IR 05000344/1985021
| ML20133E018 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Trojan File:Portland General Electric icon.png |
| Issue date: | 09/16/1985 |
| From: | Dodds R, Kellund G, Richards S NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION V) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20133D999 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-344-85-21, NUDOCS 8510090245 | |
| Download: ML20133E018 (9) | |
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U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION V
Report No. 50-344/85-21 Docket No. 50-344 License No. NPF-1 Licensee:
Portland Genercl Electric Company 121 S. R. Salmon Street Fortland, Oregon 97204 Facility Name: Troj an Inspection at: Rainier, Oregon Inspection conducted: July 2 - August 30, 1985
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Inspectors:
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S'. A. Richards' 0 Da'te S'igned Senior Resid,ent Inspector
/21#d'As o/a/w G. C. KcIlund
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D#te Signed Resid nt Ins cctor Approved By:
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R. T'. Dodds, Chief Date Signed Reactor Projects Section 1 Summary:
Inspection on July 2 - August 30, 1985 (Report 50-344/85-21)
Areas Inspected: Routine inspection of operational safety verification, corrective action, maintenance, surveillance, review of the startup testing program, inspection of 10 CFR 21 reporting activities, and inspection of various aspects of plant operation. The inspection involved 342 inspector-hours by the NRC Resident Inspectors.
38 hours4.398148e-4 days <br />0.0106 hours <br />6.283069e-5 weeks <br />1.4459e-5 months <br /> of inspection were during back shift hours. Inspection procedures 30703, 36100, 40700, 61708, 61709, 61710, 61726, 62703, 71707, 71710, 92700, 92701, and 93702 were used as guidance during the conduct of the inspection.
Results: No violations or deviations were identified. However, two items pertaining to the quality of engineering reviews and the dissemination of equipment problem information to the industry were presented to licensee nanagement for consideration (paragraphs 9 and 8 respectively).
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8510090245 850910 PDR ADOCK 0500
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DETAILS
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Persons Contacted
- W.S. Orser, Plant General Manager R.P. Schmitt, Manager, Operations and Maintenance D.R. Keuter, Manager, Technical Services J.D. Reid, Manager, Plant Services R.E. Susee, Operations Supervisor D.W. Swan, Maintenance Supervisor A.S. Cohlmeyer, Engineering Supervisor G.L. Rich, Chemistry Supervisor T.O. Meek, Radiation Protection Supervisor S.B. Nichols, Training Supervisor D.L. Bennett, Control and Electrical Supervisor M.R. Snook, Acting Quality Assurance Supervisor R.W. Ritschard, Security Supervisor H.E. Rosenbach, Material Control Supervisor J.K. Aldersebaes, Manager, Nuclear Maint. and Construction The inspectors also interviewed and talked with other licensee employees during the course of the inspection. These included shift supervisors, reactor and auxiliary operators, maintenance personnel, plant technicians and engineers, and quality assurance personnel.
- Denotes those attending the exit interview.
2.
Operational Safety Verification During this inspection period, the inspectors observed and examined activities to verify the operational safety of the licensee's facility.
The observations and examinations of those activities were conducted on a daily, weekly, or biweekly basis.
On a daily basis, the inspectors observed control room activities to j
verify the licensee's adherence to limiting conditions for operations as
prescribed in the facility technical specifications. Logs, instrumentation, recorder traces, and other operational records were examined to obtain information on plant conditions, trends, and
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compliance with regulations.
On occasions when a shift turnover was in
progress, the turnover of information on plant status was observed to determine that all pertinent information was relayed to the oncoming shift.
During each week, the inspectors toured the accessible areas of the facility to observe the following items:
a.
General plant and equipment conditions.
b.
Maintenance requests and repairs.
c.
Fire hazards and fire fighting equipment.
d.
Ignition sources and flammable material control.
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Conduct of activities in accordance with the licensee's administrative controls-and approved procedures.
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Interiors of electrical and control panels.
g.
Implementation'of the licensee's physical security plan.
h.
Radiation protection controls.
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Plant housekeeping and cleanliness.
j.
Radioactive waste systems.
The licensee's equipment clearance control was examined weekly by the inspectors to determine that the licensee complied with technical specification limiting conditions for operation with respect to removal of equipment from service. Active clearances were spot-checked to ensure that their issuance was consistent with plant status and maintenance evolutions.
During each week, the inspectors conversed with operators in the control room, and with other plant personnel. The discussions centered on pertinent topics relating to general plant conditions, procedures, security, training, and other topics aligned with the work activities involved.
The inspectors examined the licensee's nonconformance reports (NCR) to confirm that deficiencies were identified and tracked by the system.
Identified nonconformances were being tracked and followed to the completion of corrective action. NCRs reviewed during this inspection period included 85-064,85-067, and 85-070.
Logs of jumpers, bypasses, caution, and test tags were examined by the
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inspectors.
Implementation of radiation protection controls was verified by observing portions of area surveys being performed, when possible, and by examining radiation work permits currently in effect to see that prescribed clothing and instrumentation were available and used.
Radiation protection instruments were also examined to verify operability and calibration status.
The inspectors verified the operability of selected engineered safety features. This was done by direct visual verification of the correct position of valves, availability of power, cooling water supply, system integrity and general condition of equipment, as applicable. ESF systems verified operable during this inspection period included the safety injection system, the 'B'
train of the auxiliary feedwater system, and
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the 'A'
and
'B'
trains of the 125 VDC electric system.
No violations or deviations were identified.
3.
Corrective Action The inspectors examined facility records to verify that quality related deficiencies were identified and reported to cognizant management for i
resolution. Records examined by the inspectors included Requests for Evaluation, Possible Reportable Occurrences, Plant Review Board meeting minutes, and Quality Assurance Program Nonconformance Reports. Plant Review Board meetings were attended by the inspectors on July 24, July 25 and August 15.
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No violations or deviations were identified.
4.
halutanance Maintenance activities involving preventive and corrective maintenance were observed by the inspectors during the inspection period. On a selective basis, observations by the inspectors verified that proper approvals, system clearances, and required prerequisites were performed, as appropriate, prior to maintenance on safety-related systems or components. The inspectors verified that qualified personnel performed the maintenance using appropriate maintenance procedures. When possible, replacement parts were examined to determine the proper certification of materials, workmanship and tests. During the actual performance of the maintenance activity, the inspectors checked for proper radiological controls and housekeeping, as appropriate. Upon completion of the maintenance activity, the inspectors verified when possible, that the component or system was properly tested prior to returning the system or component to service.
During the inspection period, maintenance activities observed were associated with repairs to an auxiliary feedwater flow switch.
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No violations or deviations were identified.
5.
. Surveillance
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The surveilla'nc'e testing of safety-related systems was witnessed by the inspectors. 0bservations by the inspectors included verification that
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proper procedures were used, test instrumentation was calibrated and that the system or component being tested was properly removed from service if required by.the test procedure.. Following completion of the surveillance tests, the inspectors' verified that the test results met the acceptance criteria of.the. technical specifications and were reviewed by cognizant
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licensee personnel. The inspectors also verified that corrective action was initiated, if required, to determine the cause for any unacceptable test results and,to restore-the system or component to an operabic status
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consistent with the technical specification requirements. Surveillance tests witnessed during the inspection period were associated with overspeed testing of the auxiliary feedwater pump turbine, auto start testing of the auxiliary feedwater pumps, and.the performance of an incore flux map.
No violations or deviations were identified.
6.
Startup Physics Testing The inspectors examined '91
,.ar< p testing program as implemented by the following procedures:
PET-13-1, Reload Cycle 8 Startup Low Power Physics Tests PET-13-2, Reload Cycle 8 No Load and at Power Tests l
The examination consisted of a review of the above procedures for technical adequacy and completeness, observation of selected portions of the startup testing, and review of the startup test data. The test
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results appeared satisfactory with one exception. The inspectors observed that the value obtained for the radial peaking factor (Fxy) from the zero power flux map differed substantially from the acceptance criteria. The inspectors discussed this with the reactor engineer who indicated this was due to a poor quality flux map.
Subsequent maps confirmed that Fxy was within the acceptance criteria.
No violations or deviations were identified.
7.
Plant Operations At the outset of the inspection period, the plant was in Mode 5 preparing to return to operation following the refueling outage. On July 4, while in Mode 3 and during recovery from the 10 year reactor coolant system class I hydrostatic test, A and D loop first-off and second-off drain valves were found to be leaking greater than 10 gpm. An Unusual Event was declared and the valves were retorqued closed to stop the leak. The Unusual Event was terminated approximately one hour af ter it was declared. The reactor was brought critical on the evening of July 4, and reached full power on July 10.
On July 20, the reactor tripped from 100% power. The trip was caused by a short circuit in the unit auxiliary transformer cooling system. This caused the auxiliary transformer to trip on high winding temperature causing an electrical bus generator lockout. This produced a turbine trip and a subsequent reactor trip. After the reactor trip, both auxiliary feedwater pumps started automatically, but the diesel driven pump then tripped due to low suction pressure. The control operator blocked this trip and restarted the pump. Subsequentially, the turbine driven pump tripped on low suction pressure. The operator then throttled down the pump discharge valves and successfully restarted the turbine driven pump. As a result of this event, the NRC questioned the reliability of the auxiliary feedwater system. A meeting was held in the Region V offices with licensee management to discuss this issue. The content of the meeting has been summarized in Meeting Report 85-26.
The inspectors will follow up on this item as part of the routine inspection program.
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The plant returned to power on July 25, and remained there until a reactor trip occurred on August 26.
The trip was caused by a voltage dip in a 120 Vac preferred power supply which tripped the bistables on its associated channel of nuclear instrumentation. Due to the concurrent surveillance testing of another channel of nuclear instrumentation, the required 2/4 logic was present causing the reactor trip. All systems functioned as designed. The plant returned to power that evening and remained in operation through the end of the inspection period.
No violations or deviations were identified.
8.
Part 21 Reporting Activities l
The inspectors reviewed the licensee's program for reporting of defects I
and noncompliance under 10 CFR 21 and the implementation of the program.
This program is outlined by Nuclear Division Procedure NDP 700-4.
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program appears to be overly restrictive in determining whether a condition is reportable under Part 21 and appears to limit the instances where an item would be considered reportable.
As it is currently written, Part 21 allows for a wide range of interpretations as to what is reportable under the rule and what is not.
The licensee's restrictive interpretation of Part 21 was addressed in an inspection conducted by the NRC Vendor Programs Branch on August 12-16, 1985 and will be documented in the forthcoming report.
Because of the licensee's inte pretation and implementation of the rule, many items may go unreported under Part 21, but may still have generic significance. Licensee representatives stated that items that fall into this area would be reported to INPO through the Network System or the Nuclear Plant Reliability Data System (NPRDS). The inspectors tracked one such item to determine its status. The item was originally identified in Inspection Report 85-13 and concerned a coupling on a speed changer installed on both centrifugal charging pumps and on the diesel driven auxiliary feedwater pump. The coupling is held together by a key / keyway mechanism that has the potential for disengaging and disabling the associated pump. The licensee's preliminary evaluation concluded that this condition was not reportable under Part 21.
In addition, as of the beginning of August, this item had not been reported through the INPO Network System or the NPRDS. The inspectors discussed this concern about the dissemination of potentially generic information with the plant general manager. The plant manager acknowledged this concern. This area will be followed up in a future inspection (344/85-21-01).
No violations or deviations were identified.
9.
Reviews of Technical Work As previously discussed in Inspection Reports 85-13 and 85-16, the licensee had determined that previously calculated minimum performance
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characteristics for the residual heat removal (RHR) pumps were in error.
The inspectors reviewed the circumstances which resulted in this erroneous information being applied to the inservice testing (IST)
l program at the plant. -Continuing problems with the RHR pumps are well l
documented and extend as far back as initial startup testing. Beginning l
in 1982, internal correspondence began to discuss the operability of the l
pump. Two key engineers who were involved in determining the pump l
operability limits are no longer employed with the licenste and therefore l
were unavailable for interview, however, based on discussions with other l
personnel familiar with the problem, the IST engineer at the plant requested that an engineer with the-licensee's licensing organization determine the minimum acceptable performance of the RHR pumps with regard to the emergency core cooling system (ECCS) safety analysis. The licensing engineer apparently reviewed the final safety analysis report (FSAR) and based on data contained in table 6.3-17, decided that the critical pump performance characteristics were 223 feet of differential pressure at 4188 gpm.
This information appears to have been passed on to the plant IST engineer and documented by that engineer in an internal
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memorandum dated January 13, 1983.
Prior to this memorandum, all l
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exchange of'information between the IST engineer and the licensing engineer apparently was via telephone conversations.
Because of the informal manner in which this exchange took place, a formal review of the licensing engineer's work apparently was not perfo rmed. The licensee later found the engineer's conclusions to be in error. From early 1983 on, licensee management appears to have been well aware of the pump performance problems based on routing distribution of memorandums addressing RHR pump performance. However, the degraded performance was accepted based on the minimum acceptance criteria being correct.
Although later analysis by the licensee determined that the degraded performance of the RHR pumps did not significantly reduce the plant's margin of safety, the circumstances stress the need for a strong, formal review of technical work.
In response to NRC concerns raised regarding the handling of deficiencies involving Barton model 763/764 transmitters (Inspection Report 84-01) and in response to design control problems which were identified following the discovery of an electrical separation violation in a control room panel (Inspection Report 84-03), the licensee has taken actions to strengthen the operation of their engineering organization. However, during the past year several occurrences have indicated that further consideration by the licensee of the review process may be warranted.
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In September, 1984, the licensee determined that the calibration
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data for the pressurizer level instrumentation was in error.
Licensee Event Report (LER) 84-13 describes in detail the circumstances of this event. The data was incorrect in part due to a calculational error made by an I&C engineer in 1978. The work of the engineer had not been checked. The licensee has since developed procedures to review special calibration calculations.
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In late 1984, the licensee determined that the flow rate through the service water system was less than that described in the FSAR. This event was described in LER 84-21.
Subsequent analysis by the i
licensee found the reduced flow rates to be acceptable. This condition had apparently existed since initial plant operation.
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Licensee Change Application (LCA) 99, revision 1, dated December 11, 1984, contained an error with regard to adjustment of the reactor coolant system temperature-pressure curve for instrument inaccuracies. This error was noted during NRC review of the LCA.
LCAs' receive a' substantial review by the licensee prior to submittal to the NRC.
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As described in Inspection Report 85-16, paragraph 12, the
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pressu'rizer pressure instruments were determined not to be properly biased in their' calibration for the static head of water in the
, - transmitter. sensing lines. This condition has existed since initial plant operation, lhe licensee has taken action with regard to the p::oblem and is considering a 30 day report.
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Inspection Report _85-20 focused on the licensee's implementation of the IST program.' Various portions of this program were widely reviewed within the licensee's organization. However, a relatively large number. of discrepancies with the program were identified by the NRC. This raised questions regarding the depth with which the program was reviewed.
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Over the past '18 months, the plant staff has questioned and corrected errors dealing with monitoring tank levels to meet technical specification requirements. The problems were cencerned with properly accounting for the nonusable volume of water below the
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+ suction point of a tank and accounting for the shape of tanks in monitoring the level.
'Two LCAs (Licensee. Change Application) have been submitted during
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the' 1984-85 time frame to correct. errors in the determination of the proper minimum level to be maintained in the boric acid storage tanks. As discussed above, LCAs receive a wide internal review.
Several of the above items apparently resulted due to errors made during initial startup of the facility and do not accurately reflect on the
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present system for performing technical work.
In addition, none of the above items individually resulted in a serious degradation of the plant safety systems. Nonetheless, the inspectors felt that in light of the fact that each instance represented an apparent error in technical work associated with safety systems, that the issue of the adequacy of technical reviews should be discussed with licensee management.
The plant general manager stated that this area of concern has been and will continue to be considered by the licensee's senior managers. He noted that the licensee's staff has taken prompt action to correct the problems noted and that several of the problems were identified due to the questioning attitude of the licensee's staff. The plant general manager suggested that this area be a topic of future discussion between NRC Region V and the licensee. This is a followup item (344/85-21-02).
No violations or deviations were identified.
10.
Miscellaneous Observations While making a tour of the auxiliary building on July 8, with the plant in mode 1, the inspectors observed a lead shielding blanket hanging on the letdown line. The inspectors notified the radiation protection supervisor. He indicated that the blanket would be immediately removed and that appropriate personnel would be informed of this problem to prevent its recurrence.
On July 5, while performing a walkdown of the safety injection system with the plant in mode 2, the inspectors noted that the end caps on the safety injection pump casing drain lines were missing. The operating instruction that addresses the lineup of the safety injection system states that the end caps are to be installed. When the inspectors reviewed the completed valve lineup check-off list for the system, there
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was no annotation or deviation indicating that the caps were missing.
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The inspectors discussed this witli'the operations supervisor who indicated that a separate list of missing end caps was being maintained.
The inspectors acknowledged that this item was of minor safety significance,'but noted that deviations of this sort would be better controlled with the formal check-off list deviation form. The operations supervisor agreed'with the inspectors and stated that the check-of f list deviation. form would be revised accordingly.
While touring the internals of -the ' main control board, the inspectors noted several minor discrepancies with the manner in which control wiring was terminated. The inspectors informed the site quality assurance organization of the discrepancies, which were promptly corrected.
The inspectors also noted that the surveillance section of technical specification 3/4.4.6 refers to a " CALIBRATION TEST" as a defined term meaning that the definition section of the technica1' specifications define the term.
A review of the definition section, however, indicated that " CALIBRATION TEST" is not listed as a defined term. The licensee's licensing organization agreed to take action as necessary to correct the wording of the technical specifications.
No violations or deviations were identified.
11.
Exit Interview The inspectors met with the Plant General Manager at the conclusion of the inspection period. During that meeting, the inspectors summarized the scope and findings of the inspection.
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