PNO-II-82-064B, Westinghouse Has Completed Evaluation of Two Metal Objects Found in a & C Steam Generator Hot Leg Plenums.Both Objects Identified as Inconel Nuts from Control Guide Tube Hold Down Pins.Pins Replaced Prior to Startup

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PNO-II-82-064B:Westinghouse Has Completed Evaluation of Two Metal Objects Found in a & C Steam Generator Hot Leg Plenums.Both Objects Identified as Inconel Nuts from Control Guide Tube Hold Down Pins.Pins Replaced Prior to Startup
ML20054L748
Person / Time
Site: North Anna Dominion icon.png
Issue date: 07/01/1982
From: Julian C, Landis K
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
To:
References
PNO-II-82-064B, PNO-II-82-64B, NUDOCS 8207080430
Download: ML20054L748 (2)


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d July 1, 1982 PRELIMINARY NOTIFICATION OF EVENT OR UNUSUAL OCCURRENCE PN0-II-82-64B This preliminary notification constitutes EARLY notice of events of POSSIBLE safety or public interest significance. The information is as initially received without verifi-cation or evaluation, and is basically all that is known by the Region II staff on

, this date.

, FACILITY: Virginia Electric & Power Company Licensee Emergency Classification:

1 North Anna Unit 1 Notification of Unusual Event Docket No. 50-338 Alert Mineral, Virginia Site Area Emergency 4

General Emergency X Not Applicable

SUBJECT:

STEAM GENERATOR TUBE DAMAGE This PN updates PN0-II-82-64, issued on June 9, and PN0-II-82-64A, issued on June 22.

4 Westinghouse has completed evaluation of two metal objects found in the "A" and "C" steam generator hot leg plenums during eddy current testing on June 6 as part of

. the regular in-service inspection. Both objects have been identified as inconel nuts l from control rod guide tube hold-down pins in the reactor's upper internals.

The licensee is planning a video camera inspection of the upper internals.

The extent of the delay of startup from the outage is undetermined at this time.

The pins causing the problem in Unit 1 were replaced in Unit 2 prior to initial

, startup. The licensee will assess the applicability of the Unit 1 problem to operation of Units 1 and 2 at the Surry nuclear station.

Region II will monitor the progress of the licensee's inspection' efforts and review the adequacy of any corrective action required prior to restart of the Unit. Other program offices are being kept informed because of potential generic aspects.

Media interest has not occurred. Neither the licensee nor the NRC plans to issue a news release.

I The Comonwealth of Virginia has been informed.

Region II (Atlanta) received notification of this occurrence by telephone from the licensee at 5:00 p.m. (EDT) on June 30.

This information is current as of 8 a.m. (EDT) on July 1.

Contact:

K. D. Landis, RII 242-4186 C. A. Julian, RII 242-5589 DISTRIBUTION:

H. Street MNBB Phillips E/W Willste MAIL:

Chairman Palladino EDO NRR/f;gf TE NMSS ADM:DMB -

Comm. Gilinsky PA OIA RES Comm. Ahearne MPA AE0D Applicable State j Comm. Roberts ELD 8207080430 820701 PDR IS E PNO-II-82-064B PDR I , _ _ _ _ _- . _ . . . . - . _ _

a Conn. Asselstine Air Rights INP0 SECY SP NSAC ACRS CA PDR Regions:

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(Reactor Licensees)

Applicable Resitant Site //; fp r

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