IR 05000416/1989002

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Insp Rept 50-416/89-02 on 890124-27.No Violations or Deviations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Assessment of Compliance W/Nrc Bulletin 88-007, Power Oscillations in Bwrs
ML20235M064
Person / Time
Site: Grand Gulf Entergy icon.png
Issue date: 02/08/1989
From: Belisle G, Burnett P
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
To:
Shared Package
ML20235M054 List:
References
50-416-89-02, 50-416-89-2, IEB-88-007, IEB-88-7, IEIN-88-039, IEIN-88-39, NUDOCS 8902280100
Download: ML20235M064 (5)


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'yT t UNITED STATES

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~g NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION - i

, o, * REGION 11 g e,,,,, 101 MARIETTA ST., ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30323 Report No.: 50-416/89-02 Licensee: System Energy Resources, In Jackson, MS 39205 Docket No.: 50-416 License No.: NPF-29

' Facility Name: Grand Gulf Nuclear Station Inspection Conducted: January 24 - 27, 1989 Inspector: , s/r///

' Dafe Signed

% P. T. Burnett (/ V ~

Approved by:  ! kh/[/

Date Signed p G. A. Beiisie, Chiefyv Test Programs Section Engineering Branch Division of Reactor Safety SUMMARY Scope: This routine inspection was conducted to assess compliance with NRC Bulletin No. 88-07: Power Oscillations in Boiling Water Reactors (BWRs).

Results: The licensee has performed the training of the licensed operators and implemented the changes in operating procedures required to conform to the subject bulletin. The licensee's training department did an overall excellent job in programming the simulator to reproduce the LaSalle event of March 9,1988 and in creating two simulator training scenarios, credible at Grand Gulf, that would lead to trips of both recirculation pumps. Discussions with on-shift personnel confirmed they had absorbed and retained the essential lessons of their train- 1 ing on loss of forced recirculation flow. (Paragraph 2) >

No violations or deviations were identifie [$22j@g@@$$$$ 6

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REPORT DETAILS Licensee Employees Contacted J. D. Bailey, Compliance Coordinator '

l *K. E. Beatty, Training Superintendent J. C. Bell, Operations Instructor D. G. Cupstid, Manager. Plant Modification and Construction

  • L. D. Moulder, Operations Superintendent W. R. Patterson, Reactor Engineering Supervisor
  • J. C. Roberts, Manager, Performance and Systems Engineering
  • J. L. Robertson, Plant Licensing Superintendent R. F. Rogers, Manager, Unit 1 Projects
  • W. M. Shelly, Operations Training Supervisor
  • J. Summers, Compliance Coordinator ,
  • J. W. Yelverton, Manager, Plant Operations Other licensee employees contacted included shift technical advisors, operators, security force members, and office personne NRC' Resident Inspectors
  • H. O. Christensen, Senior Resident Inspector
  • J. L'.'Mathis, Resident Inspector
  • Attended exit interview Acronyms and initialisms used throughout this report are listed in the last paragrap . NRC BULLETIN N0. 88-07: POWER OSCILLATIONS IN BOILING WATER REACTORS (25599)

NRC INFORMATION NOTICE N0. 88-39: LASALLE UNIT 2 LOSS OF RECIRCULATION PUMPS WITH POWER OSCILLATION EVENT describes a situation in which a BWR 5 suffered loss of both recirculation pumps while operating with the control rods withdrawn to the 99% flow control line. With the resulting loss of-power, feedwater heating was lost as feedwater heaters automatically isolated. The colder feedwater introduced positive reactivity increasing power above the stable level for natural circulation. The APRMs, which had - been stable immediately following the power reduction, began to exhibit peak-to-peak oscillations of 20% to 75% RTP. Ultimately, the reactor scrammed on .APRM high flux,118% RT No fuel thermal or mechanical limits were exceeded during the even All BWR models 4, 5, and 6 are susceptible to the same instability on loss of forced circulation flo Bulletin 88-07 directs all licensees with such units to take specific corrective action including immediate training i

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of on-shif t personnel, additional training of all licensed personnel and STAS, review of procedures to assure adequacy for coping with the loss of forced circulation, and verification of adequacy of instrumentation required by the procedure Immediate Training Review of station records confirmed that all on-shift licensed and STA personnel were given a timely briefing on the LaSalle event with a standing order, since replaced by procedures, to scram in the event of a dual recirculation pump tri In addition, Notice 88-39 was made required reading for the same personnel. Most completed the reading by July 15, 1988, and all had signed off by July 23, 198 Operator Requalification Training Program The plant simulator was reprogrammed to reproduce the LaSalle event, and all licensed personnel and STAS were given training under lesson plan OP-LOR-IE-LP-002-00, Demonstration of Power Oscillation Classroom lectures were presented under lesson plan OP-LOR-IE-LP-001-00, BWR Core Stability /LaSalle Power Oscillation Event. Two simulator scenarios were written for plant events, which would lead to loss of both recirculation pump They were lesson plans OP-LOR-SIM-052-00, Loss of CCW/ Loss of Forced Circulation, and OP-LOR-SIM-SC-053-00, Loss of Forced Circulation / Power Oscillation The lesson plans discussed above were provided to all training shifts in normal rotation. Typically, each student received about 20 hours2.314815e-4 days <br />0.00556 hours <br />3.306878e-5 weeks <br />7.61e-6 months <br /> of simulator time and about 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> of lecture time on these lesson All on-shift and other licensed personnel completed this training by i December 21, 1988. At the end of each week of requalification  ;

training, a comprehensive examination was given on all topics ad- i dressed during the week. Five of the 71 students failed the compre- l hensive examination the first time, but passed upon re-examinatio The failures did not appear to stem from the test section on power l oscillation Licensed Operator Training Six lesson plans used in licensed operator training were revised to ;

incorporate material about the LaSalle event and power oscillation They were:

(1) OP-LO-MCD-LP-007-02, Potentially Damaging Operating Conditions, (2) OP-LO-SYS-LP-833-05, Recirculation System, (3) OP-LO-DT-LP-004-03, FSAR Transient and Accident Analysis Loss of Feedwater Heating,

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!L (4) _0P-LO-MCD-LP-006-02, Natural Circulation, Depressurization

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Transients, and Fuel Clad Quenching,

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(5) OP-LO-DT-LP-012-03, FSAR Transient and Accident Analysis Recirc FCV Failure - Decreasing Flow, and (6) .0P-LO-DT-LP-033-03, FSAR Transient and Accident Analysis Trip of-Recirculation Pump The first two lesson plans contain the most information on the issues addressed in Notice 88-39. The material provided in. the remaining ;

plans provides reinforcement for the earlier lesson l l

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The inspector concluded that both the requalification and operator train-ing programs addressed plant performance following a dual trip of the recirculation pumps ~ thoroughly, imaginatively, and convincingl d .- Procedure Changes In their letter of September 15, 1988,- the licensee identified the procedu res revised to assure power oscillations were' properly addressed. The inspector reviewed the'following procedures: '

(1) ONEP 05-1-02-III-3 (Revision 17, . 9/7/88),(TCN 5, 11/3/88),

Decrease in Recirculation System Flow Rate, (2) 101 03-1-01-2 (Revision 28, 9/7/88), (TCN 28,12/9/88), Power Operations, (3) ONEP 05-1-02-V-5 (Revision 20, 9/7/88), Loss of Feedwater Heating, and (4) S0I 04-1-01-833 (Revision 36, 9/7/88), Reactor Recirculation Syste Collectively these procedures alert the operators to the potential for power oscillations from any combination of reduced forced circu-lation flow and reduction in feedwater temperatur The procedures explicitly require reactor scram under appropriate power-flow condi-tions without observation of power oscillation In other portions ,

of the power flow map, rod insertion is permitted to leave the region i of possible instabilit In the control room, the inspector observed that a multi-colored power-flow map was posted on the reactor console and that the scram-required region was clearly identified. In addi-tion, the control rod sequence sheets from TEP 09-S-02-400, Control Rod Sequences and Movement Control, were immediately accessible at the STA's desk and the scram rod group was specifically identified for the current rod configuratio !

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i Interviews with Shift Personnel Personnel from two shif ts, including two SR0s, two R0s, and two STAS, one of whom was licensed, were interviewed individually. The inter- l viewees included one person who had failed the comprehensive examina-tion on first attempt, and one who, because of a unique training status, had been trained on power oscillations and the LaSalle event by tutoring. All showed good familiarity with the event, understood the conditions that could lead to power oscillations, and knew their duties should they enter into those conditions. None of the licensed personnel exhibited any reluctance to scram the unit should condi-tions require it or in anticipation of entering the scram-required regio This inspection did not address the licensee's response to Supplement 1 to 1 Bulletin 88-07; since the final response has not been formulated. Based upon the reviews of the training given and the revised procedures and the interviews with the on-shift personnel, the inspector concluded the requirements of Bulletin No. 88-07 had been satisfie NRC Bulletin N is close No violations or deviations were identifie . ExitInterview(30703)

The inspection scope and findings were summarized on January 27,1989, with those persons indicated in paragraph 1 above. The licensee did not identify as proprietary any of the materials provided to or reviewed by the inspectors during this inspection. The licensee had no comment on the inspection finding . Acronyms and Initialisms Used in This Report APRM - average power range monitor BWR - boiling water reactor CCW - component cooling water FCV -

flow control valve FSAR - Final Safety Analysis Report 101 - integrated operating instruction 0NEP - off normal emergency procedure R0 - reactor operator (NRC licensed)

RTP - rated thermal power S01 - system operating instruction SR0 - senior reactor operator (NRC licensed)

STA - shift technical advisor TCN - temporary change notice TEP - technical engineering procedure