IR 05000346/1987007
| ML20212Q144 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Davis Besse  |
| Issue date: | 04/14/1987 |
| From: | Christoffer G, Foster J, Ploski T, Snell W NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20212Q139 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-346-87-07, 50-346-87-7, NUDOCS 8704230020 | |
| Download: ML20212Q144 (24) | |
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U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION III
Report No. 50-346/87007(DRSS)
Docket No. 50-346 License No. NPF-3 Licensee: Toledo Edison Company Edison Plaza 300 Madison Avenue Toledo, OH 43652 Facility Name: Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1 Inspection At: Davis-Besse Site, Oak Harbor, Ohio
Inspection Conducted: March 30 through April 2, 1987 Inspectors:
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T. Ploski
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M J. Foster M 3[W
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. Christoffer AU v
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f/M Date Approved By:
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W. Snell, Chief b
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Emergency Preparedness Section Inspection Summary Inspection on March 30 through April 2, 1987 (Report No. 50-346/87007(DRSS))
Areas Inspected: Routine, announced inspection of the Davis-Besse Nuclear
! Power Station's emergency preparedness exercise, involving observations by eight NRC representatives of key functions and locations during the exercise.
- Results: No violations of NRC requirements were identified during the inspectio i 8704230020 870415
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DETAILS 1. Persons Contacted NRC Observers and Areas Observed T. Ploski, Control Room (CR), Satellite Technical Support Center (STSC),
Technical Support Center (TSC), Emergency Control Center (ECC)
P. Byron, CR, STSC D. Kosloff, CR, STSC, Operational Support Center (0SC)
T. Essig, OSC, Inplant Teams G. Christoffer, OSC, Inplant Teams J. Foster, TSC M. Smith, ECC Joint Public Information Center (JPIC)
R.Traub,RadiologicalMonitoringTeams(RMT)
Toledo Edison Personnel
- P. Smart, President
- D. Shelton, Emergency Director
- D. Amerine, Observer
- L. Storz, Controller
- S. Hook, Exercise Coordinator
- R. Varley, Controller
- D. Gordon, OSC Controller
- L. Simon, CR Controller
- J. Kirkpatrick, TSC Controller
- I. Borland, ECC Controller
- A. Lee, RMT Controller
- R. Buehler, Security Controller
- W. Comings, Medical Teams Controller
- R. Anderson, JPIC Controller
- *C. Hawley, Corporate Controller
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- The aforementioned plus about 85 other licensee personnel attended the NRC exit interview on April 2, 1987.
i 2. General An exercise of the Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station (DBNPS) Emergency Plan was conducted at DBNPS on March 31, 1987, testing the integrated i response of licensee, State, and local organizations to a hypothetical accidentscenarioresultinginasimulated,majorreleaseofradioactive materia This normal hours exercise was a partial participation exercise for the State of Ohio and a full participation exercise for i Ottawa and Lucas Counties. Attachment 1 to this report describes the
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licensee's scope and objectives for this exercise. Attcchment 2 is a narrative summary of the exercise scenario.
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i 3. General Observations i Procedures This exercise was conducted in accordance with 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E requirements using the DBNPS Emergency Plan and related i procedures, i Coordination The licensee's response was coordinated, orderly, and timely. If these events had been real, actions taken by the licensee would have been sufficient to permit State and local authorities to take appropriate actions to protect public health and safet Observers Licensee observers observed and critiqued this exercise along
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with eight NRC representatives and a number of Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) observers. FEMA observations on the responses of State and local organizations will be provided in a separate repor Critiques l
j The licensee held critiques on March 31 through April 2, 198 The
! NRC critique was held on April 2, 1987. In addition, a public
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critique was held later that day to present the preliminary findings of the NRC and FEMA evaluators.
4. Specific Observations Control Room (CR) and Satellite Technical Support Center (STSC)
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- TheSTSCwaslocatedadjacenttotheCRandisaninterimEmergency i Response Facility (ERF), pending construction of a new Technical l Support Center (TSC) within the plant's protected are i The Shift Supervisor (SS) promptly declared an Unusual Event upon
! receiving confirmation that the victim of a simulated, onsite i
accident had supposedly become contaminated. The Emergency Assistant Plant Manager (EAPM), whose duty station was the STSC, then relieved the SS of interim Emergency Director (ED) ;
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responsibilities, as permitted by orocedures. The EAPM later
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correctly declared an Alert after receiving the necessary confirmation of a significant increase in inplant radiation levels due to a resin spil All required initial notifications associated with the Unusual Event and the Alert declarations were completed in an accurate and timely '
manner, with the notification messages being well documented. Since
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the 1986 exercise, the licensee has installed in the CR a dedicated
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telephone line which provides the capability for simultaneous communications with officials in Ottawa and Lucas Counties, as well aswiththeOhioDisasterServicesAgency(0DSA). As the Unusual Event was declared prior to the ODSA s normal business hours, the CR's Administrative Assistant was well aware that the State notification would have to be accomplished by calling the backup State agency listed in the procedures. Therefore, once both counties had been initially notified, the Administrative Assistant informed the backup State agency of the Unusual Event declaration using a commercial telephone line. Later, both counties and the ODSA were simultaneously informed of the Alert declaration by means of the CR's dedicated telephone lin The Shift Technical Advisor (STA) initially notified the NRC Operations Center of both emergency declarations in a detailed and timely manner. Based on the scenario events associated with both declarations, the fact that the STA served as a communicator on these occasions did not detract from his fulfilling his STA responsibilities. However, later in the exercise, TSC staff requested that the STSC staff determine which procedure was most applicable for dealing with the resin spill situatio Rather than the TSC staff locating the answer themselves or having the STSC or Operational Support Center (0SC) staffs find the answer, the STA was instructed to research the answer to the TSC's questio This request did distract the STA from his other duties for several minute Following the Unusual Event declaration the EAPM kept the future ED, who was now enroute to the site, adequately informed of scenario-related and pertinent, actual onsite activitie The EAPM also briefed the Emergency Plant Manager (EPM) prior to the latter's leaving the CR for the TSC. Within about 10 minutes after the Alert declaration, the STSC was fully staffed and o Communications were soon established with the licensee'perationa s other ERF Transfer of emergency responsibilities from the EAPM to the ED, who proceeded directly to the TSC after the Unusual Event declaration, was accomplished in an orderly and timely manner with the aid of a checklist.
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Throughout the exercise, CR and STSC personnel demonstrated an adequate familiarity with emergency plan implementing and other relevant procedure The station s public address system was effective'ly utilized to inform onsite personnel of all emergency classifications, all required onsite protective actions, and even to provide occasional plant status briefing In the CR, communications between supervisory personnel and the operators were often too informal on occasions when the operators were ordered to perform certain actions. On some occasions, the operators did not even verbally acknowledge the orders that had been given them by their supervisors. While these informalities did not impact the responses to the exercise situations, such informal
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communications practices could result in misunderstandings of instructions given and/or actions being taken in the CR during an actual response to abnormal plant condition During the exercise, the CR/STSC workspace became quite congested due to the presence of the onshift CR crew, a second CR crew who were exercise participants, the licensee's exercise controllers, and one or two NRC inspector Normal plant operations were not, however, adversely affected by the presence of these additional persons in the C Based on the above findings, this portion of the licensee's program is acceptable; however, the following items should be considered for improvement:
- CR supervisory personnel and operators should verbally give and acknowledge orders in a formal manner, in order to reduce the potential for having these orders misunderstood or ignore * To reduce congestion in future exercises, CR exercise participants should not be located in the station's C b. Operational Support Center (0SC), Medical Drills, Security Drill, and Inplant Teams The OSC has been relocated since the 1986 exercise. The new facility was roomier than the previously used OSC workspace and was more conveniently located to the Radiation Access Control Area (RACA). The OSC was adequately staffed and fully operational within only 25 minutes of the Alert declaratio A " protected area assembly" was initiated in accordance with procedures following the Alert declaration. As part of the scenario, an individual was instructed not to report to his predesignated assembly are The inspectors were later informed that a second person had failed to report to the proper onsite assembly area. A search and rescue effort was initiated and both persons were located within 15 minutes. Accountability of all onsite personnel was accomplished within about 30 minutes after the Site Area Emergency declaration. Approximately 500 nonessential personnel demonstrated accountability provisions by leaving the protected area and proceeding to predesignated locations in the owner controlled a m . Accm%ility status reports were forwarded to the ED's attentio About 50 inplant teams were dispatched from the OSC during the exercise. Contamination control provisions were adequate at two entrances to the facility. Briefings to inplant teams on radiation protection concerns were thorough and routinely done. Debriefings were adequat However, periodic briefings to personnel assembled in the OSC were frequently' hindered by high noise levels in the facilit The OSC Manager s communicators typically used loud
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voices when forwarding updated information to hi At times, they raised their voices in competition with each other for his attentio Such practices could result in information being missed or misunderstoo Although OSC status boards were generally kept up to date with accurate information, posted release rate data were sometimes one or two hours ol In contrast, current inplant radiation level information were effectively displayed on readily visible plant layout drawings. A roster of available technicians was maintained on a status board. Accumulated exposure records were adequately maintained for inplant team members. The OSC staff also maintained a status board for displaying information on assignments given to teams that were currently dispatched. However, the board was designed for displaying information for only about half a dozen teams, while a greater number of teams were inplant at any given time. Status board plotters then tried to comaress information on all currently dispatched teams on this status aoard, which sometimes made the information difficult to rea Prior to the Site Area Emergency declaration, a technician was dispatched from the OSC to open a valve to cross-connect two water supply systems. While this was a good action, the Shift Supervisor (SS) was unaware that this corrective action was in progress until the CR received a report that the attempt to open the valve had been unsuccessfu The scenario included two separate medical drills requiring site access for two ambulances, plus an onsite response by a local fire department. Security provisions for the arrival and escort of the first ambulance were adequat However, security search procedures for the firemen and their vehicle were relatively poo A decision should have been made regarding the extent to which personnel and vehicle searches were necessary, given the nature of the simulated onsite fire, plus the fact that the firefighters and their vehicle would be under continuous surveillance while onsite. Access control provisions for the second ambulance were not observe An inspector observed post-accident sample collection and analysis activitie Overall, these activities were completed in an effective and timely manne Personnel demonstrated good familiarity with applicable procedures, and adequately monitored their simulated radiation exposures. The sample collection team followed a good practice of having the sample collection panel o]erator repeat back instructions oiven by the procedure reader efore manipulating the sampling systein's valves. This proved to be a particularly beneficial practice on several occasions when communications between team members, who were equipped with self-contained breathing apparatus and throat microphones, became quite garbled. At one point, the sample could have been spilled had the procedure reader not been persistent in ensuring that his instructions were being properly understood and acknowledged before a valve position was change _ _ _ . - , _ .
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Contamination control practices demonstrated by the first aid teams responding to the two deparate, simulated accident victims were l adequate, with the following minor exceptions. A team member who was removing supposedly contaminated clothing from the first victim did not put on gloves until being told to do so by a Health Physics technician. Later, the victim was given a nasal tube for oxygen administration. However, the loose end of the tube was allowed to touch the floor and the victim's clothing. Had the tube later been
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connected to an oxygen supply, any contamination on the tube's inlet fitting could have been introduced into the victim's lungs. The second victim's shoes, which were assumed to have become contaminated, were neither removed nor bagged prior to the victim being placed in the ambulanc Thus, contamination on the shoes could have been spread into the embulance and, perhaps, into the hospita Based on the above findings, this portion of the licensee' program is acceptable; however, the following items should be considered for improvement:
- The OSC Manager and staff should make greater efforts to improve communications discipline in the OS * The SS should be informed of all inplant team assignments prior to the teams' dispatch and be promptly informed of the results of the teams' activitie * Communications equipment utilized by members of post-accident
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sampling teams should be improve * First aid teams and accompanying Health Physics technicians should pay closer attention to detail in order to minimize the spread of contaminatio Technical Support Center (TSC)
Except for those persons assigned to the STSC, the remainder of the TSC staff reported directly to the TSC which was located on the first
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floor of the Davis-Besse Administration Building (DBAB). The TSC was fully cperational only 25 minutes after the Alert declaratio Several equipment and layout refinements had been made to the facility since the last exercise. For example, plastic-coated plant systems diagrams were available and effectively utilized to identify and also label such items as the current position of each valve along each possible release path from the containment structure.
l TSC personnel began performing their assigned duties upon their arrivals, and demonstrated good teamwork and an adequate understanding of these duties throughout the exercise. The facility was effectively managed. Per odic staff briefings were very well done. Status boards, charts, and computerized displays were
- effectively utilized to trend critical plant parameters. Status
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boards were also well used to display information on the sequence of i
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events, major decisions, assignments for resolving current technical problems, and the statiis of some inplant repair activitie Logkeeping in the TSC .cs adequate, and was primarily accomplished by a dedicated facilitj logkeepe TSC staff did a good job in assessing current plant status and in anticipating potential problems. The station's Emergency Action Levels (EALs) were closely monitored so that any emergency classification changes would be readily identified. Relatively early in the exercise, TSC staff recognized that the operability of the service water system was a major concern for this particular accident scenari Later, a conservative decision was made to inform a local fire department when the station's firefighting capability had been degraded. The staff readily recognized the need to activate the containment spray system to reduce containment pressure and the amount of radioiodines that could be released. However, system activation was blocked by exercise controllers in order to preserve the remainder of the exercise scenari Late in the exercise, a computerized, preliminary core damage calculation was efficiently done. The calculation procedure contained a useful verification step of first inputting a known set of values and checking the results, before the calculation based on scenario information would be performed. TSC engineering staff began discussing recovery issues before a scenario message needed to be issued to spur these discussions. Several principal TSC staff then conducted adequate turnover briefings to their reliefs prior to going to the Emergency Control Center (ECC) for a more comprehensive recovery discussio Based on the above findings, this portion of the licensee's program is acceptable, d. Emergency Control Center (ECC)
The ECC, which is the licensee' Emergency Operations Facility located across the hallway from the TSC in the DBAB, became fully operational within 30 minutes after the Alert declaration. The timeliness of the staffing of the licensee's ECC, TSC, and other ERFs was due, in part, to the use of a highly automated paging system which was successfully demonstrated during this exercis As was the case in the TSC, the Emergency Director (ED) and his principal assistants in the ECC closely monitored the station's EALs. The ED quickly and correctly classified the Site Area and General Emergencies. The initial notification messages to both counties and the ODSA were complete, accurate, and adequately documented. Both messages were transmitted by a dedicated communicator over a dedicated telephone line linking the ECC with both counties and the ODSA. Throughout the exercise these governmental organizations were provided with frequent updates on scenario information in accordance with the followup message
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contents guidance contained in NUREG-0654, Revision 1. Followup messages were also transmitted by a dedicated communicator and were adequately documented. Initial and followup message contents were approved prior to message transmittal in accordance with procedure Initial notifintions of the NRC Operations Center for the Site Area and General Emergency declarations were simulated. A dedicated communicator was procedurally specified and was available to perform the actual notifications and to maintain an open line to the Operations Center, if so requested. Hourly updates to the Operations Center were simulated during the exercis The initial offsite Protective Action Recommendation (PAR) associated with the General Emergency was appropriate and quickly formulate During the next 15 to 20 minutes after this recommendation was issued to shelter in certain portions of the EPZ, there was a great increase in the radioiodine release rate (roughly 10E6 uCi/cc). A scenario data limitation was that release rate and containment radiation level data were updated on computerized displays at 15 minute intervals, while most other plant parameters were updated at one minute intervals on such displays. Nevertheless, dose assessment staff easily recognized the step-increase in release rate data, alerted the ED of this change, and began generating new offsite dose projections. ECC dose assessment and TSC engineering staffs quickly conferred on the appro)tiate release rate and release duration values to be used in t1ese calculations. Current meteorological
- conditions, sheltering factors, and evacuation time estimates were automatically factored into the PAR formulation arocess. The revised PAR, which was to evacuate all areas within a)out a two mile radius of the station plus all downwind subareas out to the western border of the EPZ, was appropriate and transmitted to State and county officials in a timely manner. Throughout the exercise, dose i assessment staff kept the ED adequately informed of current and forecast meteorological conditions which could affect the offsite recommendations. ECC staff also did a very good job in monitoring all the protective actions that were being implemented by offsite authorities during the exercise.
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While the accountability of all onsite personnel was being determined,
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appropriate ECC staff interfaced to choose the appropriate evacuation routes for nonessential personnel to utilize when going from the station to a predesignated offsite reassembly area. For the purposes of this exercise, only a small group of nonessentials were allowed to demonstrate an actual site evacuation. In addition, several of these persons were purposely reported to have taken an incorrect route to the reassembly area such that they could have been contaminated by the plume emanating from the containment structure. The ED and Dose Assessment Coordinator correctly decided to dispatch a Health Physics technician to survey these evacuees at the reassembly area and to perform decontamination tasks as necessar . .. . . _ __ _ __ . ._ _ _ _ _ _ __ . .
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ECC staff were kept adequately informed of scenario events and decisions through periodic briefings plus well-detailed, current status board information. Logkeeping was adequate, and was mainly done by a dedicated ECC logkeepe Internal ECC message flow was adequat Late in the exercise, lead personnel in the ECC and other ERFs were relieved by controllers and observers so that they could convene in the ECC for a preliminary discussion on short and longer term recovery tasks. Key ECC staff adequately briefed persons relieving them of their emergency duties. An adequate, initial recovery discussion was then held by lead perso.1nel from the ECC, TSC, OSC, STSC, and Joint Public Information Center (JPIC). Among the appropriate action items identified during this discussion were: the need to provide i special indoctrination training on abnormal plant conditions to licensee, contractor, and governmental agency emergency response personnel; the need to maintain rumor control provisions for the public plus periodic media briefings; and the need to arrange for whole body counts for all personnel who were onsite after the Alert declaratio Based on the above findings, this portion of the licensee's program is acceptable.
l l Joint Public Information Center (JPIC)
The JPIC was activated within ten minutes of the Alert declaration; however, it was not considered to be fully, operational until the State Public Information Officer (PIO) arrived approximately one hour later. Since local weather conditions made travel hazardous, this time frame was acceptable. Space and communication equipment available for media use were adequate. Licensee Public Information i staff were readily available to respond to media inquiries. Licensee staff also role played reporters and interviewers to assist in demonstrating the Spokesmen's capabilitie The licensee's Spokesman responded adequately to media inquiries during the six news briefings held during the exercise. Information was presented clearly and accurately throughout the exercise. The
- Public Information staff remained adequately aware of changing scenario events and major discussions, and incorporated new r information into each briefing. Coordination of information between
! the licensee and State and county PI0s was ongoing and adequate throughout the exercise. Work space was provided for State, local and federal PI0s in an area in close proximity to the licensee's work i area. This facilitated constant interfacing and group discussions beforeeachjointpressbriefing.
l A total of 24 press releases were issued jointly by all participating l organizations. Included in these press releases were bulletins, information announcements, and a chronology of event The press i
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releases contained factual information and were presented in laymen's terms. Definitions of emergency classifications were incorporated in the releases, where appropriat Based on the above findings, this portion of the licensee's program is acceptabl f. Radiological Testing Laboratory (RTL) and Radiological Monitoring Teams (RMis)
The RTL became fully operational in a timely manner following the Alert declaratio Since the last exercise, an intercom has been installed to facilitate communications between the RTL and the ECC's dose assessment room where the RMT Coordinator was statione Contamination control points were adequately established at both entrances to the RTL following it's activatio In cddition to a RMT that conducted habitability surveys in the DBAL, which housed the TSC, ECC, RTL, and the JPIC, three offsite RMTs were organized and dispatched from the RTL. An inspector accompanied one of these teams. The team received an adequate initial briefing from the RMT Coordinator prior to leaving the DBA The team then checked its survey and communications equipment for proper operation prior to leaving the facilit A temporary problem was identified and corrected with the team's radio prior to their dispatch; however, the team was not equipped with a spare radio which would have proved very valuable had their radio malfunctioned at some later time. The team members also exhibited some confusion with the term " micro-R" versus the more familiar
" milli-R." The team then asked for and received the proper interpretation of the former term from the RMT Coordinato In general, the team adequately demonstrated the capabilities to collect, label, and store air, soil, water, and vegetation sample However, on one occasion the team let an air sampler cartridge remain exposed in the gusty conditions long enough to adversely impact the representativeness of the collected sample. While the team experienced some difficulty in getting the sample labels to adhere to the sample containers, they properly inserted the labels inside the containers so that the samples could later be adequately identifie The RMT Coordinator effectively utilized the teams to locate and track the plume as it moved through the western portion of the Emergency Planning Zone (EPZ). Typically, one team was utilized to locate the plume's leading edge, while another would traverse the plume to ascertain its approximate width and centerline concentration. The team members frequently checked and recorded their simulated exposures. Exposure information was occasionally reported to the RMT Coordinator. While the teams were kept informed of scenario weather conditions and emergency classification
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information, they were usually told of the release status and the status of offsite protective actions being implemented only after
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they had asked for such informatio Based on the above findings, this portion of the licensee's program is acceptable; however, the following items should be considered for improvement:
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- * Air sampler cartridges should be promptly bagged to preserve
] the representativeness of the sample * RMTs should be equipped with a spare radio prior to their dispatc * RMTs should be kept informed of release status and information regarding protective actions being implemented offsit . Exercise Scenario and Controller Actions The licensee submitted its exercise objectives and complete scenario i manuals in accordance with established submittal deadlines. The 1987 i exercise scenario was more challenging than the 1986 scenario, in that this year's scenario events involved a greater number of emergency
, response efforts, including: search and rescue; two medical drills; the dispatch of over 50 inplant teams; the onsite response of a local fire department; and the activation of the corporate emergency response organization (which was not evaluated by the NRC). Also, the vast majority of exercise participants were different from those who had demonstrated their capabilities in the 1986 exercise.
I Soon after an ambulance had arrived onsite in response to the first of
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two simulated medical emergencies, the CR received a report that an
- individual had apparently suffered a heart attack in the station's gate
- house. Upon learning that this was an actual medical emergency and not a part of the scenario, onshift personnel, CR controllers and exercise participants immediately devoted their efforts toward ensuring that the
, ambulance was sent to the gatehouse and that an onsite first aid team was
, also sant to that locatio The CR was then kept adequately informed of the onsite response to the actual medical emergency. The EPM and ED were
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also kept informed of the real emergency situation. CR staff informed
- the local hospital that the ambulance would soon be enroute with a real 1 patient instead of the victim of the simulated onsite accident.
- Licensee personnel also informed State and county officials and the NRC
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Operations Center of the actual onsite medical emergency. The exercise was suspended for about 20 minutes while efforts were focused on the actual emergency. Once the CR had been informed that the heart attack victim was enroute to the hospital, the exercise was resumed with a ,
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During the entire exercise, there were no controller actions whicn coula nave unfairly iniluencea parucipant responses to 3ceildi'io evelltd.
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Based on the above findings, this portion of the licensee's program
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' Exit Interview On April 2, 1987, the inspectors met with those licensee representatives i
denoted in Paragraph 1 to present their preliminary inspection findings.
- Prior to the inspectors' presentation, licensee controllers representing
- each emergency response facility and other exercise activities made summary
, presentations on their evaluations of the participants' performances.
t The licensee's preliminary evaluations were objective and in good l agreement with the ins)ectors' findings. The licensee did not indicate that any of tie matters discussed by the inspectors were
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- proprietary in natur Attachments
- Licensee'sexerciseobjectives Exercise narrative summary
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1.0 SCOPE AND OBJECTIVES 1.1 SCOPE The 1987 Davis-Besse Emergency Preparedness Exercise, to be conducted on March 31, 1987, will test and provide the opportunity to evaluate the Toledo Edison Emergency Plan and Emergency Plan procedure It will also test the emergency response organization's ability to assess and respond to emergency conditions and take adequate actions to protect the health and safety of the public. The exercise will
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demonstrate the utilizstion of " Team B" Station Emergency Organiza-tion personnel with exceptions (as will be noted in the final exer-cise package). The exercise will involve activation of the Toledo Edison Co'rporate Emergency Response (CER) Organizatio Whenever practical, the exercise incorporates provisions for " free play" on the part of the participant The scenario will simulate a sequence of events resulting in a radiological release to the environment. This relea'se will be of sufficient magnitude to warrant mobilization of State and local agencies in response to the emergency, but the participation of there organizations will be limite The exercise will also incorporate the conduct of the Station's
Annual Medical Drill, and of our semiannual post-accident sampling system drilla and our Annual Health Physics Drill for analysis of an i actual sample obtained from the post-accident samR1ing syste .
1.2 TOLEDO EDISON OBJECTIVES ?
i 1.2.1 (A.) Exercise Planning 1. (A.I.) Conduct an exercise of the Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station (DBNPS) Emergency Pla . (A.2.) Provide an opportunity for the State of Ohio, Ottawa County and Lucas County to participate in an exercis . (A.3.) Prepare an exercise information package to include:
a. (A.3.a.) The basic objectives of the exercise and appro-priate evaluation criteria.
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' b. (A.3.b.) The date(s), time period, place (s) and participating organ-ization .
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c. (A.3.c.) The simulated event d. (A.3.d.) The time schedule of l real and simulated 1
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initiating event e. (A.3.e.) The narrative summar <
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4. (A.4.) Conduct a critique of the exercis . (A.S.) Establish means to ensure completion of corrective action . (A.6.) Involve Federal, State of Ohio, Ottawa County and Lucas County emergency response personnel, organizations and agencies in a joint exercis . (A.9.) Conduct the exercise in various weather conditions (during different seasons). ,
8. (B.1.) Demonstrate the direction of the emergency orgcnization and implementa-tion of the emergency plan and emer-gency plan procedur . (B.2.) Demonstrate the transfer of the Emer-gency Director dutie .(B.3.) Demonstrate the ability for timely activation and staffing of the emer-gency facilitie .(B.4.) Demonstrate the ability to control access to emergency facilitie .(B.5.) Demonstrate the ability of corporate personnel to augment and support the plant staf .(B.6.) Demonstrate the availability of outside organizations who can be relied upon in an emergency to provide assistanc .(B.7.) Demonstrate the capability of a central point for the receipt and analysis of all field monitoring data and coordina-tion of sampling medi .(B.9.) Demonstrate the availability and dispatch of a technical liaison to offsite governmental Emergency Opera-tion Centers (EOCs).
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16.(B.10.) Demonstrate the capability for con-tinuous (24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />) operations for a protracted period for each principal organizatio .(B.11.) Demonstrate the ability for 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> per day manning of communication link .(C.I.) Demonstrate the ability to assess the incident condition .(C.2.) Demonstrate the ability to recognize Emergency Action Levels (EALs) and
, properly classify the incident.
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20.(D.1.) Demonstrate the ability to notify key
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officials in the emergency organization (Station, Corporate, State of Ohio, Ottawa County and Lucas County) via the notification system procedures within 15 minutes of classificatio .(D.2.) Demonstrate the ability to notify the NRC of any emergency classification within one hour of the occurrenc .(D.3.) Demonstrate the capability to notify and/or activate emergency personnel in each response organizatio .(D.4.) Demonstrate the ability to develop and send an initial emergency message for offsite notification and offsite authoritie .(D.S.) Demonstrate the ability to develop and send follow-up messages for information for offsite authoritie (D.6.) Demonstrate the communication capability among the Control Room, Technical Support Center (TSC) and Emergency Communication Center (ECC) and among DBNPS, the State and County Emergency Operations Centers (EOCs) and the field assessment teams, to include evaluation of the ability to understand message conten .(D.7.) Demonstrate backup communication capabilit .
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Demonstrate the ability to develop a legitimate, informative and clearly understood message summarizing the emergency, to be sent to the State and County officials who are responsible for making the decision to activate the alert and notification syste .(D.9.) Demonstrate the communication capability with the State of Ohio, Ottawa County and Lucas County within the Plume Exposure Emergency Planning Zone (EPZ).
29.(D.10.) Demonstrate the communications capa-bility with Federal emergency response organizations and the State of Ohio and State of Michigan in the Ingestion EP .(D.11.) Demonstrate the communication capability from the Control Room with NRC Head-quarter .
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31.(D.12.) Demonstrate the communications capa-bility with fixed and mobile medical support facilitie .(E.1.) Demonstrate the methods and techniques for determining the source ters of releases or potential releases of radioactive material within the plant systems.
l 33.(E.2.) Demonstrate the methods and techniques for determining the magnitude of the releases of radioactive materials based on plant system parameters and effluent monitor .(E.3.) Demonstrate the ability to estimate integrated dose from projected and actual dose rates and to compare these estimates with the Protective Action Guidelines (PAGs).
35.(E.4.) Demonstrate the ability to inoircent exposure guideline '
36.(E.5.) Demonstrate the ability to continuously monitor and control emergency worker exposur .(E.7.) Demonstrate the resources and capability for field monitoring within the Plume Exposurc EPZ.
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38.(E.8.) Demonstrate the ability to estimate total population exposur .(E.9.) Demonstrate the ability for radiological monitoring of personnel evacuated from the sit .(E.10.) Demonstrate the capability for decon-tamination of evacuated nonessential personne (E.11) Demonstrate the availability of res-piratory protection, protective cloth-
, ing and K .(E.12.) Demonstrate the organization ability to authorize emergency worker exposure in excess of 10 CFR Part 20 limit .(E.13.) Demonstrate the capability for onsite contamination contro .(E.14.) Demonstrate the ability to decontamin-ate relocated onsite personne .(E.15.) Demonstrate the capability for trans-portation of a radiological accident victi I 46.(E.16.) Demonstrate the capability for onsite and offsite radiological monitoring, to include collection, analysis of all sample media (e.g., water, vegetation, soil and air) and communication and record keepin .(E.17.) Demonstrate the response to, and analysis of, simulated elevated air-borne and liquid samples and direct radiation scaturements in the environ-men .(E.18.) Demonstrate the capability to analyze an actual sample obtained from a plant system including use of the post-accident sampling system within three hour . (F.1.) Demonstrate the ability to recommend protective actions to appropriate l offsite authorities, based on recom-mendations to include consideration of protection afforded by sheltering, as well as evacuation time estimate _ _- _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _
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50.(F.2.) Datonstrate the operation of the Joint Public Information Center and the availability of space for the medi .(F.3.) Demonstrate the ability to brief the media in a clear, accurate and tLeely manne .(F.4.) Demonstrate the ability to provide advance coordination of information release .(F.5.) Demonstrate the ability to warn or advise individuals onsite or in owner
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controlled areas, 54.(F.6.) Demonstrate the capability to evacuate nonessential personne .(F.8.) Demonstrate the ability to account for all individuals in the protective ares within 30 minute .(F.9.) Demonstrate ability to conduct search and rescue procedure .(F.10.) Descastrate the ability to establish and operate rumor control in a coordi-nated fashio .(F.11.) Demonstrate the capability for onsite first ai .(F.12.) Demonstrate the provisions are avail-able for the evaluation of radiation exposures of, and radiation uptake in a radiological accident victi .(G.1.) Demonstrate preliminary discussions of reentry and recovery capabilities and availability of procedure .(G.2.) Demonstrate the facility recovery organizatio .(G.3.) Demonstrate the availability of corpor-ate technical support for the planning and reentry / recovery operation _________
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7.4 Narrative Summary The adverse conditions of this exercise have been designed to remove from service the water sources for the Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps, allow limited water injection into the RCS, limit the PORV operation until well into the reactor accident, remove from service key pumps
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and valves that provide redundant water sources and heat sinks, and to remove filters and fail critical path valves to allow a major
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offsite release of radioactive gase The first event of the exercise begins with Contaminated Injury #1 which occurs in the Spent Fuel Pool Pump Room on Elevation 585'.
During the procedure to clean the skimmer strainer, the intended l
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. 7-15 victim is sprayed with contaminated water from the strainer, and in trying to avoid the spray, falls from a ladder used to. reach the
- strainer. The victim receives multiple injuries from the fall. The
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Station First Aid Team responds to the injury, and determines that Injury #1 requires transport offsite. The Shift Supervisor declares an UNUSUAL EVENT, based on Station procedure HS-EP-1500 (EP-1500),
EAL 6.E.1.
i After the resin transfer valve lineup is completed, a transfer of resin begins which initiates event number two. Resin is being pumped from the Letdown Purification Mixed Bed Demineralizer 1-1 to the Spent Resin Storage Tank (SRST). The SRST is overpressured and its rupture disk fails. A valve in the tank rupture disk return line has
! been inadvertently left open and resin is pumped close to an area *
radiation monitor in the valve reach rod room above the SRST roo .
The Control Roon responds to the high radiation alarm by sending -
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Health Physics (HP) personnel to the trouble area to perform an area radiation survey. The HP survey confirms the radiation level in the
, room is greater than 1000 times background, well beyond the radiation monitor alarm point. An ALERT is declared by the Shif t Supervisor,
based on HS-EP-1500 (EP-1500), EAL 6. f Following the ALERT declaration, the TSC, OSC, RTL, and ECC are activated. Protected area personnel will assembl Before the OSC is declared operational, it is determined that a continuous service person has not shown up. He was seen in the plant
i before the ALERT was declared. A search and rescue is initiated to locate the missing OSC person known to be within the protected are An initial problem for the TSC is to determine why the surveillance
, data for Decay. Heat Fump #1 is not in conformance with expected test
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result A security challenge to the ECC or TSC is attempted by unauthorized non-Toledo Edison personne A backup communications system for the station emergency response groups is demonstrate '
. A simulated entry into the containment to inspect and try to open the PORV Block Valve initiaces Contaminated Injury #2. The Injury #2
occurs inside the containment. In the simulated scenario, the
!' injured man is moved by his partner out of the containment and placed within the designated step-off area immediately outside the outer containment air lock door. The injured person becomes contaminated in the movement. The Control Room learns of the Injury #2 af ter the uninjured partner notifies the Shift Supervisor using the paging -
system outside the containment entranc As part of the Injury #2 scenario, a News Media vehicle closely follows the responding ambulance, and tries to gain site entr i r
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7-16 About an hour before the major events of the exercise, the Outer ,
Containment Purge Valve cycles open and jams in the open positio Makeup Pump 1-1 fails, the breaker has trippe At 1100 several major events are initiated: Fire in Service Water Pump Room is alarmed in the Control Roo Control Room and responding Fire Brigade evaluate the extent of the fire and call for offsite fire fighting assistanc . The Circulating Water. System to Service Water System tie Valve CT-2955 cycles to the open position on low Service Water System pressure. Valve CT-56, in series with CT-2955, is normally close It will fail in the closed position when operations tries to open it, effectively keeping the Circulating Water System from supplying water to the Service Water System.
, Essential Power Bus D-1 is disabled. This effectively places the operating makeup pump and several other important ECCS pieces of equipment in a non-operating statu ' With the loss of the Makeup' Pumps and the Component Cooling Water Pumps, the Reactor Coolant Pumps do not have seal water cooling, and must be tripped.
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Following these events, the Control Room will trip the reactor. The turbine fails to trip automaticall In about 30 seconds the turbine trips on low Main Steam line pressure, and the Feedwater Rupture Control System automatically shute the MSIV' The Pressurizer Code Safety Valves lif t as necessary to limit the maximum pressure of the RCS, since the PORV Block Valve is stuck closed and,cannot (at this time) be reopened. The reactor coolant pumps are tripped within a few minutes of the reactor scram.
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The Emergency Director in the ECC declares a SITE AREA EMERGENCY, based on HS-EP-1500 (EP-1500), EAL 3. At this time, the Emergency Director should call for activation of the Corporate Emergency Response Organizatio Makeup Pump 1-1 is restored to service by maintenance which provides limited cooling water injection to the RC Maintenance restores the Motor Driven Feadwater Pump to service.
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The fire fighting efforts in the intake structure result in fire l
water befag inadvertently sprayed on the Diesel Fire Pump. The hot diesel block cracks, destroying the engin By this time the lack of injection water to the RCS has allowed the core to reach clad melting point temperature and core superheat
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begins. The damage breaches the fuel pin cladding, releasing core fission products into the remaining RCS water. The water fission product mixture slowly finds its way to the pressurizer, and is released to the containment through the code safety valve Essential Service Bus D-1 is restored to service, bringing important equipment back on lin The Electric Fire Water Pump is restored to service by maintenance
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which releases the offsite fire truc Control of the RCS Pressure is regained when the PORY Block valve unsticks, allowing further depressurization of the RCS, however, fission products continue to flow into the containment through the
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failed Quench Tank rupture dis Samples for analysis are taken from the containment air and RCS to j demonstrate the Stations capability to take PASS samples.
2 At about 1300, the remaining (inside) Containment Purge Valve opens,
'. allowing containment air to be blown out the station vent. The filters in the Purge Train had previously been removed for replace-
ment. The containment pressure is the driving force for this releas The Emergency Director declares a GENERAL EMERGENCY, based on HS-EP-1500 (EP-1500), EAL 1.E.1.3. or 1.D.6.
J l Average meteorology conditions during the release to the environment
are wind speed 5 mph, wind direction from 097* true and atmospheric i
Stability Class E. The resulting dispersion of the plume is toward Lucas County with child thyroid dose as the limiting factor for protective action recommendations. The projected child thyroid dose
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exceeds 5 res at five miles downwind of the release point which necessitates protective action discussions. Radiation monitoring teams survey the plume and radio their results to the Dose Assessment Cente Shortly after the of fsite release begins, the Backup Service Water
- Pump is restored to service. The auxiliary feedwater system can not
- be used to put water into the steam generators.
l The offsite release must be stopped and a high radiation exposure is
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approved to provide the necessary emergency maintenance on the i Containment Purge System valve The PORV is closed restoring the RCS boundary.
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The Containment Purge Valves are closed by maintenance restoring containment integrity. Discussions are conducted by the TSC, ECC,
! and Control Room to begin the reentry and recovery procedur The emergency classification is downgraded to a SITE AREA EMERGENCY.
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Wind speed increases, atmospheric stability decreases, and wind direction shifts to the northwest. The plume is dispersed to nominal levels as the wind transports it out of the 10-mile EPZ. Radiation Monitoring Teams commence taking environmental sample Reentry occurs before the end of the Exercis .