ML20080C130

Special Rept 94-13:on 941109,three Control Bldg Cable Tray Penetrations Breached & Will Be Breached in Excess of TS Allowable Timeframe to Support Mod Activities Associated W/ Cable Installation to Secondary Alarm Station

ML20080C130
Person / Time
Site:	Sequoyah
Issue date:	12/02/1994
From:	Shell R TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY
To:	NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM)
References
94-13, NUDOCS 9412070308
Download: ML20080C130 (3)

Text

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December 2, 1994 e

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: Document Control Desk Washington, D.C. 20555 Gentlemen:

In the Matter of ) Docket Nos. 50-327 Tennessee Valley Authority ) 50-328 SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT (SQN) - UNITS 1 AND 2 - FACILITY OPERATING LICENSES DPR-77 AND DPR TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION (TS) 3.7.12 - SPECIAL REPORT 94-13 The enclosed special report provides details concerning electrical penetration fire barriers that were intentionally removed from service to support modification activities associated with the site security upgrade project. The fire barriers will be nonfunctional for a period of time greater than the TS allowable timeframe. -

This report is being submitted in accordance with TS 3.7.12 Action -

Statement (a).

If you have any questions concerning this submittal, please telephone J. Bajraszewski at (615) 843-7749.

Sincerely, R. H. Shell Manager SQN Site Licensing Enclosure cc: See page 2 i

070018 030s 941202 ~

S DOCK 05000327 //

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U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Page 2 December 2, 1994 l cc (Enclosure):

Mr. D. E. LaBarge, Project Manager U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission One White Flint, North 11555 Rockville Pike Rockville, Maryland 20852-2739 NRC Resident Inspector j l Sequoyah Nuclear Plant 2600 Igou Ferry Road

.l Soddy-Daisy, Tennessee 37379-3624 )

i Regional Administrator U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region II 101 Marietta Street, NW, Suite 2900 Atlanta, Georgia 30323-2711

e . .

ENCLOSURE SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT UNITS 1 AND 2 SPECIAL REPORT 94-13 Descrintion of Condition on November 9, 1994, three control building cable tray penetrations (see below) were breached. These fire barriers were intentionally removed from service to support modification activities associated with cable installation to the secondary alarm station (SAS) as part of the site security upgrade project. The penetrations will be breached in excess of the technical specification (TS) allowable timeframe. This condition is being reported in accordance with TS 3.7.12 Action Statement (a).

Cable Tray Floor Penetration Number Number Buildina Elevation C04685N020-01 VBM Control 685 CO2706F105 WL Control 706 1CB725C0421N000 VE Control 706 Cause of Condition Cables are being routed into the SAS from the field (perimeter). This in a preplanned activity associated with the site security upgrade project.

Corrective Action In accordance with TS Action Statement 3.7.12(a), a roving fire watch was established after the fire detectors on one side of the penetrations were verified operable. The roving fire watch will be maintained until the penetration fire barriers are reestablished. The fire barriers will be reestablished after the completion of cable installation activities.

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