ML20246N468

Forwards Synopsis of Investigation Rept 4-87-006 Re Violations in Training of Plant Security Force.Evidence That False,Incomplete & Inaccurate Records & Failure to Comply Carried Out Knowingly & W/Deceptive Intent Not Found

ML20246N468
Person / Time
Site:	South Texas
Issue date:	07/07/1989
From:	Martin R NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV)
To:	Goldberg J HOUSTON LIGHTING & POWER CO.
References
NUDOCS 8907190376
Download: ML20246N468 (3)

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! In2 Reply Refer'To:

[ Oockets: 50-498-50-499 Houston Lighting & Power Company ATTN: J. H. Goldberg, Group Vice '

President, Nuclear P.O. Box 1700 Houston, Texas 77001

SUBJECT:

REPORT OF INVESTIGATION 4-87-006 Gentlemen:

Enclosed is'the synopsis from the Report'of Investigation 4-87-006 completed by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission's (NRC) Office of Investigations (01) in late 1988. This investigation was conducted at my request to determine whether apparent violations of NRC requirements associated with the training of the South Texas Project.(STP) security force were the result of attempts to deliberately. deceive the NRC. '

This investigation concludeo thet "no evidence was found to confirm that the false, incomplete and inaccurate records, and the failure to comply with NRC requirements were carried out knowingly and intentionally with the intent ~to deceive the NRC.

Nonetheless, the investigation did conclude that there were violations of NRC security training requirements and other requirements that were in place prior to STP being granted a license to operate. In the case of the training violations, OI concluded that security depa'tment employees were " grossly negligent" in their' training of the contract guard force and in their preparation of training records. Ol'also discovered during the course of their investigation that a guard had intentionally falsified his patrol log to indicate that he had completed a tour of the Fuel Handling Building when in fact he had not. This matter was later referred to the U.S. Department of Justice for prosecutorial review. In early 1989, the department informed us that it was declining to act in this matter.

While the apparent violations of NRC requirements documented by 01 occurred prior to STP becoming an operating nuclear plant, and therefore may.be less significant from a nuclear safety and security perspective, the overall situation described by 01 is disturbing to the NRC in that it was occurring at a time when STP was preparing to receive an operating license from this agency. In order that the NRC may decide the appropriate enforcement action in this case, I request that Houston Lighting & Power (HL&P) respond in writing within 30 days of the date of this letter to 01's conclusions as described in RIV:E GFSan hn;ap RS ' RP RA RDMartin h' B

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Houston. Lighting & Power Company Your response should also address the actions HL&P took following th'e discovery of these problems in 1987 to remedy both the immediate problems and the underlying management weaknesses illustrated by these problems. A copy of your response should be sent to me.

'In accordance with Section.2.790 of the " Rules of Practice," P.'.rt 2, Title 10, Code of Federal regulations, a copy of this letter and its enclosure will be-placed in the NRC Public Document Room.

Thi response directed by this letter is not subject to the clearance procedures of the Office of Management.and Budget as required by the Paperwork Reduction Act o' 1980, PL 96-511.

Sincerely, ORIGINAL. SIGNED BY ROBERT D. AWWW Robert D. Martin Regional Administrator

Enclosure:

As stated cc w/ enclosure:

. Houston Lighting & Power Company ATTN: M. A. McBurnett, Manager Operations Support Licensing P.O. Box 289 Wadsworth, Texas 77483 Houston Lighting & Power Company ATTN: Gerald E. Vaughn, Vice President Nuclear Operations

'P.O. Box 289 Wadsworth, Texas. 77483 Houston Lighting & Power Company ATTN: J. T. Westermeier, General Manager South Texas Project P.O. Box 289 Wadsworth, Texas 77483 Central Power & Light Company ATTN: R. L. Range /R. P. Verret P.O. Box 2121 Corpus Christi, Texas 78403 City of Austin Electric Utility ATTN: R. J. Miner, Chief Operating Officer (2 copies) 721 Barton Springs Road Austin, Texas. 78704

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• . . Synopsis from Report of-Investigt. tion 4-87-006 (report dated November 29, 1988)

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SYNOPSIS In June 1987, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) Region IV requested that the Office of Investigations (01) initiate an' investigation at the Houston Lighting and Power Company (HL&P), South Texas Project (STP) to determine if security training records were falsified to conceal from the NRC the true qualifications and actual training of the contract guard force personnel on site. Previous inspections conducted by Region IV Physical Security Inspectors had determined'that the guards lacked knowledge of their duties and the training records were inadequate and incomplete.

The 01 investigation revealed that the Nuclear Security Department (NSD),

Security Training Division (STD), employees were grossly negligent in their preparation of training records and in their training of the site's contract guard force. . Records contained false entries, were incomplete and inaccurate.

and were in a state of disarray. Copies of students tests-had been discarded before scores were recorded on student Training and Qualification (T&Q) cards, class schedules were not followed, and the rules and regulations of the-Texas State Board of Private Investigators and Security Agents (TSBPI) were violated by STD instructors.

Members of the Basic Nuclear Security Officer (NS0) School were not fully trained in accordance with STP's T&Q plan and matrix in that all tests and tasks required by the T&Q Plan to be included in the course were not completed prior to the students' graduation from the Basic Nuclear STD course. This resulted in STP's violation of Procedure 3.8 of its Interim Security Plan for -

Fuel Storage which required that the contract NS0s have, at a minimum, completed the Basic Nuclear STD course. Consequent/ 1 , STP was in violation of the condition of its NRC Materials License #SNM-1972 which stated that STP would fully implement all provisions of the approved Interim Security Plan for Fuel Storage.

During the course of the investigation, 01 determined that one of the NS0s knowingly and intentionally falsified his Patrol Log to conceal the fact that he failed to complete his required patrol rounds of the Fuel Handling Building (FHB). Although NSD management personnel'were aware of this incident, the guard retained his position, and the incident was never reported to the NRC in compliance with 10 CFR 73.71.

During the course of the investigation, 01 discovered that STP officials were aware that the site's intrusion defection-system was defeatable by a specific test. NSD management arbitrarily determined that STP was not committed to probability testing requirements of Regulatory Guide 5.44, although the PSP clearly committed STP to probability tests.

Although the investigation substantiated numerous violations by STP of NRC rules and regulations, no evidence was found to confirm that the false, incomplete and inaccurate records, and the failure to comply with NRC require-ments were carried out knowingly and intentionally with the intent to deceive the NRC.

Case No. 4-87-006 1

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