier.
(Composite)-
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Failure to properly search and escort a visitor.
Failure ;o provide a vital area barrie.
Failure to report security IV
l system vulnerability.
I Failure to properly secure IV
sensitive documents.
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l-4-l Inspection Severity Functional Report No.
Subject Level Area 88-46 Procedure violation of quality
assurance procedures for not i
performing engineering evaluations for commercial grade equipment.
Procurement of safety grade
main feedwater piping without acceptable quality verification
- Severity levels to be established.
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TABLE 3
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TROJAN NUCLEAR PLANT
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SYNOPSIS OF LICENSEE EVENT REPORTS **(12/1/87-12/31/88)
Functional
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SALP Cause Code *
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Area A
B C
D E
X Totals 1.
Plant Operations
1
1
0
2.
Radiological Controls
0
2
0
3.
Maintenance / Surveillance
4
5
0
4.
0
0
0
5.
Security
2
2
0
6.
Engineering / Technical Support
2
0
1
7.
Safety Assessment /
Quality Verification
0
0
0
22
3
9
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Cause Codes:
A - Personnel Error B - Design Manufacturing C - External Cause D - Defective Procedures E - Component Failure X - Other Synopsis includes LER Nos. 87-35 through 88-47 (LERs 88-25, 34, 38
cancelled)
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TABLE 4 TROJAN NUCLEAR PLANT 1.
LICENSEE EVENT REPORTS (12/01/87 - 12/31/88)-
LER Title Salp Area /Cause Code 87-35 Fire doors made inoperable due to 1/D
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personnel error 87-36 Seismic monitoring instrumentation 3/A.
87-37 EHC switch failure caused load rejection 1/E reactor tripped manually
~ 88-01
. Reactor trip due to failed overpower 3/E delta temperature channel 88-02 Containment ventilation isolation on 2/D high containment radioactivity signal due to inadequate procedure
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88-03 Single failure mechanism discovered which 6/B could overpressurize containment electrical penetration seals 88-04 Containment penetration not verified-1/B closed as required by T.S. 4.6.1.1
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88-05
. Surveillance interval for chilled water 3/A return valves exceeded 88-06
.Centrifical charging pump seal leakage 1/E greater than FSAR assumed limits 88-07 Control room normal air conditioning 1/E system isolation due to spurious high chlorine signal 88-08 Pressurizer safety valve setpoint found 3/D out-of-tolerance during surveillance testing 88-09 Missed hourly fire patrol for inoperable 1/A fire door 88-10 Containment ventilation isolation on 3/D high radioactivity signal i
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LER Title Salp Area /Cause Code 88-11 New fuel-assembly handling violated T.S.
3/A
- 88-12
. Fire door made inoperable due to personnel error'
1/A 88-13 CCW valve position not verified as required 3/D-
-by T.S. 3/4'.7.3
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.88-14-
' Containment ventilation isolation due 2/D to high containment radioactivity signal
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Containment ventilation isolation due to 3/A-
.88-15.
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personnel error during testing
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88-16
' Steam generator water level instrument 6/X
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L"4 high-high turbine trip /feedwater i
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' isolation setpoint set outside T.S.
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88-17 Hourly fire patrols for inoperable fire 1/A c
' barriers missed
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'88-18 Excessive unfiltered in-leakage affected 3/B
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88-19 Surveillance required after. containment 3/A
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p hydrogen vent system adsorber replacement by Technical Specifications not performed
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88-20 Overpressure mitigation system actuation 3/D due to inadvertent letdown isolation 88-21 Operational mode change made without 3/A having performed the required technical specification surveillance.
88-22 Train "A" safety injection initiation 3/C during plant heatup 88-23 Containment ventilation isolation due to 1/C L:.
spurious spike on PRM-IC 88-24'
Control room emergency ventilation system 3/E inoperable due to failed damper 88-25 Cancelled
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-3-LER Title Salp Area /Cause Code 88-26 Reactor trip due to venting a flow 3/D transmitter with common sensing line with other flow transmitters 88-27 Volume control tank isolation capability 3/A was lost on loss of power to charging pump suction valve 88-28 Reactor trip due to inadequate work 3/A procedure and personnel error
'88-29 Safety-related component operability 3/B threatened.due to service water fouling with clams 88-30 Safety injection pump inoperable due to 1/A mispositioned valve 88-31 Offsite power source surveillance not 3/A performed 88-32 Control room ventilation system 3/B inoperable'due to open door 88-33 Radiation monitor not receiving 6/B representative sample 88-34 Cancelled 88-35 Surveillance of gaseous radwaste 3/A oxygen monitor was not performed 88-36 Containment ventilation isolation 3/A signal locked in due to technician caused short
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88-37 High energy barrier defeated due 6/E to broken door latch
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88-38 Cancelled 88-39 Incomplete calibration of safety 3/A system RTD's due to assumed drift value of zero l
88-40 Centrifugal charging pump seal failed 1/E
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-4-LER-Title Salp Area /Cause Code 88-41 Voluntary entry into technical 1/E specification 3.0.3 to do post-maintenance testing on safety injection valve 88-42 Instrument air line soldered joint 3/B failure 88-43 Reactor trip due to a main feedwater 1/E valve controller failure
'88-44
. Auxiliary feedwater auto-start 1/A due to 10-10 steam generator level
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88-45 Reactor' coolant system check valve leak 7/A rate not ' measured due to construction error 88-46 Containment ventilation isolation 1/C signal generated by electronic spike 88-47 Partial containment isolation due to 2/A personnel error while sampling 2.
LICENSEE SECURITY EVEf.T REPORTS LER Title Salp Area Cause Code 87-505 Inadequate compensatory 5/D post 87-506 Det aded barrier 5/B 88-S01 Degraded barrier 5/B 88-S02 Inattentive security officer 5/A 88-S03 Unsecured safeguards information 5/A I
88-504 Inadequate protection of 5/D vital equipment 88-S05 Unsecured safeguards _ information 5/A
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n Enclosure 1
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AE0D Input to SALP Review for Trojan
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LER Review-
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During the assessment period, 44 LERs were submitted to the NRC. These
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reports,> reviewed by AE0D, consisted of the following LERs:
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87-35 to 88-24 88-35 to 88-37
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88-26 to 88-33 88-39 to 88-44
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Significant Events i
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' Utilizing AE0D's screening process, the following six LERs were categorized as o
potentially safety significant:
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88-18
& cessive unfiltered inleakage affecting operability of the control room ventilation system (design / installation problem).
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88-24 Inoperability of the control room emergency ventilation system due
to a failed damper (random equipment failure).
88-27 Loss of volume control tank isolation capability due to lost of power to centrifugal charging pumps suction valve (other personnel errcr).
88-29 Operability of centrifugal charging and safety injection pumps threatened due to service water fouling with clams (maintenance problem).
88-30 Safety injection pump "A" inoperable due to mispositioned valve (licensedoperatorerror).
88-32 Control room ventilation inoperable due to open door (design / installation problem).
Causes Root causes associated with the remaining 38 LERs are:
two licensed operator errors, thirteen other personnel errors, four design / installation / fabrication problems, nine administrative control problems, one maintenance problem eight random equipment failures, and one undetermined.
Of the nine administrative control problems identified above, seven were procedural.
In addition, nine of the events were associated with inadvertent containment or control room ventilation isolations, or inoperability of these systems.
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_2 LER Quality LERs submitted adequately described the major aspects of each event, including identifying component or system failures that contributed to the event. The reports were well written, easy to understand, and typically complete, except for one with an unidentified root cause. Corrective actions taken or planned to prevent recurrence were generally specified.
Preliminary Notifications From AE0D's review of preliminary notifications issued by Region V, it appears that the April 18, 1988 event involving a containment purge isolation signal described in PNO-V-88-026 is reportable. However, no LER on this subject was found.
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