Revision as of 23:58, 10 February 2019

Text

Nrc Integrated Inspection Report 05000382-05-005
	ML060320708
Person / Time
Site:	Waterford
Issue date:	01/31/2006
From:	Graves D N; NRC/RGN-IV/DRP/RPB-E
To:	Venable J E; Entergy Operations
References
	IR-05-005
	Download: ML060320708 (33)
	v • d • e

January 31, 2006

Joseph E. VenableVice President Operations Waterford 3 Entergy Operations, Inc.

17265 River Road Killona, LA 70066-0751

SUBJECT: WATERFORD STEAM ELECTRIC STATION, UNIT 3 - NRC INTEGRATEDINSPECTION REPORT 05000382/2005005

Dear Mr. Venable:

On December 31, 2005, the NRC completed an inspection at your Waterford Steam ElectricStation, Unit 3. The enclosed report documents the inspection findings which were discussed on January 10, 2006, with Mr. Kevin Walsh, General Manager, Plant Operations, and othermembers of your staff.This inspection examined activities conducted under your license as they relate to safety andcompliance with the Commission's rules and regulations and with the conditions of your license.

Within these areas, the inspection consisted of selected examination of procedures and representative records, observations of activities, and interviews with personnel.Based on the results of this inspection, the NRC identified one issue that was evaluated underthe risk significance determination process as having very low safety significance (Green). The NRC has also determined that a violation was associated with this issue. The violation is beingtreated as a noncited violation, consistent with Section VI.A of the Enforcement Policy. The finding is described in the subject inspection report. If you contest the subject or severity of a noncited violation, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your denial, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN:

Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001, with copies to the Regional Administrator, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Region IV, 611 Ryan Plaza Drive, Suite 400, Arlington, Texas 76011; the Director, Office of Enforcement, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001; and the NRC Resident Inspector at theWaterford Steam Electric Station, Unit 3, facility.In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter, itsenclosures, and your response will be made available electronically for public inspection in theNRC Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) com ponent ofNRC's document system (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).

Entergy Operations, Inc.-2-Should you have any questions concerning this inspection, we will be pleased to discuss themwith you.

Sincerely,/RA/David N. Graves, ChiefProject Branch E Division of Reactor ProjectsDocket: 50-382License: NPF-38

Enclosure:

NRC Inspection Report 050000382/2005005

w/Attachment:

Supplemental Informationcc w/enclosure:Senior Vice President and Chief Operating Officer Entergy Operations, Inc.

P.O. Box 31995 Jackson, MS 39286-1995Vice President, Operations SupportEntergy Operations, Inc.

P.O. Box 31995 Jackson, MS 39286-1995Wise, Carter, Child & Caraway P.O. Box 651 Jackson, MS 39205General Manager, Plant OperationsWaterford 3 SES Entergy Operations, Inc.

17265 River Road Killona, LA 70066-0751Manager - Licensing ManagerWaterford 3 SES Entergy Operations, Inc.

17265 River Road Killona, LA 70066-0751 Entergy Operations, Inc.-3-ChairmanLouisiana Public Service Commission P.O. Box 91154 Baton Rouge, LA 70821-9154Director, Nuclear Safety & Regulatory Affairs Waterford 3 SES Entergy Operations, Inc.

17265 River Road Killona, LA 70066-0751Michael E. Henry, State Liaison OfficerDepartment of Environmental Quality Permits Division P.O. Box 4313 Baton Rouge, LA 70821-4313Parish President St. Charles Parish

P.O. Box 302 Hahnville, LA 70057Winston & Strawn LLP1700 K Street, N.W.

Washington, DC 20006-3817 Entergy Operations, Inc.-4-Electronic distribution by RIV:Regional Administrator (BSM1)DRP Director (ATH)DRS Director (DDC)DRS Deputy Director (RJC1)Senior Resident Inspector (MCH)Branch Chief, DRP/E (DNG)Senior Project Engineer, DRP/E (VGG)Team Leader, DRP/TSS (RLN1)RITS Coordinator (KEG)Only inspection reports to the following:DRS STA (DAP)J. Dixon-Herrity, OEDO RIV Coordinator (JLD)ROPreports WAT Site Secretary (AHY)SUNSI Review Completed: _DNG_____ADAMS: Yes G No Initials: DNG Publicly Available G Non-Publicly Available G Sensitive Non-SensitiveR:\_REACTORS\_WAT\2005\WT2005-05RP-MCH.wpd RIV:SPE:DRP/ERI/DRP/ESRI:DRP/EDRS/EB1C:DRS/PSBVGGaddyGFLarkinMCHayJAClarkMPShannon/RA/E-DNGravesE-DNGraves/RA//RA/1/23/061/31/061/31/061/30/061/31/06C:DRS/EB2C:DRS/OBC:DRP/ELJSmithATGodyDNGravesDLProulx for/RA//RA/1/27/061/31/061/31/06 EnclosureU.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION IV Docket No.:50-382 License No.:NPF-38 Report No.:05000382/2005005 Licensee:Entergy Operations, Inc.

Facility:Waterford Steam Electric Station, Unit 3 Location:Hwy. 18 Killona, Louisiana Dates:September 27 through December 31, 2005 Inspectors:M. C. Hay, Senior Resident InspectorG. F. Larkin, Resident Inspector T. F. Stetka, Senior Operations Engineer G. W. Johnston, Senior Operations Engineer P. J. Elkmann, Emergency Preparedness Inspector D. H. Overland, Reactor Inspector B. X. Tindell, Reactor Inspector B. K. Tharakan, Health PhysicistApproved By:David N. Graves, Chief, Project Branch E ATTACHMENTS:Supplemental Information Enclosure

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

IR05000382/2005-005; 09/27/2005-12/31/2005; Waterford Steam Electric Station, Unit 3;Surveillance TestingThe report covered a 3-month period of inspection by resident inspectors along with announcedinspections by a regional senior emergency preparedness inspector, two reactor inspectors, a health physicist, and two senior operations engineers. The inspectors identified one Green finding. The significance of most findings is indicated by their color (Green, White, Yellow,

Red) using Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 0609, "Significance Determination Process" (SDP). Findings for which the SDP does not apply may be Green or be assigned a severity level after NRC management review. The NRC's program for overseeing the safe operation ofcommercial nuclear power reactors is described in NUREG-1649, "Reactor Oversight Process,"Revision 3, dated July 2000. A.

NRC-Identified and Self-Revealing Findings

Cornerstone: Initiating Events

Green.

The inspectors identified a noncited violation for the failure to comply withTechnical Specification 3.4.5, "Leakage Detection Systems" based on a method ofreactor coolant system leakage detection not meeting design standards of RegulatoryGuide 1.45, "Reactor Coolant Pressure Boundary Leakage Detection System."

Specifically, the containment fan cooler condensate flow switches were identified to not meet the design requirements for detecting a one gallon per minute reactor coolant system leak. The licensee took prompt corrective actions and entered this issue into thecorrective action program.The finding is greater than minor because it is associated with the Initiating Eventcornerstone attribute of equipment performance and affects the associated cornerstone objective to limit the likelihood of an event that might upset plant stability and challengecritical safety functions in that a reactor coolant system leak could go undetected until itbecame more severe. The Phase 1 worksheets in Manual Chapter 0609, "Significance Determination Process," were used to conclude that the finding was of very low safety significance (Green) because other methods of reactor coolant system leakagedetection were available, mitigating systems would not be affected, and it did notcontribute to the likelihood of a reactor trip. The finding has a cro sscutting elementrelated to problem identification and resolution in that the licensee had missed several opportunities to identify this non-conforming condition (Section R22).

B.Licensee-Identified Violations

None.

Enclosure

REPORT DETAILS

Summary of Plant Status: The plant began the period on September 27, 2005, at 100 percentpower. On November 11, 2005, plant operators manually tripped the reactor due to decreasing main condenser vacuum following a relay failure in the circulating water logic circuitry that resulted in a loss of all running circulating water pumps. On November 14, 2005, operators commenced a reactor startup, synchronized the main turbine generator to the offsite electrical grid, and reached approximately 100 percent reactor power on November 15, 2005. Power remained at that level for the remainder of the inspection period.1.REACTOR SAFETYCornerstones: Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, and Barrier Integrity1R04Equipment Alignment (71111.04)

.1 Partial System Walkdowns

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors performed a partial walkdown of the following two systems to verify theoperability of redundant or diverse trains and components when safety equipment wasinoperable. The inspectors attempted to identify any discrepancies that could impact the function of t he system, and, therefore, potentially increase risk. The inspectorsreviewed applicable operating procedures, walked down control systems components,and verified that selected breakers, valves, and support equipment were in the correct position to support system operation. The inspectors also verified that the licensee hadproperly identified and resolved equipment alignment problems that could cause initiating events or impact the capability of mitigating systems or barriers and enteredthem into the corrective action process.*On September 26, 2005, the inspectors performed a partial equipment alignmentinspection of a critical portion of reactor auxiliary building controlled area ventilation system Train B. The walkdown was conducted using OperatingProcedure OP-002-010, "Reactor Auxiliary Building HVAC and ContainmentPurge," Revision 14. *On November 8, 2005, the inspectors performed a partial equipment alignmentinspection of low-pressure safety injection system Train A. System configuration was assessed using Operating Procedure OP-009-008, "Safety Injection System," Revision 18.

b. Findings

No Findings of significance were identified.

-4-1R05Fire Protection (71111.05).1Fire Protection - Tours

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors performed inspections of the six areas listed below to assess thematerial condition and operational status of fire protection features. The inspectors verified that combustibles and ignition sources, were controlled in accordance with the licensee's administrative procedures; fire detection and suppression equipment was available for use; that passive fire barriers were maintained in good material condition; and that compensatory measures for out-of-service, degraded, or inoperable fireprotection equipment were implemented in accordance with the licensee's fire protection program.*Fire Zone RAB 2, 18, Roof East and Roof West on October 18, 2005

Fire Zone RAB 1A, 18, 20, and 21 on October 18, 2005

Fire Zone RAB 2, 8A, 19, 20, and 32 on October 26, 2005

Fire Zone Fuel Handling Building +46", +21", +1", and -35" levels onNovember 28, 2005*Fire Zone RAB 1A, 1E, 8B, and TGB +15 level on December 12, 2005

Fire Zone RAB 16, 19, 20, 36, 37, and 39 on December 20, 2005

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R06 Flood Protection Measures (71111.06)

.1 Internal Flooding

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors performed a semiannual inspection of internal flood protection featuresin the reactor auxiliary building wing area. The inspection reviewed the design adequacy and use of various safety-related instruments that provide control room indication for area flooding from inadvertent fire protection system sprinkler actuation orhigh and medium energy line breaks. The inspection included a review of the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report, selected design calculations, and a walkdown of flood protection features in the reactor auxiliary building.

-5-

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R11 Licensed Operator Requalification Program(71111.11)

.1 Licensed Operator Simulator Training

a. Inspection Scope

On October 20, 2005, the inspectors observed one licensed operator simulator trainingscenario. During the scenario, operators responded to problems associated with an excore nuclear instrument, a component cooling water pump failure, a steam generator tube rupture, along with several additional abnormal equipment conditions occurring.

The simulator training evaluated the operators ability to recognize, diagnose, andrespond to abnormal and emergency reactor plant conditions. The inspectors observed and evaluated the following areas:*Understanding and interpreting annuniciator and alarm signals

Verifying automatic actions and analyzing plant parameters in abnormal andemergency conditions *Use and adherence of Technical Specifications

Communicating as a team and prioritizing actions with attention to detail

The crew's and evaluator's critiques

Classifying emergencies and making notifications

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

.2 Biennial Inspection

a. Inspection Scope

To assess the performance effectiveness of the licensed operator requalificationprogram, the inspectors conducted personnel interviews, reviewed both the operating and written examinations, and observed ongoing operating examination activities. The inspectors interviewed eight personnel, five instructors, two operators, and onetraining supervisor, to determine their understanding of the policies and practices for administering requalification examinations. The inspectors also reviewed operator performance on the written and operating examinations. These reviews included observations of portions of the operating examination by the inspectors. The operating examinations observed included five job performance measures and five scenarios that

-6-were used in the current biennial requalification cycle. These observations allowed theinspectors to assess the licensee's effectiveness in conducting the operating test to ensure operator mastery of the training program content.

The results of these examinations were reviewed to determine the effectiveness of the licensee's appraisal of operator performance and to determine if feedback of performance analyses into the requalification training program was being accomplished.

The inspectors interviewed members of the training department and reviewed minutes of training review group meetings to assess the responsiveness of the licensed operator requalification program in incorporating the lessons learned from both plant and industry events. Examination results were also assessed to determine if they were consistent with the guidance contained in NUREG 1021 and NRC Manual Chapter 0609,Appendix I, "Operator Requalification Human Performance Significance Determination Process."Additionally, the inspectors assessed the Waterford plant-referenced simulator forcompliance with 10 CFR 55.46, Simulator Facilities. This assessment incl uded theadequacy of the licensee's simulation facility for use in operator licensing examinationsand for satisfying experience requirements as prescribed by 10 CFR 55.46. The inspectors reviewed a sample of simulator performance test records (transient tests, surveillance tests, and malfunction tests), simulator deficiency report records, and processes for ensuring simulator fidelity commensurate with 10 CFR 55.46. The inspectors reviewed selected simulator deficiency reports generated by the licensee that did not result in changes to the configuration of the simulator to assess the responsiveness of the licensee's simulator configuration management program. The inspectors also interviewed members of the licensee's simulator configuration control group as part of this review.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R12 Maintenance Effectiveness (71111.12)

.1 Routine Reviews

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the two samples listed below for items such as:

(1) appropriatework practices;

(2) identifying and addressing common cause failures;

(3) scoping in accordance with 10 CFR 50.65(b) of the maintenance rule;

(4) characterizing reliabilityissues for performance;

(5) trending key parameters for condition monitoring;

(6) charging unavailability for performance;

(7) classification and reclassification inaccordance with 10 CFR 50.65(a)(1) or (a)(2); and

(8) appropriateness of performance criteria for structures, systems, and components functions classified as (a)(2) and/orappropriateness of goals and corrective actions for structures, systems, andcomponents functions classified as (a)(1).*Anticipated transient without scram system

-7-*Sump pump system

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

.2 Biennial Maintenance Rule Implementation

Main article: IP 71111.12B

a. Inspection Scope

Periodic Evaluation ReviewsThe inspectors reviewed the licensee's overall implementation of the Maintenance Rule,10 CFR 50.65, "Requirements for Monitoring the Effectiveness of Maintenance at Nuclear Power Plants." The inspectors reviewed the licensee's Maintenance Rule periodic assessments for the periods of April 2002 to November 2003 and December 2003 to April 2005. The resulting adjustments to the balance of equipment reliability and availability were also evaluated.The inspectors reviewed systems and functions that had suffered some degradedperformance or condition to assess the licensee's periodic evaluation activities. The inspectors selected the following six systems for a detailed review:*Core Protection Calculators*Instrument Air

Emergency Diesel Generators

Reactor Coolant System

Broad Range Gas Monitor

Steam Bypass ControlFor these systems, the inspectors reviewed the use of performance history andoperating experience in adjusting preventive maintenance, (a)(1) goals, and (a)(2) performance criteria. The inspectors also reviewed adjustments to the scope of the Maintenance Rule Program and the definitions of availability hours and requiredavailable hours.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

.3 Identification and Resolution of Problems

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors identified a Green noncited violation (NCV) for the failure tocomply with Technical Specification 3.4.5, "Leakage Detection Systems" based on a method of reactor coolant system leakage detection not meeting design standards ofRegulatory Guide 1.45, "Reactor Coolant Pressure Boundary Leakage Detection System."Description. Waterford 3 Final Safety Analysis Report, Section 5.2.5, "Detection ofLeakage Through Reactor Coolant Pressure Boundary," states, in part, that the leakage detection systems are consistent with the recommendations of NRC RegulatoryGuide 1.45 and these systems are capable of reliably detecting unidentified sources ofabnormal leakage as low as one gallon per minute (gpm). Regulatory Guide 1.45, also

states that the sensitivity and response time of each leakage detection systememployed for unidentified leakage should be adequate to detect a leakage rate, or its equivalent, of one gpm in less than one hour.The inspectors noted that one method utilized to detect unidentified leakage at thefacility utilizes containment fan cooler condensate flow switches that monitor the fourcontainment fan cooler pan drains that are each calibrated to alarm at a one gpm flowrate. Based on the licensee typically running multiple fan coolers during plant operation the inspectors noted that a one gpm reactor coolant steam leak could be distributed to all running containment fan coolers resulting in each condensate flow switch seeing less than the one gpm total. During discussions with the licensee the inspectors were informed that no analysis had been performed to assess the adequacy of this design to meet the intent of detecting a one gpm reactor coolant system leak and ultimately thelicensee concl uded the system was not adequate to meet the intent of the designrequirements. This condition had existed since initial plant operations.The inspectors determined that the licensee had missed several opportunities to identifythis non-conforming condition. In 2004, NRC inspectors identified that the containmentgaseous radioactivity monitori ng system failed to meet the design requirements ofRegulatory Guide 1.45 resulting in the licensee declaring this method of detection inoperable. In 2004, the licensee requested and received License Amendment No. 197 that, in part, specifically addressed changes associated with utilizing the containmentfan cooler condensate flow switches as a method of leakage detection to satisfy TS 3.4.5. In 2005, the licensee submitted licensee event report (LER) 05000382/2005-002 after identifying that the containment fan cooler condensate flow switches were notbeing properly calibrated to detect a one gpm flow rate.Analysis. The performance deficiency associated with this finding involved the failure tocomply with Technical Specification 3.4.5, "Leakage Detection Systems" based on a method of reactor coolant system leakage detection not meeting design standards ofRegulatory Guide 1.45, "Reactor Coolant Pressure Boundary Leakage Detection

-12-System." The finding is greater than minor because it is associated with the InitiatingEvent cornerstone attribute of equipment performance and affects the associated cornerstone objective to limit the likelihood of an event that might upset plant stabilityand challenge critical safety functions in that a reactor cool ant system leak could goundetected until it became more severe. The Phase 1 worksheets in Manual Chapter 0609, "Significance Determination Process," were used to conclude that the finding was of very low safety significance (Green). The finding was determined to be of very low safety significance because other methods of reactor coolant system leakagedetection were available, mitigating systems would not be affected, and it did notcontribute to the likelihood of a reactor trip. The finding has a cro sscutting elementrelated to problem identification and resolution in that, as previously discussed, the licensee had missed several opportunities to identify this non-conforming condition.Enforcement. Technical Specification 3.4.5.1 describes three methods of detectingreactor coolant system leakage and states, in part, that with only two of the requiredleakage detection systems operable, operation may continue for up to 30 days providedgrab samples of the containment atmosphere are obtained and analyzed at least onceper 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months when the required gaseous and/or particulate radioactivity monitoring system is inoperable; otherwise be in at least Hot Standby within the next six hours andin Cold Shutdown within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days 0.00833 hours 4.960317e-5 weeks 1.1415e-5 months . As previously stated, the containmentair cooler condensate flow switches were inoperable since initial plant startup do to not meeting the design criteria of Regulatory Guide 1.45. Additionally, as previously stated,the inspectors identified that the containment gaseous radioactivity monitoring systemfailed to meet Regulatory Guide 1.45 design criteria since initial plant startup. These two conditions not being identified by the licensee resulted in the failure to place the plant in a cold shutdown condition as required by Technical Specification 3.4.5.1. Thecorrective actions to restore compliance included utilizing the containment sump flowmonitoring system in addition to the containment fan cooler flow switches to meet thedesign requirements of Regulatory Guide 1.45. Additionally, the licensee plans to submit changes to Technical Specification 3.4.5.1 in order to clearly define the operability requirements of the leakage detection systems. Because this finding is ofvery low safety significance and has been entered into the licensee's corrective action process as CR-WF3-2005-04267, this violation is being treated as an NCV consistent with Section VI.A of the Enforcement Policy. This violation is identified as NCV 05000382/2005005-01, Inadequate Reactor Coolant System Leakage Detection System.

1R23 Temporary Plant Modifications

Main article: IP 71111.23

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed Temporary Alteration TA-05-005, "Reactor Vessel Head SealLeakage." The inspectors reviewed the safety screening, design documents, UFSAR, and applicable Technical Specifications to determine that the temporary modification was consistent with the modification documents, drawings, and procedures. The inspectors walked down accessible portions of the affected equipment. The inspectors reviewed the adequacy of post installation tests and test results to confirm that the actual impact of the temporary modification on the perm anent system and interfacingsystems was adequately verified.

-13-

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.Cornerstone: Emergency Preparedness (EP)1EP6Drill Evaluation (71114.06)

a. Inspection Scope

On October 24, 2005, the inspector observed an operator requalification examination forshift Crew E in the control room simulator. The inspectors observed the training evolution to identify any weaknesses and deficiencies in classification, notification, and Protective Action Requirements development activities. The inspectors evaluated the drill conduct and the adequacy of the licensee's critique of performance, with respect tothe self-identification of weaknesses and deficiencies. The inspectors reviewed the postdrill critique to ensure that the items independently identified by the inspectors werealso identified through the licensee's critique and properly entered into the corrective action program.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.2.RADIATION SAFETYOccupational Radiation Safety [OS] 2OS2ALARA Planning and Controls (71121.02)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspector assessed licensee performance with respect to maintaining individual andcollective radiation exposures as low as is reasonably achievable (ALARA). The inspector used the requirements in 10 CFR Part 20 and the licensee's procedures required by Technical Specifications as criteria for determining compliance. The inspector interviewed licensee personnel and reviewed:*Current 3-year rolling average collective exposure

Site specific ALARA procedures

Three work activities of highest exposure significance completed during the last outage*Intended versus actual work activity doses and the reasons for anyinconsistencies *Integration of ALARA requirements into work procedure and radiation workpermit (or radiation exposure permit) documents

-14-*Dose rate reduction activities in work planning*Source-term control strategy or justifications for not pursuing such exposurereduction initiatives*Radiation worker and radiation protection technician performance during workactivities in radiation areas and high radiation areas*Self-assessments, audits, and special reports related to the ALARA programsince the last inspection*Corrective action documents related to the ALARA program and follow-upactivities such as initial problem identification, characterization, and tracking During this inspection, the inspector completed 6 of the required 15 samples and 4 ofthe optional samples. For this biennial inspection period, all 15 required samples and 7 optional samples were completed.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.2OS3Radiation Monitoring Instrumentation and Protective Equipment (71121.03)

a. Inspection Scope

This area was inspected to determine the accuracy and operability of radiationmonitoring instruments that are used for the protection of occupational workers. The inspector used the requirements in 10 CFR Part 20 and the licensee's procedures required by technical specifications as criteria for determining compliance. The inspector interviewed licensee personnel and reviewed:*Calibration of whole body counting equipment and radiation detectioninstruments utilized for personnel and material release from the radiologicallycontrolled area

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.2PS2Radioactive Material Processing and Transportation (71122.02)

a. Inspection Scope

This area was inspected to verify that the licensee's radioactive material processing andtransportation program complies with the requirements of 10 CFR Parts 20, 61, and 71 and Department of Transportation regulations contained in 49 CFR Parts 171-180. The inspector interviewed licensee personnel and reviewed:

-15-*Shipment packages, surveys, labels, markings, placards, vehicle c hecks, driverinstructions, and disposal manifests

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.4.OTHER ACTIVITIES (OA)

4OA1 Performance Indicator Verification

Main article: IP 71151

a. Inspection Scope

The inspector sampled licensee submittals for the performance indicators listed belowfor the period October 2004 through September 2005. The definitions and guidance of NEI 99-02, "Regulatory Assessment Indicator Guideline," Revisions 2 and 3, were used to verify the licensee's basis for reporting each data element in order to verify the accuracy of performance indicator data reported during the assessment period.

Licensee performance indicator data were also reviewed against the requirements of Procedures EN-LI-114, "Performance Indicator Process," Revision 0, and EN-EP-201, "Emergency Planning Performance Indicators," Revision 2.Emergency Preparedness Cornerstone

Drill and Exercise Performance *Emergency Response Organization Participation

Alert and Notification System ReliabilityThe inspector reviewed a 100 percent sample of dr ill and exercise scenarios andlicensed operator simulator training sessions, notification forms, and attendance and critique records associated with training sessions, drills, and exercises conducted duringthe verification period. The inspector reviewed 35 selected emergency responder qualification, training, and drill participation records. The inspector reviewed alert andnotification system testing procedures, maintenance records, and a 100 percent sampleof siren test records. The inspector also interviewed licensee personnel responsible for collecting and evaluating performance indicator data. The inspector completed 3 samples during this inspection.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

-16-4OA2Identification and Resolution of Problems (71152)

.1 Semiannual Trend Review

a. Inspection Scope

As required by Inspection Procedure 71152, Identification and Resolution of Problems, the inspectors performed a review of the licensee's corrective action program and associated documents to identify trends that could indicate the existence of a moresignificant safety issue. The inspectors' review focused on repetitive equipment issues, but also considered the results of screening the corrective action program, self-assessment reports, control room logs, quality assurance audits, maintenance rule assessments, and department self-assessments to determine if additional adverse trends existed. The inspectors compared and contrasted their results with the results contained in Entergy's latest quarterly trend reports. For those areas where trends were documented in the corrective action program, the inspectors verified that Entergy had corrective actions planned or in place to address the trend. The inspectors also evaluated the corrective actions against Entergy's procedural requirements of Procedure LI-102, "Corrective Action Program." The inspectors' review nominally considered the 6-month period of July through December 2005.

b. Findings and Observations

No findings of significance were identified. The inspectors concluded that, in general,Entergy had adequately identified trends in areas within the scope of this inspection.

.2 Section 2OS2 evaluated the effectiveness of the licensee's problem identification andresolution processes regarding exposure tracking, higher than planned exposure levels,

and radiation worker practices. The inspector reviewed the corrective action documents listed in the attachment against the licensee's problem identification and resolution program requirements.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.4OA3Event Follow-up(Closed) LER 05000382/2005-004-00. Loss of Offsite Power (LOOP) DuringHurricane KatrinaOn August 29, 2005, a LOOP occurred with the plant in Mode 4. At the time of theLOOP, the plant was experiencing tropical storm winds of approximately 48 miles per hour. All loads supplied by the non-safety 6.9 kV busses were lost including the reactor coolant pumps. The two emergency diesel generators started in response to the LOOP conditions and safe shutdown loads were sequenced onto the two safety busses.

Offsite power was available on August 31, 2005. After evaluating grid stability offsitepower for Train A was declared operable on September 1, 2005, and offsite power for Train B was declared operable on September 2, 2005. The loss of offsite power

-17-occurred due to transmission system damage caused by Hurricane Katrina. The LERwas reviewed by the inspectors and no findings of significance were identified and no violation of NRC requirements occurred. The licensee documented this event in CR-WF3-2005-3872. This LER is closed.4OA5Other Activities

.1 Power Uprate (Inspection Procedure 71004)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed a sample of extended power uprate modifications to verify thatthe modifications were prepared in accordance with the licensing basis and the UFSAR.

Some of the activities that the inspectors reviewed were documented in previous inspection reports including postmaintenance testing of the low steam generator pressure trip bistables and annunciator setpoint modification, a permanent plant modification to revise atmospheric dump valve control loop, a review of emergency diesel Generator A and B jacket water and lube oil heat exchangers performance testing. Additional work not previously documented include a review of power ascension testing to ensure that plant response was as expected, closure tests of the main feedwater isolation valves, a review to verify that the licensee has established a program to adequately monitor and assess flow accelerated corrosion, and a review of the emergency feedwater actuation system control and protective circuitry.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

.2 (Closed) Unresolved Item (URI) 050000382/2004004-05 Review Revised Procedure andRe-perform Control Room Evacuation WalkthroughDuring the August 2003 triennial fire protection inspection, the team openedURI 050000382/2003011-02 concerning the adequacy of control room evacuation

Procedure OP-901-502. The inspectors were concerned that the licensee could not meet the critical times in the procedure because it required the operators to diagnose spurious operations instead of attempting to prevent and then mitigate spurious operations. Entergy enhanced the procedure to address these concerns. NRC Inspection Report 2004-004 closed the original URI and opened a new item, URI 050000382/2004004-05 to document that it was impractical to follow up the original concern due to the procedure revision, and to document a plan to inspect the new revision.On December 12 and 13, 2005, NRC inspectors observed timed walkthroughs ofRevision 9 of the procedure. These walkthroughs confirmed completion of the procedure revision and verified that the licensee could meet the critical times determinedby the Safe Shutdown

Analysis.

This URI is closed.

-18-4OA6Meetings, Including Exit

Exit Meeting Summary

.1 On December 16, 2005, the inspector presented the inspection results toMr. J. Venable, Vice President, Operations, and other members of the staff, who

acknowledged the findings. The inspector confirmed that proprietary information was not provided or examined during the inspection.

.2 On August 18, 2005, the inspectors briefed Mr. R. Fletcher, Manager, Training andDevelopment, and other members of the licensee's management of the results of the

inspection. The licensee acknowledged the findings presented. After final review of the overall biennial requalification written exams the inspectors conducted a teleconference exit with the licensee on December 6, 2005.The inspectors asked the licensee whether any materials examined during theinspection should be considered proprietary. No proprietary information was identified.

.3 On December 16, 2005, the inspectors briefed Mr. J. Venable and other members of thelicensee's management at the conclusion of the inspection.

The licensee acknowledgedthe findings presented.The inspectors returned all proprietary information to the licensee before the end of theinspection.

.4 On December 20, 2005, the inspector presented the inspection results toMr. J. Venable, Vice President, Operations, and other members of his staff who

acknowledged the findings. The inspector confirmed that proprietary information was not provided or examined during the inspection.

.5 On January 10, 2005, the resident inspectors presented the inspection results toMr. K. Walsh, General Plant Manager, and other members of licensee management at

the conclusion of the inspection. The licensee acknowledged the findings presented. The inspectors asked the licensee whether any materials examined during theinspection should be considered proprietary. No proprietary information was identified. ATTACHMENT:

SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION

KEY POINTS OF CONTACT

Licensee Personnel

S. Anders, Superintendent, Plant Security

K. Boudreaux, Maintenance Rule Team Member

E. Brauner, Engineering Lead, Maintenance Rule

J. Brawley, ALARA Coordinator, Radiation Protection

B. Collyer, Senior Lead Engineer, Fire Protection

L. Dauzat, Supervisor, Radiation Protection Operations

C. Fugate, Assistant Manager, Operations (Shift)

T. Gaudet, Manager, Quality Assurance

J. Hall, Supervisor, Operations Training

A. Harris, Acting Director, Nuclear Safety Assurance

R. Jones, Supervisor, Simulator Support

T. Jones, Lead Licensed Operator, Requalification Backup

S. Landry, Specialist, Radwaste, Radiation Protection

J. Laque, Acting Director, Engineering

J. Lewis, Manager, Emergency Preparedness

B. Morrison, Coordinator, Maintenance Rule

R. Murillo, Acting Manager, Licensing

D. Newman, Supervisor, Radiation Protection

R Peters, Director, Planning and Scheduling

C. Pickering, Code Programs Engineer

B. Pilutti, Manager, Radiation Protection

O. Pipkins, Senior Licensing Engineer

G. Scott, Licensing Engineer

J. Venable, Vice President, Operations

K. Walsh, General Manager, Plant Operations

P. Wood, Reactor Operator

AttachmentA-2

ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED

Opened

05000382/2005005-01NCVInadequate Reactor Coolant System Leakage DetectionSystemClosed05000382/2005004-00LERLoss of Offsite Power During Hurricane Katrina05000382/2004004-05URIReview Revised Procedure and Re-perform Control RoomEvacuation Walkthrough05000382/2005005-01NCVInadequate Reactor Coolant System Leakage DetectionSystem

AttachmentA-3

LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED

Section 1R04Procedures:NUMBERTITLEREVISIONOP-009-008Safety Injection System18OP-903-030Safety Injection Pump Verification14Miscellaneous DocumentsNUMBERTITLE/SUBJECTREVISIONW3-DBD-001Safety Injection System3Section 1R05ProcedureNUMBERTITLEREVISIONAdministrative ProcedureUNT-005-013Fire Protection Program9Operating Procedure 009-004Fire Protection11-8Maintenance Procedure

MM-007-010Fire Extinguisher Inspectionand Extinguisher Replacement

13AdministrativeProcedure

UNT-005-013Fire Protection Program9Fire Protection Procedure

FP-001-015Fire Protection SystemImpairments

17Training Manual ProcedureNTP-202Fire Protection Training11-4

AttachmentA-4Section 1R11ProceduresEN-TQ-202 Rev. 0 "Simulator Configuration Control"EN-TQ-202 Rev 0. Attachment 7 "Scenario Based Testing Checklist"

TDG-SIM-016 Rev. 7 "Configuration Management Training Desk Guide"

WSIM-DIR-002-CORERELOAD Rev. 0.0 "Simulator Core Reload Acceptance Test"

WSIM-DIR-003-ANNUALTESTS Rev. 1.0 "Simulator Annual Performance Tests"Training Desk Guide

DG-TRNW-0044 Rev. 15 Attachment 6.2 "Licensed Operator RequalSample Plan and Two Year Guide"Lesson PlansConfiguration Risk Management Program - Waterford 3

WLP-OPS-INC01 Rev.

5 "Review of Recent Industry Events"

WLP-OPS-EPC00 Rev. 7 "Electric Plant Components"

WPPT-OPS-EP02 Rev. 2 "Emergency Plan Training For Control Room Personnel andOperations Coordinators"WLP-OPS-LTV00 Rev. 8 "Limitorque Valve Actuators" [Lesson plan for subject of valveactuator problems.]Job Performance Measures (JPMs)RO-EDG-NORM-3, Synchronize and Load the EDG [Emergency Diesel Generator], Rev.6

RO-CVC-NORM-51, Shift Charging Pumps, Rev. 8

RO-CCS-SURV-1, Perform Containment Cooling Fans Operability Verification, Rev. 4

NAO-EFW-EMERG-7, Transfer Emergency Feedwater Pump Suction to Auxiliary Com ponentCooling Wet Towers, Rev. 7NAO-DC-NORM-7, Returning Battery Charger to Service, Rev. 10

SRO-EP-EMERG-1, Classify an E-Plan Event, Rev. 10

W3-RO-EFW-NORM-6, Return EFW System To Normal After An EFAS Initiation, Rev. 6

SRO-EP-EMERG-8, Perform Protective Action Guidelines as Emergency Coordinator, Rev. 6

AttachmentA-5W3-RO-CVC-NORM-6, Makeup to VCT in Dilute Mode, Rev. 4W3-NAO-ED-NORM-3, Startup SUPS 3MA-S, 3MB-S, 3MC-S, or 3MD-s, Rev. 5

NAO-SDC-NORM-5, Place Shutdown Cooling Purification in Service (Alternate Path), Rev. 5

SRO-EP-EMERG-7, Authorize Emergency Exposure as Emergency Coordinator (AlternatePath), Rev. 2RO-CVC-NORM-49, Makeup to VCT Using Acid Water Batches, Rev. 4

RO-CPC-NORM-11, Change CPC Addressable Constants, Rev. 4

NAO-CED-NORM-2, Placing a CEA Subgroup on the Hold Bus, Rev. 10

NAO-EDG-OFFNORM-1, Perform an Emergency Shutdown of the Emergency Diesel, Rev. 10

RO-ED-NORM-19, Transfer Safety Busses 3AB and 31AB From A(B) to TrainB(A), Rev. 10

ScenariosSimulator Scenario E-54, Rev. 2Simulator Scenario E-94, Rev. 2

Simulator Scenario E-52, Rev. 1

Simulator Scenario E-83, Rev. 1

Simulator Scenario E-80, Rev. 1

Simulator Scenario E-81, Rev. 1

Simulator Scenario E-104, Rev. 1

Written ExaminationsWWEX-LOR-5041R, 2005 RO Bienneal Exam Simulator Discrepancy ReportsHardware Affecting Training (Closed as of 8/15/2004 for t he cycl e)Software Affecting Training (Closed as of 8/15/2004 for t he cycl e)Design Changes (Closed 8/15/2004)

Current Open Deficiencies Reports (as of 8/16/05)

AttachmentA-6MiscellaneousLicensed Operator Annual/Biennial Examination Development ModelQuarterly Proficiency records for 4/21 to 6/30/05

Quarterly Proficiency records for current quarter 7/1 to 8/1405

Operations Department Qualification Status [as of 8/11/05]2 Remedial JPM Exams for individuals Remedial Simulator Scenario Exams for crews

WSXM-LOR-05042 (no revision) Dynamic Simulator Grading Summary [Crews 5 and E]Section 1R12Procedures:NUMBERTITLEREVISIONDC-121Maintenance Rule1Condition ReportsCR-WF3-2005-4134CR-WF3-2005-2959

CR-WF3-2001-0777

CR-WF3-2005-2920CR-WF3-2005-1833CR-WF3-2005-2959

CR-WF3-2003-1720CR-WF3-2004-2028CR-WF3-2005-3737

CR-WF3-2005-3980Miscellaneous DocumentsNUMBERTITLE/SUBJECTREVISIONRegulatory Guide

1.160Monitoring the Effectiveness of Maintenance at NuclearPower PlantsER-W3-2004-0250Charging Pump AB Internal Check Valves0

W-SE-2005-001Maintenance Rule Periodic (a)(3) Assessment for Cycle

0ER-W3-2004-396Evaluate 18 Inch Alarm Setpoint on the PMC for theAlternate Containment Sump Flow Indication

003

AttachmentA-7Condition ReportsLO-WLO-2005-00026LO-WLO-2004-00154

LO-OPX-2005-00138

LO-OPX-2005-00175

LO-OPX-2005-00310

2003-03883

2004-02579

2004-03465

2004-03569

2004-03660

2004-03685

2004-03817

2004-04125

2004-04150

2004-04156

2005-02853

2005-03220

2005-03445

2005-04940

2005-04947

2005-04950Work Orders

48716 55146MiscellaneousIN 2005-25, "Inadvertent Reactor Trip and Partial Safety Injection Actuation Due to TinWhisker"INPO Topical Report

TR5-47, "Review of Circuit Card/Board Related Failure That Contributedto Automatic and Manual Scrams (Addendum to

TR5-43)", May 2005Waterford 3 Maintenance Rule Periodic (a)(3) Assessment, Cycle 12, April 2002 toNovember 2003Waterford 3 Maintenance Rule Periodic (a)(3) Assessment, Cycle 13 (partial), December 1,2003 to April 13, 2005ER-W3-2001-0145-000, "Core Protection Calculator Replacement Project" AttachmentA-8Section 1R14OP 901-220, Loss of Condenser Vacuum, Revision 2OP 901-230, Condenser Tube Leakage, Revision 2

OP 901-231, Abnormal Condensate or Feedwater Chemistry, Revision 2

OP 902-000, Standard Post Trip Actions, Revision 10

OP 902-006, Loss of Main Feedwater Recovery, Revision 10Section 1R15Procedures:NUMBERTITLEREVISIONME-004-021Emergency Diesel Generator 11

OP-009-002Emergency Diesel Generator19Condition ReportsCR-WF3-2005-4943CR-WF3-2005-4976CR-WF3-1999-0045Miscellaneous DocumentsNUMBERTITLE/SUBJECTREVISIONER-W3-1997-0107Safety Function of SLO and UVO Relays0

CEP-IST-1IST Bases Document3

NRC InspectionManual Part 9900Maintenance - Preconditioning of Structures, Systems,and Components Before Determining OperabilityME-003-302Emergency Diesel Generator Undervoltage Override andSequencer Lockout Logic Circuit Testing

1Work Orders

259, 64591,

51014226

AttachmentA-9Section 1R19Procedures:NUMBERTITLEREVISIONW3-DBD-007Chemical and Volume Control System2CEP-IST-1IST Bases Document3Condition ReportsCR-WF3-2005-4458CR-WF3-2003-3769CR-WF3-2004-0176CR-WF3-2005-4923CR-WF3-2005-3430CR-WF3-2005-4293Miscellaneous DocumentsNUMBERTITLE/SUBJECTREVISIONWork Orders

74159, 75303,

51013087, 55925, 75138Section 1R22ProcedureNUMBERTITLEREVISIONSOP-003-024Sump Pump Operation9

MI-003-409Containment Air Cooler Condensate FlowSwitches Channel Functional Test

CCSIFS5160 Ai, B, C1, C2 and D

6CEP-IST-1IST Bases Document3Condition ReportsCR-WF3-2005-4267CR-WF3-2005-4237

CR-WF3-2005- 3745

CR-WF3-2004-0252

CR-WF3-2005-2907CR-WF3-2005-4006CR-WF3-2005-4267

CR-WF3-2005-4124

CR-WF3-2005-3772

CR-WF3-2005-3980CR-WF3-2004-0249CR-WF3-2005-4267

CR-WF3-2005-2412

CR-WF3-2004-2028

AttachmentA-10Miscellaneous DocumentsNUMBERTITLE/SUBJECTREVISIONW3-DBD-010Containment Cooling HVAC and Related Systems2

W3F1-2004-0028License Amendment Request

NPF-28-254 ReactorCoolant System Leakage Detection

0RegulatoryGuide 1.45Reactor Coolant Pressure Boundary Leakage DetectionSystemsLER 2005-002-000Failure of One System of RCS Leakage DetectionInstrumentation Due to Latent Human Error

000ER-W3-2004-396Reactor Coolant System Leakage Detection Systems0EC-I95-010Containment Leakage Detection Measurement SystemInstrumentation Loop Uncertainty Calculation

0InformationNotice 96-01Testing of Safety Related Logic CircuitsWork Order

50987211,

51005281, 66472Section 1R23Procedures:NUMBERTITLEREVISIONUNT-005-004Temporary Alteration Control16Condition ReportsCR-WF3-2005-4360Miscellaneous DocumentsNUMBERTITLE/SUBJECTREVISIONER-W3-2005-0334Reactor Vessel Head Seal Leakage001

Miscellaneous

DocumentsNUMBERTITLE/SUBJECTREVISIONAttachmentA-11Section 2OS2Corrective Action DocumentsCR-WF3-2005-01633,

CR-WF3-2005-01671,

CR-WF3-2005-01679,

CR-WF3-2005-01692,CR-WF3-2005-01701,

CR-WF3-2005-01706,

CR-WF3-2005-01713, CR-WF3-2005-01729,

CR-WF3-2005-01992,

CR-WF3-2005-02011,

CR-WF3-2005-02058, CR-WF3-2005-02384,

CR-WF3-2005-02408,

CR-WF3-2005-02590,

CR-WF3-2005-03052,

CR-WF3-2005-04647Audits and Self-AssessmentsLO-WLO-2005-0005-01, ALARA Planning and Controls, June 27-30, 2005

Quality Assurance Oversight Observations of Radiation Protection, O2C-WF3-2005-0106 dated

April 20, 2005 through O2C-WF3-2005-0373 dated September 6, 2005Radiation Work Permit Packages2005-511Perform Eddy Current Work/Tube Plugging Inside of Steam Generators PrimarySide and Equipment Staging and Destaging2005-600HP Surveys and Roving Job Coverage in the RCB and FHB and theInstallation/Removal of RADS in Containment2005-602Alloy 600 Pressurizer Repair Project ProceduresEN-QV-109, Audit Process, Revision 5HP-001-107, High Radiation Area Access Control, Revision 18

HP-001-114, Installation of Temporary Shielding, Revision 9

PL-182, Radiation Protection Expectations and Standards, Revision 1

RP-105, Radiation Work Permits, Revision 7

RP-108, Radiation Protection Posting, Revision 2

RP-110, ALARA Program, Revision 2MiscellaneousWaterford Nuclear Power Station Five Year ALARA Plan 2006-2010ALARA Committee Meeting Minutes April 2005 through November 2005

AttachmentA-12Section 2OS3ProceduresRP-306, Operation and Calibration of the Eberline

PM-7, Revision 3Calibration PackagesMonitor Number

HP-DS-052, December 15, 2005Section 2PS2Radiation Work Permit2005-77 Remove F

ill Head From LWM HIC, Install Lid on HIC, Move LWM HIC intoShipping Cask and Close Cask, Survey the HIC for Characterization and Survey Cask for ShippingShipment Package05-1012Radioactive Material, Low Specific Activity (LSA-II), 7, UN3321, Fissile ExceptedSection 4OA1EP-001-001, "Recognition and Classification of Emergency Conditions," Revision 20-2EP-002-010, "Notifications and Communications," Revision 2

EP-002-052, "Protective Action Guidelines," Revision 9

EP-422, "Siren and Helicopter Warning System Maintenance," Revision 3"

EP-424, 'Siren Testing and Sire System Administrative Controls," Revision 8

Desk Guide 16, "Siren System Administrative Data," Revision 10Section 40A2Miscellaneous DocumentsNUMBERTITLE/SUBJECTREVISIONFourth Quarter2004 through Third Quarter 2005Waterford 3 Quarterly Trend Reports0

AttachmentA-13Condition ReportsCR-WF3-2005-3772CR-WF3-2005-3980

CR-WF3-2004-0249

CR-WF3-2005-4267

CR-WF3-2005-2412

CR-WF3-2004-2028Section 4OA5Procedures:NUMBERTITLEREVISIONENS-DC-315Flow Accelerated Corrosion Program1

NOECP-254Control of Flow Accelerated Corrosion9

OP-901-502Evacuation of Control Room and SubsequentPlant Shutdown8OP-901-502Evacuation of Control Room and SubsequentPlant Shutdown

9Condition ReportsLO-WLO-2002-0187CR-WF3-2000-1442

CR-WF3-2005-4958Miscellaneous DocumentsNUMBERTITLE/SUBJECTGIN 2004-0303,Attachment 1RF14 Flow Accelerated Corrosion (FAC) ProgramInspection Scope - Current

MS-41 App. G Items

@@ Line 2: / Line 2: @@
 | number = ML060320708
 | issue date = 01/31/2006
-| title = Waterford Steam Electric Station, Unit 3 - Nrc Integrated Inspection Report 05000382-05-005
+| title = Nrc Integrated Inspection Report 05000382-05-005
 | author name = Graves D N
 | author affiliation = NRC/RGN-IV/DRP/RPB-E

v t e Inspection Report - Waterford - 2005005
80 \| 81 \| 82 \| 83 \| 84 \| 85 \| 86 \| 87 \| 88 \| 89 \| 90 \| 91 \| 92 \| 93 \| 94 \| 95 \| 96 \| 97 \| 98 \| 99 00 \| 01 \| 02 \| 03 \| 04 \| 05 \| 06 \| 07 \| 08 \| 09 \| 10 \| 11 \| 12 \| 13 \| 14 \| 15 \| 16 \| 17 \| 18 \| 19 \| 20 \| 21 \| 22 \| 23 \| 24 \|
2005 Quarterly Integrated 1Q (0) 2Q (0) 3Q (1) 4Q (0) Assessments Mid Cycle End of Cycle 8(0) 9(0) 10(0) 31(0) Security Operator Exams Emergency Planning Other

IR 05000382/2005005: Difference between revisions

Revision as of 23:58, 10 February 2019

Text

Dear Mr. Venable:

Enclosure:

w/Attachment:

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

NRC-Identified and Self-Revealing Findings

Cornerstone: Initiating Events

B.Licensee-Identified Violations

REPORT DETAILS

.1 Partial System Walkdowns

a. Inspection Scope

b. Findings

a. Inspection Scope

b. Findings

1R06 Flood Protection Measures (71111.06)

.1 Internal Flooding

a. Inspection Scope

b. Findings

1R11 Licensed Operator Requalification Program(71111.11)

.1 Licensed Operator Simulator Training

a. Inspection Scope

b. Findings

.2 Biennial Inspection

a. Inspection Scope

b. Findings

1R12 Maintenance Effectiveness (71111.12)

.1 Routine Reviews

a. Inspection Scope

b. Findings

.2 Biennial Maintenance Rule Implementation

a. Inspection Scope

b. Findings

.3 Identification and Resolution of Problems

a. Inspection Scope

b. Findings

1R13 Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control (71111.13)

a. Inspection Scope

b. Findings

1R14 Operator Performance During Non-Routine Evolutions and Events (71111.14)

a. Inspection Scope

b. Findings

1R15 Operability Evaluations

a. Inspection Scope

b. Findings

1R19 Postmaintenance Testing (71111.19)

a. Inspection Scope

b. Findings

1R22 Surveillance Testing (71111.22)

a. Inspection Scope

b. Findings

Introduction.

1R23 Temporary Plant Modifications

a. Inspection Scope

b. Findings

a. Inspection Scope

b. Findings

a. Inspection Scope

b. Findings

a. Inspection Scope

b. Findings

a. Inspection Scope

b. Findings

4OA1 Performance Indicator Verification

a. Inspection Scope

b. Findings

.1 Semiannual Trend Review

a. Inspection Scope

b. Findings and Observations

.2 Section 2OS2 evaluated the effectiveness of the licensee's problem identification andresolution processes regarding exposure tracking, higher than planned exposure levels,

b. Findings

.1 Power Uprate (Inspection Procedure 71004)

a. Inspection Scope

b. Findings

.2 (Closed) Unresolved Item (URI) 050000382/2004004-05 Review Revised Procedure andRe-perform Control Room Evacuation WalkthroughDuring the August 2003 triennial fire protection inspection, the team openedURI 050000382/2003011-02 concerning the adequacy of control room evacuation

Analysis.

Exit Meeting Summary

.1 On December 16, 2005, the inspector presented the inspection results toMr. J. Venable, Vice President, Operations, and other members of the staff, who

.2 On August 18, 2005, the inspectors briefed Mr. R. Fletcher, Manager, Training andDevelopment, and other members of the licensee's management of the results of the