ML20236B939
| ML20236B939 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | South Texas  |
| Issue date: | 10/19/1987 |
| From: | Kadambi N Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | Goldberg J HOUSTON LIGHTING & POWER CO. |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8710260421 | |
| Download: ML20236B939 (4) | |
Text
{{#Wiki_filter:-_ _ -_ October 19, 1987' Docket Nos. 50-498 ! and 50-499 Mr. J. H. Goldberg Group Vice - President, Nuclear Houston Lighting and Power Company .. P.' O. Box 1700' j Houston, Texas 77001 j
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Dear Mr. Goldberg:
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SUBJECT:
TRANSMITTAL OF FINAL EXERCISE REPORT FROM FEMA The NRC staff has received the enclosed final exercise report from the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). This report documeilts the observations from the exercise held on April 8, 1987. No deficiencies were identified, but , several areas requiring corrective action are discussed. j Pleasecontactmeat(301)492-9407 if you have any questions. Sincerely yours, IJ/ N.PrasadKadambi,ProjectManager ProjectDirectorate-IV ; DivisionofReactorProjects-III i IV,VandSpecialProjects j
Enclosure:
As stated cc w/ enclosure: h See next pa'e g DISJKIBUTION UWcket File NRC PDR Local PDR PD4 Reading P. Noonan J. Calvo P. Kadambi 0GC-Bethesda E. Jordan J. Partlow ACRS (10) PD4 Plant File D. Matthews, EPB LTR NAME: LETTER TO GOLDBERG h!Pll i PD4/L PD4/PM PD4/D /$ ! PNoon%)/R art - NPKadambi JCalvo 10//5/87 10/jf/87 10//f/87 8710260421 871019 DR ADOCK 050 B' 1
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-[ . Mr. J. H. Goldberg Scuth Texas Project
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; Houston Lighting and Power Company
'cci I Brian Berwick, Esq. . Resident Inspector / South Texa; Assistant Attorney General _ Project Environmental Protection Division c/u U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission P. O. Box 12548 P. O. Box 910 Capitol Station' Bay City, Texas 77414 Austin, Texas -78711 Mr. Jonathan Davis l Mr. J. T. Westermeir- ' Assistant City Attorney '
Manager, South Texas Project City of Austin Houston Lighting-and Power Company P. O. Box 1088 P. O. Box 1700 Au.stin, Texas 78767 Houston, Texas 77001
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Mr. M. B. Lee Ms. Pat Coy Mr. J. E.-Malaski- Citizens Concerned About Nuclear City of Austin Power P. O.. Box 1088 5106 Casa Oro Austin, Texas 78767-8814 San Antonio, Texas 78233 Mr. Mark R. Wisenberg i Mr. A. von Rosenberg Manager, Nuclear Licensing Mr. M. T. Hardt- Houston Lighting anc Power Company City Public Service Board- P. O. Box 1700 P. O. Box 1771 Houston, Texas 77001- l San Antonio, Texas 78296 Mr. A. Zaccaria Jack R. Newman, Esq. Mr. K. G. Hess {
.Newman & Holtzinger, P.C.- Bechtel Corporation i 1615 L Street, NW P. O. Box 2166
' Washington, D.C. 20036 Houston, Texas 77001 .
Melbert Schwartz , Jr. , Esq. Mr. T. V Shockley Baker & Botts Mr. R. L. Range , One Shell Plaza Central Power and Light Company i
. Houston, Texas 77002 P. O. Box 2121 Corpus Christi, Texas 78403 Mrs. Peggy Buchorn i Executive Director Citizens for Equitable Utilities, Inc.
Route 1. Box 1684 Brazoria, Texas 77422 I l 9 f
I ' n. 4 I k i & Power Company Houston'L ight ng - SouthTexasProject.
'CC' D Regional Administrator, Region IV
- U.S.- Nuclear Regulatory Commission Office of Executive. Director for Operations
- 611 Ryan Plaza Drive Suite 1000 Arlington, Texas 76611 Mr; Lanny Sinkin, Counsel for Intervenor Citizens Concerned about Nuclear Power, Inc.
Christic Institute-
'o - 1324 North Capitol Street
. Washington. D.C. 20002 Licensing Representative Houston Lighting and' Power Company 1 Suite 610 .
Three. Metro Center-Bethesda, Maryland 20814 4 Judge Charles Bechhoefer Atomic r afety and Licensing Board Panel U.S. Faclear Regulatory Commission Wash'agton, D.C. 20555 - l l
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- e. Mr. J. H. Goldberg Houston Lighting and Power Company ' South Texas Project (other)
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Mr. Paul Gosselink Attorney General's Office ; Post Office Box 12548, Capitol Station Austin,_ Texas 78711 Bureau of. Radiation Control State of Texas 1101 West 49th Street Austin, Texas 78756 Office of the Governor
' ATTN: Ms. Darla Parker Office of Intergovernmental Relations Post Office Box 13561 (
Austin, Texas 78711 - Judge, Matagorda County Matagorda County Courthouse 1700 Seventh Street Bay City, Texas 77414 Director, Eastern Environmental
~ Radiation Facility (SER, SSER, DES & FES)
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency Post Office Box-3009 Montgomery, Alabama 36193 Director, Criteria anc Standardt, (SER, SSER, DES FES) (ANR-460) Office of Radiation Program << U.S. Environmental Protection Agency Wash.ington 0.C. 20460 Director, Office of Radiation Programs (DES & FES) Las Vegas Facility U.S. Environmental Protection Agency i l Post Office Box 18416 Las Vegas Nevada 89114 l l EIS Review Coordinator l EPA Regional VI Office 1201 Elm Street Dallas, Texas 75270 f ; i i I r l
s. 4c o o FINAL RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS EXERCISE REPORT
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Nuclear Power Plant: South Texas Project Electric Generating Station f Applicant: Houston Lighting and Power j l l Location of Plant: State of Texas Matagorda County . Bay City, Texas Date of Report: August 17,1987 Date of Exercise: April 8,1987 l
Participants:
State of Texas Matagorda County, Texas Bay City, Texas Palacios, Texas Taylor Brothers Ambulance Service Me.tegorda General Hospital l FEDERAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY Region VI 800 N. Loop 288 Denton, Texas 76201 N
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CONTENTS 1 1 A B B R E VI ATIO N S . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . v INTROD UCTIO N AND AUTHO RITY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vi 1 EX E R CISE B A C K G R O U N D . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 1.1 E x e rc is e S u m m ary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 1.2 Fe de ral Evalu at o rs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
- 1. 3 Ex e rc is e Obj e c t iv es . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 1.3.1 STPEGS...'................................................... 4 1.3.2 State and Local Obj ectives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 1.4 Exercise Guidelines and Participant Information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
- 1. 5 Sc e n ar i o S u m m ary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 1.5.1 Sc e n ario Ti m e lin e . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 1.6 Evalu a tio n C ri t e ri a . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 2 E X E R CIS E EV ALU ATIO N . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 2.1 Texas Stat e Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 2.1.1 Bureau of' Radiation Control (BRC) Headquarters Operations.................................................. 20 2.1.2 Division of Emergency Management (DEM)/ State EOC . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 2.1.3 STP EG S EO C (B R C Operatio ns) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 2.1.4 Disaster District EOC - Pierce, Texas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25 ;
2.1.5 Bureau of Radiation Control Staging Area . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27 2.1.6 Bureau of Radiation Control Mobile Lab . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28 2.1.7 B RC Field Monitoring Team # 1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
. 2.1.8 BRC Field Monitoring Te am # 2 . . . . . . . .e . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30 2.1.9 B RC Field Monitoring Team # 3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31 2.1.10 BR C Field Monitoring Team # 4 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . 32 2.1.11 BRC Contamination Control Team . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33 2.1.12 BRC Decontamination Assistance Team . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34 2.1.13 Media Infot mation Center . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34 2.2 Loc al Govern m e nt Ope ra tions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36 2.2.1 M at agorda C ounty EO C . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36 2.2.2 Reception Center (Monitoring / Decontamination Function) . . . . . . . . . 40 2.2.3 Roception Center (Reception / Care Function) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43 2.2.4 Taylor Brothers Ambulance Service . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44 2.2.5 Matagorda G eneral Hospital . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
- 2. 3 U t ili t y Is s u e s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46 3 TRACKING SCHEDULE FOR STATE / LOCAL ACTIONS TO CORRECT DEFICIENCIES AND AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48 4 EVALU ATIO N OF OBJECTIVES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54 )
4.1 Summary of FEM A Objectives Remaining to be Met . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54 4.2 FEMA Objectives Tracking - South Texas Project . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54 til
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l TABLES l 1 Remedia1' Actions for the April.8,1987 South Texas Project ' 49 Exercise...............................................................- 55 2 Sum mary of ObjectNes Re maining to be Met . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 - FEMA Objectives Tracking Chart South Texas Project Electric i G e n e r a ting S t a t f o r, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56 .j i l 4 l
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l s ABBREVIATIONS ANL - Argonne National Laboratory ARC - American Red Cross BRC - Bureau of Radiation Control " DEM - Division of Emergency Management
, DHHS - Department of Health and Human Services-DOE -
Department of Energy , . DPS - Texas Department of Public Safety ! C EBS - Emergency Broadcast System EOC - Emergency Operations Center EPA - Environmental Protection Agency EPZ. - Emergency Planning Zone ERF - Emergency Response Facility FDA - Food and Drug Administration ; FEMA - Federal Emergency Management Agency HL&P - Houston Lighting and Power K1 - Potassium lodide LOCA - Loss-of-Coolant Accident MIC - Media Information Center mRA - Mil 11 rems per hour NP.C - Nuclear Regulatory Commission PAG - Protective Action Guide PAR - Protective Action Recommendation PAS - Protective Action Section PIO - Public Information Officer f RAC - Regional Assistance Committee RADEF - Radiological Defense RCS - Reactor Coolant System REP - Radiological Emergency Preparedness 4 RO - Radiological Officer SOP - Standard Operating Procedure STPEGS - South Texas Project Electric Generating Station TDH - Texas Department of Health USDA - United States Department of Agriculture l 1 l l l l v
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l* ' ' l o. i INTRODUCTION AND AUTHORITY On December 7, 1979, the President directed the Federal- Emergency -
' Management Agency (FEMA) to assume lead role responsibility for all off-site nuclear power facility planning and response.
FEMA's immediate basic responsibilities in Fixed Nuclear Facility Radiological
. Emergency Response Planning include: ,
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- Taking the lead in off-site eme'rgency response planning and in the .l review and evaluation of State and local government emergency plans ensuring that the plans meet the Federal criteria set forth in ;
NUREG-0654 FEMA REP-1, Rev.1 (November 1980),
- Determining whether the State and local emergency response plans 7 can be implemented on the basis of observation and evaluation of an exercise conducted by the ~ appropriate emergency response ;
jurisdictions.
- Coordinating the activities of volunteer organizations and other l involved Federal agencies. Representatives of these agencies listed below serve as members of the Regional Assistance Committee (RAC), which is chaired by FEMA.'
- U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commi::sfon (NRC) l
- U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)
- U.S. Department of Energy (DOE)
- U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS)
- U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT)
- U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA)
- U.S. Department of Interior (DOI)
- U.S. Department of Health and Human. Services (FDA) li
s . 1 1 EXERCISE BACKGROUND [
. The' initial (qualifying) Radiological Emergency Preparedness exercise for the 1 South Texas Project Electric Generating Station (STPEGS), Bay City, Texas, was {
conducted on April 8,1987. The State of Texas and Matagerda County (the single county I within the 10-mile Plume EPZ) fully participated in the exercise. A Federal Emergency I Management: Agency Evaluation Team evaluated the State and local off-site emergency response capabilities at this exercise. The results of the exercise evaluation are contained in this report, e Exercise Objectives of the STPEGS exercise, for State and local off-site
, response, were submitted to FEMA Region VI on January 21, 1087 and, after review, ,
were approved on January 27,1987. The exercise scenario was submitted to the Region on March 9,1987 and, after review by the Region and Westinghouse Idaho Nuclear Inc., a FEMA contractor, was approved on March 26,1987. Following the exercise, on April 9,1987, three review / critique meetings were , 4 held in Bay City, Texas. The first meeting, of the 23 member FEMA Evaluation Team, l provided to the acting RAC Chairman a detailed preliminary review of evaluator findings. The second meeting, later that day, with Federal, State, Local and Utility representatives ' in attendance, presented a brief critique and preliminary findings resulting from the exercise. 'The third meeting, the same evening, a critique for the ! general public from the area of the nuclear facility, presented a synopsis of the preliminary findings. Following the Public Critique meeting, a "Public Meeting",- as required by 44 CFR 350.10, was conducted and recorded. i All preliminary exercise findings have now been reviewed and consolidated in this l report. Section 2 of this report provides detailed narratives of exercise events, 3 Deficiencies noted in exercise emergency response, Areas Requiring Corrective Action (ARCAs) noted by the evaluators and Areas Recommended for Improvement (ARF!s) suggested by the evaluators, for each of the field activities tested in the exercise. j Section 3 provides a tabular summary listing of any Deficiencies (that would lead to a ] negative finding) and ARCAs, including those that require priority action. The tabular i summary provides space for State and local jurisdiction response and their schedule for j i i corrective actions. The Federal evaluators found no deficiencies in this exercise. Several ARCAs have been noted that will require action by the State and local ) participants. ( Section 4 compiles, in tabular format, a listing of FEMA Objectives yet to be , met and a tracking table depicting the status of all Objectives including those met, those partially met, those not yet met and any deficiencies or ARCAs related to those Objectives. The findings presented in this report were reviewed by the Acting RAC Chairman of FEMA Region VI. FEMA suggests that State and local jurisdictions take remedial j actions in response to each of the problems indicated in the report, and that the State j j d l l _._____________U
2 , submit a schedule for addressing these problems. The Regional Director of FEMA Region VI is responsible for certifying to the FEMA Associate Director for State and i Local Programs and Support, . Washington, D.C., that any Deficiencies and- Areas l Requiring Corrective Action have either be.en corrected or scheduled for correction and { j that such corrections have been' incorporated into State and local plans, as appropriate, The following narrative summary provides a brief overview of the exercise performances of the State of Texas and Matagorda County. More detailed discussions of ) performances by individual agencies or response organizations are provided under the appropriate location in Sec. 2. 1.1 EXERCISE
SUMMARY
State of Texas Operations: The Texas Department of Health, Bureau of Radiation Control, and the Texas Department of Public Safety, Division of Emergency Management, together with selected representatives of other State departments and agencies, fully participated in the STPEGS exercise. State operating locations included: the State EOC in Austin, the State Disaster District EOC at Pierce, the BRC staging area in Bay City, the STPEGS EOC on the plant site, and various field locations within and near the 10-mile Emergency Planning Zone (EPZ) around the plant site. With the exception of a few minor problems, mostly involving communications, detailed in the individual site narratives in Sec. 2 of this report, the State demonstrated an adequate level of readiness for responding to a radiological emergency at the STPEGS plant. . Local Government Operations: Matagorda County, the only county with the 10-mile EPZ, fully participated in the exercise. The cities of Bay City and Palacios participated as described in the local plan. The county developed the Radiological Emergency Response Plan and procedures, and the elected county officials, emergency staff and volunteers participated in accordance with the plan. County partic! pants demonstrated a high level of training, active interest and enthusiasm toward their role in the emergency response efforts. An outstanding demonstration of leadership, coordination and team effort was exhibited by county participants. Individual activities of county part'.cipants are described in Sec. 2 of this report. 9
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1.2. FEDERAL EVALUATORS-L Twenty-three (23) Federal evaluators participated in evaluating the April 8,1987
- STPEGS ' qualifying exercise. These individuals, their agencies .and their evaluation assignments are listed below: - .
Evaluator . . Agency Evaluation Location l: t
. . Gary Jones ' FEMA- ' Overall Coordination, Matagorda Co. EOC
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Hank May ' EPA STPEGS EOC Bill Gasper ANL STPEGS EOC-Ken Bertram ANL Disaster District EOC,' Pierce State EOC, Austin
. Travis Ratcliff FEMA Carl McCoy FEMA BBC HQ, Austin and State EOC, Austin
~ Gary Kaszynski ANL Matagorda Co. EOC, Bay City, Texas Harry Harrison FEM A . BRC Staging Area and BRC Field Monitoring Team #1 l
Leon Zellner FDA' BRC Field Monitoring Team #2 Leland Peyton ' FEMA BRC Field Monitoring Team #3 Frank Wilson . FEMA -BRC Field Monitoring Team #4 John Benton FEMA BRC Contamination Control Team (Access Control) Jim Opelka ANL BRC Mobile Lab Gary Sanborn NRC Media Information Center, Bay City Mike Brooks FEMA Media information Center, Bay City Dana Cessna FEMA Media Information Center, Bay City Jim Cox DOT Reception Center (Monitoring /Decon Function) John Lewis DOE : Reception Center (Monitoring /Decon Function) Tom Goertz FDA Reception Center (Reception / Care Function) Gene Nunn FEM A - Reception Center (Reception / Care Function)
, Don Newsom ANL Ambulance Service - Taylor Brothers Funeral Home
- Phil Edgington HHS Matagorda General Hospital Tom Carroll ANL Matagorda General Hesp!!a! j i
The State of Texas also stationed one or more evaluators / controllers at each of the exercise sites who participated in site critiques and evaluations. I
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1.3 EXERCISE OBJECTIVES 1.3.1 STPEGS A. General Objectives I
- 1. Demonstrate the ability of emergency response pe, onnel to implement and execute the STPEGS Emergency Management Plan and appropriate Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures.
- 2. Demonstrate the ability to alert, mobilize and augment station emergency response personnel.
- 3. Demonstrate the ability to alert Federal, State and local authorities within the specified time constraints.
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- 4. Demonstrate the ability to activate the Technical Support I Center (TSC), the Operations Support Center (OSC), and the Emergency Operations Center (EOC), and the Media Informa- J tion Center. .
- 5. Demonstrate the functional and operational adequacy of the TSC, OSC, EOC, and the Media Information Center.
- 6. Demonstrate the adequacy, operability and effective use of emergency communications equipment, and the adequacy of
' communications procedures and methods.
- 7. Demonstrate the ability to communicate and interface with the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) Headquarters Incident Response Center, and appropriate state and local governmental organizations, in an emergency situation.
- 8. Demonstrate the ability to provide the proper information to the county to support the Prompt Notification System.
- 9. Demonstrate the ability to perform post exercise critiques.
B. Direction and Control
- 1. Demonstrate the ability of each emergency response facility manager to maintain command control over emergency 1 4
response activities conducted from his facility titroughout the exercise. { 1
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- 2. Demonstrate the ability.to inR! ate and coordinate emergency
. response activities in an 'effielent and timely manner.
s 3.' Demonstrate thej ability L to call upon .and utilize outside
- support organizations if. station. capabilities are exceeded or if -
- the additional assistance is warranted.-
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- 4. Demonstrate the. ability of the STPEGS Security group to .j respond to an emergency situation. >
- 5. Demonstrate the transfer of responsibilities from the Control e Room to the TSC staff and EOC staff.
- 6. Demonstrate the ability of Corporate Public Information personnel . to support the . STPEGS . Emergency Response .
Organization.
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- 7. ' Demonstrate the ability of each emergency response facilltv manager to periodically brief personnel .within .his facility concerning the status of the emergency.
- 8. Demonstrate, through discussion, the ability to mobilize manpower and material to support; protracted (long-term)
!, operations to include recovery and reentry activities.. C. Accident Assessment
- 1. Demonstrate .the ability of the On-shift Emergency Organization and the STPEGS Emergency Response'Organiza-tion to evaluate the~ causes of' incidents and ' perform.
mitigating actions to place the affected unit (s) in -a safe, stable condition. 'j l' 2. Demonstrate -the ability of the appropriate emergency - - response facility personnel to classify an emergency condition. { l
- 3. De monstrate the ability of . the appropriate ' emergency .l response facility personnel to analyze current pbnt ']
conditions, identify projected trends and potential j consequences, coordinate with radiological assessment teams, { and provide recommendation actions. l D. Radiolorleal Assessment
- 1. Demonstrate the ability to coordinate and conduct on-site, in- J plant and off-site radiological monitoring activities, i4 l
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- 2. Demonstrate the ability to assess and provMe projections of off-site radiological conditions to support the formulation of protective action recommendations (regardless of the system used).
- 3. Demonstrate the ~ abliity to coordinate radiological data '
between the TSC and the EOC. - 4
- 4. Demonstrate the ability to coordinate STPEGS off-site radiological assessment activities with those conducted by the State.
- 5. Demonstrate the ability to direct and coordinate the deployment of on-site and off-site radiological monitoring teams, and coordinate with state radiological monitoring teams.
- 6. Demonstrate the ability of survey personnel to perform dose rate surveys, collect and analyze radiological samples and perform other prescribed on-site, in-plant and off-site radio-logical monitor!ng activities.
- 7. Demonstrate the ability to obtain and analyze samples from the in-plant normal or post-accident sampling systems, and assess the resultant data.
E. Protective Response
- 1. Demonstrate the ability to inform and update STPEGS, State and local emergency response personnel regarding the status of the emergency.
Demonstrate the ability to control the spread of contamina- i 2. tion and emergency workers' exposure.
- 3. Demonstrate the ability to formulate and implement on-site protective action measures.
- 4. Demonstrate the ability to formulate protective action recommendations for the general public and emergency I workers within the Plume Exposur.e Emergency Planning Zone.
- 5. Demonstrate the ability to communicate protective action recommendations to State and local authorities, and coordinate the protective action recommendations with the Texas Department of Health, Bureau of Radiation Control.
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.6. Demonstrate the ability to continuously account for personnel assigned to,' and operating ,out of, each emergency response
- f acility.
7.- Demonstrate the ability of :on-site personnel to provide 7 emergency first aid to .an injured, contaminated .!ndividual' prior to the arrival of the ambulance service.
, F. Public Information . .
'1. Demonstrate the capability to ' coordinate the' preparation, revlett and release 'of information with coroorate personnel and Federal, State and local government agencies; and provide !
information releases to the media.
- 2. Demonstrate the ability of rumor' control personnel to address questions concerning the status of emergency situations.
. 3. Demonstrate the abil!ty of the Media Information Director or his des!gnee to conduct media conferences.
1.3.2 State and' Local Objectiv'es , . JURISDICTIONAL.' NUREC-0654 RESPONSIBILITY LOCATION E FEMA EXERCISE OBJECTIVE NO. & TEXT REFERENCE- State Local (See Note A) ;
.1. Demonstrate ability eo mobilize- E.1, E.2 X X- all
- staff and activate facilities
, promptly.
2 .- Demonstrate' ability to fully, A.2.a, A.4 X' X 1,2,3,4 staff-facilities'and main-
, , tain s'taffing around the 3 clock. (See Note B.)
'3. Demonstrate the ability to A.1.d, A.1.e, X X 1,2,3,4,5 !
make decisions and coordinate A.2 emergency activities. , I
- 4. Demonstrate adequacy of G.3.a, H.2, X 'X 1,2,3,4,5,6 .;
facilities, equipment, H.3 l
.R maps and displays to support emergency opera- ;
.tions. ;
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- 5. Demonstrate ability to commu- F X X all ;
nicate with all appropriate i locations, organizations , and field personnel. ,
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~ JURISDICTIONAL d ' LOCATION
-NUREG-0654' RESPONSIBILITY.
' FEMA EXERCISE' OBJECTIVE'NO. & TEXT REFERENCE S t'at e' ' Lo c al' (See-Note"A)
Demonstrate. ability to I.8 X. - 4,6,7,
.6.
. mobilize ~and deploy field monitoring teams in a timely fashion. -(See-Note C.)
7.- Demonstrate appropriate .I.8, I.11 X' - 7 equipment and procedures.for e determining ambient radiation levels. X .- 7 ', 8 -
- 8. . Demonstrate l appropriate; I.9 equipment'and procedures for-measurement of airborne radiciodinec9ncentrations as low as.10- uC1/cc in the
- presence of noble' gases.
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- 9. Demonstrate appropriate I .8- X equipment and procedures for'
-collection, transportation and analysis-of samplesLof soil,' vegetation, snow, water and milk.' (See Note'D.)
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- 10. Demonstrate ability to project 1,10,.J.10 X -
R; dosage to the public from' p1,ume exposure,, based on- - i plant and. field. data and to-
. determine appropriate pro- !
l tective measures based on PACS available shelter, evacuation- - time estimates and all other-appropriate factors.
- 13. Demonstrate ability to alert E.6 - X 1 the public within the 10-mile EPZ and disseminate an initial instructional message within 15 minutes. (See Note E.)
Demonstrate ability to formu- E.5, E.7 X X. 1,4,5 14 late and distribute appro-
- priate instructions to the public in a timely fashion.
- 15. Demonstrate organizational J.9, J.10.a - X 1 ability and resources neces- J.10.g l
i sary to manage an orderly evacuation of all or part ! of the plume EPZ. l l I i) ;, O_____.__. _ _ . _ . _ _ i
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9- i JURISDICTIONAL' NUREC-06$4~ RESPONSIBILITY.. LOCATION FEMA EXERCISE OBJECTIVE NO. & TEXT- REFERENCE- State Local' (See Note A)
- 16. Demonstrate organizational J.10.j -
X -! - l ability and. resources'neces- ! sary to deal with impediments' . to' evacuation, inclement l weather or traffic obstruc-tions. . J l
- 17. . Demonstrate' organizational J.10.j -
X 1,9 ability and resourers l necessary to control access to an evacuated area.. ;
- 19. Demonstrate organizational J.9, J.10.g -
X l' ability and resources
-necessary to effect an orderly evacuation of schools within the plume EPZ. j I
- 20. Demonstrate ability to con- K.3.a, X X 1,4,7,9 j tinuously monitor and control K.3.b l emergency worker exposure. .
I
- 24. Demonstrate the ability to .C.3.a, X' X 2,5 j brief~the mediaLin a clear, C.4.a-accurate and timely'nanner.
- 25. Demonstrate ability to pro- .C.4.b X- X 1,2,4,5 videJadvance coordination :
I of information released.
- 26. Demonstrate ability to C.4.c X X 5 ,
establish and operate' rumor ; control in a coordinated l fashion.
- 27. Demonstrate adequacy of pro- J.12' X X 10 )
cedures for registration and l radiological monitoring of j evacuees. !
- r. 28. Demonstrate adequacy of J.10.h -
X 10 . facilities for mass care of . I evacuees. -
- 29. Demonstrate adequacy of K.5.a, X X 9,10,13 ;
equipment and procedures for K.5.b decontamination of emergency workers, equipment and vehicles. ; .:-_=_:_-____-_ _ L
-- , _____-_ __ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - .- -- ~_
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' JURISDICTIONAL.
NUREC-06541 RESPONSIBILITY LbCATION
'(See Note'Al
+ FEMA EXERCISE' 0BJECTIVE NO. & TEXT REFERENCE State' Local
- 30. . Demonstrate adequacy of EMS L.4: - X, 12,13 J
. transportation, personnel and - 1 procedures for, handling con-taminated individuals
~
y' including proper.decontamina-tion of.the: vehicle an'd equipment. .
.L.1 --
X 11
- 31. : Demonstrate' adequacy of.
hospital facilities and pro-cedures for handling :( contaminated individuals. j
- 32. Demonstrate ability to . 'C . I . a , X -~ '2 l 1
-identify need for,-request, C.1.b-
.and obtain federal assistance. ..
- 33. Demonstrate ability to M.4 -X - 4 ji estimate tctal population
- exposure.
Demonstrate ability to deter- M.1 'X X 1,4' 34. mine and implement appropriate q measures for controlled re-
;covery and reentry. (See- '
Note F.). .. t
'35. ; Demonstrate the ability to C.4 -
X l' effectively call upon and a utilize outside support agencies when-local capa- l j
- bilities are exceeded. -
. -J
- 36. Demonstrate the adequacy, F.1 X X all operability and effective use , c.
N; l of emergency communications equipment and the adequacy of ';. { communications procedures and methods. ( '
- 37. Demonstrate ability to monitor D.4 X. X all ]
Emergency Classification levels continuously and imple- N/C ment procedures in a' timely i manner. 1 l I c t
./-
g ,- I -
.l'>
JURI9DICTIONAL- , NUREC-0654 RESPONSIBILITY. LOCATION I KS FEMA EXERCISE OBJECTIVE NO. & TEXT REFERENCE State' Local (See Note A) S j"?
- 38. Demonstrate capability to' E. X X 1,2,3,4 effectively process.all
-incoming / outgoing messages in a timely manner, including the documentation of both actual
' and simulated messages.
- 39. Demonstrate that authority- A.2.a. - X 1,10 exists in coordinating and A.3 activating a reception center (as necessary) in a timesy manner.
' Notes:
A. ' The locations where various exercise Objectives are to be demonstrated are
~
..d'
< indicated by numerical codes as follows mt CODE TEAM ELEMENT OR FACILITY NAME LOCATION y' ,
- l. Matagorda County EOC Sheriff's Office, Bay City 2.. State EOC DPS Headquarters, Austin
- 3. Disaster District Sub 2A EOC DPS District Office, Pierce
,4. STPECS EOC STPECS Plant Site, Matagorda County
- 5. Media Information Center Holiday Inn, Bay City
- 6. BRC Staging Area Service Center, Bay City h 3
'7. Various Field Monitoring Teams 10-Mile-Er2
- 8. BRC ERV and Mobile Laboratory Pad adjacent to the STPECS EOC
,e 9. Access Control Point (s) 10-Mile EPZ .
- 10. Reception Center McAllister Jr. High School, Bay City
- 11. Matagorda Ceneral Hospital Bay City
- 12. Ambulance Service Taylor Brothers Funeral Home, Bay City ;
- 13. Vehicle Decontamination Facility Designated Car Wash, Bay City l B. This. objective will be met by presenting a roster of persons who would man the j second s'.iift, and the third where 3-shift operations are planned. Rosters for all locations will be presented at the appropriate controlling EOCs. -
C. Teams will be pre-positioned. Deployment will not be delayed to simulate travel time from normal duty stations. l
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.Cokhtlon offmirt and snow samphfpiill not Be demonstrated. (There are no f . D.
. cominercist dalricQwithin the STPECi.S Jp-mile EP2.) '
4/ E. Sirens and Tcdhikt radios will not be activated ' EBS y messages will be prepared.
' but will not be broucap. f.
, .f, y, , <
i' F. This demonstration wmk, lynded to a discussion e'f ' actions.which would need to be f-j .taken if the recoverQSnd glentry phase of the exercise were to be fully played.
' 'Y 3f Discussion in thejMattdorda Meity EOC will be minimal, since most county actions 1 y will be in responh' %recops.cattdn$ is's'ued by the Bureau of Radiation Control, Y and would, therefoge,'be merely speculative until,the actual recommendations of 'the
;(
j;x Bureau are known. j ,f' i , a q(' ,
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, j
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s
. . ' hq i Simulation i
Actual
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- l. Declaration of Fgergency X j!
., 4 -
Vt a s ' 7,8 .
- 2. Notification of/ Of f-site Agencies '
X v :y /n . V1s u X
- 3. Fx. erg,4/An'6piements ,
o g 3 4 ,, h M,' '[ 4. Activation d Ntpsite Organization .(s X W. sv. ,1: c ,- ! x g , s p- 3. Activation of Off-site Organization i t' X y ; )[j (: j' - . [' 6. Emergene[2esponsrFacilitiesAccountabilj.tyE(', X r s 4
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- 7. RCS, Post lktcidentSample X
., si i j
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l' X i
! 89 Decontamination of Contaminated \r Persons
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. 1 8 ,. ( , i X
n J b.- Emergency Mcdi'coh A.ssistance to Contaminate (I. 'if,
* 'I h jured persdr M ( I
) xs w,
,b .g j
- 10. Off-site Medidal, Response X -j
' j
- 1 e, , 2 1
3
- 11. Power Plant ConponentOperatiwUy...g' / 3' ' j ,; X {
l ( 9 j
' Disp.acchingofk'esponseTeams(NdiaQon. Monitoring, X f 12
+
'( -
Fire trigade., Repair, etc.) 4
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.y , t- s, ,s. i sz.; t 4 (/4 .
,3
*This list of item's do ctes the level of paexicipation that may result if such
/.
y, .M[v ' i f action is requestmi op directed'hy the participants in response to scenario l
'\*tg situations. It li ncE\ intended to.bc.an ' '
at[ solute list of actions that will ] 4' ' i , be taken. $ , y: c 2t - 1
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I-( . l . 13 l- 1.4 EXERCISE GUIDELINES AND PARTICIPANT INFORMATION The 1987 Graded Exercise will be conducted for the purpose of assuring proper l-emergency response by those personnel who are assigned responsibilities within the South L Texas Project Electric Generating Station (STPEGS), those personnel assigned L responsibilities as delineated in. the Matagorda County Emergency Plan, and those personnel who are assigned responsibilities as delineated in the State of Texas Emergency ' Management: Plan. Accordingly, the following guidelines have been deve' loped for the
. conduct of the 1987 Graded Exercise to demonstrate the capabilities of the exercise l participants to meet the objectives set forth in Section 2.0 of this scenario manual.
! 1. The Graded Exercise will be conducted on April 8,1987. Since exercise participants will not have prior knowledge of the exercise start time, all personnel should follow their normal routines for that day.
- 2. Following the establishment of initial conditions, the exercise will start with a postulated plant condition necessitating the declaration of an emergency at STPEGS. .
- 3. The postulated accident conditions will result in a simulated radiological release which necessitates the consideration of protective aettons for the general public. Meteorological conditions may be varied throughout the exercise.
- 4. Media centers will be manned and will perform their prescribed functions; however, no exercise press release will be made to the public.
- 5. Exercise participants will perform, as appropriate, radiological monitoring and dose rate assessment activities.
' 6. As appropriate to their exercise participation, State agencies will preposition themselves in the Matagorda County area so as to commence exercise participation at an appropriate point in the development of the exercise scenario.
- 7. STPEGS and BRC radiological monitoring field teams will be dispatched for the purpose of testing response time, acm==! cations, monitoring and sampling procedures. The f!c!d team will gather sample media and route such samples to the appropriate laboratory facilities for analysis.
Each radiological monitoring field team will be accompanied by a controller / evaluator team throughout the exercise. Each field team will rendezvous with its controller / evaluator team at the location from which it is deployed. The rendezvous locations are as follows:
g m .
. ;i :
'14 h ' a. - For the STPEGS teams, the OSC.
Lc< . L b; For the-State'Off-site Fleid Monitoring teams, the designated p off-site staging area. t
. 3. Participation : by STPEGS' on-site. personnel directly involved in.
responding to an emergency situation shall be carried out.to the fullest ' extent possible, including the deployment Lof in-plant radiological monitoring. teams,' and the use of protective clothing and respiratory protection equipment.1
. 9. .Use of protective clothing and respiratory protection equipment
'shall be: simulated by personnel assigned to the 'off-site STPEGS .,
radiological monitoring field teams.. j
- 10. As appropriate, Emergency Broadcast System (EBS) announcements
~
should be prepared and passed to the appropriate stations; however these announcements should not be released to the general pubile. Sirens'will not be sounded. -
- 11. The Bay' City. Fire Department and/or the Paldelos Fire Department may be involved in providing simulated en-site or off-site firefighting assistance. If required by the exercise scenario, the fire department (s) should be contacted for the purpose of checking communications only, but not be required to mobilized i manpower or equipment.
i
- 12. On-site security personnel should exercise their procedures for g restricting normal access to the STPEGS site without actually - l redirecting incoming and outgoing personnel.
- 13. All radio and written communications will be' preceded and followed with the words "THIS IS A DRILL". :.
. 14. In the event an' actual emergency occurs during the course of the f axercise, participants in the affected area attend to the emergency situation. The Controller in the affected area shall ;
advise the Lead Controller of the condition er.d the Lead Controller shall discuss with key participants the immediate course of the exercise.
- 15. On-site and off-site Emergency Response Facilities (E RFs),
Including State facilities in Pierce and Austin, will be manned and perform their prescribed functions as appropriate to the development of the exercise.
- 16. If the use of barricades is directed to assist in Traffic and Access Control, the barricades will not be placed to impede the flow of ,
traffic. Placement will be simulated. - __m-_.-___m .__ . _ _ . _ _ m
,M W i - ' o- . .
15
- 17. In' order to demonstrate the capability to conduct an evacuation, ,
the movement of people will be simulated. The organizational' ability and resources necessar,y to manage the evacuation will be-demonstrated. Evacuees are not essential to demonstrate shelter.
- management.
1.5 SCENARIO
SUMMARY
The exercise is based upon a aircraft crash on-site, a fire and the subsequent loss of the 13.8 KV switchgear, thel failure-of all three. Emergency Diesel Generators, the .l
- lifting of a Steam Generator PORV and a Steam Generator Tube leak.
initial conditions established that Unit I has been operating at or above 90%'
. power for the last 45 days. Unit 1 is. currently operating at 100% power with most plant parameters normal and stable. The unit is in its second fuel cycle at about the end of
' core life. Emergency Diesel Generator 13 has been removed from service to replace a cracked piston. Repairs are expected to take 16 hours. The Emergency Transformer has been removed from service for routine maintenance.
~
Unit two is in cold shutdown (mode 5). The initiating event occurs when security notifies the Shift Supervisor of an on-site crash of the HL&P helicopter. There are no passengers and the pilot suffers only minor cuts and abrasions. However, conditions are met to declare a NOUE based on an
~a ircraft crash on-site.
Thirty minutes later the Emergency Director receives notification of a fire in
. the 13.8 KV switchgear room. Conditions 'are. met at this time to' declare an ALERT based upon a fire potentially affecting safety systems. The fire continues to burn and
. after one hour. spreads'into switchgear 1F,1G,1H, and 1J eausing a loss of off-site AC power and a Reactor trip. The Steam Driven Auxiliary Feedwater pump falls to start.
Emergency Diesel Generator 12 fails to start due to a, failure of the fuel oil priming 1 pump. Emergency Diesel Generator 11 starts but its output breaker will not stay j closed., Steam Generator D Power Operated Relief Valve falls open. An SAE should be q
-. declared 15 minutes later based upon the loss of off-site power and the inoperability of j all ESF Diesel Generators for more than 15 minutes. ]
I Forty-five . minutes after the trip Steam Generator D suffers a 500 gpm tube rupture. Conditions at this time warrant the declaration of a GENERAL EMERGENCY. based upon the. loss of off-site and on-site power along with the , loss of auxiliary feedwater OR loss of two of the three fission barriers with a high potential for the loss q of the third barrier, j 1 Forty minutes later an automobile accident blocks the entrance / exit to Tres ) , Palacios Oaks. p Twenty minutes af ter the accident (four hours into the scenario) a contaminated i individual and his contaminated vehicle arrive at the reception center. j
e..
- i 16
.Four hours and fif teen minutes into the . scenario an HL&P employee.ls injured , ,
and = contaminated while . working .on the PORV isolation valve in ..the isolation valve ' ~ j cubicle. 'His injury consists of a' compound fracture of his right femur and is' severe-l
- enough to necessitate his removal to facilities off-site.
l
'J
-% 1 1.01 Seenario Timeline
~
INITIATING' , HESSAGE
' TIME NUMBER- PLANT EVENT
SUMMARY
0715 1- -Initial conditions established. 0730 2. -Security reports that the HL&P. helicopter (H+00:15)- has crashed on site at the landing pad. . The. pilot, suffered only minor abrasions and > > contusions. conditions are met to declare a' .
- m. , .
NOUE based upon an. aircraft crash on site. 'f
Reference:
- OEPP01-ZA-001 Rev. 2,' Addendum I
.2, page 9.
0745 3 c.
. contingency Messages A NOUE sh'ould be (H+00:30) declared based upon an aircraft' crash on site.- i 0800 4 The. Shift Supervisor receives a call (H+00:45) informing him of a. fire in the area of-the laydown pad at the North end of-the turbine.
building. Conditions are. met to declare an
* - ALERT based upon a fire- potentially -
affecting safety systems.-
Reference:
OEPP01-ZA-001 Re1 2, Addendum 2, page 15. 0815 5c contingency Message: An ALERT should be
. (H+01:00). declared.. l 0855 6 .The Shift Supervisor receives a report that
-(H+01:40)' the fir.e continues to burn out of control and has spread into the 13.8 KV switchgear .
I foom. 0900 7,9 The fire causes the loss of buses IF,'10. (H+01:45) 1H, and 1J. The' reactor trips and turbine trips. .On the resultant steam generator-pressure surge, steam generator D PORV sticks open. The Steam Driven Auxiliary- l Feedwater Pump fails to start. Emergency Diesel Generator 12 fails to. start due to a I failure of the fuel oil priming pump. Emergency Diesel Generator 11 starts but its output breaker will not stay closed. j d L___.-.-..-._.___.-_._---..-..- _ . - . .
v ,_ 4' 4 . 17 0915 9 Conditions are' met to declare a. SITE AREA (H+02:00) EMERCENCY based upon the loss of off-site power and the inoperability of all ESF Diesel Generators for more than 15 minutes.
Reference:
OEPP01-ZA-001-Rev. 2, Addendum 2, page 11. 0930 11c Contingency Message: A SITE AREA (H+02:15) EMERGENCY should be declared. 1015- 13 Steam generator D suffers a 500 gpm tube (H+03:00) rupture. Conditions' warrant the declaration of a CENERAL EMERCENCY based upon the failure of off-site and on-site power.along with a loss.of auxiliary feedwater for several hours OR loss of two of the three fission product barriers with a high potential for the loss of the third barrier.
Reference:
OEPP01-ZA-001 Rev. 2, Addendun 2, page 6. 1030 15e Contingency Message: 'A GENERAL EMERCENCY (H+03:15)- should be declared based upon the failure of-off-site-and on-sit'e power with a loss of auxiliary feedwater for several hours OR loss of two of the three fission product barriers with a high potential for the loss of the third-barrier. ~ 1 1055 16 Matagorda County Sheriff's office receives a (H+03:40) report of an automobile accident which is
. blocking the entrance / exit.t'o Tres Palacios Oaks.
I 1100 18s Local resident ( Andy Anderson) calls { (H+03:45) Matagorda County EOC for information and ] guidance.
- 1100 19s Missouri Pacific RR representative (Lewis (H+03
- 45) Garner) calls State EOC for guidance on !
routing trains through Matagorda County. l l
.1 1100 20 Three evacuees (not contaminated) arrive at j (H+03:45) the Reception Center. i l
E 1115 22s Concerned citizen- (Mary Sweeny) calls q f- (H+04:00) Matagorda County EOC and requests assistance ;
- i. in contacting fisherman who may be returning i home by boat through the plume. I 1115 23s Wharton County Judge calls Disaster District L -(H+04:00) Sub 2A and requests assistance in obtaining
( a Federal Disaster Declaration. L 1 1 l _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ a
. .. e
.18-1115'. 24s Concerned citizen (Bill Farber) calls. '!
Matagorda County EOC and requests "" testing of: (H+04:00) water supply in Blessing. j 1115L .25 Contaminated evacuee (Walter Rumson) arrives at Reception Center.
-(H+04:00) . !
28 A worker is injured and contaminated while
~
.1130 working on the PORV isolation valve in the (H+04: 15)
Isolation Val've Cubicle at STPECS. i 29c Local resident (Sue Bob Barker) attempts'to . 1 1130 reenter.the evacuated area.through' Access (H+04: 15) control Point. i 1145 31 Contaminated evacuee (Bill French) arrives at the Reception Center. , (H+04:30) 29c Contingency Message: If she was allowed.to , 1150 enter the evacuated area,JSue Bob' Baker.now j (H+04:35) returns to the Access Control Point. (Both
. i she and her vehicle re contaminated.)
38s MIC receives Disaster Welfare Inquiry from 1215 (See Martha Downs concerning Walter Rumson. (H+05:00) message number 25.) 1215 39 Traveler (W.T. Horne) arrives at the Access Control Point and. seeks permission to drive l (H+05:00) through the affected area. 43 State EOC receives telecopied request fer 1230 Federal Disaster Declaration from Wharton (H+05:15) County Judge. 50s Disaster District Sub 2A receives request-1315 (H+06:00) for information from concerned Jackson County resident (Greg Fuller). , 58 Repairs are completed on the PORV isolation , 1430 ! (H+07:15) valve and the valve is closed. The release is stopped at this time.- ; 1515 (APPROX.) 67 Drill activities are terminated as dira:*ed . i by the Lead Controller in the STPECS EOC. (H+08:00) 1.6 EVALUATION CRITERIA The STPEGS exercise evaluations that follow in Section 2 of this report are based l on applicable planning standards and evaluation criteria set forth in Section II of ! L NUREG 0654/ FEMA REP 1, Rev.1 (November 1980). Region VI evaluated the exercise using the modular format. Federal evaluators were instructed to mark those sections of the modules "not applicable" which did not correspond to the objectives of the exercise. I
h 19 Following :the narratives for each jurisdiction or off-site response : activity, Deficiencies, Areas Requiring Corrective Action ' and Areas Recommended for Improvement are presented with . accompanying recommendations. _ Any -identified-Deficiencies'would cause a finding that off-site preparedness is not adequate to provide reasonable assurance that appropriate protective measures can a'nd will be taken to' protect the health and safety of the public living in the vicinity of the STPEGS plans in the event of.a radiological emergency. At least one Deficiency'in this category would - necessitate a ' negative finding and require that a Remedial Drill, to demonstrate . correction, be scheduled within 90 days. Areas Requiring Corrective Action include those activities where demonstrated. performance during the exercise'was evaluated and considered faulty; corrective actions . are considered necessary but other factors indicate that reasonable assurance could be given that, in the' event of a radiological emergency, appropriate measures can and will
- be taken to protect the health and safety of the public. This category should be ,
relatively easy to correct in comparison to those classified as Deficiencies,- and correction must be demonstrated at the next regularly scheduled exercise. Areas Recommended for Improvement are also listed, as appropriate, for each jurisdiction or off-site activity. These recommendations are advisory in nature and the appropriate jurisdiction may or may not act on them as they see fit. 4 j 1 a
~
l I 20
' 2 EXERCISE EVALUATION j
-l On the basis of general criteria set forth in NUREG 0654/ FEMA. REP 1, Rev.1
-(November 1980), and' exercise objectives and observations,'. an - evaluation; has been
. performed of the April 8,.1987 exercise'at the South Texas Project Electric Generating Station. . This evaluation, beluding Deficiencies, Areas Requiring Corrective Action and FEMA Region ,VIl will- i Areas 1 Recommended for Improvement ' is presented herein.
maintain close liaisons with the. State and local governments'in determining the required . !
. corrective ' actions . (including timeframes 7for accomplishing the ; corrections) In j
. accordance with. all' established ; criteria and guidelines. There were no Deficiencies identified during this exercise.
1
- 2.1 TEXAS STATE OPERATIONS The following includes evaluations of the Texas Department of Health, Bureau of ,
Radiation Control (TDH/3RC) operations at their Headquarters in Austin, at. the State l EOC, and.at various operating locations in Matagorda County. Operations of the State Emergency Managt ment Council at their EOC in Austin and at the Disaster District EOC L in Pierce are also included. 2.1.1 Bureau of Radiation Control (BRC) Headquarters Operations State BRC Field response elements and personnel were, for the exercise, pre-positioned in Bay City. Therefore, mobilization and activation, as would be carried out in a real emergency, was not observed. However, the State plan and procedures were discussed and appear.to be functional in all respects. The Austin BRC office maintgins :
, operational control of. emergency response until a Chief of Field Operations assumes a control at either a staging area or an emergency operating site at the affecte'd locality.
The BRC Austin office was advised, by tel'ephone, at 0800, followed by a telex message, of an Unusual Event at the STPEGS plant. At 0842, . telephone and telex - At 0945, the Site Area
- messages were received upgrading the event to Alert status.
- Emergency message was received by telephone. At 1030 the Chief of. Field Operations advised BRC Austin that he was in the STPEGS EOC and was assuming control of BRC operations.
In the Austin office, following the Unusual Event declaration, BRC personnel moved a COMPAQ computer into the conference room, the emergency operations area, , and began developing potential. scenarios and inputting data for preliminary plume
' projections and dose projections. The IRDAM computer program, specifically mocified for STP, uses data on classification levels, wind speeds and directions, anticipated release rates, precipitation, and other factors to produce graphic depictions of potential plume pathways, dose projections, and other factors that can be used in early considerations of possible protective actions that could be recommended to local
' response organizations.
21 All BRC communications systems used in the exercise; telephone, telex, and hard-copy, functioned well throughout, and the operators and their procedures were entirely adequate. The staff was frequently briefed and a chalkboard was used for status display. A BRC liaison team was dispatched to the State EOC following the assumption of control by the Chief of Field Operations, and after the declaration of a General Emergency at STPEGS. While no specific FEMA objectives were assigned to this site in this exercise, it is felt that objectives 1, 3, 4, 5, 6, 36, 37 and 38 were met. DEFICIENCIES: NONE AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: NONE AREAS RECOMMENDED FOR IMPROVEMENT: NONE 2.1.2 Division of Emergency Management (DEM)/ State EOC - The DEM received notification of the declaration of an Unusual Event at the STPEGS plant at 0751. Initial activation of the State EOC was ordered at 0825, upon receipt of the Alert. Mobilization of additional staff was demonstrated as the emergency classification situation changed during the exercise. Three-shift operational capability was demonstrated by execution of shift changes. The State EOC serves as a back-up to the Disaster District EOC (in Pierce, Texas) where primary State response management authority is assigned in the even't of an STPEGS emergency. If a situation grows beyond the control of the Disaster, District, the State EOC would call on resources outside the District for support. ' The State EOC, located underground in the Department of Public Safety complex in Austin, is more than adequate to support all anticipated emergency operations, with appropriate space, power, lighting, furniture and equipment. Maps and displays in the EOC are excellent and, when augmented by the display materials brought by the BRC liaison group, provide a comprehensive array of aids for executive decision making. State EOC communications equipment, systems and procedures are very good. Telephone, telex, hard-copy and/or radio systems connect the EOC with all appropriate locations, with multiple redundancies and back-ups in case of failure of one or more
. systems. All incoming and outgoing communications are appropriately logged, duplicated and passed to EOC staff for action or information. Frequent reviews of action status were held to insure that no required actions or responses were overlooked.
The EOC staff, led by the DEM, demonstrated a thorough grasp of emergency operations requirements and participated actively in discussions leading to required decisions from the EOC. Coordination with other participating organizations and locations was maintained, and requests for Federal or other outside assistance were well managed.
( - 4 22 All exercise objectives (Nos. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 24, 25, 32, 36, 37 and 38) assigned to
- - the State EOC were adequately met.'
i DEFICIENCIES: NONE c AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: NONE AREAS RECOMMENDED FOR IMPROVEMENT: NONE 2.1.3 STPEGS EOC (BRC Operations) ;i The Texas Departm, t of Healthi Bureau of Radiation Control EOC team, pre- . staged at the Bay City Service Center, was notified of the Site Area Emergency, and the need to staff the STPEGS EOC at 0908. .They immediately initiated pre-deployment activities and when ready, departed for the EOC facility. An actual deployment, from normal offices in Austin, Houston or other BRC locations, would have required more time ! than was available in the exercise scenarlo. 'Therefore, although a mobilization from day-to-day offices was not demonstrated, the pre-staging was appropriate in this case. ! The State liaison officer to the utility arrived at the EOC at 1003, and was followed . shortly after by the remaining.BRC EOC staff. BRC functions at the STPEGS EOC includes dose assessment, development of protective' action recommendations and direction of BRC radiological field teams.- . A General Emergency was .' declared, concurrent with the arrival of the BRC team and the team .immediately initiated emergency response activities in accordance with their plans and procedures. ,
- While no shift change or around-the-clock activities were demonstrated during
, the exercise, rosters of second-shif t personnel, including names and assignments were presented to illustrate the State's capability to maintain 24-hour operation of an EOC-team.
The BRC EOC team adequately demonstrated their abilities to make needed decislehs and coordinate activities with other emergency response locations. However, the recommendation to Wharton County, from the State EOC, to take shelter was not specifically coordinates with the BRC Chief of Field Operations or his STPEGS EOC staff prior to being issued. This recommendation was based on dose projections available at the time. The STPEGS EOC is located adjacent to to the plant in the utility's Training Center. The State's main operating area within the EOC is in a room next to the main EOC. The entire EOC is dedicated to that purpose and therefore remai.ns set up and J ready for emergency response activities at all times. The State operations room is limited in size, resulting in cramped and crowded conditions. Partly because of the crowding, excessive noise in the room was a problem. The State communications equipment, and its operators are also located in the State operations room. It is useful to the overall operations that these activities are co-located, but these communications , f l
l 4 23 activities add to the noise level in the room. It is recommended that the communications operators be equipped with headsets in an attempt to limit the noise in the room. The State operations room is equipped with adequate furniture, telephones, supplies and other
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material to perform its designated functions. Emergency power and other back-up
~' systems are available if required. Utility support to the State operations includes clerical assistance, security, copying, message distribution, etc. Maps, status boards and activity displays are mounted in the State operations room and were used appropriately by the EOC staff. A problem that developed when entries on the displays could not be erased, when new entries were to be substituted should be resolved so that the displays can be updated as necessary.
Communications systems used by State BRC personnel in the EOC included: BRC. radio, the primary link to State field teams; Department of Public Safety (DPS) radio, the back-up link to the State field teams, and the link with the Disaster District EOC at Pierce. Commercial telephones, supplemented by a telefax, provided .the primary link to other State and local locations outside the EOC. HL&P communications support operations at the telefax were delayed initially due to telephone problems. Once the telephone problems were resobed, rapid and timely hard-copy transmissions were observed. The BRC radio system didn't work very well during the exercise. The field teams (monitoring and contamination control) were able to receive transmissions from the EOC, probably due to the fixed, high antenna, but the mobile units that were located more than about eight (8) miles from the EOC site, or in a few terrain features such as , underpasses, were received only intermittently by the EOC. The back-up system, the DPS radio in the field monitoring team vehicles, functioned effectively and communications were maintained. The decontamination and contamination control teams, which did not have the benefit of the DPS radio back-up, were never able to establish communications with the BRC system. The contamination control team was not aware that they could have communicated with the EOC through the inter-city frequency on the radio in the Sheriff's vehicle radio. When all DPS vehicles are equipped with radios now in the acquisition process, BRC frequencies will be available on these units and will resolve the range and coverage problems experienced by the BRC hand-held units. BRC teams not paired with DPS vehicles should be provided with more capable radios or additional repeaters should be installed around the EPZ for full area coverage. Projected dose rates, provided to the State STPEGS EOC Staff by the utility, were far in excess, by a factor of almost 100,000, of the results produced by the State field monitoring teams. This discrepancy appears to have beer. due to errors made by the utility. The BRC Chief of Field Operations recognized the proclem and made an anempt to determine what was wrong before tarang action. M ic wrnec out, nis decision to wait was a correct one. However, the discrepancy was .ever sdsfactorily resolved. The decision to recommend evacuation of all sectors out to five miles was prudent, based on the projected time required to stop the release and expectation of a wind shif t later in the evening. Inquiries about safety of water supplies were properly handled. At 1158 the BRC Chief of Fleid Operations queried the State EOC about the advisability of El use by Field Teams. Prior to receipt of a response, the Field Monitoring Team Leader advised the monitoring teams to take Kl. While the Chief of l l l
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3 t I' o 24 .. Field Operations has been' delegated the authority to recommend the use of K1 by the ! field teams, he did not make the recommendation until a response was received from the ' State EOC at 1214.. In the future, either the Chief of Field Operations or the' State EOC ' should issue an approval prior to K1 use being recommended. , The' State P!O liaison at the STPEGS EOC was fully involved in coordination of..
'information intended for release to the public. Following review of the material with the 4 Media Center, the. material was included in. the, BRC news releases. Cooperation between the EOC and the. Media Center was rapid and comprehensive.
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. Estimation of total population ~. exposure was not done' until an- evaluator questioned the State STPEGS EOC staff about it. . The staff then demonstrated the ability to carry out the required activities. . Recovery and reentry activities were table-topped due to the.brief-time frames in the exercise. The staff demonstrated that they.
understood.the important factors that need to be considered. Internal and ' external- communications to the State STPEGS EOC staff were
. logged, recorded, copied ' and distributed as appropriate. A problem was observed regarding the exchange of verbal information between the utility and the State staff. l The Utility Emergency Director provided periodic briefings to EOC personnel, including a liaison officer from the State 'who would later present the information-to the State d staff. During the exercise, one of the utility briefings included some information that
. was not intended for general release, but was not identified as being confidential or for
-Informational purposes only. The State liaison made this information known to the State staff which took action'as though the information was intended for public release. This resulted in some confusion and disaffection with the utility. It is recommended that the utility insure that briefings include a clear delineation of information that is to be released, and information that is for internal use only.
All FEMA exercise objectives (Nos. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 10, 14, 20, 25, 33, 34,' 36, 37 and 38) assigned to the STPEGS EOC were met, with the following Areas Requiring Corrective Action and Areas Recommended for Improvement.
- DEFICIENCIES: NONE AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION:
87-1
Description:
The State Department of Health (BRC) radio at tne STPEGS EOC was unable to provide contMuous communications with the State Field Teams due to limited range and/or power of the hand-held mobile units.- (NUREG 0654, F.1.d) Recommendation: The BRC radio system should be improved to provide for continuous communications with field units. Possible improvements .might include: increasing the power of the port-able units, installing additional repeaters around the EPZ or,
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- using the.DPS radio' system (now used as a back-up to the BRC. l , system) as the primary channel to the field teams.- l AREAS RECOMMENDED FOR IMPROVEMENT
- a Descriptions The room designated for use by the State EOC team is somewhat small, resulting in crowding and high noise levels.
' Recommendation: A larger room should be secured for use by the
' State emergency response team at the STPEGS EOC.
Description:
Open-speaker communications equipment in the State operating area contributed to the high noise levels. Recommendation: Radio operators be provided with headsets to reduce the noise levels and remove the staff distractions of.open: > communications.
Description:
Entries on the status boards used by the State staff-could not be erased. Recommendation: The status boards should be altered so that they can be erased and information revised, as required. 2.1.4 Disaster District EOC - Pierce, Texas
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The Pierce Disaster District EOC, the initial line of State response to any disaster, was activated promptly upon notification of the Unusual Event at STPEGS, and an appropriate staff was quickly mobilized. The EOC's capability of 24-hour operation . l L was demonstrated by presentation of. rosters of back-up personnel for all but the DEM . Regional Liaison Officer (RLO). No formal designation has been made to back-up this position. DEM indicated that they would designate, as required, an RLO from another disaster district to serve as relief for the Pierce RLO. It is recommended that this procedure be formalized, and specific back-up personnel be designated so that they can familiarize themselves with the locations and procedures in the Pierce area prior to a requirement for their activation. p The EOC facility, located in the Department of Public Safety Sub-District ! l . office, is adequate to support all disaster response operations and has the appropriate l' maps, status boards and displays to support such operations. Emergency power, food,
- , water and other essential supplies are available.
I. The EOC is supported by communications capable of maintaining contact with all
., - appropriate organizations, locations and field forces. Equipment' in place includes:
- dedicated and commercial telephone lines, data terminals, telex, Datafax, NAWAS, TELETS teletype and DPS radio sys.tems. A noisy line, during the early part of the
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p, ,- 26 l . exercise, on .the dedicated line to the utility, was the only communications. problem
" ' - experienced 'at Pierce. DPS communications operators are highly' trained and capable, l
' and operating procedures were, for the most part, adequate. It is recommended that
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;more detailed logs,L of both . incoming and outgoing . messages be maintained and that-operator.. initials .at d EOC receipt times be entered on incoming messages ~for later
- retrieval or review of specific message data.. The DPS communicator dispatched to activate a DPD radio et the STPEGS EOC to serve as a back-up to the BRC field team:
radios proved to be extremely valuable and maintained continuous contact when the BRC-hand-held units failed to provide adequate coverage.- v The Pierce EOC staff, under the direction of the Disaster District Committee
; Chairman, demonstrated a thorough knowledge of plans and procedures for, emergency;'
response. The staff was continuously aware of emergency classification levels and was- l fully involved in discussions of appropriate actions. - A problem that surfaced during the
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exercise involved the development and issuance, by the Pierce EOC,(simulated) of three , - news releases to radio stations in Wharton County. These releases we.s not coordinated with the State EOC or the Media Information Center prior to issue and could have .
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resulted in conflicting or confusing information reaching the public. It is recommended that procedures be= reviewed to insure. that all messages directed to the public be coordinated through the Media Information Center, prior to issue, to insure c' ommonality and consistency. i All FEMA exercise objectives (Nos. .1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 36, 37 and 38) assigned to the Pierce Disaster District EOC were met. ,
. DEFICIENCIES: NONE AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION:
87-2
Description:
The Pierce EOC simulated issuing three news releases to radio ' stations in Whar' ton County without coor-dinating the releases with the Media information Center. ,
- (NUREG 0654, G.4.b)
Recommendation: Review procedures to insure that all releases ;
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intended for the public are coordinated through the MIC, . a AREAS RECOMMENDED FOR IMPROVEMENT .
Description:
Communications operators did not initial or enter time of receipt on all incoming messages as required by procedures. l
- Recommendation: Operators should follow all procedures and complete message forms for later retrieval or response if required.
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Description:
Logs of outgoing messages were not maintained. The message clipboard was fairly effective in maintaining messages in l' sequence, but would be less than effective if quick' reference to a
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I message was required. Recommendation: Maintain message logs for outgoing and incoming messages.
- peseription: The DPS/DEM Regional Liaison. Officer (RLO) has no-Identified back-up or relief. The State DEM EOC indicates that another RLO would be, as needed, sent to relieve the Pierce RLO.
L .l Recommendation: Specific alternates to the Pierce RLO should be i designated, in advance. 2.1.5 Bureau of Radiation Control Staging Ares ;
;The BRC Staging Area, located at the Bay City Service Center, was activated on the arrival of BRC team personnel following the receipt of the Alert Notification. All-BRC teams and personnel were prestaged, to meet exercise time frames, at the Staging Area.- Therefore, actual mobilization and activation times were not observed. However,-
mobilization and activation procedures, described in State plans, appear to be adequate. { I The Staging Area facility is adequate in ' space and equipment and it has appropriate maps, status boards and displays to support its role In BRC deployment.
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Comn un! cations equipment at the Staging Area consists of telephones and a BRC radio base station. The equipment provided adequate links with all organizations and locations, -l except for daployed field teams. The hand; held radios used by the field teams are
' limited in range and frequently unable to contact either the Staging Area or the Field i Monitoring Team Leader at the STPEGS EOC. DPS back-up units, in the field team cars, i would have been able to maintain communications had there been a compatible unit at the Staging Area as there was at the STPEGS EOC. If some management of field teams is to be maintained at the Staging Area, improved communications to and from the teams must be provided.
The BRC STPEGS EOC staff, including the Chief of Field Operations, was deployed from the Staging Area as per written procedures. On arrival at the plant gate, they were ' denied entrance by. a plant guard who told them that "there is an emergency drill and the plant site is sealed". The team indicated to the guard that they were part of
.the emergency response and had assignments in the EOC, but he'still denied them
- entrance "until someone at the EOC authorized it." The team called the Stagir.; Area by radio requesting assistance, whereupon the Staging Area called the plant by telephone to request that they direct the guard to admit the State team. These events resulted in a to 20-minute delay in the State team reaching their assigned working area at the EOC. Personnel that should, or should not, be admitted to the plant site during an emergency is a utility issue that should be resolved prior to the emergency.
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28 , All BRC teams received briefings on current and projected plant and Control of meteorological conditions prior to their deployment from the Staging Area. the field monitoring teams was shifted to the Field Monitoring Team Leader at the EOC Once the teams were deployed, the as they were deployed from the Staging Area. Staging Area stood by to provide support as needed. All FEMA exercise objectives (Nos. 1, 4, 5, 6, 36 and 37) assigned to the Staging Area were met. DEFICIENCIES. NONE AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: See ARC A 87-1. AREAS RECOMMENDED FOR IMPROVEMENT: NONE 2.1.6 Bureau of Radiation Control Mobile Lab The BRC Mobile Lab, consisting of two units, a 45-foot semitrailer and an 18-The foot self-powered van, were pre-positioned at the STPEGS EOC for this exercise. units are not hardened and the trailer would be difficult to move rapidly out of locations A new site outside the in an area that could be at risk of contamination in an accident. EPZ, adjacent to the Media Information Center in Bay City, has been selected for future use, but communications and other in-place support to the unit (s) are not yet completed. It is recommended that the Bay City site be completed as soon as poss,1b and all required communications links, including a computer link to the STPEGS EOC, be l pre-installed for use as required. The Mobile Lab was activated at the appropriate time and adequate staff was available to perform required analysis functions. The staff was well trained and directed by an experienced radio-chemist. Their ability to calibrate their equipment, using j calibration samples was ably demonstrated. Germanium and Na1 detectors were available and computer and multi-channel analyzer equipment were used for calculations of radionuclides concentrations and measurements of levels as low as ab aCi/cc of lodine 131, using a 500 second sample measurement time. l l Field samples were received and prepared for analysis in the 16-f t. van ana toen l transferred to the 45-ft. lab trailer where the detectors and analyzers were located. The radionuclides-impregnated bench samples used for calibration of the detector systems j Proper air sample cartridges, soll, water, milk and vegetation samples were adequate. Also, l procedures were used to label, record, handle and dispose of fleid samples. procedures to avoid cross-contamination of samples and contamination of equipme were excellent. The Mobile Lab is equipped with BRC radio, phone lines, and, for this exercise, a l runner system to deliver analysis results to the EOC. At its future Bay City location, th 1 i
29 lab will be linked to the EOC by computer line. All communications worked well and j provided information needed by the lab, including advance notice of incoming field samples. All FEMA exercise objectives (Nos. 1, 5, 8, 9, 36 and 37) assigned to the Mobile Lab were met. DEFICIENCIES: NONE AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: NONE AREAS RECOMMENDED FOR IMPROVEMENT:
Description:
The Mobile Lab was located at the STPEGS EOC, in an area at risk of contamination. The lab is not hardened and can not be readily moved. A site outside the EPZ, in Bay City, has been selected for future operations but is not yet ready for use. Recommendation: Complete the Bay City site as soon as possible and evaluate the operations there at a future exercise. l 2.1.7 BRC Field Monitoring Team #1 Field Monitoring Teams were mobilized at and deployed from the BRC Staging Area located at Highway 35 and Avenue "M" in Bay City. These teams were made up of personnel from various Texas Department of. Health, Bureau of Radiation Control offices i throughout the state, and License and Weight Service Troopers of the Texas DPS. These team members were repositioned, in agreement with FEMA, in the Bay City area. l The' demonstrations of the operability and effective use of routine and emergency communication equipment and the adequacy of procedures and methods to l communicate with field personnel were met, but with difficulty. The Team #1 Health Physicist (HP) could hear instructions from the Team Controller, but efforts to respond were futile because of the low power of the hand-held radios. The team spontaneously solved this problem by having the Team #1 Department of Public Safety (DPS) Trooper handle communications via the DPS back-up rad!c. This technique was somewhat cumbersome, but effective. Prior to departure from the Staging Area, Team #1 ran through a thorough check of equipment using a written checklist. At field locations, ambient radiation levels were adequately determined (simulated). Care was taken to prevent the possible spread of contamination to equipment, vehicle and personnel. Team #1 was able 'to locate and navigate in the field to find al' preselected monitoring points. Maps were (c!!cwed and team members were familiar with the geographic area.
o - ,.. 30 , Team #1 was required to take one air sample during the exercise. Appropriate procedures and equipment were used to determine airborne radiolodine concentrations as low as E-07 uCl/cc in the presence of noble gases. An air pump was used to draw a i measured sample of air through a HEPA filter and a charcoal cartridge (silver zeolite cartridges were available in the kits but were not used). The air pump was properly calibrated for the appropriate flow rate. Sample cartridges were quickly screened with the G-M to determine if shielding was required during transport to the lab. Sample cartridges and filters were then labeled and double-b.agged prior to delivery.
' Exercise activities did not require' Team #1 to collect, transport, or analyze samples of soll, vegetation and water. However, during a lull in exercise action, Team #1 was requested by the FEMA evaluator to collect a soll sample. Team #1 did j
have all appropriate equipment and did demonstrate proper technique for all sample collection activities.
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Team #1 adequately demonstrated the ability to continuously monitor and l control emergency worker exposure through the proper use of dosimetry equipment and l procedures. Each team member was provided with a dosimetry kit and record keeping j j cards. Team members read their dosimeters approximately every half hour and properly ' recorded dose readings. The maximum allowable dose without authorization was known j by the team members. The team was aware that they should leave the area if that exposure dose was reached, and report to the Field Monitoring Team Leader for l j
- Instructions. The team was equipped with full anticontamination suits and protective equipment (i.e., coveralls, boots, gloves, respirators, etc.). l r
Team #1 demonstrated the ability to monitor Emergency Classification levels continuously and implement appropriate procedures. ] Since this was an init al exercise, there were no corrective actions verified j 1 during this exercise. - FEMA objectives met by Team #1 were 1,5,6,7,8,9,20,36 and 37. DEFICIENCIES: NONE AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: See ARC A 87-1. AREAS RECOMMENDED FOR IMPROVEMENT: NONE 2.1.8 BRC Field Monitoring Team #2 Fleid Monitoring Team #2 was, like all BRC teams, pre-staged at the Staging Area for the exercise. Activation and mobilization (an exercise simulation) were carried out at that location and teams were dispatched, by the Field Monitoring Team Leader at the STPEGS EOC. to locations in the EPZ for monitoring or sample collection I l
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assignments. Pre-deployment equipment checks, calibrations and inventories were i accomplished using a set of check ILts and SOPS included in the team equipment kits. l BRC hand-held radios were issued to the 6eam by staging area personnel for use in j communicating with the Field Monitoring Team Leader. These radios proved to be 1 inadequate as the team could receive transinissions but didn't have the range to reach the Team Leader, the Staging Area or other locations beyond about six miles from the j STPEGS EOC. The back-up DPS vehicle radlo was used successfully to maintain two-way i communications with the Field Monitoring Team Leader at the EOC. ] Team equipment and procedures for radiation survey and collection, I transportation and analysis of air, water, soil and vegetation samples were demonstrated. Team members were well trained and capable of executing all required operations. Milk and snow samples were not collected in this exercise. Team member exposure control procedures were in accordance with the written guidance included in their equipment kit. Each member was equipped with 0-200 mR and 0-20 R direct-reading dosimeters and a TLD. Protective clothing and respirators were ; available in the team kit. Maximum allowable' doses were known and dosimeter readings were monitored to insure dose was not exceeded, i All FEMA exercise objectives (Nos. 1, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 20, 36 and 3 7) assigned to this team were met. DEFICIENCIES: NONE AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: See ARC A 87-1. AREAS RECOMMENDED FOR IMPROVEMENT: NONE 2.1.9 BRC Field Monitoring Team #3 Team #3, along with all of the other BRC response teams, warprestaged at the BRC Staging Area. Therefore, team mobilization, as would be carried out'in an actual emergency, was not observed. However. the State plan and procedures for mobilization activities appeared to be entirely adequate. At the 5; aging Area, all appropriate equipment inventory and pNpara; ion activities were carried out by the team. They discovered broken cable connections for the inverter which powers their air sampler. They took immediate steps to improvise other cabling using jumper-cables from the team vehicle. Their reactions demonstrated excellent initiative and response by the team members.
. Team briefings prior to deployment were clear and concise and the teams were kept current on conditions during the course of the exercise via radio systems.
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32 Primary field team communications (BRC hand-held radios with magnetic antennas on vehicle roofs) were an' annoying problem throughout the exercise. The Staging Area in Bay City appeared to be at the extreme range of the radio units to the EOC at tt}e plant site. While transmissions from the plant could be copied on the mobile units staging there, return transmissions could not be copied at the EOC. Additionally, there were some landscape features (underpasses, etc.) in the plume EPZ that appeared to block transmissions from the mobile units. In contrast, the DPS back-up system was functional at all times and appeared to have the range and coverage that the BRC hand-held units appeared lacked. During the exercise, the. team executed a representative display of monitoring and sample collection techniques and procedures. They demonstrated a high degree of training and skill in ar such as communication, map reading, closed and open window ' j monitoring, collection os air, water, soll and vegetation samples and handling of materials to be transported to the BRC mobile lab for analysis. By prior agreement with FEMA, the team did not dress-out in Anti "C" clothing, gloves, boots, respirators, etc. However the appropriate equipment was aitallable and the team demonstrated that they could and would use the appropriate protective clothing if requ! ed. The team adequately demonstrated all objectives established for this exercise (Nos.1, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 20, 36 and 37). DEFICIENCIES: NONE AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: See ARCA 87-1. l AREAS RECOMMENDED FOR IMPROVEMENT: 1 j
Description:
Team efforts to obtain water samples, as directed from the EOC, at a steep, muddy, weed-choked stream bank {' re:sulted in personnel placing themselves in a precarious and potentially hazardous position, which would have been further complicated had they been wearing Anti 'C' gear. a s Recommendation: Provide each team with a water see:r o telescoping handle so that samples can be obtained from safer positions on stream banks. 2.1.10 BRC Field Monitoring Team #4 Team #4 was, as were all BRC teams, pre-staged at the BRC Staging Area. At this location, the team inventoried and prepared all team kit equipment and supplies for field operations. Excellent pre-deployment briefings on plant conditions, meteorological data and team readiness were given by Staging Area personnel. Following the
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declaration of General Emergency, the team was dispatched to its first assigned area for monitoring operations. l The BRC hand-held radio issued to the team proved to be unreliable as it could i usually receive transmissions from the Field Monitoring Team Leader, but its range was so limited that, beyond about six miles from the EOC, it could not be used to respond. The back-up radio in the DPS vehicle was successfully used to maintain two-way communications with the EOC. The team successfully demonstrated equipment and procedures for radiological ) monitoring and for obtaining air, water, soll and vegetation samples with consistent skill and ability. Team knowledge of the area and navigation by map reading was excellent. > The team members believed that separate approvals were required, from both BRC and DPS, to cross the plume centerline. In fact, procedures only require that the action be coordinated with either the BRC Field Monitoring Team Coordinator or the DPS communicator who are co-locatsd at the STPEGS EOC. The team was not kept fully advised of other possibly significant activities occurring in the EPZ. Information such as
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evacuation recommendations (including sectors and areas involved, etc.), access control point locations, significant public actions, etc. could be important to the team. It is , recommended that the Field Monitoring Team Leader provide, at appropriate intervals, ! brief status reports of significant EPZ activities to the field teams. Advice to the field team to take the radio-protective drug (KI) in their equipment kit was, based on readings being obtained by the team, not appropriate. This resulted in some confusion and concern. Procedures for determining requirements for KI for the field team should be I reviewed and training provided as necessary. l The FEMA exercise objectives (Nos. 1, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 20, 36 and 37) assigned to this team were met. DEFICIENCIES: NONE l
. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: See ARC A 87-1. l AREAS RECOMMENDED FOR IMPROVEMENT:
Description:
Field teams were not kept advised of other significant activities l underway in the EPZ. Recommendation: The BRC Field Monitoring Team Leader should periodically provide brief status reports of activities in the EPZ. 2.1.11 BRC Contamination Control Team The BRC Contamination Control (CC) Team was deployed, as were all BRC teams, from the Bay City Service Center Staging Area, to accompany a Matagorda
( 34 County Sheriff's Office (MCSO) Access Control team. In the pre-deployment period, the l CC team performed all required checks on equipment and supplies, and were briefed on plant conditions and weather data. On station at the designated access control point, the CC team demonstrated a j thorough knowledge of appropriate procedures and considerable skill in performance of required operations. Exercise " players" entering or leaving the access controlled area The team were monitored and if required, directed to decontamination facilities. 1 members demonstrated good decisionmaking and judgment during their operations. The BRC hand-held radio issued to the team was inadequate to establish two-way communications with the Field Monitoring Team Leader. The MCSO Deputy, manning the access control point, communicated with his dispatcher who then relayed messages. to the EOC by telephone. This alternate system proved cumbersome, subject to delays, ann at considerable risk of message misinterpretation or error. The CC team was not aware that the MCSO deputy could have communicated directly to the EOC on the Inter-city 5 It is recommended that the BRC radio system be l frequency on his vehicle radio. improved to insure two-way communications coverage throughout the potential operating area of BRC teams. q The designated Access Control Point was well outside the 10-mile.EPZ, with little risk of exposure to the BRC or MCSO personnel operating there. However, the CC team continuously monitored their urvey instruments and dosimeters to insure
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appropriate exposure control. All FEMA exercise objectives (Nos. 5, 17,'20 and 36) assigned to the Contamination Control Team were met. DEFICIENCIES: NONE 1 AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: See ARC A 87-1.
- AREAS RECOMMENDED FOR IMPROVEMENT: NONE 2.1.12 BRC Decontamination Assistance Team See Sees. 2.2.2 and 2.2.3 of this report for operations of State and Local government personnel at the Decontamination Area of the Reception / Care Center.
2.1.13 Media Information Center The Media information Center (MIC) for STP is located in the Holiday Inn on Highway 35 in Bay City. Spokespersons for the State Bureau of Radiation Control, Matagorda County and Houston Lighting & Power Company (HL&P) participated in this ' exercise. _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ __ - - - ~ - - - - - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
35 The MIC was activated at 0944. Matagorda County's PIOS were in place at about 0950. The State BRC's PIOS arrived at about 0955. This was not a complete demonstration of the state's mobilization and activation procedures since BRC participants began the exercise in Bay City. However, the BRC did follow its general plan for notifying people and activating its response teams. Coordination among spokespersons for different organizations and with other 3 locations was good. Although state and county PIOS are not often in a decision-making. role, they do play a key role in keeping emergency managers aware of information ; needs. The BRC's spokesperson, for example, recognized the need for and eventually got assistance, later in the exercise in describing actual radiological conditions and their implication for public health. This type of support, however, is crucial even in the early { stages of a nuclear plant emergency and might have been requested much earlier. l HL&P assumes the responsibility for the facility, maps and displays. Although l the MIC arrangements were adequate, performance could be enhanced if state and county PIOS who remain in their work areas during briefings could hear wha:it being said at briefings. This would aid and expedite the process of advising emergency managers of information needs at the MIC and enable those in the work area to play a stronger supporting role to the spokespersons. The physical arrangements of the press briefing room were less than ideal during ) this exercise. The presence of TV cameras in the front of the room made it more difficult for other reporters to see who was talking or to see the displays being used. Communications with other emergency - facilities took place without any problems. This was also true for information transmitted by telecopier. Although public instructions (EBS messages) were not drafted at the MIC, the county PIOS did recalve copies of all EBS announcements, which were also disseminated to all organizations and the media. This occurred throughout the exercise in a very timely fashion. For the most part, briefings were clear, accurate and timely. The only exception
'to this dealt with information related to the bases for protective actions and to actual or projected radiation levels in the off-site environment. This type of information should ,
be explained thoroughly and put in proper perspective. To accomplish this, either the ] State BRC or the utility (or both) should arrange for spokespersons who have access to this information and who have the ability to explain it. To the BRC's credit, a technically competent spokesperson appeared at the final exercise briefing and provided authoritative information on environment radiction levels. The BRC also provided useful information to the media in radiological emergency response and other :elevant features of response to radiologicalincidents. , l There were both frequent and effective exchanges of information among spokespersons for the various organizations. This was especially true for all written news l announcements which were processed rapidly and provided to all organizations.
)
e 36 HL&P operated the " rumor control" system at MIC. In conjunction with the utility's monitoring of television and radio broadcasts, it served as an effective means of providing information in response to inquiries and checking information being broadcast to the public. The employees. conducting .these activities were furnished copies of all state and county news releases, enabling them to answer questions about activities related to those organizations. The " rumor control" operatives were put to a challenging test answering call-in questions from more than 260 concerned citizens. Changes in emergency classification levels were provided promptly to and understood by the MIC. All FEMA exercise objectives (Nos. 1, 3, 4, 5, 14, 24, 25, 26, 36 and 37) assigned to the Media Information Center were met. DEFICIENCIES: NONE AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: NONE AREAS RECOMMENDED FOR IMPROVEMENT:
- Descriptions it is.Important to provide the affected public with information on the bases for protective actions, on projected dose rates and actual radiation levels in the off-site environment.
Recommendation: Either the State BRC or the utility (or both) should arrange for the appearance of spokespersons who have access to this technical information and who have the ability to explain it in laym, n's ta .as.
- Descriphon: The state and county PIOS who remain in their work areas during news briefings have no way of monitoring the briefings.
Recommendation: The addition of the capability to monitor
- briefings from the PIO work areas should be considered.
2.2 LOCAL GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS 2.2.1 Matagorda County EOC
- The Notification of Unusual Event (NOUE) was received by the Matagorda County Sheriff's office dispatch center at 0737 via the dedicated phone line. Based upon receipt of this Emergency Classification Level (ECL) the dispatcher notified the County Sheriff who is also designated as the County emergency coordinator. Subsequently, a hard copy message was received over the teletype at 0750. The hard copy received was not readable primarily because the copy was reduced in size and the handwriting was not
-y+
distinct. The emergency coordinator immediately contacted the Pierce DPS district
- office for verification of the message. Hard copy messages received later in the EOC over the telefax were readable. Based on receipt of the NOUE the County Judge, County Sheriff and the Public information Officer were notified. At 0822 the Alert was received
- and the appropriate staff was notified. The County Sheriff chose to partially activate- -
the~EOC. st the Alert notification rather than at the Site Area Emergency notification,.
- which was appropriate. An 'excellent job was demonstrated 'in setting 'up the EOC operations room. ?The room was organized and operational in'a short period of time.
' Everyone' arriving ~ at the EOC , knew their duties'and responsibilities in activating the j r
l
- EOC. 'The General Emergency was received at approximately 1030. Based on these observations, mobilization of the staff and timely activation of the EOC was adequately demonstrated. 1 The' ability to fully staff facilities and maintain staffing for 24 hours was demonstrated. All EOC staff were promptly activated and were present in accordance ,
with the plan and procedures. A roster was used to demonstrate 24-hour staffing; this was. agreed to prior to the' exercise as the means to demonstrate that portion of the objective. Access to the EOC operations room was adequately controlled and persons were required to sign in and out. Even though the EOC is outside the 10-mile EPZ,.it is recommended that once a radiation release has been confirmed, persons entering the .h
~ Matagorda County Sheriff's facility be-questioned as to whether they had been in the !
affected 10-mile EPZ. Appropriate measures could then be taken for controlling exposure.. The Matagorda County EOC is located in the County Sheriff's Department multi-purpose room in Bay City, Texas. The facility was completely adequate to support the emergency response activities. As mentioned previously, the facility is located outside-the 10-mile EPZ. Maps, status boards, and displays were excellent and were effectively used throughout the exercise. The " County Emergency Response Procedures" board was very useful for all EOC staff members. This:lisplay board listed certain procedures that should be implemented for each of the four Emergency Classification Levels. Overall, it was particularly noteworthy how quickly information was posted on status boards and how effectively this information was used in briefings and in carrying out staff responsibilities. The EOC staff demonstrated the capability to communicate with all appropriate ; personnel and organizations by effective use of equip mt and procedures. Durir.g de I: initial notification, activation, and subsequent activines, communications within the county, and to other contact points, functioned well and procedures were followed. One l . p noticeable equipment problem was the telephone hotline. Throughout the exercise. the emergency coordinator indicated that, at times, noise could be heard over the phone that negatively affected communications. However, the emergency coordinator effectively utilized the backup communleation systems when necessary. All telephones available for the EOC staff functioned well. There did not appear to be any problems with the telef ax l machine located in the EOC. All staff were well-trained in the use of communications ]; equipment and performed professionally in following procedures. L ! r d o -&a .
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' The Matagorda. County emergency coordinator was effectively. in charge of the'-
EOC _ operations. The County : Judge was also present throughout the, exerche and. provided excellent input into the decision making process. The County Sheriff, acting as Yi' the county coordinator, demonstrated outstanding management capabilities and kept h!s? 3 ,
. staff up-to-date with frequent briefings. He continued to utilize his management skills.- 3-
{ and _ abilities 'by anticipating the actions. that- he - might need to'.takel prior .to actua!L C L : events. The briefings provided input from all EOC staff members on the status of their@ j l activities. EOC staff members were updated on changes in;the emergency situation
. including Emergency Classification Levels as' they occurred. There was good use of the L ~
'J liaison representatives who were assigned to the county EOC. . Those'repidsentatives were from.the Bureau of Radiation Control ~and Houston' Lighting and Power Company.
l !' The utility representatives assisted in two areas of expertise:- (1) technical aspeelts,s(a s L did the BRC official), and-(2) drafting and preparation of EBS' messages. and pr releases. Coordination efforts were outstanding between the EOC,etaff and the:assigneb ( I: L liaison persons. These individuals' were utilized adequately by the pounty. emergency. '" coordinator.to explain or clarify.what was going on at the plant and the status of. other- r i > off-site activities.
's 1 i The 'EOC . staff did an outstanding job in monitoring Emergency Classification . l Levels and implementing procedures in a timely manner.; . In addition, not enly/were, l
procedures followed, but as previously mentioned, the county coordinator demonstrated an ability to effectively anticipate actions and prepare to implement the? appropriate procedures. , There vu an excellent demonstration of processing incoming information andI d 1 rapid documentation on status boards. . The status board information we.s updated continuously and was effectively used during briefing sessions to . monitor the actions - , being implemented. Hard copy messages and status board summaries were developed, 'j
. copied, and distributed to all em%rgency response personnel within,the EOC. Alerting 1
of the public, within the 10-mile EPZ, and dissemination. of an initial instructional . message within 15 minutes was handled effectively and efficiently by the County Judge _i and utility liaison representatives., On two occasiona, decisions were made by the County 1 Judge to implement evacuation measures. On both occasions the sirens were activated i and an EBS message was developed and disseminated within eight minutes. The Media Information Center was immediately provided telefax copies of all press releases and . EBS messages. The staff demonstrated an exceptional job of coordination and team work and those involved are to be commended. During the evacuation phase of the . exercise, EOC, staff 3 particularly the 1 transportation officer) successfully demonstrated .(simulated), offeckhe esod . timely, , capability for arranging transportation for evacuees, including school children. Also, a 4 file was checked to see if there were any special needs people'in the' evacuated area. The transportation officer and Palacios Mayor handled their responsibilitiesg well by, i putting bus drivers on standby and anticipating certain actions that might netd to be' q implemented. Also properly demonstrated was the organizational ability and resources 1
. necessary to deal with impediments to evacuation. Access control points were pedmptly activated as protective actions were ordered. There was discussion followin'g ' the exercise that illustrated some additional work was needed in the following areas:
I = -_
I J f p c 39
? -
(1) evacuation tL hthe, estimates by evacuation zones, and, (2) other traffic control points that needed to be established. The McAllis'ter Reception Center was promptly activated as called for by the county plan. Estimater; of the number of people expected were also discussec. The county coordinator initiated a second call to insure that the reception center was activated and ready to receive evacuees from Matagorda County. A second reception L center was also activated (simulated). According to the County' plan and procedures, the radiological officer is responsible for radiological protection of emergency workers. It is the responsibility of this individual to inventory dosimetry equipment, check operability of equipment and zefo dosimeters for use at the reception centers and the road blocks. Dosimetry kits -I ' have bee'n'put together for county personnel who are assigned to field activities. It is also the responsibility of the radiological officer to insure that emergency workers read
/ and log exposure and do not -exceed specified exposure levels. Radiological exposure control measures were implemented at various locations in the field; none were observed , at the County EOC. 5 During the exercise, the emergency coordinator demonstrated the ability to ,
effectively call upon and utilize outside support agencies. Support was requested from l the Bay City Police Department and from the State of Texas through the Department of l Public Safety Sub-District Office in Pierce, Texas. l A discussion took place on recovery and reentry issues at the Matagorda County EOC. This session was directed by the County Sheriff. It was evident that the county l plan procedures did not fully address actions that need to be taken during recovery and " reentry phases of exercises or actual events. Based on procedure inadequacy, the objective to demonstrate implementation of appropriate measures for controlled recovery and reentry was not fully met. A checklist is to be added to the county plan procedures concerning recovery / reentry measures to be implemented. ! Overall, all EOC staff members assigned to the Matagorda County EOC demonstrated their capabilities in an exceptional manner. One outstanding highlight was the excellent coordination demonstrated between the County Judge and County Sheriff (county emergency coordinator) in carrying out the responsibilities and functions of operating the EOC. Also the Palacios Mayor was highly involved in the EOC activities being implemented. All of the following FEMA exercise objectives were fully and successfully j de nonstrated: Nos. 1, 2. 3, 4, 5, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 19, 25, 35, 36, 37, 38 snd 39.
.. Although not listed as an exercise objective, #18 was also demonstrated. The only
< uercise objective not met was #34 relating to reentry / recovery. Objective #20 was not i
. fully observed and will be evaluated during the next scheduled exercise.
l 4 DEFICIENCIES NONE l l l l l
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,Q j,a N){/MAREAS[REdOIRING '8'l5' Descelgittor.h : Evacuation time estimat'evDOE 8CTIVE ACT
~
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by evacuation-zones ! 5 }I ')' - were no't avdla'oie! (NUREG 0654, J.10.L.).* ' i Ii J- \ 'L a.~~ t
'lecommendethn; Evacuation time estimates by zones should be l
Mallable and ine!uded in' the local plans / procedures. F' .s. 3 87-4 Escristiim Additional irtific control points were not' esub'ishett ' during the' evacuation phase of the exercise. 3 ~N q, (NUBEG 0654, J.10.}). O.
*' .w .h
< 'r RecommendatiuQ 1Reev;aluate ; g possible intersections and 3
ethe posdle rogds !t[st will need traffic control points e wf ' I}f 'y 8,7 -5 established for convol of decess to evacuated areas. DescriptNm
\
'1hd ounty procedures did .not include specific j
'a actions !.o be tak'en to implement controlled recovery and G' (
- k i reentry operations. (NUREG 0654, M.I.).'
j
< Recommendation Develop and ; test procedures . to use in l
.\
findementing recovery and r eentry operations. s s s 1 si S N 1 3) AREAS RECOMMENDED YOR IMPROVEMENT
., ; ~ y, ,,\
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- s , b Description 'Even though the county EOC is' located outside the 10-mile EPZ, persomi entering ihe EOC facility were not questioned , 3
as a precautionary measure as 'toL whether they had been in 'he
's 10-mile EP2.k Recomrixtdation:, As a precautionary measure, once a release has been confitne6c hersons entering the county EOC facility should be t questioned and appropriate measures taken if nccessary to control exposure or cont' amination. y
~
i , 2.2.2 Reception Center (Monitoring /Decontamirdtion Function)
%}f "
The function of monitoring and decontaminating evacuees and their vehicles was [ performed at the Reception Center at McAllister Junior High Schoolin Bay City. Mobilization of the Monitoring / Decontamination staff and activation of the a L facility were in accordance with local, plans and procedures, and were adequately ' demonstrated. BRC personnel, and personnel from the Texas Department of Health, Public Health Region 11 office in Rosenberg were on hand to advise and assist local r personnel. Appropriate supplies and equipment were available and properly used by Center personnel. D 4 i 1s _ . _ _ .
4 . 41 Entry to the Reception Center for evacuees was through one designated door. As evacuees entered, they were given a preliminary screening for radiological contamination. If no contamination was found, the evacuee was direrled to the Red Cross registration desk for entry processing. (See Sec. 2.2.3, Reception ibnetion.) Evacuees found to be contaminated were routed to a second monitoring station, via a paper covered walkway, which was roped off from the main . gym floor. At the second monitoring station more detailed monitoring was performed. If contamination levels in excess of 0.1 mR/hr' were observed, a ' PERSONNEL DECONTAMINATION RECORD' was filled out to document survey findings and subsequent decontamination efforts. In either case, after being monitored, all Individuals were directed to the decontamination area and assisted in decontamination in accordance with written procedures. After decontamination, evacuees were again monitored and, if clear, issued cleart clothing and directed to ARC registration. Vehicles of arriving evacuees were also monitored, but, with the concurrence of the evaluators, vehicle decontamination was described rather than demonstrated during j the exercise. Procedures require all vehicles with contamination levels above 0.1 mR/hr to - be hsid in a designated area near the Reception Center until they can be decontaminated. Vehicles with contaminated levels less than 0.1 mR/hr may be released to their drivers to be decontaminated as opportunity permits. i f Communications for the Monitoring / Decontamination function consisted of a specially installed commercial telephone line, as well as the normal telephone lines in the school. A BRC hand-held radio was also available, but this unit was only able to receive ! messages. Probably due to its limited range, the hand-held uitit was not able to transmit ) to other BRC operating locations. It is recommended that the BRC take action to ! t resolve the radio problem so that the Monitoring / Decontamination assistance personnel l at the Reception Center can have direct, two-way, communications with other BRC ' i operating locations (fixed and field) throughout the 10-mile EPZ. Monitoring / Decontamination personnel adequately demonstrated knowledge of required techniques and procedures with the following minor exceptions:
- 1. A television cameraman was allowed to cross into the controlled access area, and onto the paper walkway, to film an evacuee being ,
monitored. He spent several minutes in the area before being j asked to leave. On exiting the controlled area. he was not cheeked d for contamination. It is recommended that security procecures ce reviewed to ensure that unauthor! zed oersons are cenied access to controlled areas. ) and that anyone leaving those areas be monitored. )
- 2. Evacuees found to have contamination on their shoes during the initial screening were directed down the paper walkway to the j second monitoring station without being issued paper shoe covers. !
It is recommended that shoe covers be issued to any evacuee with shoe contamination. This would reduce the possibility of spreading
*l q
h . k 42 contamination to the floor in other parts of. the Monitoring / , Decontamination area. -. f
- 3. The personal belongings of one evacuee (a purse) were found to be .J contaminated. The purse was passed to the decontamination area,
. placed in a plastic bag and returned to the evacuee for home decontamination. ~ The level of contamination was not recorded.
Therefore, the decision to release the item could not be based on recorded levels. . if the observed level is less than 0.1 mR/hr, the . '
. decision to release the item for later_ home decontamination is in accordance with written procedures.
It is recommended that contamination levels of belongings ) returned to evacuees be recorded for file purposes. ] i
' A few of the monitors appeared to lack knowledge of proper j 4.
evacuee contamination control procedures as they asked already monitored and cleared drivers to open doors of. possibly' ) contaminated vehicles, with the resultant possibility of j decontaminating ' the drivers. Also, monitors displayed varying j levels of understanding of techniques to be employed ~ ln vehicle { decontamination. It is recommended that monitors be provided additional training on procedures and techniques for evacuee contamination control, vehicle' monitoring, and vehicle decontamination. Monitoring / Decontamination personnel knew and understood emergency. worker exposure control procedures and were equipped with direct reading dosimeters and f l TLDs. The dosimeters were periodically read'and exposures recorded. All FEMA exercise objectives (Nos. 1, 5,' 20, 27, 29, 36, and 37) assigned to the Monitoring / Decontamination function at the Reception Center were met. DEFICIENCIES: NONE j l AREAS REQUIRING CCan CTP.*Z ACTION: See ARCA 87-2. 87-6
Description:
Monitoring / Decontamination personnel did not understand, or did not follow, written procedures for vehicle ] monitoring, vehicle decontamination or evacuee contamination I control. (NUREG 0654, K.S.a. K.S.b) Recommendation: Additional training should be provided to Monitoring / Decontamination personnel to ensure that written procedures are understood and followed. 1 1
43 AREAS RECOMMENDED FOR IMPROVEMENT:
Description:
Unauthorized persons were allowed access to the controlled area. Recommendation: Security procedures should be reviewed to ensure control or access to potentially contaminated areas. 2.2.3 Reception Center (Reception and Care function) McAllister Junior High School, in Bay City, serves as the primary reception center for evacuees from the 10-mile EPZ, and approximately 1100 evacuees could be housed there. The Center is staffed by American Red Cross personnel. Security is provided by. the. Bay City Police Department. The Bay City Red Cross. office was . notified by the Matagorda County EOC at 1054 of the requirement for activation of the Reception Center. Prior to this time, some preliminary set-up of the Center by ARC' personnel was observed. Following the activation request, personnel from the ARC, the County Health Department and the BRC arrived at the Center and full preparations to receive evacuees began. All of the Center staff appeared knowledgeable of their duties and contributed to the orderly and efficient set-up of the Center. By 1130, the Center was fully activated and ready to receive evacuees. Appropriate equipment and supplies were available and used by Center personnel.
. Following initial screening for contamination by Monitoring / Decontamination personnel, and additional monitoring and decontamination if necessary, evacuees were directed to the ARC registration station where full details were recorded on ARC forms. The evacces were then directed to the school cafeteria where they were either assigned to a classroom area for housing or allowed to leave the center if other-accommodations were available to them.
Communications with other locations was via a specially installed telephone line for ARC use or by normal commercial telephone lines in the school. The Reception
. Center supervisor could also be contacted by a pocket pagar, alerting her to call the Matagorda County EOC for Information.
All FEMA exercise objectives (Nos. 1, 5, 27, 28, 36, 37, and 39) assigned to the Reception and Care function were met. l
)
DEFICIENCIES: NONE
~!
AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: NONE l AREAS RECOMMENDED FOR IMPROVEMENT: NONE l
.__ ______-_ A
l 44 2.2.4 Taylor Brothers Ambulance Service The Matagorda County Sheriff's office called the ambulance servlee with a request for transportation of an accident victim from the STPEGS plant to the hospital. ' The ambulance crew responded within one minute and acted realinically and promptly, as though it was a real emergency. The ambulance used for the response appears fully equipped to respond to an emergency and carries a radio capable of communicating with the hospital, the Sheriff's dispatcher and other emergency services. All equipment functioned adequately. Ambulance crew procedures were followed for handling the contaminated j patient. The contaminated patient and the entire stretcher were wrapped in cloth sheets j to prevent contamination spread and the floor and seats of the ambulance were draped. l Crew members used disposable gloves to handle the patient and all potentially I contaminated material. On arrival at the STPEGS plant, a plant employee boarded the ambulance with a "Off-site Assistance Kit" containing additional protective gear such as plastic sheets, gloves and bootles. However, provision of this " kit" was apparently a change in procedure from previous drills. Thus, the ambulance crew did not know the contents of the " kit" until after the patient had already been loaded using the cloth sheets. Nonetheless, appropriate care.was used in handling the patient and stretcher to l avoid spreading contamination. { At the hospital, patient transfer to the protected part of the emergency room { was equally careful. Ambulance personnel were monitored for contamination before being allowed to move to a clean area. The vehicle was monitored and found to be (simulated) contaminated inside. Procedures were described for placarding the vehicle I and returning it to STPEGs for decontamination, along with any affected equipment. The ambulance crew used the on-board rrdio to communicate with the hospital enroute so that they were aware of the patient's condition prior to his arrival. There l were some communications / coordination problems that originated at STPEGS. When the ambulance arrived at the plant gate, it was directed to another gate, then mistakenly l escorted.to the STPEGS EOC, and only then escorted to the accident site, ten minutes af ter arrival at the first gate. Then, when the ambulance was ready to depart, the crew was instructed to wait for the arrival of another technical person from the plant, which i incurred an additional six-minute delay. These events indicate a failure of internal communications or coordination at the plant. l The ambulance service was never informed, before, during, or af ter its response, ! of conditions at the plant, the Emergency Classification Level, or other factors, beyond f the condition of the patient, that might influence their response or the way to approach . J the incident site. As emergency response personnel, they should be considered to have an Interest in the information, and should be advised of conditions at the plant. 1 The ambulance crew was provided with dosimetry only upon arrival at the plant, and the instruments were collected again when they deparud. As emergency workers, they si ould be provided with instruments for the entire rur. Into and out of the EPZ.
3
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=. -
45 l All FEMA exere!se - objectives (Nos. 1, 5, 39, 36, and 37) assigned to the ambulance service were met. DEFICIENCIES: NONE i
. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION
~
87-7
Description:
Ambulance personnel responding to the call, from STPEGS, to transport an injured, contaminated patient, were issued, dosimeters while at the plant, but not while enroute into or out of the EPZ. If they had been required to enter the plume to reach their response location, there would hava been no record of their exposure. (NUREG 0654, K.3.a). i Recommendation: Personnel manning any ambulance that might be called to respond to an incident at the STPEGS plant should be issued appropriate dosimeters prior to entering the EPZ. i I AREAS RECOMMENDED FOR IMPROVEMENT I e
Description:
Contents of the "Off-site Assistance Kit," provided at the plant, were not known to the ambulance c'rew in advance. Provision of this " kit" was apparently a change from previous drills. Recommendation: Changes in procedures between the plant and the ambulance service should be communicated in advance.
Description:
The ambulance service was not informed of the status of the emergency beyond the patient's condition. Recommendation: Communications to the ambulance service should include basic information on the status of the emergency. 2.2.5 Matagorda General Hospital Upon notification, from STPEGS, that a contaminated injured patier.t was :,e!r.g sent to the hospital, mobilization efforts were started immediately. A 1.rge number of hospital staff, representing various departments, participated in tne mobilization effort. A hot area was quickly established and appropriate emergency room staff dressed in protective clothing ready for receiving the patient. Two STPEGS plant HPs arrived ahead of the patient to provide technical assistance as needed. l Two-way radio communication was established with the in-bound ambulance and ) the hospital was advised of the patient's vital signs, level and location of contamination, j ! and the estimated time of arrival at the hospital. I j I.. L__ -_
i 46- . Emergency room staff demonstrated appropriate equipment and techniques for
~
decontamination of an injured, contaminated patient. Proper precautionary measures were taken to prevent the spread' of contamination.by sealing air intakes, bagging specimens and changing gloves when appropriate. Laboratory analysis of contamination would be accomplished at the plant or at the BRC mobile lab. The two plant HPs were very knowledgeable and provided technical assistance to the hospital staff as needed. j They were particularly helpful in monitoring the patient's contamination level and in assisting the hospital staff in correct exit procedures from the hot area. Two HPs from the State BRC were also at the hospital to act as technical advisors, j The present hospital emergency room is limited as 'a treatment area due to '{ restricted access through a single entrance, used for all patients, and due to its small size. This problem will be alleviated in approximately 18 months when a new emergency room is completed. The new f acility will include a separate entrance and a specialized . treatment area for contaminated patients. In summary, the hospital staff demonstrated excellent knowledge of mobilization j procedures and proper technique for handling and treatment of a contaminated patient. The staff demonstrated this capability in a limited physical environment and responded to three actual emergencies during the course of the exercise. 4 All FEMA exercise objectives (Nos.1, 5, 31, and 36) assigned to the Matagorda General Hospital were met. ! l DEFICIENCIES: NONE l AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: NONE AREAS RECOMMENDED FOR IMPROVEMENT: NONE 2.3 UTILITY ISSUES l The following is a summary of Houston Lighting and power issues which relate l to, or impact upon, off-site activities of other participating agencies. FEMA acknowledges that its responsibility is not to cite utility Deficiencies, Areas Requiring ' i Corrective Actions, or Areas Recommenced for Impovement. However, the issues that follow should te addressed by the NRC and/or the utility u prevent their recurrence during future exercises, or in a real emergency, at the STPEGS plant.
- Description There was a significant difference, by a factor of I almost 100,000, between the dose rate projections provided by the utility and the readings being observed by the State Field Monitoring Teams, and the dose data produced therefrom.
I I I i
,a 47- I ,4.-
{ i Recommendation: . The' utility and the NRC should determine the j
' cause of this discrepancy and take appropriate action to correct this -
. potentially serious problem' .
e -
Description:
Utility.. briefings of EOC staff'at the STPEGS EOC, q < including State'.llaison officers, included information' not' intended j
' for general. release. The information was not identified as . !
confidential or for internal informational purposes only. The State.' j llaison relayed the information to the State staff who took what j
- appeared ' to ; be appropriate ' action' and. released some .of _ the -!
information to the public. ! Recommendation: The' utility should clearly L identify, - during briefings, any information that is not intended for release or is for - internal use only. e'
Description:
The State STPEGS EOC team, on arrival at the plant gate, was denied access by a plant guard until after a radio message
. was passed to the BRC Staging Area, where a telephone request for-team access was passed to the plant, which then advised the guard.
to admit the -team. A 10- to IS-minute delay 'in the State . team ! reaching their -work area at the EOC resulted from the actions of- ' the plant guard. Recommendation: Utility procedures should Jinclude clear . Instructions to plant security on who should be admitted to the site :! during an emergency.
Description:
- Communications on the' . utility ' " hot-line" at the Matagorda County EOC were made difficult due to excessive ' noise' on the line.
Recommendation: The source of the ' noise'should be located and appropriate line repairs made.
Description:
Apparent failure of internal communleation and ; coordination at the plant caused excessive delay in directing the j ambulance called to provide . care for the injured, contaminated 1 patient and further delay in moving the patient to the hospital. l Recommendation: Review internal plant communications / j coordination procedures to facilitate prompt direction of an ambulance to an incident location within the plant site, and to facilitate prompt departure from the plant area.
48
' 3 TRACKING SCHEDULE Foil STATE / LOCAL ACTIONS TO CORRECT,
.. DEFICIENCIES AND AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION Individual exercise site narratives, in Section 2 of this. report, have provided Action, - with
' listings of Deficiencies and/or. Areas Requiring Corrective recommendations, noted by the Federal evaluators during the Apef18,1987 exercise. .The evaluations . developed by the' Federal evaluators were based on applicable planning standards and evaluation criteria set forth in Sect!6n II of NUREG 0654/ FEMA REP 1, .
Rev 1 (November 1980), and pre-approved exercise objectives. The FEMA Region VI D rector is responsible for ' certifying to. the' FEMA Associate Director, State and Local Programs and Support, Washington, D.C., that any Deficiencies and/or Corrective Actions noted in the exercise will be corrected, and that such corrections will be incorporated into emergency response plans as appropriate. FEMA Region-VI may request that the State of Texas, and Matagorda County, j submit measures that they will or intend to take to correct those problems noted by the Federal evaluators. If corrective actions are necessary, FEMA Region VI.will request i that a- detailed plan, including ' dates for scheduling and implementing the. corrective action ~s, be provided if such actions cannot be instituted immediately. l
. Table 1 provides, by exercise operating location or activity group, a consolidated summary of all' Deficiencies and/or ' Areas Requiring Corrective Action. .As noted previously in this report, there were no Deficiencies identified in the April 8,1987 exercise. The table is designed so that space has been allowed to addi (1) the proposed _
l corrective' actions that will be undertaken by the State or local jurisdiction, and (2) the l projected and actual dates of completion. l i
l i
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t l al s ui n qw . ' eo y e s ti at f c d s e t coa at si l SA u uc nq s r f eoe ovid l l ee i t a i R se nt ae w oc nl . e i ei r t r mr s roer a o nCA ut a l C t y ioR A u f E a ec t c st S wl D a I E a u ~a ih a C cd q E A one t d E I L ad d e I D A eet E Fd - s v a n ol u T a pol C os a E J r ev P r e O R P S A n I d o E ei T st e P oet A t pl a S opD A m l rm ' o P o C S 7 8 9
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54 , 4~ EVALUATION OF OBJECTIVES
- 4.1
SUMMARY
OF FEMA OBJECTIVES REMAINING TO BE MET Table 2 provides a consolidated listing of those FEMA objectives which,- according to the FEMA'RAC Chairman, have not been satisfactorily met or tested, and which should be incorporated into exercise' objectives on or by the sixth year of the six-year exercise cycle in which all objectives must be tested and met.. These objectives should be considered in the development of future exercise objective lists; as well as those FEMA . objectives which, although previously tested, and satisfactorily demonstrated, must be tested and evaluated during any full-participation exercise of off-site State and local response capabilities. 3 4.2 FEMA OBJECTIVES TRACKING - SOUTH TEXAS PROJECT
. Table 3 provides a comprehensive tracking system of all FEMA exercise
~
objectives,'NUREG 0654 Reference Elements, latest exercise objectives, jurisdictional
- responsibilities, exercise dates, identified deficiencies and/or ' required corrective actions, and the date that specific ~ FEMA objectives were met by' State and local agencies. This system will track the progress and status of this data through the six-year.
exercise cycle in which all FEMA objectives muct be tested and met. 1 l
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1 55 ) l i I TABLE 2 Summary of FEMA Objectives Remaining to be Met j i L: Jurisdiction
. FEMA Objective and NUREC Reference . . _
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- 11. . Demonstrate stility' to project dosage State: Not tested.4/8/87 to the public via ingestion pathway ,
exposure, based on field data; and to { determine appropriate protective measures based on PAGs and other relevant factors.
- 12. Demonstrate ability to implement pro- State and local: Not tested tective actions for ingestion path- 4/8/87 way hazards (J.9, J.10.a/g). )
- 18. . Demonstrate organizational ability
~
Matagorda County: Demonstrated ; and resources necessary to effect an but not an objective of the i I orderly evacuation of mobility- exercise 4/8/87 impaired individuals within the plume EPZ (J.10.d).
- 20. Demonstrate ability-to' continuously Matagorda County: Partially monitor and control emergency' worker met 4/8/87 exposure (K.3.a. K.3.b)
- 21. Demonstrate ability to make the State and Local: Not tested decision, based on predetermined 4/8/87 criteria, whether to issue KI to emergency workers and/or to the public (J.10.f).
- 22. Demonstrate the ability to supply and State and local: Not tested administer KI, once the decision has 4/8/87 i been made to do so (J.10.e).
- 23. Demonstrate the ability to support Matagorda County: Not tested an orderly evacuation of on-site 4/8/87 personnel (J.2).
34 Demonstrate ability to determine and State: Met 4/6/c7 implement appropriate measures for Matagorda County: Partially q controlled reentry and recovery met 4/8/87-(H.1). i O 4
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