ML20199C295
| ML20199C295 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Sequoyah  |
| Issue date: | 11/13/1997 |
| From: | Gilley S TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20199C289 | List: |
| References | |
| LER-97-S01, LER-97-S1, NUDOCS 9711190295 | |
| Download: ML20199C295 (8) | |
Text
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Sequoyah Nuclear Plant (SQN) Unit 2 05000328 10F 8 titts iai vendalism of electrical cables.
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ABSTRACT (L6 nut to 1400 paces, te , approximately 15 single spaced typewritten lines) f16)
At approximately 0735 Eastern Standard Time (EST) on October 17, 1997, two Modifications department electricians observed that the condition of the wiring, associated with the replacement of an electrical penetration, was abnormal. The electricians notified Modifications supervision. Eleven individual conductors had sustained damage from a sharp object coming in contact with the conductests. Plant personnel notified Nuclear Security of the condition. Nuclear Security secured he scene of the reported damage and posted a security guard at the scene to limit access to authorized personnel. Plant personnel notified plant management of the reported damage. Operations personnel notified the Nuclear Regulatory Commission of the reported damage, in accordan>e with 10CFR73 at 1059 EST. The root cause of the damaged cables was vandalism. Corrective actions included repair of the damaged cables, interviews of personnel that had the potential for being in the area at the time the damage occurred, and v ikdowns to determine whether any additional vandalism had occurred. Personnel did not icentify any additional damage. SQN implemented a heightened presence of senior site management on both units. Security instituted an additional foot patrol in the plant, and established a phone number for personnel to anonymously forward information concerning the inciderst.
9711190295 971113 PDR ADOCK 05000328 8 pon hRC IURM 306 (445)
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NRC PonM 364AU.8, NUCLEAR REOULATORY COMMISSION 84-914 LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
TEXT CONTINUATION FACILITY MAME (1) DOCKET LER NUMBER (6) PAGE (3)
YtAR SE QUENTIAL NUMBE R RIVISION NUMBER 05000328 2 Of 8 SQN Unit 2 97 -- S01 -- 00 ,
tt at m e . .c. .. ,.w.o. w .omn.i e.g.es of NHC form 36f,A) (t h 1 l
l I. DESCRIPTION OF EVENT J
A. Event ,
At approximately 0735 EST on Friday, October 17, 1997, ;
two Modifications department electricians arrived at the Seal Table Room, Elevation 690 feet, of the Unit 2 Containment Building to begin their shift assignment.
Replacement of an electrical penetration was in progress i with work on both night and day shifts. Work had !
progressed to the point of splicing existing field wires to the new penetration wires. The two arriving !
electricians immediately observed that the condition of l the wiring was abnormal and subsequently notified Modifications supervision. An investigation determined that the damage was the result of vandalism. The vandalism consisted of 11 damaged electrical cables at electrical penetration No. 22, i The investigation has thus far been unable to determine ,
the identity of the person (s) involved, their motive for the act, and the precise time of the damage to '
electrical penetration No. 22. The team correlated personnel statements with data from the RadCon acce3s records to determine the window of opportunity. It appears that the event occurred within a 2-hour and '
20-minute period between approximately 0515 EST and 0735 i EST on October 17, 1997 In response to the event, the plant took compensatory actions aimed at assuring and preserving the integrity of essential plant systems. Walkdowns of safety-related !
systems, components, and structures revealed no additional damage to either unit. The Site Quality ,
-organization reviewed all PERs written since the beginning of U2C8 preoutage work started in September to identify any potential tampering issues. The team NRC FORM 366A 14 96)
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. LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) [
TEXT CONTINUATION FACILITY MAME (1) . DOCKET LER WUMBER (6) PAGE (3) !
YtAR stOVENTIAL NUMBE R REVi&lON NUMBER i 3 of 8 SQN Unit 2 C5000328 ,
97 -- 801 -- 00 n u cemu..n.c..... .u .ooa n.i4,p....,nace.,m xeaiiiii ,
presented fifteen potential issues to management for reconsideration. The evaluation concluded that none of these cases involved vandalism or tampering.
B. Date and Time of EverG The damaged cablen were discovered on October 17, 1997, at approximately 0735 EST.- The damage most likely occurred during a 2-hour and 20-minute window of time- ,
before the discovery.
C. Location The location of the damaged cables was Elevation 690 in the Seal Table Room inside containment. This is a vital area. i D. Operatina Phase Unit 1 was in power operation at approximately 100 percent, and Unit 2 was shutdown in a refueling outage with no fuel in the reactor.
E. Safety Systems Affected or Threatened None of the end devices fed by the damaged cables were safety related. In addition, the damaged cables were out of service at the time the damage occurred because of the work in progress on the penetration. Therefore, no safety systems were affected or threatened.
F. Type of Security Force Onsite The security force at Sequoyah is a proprietary force of permanent TVA employees.
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O NRC PORM 366AU.S. NUCLEAM REGULATORY COMMIS$40N 14 95)
. LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
TEXT CONTINUATION FACILITY MAaEE (1) DOCKET LER NUMBER (6) PAGE (3)
YEAR SEQUENilAL NWMR REVl&ON NWM R SQN Unit 2 05000328 4 of 8 97 -- S01 -- 00 ttai of .. .on. .. .. .a. u wown.i eop . of NRc roem aotA on G. Number and Type of Personnoi Involved The electricians that discovered the damage were contract personnel that were onsite in support of outage work activities. The person (s) causing tne event have not been identified. l H. Method of Discoverv Dayshift electricians arrived at the work location at the beginning of their shift and discovc-:d damage to the cables that was not consistent with normal work practices. The electricians notified their management of the damage.
l I. Proceoural Errors Involved There were no procedural errors involved in this event. )
J. Immediate Actions Taken in Response to the Event Operations personnel walked down accessible safety-related systems and structures on both units looking for any evidence of tampering. This included a l Unit 1 containment entry. ,
l Engineering personnel walked down accessible Unit 1 !
safety-related systems looking for.any evidence of I tampering.
Security supervision and plant. nianagement implemented interim compensatory measures to preserve evidence and locate any potential additional evidence of vandalism at the Sequoyah site. These measures did not identify any NMC FORM 366A (4 96)
o NFC PORM 36SAU.S. NUCLEAR RESULAfoRY CoMMISSloN M 9t4
. LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
TEXT CONTItWATIoM FACILITY 314385 (1) DOCKET LER NUttBER (6) PAGE (3)
YlAR 6(OLCNilAL NUMBE R REVISION NUMD(R
- SON Unit 2 05000320 $ of 8
. 97 -- S01 -- 00 n ni sa .. .c. i. ,.w.a. . aa.n.i .... .t . 5.,m ae.sai iir, additional damage. The workers reporting the damage were interviewed to determine the approximate time the damage occurred. The team also identified personnel in the area during the " window-of opportunity" using_
computer printouts.
The Site Quality organization reviewed-all PERs written from the time preoutage work scarted to identify any potential tampering issues. These activities identified 15 issues that warranted evaluation as potential tampering examples. The evaluation concluded that none of these cases involved vandalism or tampering.
The team consulted the TVA Office of the Inspector General (OIG). Considering the number of personnel working in proximity to the penetration, management decided to utilize the OIG to interview the potentially involved personnel. The OIG investigators reviewed printouts from RadCon and selected approximately 160 TVA and contractor personnel that were potentially in the
-area at the time of the incident. The OIG investigation is ongoing. The investigation has not identified any information to date that could lead to the identification of the party or parties responsible for the damaged cables.
Following the initial interviews of pertinent personnel, Security released the scene for removal of the damaged conductors and repairs to the penetration. Repairs are now-complete. Personnel removed the damaged conductors and provided them to Security for evidence preservation.
Several immediate actions were taken to heighten the awareness of site personnel to this issue: (1) The Site Vice President and Plant Manager initiated a heightened presence of senior site mantgement on both units in an effort to observe key work during the outage, protect Unit 1 from outage activities, and support worker morale NRC FORM 366A i4-95)
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hRC FOMA 3SSAU.S. NUCLEAR MOULATORY COMMIS460N I4 9H
. LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
TEXT CONTINUATION :
i' FACILITY MAME (1) DOCKET LER NUMBER (6) PAGE (3)
YEAR $(OU(NTIAL NUMMR REVISION NUMMR ,
6 of 8 SON Unit.2 05000328 97 -- S01 -- 00
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J es they performed their outage tasks. This extra +
presence contributes to the overall defense network '
provided at Sequoyah as a deterrent to random acts of t vandalism, (2) plant management conducted briefings on l 3
the_ event with site personnel. The briefing requested an increased presence in_the field with increased attention to personnel in the " wrong" area and to "off-normal" behaviors, (3) Security established a phone line-(TIPS) to permit personnel to anonymously identify to Security items that could' lead to the identification ;
of the person (s) causing the damage, and (4) Site :
Security instituted an additional foot patrol inside the plant. ;
SQN processed a Level W PER and formed an event -
respc,nse team to ascertain the root cause and corrective !
actions, j K. Corrective Actions Taken or Planned i
On October 20, 1997, Security instituted additional access restrictions for plant personnel. ,
Information was solicited from temporary personnel exiting the plant site following the outage. This ,
process did not identify any new information.
System Engineering and Operations performed a second walkdown of the plant as part of the alignment walkdowns ,
for return to power operation. -
G4RC FORM 366A {4 9H l
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NRC FORM 366AU.S, NUCLEAR MOULATORY COMMISSION 14 96)
. LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) i TEXT CONTINUATION i FACILITY NAME (1) DOCKET LER NUMsER (6) PAGE (3)
YEAR SEQUENTIAL NUMBER REVISION NUMBER j 05000328
. 7 of 8 SON Unit 2 97 -- S01 -- 00 tExi ce -,. .e. . ....o, . .oomon.i cop . 01 NitC form 306A) (17)
Security will assess a revision to the security process that would further restrict access to critical plant f areas by temporary personnel.2 Training on the consequences of vandalism will be incorporated into employee access training for outage temporary workers.2 Security will evaluate utilizing additional personnel (foot patrols) in the plant during times when large temporary work forces are present.2 l
Security will reevaluate the process for addressing security events similar to this event.*
L. Local, State, or Federal Law Enforcement Agencies Contacted The Security organization contacted the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). They discussed the investigation and advised the FBI that they would be informed of any criminal findings.
M. Description of Media Interest and Press Release ,
TVA did not issue a press release c.: this event although TVA did receive and respond to telephone calls from the media.
l
' TVA does not consider this corrective action a regulatory commitrtent. TVA's corrective action program will t rack cosnpletion of the action, NRC FORM 366A 44 964
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NRC FORM 366AU.S. NUCLEAR REOUL ATORY COMMIS$10N (4 96)
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
TEXT CONTINUATION FACILITY NAME (1) DOCKET LER NUMBER is) PAGE (3)
YEAR SCOL4NTIAL NUMMR REVISION NUMMR 8 of 8 SQH Unit; 2 05000328 --
97 -- Sol -- 00 itx1 tie nr.>r. .p.c. . .. ,.a, v .oo i.on.i cop..s of NRC Form M0A) {1H H. Indication of Previous Similar Events Personnel reviewed FERs initiated from the time preoutage work began unti] the day after the damaged cables were discovered. These activities identified 15 issues that warranted evaluation as potential tampering examples. The evaluation concluded that these issues did nor invol"e vandalism or tampering.
NRC FORM 366A 44'95)