IR 05000344/1985028

Insp Rept 50-344/85-28 on 851014-18.No Deficiencies or Violations Identified.Major Areas Inspected:Emergency Preparedness Exercise,Associated Critiques & Followup on Corrective Actions Resulting from Previous Exercises/Drills

ML20138E143
Person / Time
Site:	Trojan File:Portland General Electric icon.png
Issue date:	11/25/1985
From:	Fish R, Prendergast K, Temple G NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION V)
To:
Shared Package
ML20138E119	List: IR 05000344/1985028 ML20138E114
References
50-344-85-28, IEIN-85-044, IEIN-85-062, IEIN-85-44, IEIN-85-62, NUDOCS 8512130352
Download: ML20138E143 (12)

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rU. S.,NUCIEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

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REGION V ,.

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Report N '

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License N NPF-1

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Licensee: Portland General Electric Company 121 S. W. Salmon Street

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, Portland, Oregon 97204_- ,

Facility Name: Trojan ,

. Inspection at: Rainier, Oregon *

Inspection conducted

October 14-18,.1985

Inspectors: b Om G- n/u/95 K. M. Prendergast, Emerghncy Preparedness Analyst Datd Signed

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GbM. Teikple, Emdtgency Preparedness Analyst n l2siss-Date Signed i Team Members: M. Good, Comex G. Stoetzel, Pacific Northwest Laboratories

' Approved By: L //! b R. F. Fish', Chief Dhte signed-Emergency Preparedness Section -

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Summary:

Inspection on October 14-18, 1985~(Report No. 50-344/85-28)

Areas Inspected: Announced inspection of the emergency preparedness exercise and associated critiques, follow-up on corrective actions resulting from previous exercises / drills, and a review of Information Notice Nos. 85-44 and

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85-62. This' inspection involved approximately 181 hours0.00209 days <br />0.0503 hours <br />2.992725e-4 weeks <br />6.88705e-5 months <br /> onsite by two NRC inspectors and two contractor team members. Inspection Procedures 82301 and 92717 were use Results: No significant' deficiencies or violations of NRC requirements were identiffe ,

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DETAILS Persons Contacted ' - *T. Walt, Manager, Radiological, Engineering Branch ~

S. Orser, Plant Manager

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• B. Sherman, Nuclear Engineer ,

• J. Thale, Senior Nuclear Engineer- .

T. Meek, Radiation Protection Supervisor, ,

G. Bailey, Training Specialist' ;

J. Fisher, Mechanical Engineer v

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• Those present at exit interview.

, Follow-up on Regional Outstanding Items List l

l Closed, IN-85-44: Emergency Communications System _ Monthly Test. The

! inspector reviewed Information Notice 85-44 and records of required

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monthly communication tests. From this review it was determined that the l licensee had conducted an appropriate assessment of the related t

activities report upon receipt of IE Notice 85-44. This assessment resulted in minor procedural changes, including testing requirements for the health physics network (HPN) circuit. The Emergency Notification l System (ENS) testing requirement was previously in place and was j satisfactory. The licensee's investigation and evaluation of IE Notice 85-44 and resulting changes appear adequate. The review confirmed that

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l the emergency communications system monthly tests were conducted in l accordance with Trojan implementing procedure EP-16. This item is

! considered closed.

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l Closed, IN-85-62: Backup telephone numbers for the NRC Operations Center. IE Information Notice 85-62 provides commercial telephone numbers for NRC Headquarters to-be used by the licensee as backup numbers in case of ENS and/or HPN circuit failure. The licensee conducted an evaluation and prepared an operational assessment report which resulted in procedural changes that incorporated the NRC Headquarter's commercial telephone numbers. Stickers were provided with the NRC Headquarters

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numbers and have been affixed to NRC phones in the emergency. response

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facilities. Licensee action on this item appears adequate. This item is considered close No violations or deviations were identified in the review of this program area.

I j Corrective Action on Items Identified During Drills and Exercises

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The licensee's method for correcting items identified during drills and exercises was examined. The following describes the licensee's method.

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! The Emergency Planning Group has established a computerized system

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identified as the computerized commitment tracking list (CTL) for l tracking items identified during drills / exercises that require i corrective action. The list was started in January 1985 and r

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contains all emergency preparedness g en items from 1983 to the

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presen b .~ ManagementandEmergencyPlanningpersonnelddterminewhichitems will be tracked on the CTL. Items not. tracked on the CTL are addressed in a memo which discusses the rearaXs) they were omitite Each open item is given a trackung number by tne CTL operato Information on the CTL printout includes: tracking number, title, person responsible for tracking the item, person who wd1 pe i form the. action (s) necessary to close out the item, a space for -

describing how the item was closed ouf, and refetence documents confirming close out, action dates, and status (open or closed).

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A review of the 1984 exercise documentation, including the medicalg portion, was performed. The review indichted that comments from State, local and Federal agenciesnore considered ard were either a.idressed in a memo or were tracked N the CT '

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A number of items on the CFL which part identified at c1gsed were examined. Most of the items-reviewed appeared 't'o be closed out in an appropriate manner; however, one item appeared to be clprgd upon the r scheduling of training and not the completion of traini 3g. .

The information in -the CTL referred 'the usc<- to the documentation which ,

closed out the. item. This item (number 00168), which invo)ved writing a N new dose assessment program and prgviding for the' apociafed training, ,

appeared to be closed prematarely. The code had been west'.en and ,w documented,however,n(talloftheoperatorshadre'celveatheir \

training, as it will be part of their normal annualiretraining. As a \i result of discussing this' item, the licensee stated 'ihar they would reopen it until the traioing'30s 'been conplete ,

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. x s , s Fromthereviewofthelicensee's'b.etthf,Mrcohectigitepsidentified

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during drills and exercises, it apps:at s that the licensee has an adequate

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method for the tracking and resolving waknessh.s so' 'Gentified. However, the licensee should consider the .need to have 'all phtinent training -

completed prior to closing out an ite ( r:-

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V No violations or deviatJcns were identified in the re @( g Af this program are 'T +

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e . Emergency Exercise Plahning y ,

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The licensee's Radiological Engineering Branch has the Jespon @ ilityafor assuring that the annual emergency exercise is conducted. A member of the Branch staff was assigned to act. as the Lead Controller with the "

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responsibility of developing the sfenarip package;and conducting the exercise. The Lead Controlley was: assisted by pJrsonnel with expertise in radiological engine @g,7 nactor opeptions, and health #vsics. q'

Personsit.volvedinthescenhciodevelopment.werenotdirectlyMvolycl in the exercise. The Fhgineering Group in concert wig.h particip1ti outside agencies established the exercisc objectives. NRC Reufon 7 and FEMA Region X were provided with an opportunity to comment on the ". .

proposed objectives. The exercise document, generated under the -

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-direction of the Leadj Controller, (ncluhed 'N the pbjectives, the p)erci

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limitations, player information (guidelines), the exercise scenario, messages to be used during the exercise, initial and subsequent plant parameters, meteorological and radiological data, and controllers / evaluators instructions and work sheets. The exercise document was tightly controlled prior to the exercise. The scenario package was distributed to the controllers several days before the exercise to ensure that the controllers were sufficiently familiar with the scenario and events in their individual areas of review. The players did not have access to the exercise document or information on the scenario event. Advance copies of the scenario package were also provided to the NRC observers. This emergency preparedness exercise was intended to meet the requirements of IV.F.3. of Appendix E to 10 CFR 5 Controllers / Evaluators were stationed at each of the licensee's Emergency Response Facilities (ERFs), e.g. Control Room (CR), Technical Support Center (TSC), Operations Support Center-(OSC), Emergency Operations Facility (E0F), and the Company Support Center (CSC).

Controllers / Evaluators were also dispatched with repair / monitoring team All controllers acted as evaluators and had knowledge of the activities they were evaluating. The final briefing of controllers was conducted on October 11, 1985. The contents of the exercise document were discussed in detail at this briefing. The NRC was briefed on the scenario on October 14, 1985, during which clarifications were made on the scenario and the amount of simulation that would be allowed during the exercis All of the NRC observers were present during this latter briefin ,

No violations or deviations were identified in the review of this program are . Exercise Scenario The exercise scenario started'with the declaratio'n of an unusual event (UE) and ultimately escalated to a general emergency (GE) condition. The initiating event, which occurred at approximately~8:00 a.m., was excessive reactor coolant system (RCS) leakage greater than the Technical Specification limit. The scenario developed into an Alert at 8:30 when reactor coolant pump seal leakage increased to 60 gallons.per (

_ minute. Approximately one hour.later, the only operable reactor coolant

[i pump became inoperable which caused RCS pressure to' increase to 2635 psia and resulted in a mass breakage of rod cluster" control assemblies (RCCA)

split pins. The reactor remained critical due to failure of control rods to fully insert and the pressurizer-PORV and safety valves opened. This resulted in a site area emergency (SAE). A short time later, reactor coolant system pressure began to fall, one pressurizer safety valve remained open and the primary system began to suffer a net loss of inventory. The "A" centrifugal charging pump deadheaded and in fifteen minutes burned itself ou At this time emergency boration had stopped and a GE was declared. Soon thereafter containment pressure increased, RCS inventory was lost to containment and a major radioactivity release to the environment began as containment integrity was lost through a leaking electrical penetration. Approximately one hour later, corrective actions'resulted in containment pressure and reactor coolant system temperature decreases. Emergency boration maintained the core in a

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suberitical state and the reactor was brought to a safe condition. This terminated the exercis . Federal Observers ,

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Five NRC inspectors evaluated the lictnsee's response to the scenari The NRC observed activities in the CR, TSC, EOF, OSC, and CSC. The NRC inspector assigned to the OSC also accompanied a field monitoring team for the purpose of evaluating their performance. FEMA observed the i

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offsite portion of the response to the scenario and their findings will be issued in a separate report from that agenc ,

7. Control Room The following aspects of CR operations were evaluated: detection and classification of emergency events,' mitigation, notification, and protective action recommendations. The following are NRC observations of ,

the CR activities, The notification of State, local, and Federal authorities was timely for the unusual event and alert classification Procedures were broken out and referenced for all plant Emergency Plan action The specific wording in Table 1-4 of Procedure EP-1 caused a delay of about 11 minutes in'the declaration of the UE. The wording was not consistent with the guidance in Appendix 1 of NUREG-0654, Rev. 1. The licensee may find it beneficial to review Table 1-4 in light of the guidance stated in NUREG-0654, Appendix 1, Emergency Action Level Guidelines for Nuclear Power Plants, to ascertain if changes are neede (0 pen 85-28-01) , There were no routine plant status announceae'nts wade on the plant public address (PA) system. The use of this sys.em for safety messages and to keep plant personnel informed of plant evolutions is encouraged. It is recognized that this action may need to be

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simulated during an, exercise when the plant is operatin There was no formal log keeping evident in th'e CR (nuaerous scratdh pad logs were being kept; however, not all entries referenced time).

Formal documentation was also noted to be lacking in the TSC. A *

review of the requirements for formal documentation of an emergency event is suggested to determine whether some changes may improve record keeping. The importance of records in reconstructing the emergency event may warrant a specific objective in this area for the next exercis (85-28-02) [

No violations or deviations were identified in the review of this-program are '

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8. , Operations Support Center The following aspects of OSC operations were observed: Activation, functional capabilities, the dispatching of various inplant teams,

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coordination with the TSC, and.the observation of an offsite field. tea The following are NRC observations of the OSC' activitie There were a number of problems observed in the OSC, -som'e of which may be related to the physical size of the OSC (too small to accommodate the number of personnel required to assemble in the OSC). The following are examples of these problem (i) There does not appear to be a formal method of tracking team location or progress. On one occasion, the OSC Manager, when

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questioned by the Shift Manager, had to spend considerable time

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checking whether he had a team in the field rather than referring to a team status lo ,

(ii) One team appeared to self-evacuate which gives the impression they were not kept informed or controlled by the OS \

(iii) Status boards were not consistently maintained, some entries had times and some did not, some entries were merely inserted with little regard for actual time of occurrenc (iv) Team briefings did not always appear to include preferred ALARA routes, hazard warnings, procedures to use, check back instructions, etc. A brief checklist and a basic plant diagram might assist the OSC Manager in conducting such briefing (v) During the evaluation of the offsite field team, field team kits were observed to contain respirators and iodine cartridges; however, the procedure (EP-12) did not address any

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guidance on when to use the respirators. The licensee may find j . it beneficial to address guidance on the use of respirators in this procedur (Open, 85-28-03)

(vi) Some field team controller inputs appeared to take the form of prompting. This may have hampered the evaluator's ability to determine that adequate capabilities were being exhibited. The subject of prompting should be covered during the

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The licensee is encouraged to evaluate whether the existing OSC is capable of supporting its responsibilities during an emergency. The licensee should also examine the possibility that another location may be preferable. This item will be classified as an open ite (Open, 85-28-04)

No violations or deviations were identified in the review of this program are t,

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, - Technical Support Center The following aspects of TSC operations were observed: activation, accident assessment / classification," dose assessment, notification, and support of the Control Room in their efforts to mitigate the consequences of the accident. The following are NRC; observations of the TSC activitie ,

~ The TSC was . activated in ,a timely manner and appropriate and timely protective action recommendations we.re made to the offsite-authoritie , Some notifications to the NRC as required by.50.72(a)(i), were not timely. Specifically, a SAE was classified at 9:06 a=.m., and a GE was classified at 9:10 a.m.;~however, notifications to.the NRC were not attempted until 10:10 a.m.' This time frame is in excess of the requirement contained in 50.7 Although prompt notifications of State and local authorities were made, it was observed that these two notifications (SAE and GE) to the NRC were merely forgotte This item is considered an open item in order to review th licensee's evaluation to insure timely notification is made to the NR (Open, 85-28-05) During the evaluation of the TSC and the OSC field team, problems were observed in air sample analysis. The individuals operating the SAM-2 did not appear to be familiar with that particular piece of counting instrumentation and at one location an outdated procedure was used. In addition, poor contamination control practices were observed (no gloves were used to remove the cartridge from the air sampler and the filter and cartridge were not put in plastic to prevent contaminating the detector). It was also noted that the samples were not properly labeled with time, date and locatio There is a need to review this area to assure that training,

. procedures, and equipment are adequate for air sample collection and analysis. This iteo will be classified as an open ite (0 pen, 85-28-06)

No violations or deviations were identified in the review of this program area.

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10. Emergency Operations Facility The following aspects of EOF operations were observed: Activation, functional capabilities, offsite dose assessment and interface with offsite officials. The following are NRC observations of the EOF activitie I There appears to be an excellent interface between the utility staff and the personnel of offsite agencie During~ the observation of.the activation of the EOF the security and badging of the EOF appeared unorganized. Perhaps one entrance for i badging would cause less confusion. . _ .

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. There were numerous problems observed in the EOF, all relating to its layout. Although the Trojan visitor information center appears to be capable of functioning as an EOF, some consideration should given to improving the layout. It should be noted that a new EOF is scheduled. The time frame for completion of the new EOF should be considered when determining what short term changes could be accomplished to increase the effectiveness of the EOF in the interi (0 pen, 85-28-07)

The following are examples of the problems observed by the NRC evaluators:

(1) Work spaces were considered too smal (2) Having most of the phones in one central location is loud and distracting. Several communicators were observed to have trouble hearin (3) The comfort of the EOF staff should be considered. Many individuals were observed to be working on their knees. This may have an adverse impact on the operation of the EOF during a prolonged even (4) Emergency procedures did not appear to be stored, broken out, and consistently used in the EOF. It appeared that some individuals brought their own procedures, a practice that might lead to the use of outdated or unapproved procedures if appropriate controls are not applied. The licensee should examine this area to assure themselves proper procedures are available and use . No violations or deviations were identified in the review of this program are . Company Support Center The following aspects of CSC operations were observed: Activation, logistical support of the plant, good communication and coordination between the CSC, the TSC and the EOF. There were no-problems observed at this facilit >

No violations or deviations were identified in the reviev.of this program are .

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12 .' Critiques s The licensee held a formal critique on October 17, 1985,- the day following the exercise. The purpose of this critique was to summarize

'the findings of the exercise and to ' discuss weaknesses'or: deficiencies identified. The following represent some-of the licensee's findings that were discussed during this meeting.- ,' -

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There were numerous scenario problems observed and a more formal

~ review of the scenario by operations should be, performe .

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b. Notification for the UE and alert was timely from the Control Room; however, notification for the SAE and GE to the NRC was not as required by procedures or regulations, c. There were problems observed in the performance of air sampling in the TSC and by the offsite monitoring tea d. Status boards were noted to be improved over last year; however, there is still room for improvemen e. The use of the TSC computer enhanced the licensee's ability to transfer data; however, problems associated with the computer were also observe f. There were numerous problems observed in the OSC indicated by the following comments:

(1) The OSC was observed to be crowded and congeste (2) The repair / monitoring team briefings could be improve (3) There did not appear to be sufficient supplies available in the OSC. One narticular problem appears to ba an insufficient number of SCBAs available for OSC personne (4) Improvements to visual displays.in the OSC should be accomplishe (5) The operations personnel:would be unable to get to the Hagen Racks when the OSC was fully activated with a_ full compliment of team .

(6) There did not appear to be"any ardas to hang status board (7) There were high noise leve'Is which affected the operation of the OS ~ *

g. Therewasaninconsistent-amountofsimulation' allo [wedfrom, controller to controlle h. The licensee's public' address system"cou'd I be'effect'ively used to keep plant personnel informed of' safety and/or plant evolution i. There were several communication path's observed showing different data, this may have caused confusio j. The OSC phone to the Radiation Safety personnel at access control is located at the east end of the 93-foot level OSC while activity is at the west en k. A briefing sheet for the OSC Manager would facilitate information transfer to repair / monitoring teams, i

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. When the 45' OSC was evacuated to the 93' Hagen Rack area, the latter area was very congeste The exercise demonstrated a need for a warehouse parts person to be stationed in the OS There appeared to be a lack of communication between the OSC and the PASS team in the sampling area. Also, the scenario did not fully test the PASS team capabilities, i.e. sampling with an airborne proble In addition when the PASS team left the 45' OSC they left their SCBAs behind, when they could have been used in the 93' OS Improvements are needed in field. team communications. -The following ~

problems were observed.~ ,

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(1) Field teams were not kept informed of plant evolutions or activitie . ,;

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(2) Field teams should only report their. coordinates- for location not other landmarks or roads which ties ~up;the radios and provides no additional useful information on location.t , -

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(3) More emphasis should'be placed on field' team results in-confirming dose projection , l

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(4) Field team departure was delayed because the.the. field team

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could not get access to equipment and some equipmcnt'was

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(5) Procedure EP-12 should reference backup counting equipment in-the event the Sam-2 is inoperabl . Exit Interview -

The exit interview was held on October 18, 1985. In addition to Paragraph 1, the attachment to this report identifies some of the licensee personnel present at this meeting. The NRC was represented by five evaluator team members. During this meeting, the licensee was informed of the preliminary findings of this inspection and that these findings are subject to discussion and approval by Regional Managemen There were no violations of NRC requirements specifically identified during this inspection. There was, however, concern expressed over the untimely notification to the NRC and it was classified as an unresolved ite In addition, a number of open items were identified that will be tracked during the routine inspection program. The licensee noted that during a real emergency an open ENS line would have been established prior to the SAE and timely notifications of the SAE and GE would have been made. Subsequent to this inspection it was determined that because this was only an exercise there,was no violation of the 50.72 notification requiremen In addition,'the.following items were specifically discussed during the exit interview:

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a. There were numerous problems.obse ved in the'0SC; possibly because of the limited size of the facil'ty'and i of the congestion.in the facility. The licensee was, encouraged to evaluate the adequacy of the present OSC location toLsupportfits'rolevin an emergency and to

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determine what corrective. actions are required to resolve the problems observe b. Formal documentation of the accident,.which would be vital for reconstructicn during a real event, did not appear to be maintaine The licensee should evaluate this area during drills / exercises, to assure themselves that such documentation will be accomplishe This area should be evaluated during the next scheduled emergency preparedness exercis c. It was the general impression of NRC evaluators in the EOF that the layout of the EOF could be improved. It was acknowledged that the location of the EOF is to be changed; however, depending on the date of completion for the new EOF, the licensee was urged to determine if some short-term changes can be accomplished to increase the effectiveness of the EO In addition, the licensee is encouraged to request an advanced NRC review of the plans for the new EO This review could possibly expedite the approval of this facility, d. The scenario proceeded very rapidly from the UE to the termination of the exercise. This action may have deterred the licensee's ability to adequately respond to all problems portrayed in the scenario in_as complete a manner as they would have preferred. This also made it very difficult to evaluate all of the licensee's capabilities. The licensee should consider an exercise with a longer time frame to fully demonstrate their capabilitie e. Other items specifically discussed during the exit interview are contained within the body of this report in Sections 2 through 1 e 3f

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Exit Intervi$w dttendees

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Portland General Electric- >

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B. Withers, Vice President Nuclear _ , . W P. Yundt,' General Manager, Technical Functi'o'ns J. Lentsch,' Manager, NSRD. 4 '

. B.Schmitt, Manager,.0p'erations..andMainte'nanc$.

J B.' Susee, Operation Supervisor * ' ,

D. Keuter, Manager of Technical Services .

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T. Meek, Radiation Protection Supervisor ,

, - B. Babcock, Public. Relations, PGE, , ,

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- M. Snook,-Quality' Assurance Supervisor'

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' S. Nichols, Training Supervisor  ; ,

State of Oregon

. H. Moomey, Oregon Department of Energy, Resident Inspector i

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