IR 05000277/2012005
| ML13029A013 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Peach Bottom  |
| Issue date: | 01/29/2013 |
| From: | Gray M K Reactor Projects Region 1 Branch 4 |
| To: | Pacilio M J Exelon Nuclear, Exelon Generation Co |
| GRAY, MEL | |
| References | |
| IR-12-005 | |
| Download: ML13029A013 (48) | |
Text
January 29, 2013
Mr. Michael Senior Vice President, Exelon Generation Company, LLC President and Chief Nuclear Officer, Exelon Nuclear 4300 Winfield Road Warrenville, IL 60555
SUBJECT: PEACH BOTTOM ATOMIC POWER STATION - NRC INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 05000277/2012005 AND 05000278/2012005
Dear Mr. Pacilio:
On December 31, 2012, the U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an integrated inspection at your Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station (PBAPS), Units 2 and 3. The enclosed integrated inspection report documents the inspection results, which were discussed on January 18, 2013, with Mr. Michael Massaro, Site Vice President, and other members of your staff.
The inspection examined activities conducted under your license as they relate to safety and compliance with the Commission's rules and regulations and with the conditions of your license.
The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel.
Based on the results of this inspection, no findings were identified. However, three licensee-identified violations, which were determined to be of very low safety significance, are listed in this report. However, because of the very low safety significance, and because they are entered into your corrective action program (CAP), the NRC is treating these findings as non-cited violations (NCVs), consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the NRC Enforcement Policy. If you contest any NCVs in this report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your denial, to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region I; the Director, Office of Enforcement, United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001; and the NRC Resident Inspector at the PBAPS.
In accordance with Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR), Section 2.390 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of the NRC's document system (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Website at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).
Sincerely,/RA/
Mel Gray, Chief Reactor Projects Branch 4 Division of Reactor Projects Docket Nos.: 50-277, 50-278 License Nos.: DPR-44, DPR-56
Enclosure:
Inspection Report 05000277/2012005 and 05000278/2012005
w/Attachment:
Supplementary Information
cc w/encl: Distribution via ListServ
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS
........................................................................................................... 3
REPORT DETAILS
REACTOR SAFETY
.................................................................................................................. 4 1R01 Adverse Weather Protection .................................................................................... 4 1R04 Equipment Alignment ............................................................................................... 5 1R05 Fire Protection .......................................................................................................... 6 1R06 Flood Protection Measures ...................................................................................... 7 1R11 Licensed Operator Requalification Program ............................................................ 7 1R12 Maintenance Effectiveness ...................................................................................... 8 1R13 Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control ................................. 8 1R15 Operability Determinations and Functionality Assessments .................................... 9 1R19 Post-Maintenance Testing ..................................................................................... 10 1R20 Refueling Outage .................................................................................................... 10 1EP6 EP Drill Evaluation
RADIATION SAFETY
.............................................................................................................. 12
2RS5 Radiation Monitoring Instrumentation
.................................................................... 12
2RS6 Radioactive Gaseous and Liquid Effluent Treatment
OTHER ACTIVITIES
............................................................................................................... 16
4OA1 Performance Indicator Verification
......................................................................... 16
4OA2 Identification and Resolution of Problems ............................................................... 17 4OA3 Follow-up of Events and Notices of Enforcement Discretion
................................. 19
4OA5 Other Activities ........................................................................................................ 20 4OA6 Meetings, Including Exit .......................................................................................... 26 4OA7 Licensee-Identified Violations ................................................................................. 26
ATTACHMENT:
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION
KEY POINTS OF CONTACT
.................................................................................................... A-1
LIST OF ITEMS
OPENED, CLOSED, DISCUSSED ................................................................ A-1
LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED
........................................................................................ A-2
LIST OF ACRONYMS
............................................................................................................. A-16
Enclosure
- OF [[]]
- FINDIN [[]]
GS IR 05000277/2012005, 05000278/2012005; 10/01/2012 - 12/31/2012; Peach Bottom Atomic
Power Station (PBAPS), Units 2 and 3; Integrated Inspection.
The report covered a three-month period of inspection by resident inspectors and announced
inspections performed by regional inspectors. The significance of most findings is indicated by their color (Green, White, Yellow, Red) using Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 0609, "Significance Determination Process" (SDP). The cross-cutting aspects for the findings were
determined using
NRC management
review. The
- NRC 's program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is described in
NUREG-1649, "Reactor Oversight Process," Revision 4, dated December 2006.
Cornerstones: Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, and Barrier Integrity None.
Other Findings Three violations of very low safety significance, which were identified by Exelon personnel, have been reviewed by the inspectors. Corrective actions taken or planned by Exelon have been entered into the corrective action program (CAP). These violations and the corrective action tracking numbers are listed in Section 4OA7 of this report.
Enclosure
- REPORT [[]]
DETAILS Summary of Plant Status
Unit 2 began the inspection period shutdown for the 19th refueling outage (RFO) (P2R19). On October 17, 2012, the reactor mode switch was placed in start-up and the unit was
synchronized to the grid on October 19. On October 21, the unit was returned to 100 percent
rated thermal power (RTP). Unit 2 remained at RTP until the end of the inspection period, except for brief periods to support planned testing and control rod pattern adjustments.
Unit 3 began the inspection period at 100 percent RTP. On November 10, operators reduced
power to approximately 70 percent to perform main turbine control valve trouble-shooting and repair, and a control rod pattern adjustment. The unit was returned to 100 percent
RTP through the end of the inspection period, except for brief periods to support planned testing and control rod pattern adjustments.
1.
SAFETY
Cornerstones: Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, and Barrier Integrity 1R01 Adverse Weather Protection (71111.01 - 2 samples)
.1 Super Storm Sandy (1 Grid sample) a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed plant features and procedures for operation and continued availability
of offsite and backup power systems during Super Storm Sandy on October 30, 2012. The 500
Kilovolt (KV) grid voltage reached a maximum voltage of
- 550KV due to the reduced grid electrical demand during the storm. The inspectors reviewed the control room operator response to Alarm Response Card (
ARC-
006 00C224 J-5, Revision 2, and procedure AO 53.2-0, "Equipment Checks After a
Thunderstorm," Revision 4. The inspectors reviewed communication protocols between the
control room personnel and electrical system operations, as well as measures prescribed and taken to maintain the availability and reliability of alternating current systems during the abnormal high grid voltage.
Additionally, the inspectors reviewed procedures for severe weather preparation, main control
room (MCR) logs, and condition reports (CRs). Documents reviewed for each section of this inspection report are listed in the Attachment. b. Findings
No findings were identified.
.2 Readiness for Seasonal Extreme Weather Conditions (1 Seasonal sample) a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors performed a review of
- PBA [[]]
PS's readiness for the onset of seasonal cold
temperatures. The review focused on the auxiliary boiler system heating steam supply,
Enclosure emergency diesel generators (EDGs), emergency cooling tower (ECT), emergency service water (ESW) and high pressure service water (HPSW) pump rooms, outer intake cooling water pump structure building, and the inner intake cooling water screen structure. The inspectors reviewed the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR), Technical Specifications (TSs), control room logs, and the CAP to determine what temperatures or other seasonal weather
could challenge these systems, and to ensure
- PBA [[]]
PS personnel had adequately prepared for
these challenges. The inspectors reviewed station procedures, including
- PBA [[]]
PS's seasonal weather preparation procedure and applicable operating procedures. The inspectors performed walkdowns of the selected systems to ensure station personnel identified issues that could challenge the operability of the systems during cold weather conditions. The inspectors also
reviewed
PBAPS was identifying adverse weather issues at an
appropriate threshold and entering them into their CAP in accordance with station corrective
action procedures. Documents reviewed for each section of this inspection report are listed in the Attachment.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
1R04 Equipment Alignment (71111.04 - 5 samples)
.1 Partial System Walkdowns (71111.04Q - 4 samples)
a. Inspection Scope The inspectors performed partial walkdowns of the following four systems: All four
RHR) with 'A' train unavailable on November 13 and 14 Unit 3 4Kv electrical buses with offsite power startup source 343 out-of-service (OOS) on November 29 Unit 2 125 volt direct current (DC) electrical buses during yellow risk on November 28
The inspectors selected these systems based on their risk-significance relative to the
reactor safety cornerstones at the time they were inspected. The inspectors reviewed applicable operating procedures, system diagrams, the
TSs, work orders (WOs), CRs, and the impact of ongoing work activities on redundant trains of equipment in order to identify conditions that could have impacted system performance of their intended safety functions. The inspectors also performed field walkdowns of accessible
portions of the systems to verify system components and support equipment were aligned correctly and were operable. The inspectors examined the material condition of the components and observed operating parameters of equipment to verify that there were no deficiencies. The inspectors also reviewed whether
- PBA [[]]
PS staff had properly
identified equipment issues and entered them into the CAP for resolution with the
appropriate significance characterization. b. Findings
No findings were identified.
Enclosure .2 Full System Walkdown (71111.04S - 1 sample) a. Inspection Scope On December 11 and 12, 2012, the inspectors performed a complete system walkdown
of accessible portions of the 'B' train of ESW to verify the existing equipment lineup was
correct while the 'A' train was unavailable for planned maintenance. The inspectors
reviewed operating procedures, surveillance tests (STs), drawings, equipment line-up check-off lists, and the
- UFS [[]]
AR to verify the system was aligned to perform its required safety functions. The inspectors also reviewed electrical power availability, component
lubrication and equipment cooling, hangar and support functionality, and operability of
support systems. The inspectors performed field walkdowns of accessible portions of
the systems to verify system components and support equipment were aligned correctly and operable. The inspectors examined the material condition of the components and observed operating parameters of equipment to verify that there were no deficiencies.
Additionally, the inspectors reviewed a sample of related
WOs) to
ensure
- PBA [[]]
PS staff appropriately evaluated and resolved any deficiencies.
b. Findings No findings were identified.
1R05 Fire Protection (71111.05Q - 7 samples) .1 Resident Inspector Quarterly Walkdowns
a. Inspection Scope The inspectors conducted tours of the areas listed below to assess the material condition and operational status of fire protection features. The inspectors verified that
- PBA [[]]
PS controlled combustible materials and ignition sources were controlled in
accordance with administrative procedures. The inspectors verified that fire protection
and suppression equipment was available for use as specified in the area pre-fire plan,
and passive fire barriers were maintained in good material condition. The inspectors
also verified that station personnel implemented compensatory measures for
- OOS , degraded or inoperable fire protection equipment, as applicable, in accordance with procedures. Unit 2 circulating water pump structure on November 7 Unit 3 circulating water pump structure on November 7 Unit 3 'B' and 'D'
- RHR pump and heat exchanger (HX) rooms on November 13 Unit 2 refuel floor on December 10 Unit 2 'B' and 'D'
HX rooms on December 12 Unit 2 reactor building (RB) 135' elevation on December 13 ECT structure on December 18
Enclosure b. Findings No findings were identified.
1R06 Flood Protection Measures (71111.06 - 1 sample)
.1 Internal Flooding Reviews a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed the
- UFS [[]]
AR, the site flooding analysis, and plant procedures to
assess susceptibilities involving internal flooding. The inspectors also reviewed the
- PBA [[]]
PS personnel identified and corrected flooding problems and whether operator actions for coping with flooding were adequate. The inspectors focused on the safety-related pump structure to verify the adequacy of equipment seals located below
the flood line, floor and water penetration seals, watertight door seals, common drain
lines and sumps, sump pumps, level alarms, control circuits, and temporary or
removable flood barriers. b. Findings No findings were identified.
1R11 Licensed Operator Requalification Program (71111.11 - 2 samples) .1 Quarterly Review of Licensed Operator Requalification Testing and Training
a. Inspection Scope The inspectors observed licensed operator requalification simulator training on November 28, 2012, which included high reactor recirculation pump (RRP) vibration,
loss of an auxiliary electrical bus including the second RRP, manual reactor scram, and
the restart of one RRP. The inspectors evaluated operator performance during the
simulated events and verified completion of risk significant operator actions, including
the use of abnormal and emergency operating procedures. The inspectors assessed the clarity and effectiveness of communications, implementation of actions in response to alarms and degrading plant conditions, and the oversight and direction provided by
the control room supervisor. The inspectors verified the accuracy and timeliness of the
emergency classification made by the shift manager, and the TS action statements
entered by the shift technical advisor. Additionally, the inspectors assessed the ability of the crew and training staff to identify and document crew performance problems. b. Findings No findings were identified.
Enclosure .2 Quarterly Review of Licensed Operator Performance in the Main Control Room a. Inspection Scope The inspectors observed the following activity in the main control room (MCR): Off-site power transformer 343 start-up source restoration The inspectors observed infrequently performed tests or evolution briefings, pre-shift
briefings, and reactivity control briefings to verify that the briefings met the criteria specified in Exelon's procedure
AA-1211, "Pre-Job Briefings," Revision 7. Additionally, the inspectors observed test performance to verify that procedure use, crew
communications, and coordination of activities between work groups similarly met established expectations and standards. b. Findings No findings were identified.
1R12 Maintenance Effectiveness (71111.12Q - 2 samples) a. Inspection Scope The inspectors reviewed the samples listed below to assess the effectiveness of
maintenance activities on structures, systems, and components (SSCs) performance
and reliability. The inspectors reviewed system health reports,
- PBA [[]]
SSC was properly
scoped into the
CFR 50.65 and verified that the (a)(2)
performance criteria established by the
- SSC s classified as (a)(1), the inspectors assessed the adequacy of goals and corrective actions to return these
PBAPS staff was identifying and addressing common cause failures that occurred within and
across MR system boundaries.
Unit 2 average power range monitor (APRM) 2-out-of-4 voter failure on November 1 Diesel driven fire pump 'A' battery charger high amp reading on November 19 and November 21 b. Findings No findings were identified.
1R13 Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control (71111.13 - 4 samples) a. Inspection Scope The inspectors reviewed station evaluation and management of plant risk for the
maintenance and emergent work activities listed below to verify that
- PBA [[]]
PS performed the appropriate risk assessments prior to removing equipment for work. The inspectors selected these activities based on potential risk significance relative to the reactor safety
Enclosure cornerstones. As applicable for each activity, the inspectors verified that
- PBA [[]]
PS performed emergent work, the inspectors verified that operations personnel promptly assessed and managed plant
risk. The inspectors reviewed the scope of maintenance work and discussed the results
of the assessment with the station's probabilistic risk analyst to verify plant conditions
were consistent with the risk assessment. The inspectors also reviewed the
- TS requirements and inspected portions of redundant safety systems, when applicable, to verify risk analysis assumptions were valid and applicable requirements were met. Elevated risk during
- EDG [[]]
- RHR [[]]
- OOS on November 13 and 14 Unit 3 'F' reactor recirculation jet pump flow deviations on November 19 Elevated risk during E-1
EDG unavailability for planned maintenance on December 11 and 12
b. Findings No findings were identified. 1R15 Operability Determinations and Functionality Assessments (71111.15 - 5 samples)
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed five operability determinations (ODs) for the following degraded or non-conforming conditions: Unit 2 wide-range neutron monitoring (WRNM) during core reload on October 10 Unit 2 and Unit 3 reactor water cleanup (RWCU) motor-operated valve (MOV) primary containment isolation valve operability evaluations on October 15 Unit 3 automatic depressurization system safety relief valves (SRVs) with Buna-N material on October 31 and November 1 Unit
- ESW supply pipe flow on November 20 The inspectors selected these issues based on the risk significance of the associated components and systems. The inspectors evaluated the technical adequacy of the
TS operability was properly justified and the subject component or
system remained available such that no unrecognized increase in risk occurred. The
inspectors compared the operability and design criteria in the appropriate sections of the
- PBA [[]]
PS's evaluations to determine whether the components or systems were operable. Where compensatory measures were required to maintain
operability, the inspectors determined whether the measures in place would function as
intended and were properly controlled by
- PBA [[]]
PS. The inspectors determined, where
appropriate, compliance with bounding limitations associated with the evaluations.
b. Findings No findings were identified.
Enclosure 1R19 Post-Maintenance Testing (71111.19 - 6 samples) a. Inspection Scope The inspectors reviewed the post-maintenance tests (PMTs) for the maintenance
activities listed below to verify that procedures and test activities ensured system operability and functional capability. The inspectors reviewed the test procedure to
verify that the procedure adequately tested the safety functions that may have been affected by the maintenance activity, that the acceptance criteria in the procedure was consistent with the information in the applicable licensing basis and/or design basis
documents (DBDs), and that the procedure had been properly reviewed and approved. The inspectors also witnessed the test or reviewed test data to verify that the test results
adequately demonstrated restoration of the affected safety functions. Unit
- 2 SRV actuator functional as-left testing on September 27 Unit 2 E-22 bus logic testing on October 2 Unit 2 main steam isolation valve (
- MSIV ) as-left stroke timing on October 9 Motor driven fire pump operability test following maintenance on November 7 Unit
EDG Surveillance Test (ST) following maintenance on December 3 b. Findings
No findings were identified.
1R20 Refueling Outage (71111.20 - 1 sample) a. Inspection Scope The Unit
- 2 RFO (P2R19) was conducted from September 9, 2012 through October 18, 2012. During this inspection period, the inspectors performed the activities listed below to verify
PBAPS's controls of outage activities:
Configuration management, including maintenance of defense-in-depth, commensurate with the outage plan for the key safety functions and compliance with the applicable
- OOS [[Implementation of clearance activities and confirmation that tags were properly hung and that equipment was appropriately configured to safely support the associated work or testing Installation and configuration of reactor coolant pressure, level, and temperature instrumentation instruments to provide accurate indication and instrument error accounting Status and configuration of electrical systems and switchyard activities to ensure that]]
- TS s were met Monitoring of decay heat removal operations Impact of outage work on the sustained operation of the spent fuel pool (
SFP) cooling system Reactor water inventory controls, including flow paths, alternative means for water inventory additions, and controls to prevent unexpected inventory changes Maintenance of secondary containment as required by TSs
Enclosure Core verification - independently reviewed selected portions of core verification activities and reactor physics testing Torus closure - conducted a thorough walkdown of accessible torus areas above the suppression pool water line prior to reactor startup to verify that all debris, tools, and diving gear were removed Drywell closure - conducted a thorough inspection and walkdown of the primary containment prior to reactor startup to identify any remaining debris, tools, and equipment were removed prior to reactor startup Reactor startup preparations - reviewed the tracking of startup prerequisites and observed the Plant Operations Review Committee meeting on October 15, 2012, to ensure outstanding outage issues were resolved, and startup reviews were detailed Startup and ascension to full power operation - observed selected activities including: reactor criticality; portions of the plant heat-up, main generator synchronization to the grid, and portions of the power ascension to full power
operation Licensee identification and resolution of problems - reviewed corrective action reports related to
PBAPS was identifying issues at the appropriate level and taking adequate corrective action to resolve the
issues b. Findings
No findings were identified. 1R22 Surveillance Testing (71111.22 - 5 samples) a. Inspection Scope (4 routine surveillances;
STs and/or reviewed test data of selected risk-
significant
procedure requirements. The inspectors verified that test acceptance criteria were clear, tests demonstrated operational readiness and were consistent with design documentation, test instrumentation had current calibrations and the range and accuracy
for the application, tests were performed as written, and applicable test prerequisites
were satisfied. Upon test completion, the inspectors considered whether the test results
supported that equipment was capable of performing the required safety functions. The inspectors reviewed the following
- ST -O-020-560-2(3), Reactor Coolant Leakage Test, various tests from October 1 through December 31, 2012 (
RCS leakage sample)
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
Enclosure Cornerstone: Emergency Preparedness
EP Drill Evaluation (71114.06 - 1 sample)
Simulator Evaluation a. Inspection Scope The inspectors evaluated the conduct of a routine
- PBA [[]]
PS emergency drill on
December 12, 2012, to identify any weaknesses and deficiencies in the classification,
notification, and protective action recommendation development activities. The
inspectors observed emergency response operations in the simulator, and technical support center to determine whether the event classification, notifications, and protective action recommendations were performed in accordance with procedures. The
inspectors also attended the control room simulator drill critique to compare inspector
observations with those identified by
PBAPS's critique
and to verify whether
- PBA [[]]
PS staff was properly identifying weaknesses and entering
them into the CAP. b. Findings
No findings were identified.
2.
- RADIAT [[]]
- ION [[]]
- SAFE [[]]
TY
Cornerstone: Occupational/Public Radiation Safety (PS) 2RS5 Radiation Monitoring Instrumentation (71124.05) a. Inspection Scope During the week of December 3 - 7, 2012, the inspectors verified that Exelon personnel
were ensuring the accuracy and operability of radiation monitoring instruments that are
used to (1) monitor areas, materials, and workers to ensure a radiological safe work environment, and (2) detect and quantify radioactive process streams and effluent releases. The instrumentation subject to this review included equipment used to monitor
radiological conditions incident to normal plant operations, including anticipated
operational occurrences, and conditions resulting from postulated accidents. The
inspectors used the requirements in
- CFR Part 50 Appendix A - Criterion 60, "Control of Release of Radioactivity to the Environment," and Criterion 64, "Monitoring Radioactive Releases,"
- 10 CFR 50 Appendix I, "Numerical Guides for Design Objectives and Limiting Conditions for Operation to meet the Criterion "As Low as is Reasonably Achievable" (
ALARA) for Radioactive Material in Light-Water - Cooled Nuclear Power Reactor Effluents," 40 CFR Part 190, "Environmental Radiation
Protection Standards for Nuclear Power Operations,"
- NUREG -0737, "Clarification of Three Mile Island Corrective Action Requirements," Offsite Dose Calculation Manual (
TSs
as criteria for determining compliance.
Enclosure The inspectors performed plant walkdowns of effluent radiation monitoring systems, including liquid and gaseous systems. The inspectors verified that effluent/process monitor configurations align with
- OD [[]]
CM descriptions. The inspectors verified that channel calibration and functional tests were performed
consistent with radiological effluent
RETS)/ODCM. The inspectors verified that (a) Exelon calibrated its monitors with National Institute of Standards and Technology
(NIST) traceable sources, (b) if a primary calibration, it adequately represents the plant nuclide mix, (c) if a secondary calibration, it verifies the primary calibration, and (d) the channel calibrations encompass the instrument's alarm set points. The inspectors verified that effluent monitor alarm set points were established as
provided in the
- OD [[]]
CM and station procedures. For changes to effluent monitor set points, the inspectors evaluated the basis for changes to ensure that an adequate justification exists. The inspectors selected laboratory analytical instruments used for radiological analyses
and verified that daily performance checks and calibration data indicated that the
frequency of the calibrations was adequate and there were no indications of degraded instrument performance. As part of the problem identification and resolution (PI&R) review, the inspectors verified
that appropriate corrective actions were implemented in response to indications of
degraded instrument performance. The inspectors selected the drywell/containment high-range monitor and reviewed the
calibration documentation since the last inspection. The inspectors verified that an electronic calibration was completed for all range decades above 10 rem/hour and that at least one decade at or below 10 rem/hour was calibrated using an appropriate radiation source. The inspectors determined that the calibration acceptance criteria were reasonable,
accounting for the large measuring range and the intended purpose of the instruments. The inspectors reviewed Exelon's capability to collect high-range, post-accident iodine effluent samples. The inspectors observed electronic and radiation calibration of these instruments to
verify conformity with Exelon's calibration and test protocols. The inspectors reviewed Exelon's 10 CFR Part 61, "Licensing Requirements for Land
Disposal of Radioactive Waste," source term to determine if the calibration sources used
were representative of the types and energies of radiation encountered in the plant. The inspectors verified that problems associated with radiation monitoring instrumentation were being identified by Exelon personnel at an appropriate threshold and were properly addressed for resolution in Exelon's CAP.
Enclosure b. Findings No findings were identified. 2RS6 Radioactive Gaseous and Liquid Effluent Treatment (71124.06 - 1 sample) a. Inspection Scope During the week of December 3 - 7, 2012, the inspectors: (1) ensured that the gaseous and liquid effluent processing systems were maintained so that radiological discharges are properly mitigated, monitored, and evaluated with regard to public exposure;
(2) ensured that abnormal radioactive gaseous or liquid discharges and conditions, when
effluent radiation monitors were OOS, were controlled in accordance with applicable
regulatory requirements and Exelon procedures; (3) verified that Exelon's quality control program ensured that the radioactive effluent sampling and analysis requirements were satisfied so that discharges of radioactive materials were adequately quantified and
evaluated; and (4) verified the adequacy of public dose calculations and projections
resulting from radioactive effluent discharges. The inspectors used the requirements in
CFR Part 50 Appendix A - Criterion 60,
"Control of Release of Radioactivity to the Environment," and Criterion 64, "Monitoring Radioactive Releases;
- 10 CFR 50 Appendix I Numerical Guides for Design Objectives and Limiting Conditions for Operations to Meet the Criterion "
ALARA" for Radioactive
Material in Light-Water - Cooled Nuclear Power Reactor Effluents;" 10 CFR 50.75(g),
"Reporting and Recordkeeping for Decommissioning Planning;" 40 CFR Part 141,
"Maximum Contaminant Levels for Radionuclides;"
- 40 CFR Part 190, "Environmental Radiation Protection Standards for Nuclear Power Operations;" the guidance in Regulatory Guides 1.109, 1.21, 4.1 and 4.15;
- 1302 OD [[]]
CM Guidance:
Standard Radiological Effluent Control, as well as applicable Industry standards, and
Exelon procedures required by
ODCM as criteria for determining compliance. The inspectors reviewed the Annual Radiological Effluent Release Reports issued since the last inspection. The inspectors determined that the reports were submitted as
required by the
TSs. The inspectors identified radioactive effluent monitor operability issues reported by Exelon as provided in effluent release reports, and
determined that the issues were entered into the
ODCM made by Exelon since the last inspection. The inspectors determined that Exelon had not identified any non-
radioactive systems that had become contaminated as disclosed either through an event report or as documented in the
- OD [[]]
CM since the last inspection. The inspectors reviewed reported groundwater monitoring results, and changes to Exelon's written program for identifying and controlling contaminated spills/leaks to
groundwater. The inspectors reviewed licensee event reports (LERs) and/or special reports related to
the effluent program issued since the previous inspection. The inspectors identified no additional focus areas for the inspection based on the scope/breadth of problems described in these reports. The inspectors reviewed effluent program implementing
procedures, particularly those associated with effluent sampling, effluent monitor set
point determinations and dose calculations.
Enclosure The inspectors performed walkdowns of selected components of the gaseous and liquid discharge systems to verify that equipment configuration and flow paths align with the documents reviewed and assess equipment material condition. For equipment or areas associated with the systems selected above, that were not readily accessible due to radiological conditions, the inspectors reviewed Exelon's material condition surveillance
records. The inspectors walked down those filtered ventilation systems whose test
results were reviewed during the inspection. The inspectors verified that there were no
conditions, such as degraded high efficiency particulate air (HEPA)/charcoal banks, improper alignment, or system installation issues that would impact the performance, or the effluent monitoring capability, of the effluent system. The inspectors determined that Exelon had not made any significant changes to their
effluent release points. The inspectors observed the routine processing and discharge of effluents (including
sample collection and analysis). The inspectors verified that appropriate effluent
treatment equipment was being used and that radioactive liquid waste was being
processed and discharged in accordance with procedure requirements and aligns with
discharge permits. The inspectors selected effluent sampling activities and verified that adequate controls
had been implemented to ensure representative samples were obtained. The inspectors
determined that the facility was not routinely relying on the use of compensatory
sampling in lieu of adequate system maintenance, based on the frequency of compensatory sampling since the last inspection. The inspectors reviewed the results of the inter-laboratory comparison program to verify
the quality of the radioactive effluent sample analyses. The inspectors verified that the
inter-laboratory comparison program included hard-to-detect isotopes as appropriate. The inspectors reviewed the methodology that Exelon uses to determine the effluent
stack and vent flow rates. The inspectors verified that the flow rates are consistent with
- UFS [[]]
AR values, and that differences between assumed and actual stack
and vent flow rates do not affect the results of the projected public doses. The inspectors verified that surveillance test results since the previous inspection for
HEPA and charcoal filtration) met TS acceptance criteria. The inspectors reviewed radioactive liquid and gaseous waste discharge permits. The inspectors verified that the projected doses to members of the public were accurate and based on representative samples of the discharge path. The inspectors evaluated the
methods used to determine the isotopes that are included in the source term to ensure
all applicable radionuclides were included, within delectability standards. The inspectors
reviewed the current 10 CFR Part 61 analyses to ensure hard-to-detect radionuclides
were included in the source term. The inspectors reviewed changes in
- PBA [[]]
PS's offsite dose calculations since the last
inspection. The inspectors verified that the changes are consistent with the
- OD [[]]
CM and
Regulatory Guide 1.109. The inspectors reviewed meteorological dispersion and
deposition factors used in the
- OD [[]]
CM and effluent dose calculations to ensure appropriate factors were being used for public dose calculations. The inspectors
Enclosure reviewed the latest land use census and verified that changes have been factored into the dose calculations. The inspectors verified that Exelon was continuing to implement the voluntary Nuclear
Energy Institute (NEI)/Industry Groundwater Protection Initiative (GPI) since the last
inspection. The inspectors reviewed monitoring results of the GPI to determine if Exelon
had implemented its program as intended, and to identify any anomalous results. No
anomalous results were identified. The inspectors reviewed identified leakage or spill events and entries made into
CFR 50.75 (g) records. The inspectors reviewed evaluations of leaks or spills, and
reviewed any remediation actions taken for effectiveness. The inspectors reviewed
onsite contamination events involving contamination of groundwater. The inspectors verified that on-site groundwater sample results and a description of any
significant on-site leaks/spills into groundwater for each calendar year were documented in the Annual Radiological Environmental Operating Report for
TS (RETS). The inspectors verified that problems associated with the effluent monitoring and control program were being identified by Exelon at an appropriate threshold and were properly
addressed for resolution in Exelon's CAP.
b. Findings No findings were identified.
4.
- OTHER [[]]
ACTIVITIES 4OA1 Performance Indicator Verification (71151 - 12 samples)
.1 Mitigating Systems Performance Index (10
- MS [[]]
PI samples)
a. Inspection Scope The inspectors sampled
MSPI) for the following systems for the period of October 1, 2011 through
September 30, 2012:
Unit 2 and Unit 3 Emergency Alternating Current Power System (MS06) Unit 2 and Unit
MS09) Unit 2 and Unit 3 Support Cooling Water System (MS10) To determine the accuracy of the performance indicator (PI) data reported during this
period, the inspectors used definitions and guidance contained in NEI Document 99-02,
"Regulatory Assessment
NRC
integrated inspection reports to validate the accuracy of the submittals.
Enclosure b. Findings No findings were identified. .2 Occupational Radiation Safety Cornerstone (1 sample)
a. Inspection Scope The inspectors reviewed a listing of licensee action reports for issues related to the occupational radiation safety
OR01), which measures non-conformances with high radiation areas greater than 1 Roentgen/hour (R/hr) and unplanned personnel
exposures greater than 100 millirem (mrem) total effective dose equivalent (TEDE), 5 rem skin dose equivalent (SDE), 1.5 rem lens dose equivalent (LDE), or 100 mrem to the unborn child. The inspectors determined that no PI events for occupational radiation safety had occurred during the assessment period.
b. Findings No findings were identified. .3 Public Radiation Safety Cornerstone (1 sample)
a. Inspection Scope The inspectors reviewed a listing of licensee action reports for issues related to the public radiation safety
PR01), which measures radiological effluent release
occurrences per site that exceed 1.5 mrem/quarter (qtr) whole body or 5 mrem/qtr organ dose for liquid effluents; or 5 millirads (mrads)/qtr gamma air dose, 10 mrads/qtr beta air
dose; or 7.5 mrems/qtr organ doses from Iodine-131, I-133, Hydrogen-3, and particulates for gaseous effluents. The inspectors determined that no PI events for public radiation safety had occurred during the assessment period.
b. Findings No findings were identified. 4OA2 Identification and Resolution of Problems (71152 - 1 sample)
Routine Review of PI&R Activities a. Inspection Scope
As required by Inspection Procedure (IP) 71152, "Promblem Identification and
Resolution," the inspectors routinely reviewed issues during baseline inspection activities and plant status reviews to verify that
CAP at an
appropriate threshold, gave adequate attention to timely corrective actions, and identified and addressed adverse trends. In order to assist with the identification of repetitive equipment failures and specific human performance issues for follow-up, the inspectors performed a daily screening of items entered into the
CR screening meetings.
Enclosure b. Findings and Observations No findings were identified.
.2 Semi-Annual Review to Identify Trends (1 Semi-annual Trend sample)
a. Inspection Scope The inspectors performed a semi-annual review of site issues, as required by Inspection
Procedure 71152, "Problem Identification and Resolution," to identify trends that might
indicate the existence of more significant safety issues. In this review, the inspectors
included repetitive or closely-related issues that may have been documented by Exelon outside of the corrective action program, such as trend reports, performance indicators, major equipment problem lists, system health reports, maintenance rule assessments, and maintenance or corrective action program backlogs. The inspectors also reviewed
Exelon's corrective action program database to assess CRs written in various subject
areas (equipment problems, human performance issues, etc.), as well as individual
issues identified during the
- CAP action tracking system (Passport) from June 1, 2012 through November 30, 2012. The inspectors evaluated the
- XVI , "Corrective Action." b. Findings and Observations No findings were identified. The inspectors determined that
- CAP , adequately evaluating the identified issues, and properly identifying adverse trends before they became more safety significant problems. The inspectors noted adverse trends identified by
- PBA [[]]
PS in the Maintenance and
Operations Department in the area of human performance; including configuration control and clearance and tagging that have resulted in low-level issues of minor risk significance: Operations - Common Cause Analysis 1419073, "Nuclear Oversight Identified: Operations Shortfalls in Use of Human Performance Tools" - Common Cause Analysis 1423654, "Adverse Trend in Clearance and Tagging Events" -
- IR 1430644, "Corporate Escalation due to Continued Adverse Human Performance Event Trend" Maintenance -
IR 1430748, "Elevation for Maintenance Department Human Performance at Peach Bottom"
Enclosure - Common Cause Analysis 1394685, "Adverse Trend in Maintenance Department and Crew Clock Resets" - Common Cause Analysis 1436530, "Safety and Human Error Prevention Tools Declining Trend in Maintenance"
LER 05000277/2012001-00, Laboratory Analysis Identified Safety Relief Valve and Safety Valve Setpoint Deficiencies (1 sample) On September 25, 2012, site engineering personnel determined, based on information
received from a vendor laboratory performing
SV that
were in place during the 19th Unit 2 operating cycle. The
ASME Code
allowable + 3% tolerance. The one
SV were
replaced with refurbished
- SV for the 20th Unit 2 operating cycle. There was no actual safety consequences associated with this event. The enforcement aspects of this
OA7. This LER is closed.
.2 (Closed)
- LER 05000277/2012002-00, Common Cause Inoperability of Reactor Protection System Turbine Control Valve Instruments (1 sample) On October 1, 2012, during surveillance testing performed during the P2R19
RFO,
Instrumentation and Controls personnel identified that two of the four instruments used
to perform the
EOC-RPT) functions
for turbine control valve (TCV) fast closure were outside of their
- TS [[allowable value of > 500 psig oil pressure. The 'A' pressure sensing instrument (]]
PS-4121A) was found at a trip setting of 495 psig and the 'B' pressure sensing instrument (PS-4121B) was found at
a trip setting of 493 psig. The cause of this event is due to instrument drift. This
occurrence is reportable as a result of a common cause inoperability that resulted in two
instruments drifting low outside of the TS allowable value. The 'A' and 'B' instruments
were replaced and calibrated to within acceptable limits. There was no actual safety consequences associated with this event. If an operational transient would have occurred during power operations, the 'C' and 'D' instrument channels were operable
and would have provided the
- LER 05000278/2012003-00, Loss of Control Room Emergency Ventilation Function Due to Failure of Ventilation Fan to Start (1 sample) On October 4, 2012, during surveillance testing of a
emergency ventilation (MCREV) fan did not start as expected when an initiation signal
was generated. Although the 'B'
MCREV fan switch was
positioned such that the switch contacts were still open, thereby preventing a start of the
'A' fan.
- PBA [[]]
PS determined this event was reportable because it could have prevented
the fulfillment of the
- MCR [[]]
EV safety function with both trains inoperable simultaneously.
Enclosure The switch was correctly repositioned on the same day, and the system was returned to an operable status.
- CAP for investigation, extent-of-condition review, and evaluation for any additional corrective action that may be required. No findings or violations of
TS
allowed outage times were not exceeded. This LER is closed.
.4 Event Response - Super Storm Sandy (1 sample) a. Inspection Scope From October 25 to October 28, 2012, the inspectors reviewed
- PBA [[]]
PS's activities to
prepare for the potential arrival of Super Storm Sandy.
- PBA [[]]
PS personnel implemented
the actions specified by procedure
- PBA [[]]
PS due to the expected arrival of Super Storm Sandy within the next 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />. Inspectors remained on-site
continuously until the passing of the Super Storm on the following day. The inspectors
noted that
OCC) on October 29, 2012,
to track Super Storm Sandy and provide a centralized location for control of severe
weather-related actions. The inspectors monitored plant activities in the
OCC and monitored selected plant parameters, including: actual and projected onsite weather conditions; offsite power status; key safety equipment status; river water intake
conditions; plant equipment issues; security readiness and equipment issues; and
emergency planning considerations. b. Findings
No findings were identified.
INPO) Report Review
a. Inspection Scope The inspectors reviewed the final report for the
- PBAPS [[]]
- INPO assessment conducted in April 2012. The inspectors reviewed this report to ensure that any issues identified were consistent with
- IN [[]]
PO
identified any significant safety issues that required further NRC follow-up. b. Findings No findings were identified.
.2 Temporary Instruction (TI) 2515/182, Review of the Industry Initiative to Control Degradation of Underground Piping and Tanks, Phase 1 (2515/182 - 1 sample) a. Inspection Scope Exelon's buried piping and underground piping and tanks program was inspected in
accordance with paragraphs 03.01a through 03.01c of the TI and was found to meet all
applicable aspects of the
Enclosure b. Findings No findings were identified. .3
a. Inspection Scope The objective of this TI is to assess groundwater protection programs to determine
whether licensees' have implemented the program elements in their groundwater protection programs that were identified as incomplete in
- TI 2515/173. During December 3 - 7, 2012, the inspectors reviewed previously identified incomplete program elements within Exelon's Industry
GPI. The incomplete program elements
previously identified (NRC Inspection Report 05000277/2010004: 05000278/2010004) were: 1.
- GPI Objective 1.2 g - At the time of the inspection, a specific frequency had been established for periodic reviews of
SSCs and work practices. However, the frequency had not yet been placed in a procedure. This matter was identified in a
self-assessment and placed in the
AR924237) 2. GPI Objective 1.3 f - At the time of the inspection, Exelon had established a program for the preventative maintenance of groundwater wells. However, the program had not yet been incorporated into all applicable implementing procedures. Exelon
placed this issue into its
AR924237) 3. GPI Objective 1.4 a.- At the time of the inspection, written procedures had not been established outlining the decision making process for remediation of leaks or spills or other instances of inadvertent releases, including consideration of migration
pathways. Exelon identified this issue during an assessment of
CAP. (AR924237) 4. GPI Objective 1.4 c.- At the time of the inspection, an evaluation had not been performed and documented on the decommissioning impacts resulting from remediation activities or the absence thereof (e.g., do licensee procedures include a
decision making process to evaluate prompt remediation or delayed remediation and its impact on decommissioning). Exelon identified this issue during an assessment of
- GPI Objective 1.5 - Exelon developed program procedures to establish a record keeping program to meet the requirements of 10
CFR 50.75(g) and developed an
historical spill/leak list. However, Exelon identified, during a June 2010 audit, that
the individual record files did not reflect some information contained in station files.
Exelon initiated a review to ensure all appropriate information, consistent with criteria in
- 10 CFR 50.75(g) and the program procedure, were included in its decommissioning files. Exelon placed this matter into its
- GPI Objective 3.2 a. - An independent, knowledgeable individual had not performed, under the auspices of
NEI, an initial review within one year of the initial self-
Enclosure assessment, per
- GPI Objective 3.1.a. This assessment was completed on February 28, 2010. Exelon placed this matter into its
CAP. (AR1041430) The inspectors reviewed actions taken to correct the above listed incomplete items:
b. Findings and Observations
No findings were identified. The inspectors concluded that Exelon had satisfactorily addressed the incomplete items
documented in TI 2515/173 as discussed below.
Item 1: Exelon inserted in section 4.3.2 of Procedure
EN-AA-408-4000 a groundwater
well preventative maintenance program; For incomplete item 3, Exelon inserted in
section 4.1.7 of Procedure
AA-407
the decision making process for the remediation of leaks or spills. Item 3: Exelon inserted in section 4.1.7 of Procedure
AA-408-4000 and Attachment
of Procedure
AA-407 the decision making process for the remediation of leaks or
spills.
Item 4: Exelon inserted in section 4.1.7 of Procedure
AA-408-4000, and created with an Operational Technical Decision, a methodology for evaluating decommissioning impacts resulting from groundwater remediation activities.
Item 5: Exelon amended Procedure
- AA -228 (Revision 1) to ensure adequate records are maintained to meet the requirements of 10 CFR 50.75(g). The inspectors noted that this issue was associated with Exelon's Three Mile Island site and not
- PBA [[]]
PS.
Item 6: Although the independent assessment was not performed in the time frame
specified in the
NRC Inspection Report 05000277/2010004: 05000278/2010004, this assessment was completed on February 28, 2010, and no further action is necessary.
.4 TI 2515/187 - Inspection of Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.3 - Flooding Walkdowns
a. Inspection Scope The inspectors verified that
- PBA [[]]
PS's walkdown packages for both the accompanied and
independent plant area walkdowns listed below contained the elements as specified in NEI 12-07 Walkdown Guidance document.
Enclosure The inspectors accompanied
- PBAPS [[confirmed the following flood protection features: Visual inspection of the flood protection feature was performed if the flood protection feature was relevant. External visual inspection for indications of degradation that would prevent its credited function from being performed. Reasonable simulation of manual flood protection actions. Critical]]
- SSC [[dimensions were measured. Available physical margin, where applicable, was determined. Flood protection feature functionality was determined using both visual observation and documentation review. The inspectors independently walked down the safety-related pump structure, and verified that the following flood protection features were in place: Penetration seals Flood doors and gaskets Internal and external walls Floor Roof parapet and drains Sump system Reasonable simulation of manual flood protection actions The inspectors verified that noncompliances with current licensing requirements, and issues identified in accordance with the 10]]
- CAP. In addition, issues identified in response to Item 2.g that could challenge risk significant equipment and
- PBA [[]]
PS's ability to mitigate the
consequences will be subject to additional NRC evaluation.
.5
- TI 2515/188 - Inspection of Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.3 - Seismic Walkdowns a. Inspection Scope The inspectors accompanied
PBAPS and contracted personnel on their seismic
walkdowns of selected portions of the following plant areas: Safety-related pump structure Service water traveling screen structure The inspectors observed walkdowns of the following equipment listed on the
SWEL):
Enclosure
- HPSW pump room air supply fan 'A' The inspectors independently performed their walkdown of the Unit 2 drywell on September 30 and October 12, 2012, and the following equipment listed on the
- ADS instrument nitrogen accumulator The inspectors verified that, for the equipment listed above, the
- PBA [[]]
PS and contracted
personnel confirmed that the following seismic features were free of potential adverse seismic conditions: Anchorage was free of bent, broken, missing, or loose hardware Anchorage was free of corrosion that is more than mild surface oxidation Anchorage was free of visible cracks in the concrete near the anchors Anchorage configuration was consistent with plant documentation SSCs will not be damaged from impact by nearby equipment or structures Overhead equipment, distribution systems, ceiling tiles and lighting, and masonry block walls are secure and not likely to collapse onto the equipment Attached lines have adequate flexibility to avoid damage The area appears to be free of potentially adverse seismic interactions that could cause flooding or spray in the area The area appears to be free of potentially adverse seismic interactions that could cause a fire in the area The area appears to be free of potentially adverse seismic interactions associated with housekeeping practices, storage of portable equipment, and temporary installations (e.g., scaffolding, lead shielding) Observations made during the walkdown that could not be determined to be acceptable
were entered into
PBAPS personnel.
b. Findings
No findings were identified. .6 Post-Approval Site Inspection for License Renewal (IP 71003)
a. Inspection Scope On a sampling basis, the inspectors verified that Exelon had completed the necessary actions to comply with the license conditions that are a part of the renewed operating
Enclosure license, and had implemented the aging management programs included in the
- NRC staff's license renewal safety evaluation report. The inspectors verified that Exelon followed the guidance in
NEI 99-04 for the license renewal commitment change process, including the elimination of commitments, and properly evaluated, and reported where
necessary, changes to license renewal commitments listed in the
- UFS [[]]
AR in accordance
with 10 CFR 50.59.
This inspection verified, by observation, selected: License conditions added as part of the
- PBAPS renewed license License renewal commitments and selected aging management programs License renewal commitments revised after the renewed license was granted, were implemented in accordance with Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (
CFR) Part 54, "Requirements for the Renewal of Operating Licenses for Nuclear Power
Plants"
b. Findings and Observations No findings were identified.
The inspectors concluded that Exelon's actions regarding the commitments described
below were complete and met regulatory expectations as reflected in the NRC staff's
safety evaluation report. Commitments and Aging Management Programs Flow-Accelerated Corrosion Program The inspectors observed ultrasonic measurements taken of the standby liquid control tank suction piping (WO CO241697). The piping was examined 12-inches on either side
of the weld between valve HV-2-11-11 and the tee downstream of the weld location.
The examination was implemented in accordance with procedure
AA-335-045, "Manual Ultrasonic Requirements for Non-PDI Examinations," Revision 2. This evolution was evidence of the implementation of the aging management program proposed in the original Exelon license renewal application Section B.1.1, "Flow-Accelerated Corrosion
Program," which was codified by the renewed license condition requiring renewal related aging management programs entered into the
- UFS [[]]
AR.
Commitment 6 - Inspection of Outer Sluice Gates Commitment 6, in the renewal Safety Evaluation Report, Appendix A, requires Exelon to
perform an inspection of outer sluice gates in the circulating water pump structure. This
commitment encompassed by the
- UFS [[]]
AR, Section A.2.5, "Outdoor, Buried, and
Submerged Component Inspection Activities," and must be performed prior to period of extended operation. This commitment was generated in the applicant's response to the
RAI) 3.5-3, in a letter dated May 21,
2002. This commitment was tracked by Exelon as Commitment T04329, which was
noted on the work order implementing the inspection.
The outer sluice gates work in conjunction with the ESW system to support safe shutdown following a loss of the normal heat sink. As a consequence of the safe shutdown function of the structural steel sluice gates, Exelon identified the structural
Enclosure steel sluice gates and embedment, in Table 2.4-11 of the original application to renew their license, as a long-lived structural component of the circulating water pump structure that is subject to an aging management review. The sluice gates and embedment have the intended function of maintaining the pressure boundary when the emergency cooling
water system is called upon to operate. During the Unit 2 outage, when desilting
operations are implemented at the intakes, the circulating water pump structure, the
- HP [[]]
SW cross-tie sluice gate, and the Unit 2 'A' and
'B' sluice gates, were visually examined for a significant loss of material. The inspectors observed the diving and inspection activities implemented as part of the desilting operations, interviewed the operation manager, and reviewed the recurring task activity
(WO NBR R1178278).
Commitment 8 - Reactor Pressure Vessel Top Guide Inspection Commitment 8, in the renewal Safety Evaluation Report, Appendix A, requires that
Exelon perform an inspection of the reactor pressure vessel top guide prior to the period
of extended operation. The commitment is part of the aging management program as
described in the
NRC inspectors observed the implementation of remote visual examinations of the reactor pressure vessel top guide and reviewed the
ongoing video interrogation of the guides by trained and knowledgeable vendors.
MR Structure Monitoring Program The inspectors observed the implementation of a visual examination of the structures
associated with the 'B' and 'D' core spray rooms. This inspection was part of aging
management program B1.16, "MR Structure Monitoring Program." The inspectors noted that the check list used during the visual inspection included all the essential elements of a maintenance monitoring program. Such items as corrosion, missing or degraded
grout, and crack welds in structural steel components were included in the checklist.
Masonry walls, although limited, were visual inspected for cracked joints, deteriorated
penetrations, and missing or broken blocks. Component supports were checked for missing or loose bolts and cracked welds.
4OA6 Meetings, Including Exit Quarterly Resident Exit Meeting Summary On January 18, 2013, the resident inspectors presented the inspection results to
Mr. Michael Massaro, Site Vice President, and other
- PBA [[]]
PS staff, who acknowledged
the findings. Mr.
- USNRC , Region 1, Division of Reactor Projects, Branch 4, attended this quarterly inspection exit meeting. The inspectors verified that no proprietary information was retained by the inspectors or documented in this report.
- 4OA 7 Licensee-Identified Violations The following violations of very low safety significance (Green) were identified by Exelon and are violations of
NRC requirements which meet the criteria of the NRC Enforcement
Policy for being dispositioned as
SVs shall be operable in reactor operating modes 1, 2, and 3. TS 3.4.3.1 surveillance
Enclosure requirement states that the
- SV s opening lift setpoints are maintained within + 1% tolerance of the design opening pressure. Contrary to the above, information received by site engineering from a laboratory performing
SV as-found testing, determined that on September 25, 2012, the valve setpoint deficiencies existed with
six
SV were determined to have their as-found setpoints outside of the
SV being outside of their
allowable as-found setpoints was due to setpoint drift. The
SV were replaced
with refurbished
- SV for the 20th Unit 2 operating cycle. The amount of setpoint drift was within the as found Target Rock
SRVs/SV were replaced with refurbished valves that were tested and opened within the allowable + 1% tolerance. The inspectors determined that the finding was of very low safety significance (Green) in accordance with Section A of
Exhibit 2 in Appendix A of IMC 0609, "The Significance Determination Process for
Findings at Power," because the SRV's safety function was not affected. Although
outside the lift setpoint tolerance, the as found
- SV lift pressure values would not have challenged the reactor vessel design maximum pressure rating during the most limiting postulated accident event. The inspectors reviewed
- TS setpoint change submittal to a + 3% tolerance appropriate. Because this finding is of very low safety significance, the as-found out of tolerance
SRVs were replaced with SRVs that had
the proper lift setpoint prior to the Unit 2 reactor plant startup, and the issue was
entered into Exelon's
IR 1418320 and apparent cause evaluation
20516, this violation is being treated as a Green
- TS [[]]
- RPS instrument function with one or more required channels inoperable, action shall be taken within six hours to place a channel or trip system in a trippedcondition within six hours. Additionally,
- TS [[]]
EOC) recirculation pump trip (RPT) instrument channels inoperable, action be taken to
place the channel in a tripped condition within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> if the channel is not restored
to operable status. Contrary to the above,
- PBA [[]]
PS determined that the 'A' and 'B'
channels of the Unit 2 turbine control valve (TCV) fast closure pressure sensing
instruments were inoperable for a period of time greater than allowed by TS. Specifically, the as-found trip setpoints of the 'A' and 'B' sensing instruments were identified to be below the allowable trip setting during surveillance testing on October
1, 2012.
RFO during performance of the ST. Both instruments were replaced and calibrated to within acceptable limits
prior to reactor startup. The inspectors determined that the finding was of very low safety significance (Green) in accordance with Section C of Exhibit 2 in Appendix A of IMC 0609, " The Significance Determination Process for Findings at Power,"
because RPS system trip capability was maintained with the 'C' and 'D' instrument
channels. Because this finding is of very low safety significance and has been
entered into Exelon's
Enclosure
- 10 CFR 50.54(q) requires, in part, that a power reactor licensee follow an Emergency Plan that meets the requirements of 10
CFR 50.47(b). 10 CFR 50.47(b) requires, in part, that a standard emergency classification and action level scheme, the bases of
which includes facility system and effluent parameters, is in use by Exelon. Contrary to the above, between December 2008 and November 2012, the standard emergency classification and action level scheme associated with radiological
effluents at
- PBA [[]]
PS was not updated to reflect the changes in X/Q dispersion factor
that occurred during the December
- 2008 OD [[]]
CM revision. Consequently, the effluent
monitor emergency classification and action level thresholds for the reactor building
exhaust vent stack were non-conservative until this condition was identified and promptly corrected by
- PBAPS in November 2012. The inspectors determined that the finding was of very low safety significance (Green) in accordance with
NRC IMC
0609, Appendix B, "Emergency Preparedness Significance Determination Process,"
Table 5.4-1, because the emergency action level (EAL) classification process would
not be capable of classifying an Unusual Event (UE) within 15 minutes, but would still be capable of declaring all other
- EAL s within 15 minutes. Because this finding is of very low safety significance, and has been entered into Exelon's
CAP under
NRC's
- ATTACH [[]]
- MENT [[:]]
- SUPPLE [[]]
- INFORM [[]]
- SUPPLE [[]]
- INFORM [[]]
- ATION [[]]
- KEY [[]]
- POINTS [[]]
- OF [[]]
CONTACT Exelon Generation Company Personnel Michael Massaro, Site Vice President
P. Navin, Plant Manager J. Armstrong, Regulatory Assurance Manager T. Moore, Site Engineering Director
M. Herr, Operations Director
J. Kovalchick, Security Manager P. Rau, Work Management Director R. Reiner, Chemistry Manager R. Holmes, Radiation Protection Manager
J. Bowers, Training Director
B. Henningan, Operations Training Manager
NRC Personnel M. Gray, Branch Chief S. Hansell, Senior Resident Inspector
A. Ziedonis, Resident Inspector
- J. Furia, Senior Health Physicist M. Modes, Senior Reactor Engineer A. Rosebrook, Senior Project Engineer
- LIST [[]]
- OF [[]]
- ITEMS [[]]
- DISCUS [[]]
SED
Opened
None
Opened/Closed None
Closed 05000277/2012001-00 LER Laboratory Analysis Identifies Safety Relief Valve and Safety Valve Setpoint Deficiencies
(Section 4OA3.1)05000277/2012002-00 LER Common Cause Inoperability of
Reactor Protection System Turbine Control Valve Instruments (Section 4OA3.2)
Attachment 05000278/2012003-00 LER Loss of Control Room Emergency Ventilation Function Due to Failure of Ventilation Fan to Start Failure of
(Section 4OA3.3)
Discussed/Closed None.
- LIST [[]]
- OF [[]]
- DOCUME [[]]
- NTS [[]]
- REVIEW [[]]
ED * -- Indicates NRC-identified
Section 1R01: Adverse Weather Protection Procedures
AO 53.2-0, Equipment Checks After a Thunderstorm, Revision 4
Condition Reports 1432946, Water Intrusion E-2 EDG Bay from Door #D03, Performed on 10/30
1432957, Update to
KV CB Trouble Alarm
1197180, 2011-2012 Winter Readiness Tracking Assignments 1244622, 2011-2012 Winter Readiness Tracking Assignments (Snow) 1344584, 2011-2012 Post-Winter Readiness Critique
1355667,
- PBA [[]]
PS Winter Readiness Critique for 2011-2012
1304044, Engineering Review Requested
296874,
RB Vent Supply Heating Coil Replacement 1420796, Backdraft Damper did not Auto Close 1420797, Backdraft Damper did not Auto Close
1418459, Insulation Cover Broken off on Penetration "S" on U2 CST
21639, 'A' Auxiliary Boiler Suspected Leakage
1435494, 'A' Auxiliary Boiler Failed Post Maintenance
PM of Delivery Date 1429450, 0BE139 Temperature Control not Functioning 1429547, Heating Unit not Working
1431972, Mechanically Restrain Cooling Tower Fans In Accordance With
PB-108-111-1001
1437802, Unit 2 Change in Reactor Drywell Pressure Indications
1437808, Fan Does Not Start
Attachment 1438614, Test Equipment Prevents Closing Louvers for Winter Readiness 1438884,
PMM6 Unable to Complete Scheduled Work 1442663, Work Week 1247 This IR Goes with 1442654
1443988, Nitrogen Leaking from Boilers
1444436,
1452161, Wall Heater in BRE 8 is Broken
1444437,
AK019 - Low Evaporator Entering Water Temperature
1444518, No Steam or Water at Hand Valve When Placing Steam Hear In Service
1445229, Develop Procedure for MCR Chiller Winter Operation
1445423, Multiple Trips of Ionics Skid 1445515, 2012-2013 Winter Readiness Exception to
AA-107 Attachment 1 1444626, Potential Asbestos Contamination
1444977, Aux Steam Trap Through Wall Leak D/S HV-3-24F-38349
1445469, Work Not Completed as Scheduled
1446454, Valve Packing Leak RB Heating System
1446572,
DP in Spec
1452736,
RB Heating Coil 2AE053 Drain Valve
1452708,
RB Ventilation Supply Heating Coil 'B'
1453924, Unit
AA-102-102 Gap Found
1456604, Leaking Steam Trap in Return Line of Area Heater
1457021, Preparation for Discharge Canal to Intake Pond Cross-Tie Gate Removal
1458286, Tracking for
SE-16 Bases, Grid Emergency - Bases, Revision 12, Performed on October 30, 2012
Peach Bottom Certification Letter for Winter Readiness, dated November 15, 2012
Unified Control Room Log, Monday, November 26, 2012, Day Shift
Unified Control Room Log, Thursday, December 13, 2012, Night Shift Unified Control Room Log, Friday, December 14, 2012, Night Shift Unified Control Room Log, Sunday, December 16, 2012, Day Shift
Unified Control Room Log, Monday, December 17, 2012, Night Shift
Unified Control Room Log, Monday, October 29-31, 2012, Day and Night Shifts Section 1R04: Equipment Alignment Procedures
COL, RHR System Setup for Automatic Operation Loop B, Revision 21
Condition Reports *1452357,
ARs 01432946, Water Intrusion E-2 EDG Bay from Door #D03
01429435, Loose Nut Found in E-3 Standby Diesel Generator Room
Attachment
Attachment Section 1R05: Fire Protection
Procedures
ECT, General Area - Elevation 123' and 153', Revision 2
Condition Reports 1448248, Ground Water Intrusion in 2 'D' RHR Room
1443419, Housekeeping Zone #6 Unit 2 RB 135' Walkdown 1443720, Combustible Material in Combustible Free Zone 1446031, No Control for Combustible Material on Rad Waste 135' Elevation
1446039, No Control for Combustible Material on Unit 2 RB 135' Elevation
1450015, Housekeeping Issues in Unit 2 RB
1452738, Cart with Wood Blocks on 135' RB South End
1453765, Transient Combustibles Under Stairwell 1455595, Housekeeping Zone #6 Unit 2 RB Walkdown
Miscellaneous Technical Requirement Manual, 3.14.2, Fire Hose Stations, Circulating Water Pump Structure, Revision 6
Section 1R06: Flood Protection Measures Drawings M-541, Plumbing and Drainage Circulating Water Pump Structure Plan and Details, Revision 6 Miscellaneous Internal Plant Examination, Volume 1, Section 3.3.8 - Internal Flooding Analysis
- PBAPS [[]]
PRA Internal Flood Evaluation Summary Notebook, Revision 1
P-T-09, Internal Hazards Design Basis Document, Revision 9
Section 1R11: Licensed Operator Requalification Program Procedures
RPV Control T-102 Sheet 1-3, Primary Containment Control
T-103 Sheet 1, Secondary Containment Control
T-104 Sheet 1, Radioactivity Release
T-111, Sheet 1, Level Restoration
T-116, Sheet 1-2,
RHR T-216-2/3, Control Rod Insertion by Manual Scram or Individual Scram
T-220-2/3, Driving Control Rods during Failure to Scram
T-250-2/3,
AA-150, Operator Training Programs, Revision 5
Attachment Miscellaneous
- PS [[]]
EG0325R, T-100 Scram, Scenario 4, Revision 9
Section 1R12: Maintenance Effectiveness Condition Reports 1165407,
SI2N-60A-APRM-41C2
1166983, Refurb
- AP [[]]
RM 2/4 Voter
286163,
LM-3-PB3 2/4 Logic Module did not Drop Out RPS Logic
286435, A2 Channel 1/2 Scram During
- AP [[]]
RM 3 Logic Module Repair
287120,
- AP [[]]
RM #3 Module Swap
1434493, 2/4 Voter Failed to Actuate Trip During Surveillance
- 1443078, Gaps in the
- 1445266, IRs With No/Inaccurate Affected Systems Identified
1451965,
- APRM [[]]
- APRM [[]]
- APRM [[]]
HFA Relay Load Currents Required
1452964,
- APRM [[]]
HFA Relay Load Currents Required
Miscellaneous
- LPRM Instrumentation Section 1R13: Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control Procedures
RHR Pump Reject Test, Revision 9, Performed November 5, 2012 (Yellow Risk) Section 1R15: Operability Evaluations
Procedures SE-16 Bases, Grid Emergency, Revision 12
SE-16, Grid Emergency, Revision 11
Condition Reports 1418236,
WRNM F Reads Higher Than Expected
1419377, Risk Assessment Required for
- WR [[]]
NM's Prior to Refueling
21363, Revision to P2R19 Reload
- CCT [[]]
- WR [[]]
NM Identified with a Potential Loose Adapter
23132, NT-2-07-041D Discriminator Curves Not as Expected Miscellaneous Unified Control Room Log, Monday, October 8, 2012, Night Shift
Unified Control Room Log, Tuesday, October 30, 2012, Night Shift
Licensed Operator Training,
WRNM Instrumentation
Attachment Outage Control Center Log, Tuesday, October 2, 2012, Days Outage Control Center Log, Friday, October 5, 2012, Night Outage Control Center Log, Monday, October 8, 2012, Night
- ECR [[]]
- CLR [[]]
- SI 2K-54-E22-XXC2, Calibration Check of E22 4kV Bus Undervoltage and Sequential Loading Relays, Revision 5, Performed 09/29/12
- XXC 2, Calibration Check of E42 4kV Bus Undervoltage and Sequential Loading Relays, Revision 5, Performed 10/03/12
- MSIV Valve Closure Timing, Revision 17, Performed 10/05/12 ST-O-37C-360-2, Motor Driven Fire Pump Operability Test, Revision 14
- LOCA [[]]
23056, Evaluate
- MS [[]]
RV Pressure Switches
1419952, Relay 144-16 Sticking During
- XXC 2 Relay 144-15 Out of Cal High, Black Box Unsat 1427364, 2B Core Spray Pump Did Not Start In Accordance with E22 Bus
- LO [[]]
CA Test
22133, P2R19
- MS [[]]
IV-80A As-Found Stroke Time Fast
22697,
- MS [[]]
IV Stroke Times Near End of Acceptable Range
1445911,
LM-3-PB2 Keylock Switch
1446620, Scheduled Work Not Completed
Miscellaneous Outage Control Center Log, Thursday, October 4, 2012, Night Technical Requirement Manual, 3.14.1, Water Fire Protection System, Revision 9
APRM-31FS, Performed 11/30/12, Revision 4 Section 1R20: Refueling and Other Outage Activities Procedures AO 27.1-2, Unit 2 Reactor Cavity Let Down During Vessel Re-assembly, Revision 13
GP-2, Normal Plant Startup, Revision 130
Attachment
- PO [[]]
CRD Scram Insertion Timing of Selected Control Rods During Hydro, Revision 5
Condition Reports Common Cause Analysis 1434403, Clearance and Tagging Adverse Trend 1422610, Peach Bottom RCR Inadvertent Release of Lube Oil from Turbine Bearing Lift System
- 1425906, HV-2-16-23169L Leaking By
28185, The
28377, PB 2 Cycle 20 Startup Shutdown Margin Actual Versus Design
1430817, Minor Revision to ST-R-002-900-2(3) Required Miscellaneous Shutdown Safety Approval / Notification Form: Use of 3.0.4.b, Dated 10/12/12
Technical Specification 3.5.2:
- EC [[]]
CS - Shutdown, Amendment No. 259
Technical Specification 3.5.2 Bases:
BWR/4 STS 3.5.2 Bases, Revision 4.0 Unified Control Room Log, Friday, October 12, 2012, Night Shift
Section 1R22: Surveillance Testing
Procedures
- SO 40D.7.B, Place Control Room Ventilation Emergency Ventilation in Service from the Control Room, Revision 12
- LOOP Functional Test and E42 and E424 Alternate Shutdown Control Functional Test, Revision 19, Performed 10/04/12 (LOOP only portions)
- LOCA /LOOP Functional Test and E42 and E424 Alternate Shutdown Control Functional Test, Revision 19, Performed 10/16/12 (LOOP
- ST -O-080-675-2, Reactor Pressure Vessel (ASME Class I) Leakage Pressure Test, Revision 22, Performed 10/15/12
IST, Revision 40
Attachment
RCIC Response Time Test, Revision 10
ST-O-020-560-2(3), Reactor Coolant Leakage Test, various tests from October 1 through December 31, 2012
Condition Reports 1422221,
AV030 Failed to Auto Start
22551, Conditional
SO 40D.1.A
22527, Alarm "Control Room Supply Fan 0A-BV30 Standby Fan" Not Received 1423138,
- NOS [[]]
- ID [[:]]
- EDG [[]]
- NOS [[]]
SRO Review Failed to Identify Inoperability
1439848, A Change of
- TS [[]]
SR 3.8.1.18 Needs to be Made
26616,
- NOS [[]]
ID: Enhance Pressure Test IPA Brief for Parallel Activity
26672, Unit 2 Reactor Head Vent
CRD-2-03-4259 1426763, 2R19 Hydro - Leakage Identified on CRD-2-03-1823
26764, 2R19 Hydro - Leakage Identified on CRD-2-03-5011
26765, 2R19 Hydro - Leakage Identified on CRD-2-03-4235
26785, 2R19 Hydro - Leakage Identified on
HV-2-06-35A 1426795, 2R19 Hydro - Packing Leak on HV-2-06-34B
26796, 2R19 Hydro - Leak From HV-2-01A-84C Test Tap Cap
26798, 2R19 Hydro - Test Tap Cap Leak on HV-2-13C-47A
26800, 2R19 Hydro - Leakage Identified on
HV-2-12-17 1426803, 2R19 Hydro - Packing Leak Identified on RTV-2-12A-20530A
26807, 2R19 Hydro - Leakage Identified at Dragon Block Valve
26823, 2R19 Hydro - Packing Leak on AO-2-01A-080D
26824, 2R19 Hydro - Packing Leak on HV-2-10-88
26825, 2R19 Hydro - Packing Leak on
HPCI Governor Controls 1438936, Step Increase in Unit 2 Drywell Unidentified Leak Rate Identified
Miscellaneous Event Notification 48376, Both Trains of Control Room Emergency Ventilation Out-of-Service
- PBAPS [[]]
- PBAPS [[]]
- LO [[]]
CA with Two Offsite Sources Available, Revision 21 Outage Control Center Log, Thursday, October 4, 2012, Night
Attachment Unified Control Room Log, Thursday, October 4, 2012, Day Shift Unified Control Room Log, Thursday, October 4, 2012, Night Shift Unified Control Room Log, Friday, October 5, 2012, Day Shift Unified Control Room Log, Monday, October 15, 2012, Night Shift
Outage Control Center Log, Monday, October 15, 2012, Night
Section
AA-122-1001-F-11, "Drill & Exercise Comment & Feedback Form," Revision D Exelon Nuclear Emergency Preparedness Peach Bottom - December 12, 2012 Station Drill
Controller\Evaluator Instructions
Peach Bottom Station December 12, 2012, Station DEP Drill
Peach Bottom - Scenario 0839, Revision 3
Peach Bottom December 12, 2012, Medical Drill Revision A
CE, Revision 2, Calibration Check of RB Vent Stack Flow Loop
Instruments
SI2R-63E-2979-A1CE, Revision 10, Vent Stack Rad Monitor RY-2979A Electronic Calibration
Check
FQ, Revision 9, Vent Stack Rad Monitor RY-2979A Electronic Functional
Check
CE, Revision 6, Calibration Check of RB Vent Stack Flow Loop
Instruments
- FR [[]]
CE, Revision 10, Vent Stack Rad Monitor RY-3979A Electronic Calibration
Check
FQ, Revision 10, Vent Stack Rad Monitor RY-3979B Electronic Functional Check
Attachment
- XXC 1, Revision 8, Electronic Calibration/Functional Check of the Radwaste Effluent Radiation Monitor
ST-0-63M-810-2, Revision 6, Liquid Radwaste Monitor and Discharge Valve Functional Test Section 2RS06 Annual Radiological Effluent Release Report, January 1, 2011 through December 31, 2011,
dated 4/27/12
- OD [[]]
CM, Revision 14 Liquid Radwaste Discharges: 605-12, dated 8/15/12; 516-12, dated 7/16/12; 517-12, dated
7/16/12; 716-12, dated 9/18/12; 708-12, dated 9/18/12
Weekly Gaseous Iodine and Particulate dated: 4/4/12; 2/8/12; 8/22/12; 7/23/12; 5/30/12
Condition Reports: 01445222; 01440410; 01439489; 01299543; 01328430 Check-In Self-Assessment: 1201437-02,
REMP/RETS
1141803-01, Radiochemistry Instrumentation
1133689-02, Chemistry Laboratory and Radiochemistry Quality Control
1165276-02, Pre-NRC Self-Assessment for Procedure 71124.06
21090-02,
ODCM Pre-NRC Assessment Eckert & Ziegler Analytics Cross-Check Program results for: 1st Quarter 2012; 2nd Quarter 2012; 3rd Quarter 2012
Procedure
RT-I-037-240-2, Revision 7, Recombiner Filter B Heat Detectors Functional Test RT-M-37B-359-2, Revision 0, Recombiner Building Exhaust Filter Train A Deluge System
Airflow Test
RT-M-37B-360-2, Revision 0, Recombiner Building Exhaust Filter Train B Deluge System
Airflow Test
ST-M-40D-910-2, Revision 20, Control Room Emergency Ventilation Filter Train B Test
Section
- MSPI Deviation Reports and System Manager Notebooks: October 2011 through September 2012, Unit 2 and Unit 3
RHR/HPSW
October 2011 through September 2012, Unit 2 and Unit 3 ESW
October 2011 through September 2012, Unit 2 and Unit 3 EDGs
October 2011 through September 2012, Unit 2 and Unit
- 3 HP [[]]
- MS [[]]
- IN [[]]
PO Consolidated Events System, Revision 7
Attachment
- NRC [[]]
- NRC [[]]
- MS [[]]
PI Data Acquisition and Reporting, Revision 5
Miscellaneous:
- PBAPS [[]]
MSPI Basis Document, Revision 7
Section
LS-AA-125, CAP Procedure, Revision 17
Condition Reports *1429435, Nut Found in E3 EDG Room
- 1438812, Documentation of
SY Procedure
1442958, Analysis of Drywell Head Strongback Incorrectly Used
- CMT [[]]
RS
1445119, Insulation Not Able to be Reused (Due to 2 'B' RHR Flow orifice flange leak)
- 1451404, Packing Leak on AO-2-23-053 1419073, Nuclear Oversight Identified: Operations Shortfalls in Use of Human Performance 1423654, Adverse Trend in Clearance and Tagging Events
1430391, Declining Trend in Site Configuration Control
1430644, Corporate Escalation due to Continued Adverse Human Performance Event Trend
25757, Nuclear Oversight Identified: Lapses in Work Standards Results in Adverse Trend 1430748, Elevation for Maintenance Department Human Performance at Peach Bottom 1394685, Adverse Trend in Maintenance Department and Crew Clock Resets
Miscellaneous Peach Bottom Station Trend Review - 2Q12 Analysis Peach Bottom Station Trend Review - 3Q12 Analysis Section
AA-101-146, Severe Weather Preparation and Response, Revision 0
Condition Reports 1432999, Loss of 28 of 97 EPZ Sirens ( 25% Threshold) *1434345, Wind Speed Instrument Use
1431972, Mechanically Restrain Cooling Tower Fans In Accordance with
PB-108-111-1001
1451414,
MSSV Failed P2R19 As-Found Lift Tolerance
Miscellaneous
AO 28.2, Response to High/Low River Level, Revision 2 SE-3 Procedure, Loss of Conowingo Pond - Procedure, Revision 21
eSoms, Peach Bottom Unified Control Room Log on October 30
Attachment Hurricane Sandy Plant Status Matrix on October 30 Technical Specification
- NRC [[]]
- PBAPS Maintenance Rule Scope and Performance Monitoring, System 01A-Main Steam: Main Steam Safety Valves and Main Steam Relief Valves
- BPRWCP [[]]
- PBAPS Buried Pipe and Raw Water System Long Term Asset Management Strategy (Revision 5, February/2012)
- MPR -3670 Revision 0, Buried Piping Alternatives Analysis PB-11-0355 (149784) 4" Radwaste Discharge Mitigation Project
PBAPS Buried Service Water Mitigation Project
Prioritization of Underground Piping and Tanks
- AA -407, Revision 5, Response to Inadvertent release of Licensed Materials to Groundwater, Surface Water or Soil
CFR 72.30(d) Documentation Requirements
Miscellaneous
- NRC Temporary Instruction 2515/182, 11/17/11; Review of the Implementation of the Industry Initiative to Control Degradation of Underground Piping and Tanks
- NEI 09-14 (Revision 1), December 2010; Guideline for the Management of Underground Piping and Tank Integrity
- NEI 09-14 (Revision 2) March 2011, Industry Approach for Development of Inspection Plans that Establish Reasonable Assurance of Structural and Leakage Integrity of Buried Piping
TI-187 Procedures SE-4, Flood Procedure, Revisions 31 and 32
SE-4 Bases, Revision 22 Condition Reports *1406251, Fukushima - Flex Conduit Fitting Separated
- 1414866, Fukushima - Flood W/Ds - Valves Not Stroked Periodically
1444588, Fukushima - Available Physical Margin (APM) at Peach Bottom 1373999, Inspection Deficiencies on Sluice Gate 3A 1404681,
1403209, Documentation of Water Intrusion Open Deficiencies
Attachment 1405635, A1821132 Should be Pulled Into 2R19 1416066, Fukushima Flood W/Ds -
20405, Opportunity to Seal Conduits in E224-P-A When De-energized
1451882, Contingent Work Order for Conduit Flood Seals in
1388780, Water Intrusion in 2C RHR Room
1398861, 3C
- RHR [[]]
- HPSW Return Pipe Penetration Seal Degraded 1393061, Fukushima External Flooding Protection Feature Walkdown
CRLS
1402625, Fukushima Flooding Feature Walkdowns - DG Inaccessible Seals
1392977, Diesel Building Dirty Oil Storage Tank Trouble Alarm
1387260, Received Alarm Diesel Building Dirty Oil Storage Tank Trouble 1408393, Diesel Building Dirty Oil Storage Tank Trouble Alarm 1410422, Received Alarm "Diesel Building Dirty Oil Storage Tank"
1411311, SE-4 Revision
1411382, Fukushima:
SE-4 for EO Continuing Training
1454435 1454054 1454016 1441277 1428739 1431993 1414866 1414866 1409236 1406272 1410116 1401975 1401971 1397807 1396442 1396021
Drawings M-541, Plumbing and Drainage Circulating Water Pump Structure Plan and Details, Revision 6 Miscellaneous
- NEI 12-07, Guidelines for Performing Verification Walkdowns of Plant Flood Protection Features, Revision 0-A
- PBAPS [[]]
- IPEEE , May 1996 P-T-07, External Hazards Design Basis Document, Revision 2 Summary Results for External Flooding Simulations at
- PBAPS [[]]
- UFS [[]]
- UFS [[]]
- U.S. [[]]
- PBAPS [[]]
- IPE [[]]
EE
TI-188 Condition Reports 1459805 1459810 1459813 1459830 1438055 1437865
1437853 1411581 1428651 1428745 1429745 1419993 1426027 1425997 1425994 1425673 1424737 1424719 1424692 1424662 1423731 1416151 1413655 1413652
1413285 1411581
Miscellaneous
- PBAPS [[]]
- IPE [[]]
- U.S. [[]]
- PBAPS [[]]
- IPE [[]]
EE
Attachment Section 4OA7: Licensee-Identified Violations
Procedures
AA-1007, Revision 23 and 25
Condition Reports 1439489,
EAL Recalculation
1440410,
MSSV As-Found Lift Test Results 1421109, P2R19 - SRV S/N 17 and S/N 81 Failed Manual Lift
1445263, 2R19
SV A/F Test Results - Perform (a)(1) Determination
1411036, Unit 2 CV #4 Upper Push Rod Pin
1411069,
CV-3 Unit 2 Upper Control Arm Clevis Not Assembled as per GE
1411488, Possible Grub Screw Migration on Upper Control Arm Clevis
1415734, U2 CV 1 Lower Spring Housing Lower Guide
1416600,
CV 4 Upper Control Arm / Lower Tension Rods
1416922,
CAP Investigation
1450780, Perform Mid-Cycle
- RETS [[]]
Miscellaneous
- U.S [[]]
TS Bases 3.4.3, Safety Relief Valves and Safety Valves
Technical Specification
Attachment
- LIST [[]]
- OF [[]]
- ACRONY [[]]
- MS [[]]
- ADA [[]]
- ALA [[]]
- AP [[]]
RM average power range monitor
CAP corrective action program CFR Code of Federal Regulations
CRs condition reports
ECT emergency cooling tower EDG emergency diesel generator
- FS [[]]
AR final safety analysis report
- HP [[]]
SW high pressure service water
HX heat exchanger
IP inspection procedure IR issue report
LCO limiting condition for operation
- MCR [[]]
EV main control room emergency ventilation
MDA minimum detectable activity
MOV motor operated valve
MSIV main steam isolation valve NCV non-cited violation
- NI [[]]
NVLAP National Voluntary Laboratory Accreditation Program OCC outage control center
- OD [[]]
CM offsite dose calculation manual
- PBA [[]]
PS Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station
PI performance indicator
PI&R problem identification and resolution
PMT post-maintenance test
Attachment
- RE [[]]
TS radiological effluents technical specification
RFO refueling outage
RG regulatory guide
RPT recirculation pump trip RRP reactor recirculation pump
- RW [[]]
SFP spent fuel pool SRV safety relief valve
SSCs structures, systems, and components
STs surveillance tests
- TE [[]]
DE total effective dose equivalent
TI temporary instruction
- WR [[]]