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{{#Wiki_filter:-.A(at:ELE RATED D 1 SQQUTJ ON DE M ON STRj$b SYSTEM REGULATORY XNFORMATION DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM (RIDS)ACCESHION NBR:8812150013 DOC.DATE: 88/12/07'OTARIZED:
{{#Wiki_filter:-. A(at:ELE RATED       D 1 SQQUTJ ON         DE M ON STRj$ b             SYSTEM REGULATORY XNFORMATION DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM (RIDS)
NO DOCKET I FACIL:50-397 WPPSS Nuclear Project, Unit 2, Washington Public Powe 05000397 AUTH.NAME AUTHOR AFFILIATION SORENSEN,G.C.
ACCESHION NBR:8812150013             DOC.DATE: 88/12/07 'OTARIZED: NO                 DOCKET I FACIL:50-397     WPPSS Nuclear Project, Unit 2, Washington Public Powe 05000397 AUTH. NAME           AUTHOR AFFILIATION SORENSEN,G.C.         Washington Public Power Supply System RECIP.NAME 'ECIPIENT AFFILIATION Document Control Branch (Document Control Desk/
Washington Public Power Supply System RECIP.NAME
'ECIPIENT AFFILIATION Document Control Branch (Document Control Desk/


==SUBJECT:==
==SUBJECT:==
Provides description of process used to determine channel functional test boundaries for second level UP.DISTRXBUTION CODE: A001D COPXES RECEIVED:LTR ENCL SIZE: TITLE: OR Submittal:
Provides description of process used to determine channel functional test boundaries for second level UP.
General Distribution NOTES RECIPIENT ID CODE/NAME PD5 LA SAMWORTH,R INTERNAL: ACRS NRR/DEST/ADS 7E, NRR/DEST/ESB 8D NRR/DEST/RSB 8E NRR/XMAS/ILRB12 OGC/HDS2 RES/DSIR/EIB EXTERNAL: LPDR NSIC COPIES LTTR ENCL 1 0 1 1 6 6 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 RECXPIENT ID CODE/NAME PD5 PD ARM/DAF/LFMB NRR/DEST/CEB 8H NRR/DEST/MTB 9H NRR/DOEA/TSB 11 NUDOCS-ABSTRACT RE~LL 01 NRC PDR COPIES LTTR ENCL 2 2 1 0 1 1'1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 S NOTE TO ALL RIDS RECIPIENTS
DISTRXBUTION CODE: A001D       COPXES RECEIVED:LTR         ENCL       SIZE:
~PLEASE HELP US KO REDUCE WASTE!CXÃZACZ'lid DOCUMEÃZ CONTROL DESKi ROOM Pl-37 (EXT.20079)TO XLZMXATE YOUR NAME FRCH DISXVGKTZXGN LISTS H)R DOCUMENTS YOU DGNIT NEEDt o9" TOTAL NUMBER OF COPXES REQUIRED: LTTR 25 ENCL 22  
TITLE:   OR Submittal: General Distribution NOTES RECIPIENT           COPIES            RECXPIENT            COPIES ID  CODE/NAME        LTTR ENCL        ID CODE/NAME         LTTR ENCL PD5 LA                   1      0    PD5 PD                  2    2 SAMWORTH,R               1      1 INTERNAL: ACRS                         6      6    ARM/DAF/LFMB            1    0 NRR/DEST/ADS 7E,         1      1    NRR/DEST/CEB 8H          1    1' NRR/DEST/ESB 8D          1     1     NRR/DEST/MTB 9H                1 NRR/DEST/RSB 8E          1      1    NRR/DOEA/TSB 11         1    1 NRR/XMAS/ILRB12          1      1    NUDOCS-ABSTRACT         1    1 OGC/HDS2                1      0    RE~   LL         01     1     1 RES/DSIR/EIB            1     1 EXTERNAL: LPDR                        1     1     NRC PDR                  1     1 NSIC                    1     1 S
~0 g~~0 WASHINGTON PUBLIC POWER SUPPLY SYSTEM P.O.Box 968~3000 George Washington Way~Richland, Washington 99352 December 7, 1988 G02-88-261 Docket No.50-397 U.S.Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attn: Document Control Desk Mail Station Pl-137 Washington, D.C.20555 Gentlemen:
NOTE TO ALL RIDS   RECIPIENTS ~
PLEASE HELP US KO REDUCE WASTE! CXÃZACZ 'lid DOCUMEÃZ CONTROL DESKi ROOM Pl-37 (EXT. 20079) TO XLZMXATE YOUR NAME FRCH DISXVGKTZXGN LISTS H)R DOCUMENTS YOU DGNIT NEEDt TOTAL NUMBER OF COPXES REQUIRED: LTTR           25   ENCL     22         o9"
 
                              ~0               g~                 ~0 WASHINGTON PUBLIC POWER SUPPLY SYSTEM P.O. Box 968 ~ 3000 George Washington Way ~ Richland, Washington 99352 December 7, 1988 G02-88-261 Docket No. 50-397 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attn:   Document Control Desk Mail Station Pl-137 Washington, D.C. 20555 Gentlemen:


==Subject:==
==Subject:==
NUCLEAR PLANT NO.2 4.16 KV EMERGENCY BUS UNDERVOLTAGE DEGRADED VOLTAGE (SECOND LEVEL UNDERVOLTAGE)
NUCLEAR PLANT NO. 2 4.16 KV EMERGENCY BUS UNDERVOLTAGE DEGRADED VOLTAGE (SECOND LEVEL UNDERVOLTAGE) PROTECTION
PROTECTION


==Reference:==
==Reference:==
Letter,  R.B. Samworth (NRR) to G.C. Sorensen (SS),
                  "Confirmation of Commitment for Emergency Bus Undervoltage Protection Circuitry", dated December 5, 1988 The pur pose of this letter is      to provide a description of the decision process used to determine the Channel        Functional Test (CFT) boundaries for the second level undervoltage protection utilized at        WNP-2.
This  letter is written in    response to a telephone discussion between the Supply System    and  the NRR on November 30, 1988 and the referenced letter.                The conversation included Messrs R. Samworth and R. Burrows of NRR, P. Johnson of I8E Region V, H. Aeschliman, R. Koenigs, R. Matthews and T. Meade of the Supply System.
It is the position of the Supply System that Channel Functional Testing as required by the WNP-2 Technical Specifications does not include relays that result in trip system actuation. The manner in which the designed eight second time delay associated with second level undervoltage protection was implemented relied upon two relays; an integral five second time delay and a separate three second time delay relay.        Because the five second time delay was integral to the undervoltage sensing device,          it was included in the channel.        The addi-tional three second time delay relay was designed to execute various trip system functions (bus deenergization, load shed, bus reenergization, subsequent load sequencing and annunciation) and as such was not included in the CFT.
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0 4.16  KV EMERGENCY BUS UNDERVOLTAGE DEGRADED VOLTAGE (SECOND LEVEL UNDERVOLTAGE) PROTECTION Based  upon  prior NRC approval of the existing configuration, the Supply System prepared  the required technical specification surveillance procedures.              Test-ability capabilities were included in the Technical Specification and design review processes.      Other utilities design similarities also suggest that the WNP-2 configuration is typical.        Although, the Supply System recognizes its responsibility to ensure the technical'ccuracy of the LCO, this problem is resolvable via a Tech Spec amendment that explicitly 'delineates what type of testing is required for    each  division.
The Engineering    staff at the Supply System has reviewed the existing design and the design criteria provided to the 'Supply System by NRR in FSAR ()uestion 040.036. The results of this review indicate that the second level under-voltage protection circuitry utilized at WNP-2 meet the criteria established by the NRC. The designs of th'e division one and 'w'o, second level undervoltage protection as well as the design for the division three, second level under,-
voltage protection remain unchanged from that transmitted to NRR for review during the licensing process. The submittal to the NRC prior to initial start-up included the present design of the division one and division two, five second and three second sequential time delays.            The letters which transmitted these documents to NRR are attached for your review (Attachments 5 and 6). A requirement to incorporate all the time delay relay functions into the channel would involve a significant redesign effort.
It is  the position of the Supply System and was the position of the NRR at the time of the licensing process to not require functional testing during power operation which would result in actuation (in this case the separation of the onsite safety related busses from the offsite power, sources).              This circuitry as reviewed and subsequently approved by NRR,            did not  include  the  ability to test the three second time delay relays          associated  with  divisioh  one and two.
That portion of the logic that was designed          to  be  testable  included  only the five second time delay based upon        the  requirements    of  FSAR  question  040.036.
The five second time delay is integral to the undervoltage relay and is not a separate time delay relay. The configuration relied upon the three second time delay relay as an end point relay. In other words, that which was channelized by design is testable and included in the CFT.
The  Supply  System  has  obtained  several    other  Technical    Specifications from facilities similar to      WNP-2. These Technical Specifications vary considerably from no requined testing    to monthly Channel Functional Testing. Some Technical Specifications such as      Grand Gulf specifically exempt the time delay relays from testing.
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Pa~ge    Three.
4.16    KV EMERGENCY BUS UNDERVOLTAGE DEGRADED VOLTAGE (SECOND LEVEL UNDERVOLTAGE) PROTECTION  provides excerpts from several other utility Technical Specifica-tions.      Below  is a summary of these Technical Specifications. It is our belief tHat other utilities implement testing consistent with our position.
o        Grand  Gulf      Implements monthly Channel Functional Testing but specifi-cally  exempts time delay relays from this testing. Divi-sion three degraded voltage protection is specifically exempted.
o        LaSalle        -  Channel Functional Testing  is not implemented.
Due    to the variety of designs which implement the second level undervoltage protection,        it  can be concluded from the above that performance of periodic functional testing at power which includes the time delay relays is not typical.
Conclusion The    existing design meets the original criteria established by the NRC in FSAR question 040.036. The present functional testing appears consistent with that implemented by other utilities on second level undervoltage protection. WNP-2 believes the existing functional testing content and scope to be acceptable and in compliance with NRR requirements at the time of the licensing.
The WNP-2 Technical        Specification requires an amendment relative to the second level undervoltage protection. It is the belief of the Supply System that the associated LCO, absent interpretation, must be amended to reflect present configurations.
As    a  result of this issue,      a  review of each divisions test procedures was conducted and an additional problem was discovered.          The division three second level undervoltage protection is not testable dur ing operation and will also require reconciliation by Technical Specification amendment.
Because      this issue affects the monthly CFT on division one, two and three,        a Technical Specification amendment is required by January 12, 1989.
As  requested in the letter from NRR received Monday, December 5, we have con-ducted an initial review of our class lE relay calibration program and have t
identified 169 time delay relays which are tested as par of the Logic System Functional Testing and not included in Channel Functional Tests.            We are pre-sently aware of only four'ime delay relays which are required to be included in the Channel Functional Testing by the WNP-2 Technical Specifications.
(Division 1 and 2 LPCI pump start second start time delay and division 1 and 2 ADS actuation 105 second time delay.)
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Letter, R.B.Samworth (NRR)to G.C.Sorensen (SS),"Confirmation of Commitment for Emergency Bus Undervoltage Protection Circuitry", dated December 5, 1988 The pur pose of this letter is to provide a description of the decision process used to determine the Channel Functional Test (CFT)boundaries for the second level undervoltage protection utilized at WNP-2.This letter is written in response to a telephone discussion between the Supply System and the NRR on November 30, 1988 and the referenced letter.The conversation included Messrs R.Samworth and R.Burrows of NRR, P.Johnson of I8E Region V, H.Aeschliman, R.Koenigs, R.Matthews and T.Meade of the Supply System.It is the position of the Supply System that Channel Functional Testing as required by the WNP-2 Technical Specifications does not include relays that result in trip system actuation.
Page Four, 4.16  KV EMERGENCY BUS UNDERVOLTAGE DEGRADED VOLTAGE (SECOND LEVEL UNDERVOLTAGE) PROTECTION In summary, the Supply System considers that tHe present Channel Functional Testing performed on the second level undervoltage protection circuitry is adequate and meets the interpretation of the requirements prevailing at the time of licensing for HNP-2.
The manner in which the designed eight second time delay associated with second level undervoltage protection was implemented relied upon two relays;an integral five second time delay and a separate three second time delay relay.Because the five second time delay was integral to the undervoltage sensing device, it was included in the channel.The addi-tional three second time delay relay was designed to execute various trip system functions (bus deenergization, load shed, bus reenergization, subsequent load sequencing and annunciation) and as such was not included in the CFT.88igf500i3 50003+7 asi207 pop 4DOCK 0 pDt P oo(
The  Supply   System proposes a meeting with the NRR to discuss        this issue and present  the proposed Technical Specification amendment.
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Very  truly yours, G. C. Sorensen,     Manager Regulatory Programs TLM/bk Attachments:      1)  Channel Functional Testing
PROTECTION Based upon prior NRC approval of the existing configuration, the Supply System prepared the required technical specification surveillance procedures.
: 2)  Second Level Undervoltage Logic Descriptions
Test-ability capabilities were included in the Technical Specification and design review processes.
: 3)  Other, Utility Technical Specification Excerpts
Other utilities design similarities also suggest that the WNP-2 configuration is typical.Although, the Supply System recognizes its responsibility to ensure the technical'ccuracy of the LCO, this problem is resolvable via a Tech Spec amendment that explicitly
: 4)  Channel Functional Test Procedure PPM 7.4.3.3.1.67 Rev. 4
'delineates what type of testing is required for each division.The Engineering staff at the Supply System has reviewed the existing design and the design criteria provided to the'Supply System by NRR in FSAR ()uestion 040.036.The results of this review indicate that the second level under-voltage protection circuitry utilized at WNP-2 meet the criteria established by the NRC.The designs of th'e division one and'w'o, second level undervoltage protection as well as the design for the division three, second level under,-voltage protection remain unchanged from that transmitted to NRR for review during the licensing process.The submittal to the NRC prior to initial start-up included the present design of the division one and division two, five second and three second sequential time delays.The letters which transmitted these documents to NRR are attached foryour review (Attachments 5 and 6).A requirement to incorporate all the time delay relay functions into the channel would involve a significant redesign effort.It is the position of the Supply System and was the position of the NRR at the time of the licensing process to not require functional testing during power operation which would result in actuation (in this case the separation of the onsite safety related busses from the offsite power, sources).This circuitry as reviewed and subsequently approved by NRR, did not include the ability to test the three second time delay relays associated with divisioh one and two.That portion of the logic that was designed to be testable included only the five second time delay based upon the requirements of FSAR question 040.036.The five second time delay is integral to the undervoltage relay and is not a separate time delay relay.The configuration relied upon the three second time delay relay as an end point relay.In other words, that which was channelized by design is testable and included in the CFT.The Supply System has obtained several other Technical Specifications from facilities similar to WNP-2.These Technical Specifications vary considerably from no requined testing to monthly Channel Functional Testing.Some Technical Specifications such as Grand Gulf specifically exempt the time delay relays from testing.  
: 5)  Letter, LT Ha@roid to FA MacLean, "Second Level Undervoltage Protection for, Division 3", dated September, 27, 1983
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: 6) Letter, GC Sorensen to A Schwencer, 'Branch Technical Position SPB-1 Commitment, Implementation Status",
PROTECTION Attachment 3 provides excerpts from several other utility Technical Specifica-tions.Below is a summary of these Technical Specifications.
dated October, 14, 1983
It is our belief tHat other utilities implement testing consistent with our position.o Grand Gulf-Implements monthly Channel Functional Testing but specifi-cally exempts time delay relays from this testing.Divi-sion three degraded voltage protection is specifically exempted.o LaSalle-Channel Functional Testing is not implemented.
: 7) FSAR guestion 040.036
Due to the variety of designs which implement the second level undervoltage protection, it can be concluded from the above that performance of periodic functional testing at power which includes the time delay relays is not typical.Conclusion The existing design meets the original criteria established by the NRC in FSAR question 040.036.The present functional testing appears consistent with that implemented by other utilities on second level undervoltage protection.
: 8) Related Electrical Design Drawings cc:  JB  Martin  -  NRC RV..
WNP-2 believes the existing functional testing content and scope to be acceptable and in compliance with NRR requirements at the time of the licensing.
NS Reynolds    - BCP8R, RB Samworth  NRC DL  Hilliams -   BPA/399 NRC Site  Inspector,  - 901A A Rapacz    BPA                              I t
The WNP-2 Technical Specification requires an amendment relative to the second level undervoltage protection.
 
It is the belief of the Supply System that the associated LCO, absent interpretation, must be amended to reflect present configurations.
  ~ ~ ~
As a result of this issue, a review of each divisions test procedures was conducted and an additional problem was discovered.
'I
The division three second level undervoltage protection is not testable dur ing operation and will also require reconciliation by Technical Specification amendment.
 
Because this issue affects the monthly CFT on division one, two and three, a Technical Specification amendment is required by January 12, 1989.As requested in the letter from NRR received Monday, December 5, we have con-ducted an initial review of our class lE relay calibration program and have identified 169 time delay relays which are tested as par t of the Logic System Functional Testing and not included in Channel Functional Tests.We are pre-sently aware of only four'ime delay relays which are required to be included in the Channel Functional Testing by the WNP-2 Technical Specifications.(Division 1 and 2 LPCI pump start second start time delay and division 1 and 2 ADS actuation 105 second time delay.)
S'r Page 1  of  2 I
~0 4~*1 I Page Four, 4.16 KV EMERGENCY BUS UNDERVOLTAGE DEGRADED VOLTAGE (SECOND LEVEL UNDERVOLTAGE)
            ...8812150013 ATTACHMENT 1 CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TESTING The    following is      a  description of the periodic testing performed    on the  divi-sion one and      two, second level under voltage logic at WNP-2.
PROTECTION In summary, the Supply System considers that tHe present Channel Functional Testing performed on the second level undervoltage protection circuitry is adequate and meets the interpretation of the requirements prevailing at the time of licensing for HNP-2.The Supply System proposes a meeting with the NRR to discuss this issue and present the proposed Technical Specification amendment.
Each    month a Channel Functional Test is performed which removes the voltage input from the relay and verifies that each undervoltage relay drops out and that its output contact closes. This contact is the contact within the two out of three contact array.               This method simulates a loss of voltage to these undervoltage relays which are considered bistable devices.
Very truly yours, G.C.Sorensen, Manager Regulatory Programs TLM/bk Attachments:
A     Channel    Calibration is implemented each refueling outage on these under-voltage relays.            This calibration determines the as found setpoint and time delays and then recalibrates and resets the definite time undervoltage relays if    necessary.        The functional testing requirement is peformed by, the Logic System Functional Test (LSFT) which always occur following the divisional outage during which the relay calibrations are performed.
1)Channel Functional Testing 2)Second Level Undervoltage Logic Descriptions 3)Other, Utility Technical Specification Excerpts 4)Channel Functional Test Procedure PPM 7.4.3.3.1.67 Rev.4 5)Letter, LT Ha@roid to FA MacLean,"Second Level Undervoltage Protection for, Division 3", dated September, 27, 1983 6)Letter, GC Sorensen to A Schwencer,'Branch Technical Position SPB-1 Commitment, Implementation Status", dated October, 14, 1983 7)FSAR guestion 040.036 8)Related Electrical Design Drawings cc: JB Martin-NRC RV..NS Reynolds-BCP8R, RB Samworth-NRC DL Hilliams-BPA/399 NRC Site Inspector,-901A A Rapacz-BPA I t
The Logic System Functional            Test results in the transfer of the safety bus to the backup sour ce and then            verifies the trip of the backup source fr om these undervoltage relays.            This iteration is completed three times in order to test each channel input to the logic train.
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These    tests  as  well as other   18 month  surveillance tests are performed at  WNP-2 on an    annual basis.
S'r I...8812150013 ATTACHMENT 1 CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TESTING Page 1 of 2 The following is a description of the periodic testing performed on the divi-sion one and two, second level under voltage logic at WNP-2.Each month a Channel Functional Test is performed which removes the voltage input from the relay and verifies that each undervoltage relay drops out and that its output contact closes.This contact is the contact within the two out of three contact array.This method simulates a loss of voltage to these undervoltage relays which are considered bistable devices.A Channel Calibration is implemented each refueling outage on these under-voltage relays.This calibration determines the as found setpoint and time delays and then recalibrates and resets the definite time undervoltage relays if necessary.
It is noted that on other ECCS logic channels, such as the low reactor water level initiation of HPCS, the Channel Functional Test and Channel Calibration Testing requirements are combined into one procedure.                     This procedure incorporates a setpoint verification which records the as found setpoint. This value is compared to the allowable, value in the Technical Specification.                 If this value is exceeded a NCR and a Channel Calibration are            initiated.
The functional testing requirement is peformed by, the Logic System Functional Test (LSFT)which always occur following the divisional outage during which the relay calibrations are performed.
The as found value          is also  compared  to an administrative limit. This limit is based upon the        trip setpoint value in the Technical Specifications. If the as found value is outside the administrative limit the device is recalibrated.
The Logic System Functional Test results in the transfer of the safety bus to the backup sour ce and then verifies the trip of the backup source fr om these undervoltage relays.This iteration is completed three times in order to test each channel input to the logic train.These tests as well as other 18 month surveillance tests are performed at WNP-2 on an annual basis.It is noted that on other ECCS logic channels, such as the low reactor water level initiation of HPCS, the Channel Functional Test and Channel Calibration Testing requirements are combined into one procedure.
The purpose of this activity is to ensure that the device drift will not result in the setpoint exceeding the Technical Specification allowable limit during the next period of the functional test.
This procedure incorporates a setpoint verification which records the as found setpoint.This value is compared to the allowable, value in the Technical Specification.
The      Channel    Functional Testing of the second level undervoltage relays, ITE27Ns, has        been    modified to be consistent with this method of Channel Func-tional Testing. These modified tests have been implemented in the field during the December 88 outage.
If this value is exceeded a NCR and a Channel Calibration are initiated.
 
The as found value is also compared to an administrative limit.This limit is based upon the trip setpoint value in the Technical Specifications.
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If the as found value is outside the administrative limit the device is recalibrated.
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The purpose of this activity is to ensure that the device drift will not result in the setpoint exceeding the Technical Specification allowable limit during the next period of the functional test.The Channel Functional Testing of the second level undervoltage relays, ITE27Ns, has been modified to be consistent with this method of Channel Func-tional Testing.These modified tests have been implemented in the field during the December 88 outage.
~    ~ ~
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1 gl Attachment I Page 2 of 2The Supply System has initially adopted the policy of determining the as found trip value of bistable devices which is beyond the testing required by the Technical Specification.
gl 1
Channel Functional Testin Sco e The logic for the ECCS systems is a two out of four.logic.A contact from each instrument energizes a relay.Contacts from these four, relays are arranged in a two by two array.The existing Channel Functional Tests for, these ECCS systems isolate the instrument from the sensing line and inject a simulated signal into the instru-ment to actuate the instrument.
Attachment  I Page 2 of 2 The Supply System     has initially adopted the policy of determining the as found trip    value of bistable devices which is beyond the testing required by the Technical Specification.
Instrument.contact closure is monitored at the instr ument rack, Resulting contact'closure of the supporting relay (K5-K8)causes annunciation in the control room and this is verified.In the case of RPS this results in a half scram.Note that the actuation relays (K94, etc.)are not energized due'o the contact array.Thus the channel is defined as the instrument up to the contact within the two out of four contact array.These ECCS Channel Functional Tests fall within the same Technical Specification section as the second level undervoltage protection and also do not include the end point relays.The annual Logic System Functional Tests complete the logic testing from the actuating device to the actuated device.In the case of the ECCS systems, the~~~~~~~pumps are started and aligned in the test return mode of operation to simulate full flow condition.
Channel Functional    Testin  Sco e The  logic for the ECCS systems is a two out of four. logic. A contact from each instrument energizes a relay. Contacts from these four, relays are arranged in a two by    two array.
This is implemented both with and without the emergency diesel generator supplying the emergency bus.The second level undervoltage logic is similar.As previously described, the channel has been defined as the instrument up to the contact within the two out of three contact array.The design drawings for this logic have been provided and can be reviewed.A copy of the Channel Functional Test procedures has been provided for your, r eview.
The   existing Channel Functional Tests for, these ECCS systems isolate the instrument from the sensing line and inject a simulated signal into the instru-ment to actuate the instrument.        Instrument .contact closure is monitored at the instr ument rack, Resulting contact 'closure of the supporting relay (K5-K8) causes annunciation in the control room and this is verified. In the case of RPS this results in a half scram.         Note that the actuation relays (K94, etc.)
I F I'I r Page 1 of 4ATTACHMENT 2 SECOND LEVEL UNDERVOLTAGE LOGIC DESCRIPTIONS The division one (and division two)undervoltage protection consists of three ITE static type definite time undervoltage relays.These relays monitor the thr ee phases of the 4160 volt safety busses.These three relays each provide two contacts which contribute to a two out of three logic array.These relays are set to actuate at approximately 87.3%of nominal bus voltage and will change the state of their, contacts following a 5 second time delay.Actuation (contact closure)of two of these relays will energize two of three secondary time delay relays.These three second time delay relays contribute to the eight second time delay referenced in the FSAR and the Technical Speci-fication.The logic discussed to this'oint is described on EWD-46E-106A.
are not energized due'o the contact array. Thus the channel is defined as the instrument up to the contact within the two out of four contact array. These ECCS Channel      Functional Tests fall within the same Technical Specification section as the second level undervoltage protection and also do not include the end  point relays.
The annual    Logic System Functional Tests complete the logic testing from the actuating device to the actuated device. In the case of the ECCS systems, the
                                                ~
pumps are started and aligned in the test return mode of operation to simulate
                                                                                  ~
full flow condition. This is implemented both with and without the emergency
                      ~
                          ~
                                                          ~        ~
diesel generator supplying the emergency bus.     ~
The second level      undervoltage logic is similar. As previously described, the channel has been    defined as the instrument up to the contact within the two out of three contact array. The design drawings for this logic have been provided and can be reviewed.
A copy    of the  Channel  Functional Test procedures    has been  provided for your, r eview.
 
I F
I'I r
 
Page 1  of  4 ATTACHMENT 2 SECOND LEVEL UNDERVOLTAGE LOGIC DESCRIPTIONS The  division    one  (and  division two) undervoltage protection consists of three ITE  static type definite time undervoltage relays. These relays monitor the thr ee phases of the 4160 volt safety busses.             These three relays each provide two contacts which contribute to a two out of three logic array. These relays are set to actuate at approximately 87.3% of nominal bus voltage and will change the state of their, contacts following a 5 second time delay.
Actuation (contact closure) of two of these relays will energize two of three secondary time delay relays.           These three second time delay relays contribute to the eight second time delay referenced in the FSAR and the Technical Speci-fication. The logic discussed to this'oint is described on EWD-46E-106A.
Each of these thr ee second time delay relays will be discussed individually.
Each of these thr ee second time delay relays will be discussed individually.
E"RLY-27/S7/UV The relay 27/S7/UV contact schedule is shown on EWD-46E-106A.
E"RLY-27/S7/UV The   relay 27/S7/UV contact schedule is shown on EWD-46E-106A. Contact 3/5 of this relay feeds into an annunciator circuit shown on E521 sheet 9. This annunciator, is located within the control room.               This annunciator indicates SN-7 degraded voltage.         Contact 2/6 of this relay is shown on EWD-46E-106A Zone H-6.     This contact closes to "energize four, additional logic relays.               These relays are part of the original primary undervoltage logic and                     are   also actuated following the two second time delay associated             with the primary   under-voltage logic. Two of these relays are time delay relays, a five second and a two second.
Contact 3/5 of this relay feeds into an annunciator circuit shown on E521 sheet 9.This annunciator, is located within the control room.This annunciator indicates SN-7 degraded voltage.Contact 2/6 of this relay is shown on EWD-46E-106A Zone H-6.This contact closes to"energize four, additional logic relays.These relays are part of the original primary undervoltage logic and are also actuated following the two second time delay associated with the primary under-voltage logic.Two of these relays are time delay relays, a five second and a two second.E-RLY-62X/7 The first of these relays is E-RLY-62X/7.
E-RLY-62X/7 The   first of   these relays is E-RLY-62X/7. Contacts 1/2 and contact 5/6 of this relay   are shown   on EWD-58E-001.     These contacts are located in the trip circuit of SW-P-1A. They   provide for the load shed of the division one standby service water. pump.     Two   contacts are used for, this purpose due to the alternate shut-down capability associated with the division one standby service water pump.
Contacts 1/2 and contact 5/6 of this relay are shown on EWD-58E-001.
Contact 7/8 is shown on EWD-46E-106A. This contact disables the energization of the relay 3TR42. This is another time delay relay used in original load sequencing     logic.
These contacts are located in the trip circuit of SW-P-1A.They provide for the load shed of the division one standby service water.pump.Two contacts are used for, this purpose due to the alternate shut-down capability associated with the division one standby service water pump.Contact 7/8 is shown on EWD-46E-106A.
Contact 9/10 of this relay is shown on EWD-46E-130. This contact causes                   the load shed of the non-1E load, NCC-7C, from the class lE safety bus SN-7.
This contact disables the energization of the relay 3TR42.This is another time delay relay used in original load sequencing logic.Contact 9/10 of this relay is shown on EWD-46E-130.
E" RL Y-62/1/7 This relay is       a five second time delay relay.       Contact 1/5 is the only contact used   on   this relay and is shown on EWD-47E-003.               EWD-47E-003 depicts the control circuitry for, the division one diesel generator output circuit breaker.
This contact causes the load shed of the non-1E load, NCC-7C, from the class lE safety bus SN-7.E" RL Y-62/1/7 This relay is a five second time delay relay.Contact 1/5 is the only contact used on this relay and is shown on EWD-47E-003.
This relay provides for the enabling signal from the safety bus SN-7 under-voltage logic.
EWD-47E-003 depicts the control circuitry for, the division one diesel generator output circuit breaker.This relay provides for the enabling signal from the safety bus SN-7 under-voltage logic.
 
Attachment 2 Page 2 of 4 E-RLY-62X1/7 This relay is also used to provide load shedding following a bus undervoltage condition.
Attachment   2 Page 2 of 4 E-RLY-62X1/7 This relay is also used to provide load shedding following a bus undervoltage condition. Contact 1/2 of this relay is shown on EWD-9E-001. This contact provides for the load shed of RHR-P-2A.
Contact 1/2 of this relay is shown on EWD-9E-001.
Contact 3/4 of this relay is shown on EHD-8E-001.         This contact provides for the load shedding of LPCS-P-1.
This contact provides for the load shed of RHR-P-2A.Contact 3/4 of this relay is shown on EHD-8E-001.
Contact 5/6 of this relay is shown on EWD-80E-005. This contact provides for the load shedding of REA-FN-1A. Note that this load is a 480 volt load fed from Sl-71.
This contact provides for the load shedding of LPCS-P-1.Contact 5/6 of this relay is shown on EWD-80E-005.
Contact 7/8 of this relay is shown on EWD-80E-001. This contact provides for, the load shedding of ROA-FN-1A. Note that this load is also a 480 volt load supplied from SL-73.
This contact provides for the load shedding of REA-FN-1A.
Contact 9/10 of this relay is shown on EWD-46E-132. This contact provides for the load shedding of the non-class lE motor control center MCC-7E.
Note that this load is a 480 volt load fed from Sl-71.Contact 7/8 of this relay is shown on EWD-80E-001.
Contact ll/12 of this relay is shown on EWD-13E-001.       This contact provides for, the load shedding of CRD-P-1A.
This contact provides for, the load shedding of ROA-FN-1A.
E-RLY"62/2/7 This relay is a two second time delay relay. Only one contact is used off this
Note that this load is also a 480 volt load supplied from SL-73.Contact 9/10 of this relay is shown on EWD-46E-132.
                                              ~
This contact provides for the load shedding of the non-class lE motor control center MCC-7E.Contact ll/12 of this relay is shown on EWD-13E-001.
relay. Contact 1/5 of this relay is shown on EWD-46E-092. EWD-46E-092 depicts
This contact provides for, the load shedding of CRD-P-1A.E-RLY"62/2/7
      ~
~~~~This relay is a two second time delay relay.Only one contact is used off this relay.Contact 1/5 of this relay is shown on EWD-46E-092.
the control circuitry of circuit breaker B-7, the backup supply cir cuit breaker.
EWD-46E-092 depicts the control circuitry of circuit breaker B-7, the backup supply cir cuit breaker.for SM-7.This contact initiates closure of the backup source to SM-7 if other closure prerequisites are completed.
                            ~  ~
Example: backup supply voltage 94%.This completes the secondary relay structure initiated by E-RLY-27/S7/UV.
for SM-7. This contact initiates closure of the backup source to SM-7         if other closure prerequisites are completed. Example: backup supply voltage   94%.
E-RLY"27/S71/UV This three second time delay relay can be actuated only if the preferred source circuit breaker (7-1)for SM-7.is closed.Contact 4/5 of this relay is shown on EWD-46E-89.
This completes the secondary relay structure     initiated by E-RLY-27/S7/UV.
This contact initiates a computer input which prints out in the control room on the control room alarm typer, for the SM-7 degraded voltage condition.
E-RLY"27/S71/UV This three second time delay relay can be actuated only       if the preferred source circuit breaker (7-1) for SM-7 .is closed.
L Contact 1/5 of this relay is shown on EWD-46E-106A Zone M-6.This contact closure energizes relay E-RLY-27X/UV.
Contact 4/5 of this relay is shown on EWD-46E-89. This contact initiates a computer input which prints out in the control room on the control room alarm typer, for the SM-7 degraded voltage condition.
This relay contact schedule is shown on drawing EWD-46E-106A and described below.These are the only contacts used off this relay.
L Contact 1/5 of this relay is shown on EWD-46E-106A Zone M-6. This contact closure energizes relay E-RLY-27X/UV. This relay contact schedule is shown on drawing EWD-46E-106A and described below. These are the only contacts used off this relay.
I l J 0 Attachment 2 Page 3 of 4'E"RLY-27X/UV Only one contact is used off this relay.'ontact 1/2 is shown on EHD-46E-80.
 
EHD-46E-080 depicts the control circuitry for, the preferred source circuit br eaker, for SM-7;circuit breaker, 7-1.Contact 1/2 of E-RLY-27X/UV initiates a trip of circuit breaker 7-1." This isolates the safety bus SN-7 from the preferred source on completion of the second level undervoltage protection logic.E-RLY"27/SB7/UV This three second time delay relay can be actuated only if the backup source circuit breaker (B-7)for SN-7 is closed.The contact schedule for, this relay is shown on EWD-46E-106A.
I l J
Contact 4/6 of this relay is shown on EHD-46E-089.
0
This contact initiates a computer input which prints out in the control room on the control room alarm printer for a SN-7 degraded voltage condition.
 
Contact 1/5 of this r clay is shown on EHD-46E-092.
Attachment   2 Page 3 of 4
EHD-46E-092 depicts the control circuitry for the backup supply circuit breaker,.(B-7)for the safety bus SN-7.Contact 1/5 of the E-RLY-27/SB7/UV initiates a trip of circuit breaker B-7.This isolates the safety bus SM-7 from the backup source follow-ing the completion of the logic associated with the second level undervoltage protection.
'E"RLY-27X/UV Only one contact       is used off this relay. 'ontact 1/2 is shown on EHD-46E-80.
The trip of circuit breaker B-7 is accomplished as follows: Contact 1/5 of E-RLY-27/SB7/UV closes to energize E-RLY-SN7/UV.
EHD-46E-080 depicts the control circuitry for, the preferred source circuit br eaker, for SM-7; circuit breaker," 7-1. Contact 1/2 of E-RLY-27X/UV initiates a trip of circuit breaker 7-1. This isolates the safety bus SN-7 from the preferred source on completion of the second level undervoltage protection logic.
Contacts off this relay (E-RLY-SN7/UV) trip B-7 and disable the auto closure of B-7.The circuitry associated with this relay, as shown on the very right of EHD-46E-092, is required to prevent continuous cycling of the backup circuit breaker, B-7 if a Potential Transformer (PT)fuse were to clear,.This circuitry enables the backup circuit breaker to remain closed upon a detection of a blown PT fuse.The second level under voltage protection circuitry on the division two safety related bus SN-8 is identical to that on SN-7.The division 3 second level undervoltage logic is somewhat different.
E-RLY"27/SB7/UV This three second time delay relay can be actuated only                 if the backup source circuit breaker     (B-7)   for SN-7 is closed. The contact   schedule   for, this relay is shown on   EWD-46E-106A.       Contact 4/6   of this relay   is shown   on EHD-46E-089.
This logic was designed by General Electric.The division one and two logic was designed by the AE for WNP-2, Burns and Roe.Note that there is no backup offsite source available to SM-4.It has only the preferred source via SN-2 and its associated emergency diesel gener.ator,.
This contact initiates a computer input         which   prints out   in the control room on the control room   alarm printer   for a SN-7 degraded   voltage   condition.
Division Three Second Level Undervolta e Protection The division three second level undervoltage logic consists of two ITE static ,type definite time undervoltage relays.These relays monitor SN-4 via PTs in the same manner, as the primary undervoltage logic relays.Their designations are E-RLY-2762/4/1 and E-RLY-2762/4/2.
Contact 1/5 of     this r clay is shown on EHD-46E-092. EHD-46E-092 depicts the control circuitry for the backup supply circuit breaker,. (B-7) for the safety bus SN-7.     Contact 1/5 of the E-RLY-27/SB7/UV initiates a trip of circuit breaker B-7. This isolates the safety bus SM-7 from the backup source follow-ing the completion of the logic associated with the second level undervoltage protection.
These relays contribute to a two out of two logic system.This logic is redundant, i.e.there are two channels for, this logic.Both of these channels are shown on EWD-46E-327.
The   trip of circuit breaker B-7 is accomplished as follows: Contact 1/5 of E-RLY-27/SB7/UV closes to energize E-RLY-SN7/UV.                 Contacts off this relay (E-RLY-SN7/UV) trip B-7 and disable the auto closure of B-7. The circuitry associated with this relay, as shown on the very right of EHD-46E-092, is required to prevent continuous cycling of the backup circuit breaker, B-7                   if a Potential Transformer (PT) fuse were to clear,.               This circuitry enables the backup circuit breaker to remain closed upon a detection of a blown PT fuse.
The left-most channel will be described.
The second   level     under voltage protection circuitry on the division two safety related bus   SN-8     is identical to that on SN-7. The division 3 second level undervoltage logic is somewhat different. This logic was designed by General Electric. The division one and two logic was designed by the AE for WNP-2, Burns and Roe.       Note that there is no backup offsite source available to SM-4.
I 0 I N ,Attachment 2 Page 4 of 4 Following the detection of a second level relays will actuate.These relays will their respective contacts.This contact E-RLY-27/NX.
It has only the preferred source via SN-2 and           its associated     emergency   diesel gener.ator,.
Note that the second level when circuit breaker 4-2 is not closed and undervoltage condition on SN-4, both time out in eight seconds and close closure energizes E-RLY-62/4/Sl and undervoltage protection is disabled providing the power, to SN-4.E-RLY-27/NX trips the preferred source circuit breaker 4-2 and opens a contact in the close cir cuit of circuit breaker 4-2.This isolates the class lE bus SN-4 from the offsite source following the detection of the degraded condition and subsequent time delay of eight seconds.Following a one second time delay E-RLY-62/4/Sl will open its contact 3/7 to deenergize E-RLY-27NX and thus remove the trip signal from circuit breaker, 4-2.Also following this one second time delay E-RLY-62/4/S1 will also close its contact 8/10 to energize E-RLY-27/SX and E-RLY-27/4/SXl.
Division Three     Second Level Undervolta e     Protection The division three second level undervoltage logic consists of two ITE static
E-RLY-SX The contact schedule for E-RLY-SX is shown on EWD-46E-327.
,type definite time undervoltage relays. These relays monitor SN-4 via PTs in the same manner, as the primary undervoltage logic relays. Their designations are E-RLY-2762/4/1 and E-RLY-2762/4/2. These relays contribute to a two out of two logic system.         This logic is redundant, i.e. there are two channels for, this logic. Both of these channels are shown on EWD-46E-327. The left-most channel   will be described.
Contact 3/4 of this relay is shown on EWD-7E-004.
 
This contact initiates a start of the emergency diesel generator for the HPCS system.Contact 7/8 of this relay is shown on EWD-7E-031.
I 0
This contact actuates an annunciator on H13-P601 in the control room indicating a undervoltage condition on SN-4.Contact 9/10 of this relay is shown on EWD-7E-001.
I
This contact enables the closure of the emergency diesel generator output circuit breaker.This cir cuit breaker will close when the diesel generator output obtains sufficient fre-quency and voltage.E-RLY-27/4/SX1 Only one contact off this relay is used.Contact 2/7 is shown on EWD-7E-022.
 
N
                                                                    ,Attachment   2 Page 4 of 4 Following the detection of a second level     undervoltage condition on SN-4, both relays will actuate.     These relays will   time out in eight seconds and close their respective contacts. This contact       closure energizes E-RLY-62/4/Sl and E-RLY-27/NX. Note that the second level   undervoltage protection is disabled when circuit breaker 4-2 is not closed and   providing the power, to SN-4.
E-RLY-27/NX   trips the preferred source circuit breaker 4-2 and opens a contact in the close cir cuit of circuit breaker 4-2. This isolates the class lE bus SN-4 from the offsite source following the detection of the degraded condition and subsequent   time delay of eight seconds.
Following a one second time delay E-RLY-62/4/Sl will open its contact 3/7 to deenergize E-RLY-27NX and thus remove the trip signal from circuit breaker, 4-2.
Also following this one second time delay E-RLY-62/4/S1 will also close its contact 8/10 to energize E-RLY-27/SX and E-RLY-27/4/SXl.
E-RLY-SX The contact schedule for E-RLY-SX is shown on EWD-46E-327. Contact 3/4 of this relay is   shown on EWD-7E-004. This contact initiates a start of the emergency diesel generator for the HPCS system.
Contact 7/8 of this relay is shown on EWD-7E-031. This contact actuates an annunciator on H13-P601 in the control room indicating a undervoltage condition on SN-4.
Contact 9/10 of this relay is shown on EWD-7E-001. This contact enables the closure of the emergency diesel generator output circuit breaker. This cir cuit breaker will close when the diesel generator output obtains sufficient fre-quency and voltage.
E-RLY-27/4/SX1 Only one contact off this relay is used.       Contact 2/7 is shown on EWD-7E-022.
This contact enables the closure of the HPCS pump.
This contact enables the closure of the HPCS pump.
ATTACHMENT 3.:Page l.of 16 INSTRUMENlAllON 3/4,3.3 EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEM ACTUATION INSTRUMENTATION LIMITING CONOITION FOR OPERATION 3.3,3 The emergency core cooling system (ECCS)actuation instrumentation channels shown in Table 3.3.3-1 shall be OPERABLE with their trip setpoints set consistent with the values shown in the Trip Setpoint column of Table 3.3,3-2 and with EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEM RESPONSE TIME as shown in Tabl e 3.3.3-3.APPLICABILITY:
As shown in Table 3.3.3-1.ACTION: a.C.Mith an ECCS actuation instrumentation channel trip setpoint less conservative than the value shown in the Allowable Yalues.column of Table 3.3,3-2, declare the channel inoperable until the channel is restored to OPERABLE status with its trip setpoint adjusted consistent with the Trip Setpoint value.With one or more ECCS actuation instrumentation channels inoperable, take the ACTION required by Table 3.3, 3-l.Mith either AOS trip system"A" or"B" inoperable, restore the inoperable trip system to OPERABLE status within:.7 days, provided that the HPCS and RCIC systems are OPERABLE.2.72 hours.Otherwise, be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours and reduce reactor steam dome pressure to less than or equal to 135 psig within the following 24 hours.SURVEILLANCE
~RE UIREIPENTS 4.3.3.1 Each ECCS actuation instrumentation channel shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by the performance of the CHANNEL CHECK, CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST and CHANNE.L CALIBRATION operations for the OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS and at the fr cour@ries shnwn in Table 4,3,3.1-1.
TRIP FUNCTION C.DIVISION 3 TRIP SYSTEM l.HPCS SYSTEM TABLE.3-1 (Continued)
EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEM ACTUATION INSTRUMENTATION MINIMUM, OPERABLE APPLICABLE CHANNELS PER TRIP OPERATIONAL FUNCTION()CONDITIONS ACTION a~b.C.d.e.f.g.h.Reactor Vessel Water Level" Low, Low, Level 2 Drywell Pressure-High Reactor Vessel Water Level-High, Level 8 Condensate Storage Tank Level-Low Suppression Pool Water L'evel-High Pump Discharge Pressure-High (Bypass)HPCS System Flow Rate-Low (Permissive)
Hanual Initiation 4(b)44(b)2(c)2(d),'(d)1 1 1/division 1 2 1, 2, lt 2$17 27 1 j 2 1, 2, 1 2 3 3 3 4*5k 3 4*5A 3 4*3 4A 5'A 3 4*4)k 5*35 35 32 36 36 31 31 34 D.LOSS OF POWER MINIHUH TOTAL NO.CHANNELS OPERABLE OF CHANNELS TO TRIP CHANNELS APPLICABLE OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS ACTION l.4.16 kV Emergency Bus Undervoltage (Loss of'oltage) 2.4.16 kV Emergency Bus Under voltage (Degraded Voltage)(Division 3)1/bus 1/bus 1/bus 1/bus 1/bus 1/bus TABLE NOTATION 3 4*4 5k*37 1, 2 3 4**5m~37 (a)A channel may be placed in an inoperable status for up to 2 hours during periods of required survei'llance without placing the trip system in the.tripped condition provided at least one other OPERABLE channel in the same trip system is monitoring that parameter.(b)A'Iso actuates the associated division diesel generator.(c)Provides signal to close HPCS pump discharge-valve only on 2-out-of-2 logic.(d)Provides signal to HPCS pump suction valves only.*Applicable when the system is required to be OPERABLE per Specification 3.5.2 or 3.5.3.**Required when ESF equipment is required to be OPERABLE.Not required to be OPERABLE when reactor steam dome pressure is<122 psig.
I l Jl, 0 I rQ' Attachment 3 Page 3 of 16TABLE 3.3.3-1 (Continued)
EMERGENCY, CORE COOLING SYSTEM ACTUATION'INSTRUMENTATION ACTION ACTION 30-With the number of OPERABLE channels less than required by the Minimum OPERABLE Channels per Trip Function requirement:
a.With one channel inoperable, place the inoperable channel in the tripped condition within one hour" or declare the associated system inoperable.
b.With more than one channel inoperable, declare the associated system inoperable.
ACTION 31" ACTION 32-ACTION 33'-With the number of OPERABLE channels less than required by the Minimum OPERABLE channels per Trip Function, place the inoperable channel in the tripped condition within one hour;restore the inoperable channel to OPERABLE status within 7 days or declare the associated system inoperable.
With the number of OPERABLE channels less than required by the Minimum OPERABLE Channels per Trip Function requirement, declare the associated ADS trip system or ECCS inoperable.
With the number of OPERABLE channels less than the Minimum OPERABLE Channels per Trip Function requirement, place the inoperable channel in the tripped condition within one hour.ACTION 34-With the number of OPERABLE channels less than required by the Minimum OPERABLE Channels per Trip Function requirement, restore the inoperable channel to OPERABLE status within 8 hours or declare the associated AOS valve or ECCS inoperable.
ACTION 35-With the number of OPERABLE channels less than required by the Minimum OPERABLE Channels per Trip Function requirement a~b.For one trip system, place that trip system in the tripped condition within one hour" or declare the HPCS system inoperable.
For both trip systems, declare the HPCS system inoperable.
ACTION 36-ACTION 37" With the number of OPERABLE channels less than required by the Minimum OPERABLE Channels per Trip Function requirement, place at least one inoperable channel in the tripped condition within one hour" or declare the HPCS system inoperable.
With the number of OPERABLE channels less than the Total Number of Channels, declare the associated emergency diesel generator inoperable and take the ACTION required by Specification 3.8.1.1 or 3.8.1.2, as appropriate.
ff f ff iff 41.4.4 ffii fi LA SALLE-UNIT 2 3/4 3-27
'ttachment 3 Page 4 of 16ACTION 38 TABLE 3.3.3-1 Continued)
EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEM ACTUATION INSTRUMENTATION ACTION Pith the number of OPERABLE channels less than required by'he Minimum OPERABLE Channels per trip function requirements:
a.With one channel inoperable, remove the inoperable channel within one hour;restore the inoperable channel to OPERABLE status within 7 days or declare the associated ECCS systems inoperable.
b.With both channels inoperable, restore at least one channel to OPERABLE status within one hour or declare the associated ECCS system inoperable.
LA SALLE" UNIT 2 3/4 3"27(a) i<f TABLE..3-2 (Continued)
EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEM ACTUATION INSTRUMENTATION SETPOINTS TRIP FUNCTION C.DIVISION 3 TRIP SYSTEM 1.HPCS SYSTEM a.Reactor Vessel Mater Level-Low Low, Level.2 b.Drywell Pressure-High c.Reactor Vessel Mater Level-High, Level 8 d.Condensate Storage Tank Level-Low e.Suppression Pool Mater Level-High f.Pump Discharge Pressure-High g.HPCS System'Flow Rate-Low h.Manual Intiation'.
LOSS OF POMER l.4.16 kV Emergency Bus Undervoltage (Loss of Voltage)0 a.4.16 kV Basis 1)Divisions 1 and 2 2)Division 3 TRIP SETPOIHT>-50 inches"<1.69 psig<55.5 inches">715'7" 700 I ill>120 psig>1000 gpm H.A.2625 2 131 volts with<10 second time delay 2496 f 125 vo'its with>4 second time delay 2870 k 143 volts with<10 second time delay ALLOMABLE VALUE.>-57 inches"<1.89 psig<56 inches">715'3" 700 I 2ll>110 psig>900 gpm N.A.2625 i 262 volts with<ll second time delay~2496%,250 volts with.>3 second time delay 2870 t 287 volts with<11 second time delay 2.4.16 kV Emergency Bus Undervoltage (Degraded Voltage)a.4.16 kV Basis 1)Division 3 3814 t 76 volts with 3814 t 76 volts with 10 0 1 second time delay 10 2 1 second time delay TABLE NOTATIONS"See Bases Figure B 3/4 3-1.8These are inverse time delay voltage relays or instantaneous voltage relays with a time delay.The voltages shown are the maximum that will not result in a trip.Lower voltage conditions will result in decreased trip times.H.A.Hot Applicable J rC h Attachment 3 Page 6 of 16 TABLE 3~3.3-3 EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEM RESPONSE TIMES ECCS 2.3.4.5.LOW PRESSURE CORE SPRAY SYSTEH LOW PRESSURE COOLANT INJECTION MODE OF RHR SYSTEM (Pumps A, B, and C)AUTOHATIC DEPRESSURIZATION SYSTEM HIGH PRESSURE CORE SPRAY SYSTEM LOSS OF POWER RESPONSE TIME Seconds<40"<40*<27 Injection valves shall be fully OPEN within 20 seconds after receipt of the reactor vessel pressure and ECCS Injection Line Pressure Interlock signal, concurrently with power source availability and receipt of an accident initiation signal.LA SALLE" UNIT 2 3/4 3-31


TABLE 4.3..-1 (Continued)
ATTACHMENT 3                    .:Page  l.of 16 INSTRUMENlAllON 3/4,3.3      EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEM ACTUATION INSTRUMENTATION LIMITING CONOITION        FOR OPERATION 3.3,3      The emergency core cooling system (ECCS) actuation instrumentation channels shown in Table 3.3.3-1 shall be OPERABLE with their              trip  setpoints set consistent        with  the  values  shown  in the Trip Setpoint  column    of  Table 3.3,3-2 and      with  EMERGENCY  CORE  COOLING  SYSTEM RESPONSE  TIME  as  shown  in Tabl e 3. 3. 3-3.
EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEM ACTUATION INSTRUMENTATIOH SURVEILLANCE RE UIREMENTS.TRIP FUNCTION C.DIVISION 3 TRIP SYSTEM 1.HPCS SYSTEM a.Reactor Vessel Water Level-Low Low, Level 2 b
APPLICABILITY: As shown          in Table 3.3.3-1.
ACTION:
: a. Mith an ECCS actuation instrumentation channel trip setpoint less conservative than the value shown in the Allowable Yalues.column of Table 3.3,3-2, declare the channel inoperable until the channel is restored to OPERABLE status with its trip setpoint adjusted consistent with the Trip Setpoint value.
With one or more ECCS actuation instrumentation channels inoperable, take the ACTION required by Table 3. 3, 3-l.
C. Mith either AOS trip system "A" or "B" inoperable, restore the inoperable trip system to OPERABLE status within:
                    . 7 days,  provided that the HPCS and RCIC systems are OPERABLE.
: 2.      72 hours.
Otherwise, be in at least        HOT SHUTDOWN  within the next 12 hours and reduce reactor steam dome pressure        to less than or equal to 135 psig within the following 24 hours.
SURVEILLANCE ~RE UIREIPENTS 4.3.3. 1  Each ECCS    actuation instrumentation channel shall      be demonstrated OPERABLE by      the performance of the      CHANNEL CHECK, CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST and CHANNE.L  CALIBRATION operations for the OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS and            at the fr cour@ries shnwn in Table 4,3,3.1-1.
 
TABLE    .3-1 (Continued)
EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEM ACTUATION INSTRUMENTATION MINIMUM,OPERABLE    APPLICABLE CHANNELS PER TRIP  OPERATIONAL TRIP FUNCTION                                                          FUNCTION(  )    CONDITIONS          ACTION C. DIVISION 3 TRIP  SYSTEM
: l. HPCS SYSTEM a~    Reactor Vessel Water Level " Low, Low, Level  2                4(b)        1  2  3              35
 
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Attachment 4 Page 10 of 21 Step 4)NOTE: This test may be performed in the field or on the test bench.The case referred to may be the installed case or a spare 27N case.For testing with a spare case, verify that the resistor (5K)is installed between Terminals 1 and 9 on the back of the relay case.N/A this step for field testing.Step 5)Insert extender card into relay case.Step 6)Attach support bracket to relay case.Step 7)Plug relay into extender card.Step 8)Connect relay to test equipment for voltage pickup and dropout tests per Attachment A, adjusting both 25K ohm pots for.maximum resistance.
 
Step 9)Verify that 125 V D-C is present on relay extender card Terminals 3 and 4.Step 10)Set up the differential voltmeter as follows: Mode Switch: AC Range Switch: 1000 Null Switch: 1 Range Dials: 107.800 NOTE: The differential voltmeter will read 107.800 volts at center scale and (-)1 volt left, (+)1 volt right.Step ll)Close switch"A" and using the A-C digital voltmeter (DHV), increase voltage by adjusting the coarse and fine variacs to approximately 106 volts.Slowly increase the voltage until the differential voltmeter shows indication.
Attachment 4 Page 10 of 21 NOTE:   This test may   be performed in the     field or on the test bench. The case referred     to may be the installed case or     a spare 27N case.
Monitoring the differential voltmeter and the relay trip indicating light, increase the volt-age in small increments (with pauses in-between) until the light goes OFF.Record the differ-ential voltmeter reading"As Found" on the data sheet.PROCEOURE NUMBER 7.4.3.3.1.67 WP$94 RI (9.43)REVISION NUMBER PAGE NUMBER 7.4.3.3.1.67-10 of 21  
Step 4)    For testing with a spare case, verify that the resistor (5K) is installed between Terminals 1 and 9 on the back of the relay case.         N/A this step for field testing.
,pi I r I Attachment 4 Page 11 of 21 gStep 12)Set the differential voltmeter range dials for 106.700 volts and using the A-C DVM, adjust for approximately 109 volts.Slowly decrease the voltage until the differential voltmeter shows indication.
Step 5)   Insert extender card into relay case.
Monitoring the differential volt-'eter and the relay trip light, slowly decrease the voltage in small increments (with pauses in-between) until the trip light comes on.Record the differential voltmeter readings"As Found" on the data sheet.Step 13)Close switch"A" and set the voltage output of the transformer to 1005 of relay operating voltage (120 volts)by adjusting the coarse and fine variacs.Step 14)Step 15)'Open switch"A" and set the voltage across the relay coil to 50K of the operating voltage (60 volts)by adjusting the 25K ohm rheostats (pots).Close switch"A" on the timer start circuit.This puts 1005 voltage on the relay and sets the circuit.Step 16)Reset timer.Step 17)Open switch"A" on the timer start circuit.Record"As Found" time from Dranetz on the data sheet.Step 18)'Remove AC and DC voltages from relay.Step 19)Disconnect, test wi ring from relay.Step 20)Remove relay from extender card.Step 21)Step 22)Step 23)Step 24)Step 25)Remove support bracket.Remove extender card.Install Relay 27/7/5 in case and replace cover and seal with a lead seal./Place test switch in the"OFF." position.Reset target.PROCEDURE NUMBER 7.4.3.3.1.67 WP.Sse RI<S Sa)REVISION NUMBER PAGE NUMBER 7.4.3.3.1.67-11 of 21 P~r Attachment 4 Page 12 of 21 E.Test E-RLY-27/7-3 NOTE: The'following steps demonstrate correct functioning of the relay.Two contacts are to be checked, ll and 12, and 14 and 15.There will be voltages to these contacts until the test switch 7TS is moved from the OFF position.The test switch should be moved to the correct position as identified, 27/7-3, and meter leads placed across contact to be tested before 5 seconds time has elapsed.CAUTION: Multimeter should not be connected to relay contacts prior to switch 7TS being placed in 27/7-3 position.Voltage is present and placement of meter leads could cause inadvertent trip or fuses to blow.Step 1)Place the multimeter on OHMS, RXl scale.step 2)Place test switch 7TS in the 27/7-3 position.Place meter test leads across Terminals lland 12 and verify contact closure.NOTE: Contact should close approximately five seconds after test switch 7TS is placed in 27/7-3 p'osition.
Step 6)   Attach support bracket to relay case.
Step 3)Verify the target drops on relay.Step 4)Remove test leads from Terminals ll and 12 of 27/7-3 Relay.Step 5)Place test switch 7TS in OFF position./Step 6)Step 7)Place test switch 7TS in the 27/7-3 position.Place meter test leads across Terminals 14 and 15 and verify contact closure.NOTE: Contact should close approximately five'seconds after test switch 7TS is placed in 27/7-3 position.Remove test leads from Terminals 14 and 15 of of 27/7-3 relay.Step 8)Place test switch 7TS in OFF position.Step 9)Reset target on relay.PROCEOURE NUMBER 7.4.3.3.1.67 WP$94 R1 (9 49)REVISION NUMBER PAGE NUMBER 7.4.3.3.1.67-12 of 21 Attachment 4 Page 13 of 21 F.Test E-RLY-27/7-4 NOTE: The following steps demonstrate correct functioning of the relay.Two contacts are to be checked, ll and 12, and 14 and 15.There will be voltages to these contacts until the test switch 7TS is moved from the OFF position.The test switch'should be moved to the correct position as identified, 27/7-4, and meter leads placed across contact to be tested before 5 seconds time has elapsed.CAUTION: Hultimeter should not be connected to relay contacts prior to switch 7TS being placed in 27/7-4 position.Voltage is present and placement of meter leads could cause inadvertent trip or fuses to blow.,Step 1)Place the multimeter on OHMS, RXl scale.step 2)Step 3).Step 4)Place test switch 7TS in the 27/7-4 position.Place meter test leads across Terminals 11 and 12 and verify contact closure.NOTE: Contact should close aproximately five seconds after test switch 7TS is placed in 27/7-4 position.Verify the target drops on relay.4 Remove test leads from Terminals 11 and 12 of 27/7-4 Relay.,Step 5)Place test switch 7TS in OFF position.step 6)Step 7)Place test switch 7TS in the 27/7-4 position.Place meter test leads across Terminals 14 and 15 and verify contact closure.NOTE: Contacts should close approximately five seconds after test switch 7TS is placed in 27/7-4 position.Remove test leads from Terminals 14 and 15 of of 27/7-4 relay.Step 8)Place test switch 7TS in OFF position.Step 9)Reset target on relay.PROCEDURE NUMBER 7.4.3.3.1.67 WP.599 Rl{9$9)REVISION NUMBER PAGE NUMBER 7.4.3.3.1.67-13 of 21 P'jf (f I Attachment 4 Page 14 of 21 G.Test E-RLY-27/7-5 NOTE: The following steps demonstrate correct functioning of the relay.Two contacts are to be checked, ll and 12, and 14 and 15.There will be voltages to these contacts until the test switch 7TS is moved from the OFF position.The test switch should be moved to the correct position as identified, 27/7-5, and meter leads placed across contact to be tested before 5 seconds time has elapsed.CAUTION: Hultimeter should not be connected to relay contacts prior to switch 7TS being placed in 27/7-5 position.Voltage is present and placement of meter leads could cause inadvertent trip or fuses to blow.'tep 1)Place, the multimeter on OHMS, RXl scale.step 2)Place test switch 7TS in the 27/7-5 position.Place meter test leads across Terminals ll and 12 and verify contact closure.NOTE: Contact should close aproximately five seconds after test switch 7TS is placed in 27/7-5 position.Step 3)Verify the target drops on relay.Step 4)Remove test leads from Terminals ll and 12 of 27/7-5 relay.Step 5)Place.,test switch 7TS in OFF position./Step 6)Step 7)Place test switch 7TS in the 27/7-5 position.Place meter test leads across Terminals 14 and 15 and verify contact closure.NOTE: Contact should close approximately five seconds after test switch 7TS is placed in 27/7-5 position.Remove test leads from Terminals 14 and 15 of of 27/7-5 relay.Step 8)Place test switch 7TS in OFF position.Step 9)Reset target on relay.PRQCE13URE NUMBER 7.4.3.3.1.67 WP.998 R1{9 83)REVISION NUMBER PAGE NUMBER 7.4.3.3.1.67-14 of 21 d
Step 7)   Plug relay   into extender card.
Attachment 4 Page 15 of 21Restoration I Step.1)Obtain independent verification that test switch 7TS is in the OFF position.Verified Independent Verification Step 2)Close Switchgear Cubicle door.Step 3)Step 4)Step 5)Step 6)Verify Annunciator P800-Cl Drop 2-4 is reset.Notify Control Room that testing is complete.Verify that"As Found" values on Attachment 8 are within the Administrative Values shown on Attachment E.If so, NA Step 6.If any value is outside the Administrative Value, NA this step.NOTE:.If dropout voltage is outside the allow-able value of 103.8+6 V, notify the Shift Manager and prepare a PDR/NCR as required.Notify your immediate supervisor that cali-bration of.this relay must be performed per 7.4.3.3.1.75.
Step 8)   Connect relay to test equipment for voltage pickup and dropout tests per Attachment A, adjusting both 25K ohm pots for. maximum resistance.
Note in Comment section of cover sheet.Step 7)Step 8)Verify that"As Found" values on Attachment C are within the Administrative Values shown on Attachment E.If so, NA Step 8.If any value is outside the Administrative Value, NA this step.NOTE: If dropout voltage is outside the allow-able value of 103.8+6 V, notify the Shift Manager and prepare a PDR/NCR as required.'Notify your immediate supervisor that cali-bration of this relay must be performed per 7.4.3.3.1.66.
Step 9)   Verify that   125 V D-C   is present   on relay extender card Terminals     3 and   4.
Note in Comment section of cover sheet.PROCEDURE NUMBER'.4.3.3.1.67 WP.S99 RI (9.$9)REVISION NUMBER PAGE NUMBER 7.4.3.3.1.67-15 of 21  
Step 10)   Set up the   differential voltmeter     as follows:
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Mode Switch:   AC Range Switch:   1000 Null Switch:     1 Range Dials:   107.800 NOTE:   The differential voltmeter will read 107.800   volts at center scale     and (-) 1 volt left, (+) 1 volt right.
Attachment 4 Page 16 of 21 Step 9)Step 10)Verify that"As Found" values on Attachment D are within the Administrative Values shown on Attachment E.If so, NA Step 10.If any value is outside the Administrative Value, NA this step.0 NOTE: If dropout voltage is outside the allow-able value of 103.8+6 V, notify the Shift Manager and prepare a PDR/NCR as required.Notify your immediate supervisor that cali-bration of this relay must be performed per 7.4.3.3.1.74.
Step ll)   Close switch "A" and using the A-C digital voltmeter (DHV), increase voltage by adjusting the coarse and fine variacs to approximately 106 volts. Slowly increase the voltage until the differential voltmeter shows indication.
Note in Comment section oF cover sheet.7.4.3.3.1.67.8 Acce tance Criteria The acceptance criteria.for this procedure is that all steps have been completed and initialed.
Monitoring the differential voltmeter and the relay trip indicating light, increase the volt-age in small increments (with pauses in-between) until the light goes OFF. Record the differ-ential voltmeter reading "As Found" on the data sheet.
7.4.3.3.1.67.9 Documentation This completed test procedure shall be placed in the permanent Plant file in accordance with the 1.6 Ser'ies of the Plant Administrative Procedures.
PROCEOURE NUMBER                REVISION NUMBER    PAGE NUMBER 7.4.3.3.1.67                                                       7.4.3.3.1.67-10 of 21 WP $ 94 RI (9.43)
~~~~~~7.4.3.3.1.67.10 Attachments A.Undervoltage Relay Test Hookup B.Data Sheet for E-RLY-27/7/3 C.Data Sheet for E-RLY-27/7/4 D.Data Sheet for E-RLY-27/7/5 E.Undervoltage Relay Setpoints PROCEDURE NUMBER 7.4.3.3.1.67 WP 494 R1 (9 49)REVISION NUMGER PAGE NUMBER 7.4.3.3.1.67-16 of 21 l I g g~II~F'~~  
 
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~'II Attachment 4 Page 20 of.21DATA SHEET FOR E-RLY-27/7/5 EQUIPMENT 8-RI Y-27/7/5 P I CKUP TAP I I 0 UNOERVOLTAGE DROPOUT TAP)f%TIME TAP PICKUP DROPOUT REQUIRED/07.8 V fo67 V AS FOUND INITIALS DATE CHECK START VOLTAGE I2,0 FAULT VOLTAGE TIME.VOLTAGE CHECK REQUIRED TIME 5 sEc AS FOUND INITIALS DATE TEST EQ NO.CAL OUE DATE COMMENTS 968'21662 PAGE 2Attachment 0 PROCEDURE NUMBER 7.4.3.3.1'7 REVISION NUMBER PAGE NUMBER 7.4.3.3.1.67-20 of 21 WP 581 Rl I9 4$)
Attachment 4 Page 11 of 21 gStep 12)   Set the differential voltmeter range dials for 106.700 volts and using the A-C DVM, adjust for approximately 109 volts. Slowly decrease the voltage   until the differential voltmeter shows indication. Monitoring the differential and the relay trip light, slowly decrease volt-'eter the voltage in small increments (with pauses in-between) until the trip light comes on.
ot qh Attachment 4 Page 21 of 21 UNDERVOLTAGE'RELAY SETPOINTS SETPOINT ADHI N ISTRATI VE VALUE ALLOMA8LE VALUE PICKUP 107.8+.25 V)106.7 V~109.8 V DROPOUT 106.7+.25 V~105.6 V~08.7 V 103.8+6 V TINE 5+.1 SEC 5+.22 SEC 5+.3 SEC+NOTE: Current calculations indicate a minimum acceptable value of 105.6 V.Attachment E PROCEDURE NUMBER 7.4.3.3.1.67 WP.494 RS (9.49)REVISION NUMBER PAGE NUMBER 7.4.3.3.1.67-21 of 21  
Record the differential voltmeter readings "As Found" on the data sheet.
>t h p II (a ATTACHMENT 5 Page I of 2 IN cgCT R Mbltf ION.GK Afflerbach-9270
Step 13)   Close switch "A" and set the voltage output of the transformer to 1005 of relay operating voltage (120 volts) by adjusting the coarse and fine variacs.
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Step 14) 'Open switch "A" and set the voltage across the relay coil to   50K of the operating voltage (60 volts) by adjusting the 25K ohm rheostats (pots).
--Rtff il o-99<5 MP Gf 1 1 os-994E MPG/LB RE Green-994E CRN/LB'T Har:aid/LB-901A PLP/LB BA Holmberg-994E TLH/LB JO)hrtin-927M TL Naade-927S CR Noyes-994E PL Powel3-956B PK Shen-580 JG Tel 1efson-901A RJ Barbee-927S 5.F.A.HacLean Prospect Manager General Electric Company fhil Code 394 175 Curtner Avenue San Jose, CA 95125 TWS LCTTRR l47tSA45 COOSOTQttkf No.%4tS LtYTSR NXKQ OARS~~AlLl04 A lan%COIQflT%5%QT September 27, 1983 MPGE-2-83-425
Step 15)    Close switch "A" on the timer       start circuit.
This puts 1005 voltage       on the relay   and sets the circuit.
Step 16)     Reset timer.
Step 17)     Open switch "A"   on the timer   start circuit.
Record "As Found" time from Dranetz on the data sheet.
Step 18)   'Remove AC and   DC voltages from relay.
Step 19)   Disconnect, test   wi ring from   relay.
Step 20)   Remove   relay from extender card.
Step 21)   Remove   support bracket.
Step 22)    Remove   extender card.
Step 23)    Install   Relay 27/7/5 in case and replace cover and seal   with a lead seal.           /
Step 24)    Place   test switch in the     "OFF." position.
Step 25)    Reset   target.
PROCEDURE NUMBER                REVISION NUMBER    PAGE NUMBER 7.4.3.3.1.67                                                       7.4.3.3.1.67-11           of 21 WP.Sse RI <S Sa)
 
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Attachment 4 Page 12 of 21 E. Test E-RLY-27/7-3 NOTE:     The   'following steps demonstrate correct functioning of the relay. Two contacts are to be checked, ll and 12, and 14 and 15. There will be voltages to these contacts until the test switch 7TS is moved from the OFF position.
The test switch should be moved to the correct position as identified, 27/7-3,       and meter leads placed across       contact to be tested before     5 seconds time has elapsed.
CAUTION:       Multimeter should not be connected to relay contacts prior to switch 7TS being placed in 27/7-3 position. Voltage is present and placement of meter leads could cause inadvertent trip or fuses to blow.
Step 1)       Place the multimeter on     OHMS, RXl scale.
step     2)     Place test switch 7TS in the 27/7-3 position.
Place meter test leads across Terminals         ll and 12 and verify contact closure.
NOTE:   Contact should close approximately five seconds   after test switch 7TS is placed in 27/7-3 p'osition.
Step 3)       Verify the target drops     on relay.
Step 4)       Remove   test leads from Terminals     ll and   12 of 27/7-3 Relay.
Step 5)       Place test switch   7TS in OFF position.
                      /Step 6)       Place test switch 7TS in the 27/7-3 position.
Place meter test leads across Terminals 14 and 15 and   verify contact closure.
NOTE:   Contact should close approximately five
                                    'seconds   after test switch 7TS is placed in 27/7-3 position.
Step 7)        Remove   test leads   from Terminals 14 and 15 of of 27/7-3 relay.
Step 8)       Place   test switch 7TS in OFF position.
Step 9)       Reset   target on relay.
PROCEOURE NUMBER                  REVISION NUMBER      PAGE NUMBER 7.4.3.3.1.67                                                         7.4.3.3.1.67-12 of 21 WP $ 94 R1 (9 49)
 
Attachment 4 Page 13  of 21 F. Test E-RLY-27/7-4 NOTE:     The following steps demonstrate correct functioning of the relay. Two contacts are to be checked, ll and 12, and 14 and 15. There will be voltages to these contacts until the test switch 7TS is moved from the OFF position.
The test switch 'should be moved to the correct position as identified, 27/7-4,       and meter leads placed across       contact to   be tested before     5 seconds time has elapsed.
CAUTION:     Hultimeter should not be connected to relay contacts prior to switch 7TS being placed in 27/7-4 position. Voltage is present and placement of meter leads could cause inadvertent trip or fuses to blow.
                      ,Step 1)       Place the multimeter on     OHMS, RXl   scale.
step     2)     Place test switch 7TS in the 27/7-4 position.
Place meter test leads across Terminals 11 and 12 and   verify contact closure.
NOTE:   Contact should close aproximately five seconds after test switch 7TS is placed in 27/7-4 position.
Step 3)      Verify the target drops       on relay.
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                      .Step 4)        Remove   test leads   from Terminals   11 and 12 of 27/7-4 Relay.
                      ,Step 5)       Place test switch   7TS in OFF position.
step     6)     Place test switch 7TS in the 27/7-4 position.
Place meter test leads across Terminals 14 and 15 and   verify contact closure.
NOTE:   Contacts should close approximately       five seconds after test switch 7TS is placed in 27/7-4 position.
Step 7)      Remove   test leads from Terminals     14 and 15   of of 27/7-4 relay.
Step 8)     Place test switch   7TS in OFF position.
Step 9)     Reset target   on relay.
PROCEDURE NUMBER                  REVISION NUMBER      PAGE NUMBER 7.4.3.3.1.67                                                           7.4.3.3.1.67-13 of 21 WP.599 Rl {9 $ 9)
 
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Attachment 4 Page 14 of 21 G. Test E-RLY-27/7-5 NOTE:     The following steps demonstrate correct functioning of the relay. Two contacts are to be checked, ll and 12, and 14 and 15. There will be voltages to these contacts until the test switch 7TS is moved from the OFF position.
The test switch should be moved to the correct position as identified, 27/7-5, and meter leads placed across contact to be tested before 5 seconds time has elapsed.
CAUTION:     Hultimeter should not be connected to relay contacts prior to switch 7TS being placed in 27/7-5 position. Voltage is present and placement of meter leads could cause inadvertent trip or fuses to blow.
                    'tep     1)   Place, the multimeter     on OHMS, RXl   scale.
step     2)   Place test switch 7TS in the 27/7-5 position.
Place meter test leads across Terminals           ll and 12 and   verify contact closure.
NOTE:   Contact should close aproximately five seconds   after test switch 7TS is placed in 27/7-5 position.
Step 3)     Verify the target drops       on relay.
Step 4)     Remove   test leads   from Terminals   ll and   12 of 27/7-5 relay.
Step 5)     Place .,test switch 7TS in     OFF position.
                    /Step 6)       Place test switch 7TS in the 27/7-5 position.
Place meter test leads across Terminals 14 and 15 and   verify contact closure.
NOTE:   Contact should close approximately five seconds   after test switch 7TS is placed in 27/7-5 position.
Step 7)      Remove   test leads from Terminals       14 and 15 of of 27/7-5 relay.
Step 8)     Place   test switch   7TS in OFF position.
Step 9)     Reset   target on relay.
PRQCE13URE NUMBER                REVISION NUMBER    PAGE NUMBER 7.4.3.3.1.67                                                           7.4.3.3.1.67-14 of 21 WP.998 R1 {9 83)
 
d Attachment 4 Page 15 of 21 Restoration I
Step .1)   Obtain independent   verification that test switch 7TS is in the OFF position.
Verified Independent   Verification Step 2)     Close Switchgear Cubicle door.
Step 3)     Verify Annunciator  P800-Cl Drop 2-4   is reset.
Step 4)    Notify Control Room that testing is complete.
Step 5)    Verify that "As Found" values on Attachment 8 are within the Administrative Values shown on Attachment E. If so, NA Step 6. If any value is outside the Administrative Value, NA this step.
NOTE: . If dropout voltage is outside the allow-able value of 103.8 + 6 V, notify the Shift Manager and prepare a PDR/NCR as required.
Step 6)    Notify your immediate supervisor that cali-bration of. this relay must be performed per 7.4.3.3.1.75. Note in Comment section of cover sheet.
Step 7)     Verify that "As Found" values on Attachment C are within the Administrative Values shown on Attachment E. If so, NA Step 8. If any   value is outside the Administrative Value,     NA this step.
NOTE:   If dropout voltage is outside the allow-able value of 103.8 + 6 V, notify the Shift Manager and prepare a PDR/NCR as required.
Step 8)    Notify your immediate supervisor that cali-bration of this relay must be performed per 7.4.3.3.1.66. Note in Comment section of cover sheet.
PROCEDURE NUMBER             REVISION NUMBER    PAGE NUMBER
            '.4.3.3.1.67                                                     7.4.3.3.1.67-15 of 21 WP.S99 RI (9.$ 9)
 
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Attachment 4 Page 16 of 21 Step 9)     Verify that "As Found" values on Attachment D are within the Administrative Values shown on Attachment E.     If so, NA Step 10. If any value is outside the Administrative Value,     NA this step.
0 NOTE:     If dropout voltage is outside the allow-able value of 103.8 + 6 V, notify the Shift Manager and prepare a PDR/NCR as required.
Step 10)    Notify your immediate supervisor that cali-bration of this relay must be performed per 7.4.3.3.1.74. Note in Comment section oF cover sheet.
7.4.3.3.1.67.8     Acce tance     Criteria The acceptance     criteria. for this     procedure is that all steps   have been completed and     initialed.
7.4.3.3.1.67.9     Documentation This completed test procedure shall be placed in the permanent Plant file in accordance with the 1.6 Ser'ies of the Plant Administrative Procedures.
7.4.3.3.1.67.10
            ~  ~ ~  ~ ~    ~    Attachments A. Undervoltage Relay Test Hookup B. Data Sheet   for   E-RLY-27/7/3 C. Data Sheet   for E-RLY-27/7/4 D. Data Sheet   for   E-RLY-27/7/5 E. Undervoltage Relay Setpoints PROCEDURE NUMBER                REVISION NUMGER    PAGE NUMBER 7.4.3.3.1.67                                                     7.4.3.3.1.67-16 of   21 WP 494 R1 (9 49)
 
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Attachment 4 Page 20 of.21 DATA SHEET FOR     E-RLY-27/7/5 EQUIPMENT 8-RI Y-27/7/5 UNOERVOLTAGE P I CKUP TAP     II 0   DROPOUT TAP   )f %   TIME TAP REQUIRED                      AS FOUND PICKUP                   /07.8 V DROPOUT                  fo67   V INITIALS                 DATE TIME.VOLTAGE CHECK START       FAULT      REQUIRED TIME              AS FOUND CHECK        VOLTAGE      VOLTAGE I2,0                       5 sEc INITIALS               DATE TEST EQ NO.       CAL OUE DATE                                   COMMENTS 968'21662 PAGE 2 Attachment    0 PROCEDURE NUMBER                    REVISION NUMBER      PAGE NUMBER 7.4.3.3.1   '7                                                       7.4.3.3.1.67-20 of 21 WP 581   Rl I9 4$ )
 
ot qh Attachment   4 Page 21 of 21 UNDERVOLTAGE'RELAY SETPOINTS ADHIN ISTRATIVE          ALLOMA8LE SETPOINT                   VALUE               VALUE PICKUP               107.8 + .25   V       )106.7   V
                                                            ~109.8   V DROPOUT               106.7 + .25   V       ~105.6   V             103.8 +   6 V
                                                            ~08.7    V TINE                   5+   .1 SEC             5 + .22 SEC         5 + .3   SEC
          + NOTE:     Current calculations indicate     a minimum   acceptable value of 105.6 V.
Attachment   E PROCEDURE NUMBER              REVISION NUMBER    PAGE NUMBER 7.4.3.3.1.67                                                   7.4.3.3.1 . 67-21 of 21 WP.494 RS (9.49)
 
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(     a ATTACHMENT 5 Page I of   2 IN
.GK cgCT R MbltfION Afflerbach-9270 Jp Cooper-913E          -
                              ~MNP-2 Files-917Y Rtffilo-99<5
                                                                  %4tS LtYTSR NXKQ OARS  ~
TWS LCTTRR l47tSA45 COOSOTQttkf No.
                                                                                              ~AlLl04A lan% COIQflT%5%QT MP Gf 1 1 os-994E               MPG/LB RE Green-994E                   CRN/LB   'T Har:aid/LB-901A             PLP/LB BA Holmberg-994E               TLH/LB JO )hrtin-927M TL Naade-927S                                                     September 27, 1983 CR Noyes-994E                                                     MPGE-2-83-425 PL Powel3-956B PK Shen-580 JG Tel 1efson-901A RJ Barbee-927S 5   . F. A. HacLean Prospect Manager General     Electric   Company fhil Code     394 175 Curtner Avenue San Jose, CA 95125


==Subject:==
==Subject:==
, NUCLEAR PROJECT NO.2 SECOND LEVEL UNDERVOLTAGE PROTECTION FOR DIVISION 3  
,           NUCLEAR PROJECT NO. 2 SECOND LEVEL UNDERVOLTAGE PROTECTION FOR DIVISION 3


==Reference:==
==Reference:==
BRGE-RO-2-82-589 The General        Electric    (GE} design (FDI-TCXZ            s  ond level undervoltage protection of the Division              3    HPCS)  Diesel  Ge      tor bus does not meet all the  NRC    requirements      list          Burns and Roe in the reference.        The unac-ceptability of this            des            further dsnonstrated when the Power Systems Branch Lead Reviewer re                          design. Specifically,  he  reaffirmed the requirement        for    inciden                etection of undervoltage.
Your Hess deficf pro
                              . R.
o r
t-o
                                          .. la    d    . Clark developed a design which overcame the ade concurred with the design. This design which o coincwence was reviewed over the phone with our L                r a his verbal concurrence was given. A hard copy of the de-sign indic nd-    ivered to NRC on August 30. Response              fry  the Lead Reviewer that both primary and second level undervoltage designs are accept-able    f      a coincidence and testability standpoint.
a~I          MP  Gilles ol
  ~MO
Attachment    5 Page 2  of  2
. -. 8.. F. A. RacLean-Page The September 27, 1983 MPGE-2-83-425                                                                      h Concurrent    fifth the fmplementatfon of thfs nm desfgn, the Supply Systejn
    ~ll, fn the      fnterest of schedule, purchase the Agastat tfee delay relays.
If you  have any questfons on    thfs aatter, please contact 8'. M. P. Gflles, extensfon 2921.
      . T. Harrold 9GIA)
Assfstant Ofrector, MHP-2 Engfneerfng M. S. Chfn          - BPA A. I. Cygelman    - BER  (981A) 1f.  }l, Engelkfng  - GE  Sfte J. A. Forrest        - BKR RO T. A. Hangelsdorf    - BPC .(982D)
N. Powell            - BPC  {906D)
J. J. Verderber      - BN  HY


BRGE-RO-2-82-589 The General Electric (GE}design (FDI-TCXZ s ond level undervoltage protection of the Division 3 HPCS)Diesel Ge tor bus does not meet all the NRC requirements list Burns and Roe in the reference.
  ~,. ~
The unac-ceptability of this des further dsnonstrated when the Power Systems Branch Lead Reviewer re design.Specifically, he reaffirmed the requirement for inciden etection of undervoltage.
'}}
Your Hess deficf pro L sign indic able f.R.la d.Clark developed a design which overcame the r..ade concurred with the design.This design which o t-o o coincwence was reviewed over the phone with our r a his verbal concurrence was given.A hard copy of the de-nd-ivered to NRC on August 30.Response fry the Lead Reviewer that both primary and second level undervoltage designs are accept-a coincidence and testability standpoint.
a~I MP Gill es~MO ol
* Attachment 5 Page 2 of 2.-.8..F.A.RacLean-Page The September 27, 1983 MPGE-2-83-425 h Concurrent fifth the fmplementatfon of thfs nm desfgn, the Supply Systejn~ll, fn the fnterest of schedule, purchase the Agastat tfee delay relays.If you have any questfons on thfs aatter, please contact 8'.M.P.Gflles, extensfon 2921..T.Harrold 9GIA)Assfstant Ofrector, MHP-2 Engfneerfng M.S.Chfn-BPA A.I.Cygelman-BER (981A)1f.}l, Engelkfng-GE Sfte J.A.Forrest-BKR RO T.A.Hangelsdorf
-BPC.(982D)N.Powell-BPC{906D)J.J.Verderber-BN HY
~,.~'}}

Latest revision as of 08:05, 4 February 2020

Provides Description of Decision Process Used to Determine Channel Functional Test Boundaries for Second Level Undervoltage Protection Utilized at Facility
ML17285A116
Person / Time
Site: Columbia Energy Northwest icon.png
Issue date: 12/07/1988
From: Sorensen G
WASHINGTON PUBLIC POWER SUPPLY SYSTEM
To:
NRC OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATION & RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (ARM)
References
GO2-88-261, TAC-71445, NUDOCS 8812150013
Download: ML17285A116 (86)


Text

-. A(at:ELE RATED D 1 SQQUTJ ON DE M ON STRj$ b SYSTEM REGULATORY XNFORMATION DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM (RIDS)

ACCESHION NBR:8812150013 DOC.DATE: 88/12/07 'OTARIZED: NO DOCKET I FACIL:50-397 WPPSS Nuclear Project, Unit 2, Washington Public Powe 05000397 AUTH. NAME AUTHOR AFFILIATION SORENSEN,G.C. Washington Public Power Supply System RECIP.NAME 'ECIPIENT AFFILIATION Document Control Branch (Document Control Desk/

SUBJECT:

Provides description of process used to determine channel functional test boundaries for second level UP.

DISTRXBUTION CODE: A001D COPXES RECEIVED:LTR ENCL SIZE:

TITLE: OR Submittal: General Distribution NOTES RECIPIENT COPIES RECXPIENT COPIES ID CODE/NAME LTTR ENCL ID CODE/NAME LTTR ENCL PD5 LA 1 0 PD5 PD 2 2 SAMWORTH,R 1 1 INTERNAL: ACRS 6 6 ARM/DAF/LFMB 1 0 NRR/DEST/ADS 7E, 1 1 NRR/DEST/CEB 8H 1 1' NRR/DEST/ESB 8D 1 1 NRR/DEST/MTB 9H 1 NRR/DEST/RSB 8E 1 1 NRR/DOEA/TSB 11 1 1 NRR/XMAS/ILRB12 1 1 NUDOCS-ABSTRACT 1 1 OGC/HDS2 1 0 RE~ LL 01 1 1 RES/DSIR/EIB 1 1 EXTERNAL: LPDR 1 1 NRC PDR 1 1 NSIC 1 1 S

NOTE TO ALL RIDS RECIPIENTS ~

PLEASE HELP US KO REDUCE WASTE! CXÃZACZ 'lid DOCUMEÃZ CONTROL DESKi ROOM Pl-37 (EXT. 20079) TO XLZMXATE YOUR NAME FRCH DISXVGKTZXGN LISTS H)R DOCUMENTS YOU DGNIT NEEDt TOTAL NUMBER OF COPXES REQUIRED: LTTR 25 ENCL 22 o9"

~0 g~ ~0 WASHINGTON PUBLIC POWER SUPPLY SYSTEM P.O. Box 968 ~ 3000 George Washington Way ~ Richland, Washington 99352 December 7, 1988 G02-88-261 Docket No. 50-397 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attn: Document Control Desk Mail Station Pl-137 Washington, D.C. 20555 Gentlemen:

Subject:

NUCLEAR PLANT NO. 2 4.16 KV EMERGENCY BUS UNDERVOLTAGE DEGRADED VOLTAGE (SECOND LEVEL UNDERVOLTAGE) PROTECTION

Reference:

Letter, R.B. Samworth (NRR) to G.C. Sorensen (SS),

"Confirmation of Commitment for Emergency Bus Undervoltage Protection Circuitry", dated December 5, 1988 The pur pose of this letter is to provide a description of the decision process used to determine the Channel Functional Test (CFT) boundaries for the second level undervoltage protection utilized at WNP-2.

This letter is written in response to a telephone discussion between the Supply System and the NRR on November 30, 1988 and the referenced letter. The conversation included Messrs R. Samworth and R. Burrows of NRR, P. Johnson of I8E Region V, H. Aeschliman, R. Koenigs, R. Matthews and T. Meade of the Supply System.

It is the position of the Supply System that Channel Functional Testing as required by the WNP-2 Technical Specifications does not include relays that result in trip system actuation. The manner in which the designed eight second time delay associated with second level undervoltage protection was implemented relied upon two relays; an integral five second time delay and a separate three second time delay relay. Because the five second time delay was integral to the undervoltage sensing device, it was included in the channel. The addi-tional three second time delay relay was designed to execute various trip system functions (bus deenergization, load shed, bus reenergization, subsequent load sequencing and annunciation) and as such was not included in the CFT.

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0 4.16 KV EMERGENCY BUS UNDERVOLTAGE DEGRADED VOLTAGE (SECOND LEVEL UNDERVOLTAGE) PROTECTION Based upon prior NRC approval of the existing configuration, the Supply System prepared the required technical specification surveillance procedures. Test-ability capabilities were included in the Technical Specification and design review processes. Other utilities design similarities also suggest that the WNP-2 configuration is typical. Although, the Supply System recognizes its responsibility to ensure the technical'ccuracy of the LCO, this problem is resolvable via a Tech Spec amendment that explicitly 'delineates what type of testing is required for each division.

The Engineering staff at the Supply System has reviewed the existing design and the design criteria provided to the 'Supply System by NRR in FSAR ()uestion 040.036. The results of this review indicate that the second level under-voltage protection circuitry utilized at WNP-2 meet the criteria established by the NRC. The designs of th'e division one and 'w'o, second level undervoltage protection as well as the design for the division three, second level under,-

voltage protection remain unchanged from that transmitted to NRR for review during the licensing process. The submittal to the NRC prior to initial start-up included the present design of the division one and division two, five second and three second sequential time delays. The letters which transmitted these documents to NRR are attached for your review (Attachments 5 and 6). A requirement to incorporate all the time delay relay functions into the channel would involve a significant redesign effort.

It is the position of the Supply System and was the position of the NRR at the time of the licensing process to not require functional testing during power operation which would result in actuation (in this case the separation of the onsite safety related busses from the offsite power, sources). This circuitry as reviewed and subsequently approved by NRR, did not include the ability to test the three second time delay relays associated with divisioh one and two.

That portion of the logic that was designed to be testable included only the five second time delay based upon the requirements of FSAR question 040.036.

The five second time delay is integral to the undervoltage relay and is not a separate time delay relay. The configuration relied upon the three second time delay relay as an end point relay. In other words, that which was channelized by design is testable and included in the CFT.

The Supply System has obtained several other Technical Specifications from facilities similar to WNP-2. These Technical Specifications vary considerably from no requined testing to monthly Channel Functional Testing. Some Technical Specifications such as Grand Gulf specifically exempt the time delay relays from testing.

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Pa~ge Three.

4.16 KV EMERGENCY BUS UNDERVOLTAGE DEGRADED VOLTAGE (SECOND LEVEL UNDERVOLTAGE) PROTECTION provides excerpts from several other utility Technical Specifica-tions. Below is a summary of these Technical Specifications. It is our belief tHat other utilities implement testing consistent with our position.

o Grand Gulf Implements monthly Channel Functional Testing but specifi-cally exempts time delay relays from this testing. Divi-sion three degraded voltage protection is specifically exempted.

o LaSalle - Channel Functional Testing is not implemented.

Due to the variety of designs which implement the second level undervoltage protection, it can be concluded from the above that performance of periodic functional testing at power which includes the time delay relays is not typical.

Conclusion The existing design meets the original criteria established by the NRC in FSAR question 040.036. The present functional testing appears consistent with that implemented by other utilities on second level undervoltage protection. WNP-2 believes the existing functional testing content and scope to be acceptable and in compliance with NRR requirements at the time of the licensing.

The WNP-2 Technical Specification requires an amendment relative to the second level undervoltage protection. It is the belief of the Supply System that the associated LCO, absent interpretation, must be amended to reflect present configurations.

As a result of this issue, a review of each divisions test procedures was conducted and an additional problem was discovered. The division three second level undervoltage protection is not testable dur ing operation and will also require reconciliation by Technical Specification amendment.

Because this issue affects the monthly CFT on division one, two and three, a Technical Specification amendment is required by January 12, 1989.

As requested in the letter from NRR received Monday, December 5, we have con-ducted an initial review of our class lE relay calibration program and have t

identified 169 time delay relays which are tested as par of the Logic System Functional Testing and not included in Channel Functional Tests. We are pre-sently aware of only four'ime delay relays which are required to be included in the Channel Functional Testing by the WNP-2 Technical Specifications.

(Division 1 and 2 LPCI pump start second start time delay and division 1 and 2 ADS actuation 105 second time delay.)

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Page Four, 4.16 KV EMERGENCY BUS UNDERVOLTAGE DEGRADED VOLTAGE (SECOND LEVEL UNDERVOLTAGE) PROTECTION In summary, the Supply System considers that tHe present Channel Functional Testing performed on the second level undervoltage protection circuitry is adequate and meets the interpretation of the requirements prevailing at the time of licensing for HNP-2.

The Supply System proposes a meeting with the NRR to discuss this issue and present the proposed Technical Specification amendment.

Very truly yours, G. C. Sorensen, Manager Regulatory Programs TLM/bk Attachments: 1) Channel Functional Testing

2) Second Level Undervoltage Logic Descriptions
3) Other, Utility Technical Specification Excerpts
4) Channel Functional Test Procedure PPM 7.4.3.3.1.67 Rev. 4
5) Letter, LT Ha@roid to FA MacLean, "Second Level Undervoltage Protection for, Division 3", dated September, 27, 1983
6) Letter, GC Sorensen to A Schwencer, 'Branch Technical Position SPB-1 Commitment, Implementation Status",

dated October, 14, 1983

7) FSAR guestion 040.036
8) Related Electrical Design Drawings cc: JB Martin - NRC RV..

NS Reynolds - BCP8R, RB Samworth NRC DL Hilliams - BPA/399 NRC Site Inspector, - 901A A Rapacz BPA I t

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S'r Page 1 of 2 I

...8812150013 ATTACHMENT 1 CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TESTING The following is a description of the periodic testing performed on the divi-sion one and two, second level under voltage logic at WNP-2.

Each month a Channel Functional Test is performed which removes the voltage input from the relay and verifies that each undervoltage relay drops out and that its output contact closes. This contact is the contact within the two out of three contact array. This method simulates a loss of voltage to these undervoltage relays which are considered bistable devices.

A Channel Calibration is implemented each refueling outage on these under-voltage relays. This calibration determines the as found setpoint and time delays and then recalibrates and resets the definite time undervoltage relays if necessary. The functional testing requirement is peformed by, the Logic System Functional Test (LSFT) which always occur following the divisional outage during which the relay calibrations are performed.

The Logic System Functional Test results in the transfer of the safety bus to the backup sour ce and then verifies the trip of the backup source fr om these undervoltage relays. This iteration is completed three times in order to test each channel input to the logic train.

These tests as well as other 18 month surveillance tests are performed at WNP-2 on an annual basis.

It is noted that on other ECCS logic channels, such as the low reactor water level initiation of HPCS, the Channel Functional Test and Channel Calibration Testing requirements are combined into one procedure. This procedure incorporates a setpoint verification which records the as found setpoint. This value is compared to the allowable, value in the Technical Specification. If this value is exceeded a NCR and a Channel Calibration are initiated.

The as found value is also compared to an administrative limit. This limit is based upon the trip setpoint value in the Technical Specifications. If the as found value is outside the administrative limit the device is recalibrated.

The purpose of this activity is to ensure that the device drift will not result in the setpoint exceeding the Technical Specification allowable limit during the next period of the functional test.

The Channel Functional Testing of the second level undervoltage relays, ITE27Ns, has been modified to be consistent with this method of Channel Func-tional Testing. These modified tests have been implemented in the field during the December 88 outage.

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Attachment I Page 2 of 2 The Supply System has initially adopted the policy of determining the as found trip value of bistable devices which is beyond the testing required by the Technical Specification.

Channel Functional Testin Sco e The logic for the ECCS systems is a two out of four. logic. A contact from each instrument energizes a relay. Contacts from these four, relays are arranged in a two by two array.

The existing Channel Functional Tests for, these ECCS systems isolate the instrument from the sensing line and inject a simulated signal into the instru-ment to actuate the instrument. Instrument .contact closure is monitored at the instr ument rack, Resulting contact 'closure of the supporting relay (K5-K8) causes annunciation in the control room and this is verified. In the case of RPS this results in a half scram. Note that the actuation relays (K94, etc.)

are not energized due'o the contact array. Thus the channel is defined as the instrument up to the contact within the two out of four contact array. These ECCS Channel Functional Tests fall within the same Technical Specification section as the second level undervoltage protection and also do not include the end point relays.

The annual Logic System Functional Tests complete the logic testing from the actuating device to the actuated device. In the case of the ECCS systems, the

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pumps are started and aligned in the test return mode of operation to simulate

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full flow condition. This is implemented both with and without the emergency

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diesel generator supplying the emergency bus. ~

The second level undervoltage logic is similar. As previously described, the channel has been defined as the instrument up to the contact within the two out of three contact array. The design drawings for this logic have been provided and can be reviewed.

A copy of the Channel Functional Test procedures has been provided for your, r eview.

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Page 1 of 4 ATTACHMENT 2 SECOND LEVEL UNDERVOLTAGE LOGIC DESCRIPTIONS The division one (and division two) undervoltage protection consists of three ITE static type definite time undervoltage relays. These relays monitor the thr ee phases of the 4160 volt safety busses. These three relays each provide two contacts which contribute to a two out of three logic array. These relays are set to actuate at approximately 87.3% of nominal bus voltage and will change the state of their, contacts following a 5 second time delay.

Actuation (contact closure) of two of these relays will energize two of three secondary time delay relays. These three second time delay relays contribute to the eight second time delay referenced in the FSAR and the Technical Speci-fication. The logic discussed to this'oint is described on EWD-46E-106A.

Each of these thr ee second time delay relays will be discussed individually.

E"RLY-27/S7/UV The relay 27/S7/UV contact schedule is shown on EWD-46E-106A. Contact 3/5 of this relay feeds into an annunciator circuit shown on E521 sheet 9. This annunciator, is located within the control room. This annunciator indicates SN-7 degraded voltage. Contact 2/6 of this relay is shown on EWD-46E-106A Zone H-6. This contact closes to "energize four, additional logic relays. These relays are part of the original primary undervoltage logic and are also actuated following the two second time delay associated with the primary under-voltage logic. Two of these relays are time delay relays, a five second and a two second.

E-RLY-62X/7 The first of these relays is E-RLY-62X/7. Contacts 1/2 and contact 5/6 of this relay are shown on EWD-58E-001. These contacts are located in the trip circuit of SW-P-1A. They provide for the load shed of the division one standby service water. pump. Two contacts are used for, this purpose due to the alternate shut-down capability associated with the division one standby service water pump.

Contact 7/8 is shown on EWD-46E-106A. This contact disables the energization of the relay 3TR42. This is another time delay relay used in original load sequencing logic.

Contact 9/10 of this relay is shown on EWD-46E-130. This contact causes the load shed of the non-1E load, NCC-7C, from the class lE safety bus SN-7.

E" RL Y-62/1/7 This relay is a five second time delay relay. Contact 1/5 is the only contact used on this relay and is shown on EWD-47E-003. EWD-47E-003 depicts the control circuitry for, the division one diesel generator output circuit breaker.

This relay provides for the enabling signal from the safety bus SN-7 under-voltage logic.

Attachment 2 Page 2 of 4 E-RLY-62X1/7 This relay is also used to provide load shedding following a bus undervoltage condition. Contact 1/2 of this relay is shown on EWD-9E-001. This contact provides for the load shed of RHR-P-2A.

Contact 3/4 of this relay is shown on EHD-8E-001. This contact provides for the load shedding of LPCS-P-1.

Contact 5/6 of this relay is shown on EWD-80E-005. This contact provides for the load shedding of REA-FN-1A. Note that this load is a 480 volt load fed from Sl-71.

Contact 7/8 of this relay is shown on EWD-80E-001. This contact provides for, the load shedding of ROA-FN-1A. Note that this load is also a 480 volt load supplied from SL-73.

Contact 9/10 of this relay is shown on EWD-46E-132. This contact provides for the load shedding of the non-class lE motor control center MCC-7E.

Contact ll/12 of this relay is shown on EWD-13E-001. This contact provides for, the load shedding of CRD-P-1A.

E-RLY"62/2/7 This relay is a two second time delay relay. Only one contact is used off this

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relay. Contact 1/5 of this relay is shown on EWD-46E-092. EWD-46E-092 depicts

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the control circuitry of circuit breaker B-7, the backup supply cir cuit breaker.

~ ~

for SM-7. This contact initiates closure of the backup source to SM-7 if other closure prerequisites are completed. Example: backup supply voltage 94%.

This completes the secondary relay structure initiated by E-RLY-27/S7/UV.

E-RLY"27/S71/UV This three second time delay relay can be actuated only if the preferred source circuit breaker (7-1) for SM-7 .is closed.

Contact 4/5 of this relay is shown on EWD-46E-89. This contact initiates a computer input which prints out in the control room on the control room alarm typer, for the SM-7 degraded voltage condition.

L Contact 1/5 of this relay is shown on EWD-46E-106A Zone M-6. This contact closure energizes relay E-RLY-27X/UV. This relay contact schedule is shown on drawing EWD-46E-106A and described below. These are the only contacts used off this relay.

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Attachment 2 Page 3 of 4

'E"RLY-27X/UV Only one contact is used off this relay. 'ontact 1/2 is shown on EHD-46E-80.

EHD-46E-080 depicts the control circuitry for, the preferred source circuit br eaker, for SM-7; circuit breaker," 7-1. Contact 1/2 of E-RLY-27X/UV initiates a trip of circuit breaker 7-1. This isolates the safety bus SN-7 from the preferred source on completion of the second level undervoltage protection logic.

E-RLY"27/SB7/UV This three second time delay relay can be actuated only if the backup source circuit breaker (B-7) for SN-7 is closed. The contact schedule for, this relay is shown on EWD-46E-106A. Contact 4/6 of this relay is shown on EHD-46E-089.

This contact initiates a computer input which prints out in the control room on the control room alarm printer for a SN-7 degraded voltage condition.

Contact 1/5 of this r clay is shown on EHD-46E-092. EHD-46E-092 depicts the control circuitry for the backup supply circuit breaker,. (B-7) for the safety bus SN-7. Contact 1/5 of the E-RLY-27/SB7/UV initiates a trip of circuit breaker B-7. This isolates the safety bus SM-7 from the backup source follow-ing the completion of the logic associated with the second level undervoltage protection.

The trip of circuit breaker B-7 is accomplished as follows: Contact 1/5 of E-RLY-27/SB7/UV closes to energize E-RLY-SN7/UV. Contacts off this relay (E-RLY-SN7/UV) trip B-7 and disable the auto closure of B-7. The circuitry associated with this relay, as shown on the very right of EHD-46E-092, is required to prevent continuous cycling of the backup circuit breaker, B-7 if a Potential Transformer (PT) fuse were to clear,. This circuitry enables the backup circuit breaker to remain closed upon a detection of a blown PT fuse.

The second level under voltage protection circuitry on the division two safety related bus SN-8 is identical to that on SN-7. The division 3 second level undervoltage logic is somewhat different. This logic was designed by General Electric. The division one and two logic was designed by the AE for WNP-2, Burns and Roe. Note that there is no backup offsite source available to SM-4.

It has only the preferred source via SN-2 and its associated emergency diesel gener.ator,.

Division Three Second Level Undervolta e Protection The division three second level undervoltage logic consists of two ITE static

,type definite time undervoltage relays. These relays monitor SN-4 via PTs in the same manner, as the primary undervoltage logic relays. Their designations are E-RLY-2762/4/1 and E-RLY-2762/4/2. These relays contribute to a two out of two logic system. This logic is redundant, i.e. there are two channels for, this logic. Both of these channels are shown on EWD-46E-327. The left-most channel will be described.

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I

N

,Attachment 2 Page 4 of 4 Following the detection of a second level undervoltage condition on SN-4, both relays will actuate. These relays will time out in eight seconds and close their respective contacts. This contact closure energizes E-RLY-62/4/Sl and E-RLY-27/NX. Note that the second level undervoltage protection is disabled when circuit breaker 4-2 is not closed and providing the power, to SN-4.

E-RLY-27/NX trips the preferred source circuit breaker 4-2 and opens a contact in the close cir cuit of circuit breaker 4-2. This isolates the class lE bus SN-4 from the offsite source following the detection of the degraded condition and subsequent time delay of eight seconds.

Following a one second time delay E-RLY-62/4/Sl will open its contact 3/7 to deenergize E-RLY-27NX and thus remove the trip signal from circuit breaker, 4-2.

Also following this one second time delay E-RLY-62/4/S1 will also close its contact 8/10 to energize E-RLY-27/SX and E-RLY-27/4/SXl.

E-RLY-SX The contact schedule for E-RLY-SX is shown on EWD-46E-327. Contact 3/4 of this relay is shown on EWD-7E-004. This contact initiates a start of the emergency diesel generator for the HPCS system.

Contact 7/8 of this relay is shown on EWD-7E-031. This contact actuates an annunciator on H13-P601 in the control room indicating a undervoltage condition on SN-4.

Contact 9/10 of this relay is shown on EWD-7E-001. This contact enables the closure of the emergency diesel generator output circuit breaker. This cir cuit breaker will close when the diesel generator output obtains sufficient fre-quency and voltage.

E-RLY-27/4/SX1 Only one contact off this relay is used. Contact 2/7 is shown on EWD-7E-022.

This contact enables the closure of the HPCS pump.

ATTACHMENT 3 .:Page l.of 16 INSTRUMENlAllON 3/4,3.3 EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEM ACTUATION INSTRUMENTATION LIMITING CONOITION FOR OPERATION 3.3,3 The emergency core cooling system (ECCS) actuation instrumentation channels shown in Table 3.3.3-1 shall be OPERABLE with their trip setpoints set consistent with the values shown in the Trip Setpoint column of Table 3.3,3-2 and with EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEM RESPONSE TIME as shown in Tabl e 3. 3. 3-3.

APPLICABILITY: As shown in Table 3.3.3-1.

ACTION:

a. Mith an ECCS actuation instrumentation channel trip setpoint less conservative than the value shown in the Allowable Yalues.column of Table 3.3,3-2, declare the channel inoperable until the channel is restored to OPERABLE status with its trip setpoint adjusted consistent with the Trip Setpoint value.

With one or more ECCS actuation instrumentation channels inoperable, take the ACTION required by Table 3. 3, 3-l.

C. Mith either AOS trip system "A" or "B" inoperable, restore the inoperable trip system to OPERABLE status within:

. 7 days, provided that the HPCS and RCIC systems are OPERABLE.

2. 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />.

Otherwise, be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> and reduce reactor steam dome pressure to less than or equal to 135 psig within the following 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.

SURVEILLANCE ~RE UIREIPENTS 4.3.3. 1 Each ECCS actuation instrumentation channel shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by the performance of the CHANNEL CHECK, CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST and CHANNE.L CALIBRATION operations for the OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS and at the fr cour@ries shnwn in Table 4,3,3.1-1.

TABLE .3-1 (Continued)

EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEM ACTUATION INSTRUMENTATION MINIMUM,OPERABLE APPLICABLE CHANNELS PER TRIP OPERATIONAL TRIP FUNCTION FUNCTION( ) CONDITIONS ACTION C. DIVISION 3 TRIP SYSTEM

l. HPCS SYSTEM a~ Reactor Vessel Water Level " Low, Low, Level 2 4(b) 1 2 3 35
b. Drywell Pressure - High 44(b) 1, 2, 3 35 C. Reactor Vessel Water Level-High, Level 8 2(c) lt 2$ 3 4* 5k 32
d. Condensate Storage Tank Level-Low 2(d) 17 27 3 4* 5A 36
e. Suppression Pool Water L'evel-High ,'(d) 1j 2 3 4* 36
f. Pump Discharge Pressure-High (Bypass) 1 1, 2, 3 4A 5'A 31
g. HPCS System Flow Rate-Low (Permissive) 1 3 4* 31
h. Hanual Initiation 1/division 1 2 4)k 5* 34 D. LOSS OF POWER MINIHUH APPLICABLE TOTAL NO. CHANNELS OPERABLE OPERATIONAL OF CHANNELS TO TRIP CHANNELS CONDITIONS ACTION
l. 4. 16 kV Emergency Bus Undervoltage 1/bus 1/bus 1/bus 1, 2 3 4** 5m~ 37 (Loss of'oltage)
2. 4. 16 kV Emergency Bus Under voltage 1/bus 1/bus 1/bus 3 4*4 5k* 37 (Degraded Voltage) (Division 3)

TABLE NOTATION (a) A channel may be placed in an inoperable status for up to 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> during periods of required survei'llance without placing the trip system in the .tripped condition provided at least one other OPERABLE channel in the same trip system is monitoring that parameter.

(b) A'Iso actuates the associated division diesel generator.

(c) Provides signal to close HPCS pump discharge-valve only on 2-out-of-2 logic.

(d) Provides signal to HPCS pump suction valves only.

  • Applicable when the system is required to be OPERABLE per Specification 3. 5. 2 or 3. 5.3.
    • Required when ESF equipment is required to be OPERABLE.

Not required to be OPERABLE when reactor steam dome pressure is < 122 psig.

I l Jl, 0

I rQ'

Attachment 3 Page 3 of 16 TABLE 3.3.3-1 (Continued)

EMERGENCY, CORE COOLING SYSTEM ACTUATION 'INSTRUMENTATION ACTION ACTION 30 - With the number of OPERABLE channels less than required by the Minimum OPERABLE Channels per Trip Function requirement:

a. With one channel inoperable, place the inoperable channel in the tripped condition within one hour" or declare the associated system inoperable.
b. With more than one channel inoperable, declare the associated system inoperable.

ACTION 31 " With the number of OPERABLE channels less than required by the Minimum OPERABLE channels per Trip Function, place the inoperable channel in the tripped condition within one hour; restore the inoperable channel to OPERABLE status within 7 days or declare the associated system inoperable.

ACTION 32- With the number of OPERABLE channels less than required by the Minimum OPERABLE Channels per Trip Function requirement, declare the associated ADS trip system or ECCS inoperable.

ACTION 33'- With the number of OPERABLE channels less than the Minimum OPERABLE Channels per Trip Function requirement, place the inoperable channel in the tripped condition within one hour.

ACTION 34 - With the number of OPERABLE channels less than required by the Minimum OPERABLE Channels per Trip Function requirement, restore the inoperable channel to OPERABLE status within 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> or declare the associated AOS valve or ECCS inoperable.

ACTION 35 - With the number of OPERABLE channels less than required by the Minimum OPERABLE Channels per Trip Function requirement a ~ For one trip system, place that trip system in the tripped condition within one hour" or declare the HPCS system inoperable.

b. For both trip systems, declare the HPCS system inoperable.

ACTION 36- With the number of OPERABLE channels less than required by the Minimum OPERABLE Channels per Trip Function requirement, place at least one inoperable channel in the tripped condition within one hour" or declare the HPCS system inoperable.

ACTION 37 " With the number of OPERABLE channels less than the Total Number of Channels, declare the associated emergency diesel generator inoperable and take the ACTION required by Specification 3.8. 1. 1 or 3. 8. 1. 2, as appropriate.

ff f ff iff 41 .4.4 ffii fi LA SALLE - UNIT 2 3/4 3-27

'ttachment 3 Page 4 of 16 TABLE 3.3.3-1 Continued)

EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEM ACTUATION INSTRUMENTATION ACTION ACTION 38 Pith the number of OPERABLE channels less than required by

'he Minimum OPERABLE Channels per trip function requirements:

a. With one channel inoperable, remove the inoperable channel within one hour; restore the inoperable channel to OPERABLE status within 7 days or declare the associated ECCS systems inoperable.
b. With both channels inoperable, restore at least one channel to OPERABLE status within one hour or declare the associated ECCS system inoperable.

LA SALLE " UNIT 2 3/4 3"27(a)

i<

f

TABLE .. 3-2 (Continued)

EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEM ACTUATION INSTRUMENTATION SETPOINTS ALLOMABLE TRIP FUNCTION TRIP SETPOIHT VALUE .

C. DIVISION 3 TRIP SYSTEM

1. HPCS SYSTEM
a. Reactor Vessel Mater Level - Low Low, Level .2 >- 50 inches" >- 57 inches"
b. Drywell Pressure - High < 1.69 psig < 1.89 psig
c. Reactor Vessel Mater Level - High, Level 8 < 55.5 inches" < 56 inches"
d. Condensate Storage Tank Level - Low > 715'7" > 715'3"
e. Suppression Pool Mater Level - High 700 I ill 700 I 2ll
f. Pump Discharge Pressure - High > 120 psig > 110 psig
g. HPCS System'Flow Rate - Low > 1000 gpm > 900 gpm
h. Manual Intiation'. H. A. N.A.

LOSS OF POMER

l. 4.16 kV Emergency Bus Undervoltage (Loss of Voltage)0
a. 4.16 kV Basis ll isecond 262 volts
1) Divisions 1 and 2 2625 2 131 volts with 2625 with

< 10 second time delay < time delay 2496 f 125 vo'its with ~

2496 %,250 volts with.

time delay

> 4 second time delay > 3 second

2) Division 3 2870 k 143 volts with 2870 t 287 volts with

< 10 second time delay < 11 second time delay

2. 4.16 kV Emergency Bus Undervoltage (Degraded Voltage)
a. 4. 16 kV Basis
1) Division 3 3814 t 76 volts with 3814 t 76 volts with 10 0 1 second time delay 10 2 1 second time delay TABLE NOTATIONS "See Bases Figure B 3/4 3-1.

8These are inverse time delay voltage relays or instantaneous voltage relays with a time delay. The voltages shown are the maximum that will not result in a trip. Lower voltage conditions will result in decreased trip times.

H.A. Hot Applicable

J rC h

Attachment 3 Page 6 of 16 TABLE 3 ~ 3.3-3 EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEM RESPONSE TIMES ECCS RESPONSE TIME Seconds LOW PRESSURE CORE SPRAY SYSTEH < 40"

2. LOW PRESSURE COOLANT INJECTION MODE OF RHR SYSTEM (Pumps A, B, and C) < 40*
3. AUTOHATIC DEPRESSURIZATION SYSTEM
4. HIGH PRESSURE CORE SPRAY SYSTEM < 27
5. LOSS OF POWER Injection valves shall be fully OPEN within 20 seconds after receipt of the reactor vessel pressure and ECCS Injection Line Pressure Interlock signal, concurrently with power source availability and receipt of an accident initiation signal.

LA SALLE " UNIT 2 3/4 3-31

TABLE 4.3.. -1 (Continued) .

EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEM ACTUATION INSTRUMENTATIOH SURVEILLANCE RE UIREMENTS CHANNEL OPERATIONAL CHANNEL FUHCTIOHAL CHANNEL CONDITIONS FOR WHICH TRIP FUNCTION CHECK TEST CALIBRATIOH SURVEILLANCE RE UIRED C. DIVISION 3 TRIP SYSTEM

1. HPCS SYSTEM
a. Reactor Vessel Water Level-Low Low, Level 2 S 1, 2, 3, 4", 5*
b. Drywell Pressure-High NA
c. Reactor Vessel Water Level-High Level 8 1, 2, 3, 4~, 5"
d. Condensate Storage Tank Level-Low 1, 2, 3, 4~) 5~
e. Suppression Pool Water Level - High HA e 1 ) 2) 3) 4))l 5A
f. Pump Discharge Pressure-High NA 1 2.3 4A 5A
g. HPCS System Flow Rate-Low HA 1 2.3 5A
h. Manual Initiation HA NA 1) 2) 3 5))l D. LOSS OF POWER
l. 4.16 kV Emergency Bus Under- 3 fA)k 5A'))l voltage (Loss of Voltage) 4%A 5))lk
2. 4. 16 kV Emergency Bus Under-. 3 voltage (Degraded Voltage)

(Division 3)

TABLE NOTATIONS CA) ~

et l))

O 8Hot required to be OPERABLE when reactor steam dome pressure is less than or equal to 122 psig. V V' ll)

"When the system is requ>red to be OPERABLE after being manually realigned, as applicable, per Specification 3.5.2. Ol (A

.""Required when ESF equipment is required to be OPERABLE.

7 0

TABLE 3.

L'HERGEHCY CORE CQilLIHG SY"TEH ACTUATIOH IHSTRUHEHTATIQH HIHIHUH OPERABLE APPLICABLE CHANNELS PER QPERATIQNAL TRIP FUNCTION TRIP FUNCTION CONDITIONS EiCTION A. DIVISION I TRIP SYSTEH

l. AIIII A (LPCI NODE Ii LPCS SYSTEN
a. Reactor Vessel Mater Level - Low Low Low, Level 1 2(b) 1, 2, 3. 4", 5" 30'0
h. Orywell Pressure - High 2(b) 1, 2, 3
c. LPCI Pump A Start Time Delay Relay 1 b ) 1, 2, 3, 4*, 5" 31
d. Hanual Initiation 1/system( 1, 2, 3, 4", 5" 32
2. AUTQHATIC QKPRESSUR1'2ATIQH SYSTEM TRIP SYSTEH "A"
a. Reactor Vessel Mater Level - Low Low Low, Level 1 2(b) 1,2,3 30
b. Orywell Pressure - High 2(b) 1, 2, 3 30
c. AOS Timer I 1>>2,3 31
d. Reactor Vessel Mater Level - Low, Level 3 (Permissive) 1 1, 2, 3 31
e. LPCS Pump Discharge Pressure-High (Permissive) 2 ,1, 2, 3 31
f. LPCI Pump A Discharge Pressure-High (Permissive) 2 1, 2, 3 31
g. Hanual Initiation 2/system 1, 2, 3 32 B. OlVISIQH 2 TRIP SYS'IEH RHR 8 LP DE
a. eactor esse Mater l.evel - Low, Low Low, Level 1 2(b) I, 2, 3, 4", 5" 30 b.

c.

d.

Orywell Pressure - High LPCI Pump 8 Hanual Start Initiation Time Delay Relay

{b) 1/system (b) 1,2,3 1>> 2>> 3>

1> 2> 3>

5'1 4", 5" 30 32

2. AUTOMATIC DEPRESSURIDTIOH SYSTEH TRIP SYSTEH "8"
a. Reactor Vessel Mater Leve - Low Low Low, Level. k -2(b) 1.2 3 30
b. Orywell Pressure - High ,'(b) 1, 2> 3 30
c. AOS Timer 1 1, 2, 3 31
d. Reactor Vessel Mater Level - Low, Level 3 (Permissive) 1 1, 2, 3 31 LPCl Pump 8 and C Discharge Pressure - High (Permissive) 2/pump 1, 2, 3 31
f. Hanual initiation 2/sys em 1, 2, 3 32 C+

CQ rr>>

O e> ~

c> (D C+

crs GJ

TABLE 3.3.3-1 (Con )

ENERCEHCY CORE COOLING SYSTEM ACTUATIGH INSTRUMFNTATIOH HINII%H OPERABLE APPLICABLE CHANiNELS PER OPERATIONAL TRIP FUHCTIOH TRIP FUNCTION CONOITIOHS ACTIOH C. OIYISION 3 TRIP SYSTEM

1. HPCS SYSTEH
a. Reactor Vessel Mater Leve1 - Lowe Low, Level 2 4(b) 2 3, 4", 5" 33
b. Orywell Pressure - High& 4(b) 1, 2, 3 33
c. Reactor Vessel Mater Level-High, Level 8 2(c) 1, 2, 3, 4", 5>> 31
d. Condensate Storage Tank Level-Low

',(d) 1, 2, 5>> '74

e. Suppression Pool Mater Level-High 2(d) 1, 2, 3 5>> 34
f. Manual Initiationà I 1, 2, 3 5* 32 LOSS OF POMER I. Oivision 1 and 2 1, 2 3 4">> 5"* 30 (Loss of Yoltage)
b. 4. 16 kY Bus Undervoltage 1 2, 3, 4"" 5>>>> 30 (BOP Load Shed)
c. 4. 16 kY Bus Undervoltage 1 2 3 4>>>> 5~ 30 (Degraded Voltage)
2. Division 3 e.ia4"ev Baa Iladerveltage 1, 2, 3, 4">>, 5>>>> 30 (Loss of Voltage)

(a) A channel may be placed in an inoperable status for up to 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> during periods of required surveillance Mithout, placing the trip system in the tripped condition provided at. least one other OPERABLE channel in the same trip system is monitoring that parameter.

(b) Ai o actuates the associated division diesel generator.

(c) Provides signal to close HPCS pmnp discharge valve only.

(d) Provides signal to HPCS pump suet,ion valves only.

Applicable when the system is required to be OPERABLE per Specification 3.5.2 or 3.5. 3.

Required when applicable ESF equipment is required to be OPERABLE.

Hot required to be OPERABLE when reactor steam dome pressure is less than or equal to 135 psig.

N Prior to STARTUP following the first. refue1ing outage, the injection function of Drywe) I Pressure- Qi High and Manual Initiation are not required to be OPERABLE with indicated reactor vessel water level ro on the wide range instrument greater than Level 8 setpoint coincident with the reactor pressure toss O than 600 psig. O (D'+

Ol tA

0

'+'fl

Attachment 3 Page 10 of 16 RL M EHTAT ION TABLE 3,3.3-1 (Continued)

EHERGEHCY CORE COOLING SYSTEM ACTUATION IHSTRUHENTATIOH ACTION ACTION 30 " Mith the number of OPERABLE channels less than required by the Minimum OPERABLE Channels per'rip Function requirement:

a. With one channel inoperable, place the inoperable channel in the tripped condition within one hour" or'eclare the associated system(s) inoperable.

b, Mith more than one channel inoperable, declare the associated system(s) inoperable.

AC110N 31- lith the number of OPERABLE channels less than required by the Minimum OPERABLE Channels per Trip Function requirement, declare the associated ADS trip system or'CCS inoperable.

ACT10N 3Z- Mith the number of OPERABLE channels less than required by the.,

Minimum OPERABI E Channels per Trip Function requirement, restore the inoperable channel to OPERABLE status within 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> or declare the associated ADS trip system or ECCS inoperable.

10N 33- Mith the number of OPERABLE channels less than required by the Minimum OPERABLE Channels per Trip Function requirement, place the inoperable channel(s) in the tripped condition within one hour" or declare the HPCS system inoperable.

ACTlON 34- Mith the number of OPERABLE channels less than required by the Minimum OPERABLE Channels per Trip Function requirement, place at least one inoperable channel in the tripped condition within one hour" or declare the HPCS system inoperable.

"The provisions of Specification 3.0.4 are not; applicable.

GRAND GULF-UN1T 1 3/4 3-30

w gl h wE'

TABLE 3.3 EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEN ACTUATION IMSTRUNEHTATION SETPOIHTS ALLOMABLE TRIP FUNCTION TRIP SETPOINT VALUE A. DIVISION 1 TRIP SYSTEM

1. RHR-A7LPCI NODE AND LPCS SYSTEN
a. Reactor Vessel Mater Level Low Low Low, Level 1 > -150.3 inches" > -152.5 inches
b. Drywell Pressure High < 1.39 psig < 1.44 psig
c. LPCI Pump A Start Time Oelay Relay < 5 seconds- < 5.25 seconds
d. Manual Initiation l(Als HA NA
2. AUTOMATIC DEPRESSURIZATION SYSTEhl TRIP SYSTEN
a. Reactor Vessel Mater Level - Low Low Low, Level 1 > -150.3 inches~ > -152.5 inches
b. Drywell Pressure - High < 1 39 psig < 1.44 psig c ADS Timer < 105 seconds < 117 seconds
d. Reactor Vessel Mater Level-Low, Level 3 > 11.4 inches" > 10.8 inches
e. LPCS Pump Discharge Pressure-High 145 psig, increasing 125-155 psig, increasing.

. f. LPCI Pump A Discharge Pressure-High 125 psig, increasing 115-135 psig, increasing

g. Manual Initiation NA NA B. DIVISION 2 TRIP SYSTEM
1. RHR 8 ANO C LPCI MODE t
a. Reacto~ Vessel Mater Level - Low l.ow Low, Level 1 > -150.3 inches" > -152.5 inches
b. Drywel 1 Pressure High < 1.39 psig < 1.44 psig
c. LPCI Pump 8 Start Time Delay Relay < 5 seconds < 5. 25 seconds d., Manual Initiation II lt NA NA
2. AUTONATIC DEPRESSURIZATION SYSTEN TRIP SYSTEM 8
a. Reactor Vessel Mater Level Low Low Low, Level 1 > -150.3 inches* > -152.5 inches
b. Drywell Pressure - High < 1.39 psig < 1.44 psig
c. ADS Timer < 105 seconds < 117 seconds
d. Reactor Yessel Mater Level-Low, Level 3 > 11.4 inches* > 10.8 inches
e. LPCI Pump 8 and C Discharge Pressure-High 125 psig, increasing 115-135 psig, increasing
f. tlanual Initiation W NA C.. DIYISIOM 3 TRIP SYSTEM
1. HPCS SYSTEM
a. Reactor Vessel Mater Level - Low Low, Level 2 >-41. 6 inches~ >-43.8 inches
b. Drywell Pressure High < 1.39 psig < 1.44 psig
c. Reactor Vessel Mater l.evel High, Level 8 < 53.5 inches~ < 55.7 inches
d. Condensate Storage Tank Level - Low 0 inches > -3 inches
e. Suppression Pool Mater Level - High < 5.9 inches < 7.0 inches
f. Manual Initiation HA NA

TABLE 2 (Continued)

EHERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEH ACTUATIOH IHSTRUHEh'TRTIOR SETPOIHTS ALLOMABLE TRIP FUNCTION TRIP SETPQIHT VANE D. LOSS OF POMER Division 1 and. 2

a. 4. l6 kY Bus Undervoltage 4.16 kV Basis 2912 +0, -291 volts .

{Loss of Voltage) 2912 volts l

2. 120 volt Sas~s 83.2 +0, -8.3 volts 83.2 volts 3 Time Delay 0.5 +0.5, -0.1 seconds 0.5 seconds
b. 4.16 kV Bus Undervol tage 4.16 kV Basis 3328 +0, -167 volts (BOP Load Shed) 3328 volts
2. 120 volt Basis 95.1+0, -4.8 volts 95.1 volt,s Time delay 0.5 +0.5, -0.1 seconds 0.5 seconds
c. 4.16 kV Bus Underyoltage 1. 4.16 kV Basis 3744 +93.6, -0 volts (Degraded Voltage) 3744 volts 2 120 volt Basis 107 +2. 7, -0 volts 107 volts
3. Time Delay 9.0 + 0.5 seconds 9.0 seconds
2. Division 3
a. 4.16 kV Bus Undervoltage (Loss of Voltage}
1. 4.16 kV Oasis 3045 volts 3045 i 61 volts
2. 120 volt Basis 87 + 1.7 volts 87 volts
3. Time Delay 2.3+ 0.2, -0.3 seconds 2.3 seconds .

"See Bases Figure B 3/4 3-1.

Attachment 3 Page 13 of 16 TA8LE 3.3.3-3 EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEM RESPONSE TIMES SECONDS

1. LOW PRESSURE CORE SPRAY SYSTEM ( 40
2. LOW PRESSURE COOLANT INJECTION MODE OF RHR SYSTEM PUMPS A, 8 AND C < 40
3. AUTOMATIC DEPRESSUR IZATION'( SYSTEM
4. HlGV, PRESSURE CORE SPRAY SYSTEM < 27
5. LOSS OF POWER GRAND GULF"UNIT 1 3/4 3-33

TABlE.4. 3.

EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEttt ACTUATIOt( IHSTRUHENTATIOH SURVEILLAHCE RE UIREHEHTS CHAHt(EL OPERATIONAL CHAHHEL FUNCTIONAL CHAHHFL CONDITIONS FOR MHICH TRIP FUNCTIOtt CHECK TEST CALIBRAT I Ot( I EIR ~ERE I I'l A. DIVISION I TRIP SYSTEM

1. RHR-A LPCI MODE AHD LPCS SYSTEM
a. Reactor Vessel Mater Level-Low Low Low, Level 1 R(a) 1, 2, 3, 4*, 5+
b. Drywe11 Pressure - High R(') 1.2 3 C. LPCI Pump A Start Time Delay Relay 1, 2, 3, 4~, 5~
d. Manual Initiation R(b)
2. AUTOMATIC DEPRESSURIZATIOtk SYSTEM TRIP SYSTEH A'r
a. Reactor Vessel Mater Level-Low Low Low, Level 1 S R 1, 2, 3
b. Drywell Pressure-High S R(a) 1.2 3
c. AOS Timer .HA 3.,2,3
d. Reactor Vessel Mater Level-Low, Level 3 S R(a) 1, 2, 3
e. LPCS Pump Discharge Pressure-High S 1.2 3
f. LPCI Pump A Discharge R(')

Pressure-High S 17 27 3

g. Manual Initiation HA 1.,2,3 B. DIVISION 2 TRIP SYSTEM X. RHR 8 AND C LPCI NODE)
a. Reactor Vessel Mater Level- OW Low Low Low, Level 1 S

. R(a) A r+

c+

Drywell Pressure - High CLl

b. S R(a) CD QP O
c. LPCI Pump B Start Time Delay Relay HA 1, 2, 3, 4+, 5" O e
d. Manual Initiation HA R(b) Q

TABLE 4.3. (Continued)

EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEN RCTUATIOH UHENTATEON SURYEILLANCE RE UIREViENTS CHANNEL OPERATIONAL CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL CHANNEL CONDITIONS FOR ERICH TRIP FUNCTION CHECK TEST CRLIBRATIOH EPEE~III I . 'Ill*

E. << I IIIPE IEII( I I)

2. AUTOMA JC DEPR SSURIZATIOH SYSTEM VBP SYSTEM 8 0
a. Reactor Yessel Mater Level -
  • Low Low Low, Level 1 S R(a)

R(a) 1,2,3

b. Dry@el 1 Pressure-High S 2$ 3
c. ADS Timer HA Q I 2.3
d. Reactor Vessel Mater Level-Low, Level 3 S R(a) 1 2 3
e. LPCI Pump 8 and C Discharge Pressure-High S R(a) 1 2 3
f. Manual Initiation HA R(b) HA 1,2,3 C. DIYISION 3 TRIP SYSTEH
1. HPC S STEH
a. Reactor Vessel 'Rater Level-Low Low, Level 2 S R( ) 1, 2, 3, 0~, 5~
b. Dryvell Pressure-High& S R(a} 1, 2, 3
c. Reactor Vessel Mater S R(a) 1, 2,'3, 4";5" Level-High, Level 8
d. Condensate Storage Tank Level - Low S. R(a) 1$ 2, 3,4", 5~
e. Suppression Pool Mater Level - High S R(a) 3 4* 5A
f. Manual Initiation¹Ã '.HA NA 5*

D. LOSS OF POMER

l. Division 1 and 2 H(e) 4$ $ ."4 5'A$c
a. 4.16 kV Bus Undervoltage NA 3 (Loss of Yoltage) 4%A'A'*
b. 4.16 kV Bus Undervoltage HA N(e) 3 C$ $ c+

(BOP Load Shed} c+

c. 4.16 kY Bus Undervoltage HA 44k 5** O (Degraded Voltage) Vl Q
2. Division 3 4A"R 5w P O

c$

CC$

c+

a. 4.16 kY Bus Undervoltage NA 3 (Loss of Yoltage)

0 t 'i ~

Attachment 3 Page 16 of 16 TABLE 4.3.3.1-1 (Continued)

EMFRGEHCY CORE COOLING SYSTEM ACTUATIOH IHSTRUMEHTATIOH Rm NOTATIOtt Not required to be OPERABLE when reactor steam dome pressure is less than or equal to 135 psig.

Hfi Prior to STARTUP following- the first refueling outage, the injection func-

~

tion of Drywell Pressure High and Manual Initiation are not required to be OPERABLE with indicated reactor vessel water level on the wide range instrument greater than Level 8 setpoint coincident with the reactor pres-sure less than 600 psig.

  • Applicable when the system is requi red to be OPERABLE per Specification 3.5.2 or 3.5.3.

Required when ESF equipment is required to be OPERABLE.

'(a) Calibrate -trip unit at least once .per 31 days.

(b) Manual initiation switches shall be tested at least once per 18 months during shutdown. All other circuitry associated with manual initiation shall receive a CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST at least once per 31 days as a part of circuitry required to be tested for automatic system actuation.

(c) DELETED d) DELETED Functional Testing of Time Delay No't Required GRANO GULF"UNIT 1 3/4 3-36

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ATTACHMENT 4 Page 1 of 21 VNCOVmoLLLD lahblllbl Tllb PI Sl ll' ll&~ W 419 SUPPLY SYSTEM PLANT PROCEDURES MANUAL WNP-2 PROCEDURE NUMBER APPR DATE

  • 7.4.3.3.1.67 12/02/88 VOLUME NAME 7 SURVEILLANC PROCDURES SECTION 7.4.3 INSTRUHENTATION (ECCS ACTUATION)
  • 7.4.3.3.1.67 4.16 KV EHERGENCY BUS DEGRADED UNDERVOLTAGE (SH7) CFT E. P. NUHBER SETPOINT ALLOMABLE VALUE HANUFACTURER MODEL E-RLY-27/7-3 106.7V 103.8V + 6V ITE 27N E-RLY-27/7-4 106.7V 103.8V + 6V ITE 27N E-RLY-27/7-5 106.7V 103.8V + 6V ITE 27N Permission To Task g Perform Test 'ate Time Shift Hanager Test Performed By Test Satisfactory I i Yes i t No Si gnof f NCR Issued i I Yes I I No NCR g Procedure Completed Date Tl l11e Shift Hanager Assigned Reviewer Date Comment:

PROCEDURE NUMBER REVISION NUMBER PAGE NUMBER 7..4.3.3.1.67 4 7.4.3.3.1.67-1 of 21 WP-597 R3 l2/86)

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~~velar caweaw~vvc rmee u~w~eM Attachment 4 Page 2 of 21 7.4.3.3.1.67.1

~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~Pur use The purpose of this procedure is to provide instructions to test the setpoints of the secondary undervoltage relays and to verify their functional capabilities. This procedure accomplishes the surveillance requi rements of Technical Speci fication 4.3.3.1.

A. Obtain permission and signature from the Shift Hanager before start-ing,this test.

B. Coordinate all testing with responsible. Control Room Operator.

C. Notify the Control Room Operator that Annunciator P800-Cl Drop 2-4 (Bus 7 Degraded Undervoltage) will alarm during the performance of this test.

7.4.3.3.1.67.3 Limitations A. All discrepancies encountered during this test shall be noted and reported to your immediate supervisor and the Shift. Hanager and perform an evaluation per PPH 1.3.12.

B. Any temporary use of jumpers or lead lifting is to be performed in h accordance with PPH 1.3.9.

C. During performance of this procedure it should be noted that all steps preceded by a . g sign denote a Technical Specifications requirement. Failure to meet the acceptance criteria on these items requires immediate referral to the Shift Manager.

7.4.3.3.1.67.4 Precautions A. Care shoul'd be taken to slowly vary the voltage when testing these relays.

B. Dangerous voltages are exposed when the relay is uncovered.

C. Do not attempt to manually operate the target vanes on these relays. Although the targets return their indication under shock, they can be damaged by manual operation with a pencil or pointed object.

PROCEDURE NUMBER REVISION NUMBER PAGE NUMBER 7.4.3.3.1.67 7.4.3.3.1.67-2 of 21 WP 444 Rl ($ .44)

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Attachment 4 Page 3 of 21 7.4.3.3.1. 67. 5

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eci a 1 Test E ui ment e

A. Certified Test

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ui ment NOTE: Make certain the calibra'tion date is current.

1. Fluke AC/DC Differential Voltmeter, Model 887AB (or equivalent)
2. Dranetz Polymeter (or equivalent)
3. Fluke 8060A Digital AC Voltmeter (or equivalent)

B. Other

l. (2 ea) 25 Kilohm Rheostats (or equivalent)
2. (2 ea) 120 Volt AC Variac (or equivalent)
3. .Single Pole Snap Action Switch
4. Modified Extender Card and Relay Support Piece
5. DC Power Supply
6. Fine Adj. XFHR for Variac
7. Ohmmeter
8. Precision Regulated AC Power Supply Powertron 500S (or equivalent)
9. Stabi line Voltage Regulator SURS88101CU (or equivalent) 7.4.3.3.1.67.6 Reference A. NRC Inspection Report 84-18, Dated 01/27/84, Item 84-18-03 (This concerns'"Secondary Verification" of jumper removal.)

PROCEOURE NUMBER REVISION NUMBER PAGE NUMBER

~ 7.4.3.3.1.67 7.4.3.3.1.67-3 of 21 WP 494 Rl (9.43)

Attachment 4 Page 4 of 21 7.4.3.3.1.67.7

~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ Procedure NOTE: All steps in the body of this procedure must be completed and initialed.

NOTE: The Data Sheet attached should be filled out as noted in the procedure and a copy of the completed Data Sheet placed in the Electrical Shop Relay Data File. This procedure is to be retained in the permanent Plant File.

A. S~et U NOTE: Relays 27/7-3, 27/7-4 and 27/7-5 and test switch 7TS involved "with this procedure are located at SH-7, Cubicle No. 10.

Step 1) Open door of Cubicle No. 10.

~Step 2) Set multimeter on 250 VDC scale. Place the

+ meter lead on Terminal ll of Relay 27/7-3 and the meter lead to GND. Verify voltage to relay (approximately 60 VDC).

Step 3) Place the + meter lead on Terminal 15 and meter lead to GND. Verify voltage to relay (approximately 60 VDC).

Step 4) Place the + meter lead on Terminal 12 and the meter lead to GND. Verify voltage less than 10 volts.

Step 5) Place the + meter lead on Terminal 14 and the meter lead to GND. Verify voltage less than 10 volts.

Step 6) Place the + meter lead on Terminal ll of Relay 27/7-4 and the meter lead to GND. Verify voltage to relay (approximately 60 VDC).

Step 7) Place the + meter lead on. Terminal 15 and the meter lead to GND. Verify voltage to relay (approximately 60 VDC).

Step 8) Place the + meter lead on Terminal 12 and the meter lead to GND. Verify voltage less than 10 volts.

PROCEDURE NUMBER REVISION NUMBER PAGE NVMBER 7.4.3.3.1.67 7.4.3.3.1.67-4 of 21 WPS9$ R1 (9 $ 9)

2 Attachment 4 Page 5 of 21 Step 9) Place the + meter lead on Terminal 14 and the meter lead to GND. Verify voltage less than 10 volts.

Step 10) Place the + meter lead on Terminal ll of Relay 27/7-5 and the meter lead to GND. Verify voltage to relay (approximately 60 VDC).

Step ll) Place the + meter lead on Terminal 15 and the meter lead to GND. Verify voltage to relay (approximately 60 VDC).

Place the + meter lead on Terminal 12 and the

'tep 12) meter lead to GND. Verify voltage less than 10 volts.

Step 13) Place the + meter lead on Terminal 14 and the meter lead to GND. Verify voltage less than 10 volts.

S. As Found for Rela 27/7/3 Step 1) Cut lead wire/lead seal from Relay E-RLY-27/7/3 cover, loosen screws and remove.

Step 2) Place the test switch 7TS in the 27/7/3 position.

Step 3) Remove Relay E-RLY-27/7/3 by pulling gently on the bottom of the relay with pulling knobs.

NOTE: This test may be performed in the field or on the test bench. The case referred to may be the installed case or a spare 27N case.

Step 4) For testing with a spare case, verify that the resistor (5K) is installed between Terminals 1 and 9 on the back of the relay case. N/A this step for field testing.

Step 5) Insert extender card into relay case.

Step 6) Attach support bracket to relay case.

Step 7) Plug relay into extender card.

Step 8) Connect relay to test equipment for voltage pickup and dropout tests per Attachment A, adjusting both 25K ohm pots for maximum resistance.

PROCEDURE NUMBER REVISION NUMBER PAGE NUMBER 7.4.3.3.1.67 7.4.3.3.1.67-5 of 21 WP.994 Rl {9 $ $ )

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Attachment 4 Page 6 of 21 Step 9) Verify that 125 V D-C is present on relay extender card Terminals 3 and 4.

Step 10) Set up the differential voltmeter as follows:

Node Switch: AC

. Range Switch: 1000 Null Switch: 1 Range Dials: 107.800 NOTE: The differential voltmeter will read 107.800 volts at center scale and (-) 1 volt left, (+) volt right.

1 Step ll) Close switch "A" and using the A-C digital voltmeter (DMV), increase voltage by adjusting the coarse and fine variacs to approximately.

106 volts. Slowly increase the voltage until the differential voltmeter shows indication.

Monitoring the differential voltmeter and the relay trip indicating light, increase the volt-age in small increments (with pauses in-between) until the light goes OFF. Record the differ-ential'oltmeter reading "As Found" on the data sheet.

/Step 12) Set the differential voltmeter range dials for 106.700volts and using the A-C DVH, adjust for approximately 109 volts. Slowly decrease the voltage until 'the differential voltmeter shows indication. Monitoring the differential volt-meter and the relay trip light, slowly decrease the voltage in small increments (with pauses in-.between) until the trip light comes on.

Record the differential voltmeter readings "As Found" on the data sheet.

Step 13) Close switch "A" and set the voltage output of the transformer to 100$ of relay operating voltage (120 volts) by adjusting the coarse and fine variacs.

Step 14) Open switch "A" and set the voltage across the relay coil to 505 of the operating voltage (60 volts) by adjusting the 25K ohm rheostats (pots).

PROCEDURE NUMBER REVISION NUMBER PAGE NUMBER 7.4.3.3.1.67 7.4.3.3.1.67-6 of 21 WP.$ 94 RI (9 4$ )

0 Attachment 4 -

7 of 21 'age Step 15) Close switch "A" on the timer start circuit.

This puts 1005 voltage on the relay and sets the circuit.

Step 16) Reset timer.

Step 17) Open switch "A" on the timer start circuit.

Record "As Found" time from Dranetz on the data sheet.

Step 18) Remove AC and DC voltages from relay.

Step 19) Disconnect test wiring from relay.

Step 20) Remove relay from extender card.

Step 21) Remove support bracket.

Step 22) Remove extender card.

Step 23) Install Relay 27/7/3 in .case and replace cover and seal with a lead seal.

Step 24) Place test switch in the "OFF" position.

Step 25) Reset target; C. As Found for Rela 27/7/4 Step 1) Cut lead wire/lead seal from Relay E-RLY-27/7/4 cover, loosen screws and remove.

Step 2) Place the test switch 7TS in the 27/7/4 position.

Step 3) Remove Relay E-RLY-27/7/4 by pulling gently on the bottom of the relay with pulling knobs.

NOTE: Thi.s test may be performed in the field or on the test bench: The case referred to may be the installed case or a spare 27N case.

Step 4) For testing with a spare case, verify that the resistor (5K) is installed between Terminals 1 and 9 on the back of the relay case. N/A this step for field testing.

Step 5) Insert extender card into relay case.

PROCEDURE NUMBER REVISION NUMBER PAGE NUMBER 7.4.3.3.1.67 7.4.3.3.1.67-7 of 21 WP 59$ R1 (9 99)

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e Attachment 4 Page 8 of 21 Step 6) Attach support bracket to relay case.

Step.7) Plug relay into extender card.

Step 8) Connect relay to test equipment for voltage pickup and dropout tests per Attachment A, adjusting both 25K ohm pots for maximum resistance.

Step 9) Verify that 125 V D-C is present on relay extender card Terminals 3 and 4.

Step 10) Set up the differential voltmeter as follows:

Mode Switch: AC Range Switch: 1000 Null Switch: 1 Range Dials: 107.800 NOTE: The differential voltmeter will read 107.800 volts at center scale, and (-) 1 volt left, (+) 1 volt right.

Step ll) Close switch "A" and using the A-C digital voltmeter (DHV), increase voltage by adjusting the coarse and fine variacs to approximately 106 volts. Slowly increase the voltage until the differential voltmeter shows indication.

Monitoring the differential voltmeter and the relay trip indicating light, increase the volt-age in small increments (with pauses in-between) until the light goes OFF. Record the differ-ential voltmeter reading "As Found" on the data sheet.

step 12) Set the di ff erenti a 1 vol tmeter range di al s for 106.700 volts and using the A-C DVH, adjust for approximately 109 volts. Slowly decrease the voltage until the differential voltmeter shows indication. Plonitoring the differential volt-meter and the relay trip light, slowly decrease the voltage in small increments (with pauses in-between) until the trip light comes on.

Record the differential voltmeter readings "As Found" on the data sheet.

PROCEDURE NUMBER REVISION NUMBER PAG E NUM BE R 7.4.3.3.1.67 7.4.3.3.1.67-8 of 21 WP.59$ Rl (9.$ 5)

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Attachment 4 Page 9 of 21 Step 13) Close switch "A" and set the voltage output of the transformer to 100K of relay operating voltage (120 volts) by adjusting the coarse and fine variacs.

Step 14) Open switch "A" and set the voltage across the relay coil to 50K of the operating voltage (60 volts) by adjusting the 25K ohm rheostats (pots).

Step 15) Close switch "A" on the timer start circuit.

This puts lOOX voltage on the relay and sets the circuit.

Step 16) Reset timer.

Step 17) Open switch "A" on the timer start ci rcuit.

Record "As Found" time from Dranetz on the data sheet.

Step 18) Remove AC and DC voltages from relay.

Step 19) Disconnect test wiring from relay.

Step 20) Remove relay from extender card.

Step 21) Remove support bracket.

Step 22) Remove extender card.

Step 23) Install Relay 27/7/4 in case and replace cover and seal with a lead seal.

Step 24) Place .test switch in the "OFF" position.

Step 25) Reset target.

D. As Found for Rela 27/7/5 Step 1) Cut lead wire/lead seal from Relay E-RLY-27/7/5 cover, loosen screws and remove.

Step 2) Place the test switch 7TS in the 27/7/5 position.

Step 3) Remove Relay E-RLY-27/7/5 by pulling gently on the bottom of the relay with pulling knobs.

PROCEDURE NUMBER REVISION NUMBER PACE NUMBER 7.4.3.3.1.67 7.4.3.3.1.67-9 of 21 WP 999 RI (9.99)

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Attachment 4 Page 10 of 21 NOTE: This test may be performed in the field or on the test bench. The case referred to may be the installed case or a spare 27N case.

Step 4) For testing with a spare case, verify that the resistor (5K) is installed between Terminals 1 and 9 on the back of the relay case. N/A this step for field testing.

Step 5) Insert extender card into relay case.

Step 6) Attach support bracket to relay case.

Step 7) Plug relay into extender card.

Step 8) Connect relay to test equipment for voltage pickup and dropout tests per Attachment A, adjusting both 25K ohm pots for. maximum resistance.

Step 9) Verify that 125 V D-C is present on relay extender card Terminals 3 and 4.

Step 10) Set up the differential voltmeter as follows:

Mode Switch: AC Range Switch: 1000 Null Switch: 1 Range Dials: 107.800 NOTE: The differential voltmeter will read 107.800 volts at center scale and (-) 1 volt left, (+) 1 volt right.

Step ll) Close switch "A" and using the A-C digital voltmeter (DHV), increase voltage by adjusting the coarse and fine variacs to approximately 106 volts. Slowly increase the voltage until the differential voltmeter shows indication.

Monitoring the differential voltmeter and the relay trip indicating light, increase the volt-age in small increments (with pauses in-between) until the light goes OFF. Record the differ-ential voltmeter reading "As Found" on the data sheet.

PROCEOURE NUMBER REVISION NUMBER PAGE NUMBER 7.4.3.3.1.67 7.4.3.3.1.67-10 of 21 WP $ 94 RI (9.43)

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Attachment 4 Page 11 of 21 gStep 12) Set the differential voltmeter range dials for 106.700 volts and using the A-C DVM, adjust for approximately 109 volts. Slowly decrease the voltage until the differential voltmeter shows indication. Monitoring the differential and the relay trip light, slowly decrease volt-'eter the voltage in small increments (with pauses in-between) until the trip light comes on.

Record the differential voltmeter readings "As Found" on the data sheet.

Step 13) Close switch "A" and set the voltage output of the transformer to 1005 of relay operating voltage (120 volts) by adjusting the coarse and fine variacs.

Step 14) 'Open switch "A" and set the voltage across the relay coil to 50K of the operating voltage (60 volts) by adjusting the 25K ohm rheostats (pots).

Step 15) Close switch "A" on the timer start circuit.

This puts 1005 voltage on the relay and sets the circuit.

Step 16) Reset timer.

Step 17) Open switch "A" on the timer start circuit.

Record "As Found" time from Dranetz on the data sheet.

Step 18) 'Remove AC and DC voltages from relay.

Step 19) Disconnect, test wi ring from relay.

Step 20) Remove relay from extender card.

Step 21) Remove support bracket.

Step 22) Remove extender card.

Step 23) Install Relay 27/7/5 in case and replace cover and seal with a lead seal. /

Step 24) Place test switch in the "OFF." position.

Step 25) Reset target.

PROCEDURE NUMBER REVISION NUMBER PAGE NUMBER 7.4.3.3.1.67 7.4.3.3.1.67-11 of 21 WP.Sse RI <S Sa)

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Attachment 4 Page 12 of 21 E. Test E-RLY-27/7-3 NOTE: The 'following steps demonstrate correct functioning of the relay. Two contacts are to be checked, ll and 12, and 14 and 15. There will be voltages to these contacts until the test switch 7TS is moved from the OFF position.

The test switch should be moved to the correct position as identified, 27/7-3, and meter leads placed across contact to be tested before 5 seconds time has elapsed.

CAUTION: Multimeter should not be connected to relay contacts prior to switch 7TS being placed in 27/7-3 position. Voltage is present and placement of meter leads could cause inadvertent trip or fuses to blow.

Step 1) Place the multimeter on OHMS, RXl scale.

step 2) Place test switch 7TS in the 27/7-3 position.

Place meter test leads across Terminals ll and 12 and verify contact closure.

NOTE: Contact should close approximately five seconds after test switch 7TS is placed in 27/7-3 p'osition.

Step 3) Verify the target drops on relay.

Step 4) Remove test leads from Terminals ll and 12 of 27/7-3 Relay.

Step 5) Place test switch 7TS in OFF position.

/Step 6) Place test switch 7TS in the 27/7-3 position.

Place meter test leads across Terminals 14 and 15 and verify contact closure.

NOTE: Contact should close approximately five

'seconds after test switch 7TS is placed in 27/7-3 position.

Step 7) Remove test leads from Terminals 14 and 15 of of 27/7-3 relay.

Step 8) Place test switch 7TS in OFF position.

Step 9) Reset target on relay.

PROCEOURE NUMBER REVISION NUMBER PAGE NUMBER 7.4.3.3.1.67 7.4.3.3.1.67-12 of 21 WP $ 94 R1 (9 49)

Attachment 4 Page 13 of 21 F. Test E-RLY-27/7-4 NOTE: The following steps demonstrate correct functioning of the relay. Two contacts are to be checked, ll and 12, and 14 and 15. There will be voltages to these contacts until the test switch 7TS is moved from the OFF position.

The test switch 'should be moved to the correct position as identified, 27/7-4, and meter leads placed across contact to be tested before 5 seconds time has elapsed.

CAUTION: Hultimeter should not be connected to relay contacts prior to switch 7TS being placed in 27/7-4 position. Voltage is present and placement of meter leads could cause inadvertent trip or fuses to blow.

,Step 1) Place the multimeter on OHMS, RXl scale.

step 2) Place test switch 7TS in the 27/7-4 position.

Place meter test leads across Terminals 11 and 12 and verify contact closure.

NOTE: Contact should close aproximately five seconds after test switch 7TS is placed in 27/7-4 position.

Step 3) Verify the target drops on relay.

4

.Step 4) Remove test leads from Terminals 11 and 12 of 27/7-4 Relay.

,Step 5) Place test switch 7TS in OFF position.

step 6) Place test switch 7TS in the 27/7-4 position.

Place meter test leads across Terminals 14 and 15 and verify contact closure.

NOTE: Contacts should close approximately five seconds after test switch 7TS is placed in 27/7-4 position.

Step 7) Remove test leads from Terminals 14 and 15 of of 27/7-4 relay.

Step 8) Place test switch 7TS in OFF position.

Step 9) Reset target on relay.

PROCEDURE NUMBER REVISION NUMBER PAGE NUMBER 7.4.3.3.1.67 7.4.3.3.1.67-13 of 21 WP.599 Rl {9 $ 9)

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Attachment 4 Page 14 of 21 G. Test E-RLY-27/7-5 NOTE: The following steps demonstrate correct functioning of the relay. Two contacts are to be checked, ll and 12, and 14 and 15. There will be voltages to these contacts until the test switch 7TS is moved from the OFF position.

The test switch should be moved to the correct position as identified, 27/7-5, and meter leads placed across contact to be tested before 5 seconds time has elapsed.

CAUTION: Hultimeter should not be connected to relay contacts prior to switch 7TS being placed in 27/7-5 position. Voltage is present and placement of meter leads could cause inadvertent trip or fuses to blow.

'tep 1) Place, the multimeter on OHMS, RXl scale.

step 2) Place test switch 7TS in the 27/7-5 position.

Place meter test leads across Terminals ll and 12 and verify contact closure.

NOTE: Contact should close aproximately five seconds after test switch 7TS is placed in 27/7-5 position.

Step 3) Verify the target drops on relay.

Step 4) Remove test leads from Terminals ll and 12 of 27/7-5 relay.

Step 5) Place .,test switch 7TS in OFF position.

/Step 6) Place test switch 7TS in the 27/7-5 position.

Place meter test leads across Terminals 14 and 15 and verify contact closure.

NOTE: Contact should close approximately five seconds after test switch 7TS is placed in 27/7-5 position.

Step 7) Remove test leads from Terminals 14 and 15 of of 27/7-5 relay.

Step 8) Place test switch 7TS in OFF position.

Step 9) Reset target on relay.

PRQCE13URE NUMBER REVISION NUMBER PAGE NUMBER 7.4.3.3.1.67 7.4.3.3.1.67-14 of 21 WP.998 R1 {9 83)

d Attachment 4 Page 15 of 21 Restoration I

Step .1) Obtain independent verification that test switch 7TS is in the OFF position.

Verified Independent Verification Step 2) Close Switchgear Cubicle door.

Step 3) Verify Annunciator P800-Cl Drop 2-4 is reset.

Step 4) Notify Control Room that testing is complete.

Step 5) Verify that "As Found" values on Attachment 8 are within the Administrative Values shown on Attachment E. If so, NA Step 6. If any value is outside the Administrative Value, NA this step.

NOTE: . If dropout voltage is outside the allow-able value of 103.8 + 6 V, notify the Shift Manager and prepare a PDR/NCR as required.

Step 6) Notify your immediate supervisor that cali-bration of. this relay must be performed per 7.4.3.3.1.75. Note in Comment section of cover sheet.

Step 7) Verify that "As Found" values on Attachment C are within the Administrative Values shown on Attachment E. If so, NA Step 8. If any value is outside the Administrative Value, NA this step.

NOTE: If dropout voltage is outside the allow-able value of 103.8 + 6 V, notify the Shift Manager and prepare a PDR/NCR as required.

Step 8) Notify your immediate supervisor that cali-bration of this relay must be performed per 7.4.3.3.1.66. Note in Comment section of cover sheet.

PROCEDURE NUMBER REVISION NUMBER PAGE NUMBER

'.4.3.3.1.67 7.4.3.3.1.67-15 of 21 WP.S99 RI (9.$ 9)

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Attachment 4 Page 16 of 21 Step 9) Verify that "As Found" values on Attachment D are within the Administrative Values shown on Attachment E. If so, NA Step 10. If any value is outside the Administrative Value, NA this step.

0 NOTE: If dropout voltage is outside the allow-able value of 103.8 + 6 V, notify the Shift Manager and prepare a PDR/NCR as required.

Step 10) Notify your immediate supervisor that cali-bration of this relay must be performed per 7.4.3.3.1.74. Note in Comment section oF cover sheet.

7.4.3.3.1.67.8 Acce tance Criteria The acceptance criteria. for this procedure is that all steps have been completed and initialed.

7.4.3.3.1.67.9 Documentation This completed test procedure shall be placed in the permanent Plant file in accordance with the 1.6 Ser'ies of the Plant Administrative Procedures.

7.4.3.3.1.67.10

~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ Attachments A. Undervoltage Relay Test Hookup B. Data Sheet for E-RLY-27/7/3 C. Data Sheet for E-RLY-27/7/4 D. Data Sheet for E-RLY-27/7/5 E. Undervoltage Relay Setpoints PROCEDURE NUMBER REVISION NUMGER PAGE NUMBER 7.4.3.3.1.67 7.4.3.3.1.67-16 of 21 WP 494 R1 (9 49)

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Attachment 4 Page 20 of.21 DATA SHEET FOR E-RLY-27/7/5 EQUIPMENT 8-RI Y-27/7/5 UNOERVOLTAGE P I CKUP TAP II 0 DROPOUT TAP )f % TIME TAP REQUIRED AS FOUND PICKUP /07.8 V DROPOUT fo67 V INITIALS DATE TIME.VOLTAGE CHECK START FAULT REQUIRED TIME AS FOUND CHECK VOLTAGE VOLTAGE I2,0 5 sEc INITIALS DATE TEST EQ NO. CAL OUE DATE COMMENTS 968'21662 PAGE 2 Attachment 0 PROCEDURE NUMBER REVISION NUMBER PAGE NUMBER 7.4.3.3.1 '7 7.4.3.3.1.67-20 of 21 WP 581 Rl I9 4$ )

ot qh Attachment 4 Page 21 of 21 UNDERVOLTAGE'RELAY SETPOINTS ADHIN ISTRATIVE ALLOMA8LE SETPOINT VALUE VALUE PICKUP 107.8 + .25 V )106.7 V

~109.8 V DROPOUT 106.7 + .25 V ~105.6 V 103.8 + 6 V

~08.7 V TINE 5+ .1 SEC 5 + .22 SEC 5 + .3 SEC

+ NOTE: Current calculations indicate a minimum acceptable value of 105.6 V.

Attachment E PROCEDURE NUMBER REVISION NUMBER PAGE NUMBER 7.4.3.3.1.67 7.4.3.3.1 . 67-21 of 21 WP.494 RS (9.49)

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( a ATTACHMENT 5 Page I of 2 IN

.GK cgCT R MbltfION Afflerbach-9270 Jp Cooper-913E -

~MNP-2 Files-917Y Rtffilo-99<5

%4tS LtYTSR NXKQ OARS ~

TWS LCTTRR l47tSA45 COOSOTQttkf No.

~AlLl04A lan% COIQflT%5%QT MP Gf 1 1 os-994E MPG/LB RE Green-994E CRN/LB 'T Har:aid/LB-901A PLP/LB BA Holmberg-994E TLH/LB JO )hrtin-927M TL Naade-927S September 27, 1983 CR Noyes-994E MPGE-2-83-425 PL Powel3-956B PK Shen-580 JG Tel 1efson-901A RJ Barbee-927S 5 . F. A. HacLean Prospect Manager General Electric Company fhil Code 394 175 Curtner Avenue San Jose, CA 95125

Subject:

, NUCLEAR PROJECT NO. 2 SECOND LEVEL UNDERVOLTAGE PROTECTION FOR DIVISION 3

Reference:

BRGE-RO-2-82-589 The General Electric (GE} design (FDI-TCXZ s ond level undervoltage protection of the Division 3 HPCS) Diesel Ge tor bus does not meet all the NRC requirements list Burns and Roe in the reference. The unac-ceptability of this des further dsnonstrated when the Power Systems Branch Lead Reviewer re design. Specifically, he reaffirmed the requirement for inciden etection of undervoltage.

Your Hess deficf pro

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.. la d . Clark developed a design which overcame the ade concurred with the design. This design which o coincwence was reviewed over the phone with our L r a his verbal concurrence was given. A hard copy of the de-sign indic nd- ivered to NRC on August 30. Response fry the Lead Reviewer that both primary and second level undervoltage designs are accept-able f a coincidence and testability standpoint.

a~I MP Gilles ol

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Attachment 5 Page 2 of 2

. -. 8.. F. A. RacLean-Page The September 27, 1983 MPGE-2-83-425 h Concurrent fifth the fmplementatfon of thfs nm desfgn, the Supply Systejn

~ll, fn the fnterest of schedule, purchase the Agastat tfee delay relays.

If you have any questfons on thfs aatter, please contact 8'. M. P. Gflles, extensfon 2921.

. T. Harrold 9GIA)

Assfstant Ofrector, MHP-2 Engfneerfng M. S. Chfn - BPA A. I. Cygelman - BER (981A) 1f. }l, Engelkfng - GE Sfte J. A. Forrest - BKR RO T. A. Hangelsdorf - BPC .(982D)

N. Powell - BPC {906D)

J. J. Verderber - BN HY

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