ML20214S859
| ML20214S859 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Braidwood  |
| Issue date: | 09/24/1986 |
| From: | Steptoe P COMMONWEALTH EDISON CO., ISHAM, LINCOLN & BEALE |
| To: | Callihan A, Cole R, Grossman H Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel |
| References | |
| CON-#386-901 OL, NUDOCS 8609300120 | |
| Download: ML20214S859 (35) | |
Text
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) ISHAM, LINCOLN & BEALE DOCKETED COUNSELORS AT LAW gggpC THREE FIRST NATIONAL PLAZA .
CHICAGO,ILUNOIS 60602
' EDmRD S ISHAM, 1872 1902 TELEPHONE 312 558-7500 19 S. LASALLE STREET ROBERT T LINCOLN.18721889 TELEX 2-5288 CHICAGO. ILUNOIS 60603 WILLIAM G BEALE. 1885-1923 ypp g r r: 312 $58-5500 B ME R 1150 CON.NECTICUT A NUE. N W.
SUITE 1100
" "' 72 2 83i f3'0 TO CALL WRITER DIRECT September 24, 1986 Herbert Grossman, Esq. /
Chairman e' ~
Administrative Law Judge Atomic Safety and Licensing Board United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 Dr. A. Dixon Callihan Administrative Law Judge 102 Oak Lane Oak Ridge, Tennessee 37830 Dr. Richard F. Cole Administrative Law Judge Atomic Safety and Licensing Board United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 Re: In the Matter of Commonwealth Edison Company (Braidwood Station, Units 1 and 2)
Docket Numbers 50-456 and 50-457-01
Dear Administrative Judges:
Enclosed is a copy of the rebuttal testimony of Robert V. Laney filed on behalf of Applicant in this case.
We anticipate filing additional rebuttal testimony in the near future.
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TESTIMONY OF ROBERT V. LANEY Q.1. Please state your name and business address.
A.1. My name is Robert V. Laney. My business address is' 24 Trout Farm Lane, Duxbury, Massachusetts 02332.
Q.2. Please describe your educational and professional background.
A.2. I am a graduate of the U. S. Naval Academy. I hold a Masters degree in Marine Engineering from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and an MBA from the University of Chicago. During and follvwing World War II, I was on active Navy duty at sea and ashore.
I was Engineering Officer on a carrier, destroyer and battleship.
From 1948 to 1960 I served under Admiral H. G.
Rickover as Project Manager in the Naval Reactor Program and later as Technical Representative of the AEC and the Navy at the Westinghouse Bettis Atomic Power Laboratory during the design and construction of various nuclear power plants for Naval vessels and the Shippingport nuclear power station.
While working in the Naval Reactors Program, 1 acquired extensive experience in designing and constructing naval nuclear power plants. This included construction and operation of a landbased submarine prototype power plant and the Shippingport nuclear power station.
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While Naval Technical Representative at the Bettis Plant in Pit.sburgh, I led the development of the first comprehensive quality assurance program for the industrial plants supplying critical reactor components for naval vessels.
1 In 1960 I became Nuclear Manager at the Quincy (Mass.) Shipyard of Bethlehem Steel Company where I was responsible for the construction and installation of nuclear plants in the nation's first two nuclear powered surface ships: After General Dynamics Corp.
acquired the Quincy yard in 1964, I became Vice President and General Manager of the Quincy Division.
As General Manager, I was responsible for construction and delivery to the Navy of several nuclear powered submarines. This required retraining shipyard personnel accustomed to constructing surface ships to build nuclear submarines to the most exacting standards of quality. Quality control procedures and practices were strengthened and inspector training extended. I was closely involved in setting and main-taining Q.C. standards and in helping to resolve quality-quantity conflicts.
This retraining of crafts, strengthening of 0.C.,
and subsequent construction took place in a unionized shipyard of several thousand employees. I acquired experience in various phases of union-management rela-tions, such as contract negotiations, wage administra-
, tion, grievance resolution, and overtime, sick and
( personal time and disciplinary procedures. J
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In 1970 I joined the Argonne National Laboratory, op-erated by the University of Chicago, as Associate Director responsible for nuclear reactor research and development.
I later became Deputy Director, with responsibility for all applied energy research and development; for the oper-ation of Argonne's several research reactors; and for gen-eral laboratory administration, quality assurance, and per-sonnel and union relations.
Since leaving Argonne' in 1979, I have been an inde-pendent consultant in the nuclear energy field.
Q.3. Would you please describe your professional experience since leaving the Argonne National Laboratory?
A.3. I have:
a) Served on a senior advisory Panel, reporting to the Chairman of the Board'of the Commonwealth Edison Company, whose mission was to assess the adequacy of the company's initiatives taken as a result of the accident at Three Mile Island, b) Served as member of an Advisory Committee to the Chief Executive Officer of the General Public Utilities Corporation, whose mission was to evaluate two particular areas of concern after TMI: (1) personnel selection and training, and (2) i man / machine interface and communications problems.
c) Formed and served as Chairman of a review team whose purpose was to improve engineering support for the nuclear construction program of the Washington Public Power Supply
, System (WPPSS).
I d) Served as consultant to Houston Power and Lighting Company to evaluate their Engineering Quality Assurance Program for l the South Texas Nuclear Station.
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e) Formed.and served as Chairman of a Panel which audited the Washington Public Power Supply System's program to verify the design and construction of their WNP-2 nuclear station.
f) Testified before the Department of Public Utilities on behalf of the Attorney General of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts in the matter of the cancellation of Boston Edison's Pilgrim II Nuclear Power Station.
g) Testified before the Department of Public Utilities on behalf of the Attorney General of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts with regard to the duration of a refuel-ing outage of Boston Edison's Pilgrim I Nuclear Station.
h) Served as member of a special study group formed to advise the Nuclear Regulatory Commission on means to improve the qual-ity of construction of commercial nuclear power plants.
i) Assisted Admiral Rickover in preparing an assessment of GPU Nuclear Corporation's management capabilitity to operate TMI-1.
j) Provided testimony in the Byron licensing hearing concern-ing the implication of the QC inspector requalification pro-gram to construction quality.
k) Served as a member of an independent oversight committee to evaluate and advise Commonwealth Edison on the Braidwood Construction Assessment Program.
- 1) Chairman of a panel of experts to evaluate Houston Lighting and Power's conduct of a design verification program for South Texas.
m) Chairman of a panel to evaluate VEPCO's operation of the North Anna Station.
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. . . n) Member, GPU Nuclear Corp. Board of Directors, and Chairman of the Board Safety Committee. 1 A copy of my resume is attached to this testimony as Attachment A.
Q.4. What is the relevance of your experience to evaluating the significance of the. Amended Contention?
A.4. My thirty-eight years of nuclear experience in naval reactors, nuclear shipbuilding, and commercial nuclear power plant con-sulting has frequently required me to become intimately in-volved with means of achieving and confirming high standards of construction quality while meeting demanding production schedules. The inherent interplay and conflict between work quality and work quantity is not peculiar to commercial nuclear power plants, nor for that matter, to nuclear construction. It is present in all intensive construction work having mandatory.
quality standards, such as nuclear shipbuilding. Hence, my ex-
'perience in Naval nuclear construction and as a consultant in commercial nuclear construction are both relevant to the issues of this Braidwood hearing. Nuclear submarines require extremely high standards of quality for obvious reasons. Achieving such standards, evaluating the means for doing so, and assuring others that this has been done is no less vital in submarine than in commercial work. Although commercial nuclear plants and Naval nuclear plants differ in many ways, they do not differ in the underlying principles by which high quality is achieved.
Much of the experience acquired in one is transferable to the other.
In addition to Navy experience, I have participated in several programs of construction quality validation l
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of commercial nuclear power stations. It was my re-sponsibility, at a member of review teams, to assist the licensees to plan and conduct programs to assess the adequacy of safety-related construction work and the reliability of 0.C. inspections. This was achieved through a combination of hardware reinspections, document reviews, and analysis. The teams,on which I served reviewed and ap-proved these validation programs, audited their perform'ance, and provided independent evaluation of their results.
I also served recently as member of a review group which was appointed by the NRC to provide independent review and comment on an NRC Report to Congress, titled r
" Improving Quality and The Assurance of Quality in the Design and Construction of Nuclear Power Plants" (NUREG 1055) dated May, 1984. ,
As indicated by the title of this report, this activ-
.' ity gave me an additional insight into the recent
,. history of nuclear construction projects, including some which have been successful and some which have not, and the opportunity to form my own opinions as to the reasons why. The knowledge acquired on this project has been helpful in my assessment and evaluation of Braidwood's construction history and the current Con-tention.
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, Q.5. How'did you prepare for testifying in this case?
A.S. I read the intervenor's motion and supplement to it; the admitting order; several Comstock policies and pro-cedures; non-conformance report 3099; testimony of various witnesses; abstracts of depositions of sev-eral LKC inspectors; and selected Board Examination of some witnesses. A list of these documents is appended as Attachtent B.
I also interviewed Irving DeWald, Comstock QC Manager;
, Thomas Quaka, CECO QA Superintendent; Daniel Shamblin, CECO Construction Manager; and Randall Kurtz, S&L Assistant Head of Quality Control.
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e 0.6. To what spetific topics does your testimony relate.
A.6. My testimony relates to the following three topics:
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First, how is effective quality control maintained under conditions of construction schedule pressures?
The quality-quantity issue is at the heart of the contention that. harassment and intimidation of inspectors discouraged them from identifying deficiencies in safety-related components and systems. Such harassment was said to include pressure to sacrifice quality for production and cost considerations. It became apparent to me in reading some of the Board's examination of witnesses that they (the Board) were keenly interested in in-spector independence and the difficulty of maintaining quality standards in the face of schedule pressures.
I decided to address this topic, believing that I might
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give a useful perspective from my own experience which would assist in the proceedings.
Second, recognizing the extraordinary set of prob-lems confronting Comstock's Quality control organization beginning in 1983 and continuing into early 1985, what would experience tell us of their likely influence on individual inspector's behavior?
Whether there was a reduction in the reliability of inspectors' work performance is the crucial question.
In reading the testimony, I realized that there may be several ways to assess the credibility of inspections performed in 1984 and early 1985. Of these, my experience is suited to making an evaluation of whether production pressure, understaffing, heavy overtime, pay inequities, aggressive and unpopular supervision, and a unionization
drive would affect the. inspectors' performance of their work.
Third, are Comstock's procedures on non-conform-ances (4.11.1), corrective action (4.11.2), and stop work
( 4 .11. 3 ) adequate procedures and were they correctly applied in the case of NCR 3099?
The authority of an inspector to stop work under appropriate circumstances is an important consideration in the overall quality control situation. The fact that he is given the power to do so tells something about manage-ments quality attitude. The conditions under which the authority is exercised may tell us something about the values placed on work quantity and work quality. It appeared from the Board's questions to witnesses that they perceived NCR 3099 to be a useful example of how Comstock's stop-work policy was exercised. I believe that my experience may be useful in evaluating the policies and procedures involved and how they were applied in this instance.
- 07. Please give your observations on maintaining quality control under conditions of construction schedule pressure.
A.7. The interplay between quality of work and quantity of work is obviously a pervasive one. It operates in designing power plants as well as in constructing them. Maintaining an ap-propriate balance is an ever-present challenge to the craft worker and the inspector, and to their supervisors and. managers Appendix B, Criterion I properly requires that persons performing quality assurance functions must be provided suf-ficient independence from cost and schedule to allow them to
', , identify and assess quality problems. However, a fuller un-
. derstanding of the process by which construction quality is I achieved makes it apparent that, in the interest of quality, this independence should not be absolute. If it were, the Quality Control organization would become too isolated to contribute effectively to the total management effort on which construction quality depends.
A Quality Control organization, properly used, contributes to achieving quality, but it does not create quality. Quality is created primarily by competent design and good craftsman-ship. Quality control is an instrument which management uses to feed back information telling management whether the design is being followed and whether work quality is acceptable.
This information enables management to take timely corrective action when a 2ed is indicated.
To be effective, Q.C. must be knit into the total manage-ment team which includes design, procurement, construction and project management. Furthermore, its information feedback to other team members must be timely -- that is, it must follow closely on work performance if it is to have maximum usefulness Recognizing how essential this team concept is to achiev-ing quality, /u. sus ways have been used successfully to pro-vide O.C. the independence needed to do its job while allowing it to have the necessary close relationships with construction and project management. In the Braidwood situation, Comstock's 0.C. reports organizationally through an off-site regional QA Manager to Comstock's Corporate Q.A. Manager, who reports s
in turn to Comstock's Vice President, Operations, located at Corporate headquarters. Comstock's CC is thus afforded organ-izational independence from Comstock's on-site production manager. The Comstock 0.A./0.C. organization is under the
o surveillance of Commonwealth Edison's on-site QA/QC, which reports through CECO's Corporate.off-site QA Manager to CECO's Chief Executive Officer. CECO's. site QA organization is thus afforded organizational independence from the on-site Project Construction Department. In an example from another station which was constructed successfully,a different organ-izational pattern was followed. The licensee set up a single QA/QC program for the project, with QC reporting to the construction organization and with QA performing surveil-lances of construction and construction ~QC, auditing the entire project function, and assuring that QC was granted sufficient independence from production pressures.-
It is instructive to note that the NRC, in its 2 J-port titled " Improving Quality and the Assurance of Quality -
in the Design and Construction of Nuclear Power Plants" (NOREG 1055), May, 1984, makes two observations, quoted below, which bear on QC 's relationship with construction management. These observations are based on the NRC's appraisal and analysis of six U.S. nuclear construction projects.
. "QA can be a management tool, but to be so, it must be a part of the team of engineering, con-struction management, and project management.
To be effective as a management tool, QA must be integrated into the project." (page 3-24)
. "There did not seem to be a particular QA/QC organizational structure, function, authority, etc., that characterized plants with or without l
quality-related problems. ...No pattern of QA/QC organizational structure or delegation correlated with whether plants had experienced major quality problems or not." (page A.27)
To be effective, I believe that a QC organization must be engaged in the total enterprise, be conscious of and work to achieve the overall objectives of quality, schedule, and cost, and still, when appropriate, assert an independent view on quality issues. With this in mind, the quality-quantity relationship and the OC-construction management relationship can best be exam-ined in the context of overall program objectives and functions.
Q,g, How does this overall program perspective help our understanding of the quality-quantity problem?
A.8. As noted earlier, the quality-quantity interaction in a construction project brings with it inescapable competi-tive forces. In accommodating these, a construction project must meet three separate, sometimes competing, objectives -- quality, schedule, and cost. These three are obviously interactive. In the end, however, each must satisfy its own unique measure of adequacy.
Like a stool resting on three legs, a project fails if I
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it fails in any one of its' objectives. Utility man-agement cannot trade off one of these objectives to preserve another, for to do so merely invites failure .
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, of a different kind, because schedule and cost ~have
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only limited elasticity and quality has none.
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1 0.9. How does this bear on quality control under construc-tion schedule prescure?
A.9. From a total program perspective, all team members, including both craft and inspection personnel, must l eel a responsibility to satisfy these three broad ,
requirements. In my experience, people who are engaged in this kind of work -- managers, supervisors, in-spectors, and mechanics -- recognize and accept these obligations, including the built-in conflicts which accompany them. The constructor knows that adequate quality must be achieved, while satisfying schedules.
The inspector understands that his inspections must be performed effectively, but, consistent with that, should not unduly interfere with the progress of con-struction.
In my opinion, it is not consistent with the pro-gram objectives or the functional relationships which I have identified to suggest that the quality control c . ..
organization or individual inspectors are wholly free of schedule obligations any more than it would be to suggest that constructors have no quality obligations.
The QC organization must use its best efforts to pro-vide adequate numbers of qualified inspectors to per-form required inspections at a rate and in a manner which allows reasonable work schedules to be met.
Concurrently, inspectors must have " sufficient inde-pendence from cost and schedule" so that where ad-equate quality is in question, they have " freedom to identify quality problems." (Criterion I)
In addition to this broad obligation to work towards meeting overall schedules, there is still another reason that the CC organization must perform timely inspections at a rate which is consistent with the rate of construction. The reason is that timely in-spections contribute to achieving good quality. De-
, layed inspections and excessive inspection backlogs are threats to quality.
Q.10. How can timely inspections be assured and how do they contribute to quality?
A.10. For the work in a nuclear plant, good quality depends on the craft's ability to perform quality work and on Quality Control's inspection of a sample of or all of I'
that work to provide additional assurance of its ad-equacy or to note and correct deficient conditions.
The exercise of the " control' in quality control is accom-plisned by utilizing inspection results as a basis for drawing inferences about the quality of uninspected portions of the work and for determining when process adjustments are needed. The construction manager must maintain current knowledge of the discrepancies being found by QC, whether they are singular or repetitive discrepancies, and whether their frequency is trending up or down. To be most useful for process control, this kind of knowledge should be drawn from work re-cently performed. If the inspected sample is drawn from work performed some months ago rather than yester-day or last week, detecting and correcting adverse quality trends is obviously made much more difficult.
This need for current feed-back of quality con-trol information to construction management has two corollaries which seem to me to be important to the present proceeding:
First, quality control managers must schedule their future inspection work to conform with ex-pected construction work. They muet adjust the numbers of inspectors to the inspection work to be done and use overtime as appropriate as means of providing timely information to construction managers, enabling them to control the quality of work being produced. I believe it is evident L_-_____-_____ . oWa
that this could not be done without maintaining records of inspections performed, backlogs of uncompleted inspections, and schedules of in-spections to be performed in the future. Looking both to the past and the future, such schedules will necessarily employ actual and estimated average levels of inspector productivity.
Second, the Program Director, and especially '
his Construction Manager, has a vital need for periodic information which is available only from the QC organization concerning the results of inspections being performed, kinds and causes of-discrepancies, and inspection backlogs and their trends. Such information is essential to '
assist him in maintaining control of work process quality and in developing future construction plans and schedules.
This close relationship between production schedules and QA commitments was noted in the previously identified 1
-NRC study on improving quality in constructing nuclear power plants, NUREG 1055. Reporting on a case study of a nuclear construction project which successfully avoided significant quality-related problems, the report notes that "The licensee balanced schedule and QA commitments. The licensee responded to several setbacks by defining solutions and applying whatever resources it took to resolve each problem and recover schedule. fmphasis on maintaining schedule did not compro-mise cuality. Good management practices can produce quality amidst co:r.r.itment to schedule. " (page A.27)
I believe the Construction Manager at Braidwood had a need-as well as a responsibility to keep closely posted on Comstock's inspection backlogs and their plans and progress for working off those backlogs. The conduct of weekly in-formation meetings by the Construction Manager for this pur-pose, as indicated in testimony, appears to be no more than -
normal prudence. Had he done otherwise he would run a risk of failing in both his quality and production responsibilities.
0.11. In your opinion, did the Comstock inspection backlog require establishin'g inspection quotas for each in-spector or group of inspectors?
A.11. No. A quota, as I believe the term is being used, lays down a mandatory number of inspections with the requirement that that number be performed by an in-spector in a certain time period. It seems apparent that such a mandatory number could not possibly take account of individual job conditions which would in-fluence the amount of time required for eaca inspec-tion -- e.g. readiness of work for inspection, accessibility of work for inspection, readiness of work documentation, craft assistance for gaining inspection access, and other unique conditions affecting a particular inspection or group of inspections and the
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. - l time required to perform them. Quotas would obviously deprive an inspector of " sufficient independence from cost ano schedule" to perform his work effectively and would threaten one of the basic requirements for control of quality. The use of quotas in the above sense, as alleged by the intervenors in some of the testimony and examination of this case, is palpably impractical. Managers, supervisors, and inspectors alike are obviously familiar with the diversities of their working environment and know full well that. quotas could not work.
However, average expected levels of. inspector performance, with flexibility to allow for variable work conditions, are needed. QC management must '
match the number of inspectors required to the schedule of inspections to be performed during a future time period, utilizing experience factors for attrition, new personnel from recruiting and training; absenteeism and vacations; and average productivity levels. Staffing plans and work schedules designed to assure that QC has sufficient qualified personnel to keep control of current work quality are, in my experience, accepted as necessary tools of QC management. Without them there could be little confidence in effective, timely inspection.
It has been my experience that inspectors under-stand that their organization has a schedule responsibility, j
E just as they understand that the craft has a quality responsibility. Working amid production pressures is a normal part of the inspector's job.
Q.12. What was the extraordinary set of problems confronting Comstock's Q.C. organization from 1983 to early 1985 to which you referred in A.6.? '
A.12. In late 1982 Comstock 's QC organization was directed to increase the sampling fraction for several important categories of electrical work from 35 percent 'to 100 percent. This obviously caused a substantial increase
- n OC workload which was beyond the capacity of the '
QC staff then in place. Large backlogs of uncompleted inspections developed. Adding to this backlog was another commitment requiring Comstock QC to review a very large backlog of documents.
These presented a formidable challenge to the Comstock QC management, both at Braidwood and at Comstock's Corporate headquarters. In addition the pace of electrical construction depended on a timely recovery from the backlogged. condition.
In response to these large backlogs of uncompleted quality control work, the following actions were taken by comstock:
. An intensive recruiting drive was mounted which ultimately increased the number of inspectors
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from 36 to nearly 100 ir. less than two years.
New managers and supervisors were also added.
.- To aid the hiring campaign, new recruits were paid higher salaries than were currently being paid to more senior employees. As a result, inspector salary level impactior occurred.
Repeated salary scale adjustment; which followed did not alter the senior inspectors' perception of salary instability and inequity.
. Extended use of overtime, including for some a fifty-eight hour work week, created a condi-tion in which inspectors became accustomed to receiving substantial overtime pay. There-after, reducing overtime for any reason aroused dissatisfaction because it caused a loss of income which had come to be expected.
. Inspectors were offered opportunities to earn additional pay by qualifying for additional types of inspections; however, this opportunity was partly frustrated in the beginning by lack of a full-time training coordinator which limited chances for prompt qualification.
. Increased attrition occurred as experienced inspectors left for better paying jobs.
Thus, over a short period of time the organization, already facing work backlogs, experienced explosive growth, new management, salary instability, extensive E _m_
ove rtire.e , and increased attrition. Such a formidable collection of problems is not unexpected when an organization is confronted with a workload far beyond its immediately available means and finds that it is unable to add new personnel at che necessary rate because of a tight hiring market, uncompetitive salaries, and training lead time. Resorting to extensive overtime can help for a limited period, but continued use usually brings lower productivity and increased absenteeism, followed by dissatisfaction when overtime is reduced.
The unionization drive in the summer of 1984 appears o have core at a time when the existing level of empicyer-employee problems, includi:.g wide re- '
sentment of an overbearing supervisor, had already been exacerbated by the unusual circumstances noted above. I 0.13. In your opinion, what effect would the problems which you have enumerated have had on the attitudes and be-S havior of the inspectors?
A.13. I.believe they would have had several effects. First, there would have been loss of confidence in Comstock's QC management because they were apparently unprepared for such a substantial increase in work demand, and, in retrospect, seemed slow to adjust to it. Their
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handling of recruiting, pay adjustments, and training incentives must have appeared to the inspectors as late, inadequate, and, in respect to salaries, unfair to senior employees. Comments made to the NRC during the inspectors' visits on March 29 and in inspectors' testimony show wide dissatisfaction with management and compensation.
Accompanying this loss of confidence and resentment there would probably be a greater aggressiveness in noticing and openly criticizing other management actions.
I would expect a noticeable increase in outward ex-pressions of inspector dissatisfaction with supervisory pressurcs. Minor personnel difficulties would tend to become difficult problems and problems would tend to become weighty grievances. The level of sensitivity to all us2s of authority and to perceived affronts or inequities would rise. Individual inspectors' testimony on the visits of March'29 to the NRC office demonstrate this. These revealed a spectrum of complaints, including undeserved supervisory discipline, favoritism in overtime, production pressure, dissatisfaction with Quality First Teams, and insufficient inspectors.
I believe that a unionization drive, in these circumstances, would heighten existing unrest, magnify personal differences between supervisors and inspectors, and elevate the intensity of employer-employee controversies. Activism in support of employee L
. , r grievances is one of the customary ways of demon-
. strating the potential of union power. The intensive criticism of Saklak during the March 29 visits, for affronts extending over a substantial period of time, is an example of genuine resentment finally reaching the point of action, possibly under the stimulus of
!. I union encouragement.
O.14. How does this bear on the issue of harassment and intimidation?
A.14. It shows, in my opinion, that the group job actions of the inspectors, both those taken and those con- -
templated, can be explained through an understanding of their whole work environment. Their behavior under the circumstances should not'have been unexpected.
However, the central issue raised by the contention is not these group actions of the inspectors. It is that widespread harassment and intimidation of in-spectors discouraged them from identifying and correct-ing deficiencies in safety-related components and systems. In support of this contention intervenors cite examples of employer-employee confrontations over work quantity and work procedures, cases of inspector discipline, and the two group visits to the NRC to complain of production pressures and supervisory harassrent. <
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I The intervenor would have us believe that the complaints i
of production pressures and supervisory harassment which the l inspectors made to' the NRC on~ March 29 must be part of an 1 overall behavior pattern which included widespread misin-spections, either deliberate or in some manner taking place without the inspectors' knowledge. Quite to the contrary, I believe that the inspectors' action of taking their grievances to the NRC is entirely understandable when one considers all of the motivating forces at work. In my opinion, this was a job action taken by a group of angry, frustrated inspec-tors who had lost confidence in and contact with their manage-ment.
Despite the inspectors' complaints on March 29, they have subsequently testified that the effectiveness of their in-spections was not adversely af fected by the production pres-sures and harassment of which they spoke, and that they con-tinued to do tl. air jobs in a professional manner. In my opinion this is a consistent and believable position.
) I see a compelling distinction between an inspector's be-havior as an individual practitioner of his craft' and his be-havior as a member of a group presenting grievances.
An inspector usually works alone at the inspection site.
He is engaged in a professional task to which he brings only two essential qualifications -- his technical skills and his personal integrity. I have learned from dealing with inspec-tors that they are proud and protective of both. These represent their job security and their families' live-lihood, but, even more important, these are their badge of acceptance in the work arena. I suggest to L _ _ _
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this Board thatfan inspector. working alone at his job will scrupulously protect these, his most basic assets, unaf-
. fected by external group dissension.
) As a member of a grievance-bearing group, however, the h inspector would behave much'as any'other person in like cir-cumstances. There was intense pressure on LKC inspectors to
,; reduce inspection backlogs and keep pace with construction.
While this was normal under the circumstances, it could be ex-pected to cause some supervisor-inspector friction. Additiona3 factors such as salary inequities and extreme overtime tended to amplify such problems. The behavior of an overbearing, abusive supervisor provided a focus and a target for a range of persistent grievances. Had there been healthy management-employee relationships, such prob-lems might have been resolved with less difficulty, but under the collective stress of events and with unionization pressures, this was not possible. Group protest actions resulted.
Group protest actions taking place in an atmosphere of mistrust and tension and encouraged by union activism are, in my opinion, consistent with the simultaneous per-formance of effective inspections. The inspectors' group actions emphasized group complaints. They sought relief from affronts suffered in common. On the other hand, individual inspections performed during this same j i
period were guided by each inspector's professional values, which were deeply felt and personal. l
. I I believe that these separate, concurrent courses of action are consistent with one_another. They remind us that, whereas conditions of employment are negotiable, an inspector's professional code is not.
Q.15. Have you reviewed.Comstock Procedures 4.11.1 "Non-conforming Items," 4.11.2 " Corrective Action, " and 4.11.3 "Stop Work," and if so what is your opinion as to their adequacy for use by a construction contractor engaged in nuclear construction?
A.15. Yes. I have reviewed these three procedures, as well as Comstock's Policy Statement 1.0.0 which provides that Quality Assurance personnel be " independent from the pressures of production." In my opinion these doc-uments vest in the Quality Assurance Manager, the Quality Control Manager,'and Quality Control Inspectors adequate authority, responsibility, and procedural direction for the topics covered. I see no significant flaw in any of them.
Q.16. Would you review the circumstances of NCR #3099 and state whether you believe that Comstock handled it cor-rectly and in accordance with the policies and procedures.
referred to in my previous question?
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, A .'16 Yes. NCR #3099 states that Comstock did not have a welding procedure qualified to AWS D1.1-1975 Code which was suitable for welding ASTM A36 material to ASTM A446 material. It further stated that all previous welding of these two mater-ials was therefore " indeterminate." Investigation revealed that the NCR was incorrect on both points. The Weld Procedure Specification 4.33 then in use, supported by a Procedure i Qualification Record, was suitable for welding either A500 or A36'to A446 under the provisions of AWS Code contained in para-graphs 5.5.1.1, 8.2, 10.2, and Table 4.1.1. Because of the previously validated procedure, earlier welding of A36 to_A446 using procedure 4.3.3 was not correctly characterized as inde-terminate. There was no reason to question the soundness of these earlier welds or to consider removing or replacing any of them.
Procedure 4.3.3 did not specifically list A36 material, and because of this omission, the procedure was unclear and may have been in error. This condition was corrected by addinc A36 to the procedure's list of acceptable materials.
It is worth noting that, because of this omission, the suitability of Procedure 4.3.3 would not have been readily ap-parent to anyone unfamiliar with the background of the proced-ure, the Procedure Qualification Record which supported it, and the provisions of the AWS Code concerning procedure qualification.
A question arises as to whether the welding of A-36 to
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A-446 should have been stopped until the procedure was cor-rected by the addition of A-36. In my opinion this would have been inappropriate for two reasons. First, the NCR was incorrect in both of its principal points.
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It was incorrect in stating that Comstock did not have a qualifiec procedure to weld A-36 to A-446, and it was incarrect in stating that all previous welding of A-36 to A-446 was indeterminate.
Second, the Comstock Stop Work Procedure 4.11.3, Paragraph 2.1, commenting on the authority of the Quality Control Manager, states "This permits immediate stoppage of any activity in the event that, in the opinion of the Quality Control Manager, further processing or use is likely to cause need for significant repair or removal, or when a hold tag has been ignored." (under-lining added). There was no evidence that any faulty welds had been made and there was no reason to believe that continued welding of A36 to A446 using Procedure 4.3.3 would cause faulty welds or a need for repair-or removal.
Under any circumstances, stopping work is disruptive and costly. In this case no purpose would have been served by stopping work, and the Stop Work Procedure did not require or suggest it. I believe the decision not to stop work was correct.
'., a-RESUME ROBERT V. LANEY 24 Trout Farm Lane Duxbury, MA 02332 Phone: 617-585-8912 Robert V. Laney is a consultant in nuclear energy and energy project management. He has broad executive and technical experience in power plant design and operation; in energy research and development; and in the construction and operation of large energy projects. His working experience includes extensive periods in operating power plants for the U. S. Navy; in the Navy nuclear power development program; in nuclear ship construction; in energy research and development; and in assessment of nuclear plant design, construction, and operation.
While an officer in the Navy, Mr. Laney, in 1948, became one of a small group of engineers chosen by Admiral H. G. Rickover to assist him in developing nuclear power plants for naval ship propulsion. He served as Project Manager for the development, design, and construction of the land prototype of the Sea Wolf nuclear power plant and participated in the construction of the first nuclear submarines, the U.S.S. Nautilus and Sea Wolf.
These were followed by responsibilities in applying nuclear power to surface ships and the first nuclear power station at Shippingport, Pennsylvania.
While Naval representative at the Bettis Laboratory in Pittsburgh, Mr..Laney developed the first comprehensive quality assurance program for the Navy's network of nuclear propulsion plant suppliers.
In 1959, as a civilian, Mr. Laney moved into nuclear ship construction at the General Dynamics Shipyard in Quincy, Massachusetts. 'In 1963, he was appointed Vice-President and General Manager. In this capacity, he was responsible for the design and construction of a number of nuclear powered surface ships'and submarines.
In 1970,-he turned to the development of more advanced energy technologies when he was asked by the Univer-sity of Chicago to become Associate Director of the Argonne National Laboratory, devoted to developing a range of new energy options. He later became Deputy Director with additional responsibility for engineering development and Laboratory administration. During this period he directed programs for developing breeder reactors, improved coal combustion, conservation technologies, high-efficiency batteries, and nuclear fusion.
i Exhibit A
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He retired from Argonne in 1979 to become a private consultant in nuclear power. Some of his recent activities are listed here:
1979-80 Particlpated as member of Senior Advisory Panel to the Chairman of Commonwealth Edison to evaluate.
the Company's nuclear energy program in light of Three Mile Island.
1979-80 Participated as member of an Advisory Committee to the President of General Public Utilities to evaluate personnel selection and training, man / machine interface, and communications at Three Mile Island.
1980-81 Assisted the Department of Energy to find suitable ways to solidify and remove high-level radioactive wastes stored at West Valley, NY.
1980-82 Led a team which evaluated and advised the Managing Director in ways to improve the nuclear engineering and construction programs of.the Washington Public Power Supply System.
1981-82 Led a committee of experts formed to advise the Department of Energy concerning the merits of vario~us processes for vitrifying high-level nuclear waste.
1982 Testified before the Department of Public Uti.lities on behalf of the Attorney General of the Commonwealth of -
Massachusetts in the matter of the cancellation of Boston Edison's Filgrim II Nuclear Power Station.
1982 Testified before the Department of Public Utilities on behalf of the Attorney General of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts with regard to the duration of'a refuel-ing outage of Ecston Edison's Pilgrim I Nuclear Station.
- 1983 As consultant tc Ecuston Lighting and Power Company, performed an evaluation of the Engineering Assurance Program for their South Texas nuclear station..
1982-83 Led a panel which audited the Washington Public Power Supply System's program for verifying the design and construction of their WNP-2 nuclear station.
1983 Assisted Admiral Rickover in preparing an assessment of GPU Nuclear Corporation's management competence to operate TMI-1.
1983-84 Participated as member of a special study group which advised the Nuclear Regulatory Commission on means to improve the design and construction quality of commercial reactor plants.
1984 Provided testimony in the Byron licensing hearing concerning the implication of the QC inspector requalification program to construction quality.
1984 Became a member of GPU Nuclear Board of Directors g ,
and Chairman of its Nuclear SafetW.Committe@.
1984 Chairman of panel of experts responsible to evaluate' Houston Lighting and Power Company's program for assuring the design adequacy of its South Texas nuclear station.
1984 Chairman of a panel of experts responsible to conduct a continuing evaluation of Virginia Electric Power's operation of the North Anna nuclear station.
1985-86 Served as a member of an independent oversight committee to evaluate and advise Commonwealth Edison on the Braidwood Construction Assessment Program.
Mr. Laney holds a B.S.
Academy, an M.S. degree from the U. S. Naval '
degree from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, and an MBA from the University of Chicago.
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., e ROBERT V. LANEY Employment History January 25, 1984 to Present Member GPU Nuclear Board of Directors and Chairman of Board Committee on Safety November 1, 1979 to Present Consultant in Nuclear Project Management 1972 to November 1, 1979 Deputy Director, Argonne National Laboratory, University of Chicago.
Responsible for all applied re-search and development, and for -
Laboratory administration of this '
5300 person institution.
1970-1972 Associate Director, Argonne National Laboratory, responsible for nuclear reactor research and development.
1964-1970 Vice President and General Manager of Quincy (Massachusetts)
Shipyard Division of General Dynamics. (8500 employees) 1960-1964 Nuclear Design and Construction Manager of Quincy Shipyard of Bethlehem Steel Company.
1954-1960 As U. S. Naval Captain, technical representative of the Atomic Energy Commission at the Westinghouse Bettis Atomic Power Laboratory, Pittsburgh.
1948-1954 Reactor Development Project Manager in the Naval Reactor Program of the Atomic Energy Commission and the Navy's Bureau of Ships, Washington, DC.
1939-1948 Active duty Naval officer; various duties at sea and ashore. l Engineer office on carrier, destroyer, and battleship. j i
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_ ".** ATTACHMENT B
- 1. " Motion to Admit Claims of Intimidation and Harassment of Comstock Quality Control Inspectors",date July 13, 1985.
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- 2. " Supplement to July 12, 1985 Motions Regarding Harassment and Intimidation of Comstock Quality Control Inspectors, dated July 15, 1985.
- 3. " Memorandum and Order Admitting Harassment and Intimidation Issue," dated May 2, 1986.
- 4. Comstock procedures 4.11.1 " Nonconforming Items; 4.11.2 " Corrective Action;" and 4.11.3 "Stop Work." -
- 5. LK Comstock Policy Statement 1.0.0, May 1, 1980.
- 6. LK Comstock Non Conformance Report 3099, August 17, 1984
- 7. Testimony of:
D. P. Ilgen, dated April 25, 1986 Richard D. Arvey, dated May 2, 1986 David J. Mckirnan, dated May 2, 1986 William S. Little, undated Rogelio Mendez, undated John H. Neisler, undated Jerome F. Schapker, undated Thomas Maiman, dated April, 1986 James Gieseker, dated April, 1986 Irving F. Dewald, dated April, 1986 Robert V. Seltman, dated April, 1986 Larry Seese, dated April, 1986 Anthony T. Simile, dated April, 1986
! Randall Kurtz, dated April, 1986 James Louden, dated April, 1986-J. R. Vannier, dated April, 1986
- 8. Abstracts of Depositions of l Richard Saklak, March 24, 1986 I
Herschel W. Stout, Jr., February 24, 1986 Dean L. Peterson, undated I
Michael S. Mustered, March 5, 1986 Richard Snyder, January 29, 1986 i
r _.
'. ,.o Myra Sproull, January 29, 1986 Timothy H. Stewart, January 28, 1986 Larry A. Perryman, March 3, 1986 Richard L. Martin, March 3, 1986 Danny R. Holley, January 28, 1986 R. Doyne Hunter, January 28, 1986
- 9. Certain Board Examinations, Sonntag pages:
1790-1819 2223-2226 3003-3026 1948-1952 2235-2246 3039-3041 2091-2095 2331-2383 2116-2128 2516-2526 2166-2172 2759-2762 2179-2183 2897-2927 '
2187-2190 2963-2965 2204-2212 2981-2984 i
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