IR 05000309/1988011

Insp Rept 50-309/88-11 on 880630-0731.No Violations Noted. Major Areas Inspected:Followup in Previous Insp Findings, Review of Special Repts,Licensee Event Followup,Operational Safety Verification,Maint Surveillance & Physical Security

ML20151X409
Person / Time
Site:	Maine Yankee
Issue date:	08/16/1988
From:	Lester Tripp NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I)
To:
Shared Package
ML20151X402	List: IR 05000309/1988011 ML20151X398
References
50-309-88-11, NUDOCS 8808250345
Download: ML20151X409 (7)

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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

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' Region I Report No.: 50-309/88-11 License No.: DPR-36 Licensee: Maine Yankee Atomic Power 83 Edison Drive Augusta, Maine 04336 ,

s Inspection At: Wiscasset, Maine Conducted: June 30, 1988 to July 31, 1988-c Inspectors: Cornelius F. Holden, Senior Resident Inspector R hard J. F eudenberger, Resident Inspector Approved By: / f. M gowell E. Trfpp, Chief

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' Date Reactor Projects Section No. 3A Division of Reactor Projects Inspection Summary: Inspection on June 30, 1988 to July 31, 1988 Report No. 50-309/88-11 Areas Inspected: Routine resident inspections of plant operations including:

followup on previous inspection findings, review of special reports, licensee event followup, operational safety verification, ma i r.tenance , serveillance, physical security, radiation protection and fire protectio Backshift inspections were conducted on July 2 Results: No violations were identifie An operations department casualty drill was reviewe This initiative appears to be a valuable method to reinforce operators training and work practice h$k G

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DETAILS

' Persons Contacted Within this report _ period, interviews.and discussions were conducted with various licensee personnel, including plant operators, maintenance tech-nicians and the licensee's management staf . Summary of Facility Activ' ties lhe plant operated at full power throughout the report perio . Followup on previous Inspection Findings-(Closed) Unresolved Item 50-309/88-09-01 involved the environmental qual-ification status of. the terminal block and field leads in the power supply to solenoid operated valve SOV-21 The terminal block and field leads were determined to have a questio *ble environmental qualification status due to inadequate documentation of the "as built" installatio (See Region I Inspection Report 50-309/88-09, Detail 5.c). The questionable equipment was replaced with equipment having the necessary documentation ~

to support environmental qualificatio An analysis of the "as found" components was completed. The components were inspected and determined te be appropriate for the application in which they were installed, in accordance with the licensee's environmental qualification progra This item is close . Operational Safety Verification (IP 71707)

On a daily basis, during routine facility tours the following were checked: manning, access control, adherence to procedures and LCO's, instrumentation, recorder traces, protective systems, control room annun-ciators, radiation monitors, emergency power source operability, opera-bility of the Safety Parameter Display System (SPOS), control room logs, shif t supervisor logs, and operating orders. On a weekly basis, selected Engineered Safety Features (ESF) trains were verified to operable. The condition of the plant equipment, radiological controls, security and safety were assessed. On a biweekly frequency the inspector reviewed a safety-related tagout, chemistry sample results, shift turnovers, . portions of the containment isolation valve lineup &nd the posting of notices to workers. -Plant housekeeping and cleanliness were also evaluated.

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The inspector observed selected phases of the plant's operations to deter-mine compliance with the NRC's regulations. The inspector determined that l the areas inspected and the licensee's actions did not constitute a. health and safety hazard to the public or plant personne The following are noteworthy areas the inspector reviewed: On July 5, the maintenance department adjusted the packing on motor operated valve HSI-M-50. HSI-M-50 is the "B" train outlet isolation valve from the Refueling Water Storage Tank (RWST) to the High Press-ure Safety Injection Pump suctio It is required to.be operable by-Technical Specification The valve packing adjustment procedure (5-30-3) specifies that this valve be tested using procedure 3-5-9 "Measurement of Motor Operator Load" to ensure the packing adjustment did not adversely affect the performance of the motor operator. A prerequisite step in the "Measurement of Motor Operator Load" proced-ure had the Plant Shift Supervisor (PSS) or Shift Operating Super-visor (SOS) authorize the test to commence and declare the equipment

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inoperable. The SOS on duty interpreted this step to mean that he make a determination as to the operability of the valve during the testing as is normal practic Af ter discussing the evolution with the electricel maintenance technician who was to perform the motor operator test, the SOS determined that the test did not render the

' valve inoperable. The next shift SOS reviewed the work package after the completion of the test. He felt that the valve should have been declared inoperable based on the prerequisite step in the "Measure-ment of Motor Operator Load" procedur Operations Department hanagement reviewed the situation and deter-mined that the testing performed did not render the valve inoperable therefore, no Technical Specification requirement was exceeded. The situation was identified as a performance improvement opportunity and reviewed to establish corrective actions to prevent recurrence. The prerequisite step in the "Measurement of Motor Operator Load" proced-ure was revised so that a valve being tested need not be declared inoperable, the need to follow proctdures exactly or process a Pro-cedure Change Request (PCR) was reemphasized to the operators, and the Operatior,s Department is establishing a procedure which will control the actior.s required to remove equipment from service. The inspector reviewed the testing conditions and the procedures which controlled the test, concluding that the test performed did not render the valve inoperabl The inspector had no further question F 1

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3 On July 27, the inspector witnessed an Operations Department casualty dril The scenario consisted of a simulated loss of all feedwater and the need for an auxiliary operator to locally start the spare turbine driven auxiliary feedwater pum Previous scenarios per-formed included simulated station blackout conditions (requiring auxiliary, operator action to locally start emergency diesel gener-ators) and a simulated fire in the main control room (reouiring Plant Shift Superintendent and Control Room Operator actions to place the plant in a safe condition following a control room evacuation).

During all drills precautions were taken to stop the drill at any time if plant conditions warranted, no equipment manipulations or system lineup changes which could affect operability were allowed and a minimum of two drill controller / monitors from the Operations Department management staff were present to conduct the drill The drill scenarios contained simulated equipment malfunctions and system misalignments which are representative of realistic condi-tions, such as, breaker misalignments, valve failures and inadvertent actuation of trip device Less cbvious equipment difficulties, which also need to be overcome to successfully complete the scenario were also factored into the drills. For example, during the Station Blackout drill the securi ty card reader to the Emergency Diesel Generator Room was simulated to have failed. This required the oper-ator to have his keys in his possession to gain entry into the Emerg-ency Diesel Generator Room. Also, since a simulated station blackout was in effect, the lights were turned off in the Emergency Diesel Generator Room. The operator was penalized if he didn't have his flashlight with him. During the loss of all feedwater drill, empha-sis was placed on the need to obtain permission from the control room prior to opening a steam supply valve marked as a containment inte-grity valve and the causes, symptoms and actions taken to correct pump cavitation. The inspector considered the casualty drills to be a valuable method for reinforcing systems training, especially in diagnosing equipment malfunctions and reiterating the importance of good work practices, c. Since there has been an extended period of warmer than usual weather, the inlet water temperature has been elevate The inspector reviewed this condition to assess its impact on plant operation The Service Water system is the safety related cooling water system which provides cooling to the Primary and Secondary Component Cooling Systems (PCC and SCC) which ultimately supply cooliag to all safety related cooling loads throughout the plant. The Service Water System circulates water from the bay through the PCC and SCC heat exchang-er According to the Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) the Service Water System is designed to provide sufficient heat removal

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capacity during a shutdown to cool the reactor coolant from 400 degrees Fahrenheit to 125 degrees Fahrenheit in approximately twenty-four- hours with a service water temperature of 70 degrees Fahrenhei Since the twenty-four hour average inlet water temperature was close to '70 degrees Fahrenheit, the inspector questioned whether this design assumption was used in any of the FSAR accident analyses. The licensee verified that this assumption was not used directly in any of the FSAR analyse Component Coo'ing water temperatures are used as the basis for the FSAR analysis assumption The inspector reviewed recent temperature data for the PCC and SCC systems. The systems temperatures were maintained within FSAR analysis assumptions limits. The inspector had no further question On several occasions during the report period the weighted average containment air temperature reached the high alarm setpoint of 111 degrees Fahrenheit. The maximum temperature analyzed for an initial condition for the Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) Reactor Con-tainment Pressure Analysis is 113 degrees Fahrenheit. To reduce the containment air temperature plant operators have several options

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including placing spare components cooling water pumps, service water pumps and service water heat exchangers into servic The most effective action was determined to be starting the sixth containment recirculation fan. The containment air temperature did not exceed FSAR analysis assumptions at any time during this report perio There are six containment recirculation fans which take suction from the containment annulus space and discharge through coolers into a ring duct which distributes air to all portions of the containment building. The coolers are supplied with Primary Component Cooling (PCC) water. The licensee inspected the fans, coolers and their associated ductwork to verify adequate performance. The containment recirculation fans and coolers are assumed to not operate during the design basis containment pressure transient, therefore, the inspector concluded that the performance of the containment recirculation fans and coolers would not impact FSAR assumptions. The inspector had no further question No violations were identifie . Flant Paintenance (IP 62703)

The inspector observed and reviewed maintenance and problem investigation activities to verify compliance with regulations, administrative and maintenance procedures, codes and standards, proper QA/QC involvcment, safety tag use, equipment alignment, jumper use, personnel qualifications, radiological controls for worker protection, retest requirements, and reportability per Technical Specification . . _ . ._ _ _ _ .

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Portions ~of the following maintenance evolutions were reviewed:

Discrepancy Date Report Number Description

. y' 7/11 2549-88 Non-EQ Motor Operated Valve Preventive Maintenance (BA-67)

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7/13 2771-88 Replacement of air pressure regulator to valve EFW-A-301 N No violations or significant concerns were identifie . Surveillance Testing (IP 61726)

The inspector observed parts cf tests to assess performance in accordance with approved procedures and LC0's, test results, removal and restoration of equipment, and deficiency review and resolutio Portions of the following surveillances were reviewed:

Date Procedure Number Title 7/27 3.17. Quarterly Testing of EFW-345 and EFW-346 7/27 5-78-1 Diesel Generator Redundant Systems Check No violations or significant concerns were identifie . Observations of Physical Security (IP 71707)

Checks were made to determine whether security conditions met regul tory rsquirements, the physical security plan, and approved procedures. Taose checks included security staffing, protected and vital area barrit as ,

vehicle searches and personnel identification, access control, badging, and compensatory measures when require On July 14, plant operators viere preparing to make a routine containment entry. Health Physics and Security were notified of the planned entry in order that the necessary personnel could be present at the conta1csent personnel hatch area. When the security officer arrived, the operators were not prepared to enter the containmen The officer received a call to unlock another door in an ad,iacent are Since the containment per-sonnel hatch controls had not been unlocked at that time the officer was

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able to leave the area. When the officer returned approximately three tinutes later, the hatch controls had been unlocked and the operations personnel had entered containmen ,

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' The licensee performed an evaluation of this occurrence in accordance with the Human Performance Evaluation System (fiPES) . As a result of this evaluation corrective actions were taken. Procedure 1-12-4 "Containment Entry" was revised to emphasize the need for a security officer to man the area when the hatch is unlocked. Additionally, the distribution of th keys for the personnel hatch was restricted. The inspector had no further question .,

1 Radiological Controls IIP 71709)

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Radiological controls were observed on a routine basis during the report-ing period. Areas reviewed included Organization and Management, external radiation exposure control and contamination contro Standard industry radiological work practices, conformance to radiological control proced-ures and 10 CFR Part 20 requirements were observe Independent surveys of radiological boundaries and random surveys of nonradiological points throughout the facility were taken by the inspecto No violations or significant concerns were identifie . Exit Interview (IP 30703)

Meetings were periodically held with senior facility management to discuss the inspection scope and findings. A summary of findings for the report pericd was also discussed at the conclusion of the irispectio The licensee did not identify 2.790 material.

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