Text

Forwards FEMA Rept on 860122-23 Radiological Emergency Exercise.Deficiency Re Activation of Prompt Alert & Notification Sys & 19 Areas Requiring Corrective Actions Noted.Items Should Be Resolved Before Jan 1987 Exercise
	ML20214K577
Person / Time
Site:	Turkey Point
Issue date:	11/18/1986
From:	Verrelli D; NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
To:	Woody C; FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT CO.
References
	NUDOCS 8612020361
	Download: ML20214K577 (3)
	v • d • e

= , * '

U OMtcial

$~' '

NOV 181986 Florida Power and Light Company ATTN: Mr. C. 0. Woody Group Vice President Nuclear Energy Department P. O. Box.14000 Juno Beach, FL- 33408_-

Gentlemen:

SUBJECT:

FEMA RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY EXERCISE REPORT - TURKEY POINT NUCLEAR POWER PLANT EMERGENCY EXERCISE OF JANUARY 22-23, 1986 Enclosed is a copy of the Federal Management Agency's Report for the Turkey Point Nuclear Power Plant Emergency Exercise of January 22-23, 1986. As described in the enclosed report, FEMA has identified one deficiency concerning the activation of the prompt alert and notification system. In addition, nineteen' areas were identified which require corrective actions. These items are discussed in detail

_in Section III of the Enclosure.

We encourage you to assist the appropriate organizations in resolving the deficiency and weaknesses identified by FEMA. Resolution of these items should be completed prior to the next full scale emergency preparedness exercise scheduled for January 1987.

We also encourage you to work closely with the State and counties in the development of a scenario for the next full scale exercise that will effectively test the areas in which the abcve items were disclosed.

Sincerely, David M. Verrelli, Chief Reactor Projects Branch 2 Division of Reactor Projects

Enclosure:

FEMA Final Report cc w/ enc 1:

C. M. Wethy, Vice President Turkey Point Nuclear Plant C. J. Baker, Plant Manager Turkey Point Nuclear Plant L. W. Bladow, Plant QA Superintendent J. Arias, Jr., Regulatory and Compliance Supervisor bec w/ encl: (See page 2) i m202aggguaggo s(

1E35

r~ _ , r jl ~g .

.. r 4';

Florida Power and Light. Company - 2

bec w/ encl

y NRC Resident Inspector Document-Control Desk

. State of Florida RI RII R c RI L/ 80 ATabaka TDecker- Col ins- Elrod 11//>/86 - 11/,!;/86 11/f 6 11/fl/86 J

.. l y UNITED STATES

-**^ #pm Krog% NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

/ 4 REGION 11

I S 101 MARIETTA STREET, N.W.

l Ia f ATL ANTA, GEORGI A 30323 '

l NOV 181986 Florida Power and Light Company ATTN: Mr. C. O. Woody Group Vice President Nuclear Energy Department P._0. Box 14000 Juno Beach, FL 33408 Gentlemen:

SUBJECT:

FEMA RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY EXERCISE REPORT - TURKEY POINT NUCLEAR POWER PLANT EMERGENCY EXERCISE OF JANUARY 22-23, 1986 Enclosed is a copy of the Federal Management Agency's Report for the Turkey. Point Nuclear Power Plant Emergency Exercise of January 22-23, 1986. As described in the enclosed report, FEMA has identified one deficiency concerning the activation of the prompt alert and notification system. In-addition, nineteen areas were identified which require corrective actions. These items are' discussed in detail in Section III of the Enclosure.

We encourage 'you to assist the appropriate organizations in resolving the deficiency and weaknesses identified by FEMA. Resolution of these items should be completed prior to the next full scale emergency preparedness exercise scheduled for January 1987.

We also encourage you to work closely with the State and counties in the development.of a scenario for the next full scale exercise that will effectively test the areas in which the above items were disclosed.

Sincerely, J '

D vid M. errelli, Chief

( Reactor rojects Branch 2

! Division of Reactor Projects

Enclosure:

FEMA Final Report cc w/ encl:

C. M. Wethy, Vice President Turkey Point Nuclear Plant C. J. Baker, Plant Manager

. Turkey Point Nuclear Plant i L. W. Bladow, Plant QA Superintendent

, J. Arias, Jr., Regulatory and Compliance Supervisor l

l .

i

sa f %

' ,D

! Federal Emergency Management Agency t

g y

)/ Washington, D.C. 20472 Oct 3- BBS MEMORANDUM FOR: Edward L. Jordan Director Division of Emergency Preparedness and Engineering Response Office of Inspection and Enforcement U.S. Nuclear latory Comnission FBOM: Ri .

M Assistant Associate Director /

Office of Natural and Technological Hazards Programs

SUBJECT:

Exercise Report for the January 22-23, 1986, Exercise of the Offsite Radiological Emergency Preparedness (REP)

Plans for the Turkey Point Nuclear Power Plant Attached is a copy of the Exercise Report for the January 22-23, 1986, full participation joint exercise of the offsite REP plans for the Turkey Point Nuclear Power Plant. We State of Florida and Dade and Monroe Counties, both located in the 10-mile plume emergency planning zone (EPZ), fully particip:ted in the exercise. Broward County, located in the 50-mile ingestion EPZ participated on the second day of the exercise.

De exercise report, dated July 15, 1986, was prepared by Region IV of the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). De report does not identify any deficiencies resulting fran this exercise. Here were identified, however, ten areas requiring corrective actions and fifteen areas recomended for improvement. FEMA Headquarters has determined the area requiring corrective action involving the activation of the ~

prmpt alert and notification system to be a deficiency. Plan changes have been made and a remedial drill has been scheduled (in conjunction with the January 1987 NRC/ Utility annual exercise) intended to correct this deficiency. Also, the nine areas listed on the attached sheet have been determined by FEMA Headquarters to be areas requiring corrective actions which were identified as areas recomended for improvement in the exercise report. Rese nire items will be evaluated in the next biennial exercise along with the 10 others identified in the exercise report.

FEMA Region IV staff has furnished a copy of this exercise report to the State of Florida and will assure completion by the State of the necessary corrective actions. A report on the results of the remedial

drill will be furnished to you at a later date.

Based on the results of this exercise, and the corrective actions already empleted and currently scheduled, the 44 CFR 350 FENA approval granted on February 15, 1984, will remain in effect, pending the January exercise.

If you have any questions, please contact Mr. Robert S. Wilkerson, Chief, Technological Hazards Division, at 646-2860.

/ Attachments -8610210180'861003 pn- ;' As Stated PDR F

ADOCK 05000251 PDR p( ' d1

e 9 * /

b AREAS RECOMMENDED FOR IMPICVEMENT THAT FEMA HEADQUARTERS CONSIDERS AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTTVE ACTIONS Turkey Point 'N'u clear Power Plant Fanrcise Report Dated July,15, 1986 State Emergency Operations Center

=====================

Item t's 2 and 3 on page 10.

Emergency Operations Facility

=============================-

Item # 1 on page 11.

Dnergency News Center

=========

Item #'s 1, 3 and 4 on page 13.

Field Monitoring Teams

==========

It.em # 2 on page 16.

Miami-Dade Monitoring / Decontamination Station

============================================= ,

Item # 1 on page 23.

Monroe County

============= ,-

Item # 1 on page 26.

l I

J

, l N: <

[ Y d -Federal Emergency Management Agency

-i Region IV. 1371 Peachtree Street, NE Atlanta, Georgia 30309 l' July 16, 1986

a-t, l

v MEMORANDUM FOR:- RICHARD W. KRIMM, ASSISTANT ASSOCIATE DIRECTOR l OFFICE OF NATUR L AND TECHNOLOGICAL HAZARDS PROGRAMS, SL-N

' l FROM: Major P. May .

. Regional Director

SUBJECT:

Turkey Point Nuclear Power Plant (Florida)

- Exercise Report Attached is the exercise report for the Turkey Point Nuclear Power Plant full participation exercise conducted on January 22-23, 1986.

Based on a review of the attached report and the recommendation of the Natural and Technological Hazards Division Chief, dated July 15, 1986, this office concurs that the off-site emergency preparedness is

adequate to provide reasonable assurance that appropriate measures can be taken to protect tuu health and safety of the public living in the vicinity of the site in the event of a radiological emergency.

We have discussed the inadequacies contained in the report with the

State of. Florida and have requested that a schedule of corrective actions be submitted to this office within thirty days.

We have also required that an EBS remedial drill be accomplished by the Emergency News Center and Dade County in conjunction with, and no ~

later than, the next NRC annual exercise.

l You will note that the NUREG E.5. and E.6. inadequacies are identified as " Areas Recommended for Corrective Action". However, based on the interpretation provided us during discussions with Mr. Speck and Mr.

Wilkerson in Atlanta on June 30, 1986, these pa'rtkcular problems would have been considered " Deficiencies" had we known of this interpretation at the time of the exercise. In the evaluation of future exercises,ficiencies".

identified as "De inadequacies of similar significance will be l The report includes minor changes suggested by the Regional Assistance i Committee. We request that FEMA Headquarters review and forward a l

copy of the exercise report to NRC Headquarters within 10 days of receipt as required by GM-EX-1, Remedial Exercises, dated July 12,

! 1985. Please advise this office when the report has been transmitted

! to NRC.

l Attachment l

)

.- i s'

TURKEY POINT NUCLEAR POWER PLANT EXERCISE Conducted on January 22-23, 1986

~%?

a -

a 4 -

A ~

4

\ O O

/ .

r i

i 1 l l

FEDERAL EMERGENCY l

MANAGEMENT AGENCY REGION IV

?Mia! Mea 88!so PDR

o- -

3 Federal Emergency Management Agency

- Region IV 1371 Peachtree Street, NE Atlanta, Georgia 30309 TURKEY POINT NUCLEAR POWER PLANT EXERCISE Conducted on January 22-23, 1986 Exercise Report July 15, 1986 Utility: Florida Power and Light Company Plant Location: Dade County, Florida Participating State and local governments: ,

State of Florida Dade County Monroe County Broward Cou-ty, i

l l

I b

l .

i

' * ^ '

NUCLEAR POWER PLANT SITES IN FLORIDA 10 AND 50 M1LE RADIUS

-FARLEY

=

7 iq n.

.,,g ..q . . . .

S 3, '.,

t, ' g{ { '-% - , , . ./ - .'

. ., . . s

,'s ..,9 ,,,,, ,, ,-- 7 , - , ) g.

f, *

, . - - ,; rl _$****

(' 'ei

ha. 4.~ /g,. .4 q'*a' t s ...

1,.......

.3 i h1u..... I T=

e :V..~.

^

./ .,,, w. , , , . . u I

r-i 8

s L'*4 I.h ; 4, \ '

t CRYSTAL RIVER s .

y!, ,.

! I!.

Ag m .

.,m= w ,,,.0.*,*_# f, '

~~'

'I <

_-. _ ,.m.,.

, me n , ... }, ,

y n ( . .

j i ,,,u, T

t ~

L.

i.

N -.T,7,',uJ,'lG;f.,%.f . _ _;

ST. LUCIE t_; ,. i ,

s ._

u .., ; i ~ .,...,.

s*'"# GS

..."p.._.

s,i es.arr

. r' 1 --

4 1. ,.,. _* ese a, r- i sa.,

. Ys y

% 1 s

b TURKEY POINT -

4

)n '

9, a .

?

_ . - . _ . . _ _ _ _ _ _ , ,.m.._.[. _.,,_v, . --_ _

,o i TABLE OF CONTENTS M

Exercise Summary 1 I.

6 II. Detailed Discussion Introduction 6 7

State of Florida l-State Emergency Operations Center (SEOC) 7 Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) 10 Emergency News Center (ENC) 12 h Mobile Emergency Radiological Laboratory 14 (MERL)

Field Monitoring Teams 14

- Risk Counties 16 F 16 Medical Services 17 l Dade County 23

~

Monroe County Fifty-Mile Ingestion Pathway County 26 Broward County 26 Summary Listing of Inadequacies 28 III.

IV. Summary Listing of Areas Recommended For 31 Improvement 34

' - V. Appendices A. Evaluator List and Assignments Exercise Objectives f B.

l -i-

_ . , . _ . . _ - _ , . . . . , _ _ . _ . _ _ .___.________.._.._-______-..i-_..__.____.__.__--.____

I i

1. EXERCISE

SUMMARY

On January 22-23, 1986, the Turkey Point Nuclear Power Plant conducted a radiological emergency response exercise. Day one activities Day were two concentrated in the 10-mile Emergency Planning Zone (EPZ).

activities expanded into the 50-mile Ingestion Pathway Zone. The off site emergency response capability was fully demonstrated by the State of Florida and Dade, Monroe and Broward Counties.

The Turkey Point full participation exercise was observed by twenty Federal evaluators, representing seven Federal agencies (FEMA, NRC, g DOE, USDA, DOT, EPA and HHS/FDA). This was the fourth exercise for State and local governments to demonstrate the Florida Radiological

_Esergency Response Plan for Nuclear Power Plants.

h During the exercise, evaluators identified twelve superior items and recommended improvement in fifteen areas. Ten inadequacies were also identified. The report indicates that a remedial drill is required to correct the inadequacies observed at the Emergency News Center and the Dade County EOC. These inadequacies involve the need for more effective use of the Prompt Notification System and the Emergency Broadcast System.

'The following is a brief summary of the exercise activities.

c 4

State of Florida State Emergency Operations Center (SEOC) f ,

The State EOC was fully staffed with a complement of representatives

/ from 15 State agencies, the Governor's Advisory Committee, and a

$ liaison from Florida Power and Light Company.

Emergency operations management was well executed-ty the State Operations Officer. Access to the State EOC was adequately controlled, and efficient message handling procedures were demonstrated.

The State EOC was notified of all changes in the emergency classification level. All protective action recommendations were discussed by representatives at the EOF and the State EOC, before I implementation. It appeared that State Operations were not hindered by the elimination of the-Forward EOC.

l The State EOC is an adequate emergency facility and can support a

l protracted emergency response. The capability and implementation of all communication resources was excellent.

.a ,

The State Department of Agriculture implemented all ingestion pathway protective actions adequately.

A separate room in the EOC is designated for all media activity.

Press releases were posted and rumor control lines were continuously monitored.

State Radiological Health personnel at the State EOC demonstrated familiarity with tasks delineated in the State Emergency Response Plan provided technical input for EOC activities as required uti1Ized available State and Federal resources at the appropriate times, and in general, appeared to have the expertise and proficiency to perform their assigned functions.

Rad Health and other State agency efforts to provide responsive

,anagement of the simulated incident were well integrated.

Emergency Operations Facility (EOF)

The objectives of the exercise were fulfilled in a professional and 4 well-organized manner. Activation, staffing, communications, dose assessment and protective action recommendations were carried out according to existing plans. The performance by the Radiological Health staff was outstanding.

Emergency News Center (ENC)

A need for more training and familiarization with established procedures for the State and county public information staffs was indicated. On Several errors in the implementation of procedures were observed. the first day, the most serious error was in the use of the EBS. The Dade County PIO prepared only one EBS message following i

the initial activation of the siren system, and that message ,

instructed residents to " return to their homes", even though they were involved in an evscuation initiated almost an hour before. Later in the day, when additional sectors were ordered evacuated, the EBS was not used at all. PIO staff did not appear to be knowledgeable of one another's responsibilities; e.g., both Dade County and the State PIO issued news releases instructing the public in the 10-mile EPZ l

concerning the use of well water for drinking. In addition, the instructions were contradictory.

Mobile Radiolonical Emergency Response Laboratory (MERL)

MERL staff were well trained in radioisotopic sample analysis and sample-handling techniques. Equipment aboard the MERL is of research grade and represents " state-of-the-art" in radioisotope identification and analysis. Staff were able to analyze environmental samples and provide results of lab analysis to the State Radiological Health staff The MERL operated stationed at the EOF in a timely manner.

efficiently.

l

_ _ . _ , . _ _..__-._-_=_

g .o >

Field Monitoring Teams The field monitoring teams were deployed and field measurements were taken on both days of the exercise. The field teams have adequate equipment and personnel. The teams need updated and expanded standard operating procedures that detail their field practices. The teams need better maps and some method of communication that will provide consistent contact between the field teams, mobile lab (MERL) and the EOF.

Risk Counties Medical Services The medical drill was accomplished in an outstanding manner. The Baptist Hospital-based team was well trained and professional. The patient was processed rapidly through decontamination while accomplishing the necessary medical procedures.

Clean up procedures were proper for controlling the spread of contamination.

Dade County The Dade County EOC is an excellent facility for the support of an emergency response to an incident at the Turkey Point Nuclear Power Plant. Communications equipment was adequate and both primary and secondary systems were demonstrated. Notification and activation of staff was efficient. Response staff which participated in the exercise were trained and familiar with procedures. Some confusion exists with regard to which plans will be used for response operations. This issue needs to be resolved between State and local officials.

The emergency response operation was effectively managed by the Director. Leadership was evident and staff worked well with the Director to respond to the energency needs. _

Problems were identified in the Prompt Notification System. Better procedures and more training are needed to ensure the public is promptly notified of emergency situations at Turkey Point.

Decisions on protective actions were not made at the Dade County EOC but rather at the EOF by the Assistant County Manager (acting directly l l for the County Manager). Decisions were made by the County I

Environmental Health Director on protective actions for emergency I workers. Potassium iodide was issued and ordered taken in accordance i i with the County plan and Environmental Protection Agency guidance; I these decisions were prompt and appropriate.

I i

t

' . 4 e

Once protective actions had been decided, the Dade County EOC was well prepared to implement them.

Traffic and marine access control was promptly ordered and implemented by the Metro Dade Police and Florida Marine Patrol.

l Opening of Reception Centers was simulated during the Site Area emergency and demonstrated later in the day. l

)

A 350 school children and staff was ordered i atsimuisted evacuation of 3,d an necessary arrangements for 346 buses and the General Emergency, drivers were made to transport the evacuees to paired schools l previously identified in the plan.

I The Dade County EOC is not within the 10-mile EPZ and therefore no dosimetry issuance was necessary. Potassium iodide is available for emergency worker use as well as for local hospitals and for Homestead Air Force Base. The County environmental health director was familiar with procedures for its use.

The reentry planning and impleme'tation n developed in the Dade County EOC on the second day of the exercise was appropriate, well coordinated, and timely. However, it was limited and hampered throughout the day by a lack of technical information on the location, extent, and level of contamination in the affected area.

Four field activities performed by Dade County emergency workers and volunteers were observed: vehicle monitoring, vehicle decontamination, evacuee monitoring / decontamination, and evacuee

registration and sheltering. The Metro-Dade Fire Department demonstrated vehicle monitoring for contamination. For the most part, the demonstation was well done and the participants were knowledgeable of the fundamental procedures. However, additional training Although is a

suggested to reinforce monitoring concepts and techniques.

Fire Department truck was present, no demonstration of vehicle -

decontamination was accomplished.- County law enforcement personnel were present but traffic control at the Center was not demonstrated.

! Evacuee monitoring was demonstrated by a different Metro-Dade Fire

Department team. This demonstration was also fundamentally correct, however, additional training is suggested to enhance theteams participants'

. understandicg of the procedures. Additional monitoring Adequate were equipment, present to assist in decontamination activities.

- decontamination kits, and temporary clothing could be procured. There was no demonstration of decontamination or access control.

I Volunteers from the American Red Cross staffed the registration center and shelter. For the most part, the registration simulation was e acceptable. However, the function and role of the shelter during a e- - - - - - - - - w--w,- ,,s- e, , , - - i---en-=-, - -.ww,-mg- g -y-- -+ w *r- y espr my -P

i

. .- , j radiological emergency was not clearly understood by the volunteers.

It is recommended that Dade County planners and the American Red Cross jointly determine sheltering / care requirements for evacuees during a radiological emergency. A comprehensive plan and SOP's should be developed for the facility and the volunteers trained in procedures.

Monroe County The emergency response capabilities at the Monroe County EOC in

' Plantation Key were more than adequate to handle the activities presented by the scenario, with the exception of a need for a back-up communication system between the EOC and Ocean Reef. In addition, previously identified problems were corrected inasmuch as the scenario allowed. Overall, it was an excellent demonstration of emergency response capability.

Fifty-Mile Ingestion Pathway County Broward County Broward County's participation in the exercise was limited to receipt of NAWAS messages and a partial activation of the County's emergency communication systems. NAWAS messages were monitored and recorded on ,

l State Nuclear Power Plant Notification forms. One message was relayed to County offices, schools and radio stations via the County's tone activated receiver system.

Although not part of the exercise, several County facilities and procedures were shown to the evaluator, including staff activation j procedures, communications equipment, dosimetry and monitoring kits, and the County's large and well-organized EOC.

r 9

s l

II. DETAILED DISCUSSION Introduction The Turkey Point Nuclear Power Plant is owned and operated by Florida Power and Light Company. It is located in Dade County adjacent 1c the northern portion of Monroe County known as the Upper Keys. Portions of Dade and Monroe Counties lie within the 10-mile EPI. All or parts of Dade, Monroe, Collier and Broward Counties lie within the 50-mile 4 ingestion pathway. During this exercise the ingestion pathway activities included Broward County.

The Turkey Point exercise was a Full Participation / Ingestion Pathway Exercise conducted on January 22-23, 1986. This exercise was observed by twenty Federal evaluators, representing seven Federal agencies (FEMA, NRC, DOE, USDA, DOT, EPA, HHS/FDA).

Criteria used to evaluate the exercise are contained in the " Modular Format for Uniformity of Radiological Emergency Preparedness Exercise Observations and Evaluations" issued by FEMA on August 5, 1983. (For a detailed listing of evaluators and assignments, see Appendix A).

The exercise objectives established a full-system test for the off site response plan. (See Appendix B--Exercise Objectives). All objectives were incorporated into the exercise scenario. The scenario established exercise activity for both days. (Refer to Appendix C for

a detailed time line of the scenario). ,

The last exercise, conducted on November 7, 1984, at Turkey Point was a partial participation exercise evaluated by eight Federal evaluators representing FEMA and NRC. Dade and Monroe Counties fully demonstrated response operations, and the State of Florida participated in the exercise at the Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) and the Emergency News Center (ENC). There were no deficiencies observed during this exercise, and previously noted problems at the l June 1983 exercise had been corrected. Therefore, there were no outstanding items from previous exercises.

l The Turkey Point Nuclear Power Plant Exercise included the following participants:

Florida Power and Light Company Turkey Point Nuclear Power Plant Florida Division of Emergency Management

,, , Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services

{

Florida Public Service Commission ;

Florida Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles 1 Florida Marine Patrol !

Florida Game and Fresh Water Fish Commission Florida Department of Transportation !

Florida Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services Florida Department of Military Affairs '

Florida Department of Natural Resources American Red Cross -

Dade County Emergency Management Agency Metro-Dade Police Metro-Dade Fire Dade County Cooperative Extension Dade County Public Schools i Dade County Public Health Department Dade County Public Works Dade County Water and Sewer Dade County Environmental Resources Management Dade County Parks Department Dade County Manager Assistant Monroe County Civil Defense Monroe County Sheriff's Department Ocean Reef Club Security Monroe County Volunteer Fire and Rescue Departments Monroe County Social Services Broward County Emergency Management Agency During this exercise 12 superior items were identified along with.15 areas recommended for improvement. Ten inadequacies were also

>- identified. A remedial drill is required to correct the inadequacies observed at the Emergency News Center and the Dade County EOC. These inadequacies involve the need for more effective use of the Prompt -

Notification System and the Emergency Broadcast System.

The following detailed discussion highlights the specific activities demonstrated during the exercise. Activities are discussed by the location of the demonstration in the following order: the State of Florida , the risk counties, and the ingestion pathway county.

I State of Florida State Emergency Operations Center (SEOC)

Since deployment of personnel to the SEOC was not an objective of this exercise, all emergency response personnel were already in place at the State EOC during the alert stage. The SEOC was fully staffed with a complement of representatives from 15 State agencies, the Governor's i

Advisory Committee and a liaison from Florida Power and Light Company, Emergency operations management was effectively carried out by the j operations officer. Appropriate State officials were involved in the decision-making process. Frequen.t briefings were held to update the response personnel on the changing emergency conditions. Efficient

cessage-handling procedures were demonstrated. Message logs were

, typed and distributed to all appropriate State agency representatives. Access to the SEOC was adequately controlled with all participants being badged before being allowed into the operations room.

'f The SEOC was promptly notified of the changes in the emergency classification: Notification of Unusual Event - 0734; Alert - 0829; Site Area Emergency - 1030; General Emergency - 1130. Status boards and maps were clearly visible and were generally kept up-to-date on the changing emergency conditions.

All protective actions were discussed between representatives at the EOF and the SEOC before implementation. The Governor's Advisory Committee was consulted on only one occasion; this was regarding implementation of protective action recommendations. It is recommended that the State of Florida review the value of this formal committee.

It appeared that State operations were not hindered by the elimination

of the Forward EOC's. Communications and decision-making activities were effectively managed between the SEOC and the EOF. All -

communication systems worked effectively including the hot-ring down line and the hard-copy telefax machine. The capability and implementation of all communication resources were excellent.

The State EOC is an adequate facility and can support an extended smergency response. There is sufficient furniture and equipment to support State emergency activities; however, more space could be j utilized effectively.

The State Department of Agriculture implemented well all ingestion pathway protective actions. The Department established a program to monitor all movement of agricultural products into and out of the contaminated area 0-10 miles from the plant. Area farmers were j notified that the Department would be taking samples on Day 2.

l Media relations were efficiently handled by the State Public Information Officer. Press releases were posted in a separate room designated expressly for the media. All media briefings were simulated. Rumor control lines were monitored throughout the exercise providing accurate information to inquiries.

Recovery and re-entry actions were adequately addressed by all State agencies. Decisions were communicated promptly from the EOF to all response organizations at the SEOC.

Radiological Health personnel updated " projected dose status board" updated as soon as data arrived. There were a few problems in this area that appeared to be the result of incorrect data being sent from the EOF. SE0C Radiological Health personnel recognized the erroneous information and called the EOF to get a correction. Communications and interaction between SEOC Radiological Health and EOF personnel were frequent and appeared to be effective.

)

.g.

.o. ,

Radiological Health personnel took part in internal discussions regarding protective measures, provided technical input to other State agencies as necessary, and took part in periodic updates for SEOC personnel. Radiological Health actions and tasks followed the outline of the State Emergency Response Plan.

Radiological Health, the State Department of Agriculture and the Florida Highway Patrol coordinated closely their efforts to bring food into the Florida Keys.

Radiological Health has a system of NAI detectors set up at weigh stations and alerted the weigh stations to the possibility of contaminated vehicles leaving the affected area.

Radiological Health and the State Department of Agriculture worked closely together to insure that no contaminated food crops were shipped out, such as the potato crop in the area which was ready for harvest. Rad Health also coordinated with the Florida Department of Natural Resources regarding harvesting of shellfish in the area.

Radiological Health coordinated with the Florida Highway Patrol regarding shipment of primary coolant samples to Oak Ridge for analysis.

Request for assistance from DOE, EPA, and coordination with the southern states pursuant to SMRAP were demonstrated.

Superior Items:

1. Emergency operations management was well executed.

2. Decision-making activities were effectively managed.

3. The capability and implementation of all communication -

resources was excellent. ~

f

4. Graphics projection system for maps.

5. Communications into the State EOC via~ radio and telephone were very good. There were enough telephones for al.1 staff and no complaints were voiced about phone lines.

6. Promulgation of information in the State EOC was prompt and effective. Knowledge of emergency response plan by all staff was good. Knowledge and utilization of available resources was good.

7. Radiological Health interface with other State agencies was effectively demonstrated. Technical expertise of HRS, Radiological Health personnel at the State EOC was sufficient to properly perform necessary tasks.

I i i

Deficiences: None.

Areas Requiring Corrective Action: None.

Areas Recommended For Improvement:

1. More space in the SEOC could be utilized effectively.

2. Dade County representatives should follow the State plan for requesting resources and personnel from the State. Requests should be made directly to State representatives in the SEOC in Tallahassee.

3. Technical data such as dose projections arriving from the EOF were sometimes conflicting. Dose projections received by Radiological Health and by DEM personnel were sometimes different, causing some confusion and time delay while problems were being resolved. The data leaving the EOF needs to come from one source that has the capability to review and approve it.

4. It would be helpful if the estimated plume location / footprint were displayed in the EOC.. Perhaps a copy could be faxed from the EOF and projected with the graphics projection system at the EOC.

5. The status board showing whole body and thyroid doses that is maintained by HRS has its whole body and thyroid columns reversed, with respect to the STATE OF FLORIDA NOTIFICATION MESSAGE FORM FOR NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS which was utilized during the exercise. This difference is a potential source of er.ror, and can be easily rectified. Also, on the same status board, under the column " Total Releases", the data that was plotted was in units of " Release Rate" (ci/sec).*

The status board should be changed to reflect this.

Emergency Operations Facility (EOF)

Communications and coordination between the Florida Division of Emergency Management and the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services were excellent. The overall interaction among the representatives of the State, Dade County, and Florida Power and Light Company was also exceptional.

Unlike previous exercises, the Dade County representative located in the EOF, who was acting on behalf'of the Dade County Manager, played a major decision-making role which significantly enhanced the overall management of the emergency. Although this action enhanced EOF operations, it also had the effect of reducing the role of the Dade County EOC to one of providing support. Consequently, it will be

necessary for Dade County management to conduct a thorough review of their operating procedures and make changes to ensure that the staff at the County EOC provides maximum support to the County decision-maker located in the EOF. ,

Representatives of the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services performed a rapid and independent assessment of the accident in a timely and professional manner, and immediately coordinated the results of this assessment with the Governor's Authorized i

Representative. The results of the State-performed accident assessment were in good accord with the results of the assessment performed by the utility operator. This greatly facilitated overall emergency management since the need to reconcile major differences was eliminated.

During the simulated emergency, as well as the ingestion pathway activities, the State, County and utility representatives jointly developed and implemented appropriate protective actions to protect public health and safety.

The EOF carried out its responsibilities according to the existing plan and fulfilled the exercise scenario objectives in a professional and well-organized manner.

Excellent leadership was provided by the Florida Power and Light Company representatives, the NRC and the State. Decisions on the most appropriate protective actions were reached only after collective consideration of the facts regarding reactor conditions, projected

radiation release rates and field radiation levels.

The EOF was well equipped with dose assessment computers, communications equipment, maps, charts, status boards, reproduction capability, etc. All equipment functioned well with a minimum of i mechanical problems. .

Superior Items:

1. Performance of the DHRS Radiological Health staff in assessing the severity and scope of the accident and in making subsequent protective action recommendations.

Deficiencies: None.

Areas Requiring Corrective Action: None.

Areas Recommended For Improvement:

1. A thorough review of Dade County's operating procedures is needed to ensure that the staff at the County EOC provides maximum support to the County decision-maker located in the EOF.

I

Emergency News Center (ENC)

It was apparent on Day 1 that the State and County PIO staffs had little or no training or experience in working together. This was reflected in several ways during the two-day exercise. No State or County PIO seemed certain who was responsible for all the actions required of a joint information center in such an accident scenario.

For instance, EBS was not effectively utilized, conflicting information was provided to the public in news releases and there was considerable confusion about who should be the spokesperson on what subjects. There was also some lack of attention to detail. For instance, all the PIO's in the ENC coordinated on two separate news releases with contradictory instructions to the public. In another instance, a list of schools to be used as " sponsor" schools for evacuated children was not updated to fit current protective action conditions. Although a message was received in the ENC indicating the initial activation of the sirens, the PIO's did not respond at once to begin drafting the instructions to the public for airing on EBS stations. In fact, after the sirens were sounded, the only message generated was one which instructed already-evacuated people to return to their homes. (E.5. and E.6.)

Much of the confusion and inefficiency in the ENC could also have been execerbated by the unclear lines of authority which were evident between the Metro-Dade Emergency Management Director and the assistant to the County Manager who was located in the EOF and provided public information instructions to the Dade County PIO.

Superior Items:

1. Response to several controller-injected rumors was excellent. ,

Deficiencies: None.

Areas Requirina Corrective Action:

l l 1. E.5. 4 E.6. The Dade County PIO issued an EBS message instructing residents hearing the initial sounding of the sirens to return to their homes fifty-four minutes after the l

i same residents were being evacuated by local government i forces. The effect of this erroneous instruction would have l caused evacuees to turn around on established evacuation routes in the midst of a significant traffic flow out of the l

i area. Those who reentered could have been subsequently exposed to contamination when the radiation release began later. Later, the EBS was not used even though new areas were designated to be evacuated. Since the State and local government staffs clearly did not activate the alert and j

notification systems and follow acceptable procedures in the l

l

_.__.___..___._______i_.___.__..___._ _

i .. .e ,

s use of the EBS, remedial actions are necessary. It is recommended that procedures be reviewed and corrections made

to ensure effective use of EBS. Staff should be trained and new procedures demonstrated in a remedial drill.

Areas Recommended For Improvement: .

1. Both the licensee and the State issued news releases stating each had made protective action recommendations before the L county -which ultimately had to decide whether those actions would be implemented, could make its decision one way or the other. It is recommended that, whenever possible, the final decision to implement (or change, or ignore) recommended protective actions be made simultaneously with the recommendations. This would preclude public concern over whether their governmental officials are listening and responding to the recommendations.

2. The exercise did not adequately test the public information staffs. In a scenario involving escalation to General i Emergency and the evacuation of more than 90,000 people, not '

one media inquiry was received on the first day in the ENC on the incoming phone lines dedicated to media. In the press briefings, there were less than a dozen questions asked of the spokespersons. It is recommended that future scenarios be augmented with telephonic media inquiries suitable to the situation and that mock media be utilized in the press briefings to provide realistic testing of the public information staffs.

3. It did not appear that the various public information staffs had either worked together or trained together enough to insure a team response to the accident at Turkey Point.

Procedures were developed spontaneously as the scenario -

drove them, rather than those procedures having the benefit

.of pre-exercise mutual consideration and adoption. It is recommended that public information staffs meet and

establish jointly approved and accepted procedures to cope !

with the anticipated demands for information from the media and the public.

4. On the second day, there was one instance of the public

receiving conflicting information in news releases. A State news release advised the public that water from " wells is safe for drinking", but a subsequent county news release

- contradicted that stating, " private wells should not be used

! until the Health Department has had a chance to test the -

l

}

_ _________.___.____,._8

t

,, , l water for contamination". The most significant point of this occurrence is that, as in all other news releases, all l principal P10's coordinated'on that news release, but did not detect the contradiction.

5. The PIO phones in the workroom should have ringer lights like those in use in the EOF. The phones are so close together and ringers are so loud that the PIO's cannot always determine which phone is ringing.

Mobile Emergency Radiological Laboratory ('MERL)

The MERL was prepositioned at the Florida Power and Light Company substation on Palm Drive about two miles east of Homestead.

Electrical connections were available at the substation but were not available at the MERL or the alternate location at the South Dade Government Center. Thus, MERL did not relocate as called for in the scenario.

MERL staff were well trained in radioisotopic sample analysis and sample handling techniques, having attended the Las Vegas RERO course and having basic radiation science training at the B.S. level.

Equipment aboard the MERL is of research grade and represents

" state-of-the-art" i'n radioisotopic identification and analysis.

! Staff were able to handle and analyze environmental samples and provide results of the lab analysis to the EOF in a timely manner.

Deficiencies: None.

I Areas Requirina Corrective Action: None.

Areas Recommended For Improvement: None.

Field Monitorina Teams No notification or mobilization of the field monitoring teams was demonstrated. The field monitoring teams were instructed the night before the exercise to report to the Dade county Emergency Operations Center (EOC) to pick up their equipment at 8:30 a.m. on Day 1 of the -

exercise. After picking up their equipment, the field teams proceeded to the Florida Power and Light (FPL) substation located at 16100 Palm Drive where the Mobile Emergency Radiological Laboratory (MERL) was prepositioned.

The field team equipment was adequate, although not all the first response teams would have a complete kit until the MERL arrived from Orlando. Monitoring equipment was in current calibration. However, it is suggested-that equipment be better packed in order to prevent breakage and to protect equipment from tumbling loose in a vehicle.

l l

t

The maps used by the field teams were provided by Florida Power and Light Company and were cumbersome to use and difficult to read. The '

grid system on the map is useful for reporting a team's location; however, it is sometimes difficult to distinguish between a grid line and a road. Even those teams with a member who was familiar with the area had a difficult time finding their location on the map. On several occasions teams were at the same location because they misread

the map. Because the teams report readings based on grid locations, it is important that they report their location accurately. On several occasions teams reported readings at erroneous locations. In a real event this would affect the projected plume location and dose projection.

! The field teams need additional training especially in the use of the equipment used to count air samples. Expanded and updated Standard Operating Procedures (SOPS) is recommended. For example, when air samples are taken in an area which has an elevated reading, the team should withdraw from the area before counting the sample. On the second day of the exercise the field team members collected ingestion pathway samples. However, they did not always use accepted health physics practices when collecting the samples. For example, when collecting water samples, they did not rinse the container or cap.

They simply dipped the container into the water source, which could have contaminated the outside of the container. A bucket and rope are recommended to collect the sample. The sample should be bagged if the outside gets wet, so that contamination is not spread. Additional SOPS are needed for environmental sampling. (I.8.)

The field teams had two different radio systems available during the exercise; however, neither worked on a consistent basis. There was a

repeater located near the plant, but the teams still had trouble

communicating with MERL and EOF which were less than 10 miles away.

When questioned about this problem, neither the field teams nor the field team coordinators could explain what the problem was. Althodgh the teams were able to relay information, it is a problem which j requires corrective action before the next exercise. (F.1.d.)

The field team members were issued dosimeters on each day of the exercise. However, they were rarely read on the~first day of the exercise. The field team cooordinator at the EOF did not ask for their readings

tracking the timehowever,in spent an area when the team was taking a sample.they were keeping l This provided an estimated dose for each team on the morning of the second day. However, the team members need to be aware of their exposure and should not depend on the EOF to keep track of it. It is in their procedures to read the dosimeters and record the reading every 30 minutes. On the second day of the exercise, the team members were reminded to read their dosimeters in the morning briefing and did

so.

The field monitoring teams currently have adequate personnel to sustain a 24-hour operation.

~ _-___ __ _ _ _ __ _ __ _ __ _

16-Superior Items:

1. Adequate amount of equipment and in current calibration.

2. Adequate personnel to staff a 24 hour2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months operation.

Deficiencies: None. ,

l Areas Requiring Corrective Action:

> 1. F.1.d. Communications - Field team radios did not work

< consistently. When asked what the problem was no j

explanation as to the source of the problem could be provided.

2. I.8. Field practices and Standard Operating Procedures -

Field teams need improved and expanded SOPS in air sampling and environmental sampling and should be instructed to use the SOPS.

Areas Recommended For Improvement:

1. Field teams are provided with dosimeters and recording sheets but did not use them on a consistent basis. A reminder in the initial daily briefing, and possibly from 1

the EOF controller during the day, would be helpful.

2. I.8. Maps - Field team maps are cumbersome to handle and difficult to read. Maps need to be improved possibly by including landmarks and color.

I Risk Counties .

Medical Services The Baptist Hospital-based medical drill was well executed. The room was properly prepared. Personnel were dressed prior to patient arrival. The monitoring equipment was tested for proper operation.

The hospital team was well trained and worked well together. The i

patient was received, priorities were established and tasks rapidly l accomplished. All activities were well handled with a high priority on contamination cre. trol. The patient was well treated and rapidly processed.

After patient transfer for more complete medical treatment, all personnel properly removed outer garments to control any possible spread of contamination. .

o

=-wg-g-w,%--m--,-,-e---i+--5--'-- w+-- w e ye-ve-www-w -mew.vm -w1,'yewuse-7-w-w w,-v e w -g m-,w-w se vav m ete'-+-w g-w-wM- e - -w-d-- - - - - --ww-- --g--ie-*g* v

17-4 Superior Items:

1. Baptist Hospital has a well trained team. Personnel were knowledgeable and prepared to perform their tasks. (

, Deficiencies: None.

Areas Requiring Corrective Action: None.

Areas Recommended For Improvement: None.

Dade County The notification lists for response staff were current with up-to-date phone numbers. Two EOC staff conducted alerting and activation.

Confirmation began with initials for verification und later this was changed to full names. Procedures worked well and staff were I trained. The EOC was activated in stages. During Alert, the EOC operations included posting of status boards and logging of messages.

As the Alert continued many agencies with key roles (Public Safety, Fire, Public Works) were operational. All staff were in the EOC and operational at 1016.

Staff were trained and familiar with procedures and agency resources available for support. Procedures and checklists were used. However, procedures used were not those identified in the State plan which was reviewed by the Regional Assistance Committee. There is confusion

about which plan is to be used by Dade County for response

operations. It is very difficult to determine if response actions are demonstrated correctly when the State and County are using different plans. It is recommended that a determination be made as to which plans will be used (A.1.b.).

I The 24-hour response-capability was demonstrated in several ways by' different agencies. The Dade County Emergency Management Agency used all staff during the entire exercise for training purposes. The Public Safety Department double staffed for both days of the exercise, switching the lead staff role to allow for cross-training. Double staffing was also utilized by the Metro-Dade Fire Department and the American Red Cross. The remaining agencies only staffed one shift and simulated the 24-hour capability.

The Director was effectively in charge of the IOC. The E0C staff and director worked well together in problem solving with multi-agency response coordination. One example involved the need for additional school buses for evacuation of school children. This problem was l resolved jointly by Public Transportation, the School Board and Public Health.

j 9-+w-,--9m wr- yam--9-w---wp=wmy---99m--wwqw,yww--y w up-m w-w-evwg-w r g -> Nw- m T-F---6wreTWw- - - - " ' ' ' ' * ' - - ~ ' ~ '

~ ' '

.. . ! The EOC briefings could be improved by conducting more frequent agency briefings to allow all staff in the E0C to be aware of response operations underway. Having more frequent briefings would help to keep briefings to a reasonable length of time The as well as to allow

'- staff to continually be aware of activities. first agency participation briefing was scheduled for 1:30 p.m. and started at 1:45 p.m. This briefing lasted until 2:12 p.m. and occurred during the peak of evacuation activities.

The Dade County EOC has a conference capability with the EOF, Viahethe ENC, and all other parties on the dedicated ring-down phone. t public address system in the EOC, these calls can be heard by all i staff. This provides an excellent briefing technique and was used very effectively during the exercise. l j

i The Dade County Manager's Assistant was dispatched to the EOF and participated in the Utility / State / Local decision making activities.

The Dade County representative at the EOF was continually in contact by hot ring-down telephone with the Dade County Director advising of PAG's and other decisions for response.

The Dade County EOC's physical facilities are excellent. Adequate space was available for each agency. Each agency had its own In addition, most agencies had separate status boards at 1

telephone.

their location to post actions implemented. The layout of the facility allowed for easy movement and no crowding. Telephones vere muted, the floors were carpeted, and the ceiling and upper walls were As a result, noise was not a

< acoustic tile to reduce noise levels.

l problem.

All necessary charts and maps were available. However, maps or visual i

l aids depicting evacuation routes, traffic / access points, and l

1 population density by sector would be useful. The plotting of the, plume and sheltered / evacuated zones on a map would also be helpful.

Dade County communications equipment provides for primary and I secondary systems to communicate with all emergency response

, operations. Equipment includes dedicated ring-down telephone, NAWAS, LGR, commercial telephone, hard-copy transmission (Omnifax) and other mobile radio support. In addition a hard-copy communications net is l

available with all news media. This is an excellent support tool in transmitting important information to the media.

The activation of the prompt notification system (PNS) was inadequate. General Emergency was declared at 11:25 a.m. At 12:06 p.m. the Dade County EOC was advised by the EOF that the State and Dade County agreed with Florida Power and Light Company recommendations for evacuation. The sirens were activated at 12:45 p.m. with verification of the EBS message over the radio approximately three minutes later. The system was not activated or simulated at any other time during the drill. Preparation for and I

transmission of EBS messages was not carried out at the Dade County EOC but was a responsibility of the ENC according to the Dade County

i .. . 39 Director. The Dade County operations did not have copies of what would have been transmitted over EBS, and there was no evidence that such a message was coordinated.

The PNS was not activated or simulated at several points in the scenario in which it should have been. At 11:25 a.m. the evacuation of a public school was simulated. Prior to this the Homestead Bayfront Park was closed and evacuated at 11:00 a.m. as a l precautionary action. At 11:55 a.m., a 5-mile evacuation was simulated as being implemented and message log number 35 indicated the Marine Patrol had boats in route to the area. The PNS was not utilized during the implementation of protective actions. i Annex Q, Turkey Point Site Plan, identifies the Dade County Director

, os the individual responsible for the activation of the system. It is not clear from the plan if the EBS is a County EOC function or an ENC function. EBS procedures need to be clearly delineated in plans and procedures.

The fact that the PNS was activated approximately 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months and 20 '

ninutes following the General Emergency declaration is a problem.

This is even more serious as it was the only activation of the ,

system. Further, it.was not clear from the participants that the EBS Plans l

message coordination had been adequately worked out in advance.

and procedures need to be established which will efficiently activate the system and clearly establish responsibilities for implementation (E.5 and E.6.).

Dose projections are not the responsibility of the Dade County EOC and none were made there. Decisions on protective actions for the public t

l were not made at the EOC, but rather by a county decision maker at the Emergency Operations Facility. The only protective action recommendations made at the EOC pertained to the use of potassium ,

iodide (KI) as a thyroid-blocking agent for county emergency workers.

The decision to issue K1 to emergency workers was made late in the morning of the first day of the exercise by the county Environmental Health Director. His decision was in accordance with the County plan. The K1 was distributed by the Metro-Dade Police Department.

The order to take the K1 was issued about 1410 by the director after obtaining concurrence of the State Health Officer at the SEOC in Tallahassee. This order was based on current dose projections and was in agreement with Environmental Protection Agency guidance.

Marine traffic within ten miles of the plant was controlled early in the exercise by the Florida Marine Patrol.

The reception center was ordered opened about 1035 but actual demonstration of the opening was done later.

There was a simulated evacuation of the schools ordered at 1130.

Arrangements for obtaining the necessary 346 buses and drivers to

20-transport about 3350 people were considered and carried out promptly.

Most buses were obtained from the schools, but 15 were obtained from the County. The children were taken to paired sister schools according to the County plan.

No dosimetry was issued to EOC workers because the EOC is well beyond the 10-mile EPZ.

An adequate supply of KI is kept at the EOC for County emergency workers, local hospitals and Homestead Air Force Base. The County environmental health director was aware of procedures for its use.

Little decision making on recommendations for reentry were done at the Dade County EOC. The role of the EOC was primarily one of implementing decisions made at the EOF. Implementation of those decisions was hampered throughou, the second day of the exercise by a lach of technical information on the location, extent and level of contamination in affected areas.

Nonetheless, preliminary planning on the basis of known information in the morning was directed by the County Emergency Management Director

! to all County agencies. By 1110 all agencies had prepared appropriate plans to deal with the first stage of reentry once it was ordered.

The various agencies had coordinated their plans at necessary.

The planning considered the number of shelters open and number of evacuees, FEMA requests for facilities, curtailment of bus routes, consumption and control of foodstuffs within the area, and fire and j police services.

Little additional planning and implementation was carried out until Inte in the afternoon when the first technical information arrived.

Even then, the information was not specific about the location of " hot spots" and the level of contamination, which precluded further specific planning. The planning that was done was appropriate and timely.

~

Superior Items:

1. Decisions on the issuance of potassium iodide for emergency workers were Environmental The County very timely, Health Director did an excellentappropriate and well implem job in carrying out that responsibility.

2. The use of the teleconferencing capabilities for the dedicated ring-down phone allowing EOC personnel to hear briefings from the EOF.

3. EOC facilities and communications support.

Deficiencies: None.

.. . 21-Areas Requiring Corrective Action:

1. A.1.b. There is confusion regarding the correct plans for Dade County to use in the response to an incident at Turkey Point. This needs to be. resolved and a determination made.

2. E.5.4 E.6. The activation of the prompt notification systes ;

(PNS) was inadequate. It is recommended that procedures be !

reviewed and corrections made to ensure effective use of PNS 1 and EBS. Staff should be trained and new procedures (

demonstrated in a remedial drill.

Areas Recommended For Improvement:

1. More frequent agency briefings. This would allow all staff to be better informed and not delayed by long, infrequent briefings.

I

2. Better use of public information and news releases. All staff need to know what the public is being told, most importantly the emergency information. Although these messages were posted on a clip board in the PIO corner, most staff were not aware of them or their contents.

Miami-Dade Consunity College-South (MDCC)

Monitoring / Decontamination Station A vehicular monitoring and decontamination station was established at i MDCC-South. The primary function of the station was for monitoring and decontaminating evacuees' vehicles. It is not expected that emergency vehicles would use the facility as most are equipped with 1

monitoring kits (especially fire vehicles) and the operators, approximately 1200 in Dade County, are trained in procedures. .

1 Representatives from the Metro-Dade Fire Department demonstrated vehicle monitoring. These individuals were generally knowledgeable and demonstrated proper techniques. It is suggested that these people receive periodic refresher courses to reinforce sopitoring concepts.

For example, and as indicated in previous exercise reports, monitors l should protect the instrument probes from contamination. Additional training is also required to ensure complete vehicular monitoring.

During this demonstration, examination of the radiator and air cleaner were omitted. When questioned, the participants were unaware of the

need to protect the probe and the need to examine under the hood of the vehicle.

l l

. - . . 22-The monitors were issued low- and high-range dosimeters as well as TLDs. They were trained in reading the dosimeters and were aware of turn-back values. It was estimated that 100 (50 teams) individuals could be assembled within an hour with the capability to monitor approximately 1000 cars per hour. Although a fire department truck was present, no demonstration of vehicle decontamination was planned.

I Monitoring and registration of evacuees were the primary functions at '

the MDCC Center. Evacuees were to be escorted to the monitoring station where they would be screened for contamination. Trained i

monitors should receive additional training in procedures to protect the instrument probes from accidental contamination. A sufficient number of monitoring teams could be assembled to handla the anticipated numbers of evacuees.

Following monitoring, evacuees would either be decontaminated, registered or released. Those to be decontaminated were directed to shower rooms immediately adjacent to the monitoring station.

Contaminated clothing and personal articles would be collected and stored. No provisions for the secure storage / accountability of l

personal valuables were made. Decontamination showers, subsequent i

l

! monitoring and the issue of temporary clothing were planned. With completion of decontamination, the evacuees were to be directed to the

reception area for registration. Those evacuees without contamination were sent directly to the reception area. Registration for those evacuees requesting shelter was to be performed following the ARC's standard procedures. Although forms had been prepared to indicate an

.' individual had been effectively decontaminated, no similar clearance was provided for those evacuees entering the center who had been determined to be uncontaminated. A simple, inked hand-stamp could be used to identify the successful screening of individuals to the i shelter manager. No evacuees were available for the demonstration.

The MDCC can be used effectively as a shelter for evacuees. However, there was some confusion among ARC volunteers as to the overall role of the facility and what services were to be provided. Basic information, such as the flow of evacuee traffic into the center was No overall shelter plan or l not clearly understood by the volunteers.

SOP's for the facility were present. Communication capabilities, although available through law enforcement and fire radios, would be cumbersome to use. It was recommended that Dade County emergency planners and the ARC jointly determine sheltering / care requirements for potential evacuees resulting from a radiological emergency.

Following this determination, a comprehensive sheltering plan, with SOP's for the facility, should be developed. (A.1.b. and J.12.).

- - - - - - - - - -my,-w-w-we -,-y wwww,ww.w,,,--iwwww-,,*-w,-,- --www,--r

. . . 23-I Deficiencies: None.

1 Areas Requiring Corrective Action: l r

I

1. A.1.b. and J.12. American Red Cross volunteers were not familiar with the plar. of operation for the MDCC shelter.

Different volunteers provided different answers to questions regarding the facility (e.g., Was it merely for registration, shelter, or both? Would sleeping accommodations be provided? What was the capacit of the shelter? Would a nurse's station be established?y What communications were available to whom? How could it be determined if a registrant had been monitored?

It was recommended that Dade County emergency planners and ARC reprsentatives jointly agree on what they could expect in terms of sheltering / mass care requirements during a radiological emergency. The statement that they have

" handled hurricane emergencies" is not adequate since there are significant differences between hurricanes and radiological emergencies. A comprehensive sheltering plan '

should be developed for radiological emergencies.

Contingency plans should be based on the potential number of evacuees and their potential length of stay in shelter.

SOP's for the facilities should be prepared and the volunteers should be trained in accordance with the

, procedures.

2. J.10.j. This objective was not demonstrated during the '

exercise and remains outstanding.

Areas Recommended For Improvement:

1. The MDFD monitoring teams require additional training.

Although fundamental techniques were demonstrated, the understanding of what they were doing was weak.

Monroe County The EOC in Monroe County located at Plantation Key is the County's principal EOC that responds to an accident at the Turkey Point Nuclear Power Plant. This EOC is located in the County Courthouse and is, overall, an acceptable facility for responding to a radiological emergency. Adequate amentties were present, back-up power was available, and all appropriate maps and emergency classification information was available. According to the Civil Defense Director, adequate space would be available in an actual emergency because only key emergency response personnel would be present in the EOC. The exercise objective to determine the adequacy of the Monroe County EOC to support emergency operations was set.

1

~ - . - - . . - - . . - _ _ _ - _ _ -

_ _ _ _ __z

Activation and staffing of the E0C and alerting and notification of key emergency response personnel were performed effectively, thus meeting the exercise objective. The Civil Defense Director was notified of the NOUE at 7:40 a.m. and of the Alert at 8:55 a.m. via '

radio pager. The Sheriff's Office receives the notification from the utility and contacts the Civil Defense Director; this communication link is monitored 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months per day. The EOC was not fully staffed, only key emergency response personnel were present. A major improvement in staffing resulted from the presence of the Ocean Reef Fire Chief who effectively coordinated from the EOC with the Ocean Reef development.

The Monroe County EOC was very capably managed by the Civil Defense Director and the Assistant Civil Defense Director. The two individuals and their staff were clearly aware of their responsibilities and of the coordination of the County resources. All appropriate staff were involved in decision-making, periodic briefings were held, and message handling was efficient. The hotline ring-down phone needs to be monitored at all times. Overall, the objective was met to demonstrate the ability of key individuals to coordinate and i direct the response operations and activities.

For the most part, communications equipment was good and procedures were effective in internal information flow. The hotline ring-down phone provided the key communications link between the principal h organizations, including Ocean Reef. However, radio communications (LGR) should be established as a back-up communications link (this recommendation has been made at previous exercises). (F.1.).

The transmittal of information from the EOF on the incident i classification form was inefficient. It was difficult to transcribe oral information onto the form. Transmittal of hard-copy via the Omnifax with subsequent oral confirmation would reduce the chance of -

i confusing PARS. Similarly, in these message transmissions l meteorological data was not provided early in the exercise. Many '

times "In-Place Shelter" should have been clearly stated to avoid confusion with " Sheltering". Also, hard-copy receipt of messages was delayed by two hours early in the exercise. ,

The Monroe County EOC simulated the alerting of the public at Ocean Reef. This was done following the receipt of the General Emergency l recommendation for in-place sheltering of this community. It was

! , indicated that sirens will be installed at Ocean Reef in the future.

At present route alerting is used to notify the public, and

! . information messages are prescripted that advise residents to turn on l

l i

.. ~ - .

a local radio or television station for further information; it is suggested that specific local radio and television stations be indicated in the messages to assure that the residents obtain information specific to Monroe County.

Traffic control points and marine traffic control were established.

Appropriate assessments were made of the resources available to carry out these actions. Reception centers were also activated (simulated) in a timely manner, and communication links were established with the centers. ,

No objectives were to be tested for radiological exposure control or for recovery and reentry. However, the county responded by monitoring and decontaminating a vehicle at the Key Largo Fire Department Station

2. Previously identified problems with dosimetry (lack of low-range dosimeters and TLDs) and monitoring procedures (touching probes to individuals or automobiles) were corrected. Recovery and reentry was

not tested because Monroe County was not evacuated. Relaxation of the in-place sheltering PAR in Ocean Reef was coveyed to the county and appropriate actions were taken.

The Monroe County EOC had two PIDs at the Emergency News Center.

Procedures were demonstrated for coordinated and timely dissemination of information to the public and media. News releases were coordinated between the EOC and the county PIOS at the ENC.

l The scenario provided an acceptable level of activity for the l participants. The controller message inputs were excellent and contributed to keeping the exercise activities interesting.

Superior Items:

1. Attendance of the Ocean Reef Fire Department Chief at the Monroe County EOC to coordinate activities between the County and the community. Excellent display of capabilities.

- ^

Deficiencies: None.

Areas Requiring Corrective Action:

1. F.1. A back-up communications system does not exist between the County EOC and Ocean Reef. Recommendation: Establish a Local Government Radio (LGR) link between the County EOC and Ocean Reef as a back-up to the existing dedicated telephone

.line.

l l

l e

l_ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __n _ _ . __ _ __

1

,o . - 26-Areas Recommended For Improvement:

1. Route alerting messages did not-indicate specific local l radio or television stations for the public to turn to. To i assure that loca1' citizens receive public information l specific to Monroe County, include in instructional messages '

local radio and television stations.

Fifty-Mile Ingestion Pathway County Broward County Broward County's participation in the exercise was limited to receipt of NAWAS messages and a partial communications system activation. On the NAWAS system, the Alert Emergency classification was received at 8:36 a.m. on Day 1, and the General Emergency classification was received at 12:22 p.m. No Site Area Emergency message was received.

Several updates were received following the General Emergency message. Messages were recorded on State notification message forms.

The County partially activated its communications system for the exercise. One messa receiver (plectron) ge system, was sent which out serves via the CountyCounty radio-activated agencies, schools, local radio stations, and other institutions. Local government radio !

was also used, to contact Dade County at one point.

The County Agricultural Extension Agent interviewed by the evaluator demonstrated a good knowledge of the types of foods produced in the County, and indicated that a mailina list of food producers is maintained and updated annually by . is office. The County Public Works Director explained that all coJnty potable water supplies are drawn from wells, minimizing the posaibility of radiological -

contamination.

Broward County civil defense staff inv.*ntoried many of the county's emergency response procedures and faci:.ities for the benefit of the evaluator. The County has a large and well-equipped EOC, used primarily for weather emergencies, including separate rooms for operations management, executive-level meetings, citizen information, and communications. Several radio communication channels are available,' including police, fire, and local government frequencies, highway department and mass transit department frequencies, and RACES amateur radio channels.

I

+- ye w y--g y-- ----,r=- --,-wwe vr--v-v--

y -7wr,--i_-e-w w , - v -w-+-t--------+--s-- w m- '-e----.. _ _ _ - _ -

.o .

. 27-Staff activation procedures were explained and consist of a fan'out from the Sheriff's dispatch office, conducted by telephone and radio pager. The fan-out can be initiated at any time around the clock.

Lastly, the County has large stocks of dosimetry and radiological monitoring equipment and has trained over 200 police and fire personnel in their use.

Broward County demonstrrted that it is capable of fulfilling its limited responsibilities as described in the State plan.

Deficiences: None.

Areas Requiring Corrective Action: None.

Areas Recommended For Improvement: None..

+

e

,m -g-.. --. - -w.. ,, -_ _,m.g w-

l l

l 1

i l

\

III. SUHMARY LISTING OF INADEQUACIES Facility or Activity NUREG Ites Comments / Corrective Action l

Deficiencies None Areas Requiring Corrective Action Emergency E.5 4 E.6 The Dade County PIO issued an EBS News Center message instructing residents hearing the initial sounding of the sirens to return to their homes fifty-four minutes after the same residents were evacuated by local government forces. "

, The effect of this erroneous instruction would have caused evacuees to turn around on established evacuation routes in the midst of a significant traffic flow out of the, area. Those who reentered could have been subsequently exposed to

- contamination when the radiation release began. Later -the EBS was not used even thougn new areas were

- designated to be evacuated. Since the j State and local government staffs

- clearly did not activate the alert and notification systems and follow

' acceptable procedures in the use of the EBS, remedial actions are necessary. It is recommended that t procedures be reviewed and corrections

- made to ensure effective use of the EBS. Staff should be trained and new procedures demonstrated in a remedial drill.

. 1

--- - =. -

Facility or Activity NUREG Ites Comment / Corrective Action Field F.1.d. Communications - Field team radios Monitoring did not work consistently. When teams were asked what the problem was, no explanation of the source of the problem could be provided.

. I.8. Field practices and Stan'dard Operating Procedures - Field teams need improved and expanded SOP's in air sampling and environmental sampling.

Dade County A.1.b. There is confusion regarding the Plans correct plans'for Dade County to use in the response to an incident at Turkey Point. This needs to be resolved and a determination made.

Dade County E.5. 4 E.6. The activation of the prompt EBS notification system (PNS) was inadequate. It is recommended that procedures be reviewed and corrections be made to ensure effective use of PNS and EBS. Staff should be trained and then should demonstrate procedures in a remedial drill.

Dade County A.1.b. 4 American Red Cross volunteers were not Sheltering J.12. familiar with the plan of operation .

for the MDCC shelter. Volunteers provided different answers to '

i questions regarding the facility (e.g., Was it merely for registration, shelter, or both? Would sleeping accommodations be provided? What was the capacity of the shelter? Would a nurse's station be established? What

communications were available to l whom? How could it be determined if a I registrant had been monitored?).

l

. . - , , . - - - - - - - i

Facility or Activity NUREG lten Comment / Corrective Action It was recommended that Dade County emergency planners and ARC representatives jointly agree on what they could expect in terms of sheltering / mass care requirements during a radiological emergency. The statement that they have " handled hurricane emergencies" is not adequate since there are significant differences between hurricanes and radiological emergencies. A comprehensive sheltering plan should be developed for radiological energencies. Contingency plans should be based on the potential numbers of evacuees and their potential length of stay in shelter. SOP's for the facilities should be prepared and the volunteers should be trained in accordance with the procedures.

Monroe County F.1. A back-up communications systen does not exist between the County EOC and Ocean Reef. Recommendation:

Establish a Local Government Radio (LGR) link between the County EOC and Ocean Reef as a back-up to the existing dedicated telephone line. f 7

l

. . , _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - - . . . . .s___.. .____..__i

IV.

SUMMARY

LISTING OF AREAS RECOMMENDED FOR IMPROVEMENT Facility or Activity Area Rec 6mmended For Improvement State EOC 1. More space in the SEOC could be utilized effectively.

2. Dade County representatives should follow the State plan for requesting resources and personnel from the State. Requests should be made directly to State representatives in the SEOC in Tallahassee.

3. Technical data such as dose projections arriving from the EOF were sometimes conflicting. Dose projections received by Radiological Health and by DEM personnel were sometimes different, causing some confusion and time delay while probicas were being resolved. The data leaving the EOF needs to come from one source that has the capability to review and approve it.

4. It would be helpful if the estimated plume location / footprint were displayed in the EOC.

Perhaps a copy could be faxed from the EOF and projected with the graphics projection system at, the EOC.

5. The status board showing whole body and thyroid doses that is maintained by HRS has its whole body and thyroid columns reversed with respect to the STATE OF FLORIDA NOTIFICATION MESSAGE FORM FOR NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS which was utilized during the exercise. This difference is a potential source of i error, and can be easily rectified. Also on the same status board, under the column " Total Releases", the data that was plotted was in units of " Release Rate" (ci/sec). The status board should be changed to reflect this.

EOF 1. A thorough review of Dade County's operating procedures is needed to ensure that the staff at the County EOC provides maximum support to the county decision-maker located in the EOF.

.. . Facility or Activity ~ Area Recommended For Improvement Emergency 1. Both the licensee and the State issued news News Center releases stating each had made protective action recommendations before the county, which ultimately had to decide whether those actions would be implemented, could make its decision one way or the other. It is recommended that, whenever possible, the final decision to implement (or change, or ignore) recommended protective actions be made simultaneously Jith the recommendations. This would preclude public concern over whether their governmental officials are listening and responding to the recommendations.

1

2. The exercise did not adequately test the public information staffs. In a scenario involving escalation to General Emergency and the evacuation

~

of more than 90,000 people, not one media inquiry was received on the first day in the ENC on the incoming phone lines dedicated to media.- In the press briefings, there were less than a dozen questions asked of the spokespersons. It is recommended that future scenarios be augmented with telephonic media inquiries suitable to the situation and that mock media be utilized in the press briefings to provide realistic testing of the public information staffs. .

3. It did not appear that the various public information staffs had either worked together or trained together enough to insure a team response to the accident at Turkey Point. Procedures were developed spontaneously as the scenario drove them, rather than those procedures having the benefit oP~

pre-exercise mutual consideration and adoption. It i

is recommended that public information staffs meet i

and establish jointly approved and accepted procedures to cope with the anticipated demands for i

information from the media and the public.

i

4. On the second day, there was one instance of the public receiving conflicting information in news releases. A State news release advised the public that water from " wells is safe for drinking", but a subsequent county news release contradicted that ,

stating, " private wells should not be used until ,

the Health Departuent has had

, . . . . . . . . - - . _ _ , , . - - - . . _ - _ , .-__--,.-..-.__..-.-,-_.,...______,,__,_,,-__y,,-, _.-m, -. , - . , _ , . , , _,_, , . , . . - . - . - - - + , . _ - - , - - , . - , , , a-,

l 33 l

Facility or Activity Area Recommended For Improvement a chance to test the water for contamination". The most significant point of this occurrence is that, as in all other news releases, all principal PIO's coordinated on that news release, but did not detect the contradiction.

5. The PIO phones in the workroom should have ringer lights like those in use in the EOF. The phones are so close together and ringers are so loud that the PIO's cannot always determine which phone is ringing.

Field 1. Field teams are provided with dosimeters and Monitoring recording sheets but did not use them on a Teams consistent basis. A reminder in the initial daily briefing, and possibly from the EOF controller during the day, would be helpful.

2. ' Field team maps are cumbersome to handle and difficult to read. Maps need to be improved, possibly by including landmarks and color. '

Dade County 1. More frequent agency briefings. This would allow i E0C all staff to be better informed and not delayed by long, infrequent briefings.

2. Better use of public information and news releases. All staff need to know what the publit is being told, most importantly the emergency information. Although these messages were posted on a clip board in the PIO corner, most staff were not aware of them or their contents.

l Dade County 1. The MDFD monitoring teams require additional l Outside training. Although fundamental techniques were l ! Activities demonstrated, the understanding of what they were

doing was weak.

Monroe County 1. Route alerting messages did not indicate specific l

l EOC local radio or television stations for the public to turn to. To assure that local citizens receive public information specific to Monroe County, include in instructional messages local radio and television stations.

1

=

l I..-_,_.--,._. . _ _ _ . _ , _ _ _ __.___.--___,____._---____l-___

V. APPENDICES A. Evaluator List and Assignments B. Exercise Objectives and Scenario e

e& C i

i ,

APPENDIX A I

FEDERAL EVALUATOR ASSIGNMENTS TURKEY POINT NUCLEAR POWER PLANT EXERCISE January 22-23, 1986

. CHIEF OF EVALUATORE AND RAC IV CHAIRMAN Glenn Woodard (FEMA)

STATE EMERGENCY OPERATIONS CENTER (SEOC) - TALLAHASSEE Tom Hawkins (FEMA)

. Cheryl Malina (USDA) '

Jere Dumas (DOE)

EMERGENCY OPERATIONS FACILITY (EOF)

Bob Trojanowski (NRC)

Dick Payne (EPA)

EMERGENCY NEWS CENTER (ENC)

Jack Glover (FEMA) 4 MOBILE EMERGENCY RADIOLOGICAL LABORATORY (MERL)

Ray Boyett (FEMA)

FIELD MONITORING TEAMS Karen Guziel (FEMA)

Bill Gasper (FEMA)

Caroline Herzenberg (FEMA)

Don Singleton (FEMA) q; l-TRANSPORTATION / EVACUATION Al Hall (DOT) l

~~

MEDICAL SERVICES / MOBILE RADIOLOGICAL HEALTH Brad Eichorst (FDA)

DADE COUNTY Cheryl Stovall (FEMA)~ -"

I

' Jim Levenson (FEMA)

Tony Foltman ('EMA) i MONROE COUNTY Ed Tanznan (FEMA) t '

BROWARD COUNTY l Gary Kaszynski (FEMA)

f. MOBILE DURING EXERCISE ACTIVITIES I John Heard (FEMA) i t s

O a#. 9 e

APPENDIX B m

9 S

S h

i GOALS AND OBJECTIVES TURKEY POINT EXERCISE JANUARY 22-23, 1986 The following goals and objectives reflect full staffing by the State of Florida in the State Emergency Operations Center. This staffing includes the Governor's Authorized Representative located at the licensee's EOF, the Public Information Officer located at the Emergency News Center, and liaison personnel The assigned to local government emergency operations centers.

exercise will fully evaluate emergency response and com-munications capabilities among state and local governments, and the licensee.

Goals I.

To evaluate portions of the Florida Radiological Emergency Management Plan for Nuclear Power Plants and confirm its adequacy for response to an emergency situation at the Turkey Point nuclear power plant.

Specific portions of the' plan to be addressed are: ,

A. Annex Q - Turkey Point Site Plan I

g

- B. Annex B - Emergency Response Organizations and Responsibilities

C. Annex G - Public Information D. Annex H - Emergency Facilities E. Annex I - Accident Assessment F. Annex J - Radiological Exposure Control G. Annex L - Medical and Public Health Support H. Annex M - Recovery and Reentry

,, . II. To ovoluoto th2 radiological amargoney preparsdness capa-bilities of those counties within the plume and ingestion exposure pathway EPZ's.

III. To provide an opportunity for state agency personnel to be cross-trained in different aspects of radiological emergency operations.

OBJECTIVES - Plume Exposure Pathway I. Emergency Operations, Facilities and Resources A. 7b demonstrate point-to-point communications between state and local emergency response organizations and Florida Power and Light (FP&L) emergency personnel at thp Turkey Point nuclear power plant.

B. To determine the adequacy of the Dade and Monroe counties' EOCs to support emergency operations, including the establishment of a communications link to shelters.

II. Alerting and Mobilization of Of ficials and Staf f A. , To demonstrate the procedures for the alert and notifi-cation of key emergency response personnel. (All state and local staff, will be-prepositioned for the purpose of alert and notification.)

- III. Emergency Operations Management A. Tc demonstrate the ability of key individuals within prin-cipal emergency response organizations to coordinate and direct the response operations and activities of I

their respective organizations.

l

. IV . . Public Alorting and Natification A. To demonstrate the systems and procedures for notifi-cation of the public that a radiological emergency condition exists. The means of notification to be tested will be siren systems and broadcast notifica-

, tion systems. Messages will be developed, but not transmitted to broadcast systems. Siren system acti-vation will be simulated as necessary during the emergency .

V. Public and Media Relations A. . To demonstrate the organization and procedures for the coordinated and t!.mely dissemination of information to the public and media. This will include coordination i

of news releases among FP&L, state and county public information officials. The Emergency News Center will be fully staffed and operational.

VI. Accident Assessment

l '

A.-

Tb demonstrate the procedures for determining the This will radiological consequene,es of the emergency.

include deployment of the MERL and field teams under the coordination, direction and control of the State.

VII. Health, Medical, and Exposure Control Measures A.

To demonstrate the ability of Dade and Monroe counties to provide adequate health and medical services to contaminated individuals.

~e

, -4w~ + - - ,- - - ,.,e, ..=,,,-,,_.-,,-,y,-y,,,-...-w--,--e.,.,.-,---w. -

- , ,, -,.w-,e w,,--- ,,,,v -,.--,y--- - - --.,

e VIII. . Actions to Prctect th2 Ptblic A. To demonstrate the adequacy of the decision-making process with regard to determining the appropriate protective actions to protect the public.

B. To demonstrate the ability of Dade and Monroe counties to implement recommended protective actions. This will include demonstrated traffic control,.decon-tamination, and sheltering of evacuees in Dade County.

OBJECTIVES - Ingestion Exposur.e Pathway I. Emergency Operations, Facilities and Resources A. To demonstrate the point-to-point communications between

' state and local emergency response organizations in the 50 mile E/Z counties, to include communications with field teams. .

B. To determine the adequacy of the Dade, Monroe, Collier, and Broward counties EOCs to support emergency operations.

A communications drill will be conducted for all. 50 ,

l- .. w w..

mile EPZ counties.

II. Alerting and Mobilization of Officials and Staff A. To demonstrate the procedures and systems for the identification of major exposure pathways from con-taminated food and water in Dade County. (All state t

and local staff will be prepositioned.)

t III. Emergency Operations Management A. To demonstrate the ability of key individuals within prin-cipal emergency response organizations to coordinate I and direct the response operations and activities of their respective organizations.

' -- --,-r-, . _ , . _ _ _ _

IV . Public Alerting and Notification A. To demonstrate the systems and procedures for notifi-cation of the public that a radiological emergency condition exists in counties from contaminated water or foodstuffs. The means of notification to be tested will be broadcast notification systems in Dade, Broward, Monroe, and Collier counties.

V. Public and Media Relations A. To demonstrate the organization and procedures for the coordinated and timely dissemination of information to the public and media. This will include coordination of news releases among state and county public infor-mation officials. Messages will be prepared, but not sent to farmers, food processors and water system operators.

VI. Accident Assessment A. To demonstrate the procedures for determining the .

radiological consequences of the emergency.

B. To demonstrate the capability of the state to deploy field teams and perform field measurements, f

9 i

l

1 VII. Actiens to Protect the Public A. To demonstrate the adequacy of the decision-making process with regard to determining the appropriate protective actions to protect the public from con-tam'inated water, milk, and crops.

B. To demonstrate the capability of emergency response personnel in coping with reentry and ingestion pathway situations after a release from a nuclear power plant.

This will include coordinating actions with state agencies.

VIII. Recovery and Reentry A. To demonstrate the adequacy of state and county plans and procedures for recovery and reentry operations.

This will include development of a general recovery plan outline to be utilized in managing recovery and reentry.

B. To demonstrate the joint recovery and reentry deci'-

sions made by the state and counties to relax protec-l l

' tive actions. _

8

~' - ,-- , , - . . , . , , .

TURKEY POINT NUCLEAR POWER PLANT INGESTION EXPOSURE PATHWAY EXERCISE JANUARY 22-23, 1986 ;

EXERCISE SCENARIO 1

TIME SCENARIO EVENT Day 1 5:45 am Exercise. connences. Initial conditions are establis.hed.

5:55 am Mechanic suffers a stroke while performing repairs; hands, face and hair are contaminated.

6:00 am Small tube leak developes in Steam Generator A; but is within Technical Specifications guidelines. Leak is being closely monitored and tested.

6:05 am First aid team at site, transport is requested.

6:45 am Ambulance departs site. A Notification of Unusual Event should be declared within 15 minutes.

6:45 am State Warning Point receives Notification of Unusual Event.

7:15 am Steam generator blowdown radiatica channel goes into alarm as leak i deteriorates.

7:25 am Reactor Coolant System inventory balance indicates 1.2 gpm leakage into l

l the Steam Generators.

7:25 am State Warning Point receives second notification of Unusual Event.

7:30 am Unit power reduction begins to meet Tech Specifications. .

8:10 am 200% per minute turbine runback is initiated when the feed.ater pump trips. Automatic steam dumps are inoperable. Without st?am dump or secondary safety activation the average temp and RCS Pressure increase rapidly causing pressurizer spray and PORV,'s to actuate. Automatic trip fails.

8:11 am Reactor is manually scrammed. (Alert should be declared due to failure of-

. reactor protection system to initate and complete a scram.)

Turbine and generator trip automatically on the reactor trip. Power transfers automatically from f4 auxiliary transformer to #4 start-up I: transformer.

. 8:11 am State Warning Point and Dade and Monroe counties on stand-by.

i PAGE 1 TURKEY POINT EXERC;*,E SCENARIO

. . - - . _ _ _ . - _ _ _ - _. - - x _.

1 f . . . . .

DAY 1 CONT!WED TIME SCEhARIO EVENT 8:12 am All post-trip systems are operating. The pressurizer PORV's are closed.

Spray valve PCV-455A does not close as the valve becomes stuck mechani-cally in the open position.

8:15 am RCS pressure is falling continually. Operator notices the abnormal post-trip depressurization.

8:15 am DWts activates the Office of Radiation Control Southern Region and advises

them to respond to the Dade' County EOC.

8:20 am RCP's 48 and 4C are manually tripped to stop the pressure transient upon )

diagnosis of the stuck spray valve. !

RCS pressure has been stabilized. RCS cooldown will be initiated via the 8:25 am steam dump and auxiliary spray will be utilized for depressurization. l 8:30 am Based upon emergency at the site, the E0F may be activated during this ;

9:40 am time window. ~

Contact by telephone at State personnel on stand-by at FP&L Headquarters.

5 tate Warning Point.

When FP&L advises that they have activated the EOF, the State and Counties will begin activation. This will occur no later than 9:40 A.M.

1

! 8:45 am Cooldown at 70 F/hr is established.

9:00 am ORC personnel at Metro EOC to pick-up survey equipment and radios.

Steam generator pressure and 9:20 am Tube leakincreasing level are deteriorates into tube rupture.RCS pressure falls as inventory is rapidly.

- through the tube rupture.

- 9:28 am Operatur actions are taken to bottle up Steam Generator.

9:35 am Loss of Containment Accident, good portio'n of Safety Injection (SI) is spilled into containment.

9:40 am Remaining portion of Safety injection flow is providing adequate RCS decay con-heat removal although inventory is not being totally replaced.

tinues to depressurire slowly through the break.

Note: A Site Area Emergency should be declared.

5'.

I PAGE 2 TURKEY POINT EXERCISE SCENARIO

- ._- _ _ - - .-. . - - _ - . - - .. n __ - . --_a

DAY 1 CONTlh0ED g SCENARIO EVENT 9:40 am Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) activated and operational.

Turkey Point site evacuation of non-essential personnel. (A demonstration of a washdown point may occur here if players deem it necessary.)

If not previously activated, begin activation of State and County EOC's.

10:00 am An oil leak at Start-up Transformer #4 causes a fire, automatic suppression system extinguishes the fire. Fire is reported by security.

10:01 am Feeder breakers trip open due to loss of f4 start-up transformer. Olesel generator A begins to pick up the emergency loads. SafetyInjectionpump fails to lead due to sequencer relay failure. Diesel generator 8 trips due to a clogged fuel filter as it tries to pick up its loads.

10:15 am Preliminary damage assessment indicates start-up transformer #4 has sustained extensive damage.

10:15 am If not previously operational, State and County EOC's operational.

10:30 am Only 38 Safety Injection pump is operating to supply water to the RCS.

RCS pressure is falling steadily due to inability to make up inventory loss through the LOCA. Core cooling becomes inadequate as SI flow is reduced and S/G C effectiveness is lost due to insufficient RCS Inventory.

10:30 am FP&L declares General Emergency.

0-2 mile evacuate complete radius, FP&L recommends:

2-5 mile evacuate downwind (QRA),

2-5 mile shelter remaining sectors

5-10 mile shelter complete radius.

Dade County orders: 0-5 mile evacuation complete radius, 5-10 mile shelter complete radius.

10:45 am Core da:nage begins to take place as a resuIt-6f the lack of core cooling.

A General Emergency should be declared at this point if not at 10:30 ac.

11:00 am Operator action is initiated to speed up the RCS depressurization via the PORY's in an attempt to bring in accumulator and RHR cooling.

11:00 am Dade County requests Executive Order. Governor takes it under consideration.

11:15 am Accumulators are discharging. Core cooling is restored. RCS pressure has leveled off.

TURKEY POINT EXERCISE SCENARIO PAGE 3

~

DAY 1 CONTINUED TIME SCENARIO EVENT 11:30 am The Smith family requests a place to stay because they have been evacuated.

11:50 am Accumulators have totally discharged. RCS depressurization continues through the break and the PORV's.

Most is lost thro' ugh tr.e 12:00 pm EnR pump A begins to deliver water to the RC5. Sufficient flow is p SI line break.

12:30 pm Diesel Generator 8 is restored to operational status and begins to carry plant loads.

1:00 pm Recirculation flow from the containment pump is initiated.

1:00 pm DHR5 Mobile Emergency Radiological Laboratory (MERL) arrives at FP&L Substation (16100 Palm Drive).

1:15 pm A massive pump vibration and damage as well as a crack is caused in the RHR pump A casing. Highly radioactive water leaks from the crack into the Auxiliary building. A release path to the environment now exists via ven-tilation to the plant vent stack.

0-5 mile evacuation complete radius,

! FP&L recommends: 5-10 mile shelter complete radius.

Dade County orders: 0-5 mile evacuate all sectors (see 10:30 am) 5-10 mile evacuate downwind sectors (QRA) j 5-10 mile shelter all others.

The above Dade County evacuation orders are possible but as a mini-(tiote:

mum Dade County should follow FP&L PAR's).

I i

1:30 pm Dose projection indicates greater than 5 R/hr. thyroid dose rates at the site boundary.

1:30 am DHR5 field team personnel will begin tracking the release (Plume). _

at Miami Dade Conmunity College Dade County activates the Reception Cente South Campus.

1:45 pm Attempt to close valves falls as both trip out on motor thermal overload as they reach their midpoint position.

E a

e e

! PAGE 4 TURKEY POINT EXERCISE SCENARIO

=

DAY 1 CONTINUEO M SCEWARIO EVENT 1:45 pm Controller play regarding evacuation problems.

5:00 Various motor vehicle accidents.

Residents refuse evacuation.

Vehicles stopped on the roadway (Mechanical problems, no gas, etc.)

pm Dade County receives Executive Order which was requested at 10:45 a.m..

2:00 MDPD/FHP set-up roadblocks at U.S.1 north of the Seven mile bridge and at Card Sound bridge.

SE0C - GFC inquires about the possibility of duck hunters in the mangroves 2:15 pm surrounding Turkey Point.

2:30 pm Reception Center operational and receiving evacuees.

Controller play regarding Reception Center problems (People arriving 2:30 pm without medications, baby diapers, baby formula. People bringing pets.

5:00 pm Panic, etc.)

Police units report media helicopters and light aircraft flying towards 2:45 pm Turkey Point Plant and buzzing the evacuation traffic.

DHR5 field team performs aerial surveillance of.the Plume.

3:00 pm 4:00 pm The following issue is raised through rumor control phones and media reps.

3:00 pm People living 10-20 miles away from the plant want to know which shelte '

to report to because radiation does not stop at the 10 mile boundary.

Feople requesting guidance on protecting farm products.

A load of vegetables tries to go through a police roadblock from the eva-3:30 pm cuation area.

4:00 pm Media announces shelter openings at incorrect locations.

The release 4:30 pm Valves are closed by by-passing the motor overload circuit.

is terminated.

l 5:00 pm FERL relocates to South Dade Government Center (10800 I 5:30 pm Exercise activities terminated for Day 1; Controllers will brief par-ticipants regarding Day 2 activities.

l PAGE 5 TURKEY P0lt.T EXERCISE SCENARIO r

= .. .

DAY 2 Tlg SCENARIO EVENT

. 8:00 am Day 2 exercise activities commence. Major plant conditions remain unchanged.

8:00 am Controller play regarding residents wishing to return home 12:00 gr .

hews reports of looting and fires panic shelterees.

Shelterees leave Reception Center.

People begin overwhelming roadblocks.

Residents start calling from home for status.

(Should prompt discussions of staged re-entry as well as:

Do we send units to round them up?

Do we force them to leave the area?

If we do, how do we control spread of contamination?

Do we offer them local government support, fire and police, etc.7) 8:30 am A leak has caused a dangerous mixture of hydrogen and oxygen in the gas decay tanks as well as the presence of highly radioactive gases.

8:30 am DriRS Field Teams begin determining footprint.

9:00 am Receive report of alarm at Homestead AFB Credit Union, 12171 Moody Drive.

Audio monitoring device detects voices and discussion on blowing the safe.

they appear to have a hostage. (Should prompt some discussion of responding units inside area.)

9:30- am The leak has been stopped, the plant recomends that a controlled release be initiated to allow the venting of gases from the system.

9:30 am Political discussions and problems regarding the controlled rete.ase.

12:00 pm Controllers will have messages but are to refrain frcrn infecting artiff-ciality if discussions are lively and realistic.)

11:00 am Calculations show doses from the controlled release would not cause signi-ficant health hazard.

12:00 pm Decision to vent gases is finalized (This is a target time and not final).

i 1:00 pm Venting process is initiated. No problems are encountered.

[ 2:00 pm Yenting is completed.

2:15 pm Footprint established. Re-entry and recovery planning begins.

4:30 pm Exercise activities are terminated.

e i

l - TURKEY POINT EXERCISE SCENARIO PAGE 6 i

~~

ff g

g

? * , . *. , .

b f*, #.*'.

~. . .

STATE OF FLORID A AFFAIR $

DEP ARTMENT OF COMMUNITY F LORID A 32301 2571 E X E C U T iv t CENTER CIRCLE. EAST + T AL L AH A55E E, soscsAHAu December 5,1985 *"g5;8 ,

ceca.

Mr. Glenn C. Woodard, Chief Natural and Technological Hazards Division Federal Emergency Management Agency 1371 Peachtree Street, Northeast 4 Atlanta, Georgia 30309 6

Dear Mr. Woodard:

Thank you for your letter of November 8, 1985 approving i d

The following . comments are keyed to the specific in your letter and should clarify any confusion concernir.g the objectives of the exercise. -

1.

The Florida Department of Health and Rehabilitative ?

Services, Office of Radiation Control, during the exercise between days one and will de.:nstrate ,

.a shift change ,

two.

The Florida Division of Dnergency Managerrent wi,11 simulate shif t changes in the state EOC and the EOF.

2.

It is anticipated that a simulated evacuation will take place in the exercise and that Dade County Thewill simulate scenario controlled access to an evacuated area.will delineate s movement and weather conditions.

3.

It is not anticipated that protective actions specific -

to mobility impaired or schools will be demonstrated by

' the counties. '

I i

4. Exposure control for emergency workers will be

' demonstrated in the exercise.

5. Add the f ollowing to Objective V:

B. To demonstrate rumor control capabilities in the l Dade County LOC and the State EOC.

t

% D v.a.s4ClutNT l " ** ^\D

~ , , . . . . . _ _- _ ~._.'_"""._'?___ _ ' U"YL N* DIM lO' "Ni

kl50L Rt t PL A%tN

__ ---- - -~ -,

.~ *,*.. .

Mr. Glenn C. Woodard December 5, 1985 Page Two

6. Within the context of objective VIII, the decision-making process includes consideration of procedures for determining the need for federal assistance in the ingestion exposure pathway portion of the exercise.

7. Following under separate cover is a draft copy of the revised Florida Radiological Emergency Management Plan.

As you may be aware, the Field EOCs in the Turkey Point, St. Lucie and Crystal River areas are no longer opera-tional. In the revised plan, direction an6' control of state agency activities during an emergency now flows directly from decision-making personnel in the State EOC to field representatives of each agency. It is our intention to test this revision to our plan through the Turkey Point exercise, in keeping with the requirements of 44 CFR Parts 305.8, 350.9, and 350.14. Our experience daring activation of the state EOC for I Hurricanes Elena and Kate indicates that this~ procedure works extremely well and enhances quick response to emergency conditions at the local level.

8. There will be no off-site fire demonstration.

Your assistance in preparing for the Turkey Point exercise is greatly appreciated. If,you should have any further questions, please do not 1720 hesitate td Gadscen South contact me at the Street, Division Tallahassee,

~

of E.norgency Management, '

Florida 32301-5597 (904/488-1900). .

Sincerely, Gordon 'L. G5thrie' Director l !

l GLG/nb .

i cca Marty Bishop l ' Billy Wagner I l

s William Wagner l Arthur St. Amand e l 4

i 9

~ ~~---,v~.- . . . . _ _ _ _ _ _ _

ML20214K577

Contents

Text

SUBJECT:

Enclosure:

SUBJECT:

Enclosure:

SUBJECT:

=====================

=========

==========

SUBJECT:

SUMMARY

SUMMARY

Dear Mr. Woodard:

Navigation menu

ML20214K577

Text

SUBJECT:

Enclosure:

SUBJECT:

Enclosure:

SUBJECT:

=====================

=========

==========

SUBJECT:

SUMMARY

SUMMARY

Dear Mr. Woodard:

Navigation menu

Search