ML20206E028

Advises That Nuclear Industry Overlooked Most Important Lesson Resulting from TMI Accident,To Wit,That Station Operator/Mgt Official Stationed in Control Room Would Have Prevented Accident

ML20206E028
Person / Time
Site:	Three Mile Island, 05000000
Issue date:	07/07/1988
From:	Cale Young AFFILIATION NOT ASSIGNED
To:	Zech L NRC COMMISSION (OCM)
Shared Package
ML20206D924	List: ML20206D920 ML20206D945 ML20206D950 ML20206D971 ML20206D992 ML20206D997 ML20206E005 ML20206E028 ML20206E036 ML20206E043 ML20206E070 ML20206E074 ML20206E086 ML20206E090 ML20206E095 ML20206E228 ML20206G865 ML20207B103
References
NUDOCS 8811170366
Download: ML20206E028 (2)

Text

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oI. *1 262 Sheffield Lane Glen Ellyn, 11, 60137 July 7, 1988 Mr. Lando Zech Chairmin U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555

Dear Lando:

The nuclear industry has overlooked the most important lesnon from the Three Mile Island accident. A management official, a Senior Operator, stationed in the control room would have recogniced the loss of enolant accident. A management official in the control room responsible for operating the nuclear plant in accordance with the operating License, would have prevented danage to the nuclear reactor.

Before the accident, operators in the control zoom were operating three reactor crolant systems abnormally to compensate for a leak. The reactor coolant system leak incretased several bours bef?re the reactor scram. After the reactor scram, instroments and alarms in the control room signaled a loss of coolant accident.

A management official in the control room would have recognized the reactor coolant system leak after the reactor scram. Being responsible for operating the nuclear power plant in accordance with the Operating License and Technical Specifications, this of ficial would have ordered the primary plant operator to turn on the high pressure injection system.

The accident would have been terminated without damage to the nuclear reactor.

I made two studies of the Three Mile Island accident. My first -a study of the actions of operators during the first few minutes of the accident - shows that the operators should have followed their rules for operating the nuclear plant.

If operators had followed plant Procedures and Technical Specifications as required by the operating License, there would have been no accident.

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l Hy second study shows the errors of Three Mile Island 1 operators and managers ano Metropolitan Edison executives, 1 during the first day of the accident. On pages 37-40 of Tile

STUDY, errors of the first management of ficial to arrive on ,

1 scene - the Superintendent Technical Support - are

! identified. Corrective action for these errors - stationing a l J

management official, a qualified Senior Operator, in tha j control room in charge - is proved on pages 42, 4 3, and 4 4.  !

corrective action is summarized on pages 15 and 16 of the l

SUMMARY

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Enclosed are copl(s of my two studies of the Three Mile '

i Island accident. f J Sincerely yours,  !

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Charlas Young

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