IR 05000382/2023010

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Comprehensive Engineering Team Inspection Report 05000382/2023010
ML24029A254
Person / Time
Site: Waterford Entergy icon.png
Issue date: 01/31/2024
From: Vincent Gaddy
NRC/RGN-IV/DORS/EB1
To: Sullivan J
Entergy Operations
Cullum C
References
IR 2023010
Download: ML24029A254 (20)
v • d • e


Text

January 31, 2024

SUBJECT:

WATERFORD STEAM ELECTRIC STATION - COMPREHENSIVE ENGINEERING TEAM INSPECTION REPORT 05000382/2023010

Dear Joseph Sullivan:

On January 22, 2024, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at Waterford Steam Electric Station and discussed the results of this inspection with you and other members of your staff. The results of this inspection are documented in the enclosed report.

One finding of very low safety significance (Green) is documented in this report. This finding involved a violation of NRC requirements and was determined to be Severity Level IV. We are treating this violation as a non-cited violation (NCV) consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.

If you contest the violation or the significance or severity of the violation documented in this inspection report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your denial, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN:

Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region IV; the Director, Office of Enforcement; and the NRC Resident Inspector at Waterford Steam Electric Station.

This letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be made available for public inspection and copying at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html and at the NRC Public Document Room in accordance with Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 2.390, Public Inspections, Exemptions, Requests for Withholding.

Sincerely, Signed by Gaddy, Vincent on 01/31/24 Vincent G. Gaddy, Chief Engineering Branch 1 Division of Operating Reactor Safety Docket No. 05000382 License No. NPF-38

Enclosure:

As stated

Inspection Report

Docket No. 05000382 License No. NPF-38 Report No. 05000382/2023010 Enterprise Identifier: I-2023-010-0020 Licensee: Entergy Operations, Inc.

Facility: Waterford Steam Electric Station Location: Killona, LA Inspection Dates: November 27, 2023 to December 15, 2023 Inspectors: J. Braisted, Senior Reactor Inspector D. Bryen, Reactor Inspector W. Cullum, Senior Reactor Inspector C. Franklin, Reactor Inspector N. Mentzer, Reactor Inspector E. Rosario, Reactor Inspector F. Thomas, Reactor Inspector C. Young, Senior Reactor Analyst Approved By: Vincent G. Gaddy, Chief Engineering Branch 1 Division of Operating Reactor Safety Enclosure

SUMMARY

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) continued monitoring the licensees performance by conducting a Comprehensive Engineering Team Inspection at Waterford Steam Electric Station, in accordance with the Reactor Oversight Process. The Reactor Oversight Process is the NRCs program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors. Refer to https://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/oversight.html for more information.

List of Findings and Violations

Failure to Verify the Adequacy of Design of the Alternate Source Term Dose Consequence Analysis and Provide Complete and Accurate Information to the Commission Cornerstone Significance/Severity Cross-Cutting Report Aspect Section Barrier Integrity Green None (NPP) 71111.21M Severity Level IV NCV 05000382/2023010-01 Open/Closed The inspectors identified a Green finding and associated Severity Level IV Non-cited Violation (NCV) of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR) Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, Design Control, and 10 CFR 50.9, Completeness and Accuracy of Information, when the licensee failed to verify the adequacy of design of the loss of coolant accident alternative source term radiological dose consequence analysis and provide related information to the Commission that was complete and accurate in all material respects.

Additional Tracking Items

None.

INSPECTION SCOPES

Inspections were conducted using the appropriate portions of the inspection procedures (IPs) in effect at the beginning of the inspection unless otherwise noted. Currently approved IPs with their attached revision histories are located on the public website at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/insp-manual/inspection-procedure/index.html. Samples were declared complete when the IP requirements most appropriate to the inspection activity were met consistent with Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 2515, Light-Water Reactor Inspection Program - Operations Phase. The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel to assess licensee performance and compliance with Commission rules and regulations, license conditions, site procedures, and standards.

REACTOR SAFETY

===71111.21M - Comprehensive Engineering Team Inspection The inspectors evaluated the following components and listed applicable attributes, permanent modifications, and operating experience:

Structures, Systems, and Components (SSCs) (IP section 03.01) ===

Main article: IP 71111.21
(1) Safety Injection (SI) Sump Outlet Header A Isolation Valve SI-602A
  • Motor-operated valve (MOV) program documents, in-service testing (IST)plan, and SI system design basis document
  • Design bases review calculation for SI-602A, including evaluations of torque switch settings and weakest link
  • SI system piping and instrumentation diagram and the MOV electrical schematic diagram
  • Valve and actuator vendor manuals for installation, operation, and maintenance
  • Inservice testing records including procedures and results for position indication, leakage, opening, and closing
  • Diagnostic testing records including procedures and results
  • Maintenance work order history records and visual inspections
  • Visual inspection of the as-built configuration and material condition
(2) Refueling Water Storage Pool
  • Safety injection (SI) system design basis document
  • Calculations for refueling water storage pool (RWSP) volume design requirements and required submergence to prevent vortexing
  • Records of chemistry samples for temperature, boron concentration, and pH
  • SI system piping and instrumentation diagram
  • Maintenance work order history records of visual inspections
  • Visual inspection of the as-built configuration and material condition
(3) Component Cooling Water (CCW) Header A to B Supply Isolation Valve CC-200B
  • Air-operated valve (AOV) program documents, in-service testing (IST) plan, and CCW system design basis document
  • Design bases review calculation for CC-200B
  • CCW system piping and instrumentation diagram and the AOV electrical schematic diagram
  • Valve and actuator vendor manuals for installation, operation, and maintenance
  • Inservice testing records including procedures and results for position indication, opening, and closing
  • Diagnostic testing records including procedures and results
  • Maintenance work order history records and visual inspections
  • Visual inspection of the as-built configuration and material condition
(4) Component Cooling Water Surge Tank
  • Component Cooling Water (CCW) system design basis document
  • Calculations for CCW surge tank volume design requirements and required submergence to prevent vortexing
  • CCW Surge tank level & Makeup circuit design
  • Records of internal coating inspection, and CCW Chemistry controls including biocide,
  • CCW system piping and instrumentation diagram
  • Maintenance work order history records of visual inspections
  • Visual inspection of the as-built configuration and material condition
(5) Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) A Room Exhaust Fan
  • EDG room ventilation system design basis document
  • Calculations for EDG heat load and required ventilation air flow
  • Records of EDG ventilation seismic qualification and system testing
  • EDG room ventilation system diagram
  • Maintenance work order history records and visual inspections
  • Visual inspection of the as-built configuration and material condition
(6) 4kV-ESWGR-3B, 4.16kV Switchgear 3B3-S
  • Design calculations
  • Design drawings
  • Diagnostic testing records including procedures and results
  • Maintenance work order history records
  • Visual inspection of the as-built configuration and material condition
(7) High Pressure Safety Injection Header Cold Leg Flow Control Isolation Valve SI-226A
  • Motor-operated valve (MOV) program documents, in-service testing (IST)plan, and SI system design basis document
  • Design bases review calculation for SI-226A, including evaluations of torque switch settings and weakest link
  • SI system piping and instrumentation diagram
  • Valve and actuator vendor manuals for installation, operation, and maintenance
  • Inservice testing records including procedures and results for position indication, opening, and closing
  • Diagnostic testing records including procedures and results
  • Maintenance work order history records and visual inspections
  • Visual inspection of the as-built configuration and material condition
(8) Emergency Feedwater (EFW) Motor Driven Pump A
  • EFW System design basis document
  • Calculations for pump head curve and NPSH
  • EFW system piping and instrumentation diagram
  • Pump vendor manuals for installation, operation, and maintenance
  • Inservice testing records including procedures and results
  • Maintenance work order history records and visual inspections
  • Visual inspection of the as-built configuration and material condition
(9) 480 V Switchgear Bus 3B31-S (SSD-ESWGR-31B)
  • Visual inspection of switchgear for as-built configuration and material condition
  • Environmental conditions for equipment
  • Voltage analysis and short circuit calculations
  • Protection settings and coordination study
  • Vendor manual for conformance with manufacturer instructions for installation and maintenance
  • Preventive maintenance and periodic verification testing
  • Component maintenance history
  • Schematic and wiring drawings
  • System health report
(10) DC switchgear 3B, DC Power Distribution Panel 3B-DC-S (DC-EPDP-B-DC):
  • System health report
  • Maintenance, inspection, and testing procedures
  • Component maintenance history
  • Schematic and wiring drawings
  • Vendor operating and maintenance requirements
  • Short circuit calculations, coordination studies, load flow calculations, and maintenance activities to ensure they were appropriate for the design of the Class 1E DC 3B-DC-S Power Distribution Panel
  • Corrective action documents

Modifications (IP section 03.02) (5 Samples)

(1) EC-77544, Broad Range Gas Monitor (BRGM) System Replacement
(2) EC-83354, Replace SI-512A with a Swing Check Valve
(3) EC-91881, Substitute CPC D RTD Input
(4) EC-83913, Main Steam Isolation Valve (MSIV) Solenoid Valve Upgrade
(5) EC-84942, AMTEK Solid State Controls Component Substitution Justification 10 CFR 50.59 Evaluations/Screening (IP section 03.03) (18 Samples)
(1) EC-75220, Evaluation of Impacted Safety Related Calculations
(2) EC-77544, Broad Range Gas Monitor System Replacement
(3) EC-88102, Update to Consider Normal Shutdown with LOOP as Bounding CCW Pump Runout Case
(4) EC-88373, Stroke Time Evaluation of Various SI, CVR, SBV Valves
(5) EC-90132, Clarification of Seismic Design Requirements for Piping and Valves Upstream of EBA Tank Isolation Valves (EBA-203, EBA-204, 4BA1/2-5)
(6) EC-90302, Issue SPEC-21-00004-W WF3 Essential Chiller Specification per EC-

===90302 for Essential Chillers RFRMCHL0001 A, B, C

(7) EC-91867, Minimum Required Wall Thickness for 132" CW Lines and Selected Tanks
(8) EC-92876, Evaluate Use of Alloy 690 Thermowells for Cold Leg RTDS
(9) EC-94658, FHD-232A Leak Repair Evaluation
(10) EC-93448 Screen, Revision of Calc and Spec of Battery A and AB
(11) EC-91881, Substitute CPC D RTD Input
(12) PAD-OP-902-005 Screen, Station Blackout Recovery Procedure Change
(13) PAD-OP-901-310 Screen, Loss of Train A Safety Bus Procedure Change
(14) EC-93747, Generate AOV Design Basis Calculation for PMU-144
(15) EC-95077, RCS FME - RCITE0112CD Thermowell and RTD
(16) EC-94858, ECE91-053 12IAV55C Acceptance Range Change
(17) EC-95070, Temporary Load Bank for Integrated Diesel Test A Train Turbine Control System
(18) EC-90044, Temp Indication Switch Standard EN-IC-S-025-W Operating Experience Samples (IP section 03.04) ===
Main article: IP 90302
(1) OE-NOE-2022-00067, INPO IER L3 22-3 Power Excursion and Delayed Scram During Zero-Power Physics Testing
(2) OE-NOE-2020-00166, IRIS 475373 Manual Scram due to Electro-Hydraulic Control System Levels
(3) OE-NOE-2022-00192, IRIS 535302 Loss of Power to Emergency Class Buses

INSPECTION RESULTS

Failure to Verify the Adequacy of Design of the Alternate Source Term Dose Consequence Analysis and Provide Complete and Accurate Information to the Commission Cornerstone Significance/Severity Cross-Cutting Report Aspect Section Barrier Green None (NPP) 71111.21M Integrity Severity Level IV NCV 05000382/2023010-01 Open/Closed The inspectors identified a Green finding and associated Severity Level IV Non-cited Violation (NCV) of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR) Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, Design Control, and 10 CFR 50.9, Completeness and Accuracy of Information, when the licensee failed to verify the adequacy of design of the loss of coolant accident alternative source term radiological dose consequence analysis and provide related information to the Commission that was complete and accurate in all material respects.

Description:

Waterford submitted license amendment request (LAR) 198 (ML042020294) to the NRC for full implementation of an alternative radiological source term (AST) for calculating offsite radiological doses and doses to control room personnel during design basis accidents (DBAs). The NRC approved the request on March 29, 2005, in a letter to Waterford (ML050890248) which also contained its safety evaluation of the change. NRC Regulatory Guide (RG) 1.183, Alternative Radiological Source Terms for Evaluating Design Basis Accidents at Nuclear Power Reactors, dated July 2000, provides guidance on methods acceptable to the NRC for implementing an AST, and Waterford described use of this guidance in their original LAR submittal in addition to other relevant correspondence submitted to the NRC (ML042470194, ML042890193, and ML043010129). As stated in RG 1.183, full implementation of the AST revises the plant licensing basis to specify the AST in place of the previous accident source term, and the DBA loss of coolant accident (LOCA)must be re-analyzed using the guidance in Appendix A. However, licensees may use methods other than those described in RGs (i.e., exceptions) for compliance with regulations if they provide an acceptable basis.

In the NRCs safety evaluation of the dose consequences of Waterfords DBA LOCA, the NRC stated, based upon information provided in correspondence, that Waterford performed an analysis of the radiological consequences of a (large break) LBLOCA for the (extended power uprate) EPU conditions using the guidance on source term and activity release in RG 1.183. Waterford evaluated three release pathways in the LBLOCA dose analysis: (1)leakage to the reactor auxiliary building serviced by the controlled ventilation area system (CVAS);

(2) leakage to the secondary containment that is serviced by the shield building ventilation system (SBVS); and
(3) leakage from the containment directly to the environment.

Additionally, emergency core cooling system (ECCS) components outside containment were assumed to leak 0.5 gallons per minute (gpm) of containment sump water into areas serviced by the CVAS, starting when the ECCS goes into recirculation mode. The CVAS and SBVS are safety-related systems that may be credited to limit the radiological dose consequences offsite and in the control room in accordance with RG 1.183.

Appendix A to RG 1.183 describes the assumptions that are acceptable to the NRC for evaluating the radiological consequences of a LOCA at a light water reactor. Section 5 of Appendix A provides the specific details for evaluating engineered safety feature (ESF)system leakage. These are systems that recirculate sump water outside of the primary containment, such as the ECCS at Waterford. The release source includes leakage through valve packing glands, pump shaft seals, flanged connections, and other similar components. The source may also include leakage through valves isolating interfacing systems. The guidance goes on to state that consideration should be given to leakage through valves isolating ESF recirculation systems from tanks vented to atmosphere, e.g.,

ECCS pump miniflow return to the refueling water storage tank. At Waterford, the equivalent tank is called the refueling water storage pool (RWSP). Finally, leakage should be taken as two times the sum of the simultaneous leakage from all components in the ESF recirculation systems.

The inspectors reviewed Procedure OP-903-110, Reactor Auxiliary Building (RAB) Systems Fluid Leak Test, which Waterford cited as the basis for the ESF system leakage criteria of 0.5 gpm. The purpose of OP-903-110 is to provide leak rate tests on those portions of ESF systems outside containment that could contain highly radioactive fluid during a serious transient or accident. The inspectors observed that the ECCS pumps take suction from the RWSP and return it to the RWSP through the miniflow return lines during the test. In other words, certain valves that would normally be closed and isolate the RWSP from the ECCS during the recirculation phase of a LOCA are open during the test, so the test does not verify that the system leakage criteria is met. Additionally, the inspectors observed that the RWSP is not vented to the CVAS but to the nonsafety-related RAB normal ventilation system whose design does not allow it to be credited to limit radiological dose consequences in accordance with RG 1.183. Finally, the inspectors reviewed Calculation EC-S92-001, Revision 1, which was Waterfords evaluation of NRC Information Notice 91-56, Potential Radioactive Leakage to Tank Vented to Atmosphere, but had since been retired. The inspectors observed that valves SI-106A(B), SI-107A(B), SI-120A(B), SI-121A(B), SI-412A(B), SI-417A(B), and CS-118A(B) were all listed as potential leak paths from the containment sump to the RWSP. Since RG 1.183 specifically stated to consider unfiltered leakage through isolation valves into tanks, such as the RWSP, and the Waterford analysis did not consider this source, nor state any exceptions, the inspectors concluded that the leakage through the valves was an unanalyzed and unfiltered release pathway and, consequently, Waterford had provided incomplete and inaccurate information to the NRC.

The inspectors also reviewed the NRCs safety evaluation of LAR 186 (ML030760620)regarding realignment of RWSP boundary isolation valves to the nonsafety-related RWSP purification system. This LAR authorized Waterford to implement a design change where two normally closed manual valves (FS-423 and FS-404) were altered to normally open. In the safety evaluation, the NRC concluded that Waterford would have adequate time to isolate the RWSP either from a pipe crack in the RSWP purification system concurrent with a LOCA or from draw-down by the RWSP purification system aligned to the spent fuel pool (SFP) during a LOCA before reaching the analytical limit of the RWSP. The inspectors also observed that the need to isolate the RWSP from the RWSP purification system is time-critical and the operation is performed locally. Though the RWSP purification system is not part of the ECCS, it is hydraulically connected to the RWSP at the onset of a LOCA, and the inspectors observed that the operator action to close the isolation valves may not occur until after Waterford transitioned to recirculation from the containment sump. Additionally, portions of the purification system are in areas not serviced by the CVAS, and Waterford does not implement a purification system leak test like OP-903-110. The inspectors also observed that EC-S92-001 identified that SI-347 is another normally open valve with potentially similar consequences. Since RG 1.183 specifically stated to consider leakage through valve packing, pump seals, flanged connections, and valves isolating other systems, such as the RWSP purification system, and the Waterford analysis did not consider this source, nor state any exceptions, the inspectors concluded that the leakage through the valves was another unanalyzed and unfiltered release pathway and, consequently, Waterford had provided incomplete and inaccurate information to the NRC.

Corrective Actions: The licensee performed an initial evaluation of the unanalyzed release pathways and determined the additional dose offsite and to the control room would remain below the acceptance criteria in 10 CFR 50.67, "Accident Source Term," for allowable dose. Additionally, the unanalyzed release pathways are serviced by the nonsafety-related RAB normal ventilation system which is filtered but not to the degree that RG 1.183 would allow crediting it for filtration.

Corrective Action References: CR-WF3-2023-18180

Performance Assessment:

Performance Deficiency: The inspectors determined that the failure to verify the adequacy of design of the LOCA AST offsite and control room radiological dose consequence analysis in accordance with 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, was a performance deficiency. This performance deficiency resulted in the licensee providing incomplete and inaccurate information to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.9.

Screening: The inspectors determined the performance deficiency was more than minor because it was associated with the Design Control attribute of the Barrier Integrity cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to provide reasonable assurance that physical design barriers protect the public from radionuclide releases caused by accidents or events. Specifically, the licensee failed to verify the adequacy of design of the radiological dose consequence analysis when it failed to account for leakage of contaminated water through isolation valves to the refueling water storage pool which vents to an area of the reactor auxiliary building that represents an unfiltered release pathway and additional dose offsite and to the control room.

Significance: The inspectors assessed the significance of the finding using IMC 0609 Appendix A, The Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings At-Power. The inspectors determined the finding was of very low safety significance (Green) because the finding only represented a degradation of the radiological barrier function provided for the control room, auxiliary building, or spent fuel pool.

Cross-Cutting Aspect: Not Present Performance. No cross-cutting aspect was assigned to this finding because the inspectors determined the finding did not reflect present licensee performance.

Enforcement:

The ROPs significance determination process does not specifically consider the regulatory process impact in its assessment of licensee performance. Therefore, it is necessary to address this violation which impedes the NRCs ability to regulate using traditional enforcement to adequately deter non-compliance.

Severity: This violation was less serious than the Severity Level III violation example described by Section 6.9.c.1 of the NRC Enforcement Policy, which stated that Inaccurate or incomplete information is provided or maintained. If this information had been completely and accurately provided or maintained, it would likely have caused the NRC to reconsider a regulatory position or undertake a substantial further inquiry. Specifically, the inspectors determined, based upon a review of multiple, approved AST LAR submittals for other licensees, which did include leakage through RSWP isolation valves in their LOCA analyses, that the NRC would not likely have caused the NRC to reconsider a regulatory position or undertake a substantial further inquiry had the information been complete and accurate. The Policy did not contain an applicable Severity Level IV violation example. However, the inspectors determined the violation met the Policy definition of Severity Level IV in that it created the potential of a more than minor safety consequence because it resulted in an increase in radiological dose offsite and to the control room.

Violation: Title 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, Design Control, states, in part, that measures shall be established for verifying or checking the adequacy of design, such as by the performance of design reviews, by the use of alternate or simplified calculational methods, or by the performance of a suitable testing program.

Contrary to the above, between July 15, 2004, and December 11, 2023, the licensee failed to verify or check the adequacy of design of its LOCA AST offsite and control room radiological dose analysis. Specifically, licensee did not include in its source term, two unfiltered release pathways through isolation valves to the RWSP and through the RWSP purification system when implementing the guidance described in RG 1.183.

10 CFR 50.9, Completeness and Accuracy of Information, states, in part, that information provided to the Commission by a licensee shall be complete and accurate in all material respects.

Contrary to the above, between July 15, 2004, and October 19, 2004, the licensee failed to provide information to the Commission that was complete and accurate in all material respects. Specifically, in the licensing correspondence listed below, the licensee documented that they had performed the radiological dose consequence analysis using the guidance of RG 1.183, they had taken some exceptions to RG 1.183, and that ECCS was assumed to leak 0.5 gpm outside containment but to areas of the RAB serviced by the CVAS. However, the dose consequence analysis did not conform to the guidance in RG 1.183 because it did not include release pathways (i.e., ECCS leakage through RSWP isolation valves and leakage through the RWSP purification system) that should have been analyzed. Though Waterford did take exceptions to RG 1.183, the exceptions were not related to leakage through isolation valves. Additionally, these release pathways involved releases to areas of the RAB not serviced by the CVAS and were, therefore, unfiltered. Because the licensee did not follow the guidance of RG 1.183 by failing include the unfiltered release pathways in their dose analysis or provide an acceptable alternative to excluding the unfiltered release pathways, the information provided to the NRC was incomplete and inaccurate. Finally, this information was material to the NRC because full implementation of the AST revised the licensing basis for Waterfords accident source term and the addition of these unfiltered release pathways increases the analyzed radiological dose offsite and to the control room.

Enforcement Action: This violation is being treated as a non-cited violation, consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.

EXIT MEETINGS AND DEBRIEFS

The inspectors verified no proprietary information was retained or documented in this report.

  • On January 22, 2024, the inspectors presented the Comprehensive Engineering Team Inspection results to Joseph Sullivan and other members of the licensee staff.
  • On December 14, 2023, the inspectors presented the exit meeting for the Comprehensive Engineering Team Inspection results to Joseph Sullivan, Site Vice President, and other members of the licensee staff.

DOCUMENTS REVIEWED

Inspection Type Designation Description or Title Revision or

Procedure Date

71111.21M Calculations 3-H Diesel Generator Room Ventilation 4

EC-24731 Emergency Feedwater System Head Curves 3

EC-E91-055 AC Short Circuit Calculations 8

EC-E91-251 Short Circuit Study For PDP 3B-DC-S & PDP 3B1-DC-S 1

EC-I95-019 Plant Protection System Indication and Recording Loop 5

Uncertainty Calculation

EC-M84-001 Tank Volume vs. Level Tables 6

EC-M92-027 MOV Design Basis Review Calculation No. SI.003 6

EC-M92-037 MOV Design Basis Review Calculation No. SI.002 4

EC-M97-026 Required Submergence to Prevent Vortexing in the RWSP 1

EC-M97-044 Design Basis Review for CCW Isolation Valves CC-200A(B), 0

CC-501, CC-562, CC-563, and CC-727

EC-M98-008 RWSP Volume Design Requirements 0

EC-S92-001 NRC IN 91-56: Post-LOCA Releases Through RWSP 1

EC-S97-020 Toxic Chemical Analysis to Assess Control Room 1

Habitability

EC90-050 Degraded Voltage Relay Setpoint & Plant Load Study 8

EC91-056 Relay Settings and Coordination Curves for 6.9kV 4.16kV 4

and 480 buses

ECE13-001 480 VAC Masterpact NT/NW Micrologic 5.0A Device 0

Settings and Coordination Study

ECE17-001 EF# Arc Flash Risk Assessment 0

ECE91-050 Degraded Voltage Relay Setpoint & Plant Load Study 9

ECE91-194 Load Study For PDP-3B-DC-S and 3B1-DC-S 6

ECM21-002 Minimum Required Wall Thickness for 132 CW lines and 0

Selected Tanks

ECS09-005 Air-Operated Valves - Design Basis Accident Times 1

EE2-11-05 Calculation of Fault Clearing Time of Protective Devices 0

Used as Back-up Protection of Electrical Penetration

MNQ-10-12 NPSH Available for EFW Pumps 1

MNQ9-2 Component Cooling Water System 3

Inspection Type Designation Description or Title Revision or

Procedure Date

MNQ9-46 NPSH Available for CCW Pumps 0

Corrective Action Condition Report 2014-03711, 2015-01904, 2021-00147, 2021-00244, 2023-

Documents (CR-WF3-) 15701, 2023-17135, 2022-01335, 2023-15663, 2019-01534,

20-00258, 2021-05371, 2021-05624, 2023-15971, 2022-

03722, 2023-13732, 2023-15260, 2020-06272, 2019-08585,

23-17364, 2022-02962, 2023-00351, 2023-00867, 2023-

290, 2023-15683, 2023-16984,

Corrective Action Condition Report 2023-17870, 2023-17880, 2023-17881, 2023-17892, 2023-

Documents (CR-WF3-) 17910, 2023-17911, 2023-17912, 2023-18092, 2023-18180,

Resulting from 2023-18189, 2023-18230, 2023-18042, 2023-17930, 2023-

Inspection 17926

Drawings 1564-1630 Containment Spray Pumps Design Curve 0

74470-772-001 Instrument Nozzles, Waterford III Piping, Component Code 4

  1. 91-0118-0001

B289, Sheet 109 Power Distribution & Motor Data, 125 V D-C Distribution 11

Panel 3B-DC-S

B289, Sheet 21 Power Distribution and Motor Data 480V SWGR 17

[Switchgear] 3B31-S One Line Diagram

B289, Sheet 21-1 Power Distribution and Motor Data, 480V SWGR 6

[Switchgear] 3B31-S One Line Diagram

B289, Sheet Power Distribution & Motor Data, 480V Switchgear 3B31-S 8

21A1 Programmer Settings

B424 Control Wire Diagram: Component Cooling Water Isolation 10

and Makeup

ESSE-BA-IC144 Main Control Room Emergency Breathing Air Piping 1

F42932 16" Type 9220 Valve Assembly w/Bettis 732C-SR80-M3 D

Actuator

G160 Flow Diagram: Component Closed Cooling Water System 50

G163 Flow Diagram Containment Spray & Refueling Water 43

Storage Pool

G167 Flow Diagram Safety Injection System 51

G195 Piping Diagram Safety Injection System 21

G287, Sheet 1 125 VDC and 120 VAC One Line Diagram 33

H33760-1201 Sensor, Temperature C

Inspection Type Designation Description or Title Revision or

Procedure Date

L-3439 Component Cooling Water Surge Tank 09/23/1977

Engineering EC 39363 MOV Design Basis Review Calculation NO SI.003 6

Changes EC 75220 Evaluation of Impacted Safety Related Calculations 0

EC 77544 Broad Range Gas Monitor (BRGM) System Replacement 0

EC 83354 Replace SI-512A with a Swing Check Valve 0

EC 83913 MSIV Solenoid Valve Upgrades 0

EC 84529 Planned FCR for EC-83913 - MSIV Solenoid Valve Upgrade 0

- Incorporate Vendor Supplied Documentation

EC 84942 AMTEK Solid State Controls Component Substitution 000

Justification

EC 88102 Update to Consider Normal Shutdown with LOOP as 0

Bounding CCW Pump Runout Case

EC 88373 Stroke Time Evaluation of Various SI, CVR, and SBV Valves 0

EC 90044 Temperature Indication Switch Standard EN-IC-S-025-W 000

EC 90132 Clarification of Seismic Design Requirements for Piping and 0

Valves Upstream of EBA Tank Isolation Valves (EBA-203,

EBA-204, 4BA1/2-5)

EC 91114 MOV Design Basis Review Calculation No. SI.003 6

EC 91426 Evaluation of EC-M89-002 to Increase Supply Pressure for 0

N2 Accumulators III and IV

EC 91867 Minimum Required Wall Thickness for 132" CW Lines and 0

Selected Tanks

EC 92876 Evaluate Use of Alloy 690 Thermowells for Cold Leg RTDs 0

EC 93747 Generate Air Operated Valve Design Basis Calculation for 0

PMU-144

EC 94658 FHD-232A Leak Repair Evaluation 0

EC 94858 ECE91-053 12IAV55C Acceptance Range Change 0

EC 95070 Temporary Load Bank for Integrated Diesel Test A Train 0

Turbine Control System

EC 95077 RCS Foreign Material Evaluation - RCITE0112CD 0

Thermowell and RTD CR-WF3-2022-3722 - Evaluation for

Continued Operation

ER-W3-99-0184- Weld Repair of Inconel Instrument Nozzles on the Hot Legs 2

01-02

Inspection Type Designation Description or Title Revision or

Procedure Date

Engineering 2022-01 Substitute CPC D RTD Input RC ITE0112CD1 with RC 0

Evaluations ITE0115-1

Miscellaneous 457002467 Paul Munroe Enertech MSIV Pump Valve 3

LOU-1564.108 EBASCO Purchase Specification for Main Steam Isolation 08/02/1984

Valves

LOU-1564.724 EBASCO Purchase Specification for Miscellaneous Shop 09/14/1984

Fabricated Tanks

SEP-WF3-IST-1 WF3 Inservice Testing Bases Document 9

SEP-WF3-IST-2 WF3 Inservice Testing Plan 10

SEP-WF3-IST-3 WF3 Inservice Testing Cross Reference Document 9

TCABP Time Critical Action Program Bases 10

TD-B015.0045 Babcock and Wilcox CCW and ACCW Pump Model 5

2X14X16 DE Manual

TD-B237.0195 GH Bettis Service Instructions, Disassembly, & Reassembly 0

for Spring Return Series Pneumatic Actuators

TD-C173.0015 C & D AutoReg Charger Handbook, 3 Phase, 6 Pulse SCR 4

Chargers

TD-C173.0025 C & D Standby Battery Vented Cell Installation & Operating 3

Instructions, RS-1476, Section 12-800

TD-F130.0015 Fisher Controls Valve Bodies 12

TD-F130.0015 Fisher Controls Valves Bodies 12

TD-G080.0155 General Electric Low Voltage Power Circuit Breakers, 6

Various Instructions

TD-L200.0045 Limitorque Type SMB Instruction & Maintenance Manual 3

Bulletin SMBI-82D

TD-S250.0025 Solid State Controls Ferroresonant UPS Technical Manual 3

Number 95-006000-90 Rev. B 9/91

TD-W120.3095 Westinghouse Molded Case Circuit Breakers Series C, K- 1

Frame, For Type DK, KDB, KD, HKD, KDC, KW, HKW,

KWC

W3-DBD-001 Safety Injection System 305

W3-DBD-003 Emergency Feedwater System 2

W3-DBD-008 Electrical Distribution (DC Portion) Design Basis Document 301

W3-DBD-011 Electrical Distribution (AC Portion) Design Basis Document 302

Inspection Type Designation Description or Title Revision or

Procedure Date

W3-DBD-14 Safety Related, Air Operated Valves 304

W3-DBD-4 Component Cooling Water, Auxiliary Component Cooling 307

Water

Procedures EN-DC-115-01 Industry Standard Design Process (IP-ENG-001) 3

EN-DC-312 Motor Operated Valve (MOV) Test Data Review 9

EN-LI-100 Process Applicability Determination 33

EN-MA-118 Foreign Material Exclusion 18

EN-OP-103 Reactivity Management Program 9

EN-OP-115 Conduct of Operations 33

EN-OP-120 Operator Fundamentals Program 3

EN-OP-123 Time Critical Action Program Standard 7

ME-003-330 480 Volt G.E. Switchgear Breakers 318

OP-002-003 Component Cooling Water 322

OP-002-006 Fuel Pool Cooling and Purification 331

OP-010-003 Plant Startup 365

OP-010-005 Plant Shutdown 347

OP-0101-007 Plant Cooldown 007

OP-901-212 Rapid Plant Power Reduction 024

OP-901-310 Loss of Train A Safety Bus 314

OP-901-311 Loss of Train B Safety Bus 312

OP-901-510 Component Cooling Water System Malfunction 306

OP-901-511 Instrument Air Malfunction 20

OP-902-000 Standard Post Trip Actions 18

OP-902-005 Station Blackout Recovery Procedure 23

OP-902-008 Functional Recovery Procedure 31

OP-902-009 Emergency Operating Procedure Standard Appendices 323

OP-903-001 Technical Specification Surveillance Logs 105

OP-903-014 Emergency Feedwater Flow Verification 318

OP-903-046 Emergency Feed Pump Operability Check 325

OP-903-118 Primary Auxiliaries Quarterly IST Valve Tests 65

OP-903-121 Safety System Quarterly IST Valve Tests 35

OP-903-129 Component Cooling Water Makeup Pump Operability Check 16

OP-904-004 Turbine Miscellaneous Test and Checks 312

Inspection Type Designation Description or Title Revision or

Procedure Date

UNT-006-033 Technical Specifications Surveillance Frequency List 8

Work Orders Work Order (WO- 00019593, 00019634, 00019649, 52873452, 52944019,

) 52960918, 52960918, 53034122, 00495839, 00167498,

00514233, 00565026, 00026241, 00026243, 00298246,

00050249, 00563831, 00563832, 51794244, 52984649,

2333000, 52364836, 52487650, 52504349, 52544989,

2575173, 52581739, 52609098, 52645886, 52667983,

2675538, 52689470, 52691659, 52778435, 52881422,

2832648, 52944180, 52962382, 52962657, 54008005,

00504476, 00504477, 00527322, 53033253, 52958193,

2963037, 53002842, 00536432, 54032998, 53036041,

2947469, 52968126, 54003050

17

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