ML17348B474
| ML17348B474 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Turkey Point  |
| Issue date: | 04/13/1992 |
| From: | Raghavan L Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | Goldberg J FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT CO. |
| References | |
| TAC-M81313, TAC-M81314, NUDOCS 9204280379 | |
| Download: ML17348B474 (178) | |
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UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555 April 13, 1992 Docket Nos.
50-250 and 50-251 Mr. J.
H. Goldberg President Nuclear Division Florida Power and Light Company P. 0.
Box 14000 Juno
- Beach, Florida 33408-0420
Dear Mr. Goldberg:
SUBJECT:
TURKEY POINT UNITS 3 AND 4 - AUDIT OF STRUCTURES AND CIVIL ENGINEERING FEATURES (TAC NOS.$181313 ANDj!P1314)
The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) staff performed a structural audit at Turkey Point during the week of January 13, 1992.
The objectives of the audit were to obtain information about the performance of structures at Turkey Point and to draw some generic conclusions based on the information obtained from this audit and audits at other plants.
During the audit, you presented a concise summary of past experiences related to Category 1 structures and other civil engineering features, including a
discussion of events such as delamination of the Unit 3 containment dome during construction, dropping of a spent fuel assembly in the spent fuel storage
- pool, and intake structure degradation.
As part of the audit, we performed a walkdown of the plant and examined the containment exterior
- surfaces, auxiliary, control, old and new diesel buildings, spent fuel storage
- areas, safety-related
- tanks, intake structures and cooling canal areas.
Since both Units 3 and 4 were operating at the time of the audit, a walkdown of the inside of the containment could not be performed.
Based on your presentation and our walkdown, several questions and concerns were raised for which you provided written responses and furnished other pertinent documents.
We reviewed and discussed your responses and presented our final observations in an exit meeting on January 17, 1992.
We also made recommendations for improvement but did not identify any specific action items.
The enclosure provides a detailed report of the audit.
We observed that, in general, the civil/structural plant features are performing well.
- However, some structures/components do show signs of degradation, such as degradation of concrete beams and walls of the intake structure, water accumulation in the vertical surveillance tendons and water infiltration into the tendon gallery.
- However, we recognize that you are already aware of some of these degradations and are in the process of monitoring and addressing them.
This is evident by the ongoing repairs to the 9204280379 920413 PDR ADOGK 05000250 p
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Mr. J.
H. Goldberg April 13, 1992 intake structure and the bent plates on the anchor bolt chairs of some exterior tanks.
During the 1993 refueling outage, you plan to perform an analysis for liner bulging and repair the liner coatings, seam welds and penetration canisters.
In addition, as stated in the exit meeting, you have formed a team to develop a short-term as well as a long-term inspection and repair plan to address civil/structural areas that are not currently included in a specific maintenance program.
We believe that this is an important program and, upon implementation, should ensure the continued "good condition" of the structure and civil engineering features at the plant.
If you have any questions, please call me at (301) 504-2019.
Sincerely, (Original Signed By)
Enclosure:
Audit Results
'cc w/enclosure:
See next page DISTRIBUTION
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NRC & Local PDRs PDII-2 RF G. Lainas S. Varga H. Berkow, w/o enclosure D. Miller, w/o enclosure L. Raghavan G. Bagchi, w/o enclosure H. Ashar, w/o enclosure OGC ACRS (10)
M. Sinkule, RII L. Raghavan, Acting Project Manager Project Directorate II-2 Division of Reactor Projects --I/II Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation OFC L
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AUDIT.TP
Hr. J.
H. Goldberg Florida Power and Light Company Turkey Point Plant CC:
Harold F. Reis, Esquire Newman and Holtzinger, P.C.
1615 L Street, N.W.
Washington, DC 20036 Jack Shreve, Public Counsel Office of the Public Counsel c/o The Florida Legislature 111 West Madison Avenue, Room 812 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1400 John T. Butler, Esquire
- Steel, Hector and Dayis 4000 Southeast Financial Center Hi ami, Florida 33131-2398 Hr. Thomas F. Plunkett, Site Vice President Turkey Point Nuclear Plant Florida Power and Light Company P.O.
Box 029100 Miami,.Florida 33102 Joaquin Avino County Manager of Metropolitan Dade County 111 NW 1st Street, 29th Floor Miami, Florida 33128 Senior Resident Inspector Turkey Point Nuclear Generating Station U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission P.O.
Box 1448 Homestead, Florida 33090 Mr. Jacob Daniel Nash Office of Radiation Control Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1317 Winewood Blvd.
Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Mr. Robert G. Nave, Director Emergency Management Department of Community Affairs 2740 Centerview Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2100 Administrator Department of Environmental Regulation Power Plant Siting Section State of Florida 2600 Blair Stone Road Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Regional Administrator, Region II U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 101 Marietta Street, N.W. Suite 2900 Atlanta, Georgia 30323 Attorney General Department of Legal Affairs The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32304 Plant Manager Turkey Point Nuclear Plant Florida Power and Light Company P.O.
Box 029100 Miami, Florida 33102 Hr.
R.
E. Grazio Director, Nuclear Licensing Florida Power and Light Company P.O.
Box 14000 Juno
- Beach, Florida 33408-0420
ENCLOSURE 1
TURKEY POINT NUCLEAR POWER PLANT TRIP REPORT
Purpose:
Location:
Audit of Structures and Civil Engineering Features Turkey Point Nuclear Plant - Units 3
& 4 Florida City, Florida Dates:
Personnel:
January 13-17, 1992 R. Rothman (NRC), H. Ashar (NRC),
J.
Lenahan (NRC), R. Morante (BNL),
J.
Braverman (BNL)
Back round:
The objective of the plant visit was to obtain information about the-performance of structures at operating plants and to draw some generic conclusions based on the information obtained from this and other plant visits.
To'achieve this objective, an assessment of the existing condition and past performance of structures and civil engineering features at Turkey Point Nuclear Plant was performed.
Any failures, degradations, maintenance, surveillance, modifications/repairs of safety related structures were of interest.
Structures reviewed include buildings, tanks, cable tray and conduit supports, anchorages, underground structures, and the water intake structure.
ns ection Summar January 13, 1992:
The afternoon of January 13 was devoted to health physics training, whole body counting, dosimetry/badging, and introduction to several Florida Power
& Light (FPL) personnel.
Discussions were held regarding the agenda, available documents, facilities for the formal presentation, and schedules.
FPL prbvided a computerized list of all plant changes and modifications and a separate list of changes for which the civil engi'neering discipline was the lead group.
From this list the audit team selected a representative sample of structural plant changes for which 10 CFR 50.59 evaluations were performed; These were identified to FPL the following morning to enable them to retrieve the document files from their Juno Beach office.
January 14, 1992:
An entrance meeting was held with FPL personnel and the NRC/BNL representatives.
A list of the attendees at the entrance meeting is contained in Attachment 1.
R. Auluck (NRC Pro)ect Manager for Turkey Point) and R. Rothman described the purpose and scope of the visit.
A formal presentation was then made by FPL personnel.
A copy of the agenda and viewgraphs used in the presentation is included in Attachment 2.
The ma)or'opics covered include design criteria, containment structures, support anchorages, spent fuel pool and racks, intake structure, masonry walls, structural boundaries, geology/foundation conditions, maintenance of structures, seismic instrumentation, civil/structural LERs, past structural issues, civil/structural 10 CFR 50.59 evaluations, and emergency plans for natural emergencies.
January 15, 1992:
The audit team stayed together during the entire walkdown except as noted later on January 16, 1992.
Since both nuclear units were operating, no walkdowns could be made inside containment.
The audit team began the walkdown in the tendon gallery beneath the Unit 3 containment.
.The entire tendon gallery was examined (all 360')
and included the concrete walls, floor, ceiling (bottom of mat), tendon bearing piates, and tendon grease caps.
The review of the outside containment encompassed the containment dome, ring girder, wall, tendon buttresses, tendon bearing plates and tendon grease caps.
The containment dome was closely examined for any signs of delamination, which occurred following original construction of the containment.
At that time, the exterior concrete layer of the dome separated from the tendon layer.
FPL described the repair made to correct this problem in their formal presentation.
It consisted of removing the delaminated layer, placing radial reinforcement, and pouring a new concrete layer to repair the domes'n the afternoon, the audit team examined areas in the Unit 3 spent fuel pool building, accessible portion of the containment mat, auxiliary building, control building, and Unit 4 switchgear building.
These walkdowns included the cable spreading
- room, battery room, control room, roofs of the spent fuel and auxiliary building,"'4160 Volt switchgear
- room, 480 Volt load center area, air handling equipment room, computer room, seismograph pit, cathodic protection system terminal panel area, CCW heat exchanger
- room, RHR heat exchanger
- room, and the RHR pump room.
Structural components reviewed in these areas include concrete floors, walls, and ceiling; building structural steel; conduit/supports; cable tray/supports; piping support anchorages; seismic gaps between buildings; equipment supports; tanks'nd masonry walls.
January 16, 1992:
In the morning, the audit team examined the Unit 3 and 4
emergency diesel generator buildings, diesel oil tank for Unit 3, condensate storage
- tank, and Unit 3 and 4 intake structure.
In the emergency diesel generator building the structural components reviewed include the concrete floor, walls, and ceiling; diesel support frame/anchorage; day tank anchorage; and electrical equipment support/anchorage.
In the intake structure, the structural components reviewed include the concrete floor; partially accessible portions of the CW pump concrete support beams and wallsg and concrete walls at the East side of the intake structure and the screen washout area.
Since both units were operating, it was not possible to view the concrete walls and slab below grade from inside the intake structure.
- However, photographs taken by FPL inside the intake structure below grade were made available and were reviewed by the audit team later in the day.
The above describes the structures and scope of the walkdown review effort for aging related degradation effects.
During all of the walkdowns, a walkdown log was maintained as shown in Attachment 3 in which the team recorded for each observation the building/area, elevation,
- location, component/item, aspect
- reviewed, photograph
- number, and any. comments.
Data were recorded for structural components when aging degradation effects were present as well as when they were not.
Photographs were taken for selected items to enhance the documentation and these were noted in the log.
In addition, measurements were taken when appropriate (such as crack width), to determine the severity of the degradation.
In the afternoon, the audit. team split into two groups.
The first group consisting of H. Ashar and R. Morante covered the 10 CFR 50.59 evaluation review.
The second group consisting of the remaining members of the audit team examined the cooling canals.
A FPL representative made a short presentation to the first group describing the 10 CFR 50.59 Program and Initiatives.
A copy of the viewgraphs is presented in Attachment 4.
The presentation covered the procedures and guidelines, review and approval process,
- training, and recent initiatives to improve the program.
j The. second group was driven by a FPL representative around the perimeter of the cooling canals.
Several stops were made to more closely examine the canals.
FPL originally released the cooling water discharge directly to the ocean.
- However, due to environmental concerns a cooling canal system was constructed to service both nuclear units and the fossil units at Turkey Point.
It is an extensive canal system consisting of 200 feet wide canals spanning 168 miles in total length.
FPL literature
containing further details and a map of the canal system is presented in Attachment 5.
Upon completion of the canal system examination, the audit team reassembled to review representative 10 CFR 50.59 evaluation packages related to the civil discipline.
A limited review was made on PCM 79-015,82-148, 83-050, and 90-472.
At this time, FPL provided written responses and documents to address and resolve questions and concerns raised by the audit team during the formal presentation session and during the walkdowns.
The audit team reviewed and discussed the FPL responses.
A list of the more meaningful observations was then compiled.
This list was conveyed verbally to FPL at the exit meeting held on January 17, 1992.
Results Observations During the exit meeting held on January 17,
- 1992, R. Rothman reiterated the purpose of the NRC staff visit and the observations noted as a result of the formal presentation given by FPL and the walkdowns performed by the audit team. It was explained that the observations were being presented to FPL for their information and do not represent requirements by the NRC.
Any action the licensee might take as a result of these observations is considered voluntary.
A list of the attendees at the exit meeting is contained in Attachment 1.
While most of the civil/structural plant features examined at Turkey Point Nuclear Plant were in good condition after 19 years of operation, there were some components which did show varying degrees of aging degradation.
The key observations are discussed below, with a more complete list and detailed description presented in Attachment 6.
'8 Observations noted in the Unit 3 tendon gallery include some signs of corrosion in the tendon bearing plates, cracks and voids in the concrete adjacent to a few bearing plates, and a gap of about 2" between the tendon gallery wall and the ceiling which permits water infiltration. It appears that the large gap developed due to deterioration of the joint filler material.
In FPL's presentation of the tendon surveillance program at Turkey Point, it was noted that water had accumulated at the bottom of the vertical surveillance tendons in Unit 3.
This condition was not observed in Unit 4 during its tendon surveillance.
Expanded surveillance of vertical tendons in Unit 3 for the presence of water would identify the extent of this condition as a first step toward resolution.
Examination of the condensate storage tank revealed bent plates on the.anchor bolt chairs, deterioration of the water seal at the base of the tank coupled with corrosion of the tank bottom
- plate, and signs of corrosion/scratches/gouges on the tank wall.
Significant deterioration in the concrete beams supporting the ICW pumps and CW pumps in the intake structure had occurred.
This consisted of delamination of concrete cover over the reinforcement and corrosion of the steel reinforcement.
FPL was aware of these problems and is in the process of repairing the beams.
Repairs began in 1985 and completion is planned by the end of 1996.
The audit team reviewed a report on the intake structure prepared by a consultant to FPL., The report indicates that the bay walls are also degrading and experiencing active corrosion of the reinforcing bars.
Therefore, the audit team recommended that the licensee also give close attention to other parts of the intake structure such as the intermediate and exterior walls..
For unreinforced masonry walls, the seismic qualification relies on the assumption that there are no cracks in the wall.
However, there appears to be no formal monitoring program to confirm that no cracks develop.
Turkey Point has only one three-component accelograph that records photographically.
This provides only limited information which will require time to evaluate.
If improved seismic instrumentation were available it may be possible to avoid unnecessarily shutting the plant down in the event of a nondamaging earthquake.
An examination of the Unit 3 containment dome showed no signs of concrete degradation or delamination, which was a
problem after original construction.
However, the overlay/coating on the dome was peeling.
This may also be the cause for some of the clogged drains that have occurred at the base of the dome.
Photographs for some of the key observations noted above are presented in Attachment 7.
Although it was not possible to examine the inside of the containments, FPL in its formal presentation on January 14, 1992 and in their viewgraphs (Attachment 2), did present the results of the Unit 4 containment building ILRT structural inspection report.
Some of the items identified in the ILRT report are
- peeled, delaminated, and disbonded topcoat in some areas of the containment liner; surface corrosion of some of the liner seam welds and penetration canisters; leaching of joint filler material between the liner and adjacent concrete structuresg radially inward bulging of the liner; and two 1/16 inch cracks in the 4B steam generator cubicle wall.
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The 10 CFR 50.59 evaluation procedure seems to have been significantly improved in the past few years.
A limited review of the individual engineering packages revealed that up to 1983 there was very little documentation relating to safety evaluations.
On a Change Request Notice, the engineer would only be required to identify whether "this change affects nuclear safety or design criteria."
A review of a more recent engineering package (PC/M No.90-472) did, however, reflect a
substantial safety evaluation as required by the current FPL procedures regarding 10 CFR 50.59.
Conclusio Considering that the two units have been operating for approximately 19 years, most civil/structural plant features have performed well.
Some structures/components,
- however, do show signs of varying levels of aging degradation.
The most severe cases relate to degradation of concrete beams and walls in the intake structure, water accumulation in the vertical surveillance tendons and water infiltration into the tendon gallery.
FPL was aware of some of the observations identified by the audit team and was in the process of monitoring or addressing some of the concerns.
Examples of this include repairs being performed to the intake structure; enhanced protective coatings program; repairs to be made for the bent plates on the anchor bolt chairs of some exterior tanks; repairs to the liner-coating, seam welds and penetration canisters planned for the 1993 refueling outage; and a FPL analysis to address liner bulging.
In addition to the ongoing repairs and enhanced protective coatings
- program, FPL stated that a team has been formed to develop a strategic plan for addressing plant material condition.
This team will consider short term and long term repairs and inspections for civil/structural areas that do not currently have a specific maintenance program.
The audit team believes that this is an important program, which if properly implemented will prevent the development of any significant degradation of structures and civil engineering features.
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ATTACHtlENT 2 TURKEY POINT UNITS 3
&4 NRC REVIEW OP SAFETY RELATED STRUCTURES JANUARY 13-17 1992 SCHEDULE JANUARY 13'992 NRC STAFF ARRIVES AT PTN (2:00 PM)
TO COMPLETE NECESSARY HP TRAINING JANUARY 14 g 1992 FPL PRESENTATIONS ON SELECTED NRC TOPICS 08:00 11'30 PRESENTATIONS 11:30 01 00 LUNCH & NRC STAFF CAUCUS 01:00 04:00 PRESENTATIONS 04:00 - 04:30 NRC STAFF CAUCUS 04:30 - 05:00 REVIEW OF ACTION/FOLLOW-UP ITEMS SEE PAGE 2
FOR DETAILED SCHEDULE JANUARY 15'992 08:00 11:30 11:30 FIELD WALKDOWNS (See page 3 for detailed schedule) 01:00 LUNCH
& NRC STAFF CAUCUS 01:00 04:00 FIELD WALKDOWNS 04'00 04:30 NRC STAFF CAUCUS 04:30 - 05:00 FPL/NRC STAFF MEETING JANUARY 16'992 08:00 12:00 12:00 FIELD 'ALKDOWNS AND REVIEW OF SELECTED 50.59 EVALUATIONS ( SPLIT NRC TEAM )
03:00 LUNCH & NRC STAFF CAUCUS 03:00 05:00 DISCUSSION OF FINDINGS/OBSERVATIONS IDENTIFICATION OF FPL AND NRC FOLLOW-UP ACTIONS JANUARY 17 1992 08'00 -10:00 EXIT MEETING
0,
NRC REVIEW OP SAPETY RELATED STRUCTURES PPL PRESENTATION SCHEDULE JANUARY 14 1.992 TOPIC SCHEDULE INTRODUCTION 08:00 08:05 1.0 DESIGN CRITERIA 2.0 CONTAINMENT STRUCTURES 3.0 SUPPORT ANCHORAGES 4.0 SPENT FUEL POOL AND RACKS 5.0 INTAKE STRUCTURE 6.0 MASONRY WALLS 08:05 08:40 08:40 09:50 09:50 10:10 10:10 10:30 10:30 11:10 11:10 - 11:30 LUNCH & NRC STAFF CAUCUS 11:30 01:00 t
7.0 STRUCTURAL BOUNDARIES 01:00 01:20 8.0 GEOLOGY/FOUNDATION CONDITIONS 01:20 01:40 9.0 MAINTENANCE OF STRUCTURES 10.0 SEISMIC INSTRUMENTATION 11.0 CIVIL STRUCTURAL LER'S 12.0 PREVIOUS NRC STAFF REPORTS 13.0 10CFR50.59 EVALUATIONS 14.0 EMERGENCY PLANS 01:40 - 02:20 02 20 - 02 35 02:35 02:55 02:55 03:15 03:15 - 03:25 03:25 - 03:40 ADDITIONAL ITEMS NRC STAFF CAUCUS 03:40 04:00 04:00 - 04:30 REVIEW OF ACTION/FOLLOW-UP ITEMS 04:30 05:00
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NRC REVIEW Op SAFETY RELATED STRUCTURES WALKDOWN SCHEDULE JANUARY 15-1 6 I.9 9 2 LOCATION SCHEDULE JANUARY 15'992
~ UNIT 4 TENDON GALLERY I
~ UNIT 3 TENDON GALLERY
~ UNIT 3 SPENT FUEL POOL
~ AUX. BLDG ROOF AREA
~ UNIT 4 SPENT FUEL POOL
~ UNIT 4 CONTAINMENT ROOF
~
YARD TANKS ZN RCA LUNCH AND NRC STAFF CAUCUS
~ AUX. BLDG INTERIOR
~ SEISMIC INSTRUMENTATION
~ TURBINE BLDG 18 FT.,
COMPUTER RM
~ TURBINE BLDG 30 FT.,
CABLE SPREAD ROOM AREA
& NEW ELECT. EQUIP.
~ TURBINE BLDG 42 FT.,
CONTROL RM AREA NRC STAFF CAUCUS FPL/NRC STAFF MEETING JANUARY I.6 p 1992
~ UNIT 3 EDG BLDG
~ UNIT 4 ED/ BLDG
~ INTAKE STRUCTURE
~ SITE PERIMETER
~
OTHER AREAS OF INTEREST 08:00 8:45 08:45 9:30 09:30 09:45 09:45 - 10:15 10:15 - 10:30 10:30 - 11:15 11:15 11:30 11:30 - 01:00 01:00 01:45 01:45 - 02:OO 02:00 02:45 02:45 - 03:30 03: 30 04: 00 04:00 04:30 04:30 - 05:00 08:00 08:30 08:30 - 09:00 09:00 09:30 09:30 10:30 10:30 - 12:00
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TURKEY'POINT UNITS 3&4 NRC REVIEW OF SAFETY RELATED STRUCTURES JANUARY 13-17,1992 TLIN F PRE ENT Tl N
1.0 DESIGN CRITERIA (R. GIL)
- SEISMIC DESIGN CRITERIA
- WIND DESIGN CRITERIA
- TORNADO MISSII.E PROTECTION
- FLOOD PROTECTION
- SAFETY RELATED STORAGE TANKS
- UNIT4 EDG BUILDING 2.0 CONTAINMENTSTRUCTURES (K. GREENE)
- TENDON SURVEII LANCES
- CATHODIC PROTECTION SYSTEM
- PRE-ILRT INSPECTION 3.0 SUPPORT ANCHORAGES (R. GIL) 4.0 SPENT FUEL POOL AND RACKS (R. GIL) 5.0 INTAKESTRUCTURE (T. CARTER) 6.0 MASONRYWALLS (R. GIL) 7.0 STRUCTURAL BOUNDARIES (R. GIL)
OUT IN PRESENTATI N
ONTINUED 8.0 GEOLOGY/FOUNDATIONCONDITIONS (R. GIL)
- GROUNDWATER EFFECTS
- SETTLEMENT 9.0 MAiNTENANCEOF STRUCTURES
- OVERVIEW (R. GIL)
- PROTECTIVE COATINGS (G. DOLDERER)
- ICW PIPING SYSTEM STRUCTURAL CONDITION (T. LUKE)
'1 0.0 SEISMIC INSTRUMENTATION(R. GOULDY) 11.0 CIVILSTRUCTURAL LER'S (J. KNORR) 12.0 STRUCTURAL ISSUES - PREVIOUS NRC STAFF REPORTS (H. GAVANKAR) 13.0 CIVIL/STRUCTURAL10CFR60.69 EVALUATIONS(H.
GAVANKAR) 14.0 EMERGENCY PLAN fOR NATURALEMERGENCIES (J.,KIRKPATRICK)
1,0 DESIGN RITERIA
~ GENERAL CRITERIA
~ SEISMIC DESIGN CRITERIA
+ WIND DESIGN CRITERIA
~ FLOOD PROTECTION
~ SAFETY RELATED STORAGE TANKS
~ UNIT 4 EDG BUILDING
1.0 DESIGN CRITERIA (CONTINUED)
N RA RITERIA
~ NORMALLOADS (AISC, ACI, LOCAL CODES)
~ ACCIDENT 5. NATURALEVENT LOADS-Y= 1/4 (1.26D + 1.25E)
Y= 1/cf) (1.26D + 1.0R)
Y= 1/cf) ('1.26D + 1.26H + 1.26E)
Y= 1/4 (1.0D + 1.0E')
WIND LOADS ARE SUBSTITUTED FOR "E"
~ SPECIFIC CONTAINMENTCRITERIA IS CONTAINED IN SECTION 5.1 OF UFSAR
~ ADDITIONALDETAILS AVAILABLEIN CHAPTER 6 OF UFSAR AND DESIGN BASIS DOCUMENT/SELECT LICENSING ISSUES
1.0 DESI N CR TER)A C NTIN ED SEl lVll DESI N
RITE IA
~ LOCATED IN VERY LOW SEISMIC HAZARDZONE
~ HOUSNER RESPONSE SPECTRA- 0.05 OBE, 0.15 SSE
~ VERTICALSPECTRA TAKEN AS 2/3 OF HORIZONTAL SEISMIC FORCES APPLIED SIMULTANEOUSLYIN VERTICALAND WORST CASE HORIZONTAI.
~ SPECTRA FOR CONTROL BUILDINGAND CONTAINMENT GENERATED USING TIME HISTORY TECHNIQUE (SAMPLE EARTHQUAKE-1940 EL CENTRO, CALIFORNIA)
~ AUXILIARYBUILDINGUSES GROUND SPECTRA - STRUCTURE IS BROAD WITH RESPECT TO ITS HEIGHTANDHAS NATURAL FREQUENCIES OUTSIDE AMPLIFIEDPORTIONS OF DESIGN SPECTRA
~ DAMPING VALUES CONSERVATIVE IN COMPARISON WITH REG. GUIDE 1.60
~ AEC PUBLICATIONTID-7024 USED AS BASIC GUIDE
1 DE I
N RITERIA NTINUED WIND DE I
N RITERIA
~ HURRICANE WIND LOAD OF 146mph (REPLACES "E" IN LOAD COMB(NATIONS)
~ TORNADO WIND LOAD OF 226mph
~ DIFFERENTIALPRESSURE OF 1.6 psi
~ TORNADO MISSILES (DESCRIBED BELOW)
~ TORNADO WIND, PRESSURE, MISSILE AND DEAD LOADS ARE APPLIED SIMULTANEOUSLY
~ WIND FORCES CALCULATEDPER ASCE PAPER 3269
~ FOR TORNADO LOADS, STRESSES ARE LIMITEDTO YIELDAND LOCALCRUSHING IS ALLOWEDAT THE MISSILE IMPACTZONE
~ BUILDINGSTRUCTURES ALSO REVIEWED FOR NO LOSS OF FUNCTION FOR TORNADO WINDS OF 337mph WITH 2.26 psi PRESSURE LOAD
1 DESl N
RITERIA NTINUED T RNAD IVII I
PR 7 Tl N
~ lVIISSILESPECTRUM:
- CORRUGATED SHEET SIDING 6 225mph
- BOLTED WOOD DECKING e 200mph
- PASSENGER CAR 6 50mph
~ PROTECTION PROVIDED BY:
- CLASS I ENCLOSURE
- REDUNDANCYAND SPACING
~ DESIGN METHODOLOGY
- ENERGY BALANCEEQUATIONS ARE USED TO DETERMINETHICKNESS OF CONCRETE OR STEEL
- CONTAINMENTPENETRATION ANALYSISBASED ON NAVDOCKS P-61
- LOCALCRUSHING PERMITTEDATlVIISSILEIMPACTZONE
1.
DE IGN RITERIA NTIN ED FL OD PR TE Tl N
~ LOCATION: COASTALWITH BARRIER ISLANDS LOCATED 6-8 MILES OFFSHORE
~ PLANT GRADE AT EL. 18ft IVlLW
~ DESIGN BASIS FOR MAXIIVIUMFLOOD STAGES AND WAVE HEIGHT BASED ON TESTING
~ MODEL USED PROBABLE IVlAXIMUMHURRICANE, ASSUIVIED STATIONARYTO ESTABLISH STEADY STATE CONDITIONS
~ PREDICTED MAXIMUlVIFLOOD EL. OF 18.3ft MLW
~ PREDICTED WAVE RUN-UP OF 8.7ft
~ FLOOD PROTECTION FEATURES INTAKE:
- 4ft HIGH WALLON EAST SIDE (EL. 20ft)
- 4ft HIGH OPENING ON EAST WALL(11-13ft ELEV.)
- ICW PUMPS SET AT EL. 22.6ft
- DECK DESIGNED FOR SURGE UPLIFT FORCES
~ FLOOD PROTECTION FEATURES POWER BLOCK:
. - BARRIERS TO EL. 20ft TO NORTH, SOUTH 5, WEST
- BARRIERS TO EL. 22ft TO EAST (DUE TO WAVE RUN-UP
- BARRIERS ARE CONTINUOUS WITH STOP LOGS AT OPENINGS
~ 1988 LER'ARfOUS CORRECTIVE ACTIONS IMPLEIVlENTED, INCLUDINGRE-EVALUATIONOF DESIGN BASIS PARAMETERS
1.0 DE I
T T
~ TANKFUNCTIONS:
- UNIT 3 8c UNIT4 CONDENSATE STORAGE (CST)
- UNIT 3 8c UNIT4 REFUELING WATER STORAGE {RWST)
- UN)T 3 DIESEL OIL STORAGE (DOST)
(UNIT4 DIESEL OIL STORAGE TANK IS WITHINNEW UNIT4 DIESEL BUILDING)
~ ORIGINALDESIGN CRITERIA
- SEISMIC DESIGN WAS TO A GROUND ACCELERATIONOF 0.06g, UStNG TID-7024 METHODOLOGY
- WINDLOADS USED WERE 194mph FOR FULLTANKSAND 140mph FOR EMPTY TANKS.
- MISSILE PROTECTION FOR THE CST'S AND RWST'S IS PROVIDED BY REDUNDANCYAND SPACING
- NO MISSILE PROTECTION WAS PROVIDED FOR THE DOST (SUFFICIENT TIMEWOULD BE AVAILABLEDUE TO DAY TANKS AND BATTERIES TO OBTAIN OIL FROM OTHER SOURCES)
TYR T
TAN I
0
~ SUBSEQUENT ACTIVITIES
- CLASS I TANKS IDENTIFIEDUNDER A-46 WALKDOWN/REVIEWEFFORT
- BASED ON SEISMIC TEAMREVIEWANDCALCULATIONS, TANKS ARE ADEQUATEFOR 0.16g SEISMIC INPUT (BASED ON ASCE STD. 4-86 WHICH CONSIDERS AMPLIFIEDFREQUENCY RESPONSE OF IMPULSIVEFLUID MASS)
- SEISMIC I OADS CALCULATEDBYA&6TEAMENVELOP PTN DESIGN BASIS TORNADO WIND LOADS
- NEW UNIT4 DIESEL OIL TANKS ARE MISSILE PROTECTED AND CROSS-TIED INTO UNIT 3 TANK
~ MAINTENANCE/SURVEILLANCEACTIVITY
- CST REPAIRS COMPLETED IN 1983 - NITROGEN BLANKETINGAND TANKSEAL ADDED TO PROTECTION CST COATING REPAIRS RE-PERFORMED IN 1991-COATINGS APPLIED IN 1983 WERE DEFICiENT
AFETY R T
RA TAN
- THE EMERGENCY DIESEL OIL STORAGE TANK lS INSPECTED EVERY TEN YEARS, BY PROCEDURE
- DURlNG EDG OIL TANKINSPECTION IN 1987, MINOR PAINT DAMAGEWAS FOUND DUE TO METHOD USED FOR SAMPLING ACTIVITIES-THIS PLROBLEM WAS CORRECTED
- INPO SER 2-84 AND IEN 86-08 IDENTIFIED POTENTIAL PROBLEMS WITH EPOXY COATINGS IN OIL STORAGE TANKS - ISSUE NOT APPUCABLE TO PTN, A DIFFERENT COATING SYSTEM WAS USED, WHICH IS COMPATIBLE WITH OIL STORAGE TANKS
- NO OTHER INTERNALCOATING PROBLEMS HAVE BEEN IDENTIFIED
- TANKEXTERIORS RECENTLY INSPECTED AS PART OF A-46 WALKDOWNS,NO CORROSION OR FOUNDATION CRACKINGWAS IDENTIFIED-DAMAGED/BENTANCHOR BOLT CHAIR PLATES WERE IDENTIFIEDAND MODIFICATIONIS PRESENTLY BEING DEVELOPED
- IDENTlFICATIONAND IMPLEMENTATIONOF REQUIRED INSPECTIONS FOR TANKSWILLBE CONSIDERED BY THE RECENTLYFORMED PLANTMATERIALCONDITIONTEAM
1.
DE IGN CRITERIA ONTINUED UNIT 4 ED BUILDIN
~ COMPLETED IN 1991 AS PART OF EMERGENCY POWER UPGRADE 1
~ STRUCTURE HOUSES THE EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATORS FOR UNIT4,WITH ITS AUXILIARIES,AND TWO DIESEL OIL COMPARTMENTS
~ LOAD COMB!NATIONSAND STRUCTURALACCEPTANCE CRITERIA IN ACCORDANCE WITH NUREG 0800 (STANDARD REVIEW PLAN).
~ SEISMIC DESIGN h
- VERTICALACCELERATIONTAKEN AS 2/3 OF HORIZONTAL
- RESPONSE SPECTRA DEVELOPED IN ACCORDANCEWITH
'EG.
GUIDE 1.60
- DAMPINGVALUES USED IN ACCORDANCE WITH REG. GUIDE 1.61
- MODES AND.ORTHOGONALEARTHQUAKECOMPONENTS-COMBINED IN ACCORDANCE WITH REG. GUIDE 1.92
- FLOOR RESPONSE SPECTRA DB/ELOPED FROM SYNTHETIC TlPIE-HISTORIES IN ACCORDANCE WITH REG. GUIDE 1.122
- MATHMODELCONSISTS OF LUMPEDMASS CANTILEVERAND WITH SOIL SPRINGS
1.
DE IGN CRITERIA ONTIN ED N T 4 D
B I DIN NTIN ED 4
~ HURRICANE WIND DESIGN
- VELOCITYPRESSURES CALCULATEDIN ACCORDANCE WITH ANSI 58.1 OR ASCE PAPER 3269, FOR CASES NOT COVERED BY ANSI
- SOUTH FLORIDA BUILDINGCODE ALSO REVIEWED
~ TORNADO LOADS
- WIND VELOCITIES AND DIFFERENTIALPRESSURES IN ACCORDANCE WITH REG. GUIDE 'I.76 AND SRP
- WIND VELOCITYPRESSURE CALCULATEDIN ACCORDANCE WITH ANSI 58.1 WITH NO VARIATIONTAKEN FOR HEIGHT OF STRUCTURE, AND A GUST FACTOR OF UNITY
- WINDANDPRESSURE LOADS ARE COMBINEDWITHTORNADO MISSILE IMPACTFORCES IN ACCORDANCE WITH SRP
- TORNADO MISSILE SPECTRUM IN ACCORDANCE WITH SRP
+ FLOOD PROTECTION
- M'AXIMUMFLOOD AND WAVE RUN-UP ELEVATIONS IN ACCORDANCE WITH FSAR
- BARRIERS DESIGNED IN ACCORDANCE WITH REG. GUIDE 1.102
2.0 NTAINMENTSTR CTUR DES RIPTl NTAINMENTTEND N SURVEILLAN E PRESCON CORPORATlON (BBRV SYSTEM)
NINETY0/4-INCH WIRES WITH BUTfONHEADEDANCHORAGES, STRESSING WASHERS, SHIMS 165 DOME TENDONS, 180 VERTICALTENDONS, 489 HOOP (HORl2ONTAL)TENDONS HCTRA TENDONS PROVIDED FOR SURVEILLANCEPURPOSES ANYTHREE ADJACENT TENDONS IN ANYOF THE THREE GROUPS CAN BE LOST (LOAD REDISTRIBUTION CAPABILITlES OF CONTAlNMENTSHELL)
~ I 0'4 0 op pp 0
0 00 p 0 0
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0 pp 0 0 0 0 0 (0
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COHThlNHEHT STRDCTURE PRESTRESS TENDON HhRDWhRE hSSEHSLT
~
I
~ '
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~
~ ~
~
~
4
~
~
~
I I
X I>>
5>>
I I
a g
I I I
~ 5
NTAINMENTT ND N
RV IL N
NT'D FFE TIV 8
TR IN ND N
PRESTRESS LOSSES ELASTIC SHORTENING OF CONCRETE CREEP OF CONCRETE SHRINKAGE OF CONCRETE RELAXATIONOF PRESTRESSING STEEL FRICTlONALLOSSES VALUES OF PRESTRESS LOSSES DETERMINED BY CALCULATIONS,INFORMATIONPROVIDED BY PRESCON, OR FULLNCALETEST DATA PRESTRESS LOSSES APPLIED TO JACKING STRESSES TO DETERMINE FINALEFFECTIVE PRESTRESS AT THE END OF 40 MARS FOR TENDONS lN EACH GROUP'THESE VALUES ARE DOCUMENTED lN FSAR.
2.
A C
NTAINMENTTENDON SURVEILLANCES CONT'D ORIGINA PLANT TE HNI AL SPECIFICATION RE IREMENT ORIGINALPLANT TECHN!CALSPECIFICATIONS IN EFFECT THROUGH 15TH YEAR SURVEILLANCE NINE TENDONS WERE ORIGINALLYSELECTED FOR SURVEILLANCE;THESE TENDONS WERE To BE EXAMINEDAs PART OF EVERY SURVEILLANCE DURING CONSTRUCTION, CONCRETE DELAMINATIONS OCCURRED IN UNIT 3 CONTAINMENTDOME; CONDITION WAS CORRECTED DURING CONSTRUCTlON. INSPECTION OF ADDITIONALUNIT 3 DOME TENDONS WAS REQUIRED THROUGH FIRST THREE YEARS OF PLANT LIFE SOME SURVEILLANCETENDONS WERE OBSERVED TO BE TOO CI.OSE TO MAINSTEAM VALVES FOR PERSONNEL SAFETY; THEREFORF DIFFERENT TENDONS FOR SURVEILLANCEWERE SELECTED.
REQUIRED TESTS UFTAFF MEASUREMENTS {EACHTENDON)
SHEATH FILLER INSPECTION - VISUAI CHEMICALTEST (EACH TENDON)
FOR ONE TENDON FROlN EACH GROUP, TENDON WAS DETENSIONED; WIRE WAS REMOVED, VISUALLY INSPECTED, TENSILE TESTS PERFORMED
TURKEY POINT UNIT 3 xzzzmu.
mazru lax~ 2'~
eau.m K~ Mama, uz~
1D15 1D18 1D27 X
X+
X X
1D36 2D11 X
X X
X X
2D21 2D24 2D28 3D21 3D24 3D28 1D53 62H18 64H50 42H70 64H51 X+
X X
X+
X X
X+
X+
X X+
X+
X X
X X
X X
X X
X X+
X X
X X
13H47 23vi 45V7 X+
X+
X+
X X
X X
61V1 X
X 12V3 61V2
- TENDONS DETENSIONED FOR WIRE INSPECTION
TURKEY POINT UNIT 4 1D28 2D28 X+
X X
X 3D28 2D14 2D3 13H15 35H70 51H50 13H38 42H57
~
64H70 42H80 62H38 13H51 12V29 34V29 56V29 X+
X+
X+
X+
X X
X X
X X
X+
X X
X X
X X
X+
X X+
X X
X
't1
+ - TENDON DETENSIONED FOR MIRE INSPECTION
2.
A ONTAtNMENTTEND N SURVElLLAN ES CONT'D NEW T HNI A P
IFI ATI N RE IREMENT IN EFFECT BEGINN!NG WITH 20TH YEAR SURVEILLANCE {1992)
REQUIRES THAT STRUCTURAL INTEGRITYOF TENDONS BE DEMONSTRATED EVERY FIFTH YEAR FROM DATE OF INITIAL STRUCTURAL INTEGRITYTEST REQUIRES SURVEILLANCEOF A RANDOM BUT REPRESENTATIVE SAMPLE OF AT LEAST 12 TENDONS {3 DOME, 4 VERTICAI 8 HORIZONTAL)
FOR EACH SUBSEQUENT INSPECTION, ONE TENDON FROM EACH GROUP MAYBE KEPT UNCHANGED TO DEVELOP A HISTORY PROVISIONS EXIST FOR SELECTING SUBSTITUTE TENDONS TO REPLACE SELECTED TENDONS THATARE INACCESSIBLE OR UNSAFE FOR INSPECTION-PRESCRIBED BYASME IWL-2521.1 (a)
REQUIRED TESTS UFTNFF MEASUREMENTS (ALLTENDONS)
SHEATH FILLER INSPECTION (ALLTENDONS)
VISUALINSPECTION CHEMICALTESTS NO CHANGE IN PRESENCE VERIFICATIONOF MINIMUMGREASE COVERAGE NO UNACCEPTABLE CORROSION IN END ANCHORAGES NO UNACCEPTABLE CRACKING IN CONCRETE ADJACENT TO END ANCHORAGES WIRE INSPECTION (FOR ONE TENDON FROM EACH GROUP)
VISUALINSPECTION TENSILE TESTS PLANT IS SUBJECT TO LlMITINGCONDITIONS FOR OPERATION (LCO) IN THE EVENT OF UNACCEPTABLETEST RESULTS; LCO ls DESCRIBED IN TECHNICALSPECIFICATIONS.
NTAIN T
0 N
F R S
TS HR H
ALLIJFTWFF VALUES EXCEEDED THE MINIMUM EFFECTIVE DESIGN PRESTRESS TYPICALLYFOUND MILLSCALE, MINOR CORROSION ON SHlMS AND BEARING PLATES, SOME SLIGHT SPOTTY, DISCOLORATION DURING UNIT 3 1ST YEAR SURVEILLANCE, FOUND CORROSION VflTHPITTING ON SEVERAl. ANCHORAGES AND WIRES FOR VERTICALTENDONS; THIS WAS CAUSED BYA DELAYtN INSTAIJJNG THE SHEATH RLLER DURING CONSTRUCTION (WIRES AND ANCHORAGES EXPOSED MOISTURE PAt08 TO TENS!ONtNG. THt8 WAS NOT A PROGRESSIVE CONDITION, HO ER.
BEGINNING IN THIRD YEAR, SOME CORROSION OF GREASE CAPS AND BEARING PLATES FOR UNIT 3 TENDONS WAS NOTED.
SUGHT INCREASE OF CORROSION LEVELS OF SHIMS, BEARING PLATES, STRESS NASHERS NOTED DURING IOTH YEAR SURYEIUANCE NO SERIOUS PROGRESSIVE CORROSION OBSERVED MORE CORROSION OBSERVED ON UNIT3 THAN ON VNIT4
2.O A CONTAINMENTTEND N
URVEILLAN E
SUMMARY
AND TREND F RE ULT THR SURVEIL NIR IN P N
I A
MINOR SCRATCHES, NICKS, DIE MARKS, HEAT TREAT)NG DISCOLORATION, LOCALIZEDCORROSlON DURING UN!T3 1ST YEAR SURVEILLANCE, SOME CORROSION PflTlNG OBSERVED ON VERTICALTENDONS (EXPOSED'TO MOISTURE PRIOR TO TENSIONING).
SOME OXIDATIONAND PITnNG NOTED IN UNIT3 5TH AND 10TH YEAR SVRVEILLANCES (NOT PROGRESSIVE)
MORE CORROSION OBSERVED ON UNIT3 THAN ON UNIT4
2.P A
CONTAINMENTTENDON SURyEILLAN E CONT'0
SUMMARY
AND TREND F RES T
THR GH TENTH YEAR S
RVEI WIR N
TIN FOR UNIT3, TWO SPECIMENS {ONE IN 1 ST YEAR, ONE IN 5TH YEAR) HAD YIELD STRENGTHS '!-2.3% BELOW REQUIRED VALUE;WIRES FROM SIX TENDONS (FIVE IN UNIT3, ONE IN UNIT4) HAD ULTIMATESTRENGTHS 1%
BEI.OW REQUIRED VALUE FOR EACH SITUATIONWHERE YIELDSTRENGTH WAS BELOW REQUIRED VALUE,AVERAGEYIELD STRENGTH OF ALLSPECIMENS TAKEN.FROM WIRE IN QUESTION WAS ABOVE REQUIRED VALUE.
FOR EACH SITUATIONWHERE ULTIMATESTRENGTH WAS BELOW REQUIRED VALUE,AVERAGE YIELDSTRENGTH OF WIRE WAS ABOVE REQUIRED VALUE (YIELDSTRENGTH IS MORE INDICATIVEOF THE BEHAVIORAND ACCEPTABILITY OF TENDON WIRES AT NORMALAND ACCIDENT CONDITIONS THAN IS THE'LTIMATESTRENGTH).
FOR REASONS LISTED ABOVE, CONDmON OF WIRES WA CONSIDERED TO BE ACCEPTABLE
2.0 A
CONTAINMENTTEND N SURVEILLANCES CONT'D
SUMMARY
AND TRENDS F RESULT THROUGH TENTH YEAR S
RVEILLAN NT'0 SHEATH FILL R INSPE TI N
CHEMICALCONTENT, NEUTRALIZATIONNUMBERS WERE ACCEPTABLE OBSERVED FREE WATER AND DISCOLORATION IN SEVERAL UNIT 3 TENDONS. THIS WAS APPARENTLY DUE TO USE OF REMOVABLETENDON PIT COVERS FOR SURVEILLANCETENDONS (ALLOTHER VERTICALTENDON TOP. CAPS WERE COVERED WITH CONCRETE);
INADEQUATESEALS ALLOWEDWATER TO ACCUMULATEIN PITS, SEEP INTO TENDON SHEATHS.
CHEMICALTESTS SHOWED PERCENTAGE OF FREE WATER TO BE WITHINACCEPTANCE UMITS DESIGN OF SEALS HAS BEEN MODIFIED IN AN ATTEMPTTO MAKETHE COVERS WATERTIGHT;.
FURTHER IMPROVEMENTS TO SEALS WILLBE IMPLEMENTEDDURING 20TH YEAR SURVEILLANCE SPECIAL SURVEILLANCEOF VERTICALTENDONS WAS PERFORMED FOLLOWING 10TH YEAR SURVEILLANCETO ADDRESS ISSUE OF WATER'IN TENDONS.
FREE lgATER WAS FOUND IN SEVERAL TENDONS, BUT PERCENTAGE WAS ALWAYSWITHINACCEPTANCE UMITS.
NO UNACCEPTABLE PROGRESSIVE CORROSION WAS NOTED ON VERTICALTENDON WIRES.
SOME LEAKAGEOF SHEATH FILLER FRONI VERTICAL TENDON CAPS NOTED (CRACKED GASKETS, CORRODED CAPS).
PLANT IS CURRENTLYWORKING TO REMOVE CORROSION, RfCOAT CAPS AS NECESSARY.
2.0 A ONTAINM NT TENDON S RYE}LLANCE CONT'D
SUMMARY
F FIFTE NT YEAR RVBLLAN MOST RECENT TENDON SURVEILLANCE-PERFORMED IN 1988 12 TENDONS lNSPECTED FOR UNIT 3, 10 FOR UNIT4 FOR EACH UNIT, ONE ADDITtONALHORIZONTALTENDON INSPECTED TO MEET!NTENT OF TECHNICAL.
SPECIFICATION IMPLEMENTATIONPROCEDURE 0-AOMRR 021 (REFLECTING NEW TECH SPECS, WHICH WERE IN REVIEW PROCESS AT THE TIME)
TWO ADDITIONALUNIT3 VERT1CALTENDONS INSPECTED TO $ATISFY RECOMMENDATIONS MADEAFTER 10TH YEAR AND SPEClAL VERTICALTENDON SURVEILLANCES AMOUNTOF CHEMICALIMPURITIES WAS WITHIN ACCEPTANCE LIMITS IN THREE TENDONS IN UNIT 3, SMALLAMOUNTOF FRE WATER WAS OBSERVED; NONE OBSERVED IN UNIT4.
TESTS SHOWED PERCENTAGE OF FREE WATER TO BE WITHINACCEPTANCE LIMIS.
FOR SEVERAL UNIT4 HORIZONTAlTENDONS, NKIITRAAHATIRHNNNNKR IHNINATKRYKRY SURHT1.Y ACIDIC NATURE, WHICH WAS OUTSIDE SPECIFlED LlMITS.
VALUES WERE WITHINUMITS RECOMMENDED BY MANUFACTURER, HOWEVER, AND WERE THEREFORE CONSIDERED ACCEPTABLE.
MODIFIED FORMULATIONSOF VISCONORUST SHEATH FiLLER WHICH HAVE HIGHER BASE NUMBER HAVE BEEN USED AS REPLACEMENT GREASE 1N LATER SURVEIllANCES.
4 CONTAINMENTTEND N SURVEILLANCES C NT'D S
MMARY F FIFTEENTH YEAR URVEILLAN E NT'0 N
AN H RA A
MB IE NO EXCESSIVE CRACKING OR CORROSION.
SOME SURFACE OXIDATIONOBSERVED AT OUTER EDGE QF BEARING PLATES AT TOP ENDS OF SOME VERTICAL TENDONS FOR BOTH UNITS. OVERALLCONDITION WAS CONSISTENT WITH THAT REPORTED IN EARLIER SURVEILLANCES.
THE 15TH YEAR SURVEILLANCEREPORT RECOMMENDED THATTHECORRODED AREAS OF THE BEAR!NG PLATES BE CLEANED AND COATED
2.
A NTAINM NT TENDON URVEILLAN ES NT'D
SUMMARY
F FIFTEENTH YEAR URVEIL N
LlFT-F F R
PREVIOUS SURVEILLANCES COMPARED MEASURED FORCES TO CALCULATEDMINIMUM40-YEAR DESIGN STRENGTHS.
THIS SURVEILLANCEUTILlZEDMETHOD DESCRIBED IN REG. GUIDE 1.38.1 TO DETERMINE UPPER AND LOWER BOUND LIFTOFF VALUES FOR EACH lNDIVIDUALTENDON AT ANYPOINT DURING ITS UFE.
FOR UNIT3; LIFTOFF VALUES FOR EACH TENDON EXCEEDED PREDICTED LOWER BOUND VALUES.
FOR UNIT4, LIFTOFF VALUEFOR ONE TENDON WAS 0.3/o BELOW PREDICTED LOWER BOUND VALUE. PER PROCEDURAL REQUIREMENTS, FOUR ADDITIONAL ADJACENT TENDONS WERE TESTED; TWO OF THE UFT-OFF VALUES WERE SLIGHTLYBELOW PREDICTED LOWER BOUND VALUES.
'IN ACCORDANCE WITH PLANT PROCEDURE, 'AN EVALUATION.WASPERFORMED, AND A SPECIAL REPORT WAS SUBMf1TED TO NRC. THIS REPORT CONCLUDED THAT.THE PRESTRESSING SYSTEM WOULD MAINTAINITS INTEGRITY;THIS WAS BASED ON MEASURED STRESS LEVELS AND THE DESIGN MARGINS IN THE SYSTEM.
IT WAS RECOMMENDED THAT LlFTNFF VALUES FOR FOUR OF THE TENDONS IN THIS AREA BE OBTAINED DURING THE NEXT SURVEILLANCE,
~
I.IF'IOFF RESEAT TURKEY POINT ijNIT 4 TENDON IBHSI PREDICTED I.IFTOFF FIERCE AT IS/g YEARS 5S5.1 NIPS 150 C50 550 5
IO Tlirt AFTER INITIAL TENSIONING IYEARS)
F)GUAE I I 20 M
40
.0 A NTAINMENTTEND N
RVEl LAN E UMMARY F I
NTH R
RV ILLAN NT'D LlFT NT'OR SEVERAL TENDONS ON BOTH UNITS, MEASURED LIFT-OFF FORCE EXCEEDED PREDICTED UPPER BOUND VALUE.
IN ALLCASES EXCEPT ONE, THE TENDONS HAD UNDERGONE PREVIOUS SURVEILLANCES; HIGH LIFT-OFF VALUES WERE A CONSEQUENCE OF HAVINGADDITIONAL FORCE APPLIED TO TENDONS DURING THE PREVIOUS DETENSIONING/RETENSIONING PROCESSES.
THE EXCEEDING OF THE UPPER BOUND VALUEDOES
'OT AFFECT SAFETY OR STRUCTURAL CAPACITY.
WHEN THE EXCESS RETENSIONING LOADS ARE CONSIDERED, THE GENERAL PATTERN OF
. PRESTRESS LOSS IN THE TENDONS FOLLOWS THE PREDICTED BEHAVIOR.
'HIS ISSUE WILLCEASE TO BE A-FACTOR IN FUTURE SURVEILLANCES, AS INSPECTION WILLINVOLVE RANDOMLYSELECTED TENDONS INSTEAD OF TH PREVIOUSLY DESIGNATED TENDONS. ALSO, THE 16TH YEAR SURVEILLANCEREPORT HAS RECOIIJIltrIENDEDTHAT RETENSIONING LOADS BE AS, CLOSE AS POSSIBLE TO THE IJFTWFF LOADS TO PREVENT THE INTRODUCTIONOF ADDITIONAL PRESTRESS INTO THE TENDONS.-
~
LlFTOFF RESEAT TURKEY POlNT'NlT 3 PREDlCTED LlFTOFF FORCE AT 'le/g YEARS TENOON 45V7 576.3 KlPS UlA 750 K
Ll A'a.
C)
ClK CllI-650 550 4
5 10 Tll4E AFTER INlTlAL TENSlONlNG (YEARS )
FIGURE G
20 30 40
2.
A NTAINMENTTENDON RVEILLAN F NT'D
SUMMARY
F FIFTEENTH YEAR URYEILLANC NT'0 WIR N P TI N
I AL LOCALAREAS OF LEVEL 3 CORROSION {NOT PROGRESSIVE)
UNIT 3. VERTICALTENDON WIRE SHOWED PATCHES OF SURFACE ROUGHNESS WIR N
ALLUNIT3 SAMPLES MET REQUIRED VALUES IN UNIT4, 2 SPECIMENS FROM ONE VERTICALTENDON SHOWED ULTIMATESTRENGTH LESS THAN 4.% BELOW REQUIRED VALUE. PER PLANT PROCEDURE, AN EVALUATIONOF THIS CONDITION WAS PERFORMED, AND A SPECIAL REPORT WAS'SUBMmED TO NRC. THIS
. REPORT CONCI.UDED THAT STRUCTURAL INTEGRITYOF THE CONTAINMENTSTRUCTURE WAS NOT ADVERSELY AFFECTED, FOR THE FOLLOWING REASONS:
DESIGN OF CONTAINMENTALLOWSANYTHREE ADJACENT VERTICALTENDONS TO BE LOST THE WIRE IN QUESTION MET THE SPECIFIED'EQUIREMENTS FOR YIELDSTRENGTH IT WAS RECOMMENDED THAT'ADDITIONALWIRES FROM THE SAME HEATAS THE WIRE IN QUESTION BE INSPECTED DURING THE NEXT SURVEILLANCE.
2.
A NTAINMENTTEND N
URVEILMN ES Nl"D POSSIBL LEAKAG F
HEATH FI LE RECENTLY RAISED CONCERN RELATED TO DIFFERENCES BETWEEN AMOUNTOF SHEATH FILLER REMOVED FROM CONTAINMENTAND AMOUNTOF SHEATH FILLER REPLACED PREVIOUS TURKEY POINT SURVEILLANCEREPORTS HAVE NOT TABULATEDTHIS DATA. RESEARCHED PERFORMED ON ORIGINALDATA RECORD SHEETS FILLED OUT BY.
SURVEILLANCEPERSONNEL; DATANOT AVAILABLEFOR ALL SURVEILLANCES, HOWEVER.
VOLUMES WERE NOT RECORDED PRECISELY ESTIMATES BASED ON LEVELS OF SHEATH FILLER IN BARRELS EXACTAMOUNTS OF OVERFLOW NOT MEASURED IN MAJORITYOF CASES; VOLUMEREMOVED AND VOLUME REPLACED WERE OF SIMILARMAGNITUDES.
IN APPRONMATELY30% OF CASKS, THERE WAS AT LEAST A 10 GALLON DIFFERENCE BETWEEN VOLUMEREMOVED AND VOLUMEREPLACED.
POSSIBLE EXPLANATIONSFOR DIFFERENCES:
VOIDS IN ORIGINALINSTALLATION LEAKAGEFROM TENDON CAPS THERMALSHRINKAGE OF GREASE {UP TO 8%)
PENETRATION OF GREASE INTO SPACES WITHINWIRE BUNDLE (OCCURRING OVER TIME LEAKAGEINTO CONTAINMENTCONCRETE
'BECAUSE OF THERMALGRADIENT, LESS COMPRESSION OCCURS ON OUTSIDE SURFACE OF CONTAINMENT. GREASE LEAKINGFROM SHEATHS WOULD BK MORE UKELYTO MIGRATE TO OUTSIDE SURFACES.
THERE HAS BEEN NO SIGNIFICANT AMOUNTOF GREASE LEAIQLGEFROM CONCRETE CRACKS OBSERVED ON EITHER CONTAINMENT.
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SIBL KA F
HEATH Fi R
NT'D EVALUATIONOF POSSiBLE EFFECTS OF SHEATH FiLLER LEAKAGEINTO CONTAINMENTCONCRETE FOR PRESTRESSED SHELI.NO REUANCE IS MADE ON MECHANICALINTERLOCKINGFOR RESISTANCE OF APPLIED LOADS. THEREFORF GREASE CANNOT DEGRADE SHEAR CAPACITYOF SECTlON.
~ ACI 615.1R-79 INDICATESTHAT PETROLEUM PRODUCTS ARE NORMALLYHARMLESS TO MATURE CONCRETE ALTHOUGHLIMITE,RESEARCH INDICATES THAT COMPRESSIVE STRENGTH OF MOIST CURED CONCRETE IS RELATIVELYUNAFFECTED BY IMPREGNATION.OF OII ABSORPTION OF OIL CAUSES DECREASE IN COMPRESSIVE STRENGTH lMMEDIATELYFOLLOWING EXPOSURE TO OIL, AND FOR A SHORT TIMETHEREAFTER.
WITHINSEVERAL MONTHS, OIL IMPREGNATED SPECIMENS EXHIBITCOMPRESSIVE STRENGTHS EQUAlJJNG OR.
EXCEEDING THE CONTROL SPECIMENS.
TESTS SUGGEST THAT RELATIVELYLARGE HYDROCARBON MOLECULES ARE UNABLETO PENETlRATK THE PARTS OF THE MACROSTRUCTtjRKOF THE CONCRETE PASTE REACHED BY WATER, AND THEREFORE CAUSE NO DETRIMENTALEXPANSION. NO SWELLING HAS BEEN OBSERVED IN OVEN DRIED SPECIMENS EXPOSED TO KEROSENE OR LUBRICATlNGOIL
2.0 A ONTAtNMENTTEND N SURVEILLANCES CONT'D FAILURE F AN H R H D THREAD b
RIN RV I LAN iNSPE Tl NRC INFORMATIONNOTICE (IN) 910 ISSUED IN DECEMBER 199'I DOCUMENTED FAILURE OF THE INTERNALTHREADS OF AN ANCHOR HEAD WHILETHE TENDON WAS BEING STRESSED WITH THE HYDRAULICSTRESSING RAN (OCQNEE).
SITUATION CAUSED BY STRESSES Il4 THREADS EXCEEDED MATERIALYIELDSTRENGTH THIS IS A PERSONNEL SAFE7Y ISSUE; NO EFFECT ON NUCLEAR SAFETY OR STRUCTURAL INTEGRITYOF PRESTRESSING SYSTEM CONSIDERATION WILLBE GIVEN TO THIS SITUATION PRIOR TO THE 21TH YEAR SURVEILLANCE.
2.
NTAINMENTSTRUCTURE B.
ATH Dl PR TE TI N
CATHODIC PROTECTION SYSTEM INSTALLEDDURING ORIGINAL CONSTRUCTION TO CONTROL GALVANICCORROSION ON METALLIC SURFACES OF THE CONTAINMENTFOUNDATIONS SYSTEM DESIGNED TO PROTECT EXTERNALSURFACES OF THE LINER PLATE, REINFORCING STEEL, TENDON ASSE MBLIES THESE SURFACES ARE CONNECTED TO CATHODIC PROTECTION RECTIFIERS PRO/UNIT). POSITIVE SIDE OF CURRENT SUPPLY CONNECTED TO ANODES IN FOUR DEEP WELLS AROUND EACH CONTAINMENT.
REFERENCE ELECTRODES WIRED TO CONTROL CABINETTO TREND THE EFFECTS OF THE SYSTEM.
CATHODIC PROTECTlON SYSTEM IS CONSIDERED TO BE A 8
N ICIA ENHAN EM RATHER THAN AN INTEGRALPARTOF THE CONTAINMENTDESIGN.
HISTORlCALLY,THE CATHODIC PROTECTION SYSTEM HAS PROVIDED CONSISTENT CORROSION CONTROL PERIODIC MAINTENANCEHAS, UNTILRECENTLY, EFFECTIVELYMAlNTAINEDTHE OUTPUT OF THE SYSTEM'.
THE SYSTEM IS PRESENTLY EXHIBITINGREDUCED OUTPUT.,
RECTIFIERS PROVIDING CURRENT TO THE BASE OF CONTAINMENTVESSELS HAVE BEEN FOUND TO BE IN PROPER OPERATING CONDITION.
SEVERAL ANODES ARE INDICATINGVERY LOW CURRENT READINGS REPLACEMENT EVALUATIONSARE PRESENTLY UNDER CONSIDERATION.
TURXEY POINT UNIT 4 COHTAIHMEMT BUILDZNO ZLRT STRUCTUEULL INSPECTIONS I~
ZNSPECTZOM REQUIREMENTS o
NHX TEE INBPECTZON NAS CONDUCTED o
NEAT NERE THE REQUIREMENTS ZZo SCOPE o
NEAT STRUCTURAZ ELmlEHTS NERE REVZENED o
TO mAT DEGREE %ERE THBX REVZENED ZZI~
ZNSPECTZOM ATTRIBUTES AND CRXTERZA o
NEAT ATTRXBUTES NERE INSPECTED o
NSLT CRITERIA %AS USED TO DETERMINE SXOXXFZCAHT DEQQADATXOM RESOXs TSg SVLTsUATZOMp AMD CORRECTZVE ACTION o
NHAT NAS POUND DURIMO TSE INSPECTION o
EVaXUATZOX OV SiaSXVXCAMT imuaS mUHD o
CORRECTIVE ACTiONS ZMPTEMEHTED OR PIAHHED CONCLUSIONS o
NITS RESPECT TO ZHLT-o NXTS REKQLD TO IA)MQ TERX PER?ORMAMCE VZ~
~<r'gTURQ ~g o
UNIT 3 IIEET INSPECTION o
UHXT 4 ZLRT INSPECTION
I ~
INSPECTION REQUIREMENTS A.
TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 4 ~ 5 ~ 1 ~ 5 ~ 3 fc 10 CFR 50 APPENDIX J IM ACCORDANCE NITH 10 CFR SORY APPEHDIZ J g SECTXOM Vg A VISUAL INSPECTION OF THE ACCESSIBLE IHTERIOR AHD EXTERIOR SURFACES OF THE COHTAI?QtEHT, IMCLUDIHQLINER PLATE, SHALZs BE PERl'ORATED DURXHQ TEE SHUTDOWN FOR (BUT PRIOR TO)
EACH TYPE iAi COHTAIMÃEHT LEAXAQE RATE TEST T1Gt PURPOSE OF THIS ZMSPECTXOM SHALL BE TO IDEHTXFY EVZDEHCE OF DEGRADATION
%RICH MAY AFFECT COHTAXMHEHT STRUCTURAL XHTEQRZTY OR LEAKTXQETMESS TEE VISUAL INSPECTION SHALL BE QEMERAL IM MATUREg XTS ZHTEHT SHALL BE TO DETECTS 1 ~
QROSd AREAS Ol'IDESPREAD CELhCXXHQ 2 ~
SPALLZMQ OF CONCRETE 3 ~
QOUQZHQ OF STEEL ELEHEHTS 4 ~
RUST 5 ~
NEXiD DEQRADATZON B
TO ESTABLISH A BASELXHE FOR FUTURE XLRT SURVEZLLAHCES 1e DETAILED ZMSPECTXON AMD NOTES 2 ~
PE 3 ~
REPORT ADDRESSZMQ FZMDZHQSg EVALUATZOMSi CONCLUSIONS AHD CORRECTIVE ACTXOMS Ce POST ZLRT ZMSPECTXON TO IDENTIFY AMY STRUCTURAL CHAMQES RESULTZMQ FROM ZLRT
ZZ.
SCOPE ACCESSIBLE COMPOHKHTS OF POST TENSXOHZHO TEHDOHS TO DETECT SRBASB LZJQULOB 1 ~
ALL HORIZONTAL (HOOP)
TEHDOHS EXCEPT FOR A SMALL NUMBER ZH ARRAS WHICH NKRB INACCESSIBLE DUB TO ZNTERFERENCES 2 ~
ALL DOME TENDONS 3 ~
AIsL VERTICAL TENDON LONER ENDS ~
UPPER ENDS ARB ENCASED IM CONCRETE Bo EXTERIOR CONCRETE SURFACES TO DETECT STRUCTtMQ DEFZCZENCXES le EXTERIOR l6QsX>> AHD TENDON BUTTRESSES 2 ~
DOME AHD RXHO OZRDER 3.
ACCESSIBLE PORTZOM OF FOUOATZOM mTHZM THE TENDON OALLERY I
Ce INTERIOR LINER AND PENETRATZONS TO DETECT AREAS %KZCH AFFECT LEAXTZOHTNESS 1 e CYIsZHDER XsZMER
%AS OBSERVED FROM THE THREE, MAIM ELEVATZOMS 14 FT BASEMENT XsEVEXsg 30 FT 4
ZM MEN%ANISE LEVELS AND 5$ FT OPERATXMO DECK 2~
DOM3 LINER INSPECTED USZMO BINOCULARS 3 ~
ALX>> PENET$%TIOM CAMXSTERS 4 ~
SPECIAX>> ATTEMTZOM PIsACED OM INTERFACE AT FOUNDATZOM BASEMAT mERE mTER ACCUMULATXOMPOTENTIAL ZS HXOH Do.
OTHER INTERNAL STRUCTURES THAT RECEIVED A OENERAXs VXSUAIs XNSPECTXON 1.
CONCRETE CUBICLE MALLS.
REACTOR
- CAVITY, STEAM OEHERATORt REACTOR
- COOLANT, PUMP g PRESSURZ3ER g
ACCUMULATOR WALLS 2 ~
PRIMARY AND SECONDARY BXOSHXEXsD WALLS 3o FX>>OORS OF THE THREE MAIM DECKS io STRUCTURAL STEEIs SUPPORTXMO THE THREE MAXM DECKS
IXZ~
IMSPECTZOM ATTRIBUTES AHD CRITERZA CRZTERXA ISSUED UHDER FPL EMQZMEERZMQ EVALUATIONZN PTM SECS~91~087 EHTZTLED ssQUIDELZHE FOR VISUAL IHSPECTZOH Ot POST-TEHSXOHXHQ TEHDON COHPOHEHTS 1 ~
CORROSION OF CAPS AMD ATTACHIMQ STUDS ~
AREAS COMSZDERED DEQRADED VERS THOSE EXHZBZTZMQ PZTTZMQ AMD/OR DELAMZMATXOMRESULTZMQ IM SXQMZFZCAMT LOSS OF CROSS SECTION 2 ~
QREASE LEJQGLQE
%HICK
%OULD BE EVZDEHCE OF SUBSTAHTZAL REDUCTION OF ISV22iTORY'XAMPLES QIVEM
%5RS POOLZMQ OM HORZSOHAL SURFACES'UBSTAMTIAL STAIHIMQ OF CONCRETE mes, mZOR LZaXS AROUHD QASXETSg
%ETTZHQ OF SEVEEULZs AMACEHT CAPS BY SIMQLE TEHDOMe B e EXTERIOR CONCRETE SURFACES 1 ~
EZPOSED REXHFORCZMQ BARS 2 ~
SZQNZFICAMT CONCRETE SPALLS 3 ~
CRACK PAMlERMS 4 ~ 'RACKS SXEZEXTZMQ RUSTBLEEDXMQ 5 ~
RUSTBLEOXMQ OR STAZHZMQ 6 ~
SXMQLE CRACXS 1/14 INCR OR (GtEATERg OR AHY CRACK ADJACENT FRACTURE SURFACESe Ce ZHTERZOR LZHER AND PEHETRATZOMS 1e 2e DEQRADED COATXHQS ~ PEELED'ELAKCMATEDg DXSBOHDED VERS LOQQED TO DETERMINE I?
AMT DEQRADATZOM OCCURRED DURZMQ DEPRESS URINATION CORROSZONe PZTTZHQg DELAÃZHATZONg EXTENSIVE SGR?ACE CORROSION 3 ~
DZSTORTXONe BULQES AMD CRACKS
Do OTHER ZMTKQGLL STRUCTURES 1
COMCRETE DEQRADATZOM AS P~OUSLX DEPIMED 2 ~
STRUCTURAL STEEL DEQRADATZOM o
DEQRADED COATIMQS o
CORROSZOM o
DXSTORTXOMi EZCESSXVS D PLZCTXOM<
%ARPXMQi CRACKS+
o DEQRADED COMMECTIOMSo CRACKED'OOSE@
CORRODED g
ZV RESULTS AHD EVALUATION STRUCTURAL ELEMENTS INSPECTED
%ERE POUND TO BE ZH QESQSLLLLY QOOD COHDXTZON Ae POST TEHSXOHZHQ TENDONS 1 ~
CAPS AHD STUDS RESULTS>
MINOR SURFACE CORROSION OF CAPS AND STUDS %AS NOTED OM HORZEOHTAIsg DOMES'HD VERTZCAIs TEmON CAPS ON UNIT 4 ~
UHXT 3 TEMDON QAIsLERY %AS INSPECTED FOR COXPARZSOM OF THE VERTICAL TENDON CONDITION, AHD HORE SZQHZFZCAHT CORROSION ZNCLUDZHQ PZTTXNQ AHD DEHQlZHATZOM NOTED ON VERTICAL TENDON LONER CAPS EVALUATION!
BASED ON THE LEVEL OF CORROSION NOTED ON THE UNIT i CAPS'HE CONDITXON mlS HOT COHSIDERED SZQHZFZCAHT m:TH RESPECT TO XLRTg AHD IT %AS CONCLUDED THAT HO XmaOZATE ACTION mS NECESSARY.
XT mS CONCLUDED THAT THE UNIT 3 VERTZCAIs TEOON LCNER CAPS REQUIRED REPAIRS ON a TxmaY SCHGULX.
CORRECTIVE ACTION!
o MEND TENDON INSPECTION PROCOURE 0 BMX 051 1
TO MONITOR RATE OF CORROSION OF CAPS AT 6
MONTH INTERVAIaSe REPAIR AS HECESSARYe 0
REPAIRZHO UNIT 3 VERTZCAIs TENDON LOSER CAPS BY CLEANIHQ AHD RECOATZHQe l
ts 2 ~
QREASE LEAXAQS THROUQH CAPS RESULTS<
QREASR MRS NOTED ON SEVERAL CAPS'RZMARZIsY ON THE LCNER END OF THE VERTXCAL CAPS AHD SOME HORIZONTAL CAPS.
THE QREASr LEAXAQE OCCURS THROUQH THE VILL ON THE HORIZONTAL CAPS'HE QREASE ZS CAKED NZTH DEBRIS AHD MOTHERED e SEVESUlL VERTICAIs CAPS HAD DROPLETS OF QREASE OM THE ATTACHMENT STUDS~
AND T%0 VERTICAL TENDON CAPS
%ERS NOTED TO HAVE ACCUMmaTZONS OF APPROXunTELY 4-e OUNCES DIRECTLY BENEATH TREK OH THE QALLERY FLOOR~
EVALUATION:
IT %&3 CONCLUDED THAT THE AMOUNT OP QREASS LEAXAQE
%AS HOT Or AH IMMEDIATE CONCERN BASED ON THE QUANTITY Or QREASS
?OUHD NZTH RESPECT To THE TOTAL VOLUME Ol'REASS %ZTHIM THE SHEATHS ~
IH ADDITION~
THE RATE or LEAEAQS Is Los, BASED oN THE maTHERIHQ OBSERVED AHD THS MINOR QUANTITY Or PRESE MATERIAL
?OUHDe coaREcTzvE AcTxoNc o
AMEND TENDON INSPECTION PROCEDURE 0-BMM 051 ~ 1 To MONITOR RATS Or QREASS LEAEAQE AT 5 MONTE ZNTERVALSe
-REPAIR COMPONENTS AS HECESSARYe 3 ~
'TEHDON QALLERY RESULTS!
TENDON QALLERY SUMP PUMP
%AS
?OUMD To BS OUT Or sERVzcS RESULTZMQ zM AccUMULATZON or mTER ON THE
?Looae R3&HIATER IS EHTERZHQ THS QALLERY PRIMARILY THROUQH THS EHTRANcS MANHOLE, AND UPPER max eoIHT.
soME CRAcxs DUE To aEzNtoacEMEMT coaaoszoN mamt NOTED OM THS QALLERY NALLSe SVALUATXOM!
SINCE THE TENDON %!LLSRY ZS NOT A SAFETY RELATED STRUCTURE e VARIOUS CORRECTZVS ACTXONS
%ZIsI>>
BE IMPLEMENTED TO REPAIR AND MAINTAINTHS SUMP PUMPS REPAZR NAlsZs DEFZCZENCXESg AHD IMPROVE THS coNrzQURATZOM or THS MANHOLE.
THzs mLL IMPROVE CONDITIONS FOR FUTURE INSPECTIONS AHD MZNZMZIS THE posszszxzTY or CORROSION To THE TENDON cAps AND QAXsIsERY RSZNFORCEMEHT e ACTION!
REPAIR AHD MAINTAIN SUMP PUMP e INCLUDE SUMP PUMP SURVEZLLANCS AS PART Or TENDON ZNSPECTXON PROCEDURE O
SMM 051e1e ADD COIsx>>AR AT MAHHOLS To PRECLUDE RUMO?l'ROM EHTERZMO QALLERYe
B EXTERIOR CONCRETE 801UPACES CYLINDER lGLLZs AHD TENDON BUTTRESSES RESULTS t CYLINDER
%ALL mLS
?OUHD TO BE XM QOOD CONDITION+
T%0 REPAIRED AREAS
%KXCH
%ERE ASSOCIATED %ZTH THS ORZQZHAL COHTAZHMEHT STRUCTUEULL ZHTEORZTY TEST (SZT)
WERE OBSERVED TO HAVE QREASE'TAINS o
MO OTHER EVIDENCE OF GREASE LEAKLOE ?ROM THS SHEATHS %AS ?OUHDo MINOR SPALXsZMO %AS NOTED AT THS CORNER 0?
SONS TEHDOH BUTTRESSES 1%AY PROM THE SEATZMO BASEPLATES.
MOST OF THS SPALLZD AREAS HAVE BEEN REPAIRED o HO EXPOSED REZH?ORCEKEHT OR
. SIQHZ?ZCAHT RUSTSTAIMIMO %AS ?OUHDi EVALUATXOHs THS QREASE STAINS
'%ERE DETERMINED TO BE ZNSXONZ?ZCAHT SXMCS MO ?RESH MATERIAL MRS OBSERVED AHD THE STAINS ARS
%EATHImED AHD DISCRETE e THE SPALLS VERS MOT CONSIDERED STRU&lURALLYSZOHX?ZCANT BASED ON THEXR SXSS AHD LOCATXONe THEY
%ERS ATTRIBUTED TO THE ORXOXHAL CONCRETE PLACEMEHTp POST TENSXOHIHQ OP ERATZON AMD INCIDENTAL CONTACT NZTK EQUZPMEMT DURXHO THS TENDON SURVEILLAMCES~
CORRECTIVE ACTION!
o REPAIR SPALLED AREAS DURZNO THS 1.993 TNEHTZETH TERR TENDON SURVEILLANCE THS DOME 8%8 ?OUHD TO BS ZN QOOD CONDITION OVERALLe NO mTER POHDZHO mS NOTED.
a HORZSOMTAL CRACX mS NOTED ON THS RXMO OIRDER HEAR BUTTRESS HUMBER 5 AHD OTHER CRACKS BETWEEN DOME TENDON INSETS
%AS OBSERVED.
SONS MINOR CORROSION O?
THS TENDON SURVEILLANCE SKYCLZMBER RAILS MRS HOTEDe THE SKID RESISTANT MATERIAL APPLIED TO THS DOME %AS NOTED TO BS PEELXHOo SOME SECTIONS OF THE HASDRAZLS %ERE FOUND TO BS CORRODED AHD ZM HEED O? REPAIR+
THE HORZSOHTAL CRACXS ARE TYPICAL OF THOSE DOCUMENTED NXTHZM THS ORXQXMAL SXT REPORT AMD RESULTED PROX TEE POS'T TENSZOHXMO OPERATION AND PRESSURE TEsT.
HO
- SPALIXMO, RUST-BLEEDXMO oa OTHER SZQNS OF ADVANCED DEQRADATIOM %ZRS HOTEDe A
CLOSE XMSPECTZOM %ILL BE PERFORMED DURXMQ THE 20TH YEAR TENDON SURVEZLLtLHCEe THS OTHER ITEMS
'WERE NOT REPAIRED UHDER PLANT voax ORDERS.
CORRECTIVE ACTION<
o PERFORM A DETAILED INSPECTION OF RZMO OIRDER CRACXS DURZHO THS 20TH YKhR TENDON SURVEILLANCE XN T993, o
REPAIR DOME CPO9kLAYg SXYCLIMBER RAILSg AHD HAMDRAXLS.UNDER PLANT coax oanERS 3 ~
FOUMDATXOM RESULTS!
THE FOUMDATXON IAS FOUI TO BE ZN EXCELL coHDZTzoM IZTE Ho svznEHcs oF STRUcmnuLL DEQRADATZOM FOUND e SURVEILLANCE OF THS FOUHDATION NZTEXM THS OALLERY
%ILL BS INCLUDED IXTEZM THS TENDON INSPECTION PROCEDURE 0 8N 051ele o
MNXD PROCEDM 0 NX 054e i TO IHCLUDS I&RIMTHS QALLERY AT 4 MOST'MTERVALSe
C>>
ZMTERZOR LZMER AHD PEHETRATZOM RESULTS'OME AREAS OF PEEZsEDp DELAXZMATKDg AHD DZSBOHDED TOPCOAT VERS OBSERVED>>
ZH THESE AREAS'HE PRIME COAT ZS ZHTACT AHD AFFORDZHO CORROSION PROTECTZOM TO THE LZMER>>
SURFACE CORROSION OF SOME OF THE LZHER SZAX mass AS maZ AS A Fgg PEHETRATZOH CAMZSTERS
%AS OBSERVED>>
JOZHT FILLER MATERIAL BETWEEN THE LZMER AHD ADJACEHT COHCRETE STRUCTURES
%AS MOTED TO BS LEACHZMO ZM SONS AR?RS>>
INWARD BQLOZMO OF THS LZHER 5%8 OBSERVED AT THS OPERATZHO DECK ZsEVEL AHD ABOVE TO THE POLAR C$Q!85 OZRDER L1s>>>>s ~
NELS ZT OCCURS'HS BQLOZMO RUNS THS EHTZRE HEZOHT OF THE 1D FOOT LZHER PAHEL AHD THEY ARS APPROXZMMELY 15 ZMCHES %ZDS AN) 1/2 ZMCH OUT OF ROUHD %XTH THS ADJACEHT SECTZOMS %RICH ARS MOT INWARDLY BQLOZMO>>
THS BQLOZMO ZS RAHDOX BUT
%IDESPREAD AROUHD THS PERIMETER OF THE BQZZsDZMO>>
EVRLQATIONe THS COATZMO DZSCREPAHCZES VERS LOOOED TO DETECT AHY ADDZTZOMAL COATZMO FAILURES RESULTZHO FROX THS ZLRT DEPRESSURXSMXOM>>
HO ADDITZOHAL COATZMO FAILURES NRKS MOTED FOLLOmSO THS ZLRT.
THS COMDITIOM OF THS COATZHOS
%AS COMCLQDED TO BS ACCSPTABZsS FOR UNIT OPERATZOM>>
THS CORROSION OBSERVED %LS SUPERFICIAL AHD HOT OF COHCERM RELATIV3 TO THS ZMTSORZTY OF TH@ AFFECTED COMPOMEHTS.
THS JOINT FILLER MATERIALCONDITION %AS LOOOSD FOR FUTURE FUNCTION OF THS JOINT FZLZsER ZS TO PRECLUDE DEBRIS FROX OETTZMO LODOSD BETNSEN THS COMCRETS FLOORS AHD NALZsg AHD THS LZMSR>>
ZMDUSTRY RESEARCH IMDZCATEDTHAT THE ZsIMER BULOZMO ZS MOT ORIOZMAZs DSSXOM CALCQZsATXOMS ZMDZCATED THAT THE WM INDEPENDENT KiZs CALCULATION%AS PERFORMED TO COHFZRX THE ADEQUACY OF THS LZHER ZM THE AS FOUHD COMDZTZOM>>
o REPAIR DEORADED COATZMOS UHDER THE MATERXEL UPORADE PROORAX o
REPAIR CORRODED LIHER AHD PEMETRATIOM CAHISTERS DURIMO THS 1993 REFUEZsIMO OUTAOS
g/N/tFAC. /H~D IA'/7/AL CO4CVJCW wr~ ccavcvrzcw (wg mme I
>Ww (
rm~ +
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I
)
I, ~rv~ roe WAS'hhfACY4f4 4
a MEASURE AHD MAP THE LIMER BULQES ZM DETAIL TO DETERHZME XP THE COSDXTIOM ZS CHAMQZMQ AMD TO ALLO%
FURTHER STUDY RESULTS AHD EVALUATXON (CQHTISUED)
Do OTHER STRUCTURES RESULTS<
'EMERAL ZMSPECTXON OT OTHER STRUCTUREB NAB CONDUCTED AHD MO SZQHZTZCAHT DEmADATZOM %AS PQUMD
%NO I/16 ISCH CRACKS ORIQXSATXSQ AT THE LOSER CQRHERS OT A DUCT PEHETRATZOS THROUQH THE iB STEAM QEHERATOR CUBICLE %AZsL VERS POUHDo
%%LUATZONc THE CRACKS %ZRS HQT CONSIDERED BIQSIl'ZCAHT BASED QS THEIR SXSEg ASD THE PACT THAT SO ADDITZOHAL SZQHB OT DZSTRESS
%ERE PQUHDe A REVZZN QT THE DESZQH DRANZNQS ISDZCATED THAT SO SZQHXPXCAST LOADS ARE PRESEHT XM THE AREAR'HD ZT~ CQMCIUDED THAT~
RESULTED DUE TO SHRZHXAQE AHD ASSOCIATED STRESS CONCEHTRATIOMB AT THE WALL DISCQHTXMUZTYo o
REPAIR THE CSLRCXS MND COAT
%Ref DURZMO THE SEXT RETUELZM4 OUTAQE ZN 1903 CONCLUSIONS Ao PROCEED
%XTH ILRT BASED ON FAVORABLE RESULTS POUHD DURIN4 TH3 INSPECTION A TIMELY SCHEDULE C~
SO ADVmSE EFFECTS POUHD DUE TO THE ILRT
ÃPLURE PINESS As Bo UMZT 3
ZLRT ZMPECTIOMS SCHEDULED FOR L992 REFOELZHO OUTAOE %ILL BE PERFORMED IS 1 SZMILAR MANER AND NZLL BE DOCUMENTED %ZTEIM 1 REPORT USE BASELZSI5 ZSPORHATZON 'ECORDED FOR THE UNIT 4 ZLRT PRESZSmr Y SCEEDULZD VOR TEE X9OS REPUZLIza OUTAOEo UPDATE REPORT. AS NECESSARY>>
PPORT AN HORAGE
~ DESIGN CRITERIA 5 PRACTICE
~ 79-02 RESOLUTION
~ OTHER PAST PROBLEM AREAS
SUPPORT ANCH RAGES ONTINUED
~ DESIGN CRITERIA 5. PRACTICE
- APPROVED ANCHORS FOR DESIGN ARE HILTIKBII 8c DRILLCO MAXIBOLT
- ANCHORS HAVE SITE SPEClFIC TESTING FOR DEVELOPMENT OF CAPACITIES AND INSTALLATIONTORQUE VALUES
- S.F. OF 4 IS USED FOR DESIGN, S.F. OF 2 IS USED FOR FUNCTIONALITYREVIEWS
- S.F. Of 3 IS ALLOWEDTO LIMITEDEXTENT FOR EVALUATION OF INSTALLEDRACEWAYSUPPORTS
- STRAIGHT LINE SHEAR-TENSION INTERACTIONFORMULA NORMALLYUSED FOR DESIGN, SQUARED INTERACTIONUSED FOR FUNCTIONALITYREVIEWS
- PRYING ACTIONIS ACCOUNTED FOR BY EITHER CONSIDERING BASEPLATE FLEXIBILITYIN THE CALCULATIONOR BY ASSUMING A RIGID BASEPLATEAND APPLYINGA S.F. OF 1.5
- FPL SPEC COVERS INSTALLATIONAND INSPECTION GUIDELINES FOR EXPANSION ANCHORS
- DESIGN INFORMATIONINCORPORATES LESSONS LEARNED FROM PAST PART 21 NOTIFICATIONSISSUED BY HILTI, INCLUDINGEDGE DISTANCE ISSUE OF 1988
- EXPANSION ANCHORS NOT ALLOWEDFOR ANCHORAGE OF VIBRATING/ROTATINGEQUIPMENT OR ATTACHMENTSTO MASONRY WALLS
- DESIGN OF OTHER ANCHORS FOLLOW ACI-349 CRITERIA
SVPP RT AN HORAGE C
NT)N ED
~ 79-02 RESOLUTION EFFORT
- 1PP% INSPECTION PERFORMED FOR ANCHORS ASSOCIATED WITH SYSTEMS IN 79-02 SCOPE' MOST DEFICIENCIES FOUND IN SHELL-TYPE ANCHORS
- DEFICIENT ANCHORS REPLACED WITH WEDGE-TYPE ANCHORS WHICH WERE SITE SPECIFIC TESTED
- S.f. OF 5 WAS USED FOR SHELL TYPE ANCHORS, OTHER CRITERIA IN ACCORDANCE WITH THAT DISCUSSED ABOVE
- AFTER SEVERAL INSPECTIONS, FINAL79-02 REPORT WAS ISSUED ON OCTOBER 22, 1987
~ OTHER PAST PROBLEM AREAS
- IEN 80-21 IS BEING ADDRESSED UNDER THE A-46 PROGRAM
- JAN,91 HILTI PART 21 ON CAPACITIES FOR 1" AND 3/4" ANCHORS
'OT A PROBLEM AT PTN DUE TO SITE SPECiFIC TESTS NEW TESTS AND SPEC REVISION REQUIRED DUE TO MODIFICATIONOF AFFECTED ANCHOR SIZES BY HILTI
-'lE NOTICE 86-94, HILTI PART 21 ON 1/2" ANCHOR CAPACITIES
'APACITIES REDUCED BY MAX.OF 11%
'PL REVIEWED 50% OF 79-02 SUPPORTS, AND STANDARD DETAILS FOR SMALLBORE PIPING AND RACEWAYSUPPORTS ALLSUPPORTS REVIEWED FOUND TO BE ACCEPTABLE REVISED DOCUMENTS AFFECTED BYNEW ALLOWABLES
3.
SUPPORT ANCHORA E
NTIN ED
- REDUCED CAPACITIES FOR WEJ-IT ANCHORS
~ FOLLOW UP ON PROBLEM IDENTIFIEDAT CRYSTAL RIVER
. FOUND TO ALSO BE APPLICABLEAT PTN
'EDUCTIONS IN ANCHOR CAPACITIES OF 50-60%
NO FUNCTIONALITYPROBLEMS FOUND (S.F. 0 2.0)
SEVERALSUPPORTS REQUIRED MODIFICATIONTOMEET FSAR REQUIREMENTS
4.0 PENT FUEL P OL AND RACK
~ ANALYSISOF POOL STRUCTURES
~ CONDITION OF POOL
~ LINER PLATES
~ HEAVY I OADS HANDLING
4 SPENT FUEL POOL AND RA K
NTINUED
~ NEW HIGH DENSITY STORAGE RACKS INSTALLEDIN BOTH UNITS
~ ANALYSIS OF POOL STRUCTURES
- ANSYS FINITE ELEMENT 3-D MODEL
- SOIL REPRESENTED BY SYSTEM OF SPRING ELEMENTS
- LINER NOT INCLUDED AS STRUCTURAL ELEMENT
- LOADS 5, LOAD COMBINATIONSPER FSAR
- ANALYSISINCLUDED BOILING CONDITION (212 ),
CONSERVATIVELYIGNORED COOLING SYSTEM
- ALL'CONCRETE STRESSES WITHINALLOWABLES
- MINOR LOCALIZEDREBAR OVERSTRESS IN 212~ THERMAL+
SEISMIC LOAD CASE AT THE BOTTOM CENTER AREA OF FOUNDATION MAT-CREATES NO LOSS OF FUNCTION
- ANALYSISREVIEWED IN DETAILAND APPROVED BY NRR DURING RERACK LICENSING - SER WAS ISSUED
~ CONDITION OF POOL STRUCTURE
- STRUCTURE IN GOOD CONDITION OVERALL
- CRACKING IDENTIFIEDAT JOINTS BETWEEN MAINPOOL STRUCTURE AND ADJACENT NEW FUEL STORAGE AREA-CONDITION REPAIRED IN 1986 (PC/M'5-71 8c 72)
4 PENT F POOL AND RA K
NTlN D
~ LINER PLATES
- LlNER IN MAlNPOOL AREA REPLACED lN LATE 70'S TO 1/4" PLATE
- LINER WAS ANALYZEDAS PART OF RERACK EFFORT AND FOUND TO REMAIN FUNCTIONAL
- NO LEAKAGEHAS BEEN IDENTlFIEDIN MAINPOOL AREA
- TRANSFER CANALLINER
'OT REPLACED ALONG WITH MAINAREA LINER
'EAKAGEHAS BEEN DETECTED IN UNIT3-WELLWITHIN MAKE-UPCAPABIL'ITY
'ITUATIONHAS BEEN REVIEWED AND REPAIRS IMPLEMENTED NO STRUCTURAL DEGRADATIONOf CONCRETE OR REBAR IS EVIDENT-CONSERVATIVE ESTIMATES OF POTENTIALDEGRADATIONARE ENVELOPED BY DESIGN MARGIN IN THE STRUCTURE (NCR N-91-0330)
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- HIGH DENSITY RACKS INSTALLEDWITH CAPACITY OF APPROXIMATELY1400 STORAGE LOCATIONS t
- RACKS DESIGN AND BUILTBY WESTINGHOUSE IN ACCORDANCE WITH FSAR REQUIREMENTS AND APPLICABLE NRC SRP AND OT POSITION PAPER
- RACKS ARE FREE STANDING AND MEET ALLREQUIREMENTS DOCUMENTED IN SER ISSUED BY NRC IN 1984'
REGlON I FUEL, STORAGE RACK MOOULE
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4.0 PENT FU f POOL AND RA KS CONTINUED
~ HEAVYLOADS HANDLING
- LIMITSWITCHES ON CASK CRANE PREVENT MOVEMENTOF BEYOND CASK LAYDOWNAREA AND ALSO RESTRICT VERTICALLIFT
- TECHNICALSPECIFICATIONS AND PLANTPROCEDURES LIMIT ANYLOADS THATCAN BE TRANSPORTED OVER SPENT FUEL TO 2000lbs
- NEW SPENT-FUEL CRANE INSTALLEDIN 1990
. DESIGNED FOR 4000lb CAPACITY-LOAD LIMITSET TO 2075lbs TO PRECLUDE UPLIFT'FORCES ON THE RACKS
'. DUALCABLE DESIGN HOISTS EQUIPPED WITH EDERER X-SAM JR SYSTEM FOR PROTECTION AGAINSTLOSS OF LOAD, LOAD SWAY, TWO-BLOCKINGAND LOAD HANG-UP PROVIDES BETTER LOADCONTROL FOR THE OPERATOR CRANE PROVIDES BOTH ELECTRONIC AND VISUAL STORAGE LOCATION INDEXING
- PLANT PROCEDURES REQUIRE EVALUATIONSFOR ANY HEAVYLOAD LIFTS IN THE VICINITYOF SPENT FUEL-EVALUATIONSHAVE BEEN PREPARED FOR CASES SUCH AS REPAIRS TO THE POOL KEYWAYGATE
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U ts 3 an t ke st ct e
Orientation:
The geometry and primary components of the PTN Units 3 and 4 Intake Structure Overviews Documented history of the structure Zn depth revt.ev of "Selected Topics~'.
1.
Circulating Water (CW)
Pump Thrust Beams 2.
Law Engineering and Testing Corporation Report 3.
Modifications to Intake Cooling Water (ICW) Support Beams Standard Repair External Reinforcement "Beam" Fix 4.
Mitigation Modifications 5.
Assessment and Planning Activities Independent Review by APTECH Engineering Structural Assessment by FPL Selection of a "Long Term" Repair Approach Development of a
Long Term Action Plan, Specification CN 2.28 Proposed Implementation Schedule 8ummary:
Documentation Available FPL
plan v9.ew!
Location of major ecpxipment:
- 1. Traveling Screens 2.
ZCW Pumps
- 3. Screenwash Pumps
- 4. Circulating Water Pumps Bay designations:
ZCW and CW Location of major structural components:
- 1. bay walls 2.
ZCW suyport beams
- 3. traveling screen suyport beams Profile Vins'!
Location of major.structural components:
1.
ZCW support beams
- 2. traveling screen support beams 3.
CW thrust beams
- 4. strut beams
- 5. turning vein structure Reference water levels:
1.
normal operating / mean sea level 2.
level to which bays were dewatered to perform the Law Engineering testing and sampling.
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APPROX. 52 FT.
EL - 2b'<<F
H S OR Zn-service Dates Unit 3:
1972 Unit 4:
1973 1985 /
1986'WP thrust beams found to be seriously degraded. All beams were replaced.
Strut beams in the wet/dry zone (El 1' 9") were found to be degraded.
Strut beams were repaired.
Walkway support beams (El 1' 6")
were found to be degraded and were replaced.
1987 (Unit 3 g Cycle 11)
~
In-depth testing by Law Engineering of pump support beams and bay walls.
Inspection and repair of deteriorated structural components to include; 1) removal of unsound
- concrete,
.removal of corrosion from rebar, scotchcoating of rebar, and replacement of concrete, and 2) replacement of IC pump anchor bolts.
Recommendation to perform a visual condition survey of the intake structure, structural elements every 12 to 18 months.
1988 (Unit 4, Cycle 12):
Inspection and repair of deteriorated structural components to include; 1) removal of unsound
- concrete, removal of corrosion from rebar, scotchcoating of rebar, and replacement of concrete, and 2) replacement of ICW pump anchor bolts.
. External "Beam Fix" to the 4B ICW Pump support beam.
Half-cell potential testing of the operating deck by FPL personnelo
1989 (Unit 3 Short Notice Outage)'etailed inspection of all Unit 3 bays.
Total chloride content determination for selected sites on the operating deck.
1990 (Unit 3, Cycle 12):
In-depth testing and evaluation to include;
- 1) concrete sampling of the selected ICW support beams to determine total chloride content,
- 2) half cell potential testing by FPL personnel, 3) independent review by Aptech Engineering, and 4) formal structural assessment by FPL.
Formal inspection, documentation and assessment of all Unit.3 bays.
General inspection of bay walls above waterline.
Development and issuance of FPL Specification CN 2.28 detailing inspection requirements and a
six year implementation plan for installation of permanent modifications.
1991 (Unit 3 EN - Unit'4g EN/Cycle 13):
Detailed and confirmatory inspections of all bays with repairs as required.
Installation of permanent "external beam" modification to the 3C ZCW pump support
.beam.
Completed as a proactive, plant management initiative.
Installation of "mitigative" modifications consisting of; 1.
grout reprofiling of the operating deck, 2.
grout sealing of all recesses in the operating deck, 3.
modification to the CW pump drain lines, 4.
sealing of concrete surfaces (deck and selected ICW pump support beam surfaces),
and 5.
installation of drip flashing on the lower east face of the ZCW pump support beam.
Identification of stress induced cracking and delamination of the CW pump thrust beams.
General inspection of bay walls above water line.
Preparation and issuance of PCM 91-198 for repairs and modifications (3B ICW external beam modification) during the Unit 3, Cycle 13 outage.
Inspection and implementation of permanent modifications.
circulating Rater Pump Thrust Beams Found to be seriously degraded in 1985. Concrete cover was essentially nonexistent due to corrosion induced spalling.
To resolve the deficiency; 1.
all concrete was removed 2.
all rebar was removed and Gr.
60 epoxy coated rebar was installed 3.
concrete was repoured to the original dimensions 4.
beams were coated with coal tar epoxy to inhibit chlorides from intruding into the concrete.
Stress cracks and an areas of delamination were documented in inspections conducted in 1990.
No rust bleeding or evidence of corrosion were noted.
Based on the function of the pump and the support beam (Not Nuclear Safety Related) the condition was determined not to be a
potential operability concern and is being prioritized for repair.
The root cause of the initial failure appears to be that
'stress cracks formed as a result of a
downward Load created during pump start-up which tends to
- impose, rotation on the beam via the through-bolts attaching th pump to the beam.
The cracks provided a direct path for the intrusion of moisture, rich in chlorides, which resulted in rapid degradation due to corrosion.
Although the current condition is similar, the rate of corrosion of the rebar is far less due to the epoxy coating on the rebar.
No evidence of corrosion induced degradation was noted.
- '(gjjjgjggg+~wyC~g~uiiif+".W~~~i!m+3 A method of repair has been determined which will eliminate the mechanism for stress cracking. Xnstallation of this repair with repair of the cracked and delaminated sections will be specified and installed in accordance with applicable
,.: outage schedules.
Schematic Representation CW Pump Thrust Beam
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raw Engineering Report (March 9, 1987)
Scope of Nozk:
1.
Visual condition survey.
2.
Depth of cover confirmation by drilled probe measurements.
3.
Sampling for chloride concentration and pH determination.
4.
Copper/copper sulfate half cell potential survey.
Sampling area consisted of beams, struts, and walls above normal waterline (exposed surfaces) as well as walls and struts which are submerged under normal operating conditions.
Results:
1.
Visual condition survey identified only two areas where there was evidence of corrosion induced cracking or.spalling:
Struts at El 1'-9" showed some minor rust staining with no evidence of cracking or spalling.
Underside of operating deck beams showed evidence of significant rust staining and crack developmen due to rebar corrosion.
2.
Depth of cover averaged 3" on beams and struts and 6" on bay walls which was in agreement with design drawings.
3.
Overall conclusion:
active corrosion activity can be expected in exposed portions of the structure where 3" of cover is present.
active corrosion was not expected in areas where 6" of cover is present but is postulated to be in the early stages of development in atmospherically exposed areas.
in the areas of the bay walls which are normally submerged but exposed by dewatering for sampling and testing:
there is a distinct change in chloride levels between the normally exposed and normally submerged areas (ie. chloride levels are much greater in the normally exposed areas).
~IBeam bL'odification' (1988)
Background:
In response to the observations and testing conducted during previous
- outages, inspections and repairs were planned to be performed on the Unit 4 ICW support beams during the Unit 4, Cycle 12 Refueling Outage.
Based on observed conditions, 3 out of four bays were repaired utilizing standard repair procedures and one bay (4B ICH) received a newly designed external reinforcement system.
Stand424 Rlpsir Standard repairs are utilized when the observed condition, subject to detailed analysis, is determined to be within the existing design criteria.
These repairs consist of:
removal of unsound concrete.
cleaning of corrosion from exposed rebar surfaces.
documentation of as>>found reinforcement geometry.
coating the exposed rebar with a rust inhibiting coating (Scotchcoat).
repouring the concrete to original geometry.
Extenul Reinforcement - "Beaa PM'his method of'epair was first established as a specific modification for deficiencies identified in the 4B ICW support beam (general corrosion of reinforcement, significant cracks forming within the pump barrel, loss of reinforcement due to misplaced conduit). It would later be established as the design standard for permanent modification to all bays to ensure that the design basis of the structure is maintained beyond the expected end of plant life. This repair consists of:
removal of'nsound concrete.
cleaning of corrosion from exposed rebar surfaces.
documentation of as-found reinforcement geometry.
coating the exposed rebar with a rust inhibiting coating (Scotchcoat) grouting "shear lugs into the bay walls.
attaching epoxy coated structural plate to the bottom face of the beam surfaces via. expansion and welded headed anchors.
repouring the concrete to original configuration.
welding of a structural "T-beam" to the cover plates and the grouted-in shear lugs.
coating of all exposed surfaces with Coal Tar Epoxy.
Schematic Representation "Beam Eix" - External Reinforcement 0
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Section A - A
Mitigation Modifications In order to provide adequate assurance that permanent, repairs can be effected on the ICW pump support beams within scheduled outage windows over a six year period, specific modifications were required to "mitigate" the effects of on-going corrosion activity.
These modifications consist of:
reprofiling the deck surface to promote drainage and prevent standing water which promotes the migration of chloride ions.
sealing of conduit access recesses in the deck surface to prevent the collection of water which in-turn promotes the migration of chloride ions and saturates the concrete elements.
addition of a "drip" flashing to the lower east face of the beams to prevent water from adhering to this beam surface.
extension of'W pump drain lines beyond the lower east face of the beam to prevent the constant wet/dry cycles previously imposed on the beam.
application of a clear sealer to the top and east face of the of the beam to inhibit the further migration of chloride ions.
Assessment and Planning Activities
Background:
prom 1985 to 1990, a considerable number of inspections,
- repairs, and testing procedures. were employed to assess and demonstrate the acceptability of the structure.
Xn
- ,~ p'ail,lPdK'(i...i!!J',,I'p,I, h -:,,Ni ~ ~4h -.i'-:,'V':"tl"i CC~+~ijoNCraaCe4"'.4<5ac&E?tjjkaeerQijj'dditionally, FPL with the A/E of record (Bechtel) and the independent review of Aptech, established the basis. for the long term treatment of the structure.
To consolidate the data and establish a firm operating basis,'
formal "Structural Assessment" was prepared by FPL. Following the assessment, a long term plan for the inspection and repair of the structure was issued.
Independent Review:
Scope of Work:
1.
Visual condition survey.
2.
Review of previous inspections and test data.
3.
Analysis of data to estimate the remaining life of the structure.
4.
Provide recommendations on how to improve the existing condition and ensure that the structure remains within it's design criteria beyond the expected end of plant life.
Results 1.
The current condition, with the repairs completed to date, is not likely to become an immediate concern.
2.
Scheduling of permanent repairs should be able to be accomplished within projected outage schedules, over a six (6) year period, assuming specific mitigative actions are implemented and regular inspections, are made to confirm the structural condition.
Structural Assessment:
In August 1990, a structural assessment was prepared by the FPL Site Civil Engineering Discipline. This document consolidated the results of inspections,
- testing, independent assessments, and design basis calculations.
In reviewing the available data, the following conclusions were reached:
1.
The current condition of the intake structure was not, expected to degrade rapidly and continued to meet all design basis requirements.
2.
Mitigating measures are required to be implemented to allow time to install permanent modifications within pro)ected outage schedules.
3.
Inspections are required during each outage to ensure that installed repairs continue to perform as designed and to monitor the progress of remaining degraded components.
10
Long Term Repairs:
Several approaches to the long term repair of the intake structure were considered.
Since the most critical
- members, the beams supporting the Saf ety Related ICN
- pumps, were also the members in the most critical need of repair, efforts were concentrated on permanent fixes to these beams.
The approaches considered were:
continue to repair as corrosion becomes visible This repair, adequate in the short
- term, arrests the degradation in an intermediate state.
Implementation of this repair would continue through the life of the structure or until such time as the limiting quantity of reinforcement remains.
Remove all concrete past the rebar, replace rebar and concrete This method restores the original design margin of the structural members by; 1) replacing the existing chloride ion laden concrete with.new concrete, and
- 2) replacing the existing degraded rebar with corrosion resistant materxal.
Installation of "external" reinforcement systems t
replace degraded reinforcement This method of repair, already employed in the 4B ICW bay, restores the original design margins and can be implemented one bay at a time within the plant outage duration criteria. This repair was evaluated and selected as the preferred method of permanent repair.
11
Establishing a Plan of Action:
With evaluations complete and the method of permanent repair selected, a plan for the remaining scope of work was developed.
FPL Specification CN 2.28 was prepared and issued as a scheduling and planning guideline to complete the balance of inspection and repair activities. All permanent modifications are specified and implemented under separate Plant Change/Modif ication (PC/M) documents.
This specification delineates:
Installation of mitigative repairs.
Uniform techniques for the formal documentation and reporting of crack geometry and propagation in structural elements.
Guidelines for the conduct of inspections.
Recommended implementation schedule for completion of permanent repairs over a six (6) year implementation period.
12
Xmplementation Schedule:
See:
Specification Cn 2 28, Attachment 2
Summary:
1.
Timeline summary 2.
Graphic representation showing the location and method of repair for identified deficiencies 3.
All evaluations and test reports 4.
Volumes of photographs taken to document the condition of the structure during inspection and repair periods.
~,
13
SPECIF iCATION Nuclear Etlglneerlhg intake Structure, lnapectfon and Repair Spec No. CN-2.28 Revlalon 1 Data Page 1 ot1 Recommended Implementation Schedule ModNcatlons and inspections cÃ%:48M>..u HA&A
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6.0 MASONRY WALLS
~ INITIALRESOLUTION OF IEB 80-11
~ RESOLUTION OF LER 250-83-06
~ POST IEB 80-11 ACTIVITY
6.
MASONRY WALLS CONTINUED
~ lNITIALRESOLUTION OF IEB 80-11
- 97 WALLS IDENTIFIEDAS EITHER SUPPORTING SAFETY RELATED COMPONENTS OR OF II/I CONCERN
- WALLS WERE WALKEDDOWN TO VERIFY CONFiGURATION AND IDENTIFYALLATTACHMENTSAND PENETRATIONS
- ALLWAILS WERE ANALYZEDFOR APPROPRIATE LOADS AND LOAD COMBINAT)ONSBASED ON CONFIGURATION SHOWN ON RECORD DRAWINGS
- REPORT WAS SUBMITTEDTO NRC IN APRIL, 1981
- RESPONSE TO FOLLOW-UP QUESTIONS WAS SUBMITTED IN MA'Y, 1982
~ 6.
MA NRY WALLS NTIN D
+ RESOLUTION OF LER 250-83-06
- DURING MASONRY WALLMODIFICATIONSIN APRIL, 1983, MASONRYWALLS IN CONTROL ROOM FOUND TO DEV'IATE FROM DRAWING DETAILS USED TO RESOLVE IEB 80-11
( MISSING GROUT AND REBAR IN CELLS )
- INSPECTIONS WERE INITIATEDTO ASSESS EXTENT OF PROBLEM - DISCREPANCIES WERE FOUND TO AFFECT ALL AREAS OF THE PLANT AND THE NEED FOR RE-ANALYSIS WAS IDENTIFIED
- ALLWALLS WERE RE-ANALYZEDUSING NRC APPROVED ELASTIC METHODS WITH THE EXCEPTION OF STEAM GENERATOR FEEDPUMP ROOM WAILS WHICH WERE ANALYZEDUSING ARCHING ACTION METHODOLOGYFOR INTERNALPRESSURE, ONE-DIRECTIONALLOADS ONLY
- UNINSPECTED ALLOWABLESWERE USED FOR THE RE-ANALYSISAND SAMPLES OF THE IN-PLACE MATERIALS WERE TESTED TO VERIFY THATTHEY MET DESIGN SPECIFICATION REQUIREMENTS
- CRACKS IDENTIFIEDDURING THE WALKDOWNSWERE EVALUATEDAND REPAIRED - NO NEW CRACKS HAVE BEEN IDENTIFIEDIN SUBSEQUENT INFORMALWALKDOWNS
- INTERFACES WITH MAINSTRUCTURE WERE CONSIDERED IN Tfg EVALUATIONEFFORT
- APPROXIMATELY34 WALLSWERE MODIFIEDAND 25 WALLS WERE REMOVED
6,0 MA ONRY WALL ONTIN ED
- MODIFICATIONSCONSISTED OF THE FOLLOWINQ; ADDITIONOF WALLBRACING ADDITIONOF TOP SUPPORT
'ILLINGOF EMPTY CELLS WITH GROUT
'DDITIONOF GROUT AND REBAR
- A THREE DAYAUDITOF THE MASONRY WALLRE-ANALYSIS EFFORT WAS CONDUCTED BY THE NRC AND ITS CONSULTANTS IN AUGUST, 'I 983 - AUDITINCLUDEDA SITE VISIT
- CLOSURE OF THE IEB-80-11 EFFORT FOR PTN IS DOCUMENTED IN NRC INSPECTION REPORT NO. 88-17
- 6.0 MASONRY WALL ONTINUED
~ POST IEB 80-11 ACTIVITY
- MODIFICATIONSTO MASONRY WALLS ARE STRICTLY CONTROLLED BY PLANT CHANGE PROCEDURES AND SPECIFICATIONS - MODIFICATIONSARE AVOIDED WHENEVER FEASIBLE
- DRAWINGS HAVE BEEN DEVELOPED TO IDENTIFYTHE LOCATIONAND SAFETY CLASSIFICATION OF ALL MASONRYWALLS IN THE POWER BLOCK
- WHEN THE ADDITIONOF LOADS TO EXISTING WALLS IS NECESSARY, CALCULATIONSARE REVISED TO TRACK THE NEW LOADS AND ENSURE THATTHE WALL REMAINS STRUCTURALLYADEQUATE
- ONLY THROUGH BOLTING IS ALLOWEDFOR ATTACHMENTS TO MASONRY WALLS - ANCHORS ARE TRACKED IN CALCULATIONS
- MODIFICATIONS/EVALUATIONS EXISTINGWALLSFOR DC ENCLOSURE ROOII/I.QUALIFIED TO IEB 80-11 REQUIREMENTS "
'EW MASONRYWALLSADDED IN AUXILIARYBUILDING AS PART OF UNIT4 EDG ADDITION
'IMITEDNUMBEROF MINORLOADSADDEDTO SOME OF THE EXISTING WALLS
~ NRC fE NOTICE 87-67 WAS ISSUED IN DECEMBER, 1987 TO ADDRESS FOLLOW-UP PROBI.EMS AT SOME UTILITIES-FPL HAS A PROGRAM ANDPROCEDURAL CONTROLS IN PLACE TO PREVENT RECURRENCE OF THE PROBLEMS WHICH LED TO IEB 80-11
7.0 STRUCTURAL BOUNDARIES
~ BACKGROUND
~ DESIGN FEATURES
7.
TR TVRALBOUNDARIES CONTINUED BACKGRO ND
~ LONG TERNI AND SEISMIC DISPLACEMENTS EXPECTED TO BE RELATIVELYINSIGNIFICANT
- COMPETENT ROCK FOUNDATION (WITH LIMITEDROCK FILL)
DIFFERENTIALSETTLEMENT EXPECTED TO BE INSIGNIFICANT{EXPECTED TO BE ELASTIC, DUE TO INITIALLOADINGj NO DIFFERENTIALSEMLEMENT IS EVIDENT IN ANY STRUCTURES, BASED ON INFORMALOBSERVATIONS POTENTIALFOR SEISMIC DEFLECTIOMS ARE REDUCED
- LOW SEISMICITY NO KNOWN FAULTS - FAR FIELD EARTHQUAKES ONLY, WITH NO SEVERE DISPLACEMENTS
'ECENT SEISMOLOGY. EVALUATIONSCONFIRM LOW SEISMIC HAZARD FOR SITE AREA
- MAXIMUMHEIGHT FOR SPACIAL INTERACTIONS IS LESS THAN 40ft ABOVE GRADE
- STRUCTURES IN CLOSE PROXIMITYTO EACH OTHER HAVE RELATIVELYHIGH NATURALFREQUE NCIES
- RELATIVESEISMIC DEFLECTIONS BETWEEN ADJACENT STRUCTURES ARE EXPECTED TO BE LESS THAN 1/4 INCH
'XISTING CALCULATIONSSHOW SEISMIC DISPLACEMENT BETWEEN CONTROL AND AUXILIARY BUILDINGTO BE SIGNIFICANTLYLESS
7.0 STRUCTURAL BOUNDARIE ONTIN ED DESI NF A R
NT F R DIFFERENTIA TT M
T
~ BUILDINGS IN CLOSE PROXIlVllTYTO EACH OTHER WERE PROVIDED WITH SUFFICIENT SEPARATION IN DESIGN
- MINIMUM1/2 INCH SEPARATION BETWEEN AUXILIARY AND CONTROL BUILDINGS,
- 3/4 INCHES BETWEEN AUXILIARYBUILDINGAND CONTAINMENT
- GAPS FILLED WITH COMPRESSIBLE MATERIAL
< WELL DESIGNED COMMODITIES (PIPING, RACEWAYS)
RUNNING BETWEEN BUILDINGS CAN ACCEPT SEISMIC DISPLACEMENTS OF THE MAGNITUDEEXPECTED AT PTN
~ CURRENT DESIGN PRACTICE ACCOMMODATESTHE POTENTIALFOR DIFFERENTIALMOYEMENTS BETWEEN STRUCTURES
8.0 GE LO Y FOUNDATION ONDITION
~ SUBSURFACE CONDITIONS
~ FOUNDATION CONDITIONS
~ EXPECTED SETTLEMENT
~ GROUNDWATER CONDITIONS
t 8.
EOLOGY FOUNDATIONCONDITI NS CONTINUED
~ SUBSURFACE CONDITIONS
- SITE LIES WITHINCOASTAL LOWLANDON SOUTH FLORIDA SHELF
- SITE ORIGINALLYCOVERED BY MANGROVESWAMP
- UNDERLYINGTHE ORGANICSOIL IS PLElSTOCE NE LIMESTONE TO A DEPTH OF APPROXIMATELY1,00 FEET
- THIS IN TURN IS UNDERLAINBY LIMESTONEOF MIOCENEAGE
~ FOUNDATION CONDITIONS
- ALLPLANT STRUCTURES BEAR ON THE LIIVIESTONE,WHICH IS LOCATED NEAR THE ORIGINALGROUND SURFACE, OR ON COMPACTED LIMEROCKFILLWHICH BEARS ON THE LIIVIESTONE
- THE ROCK IS COMPETENT WITH RESPECT TO THE FOUNDATION LOADING
-'OIVIESOFT ROCK AND POTHOLES FOUND DURING FOUNDATIONEXCAVATIONWERE REMOVEDAND REPLACED WITH COMPACTED FILL
-'AL'LIVIAJOR FOUNDATIONS ARE FOOTINGS AND MATS
- ALLOWABLEBEARING PRESSURES ARE:
LIMEROCKFILL- '10 KSF
. FOUNDATION ROCK-7.5 KSF
LOCKE fLglSTOCXgg F T
ARG TAMIAMIAl LEGEN0:
COltALLINC LIMESTONE SILTY Oft CLAYCY SANO SILTSTONC ON CLATSTO NtOILLACKOL4LIaCSTONC Hl
8.0 EOLO Y FQ NDATIONCONDITIONS CONTINUED
~ FOUNDATION SETTLEMENT
- MAJOR STRUCTURES ARE BEARING ON ROCK OR ON COMPACTED FILL, THEREFORE SETTLEMENT WAS NOT A CONCERN
- EXPECTED SETTLEMENT IS ELASTIC AND WILLOCCUR AS LOAD IS APPLIED
- NO LONG TERIVI SETTLEMENTWILLOCCUR
- SETTLEIVIENTESTIMATES WERE BASED ON ELASTICTHEORY-EXPECTED TOTALAND DIFFERENTIALSETTLEMENTS ARE LESS THAN 1/2 INCH
- SINCE COMPLETION OF CONSTRUCTION, NO VISIBLE SIGNS OF DISTRESS DUE TO SETTLEMENT HAVE BEEN IDENTIFIED
8.
E LO Y FOUNDATI N CONDITI N
NTIN ED
~ GROUND WATER CONDITIONS
- SHALLOW GROUND WATER CONDITIONS PREVAILAT THE SITE
- GROUND WATER LEVELS FLUCTUATEWITH THE LEVEL OF BISCAYNE BAY
- RECENT MEASUREMENTS SHOW GROUND WATER LEVELS TO BE ABOUT EL. 0 FEET
- THE GROUND WATER LEVEL HAS NO EFFECT ON THE STABILITYOF THE STRUCTURES
- NO SEEPAGE OF GROUND WATER HAS BEEN REPORTED OR IDENTIFIED IN ANY OF THE BELOW-GROUND STRUCTURES
- MAJOR FOUNDATION ELEVATIONS:
CONTAINMENTSTRUCTURE BUILDINGFLOOR EL. '14 FT REACTOR WELL (TOS)
EL. - 16.5 FT REACTOR WELI (BOS)
EL. -23.7 FT
'UXILIARYBUILDING MAINLEVEL (TOS)
EL. 18 FT LOWER LEVEL (TOS)
EL. 10 FT RHR EQUIPMENT ROOM EL. %.5 FT
'ONTROL BUILDING LOWER LEVEL (TOS)
EL. 18 FT
9.0 MAINTENAN E OF STR TURES
~ OVERVIEW
~ PROTECTIVE COATINGS ICW PIPING
9.0 MAINTENAN E F STR CTURE ONTINUED
~ IMPORTANTISSUE DUE TO SALT AIR ENVIRONMENT
~ VARIOUS NCR'S ISSUED AND RESOLVED IN THE AREA OF CORROSION (REVIEWED BY ENGINEERING AND REPAIRS IMPLEMENTEDAS APPROPRIATE)
~ SPECIFIC PROGRAMS AND/OR MODIFICATIONSHAVE BEEN IMPI EMENTED FOR AREAS OF SPECIAL CONCERN:
- INTAKESTRUCTURE
- ICW BURIED PIPING
- PROTECTIVE COATINGS
- TPCW HX PfDESTALS
- AUX. BUILDINGBASEMENTWALL
~ A TEAM HAS BEEN FORMED AT PTN TO DEVELOP A STRATEGIC PLAN FOR ADDRESSING PLANTMATERIALCONDITION-THIS TEAM WILLCONSIDER BOTH SHORT TERM AND LONG TERM REPAIRS AND INSPECT1ONS FOR CIVIL/STRUCTURALAREAS THATDO NOT CURRENTLY HAVEA SPECIFIC MAINTENANCEPROGRAM
~ 1 992 (CIVIL/STRUCTURALMAINTENANCEAND REPAIR PROJECT AUTHORIZEDAND UNDERWAY
9.
MAINTENAN E F
TR T
RE NTlN ED PR T
IV OAT)N
~ MATERIALCONDITION UPGRADE PRO'GRAM
-REPLACEMENT/REPAIRS OF COATING SYSTEMS TO IMPROVE CORROSION PROTECTION, DECONTAMINATIONAND PERSONNEL SAFETY
-PLANT !S SPLIT INTO PROJECT AREAS WITH TARGET COMPLETION DATES
-STRATEG!C PLANNINGTEAM PRIORITIES ARE FACTORED INTO SCHEDULES
- LEVEL 2 AND BOP AREAS COMPLETED IN 1991:
UNIT 3 RHR PUMP AND HX ROOM UNIT 3 SPENT FUEL PUMP AND HX ROOM
'OST ACCIDENT SAMPLING ROOM UNIT4 EDG BUILDING
- AREAS WITH COATING WORK IN PROGRESS:
'NIT3/4 INTAKE
. UNIT4 CHARGING PUMP ROOM
AINTENANCEOF TRUCTURES CONTINUED
- 1991 DUALUNITOUTAGE CONTAINMENTCOATING PROJECT TEAM FORMED CONSISTING OF FPL COATING SPECIALIST, SITE COATING SUPERVISOR, APPLICATION CONTRACTOR SUPERVISOR. AND INSPECTION CONTRACTOR SUPERVISOR TEAMACTIVELYPARTICIPATEDIN PLANNING,TRAINING AND DAILYSUPERVISION FPL COATING SPECIALIST SUPPLIED TECHNICAL SUPPORT, TRAINING,PLANNING, CONTRACTOR SUPERVISION AND FIELD AUDITS WORK FORCE CONSISTED OF,APPROXIMATELY150 PAINTERS AND INSPECTORS, PLUS ADDITIONAL
. SUPPORT
'PPROXIMATELY62,000 SQ FT REMOVED AND RECOATED
'PERATINGDfCK (EL. 58 FT) AREAPROJECT ELEMENTS:
LINERPLATE CCW LINES MANIPULATORCRANE EMERGENCY COOLERS EMERGENCY FILTERS CONCRETE SURFACES NORMALCOOLERS
'ONCRETE WALLSANDCEILINGS WERE COATED INSIDE THE SHIELD WALLS AT EL. 14 FT
- 1992 OUTAGE CONTAINMENTCOATING PLAN IS NOW BEING DEVELOPED
.0 IVIAINTENANCEOF STRUCTURES CONTINUED
~ PROTECTIVE COATINGS SPECIFICATIONS
- CONTAINIVIENT-LEVEL 1
. COATING SYSTEMS REDESIGNED TO IMPROVE CORROSION PROTECTION, DECONTAMINATION,EASE OF APPLICATIONAND IVIAINTENANCE,USING ADVANCED IVIATERIALSAND INDUSTRY STANDARDS
. COATING SYSTEMS WERE IRRADIATEDAND DBA TESTED TO DESIGN PRESSURE AND TEMPERATURE
( ANSi 6.9 8c 101.2
)
COATINGS WERE FIELD TESTED FOR EASE OF APPLICATION,TO REDUCE TIMEANDIMPROVEQUAUTY
'OTHER DESIGN FACTORS=WERE V.O.C'S, HARDNESS, RECOAT TIMES, AND CURE TIMES
. PAINTERS RECEIVED TRAININGON SITE PROCEDURES AND SPECIFICATION REQUIREMENTS PRIOR TO APPLYING COATINGS QC HOLDS ARE SPECIFIED FOR CRITICALACTIVITIES (SURFACE PREPARATION, AMBIENTCONDITIONS, MIXING,FILIVITHICKNESS, ETC.)
THE SPECIFICATION REQUIRES ENGINEERINGREVIEWOF ANY DEGRADED CONDITIONS FOUND {CONCRETE CRACKS, STEEL CORROSION) PRIOR TO PROCEEDING WITH COATING ACTIVITIES
. THE SPECIFICATION WAS RECENTLY REVISED TO INCORPORATE LESSONS LEARNED DURING THE DUAL UNIT OUTAGE EFFORT
9.
IVlAINTENACEOF TRU T RES CONTIN ED
- BALANCEOF PLANTAND LEVEL 2
. SPECIFICATION REVISED SIGNIFICANTLYTO ENHANCE THE REQUIREMENTS OF COATING SYSTEMS, SURFACE PREPARATION, APPLICATION,TRAININGAND PROTECTION OF PLANT EQUIPMENT AND PERSONNEL SPECIFICATION UPGRADES ARE IN ACCORDANCE WITH CURRENT INDUSTRY STANDARDS AND WILLREDUCE CORROSION, CONTAMINATIONAND LENGTHEN THE MAINTENANCEPAINTING CYCLE TURKEY POINT AND ST.,LUCIE (FPL'S OTHER NUCLEAR SITE) HAVE COMMON LEVEL 2 BALANCEOF PLANT COATING SPECIFICATIONS, INCORPORATING TECHNICAL REQUIREMENTS ANDLESSONS LEARNEDATBOTH SITES A COATING MAINTENANCEPROCEDURE IS UNDER DEVELOPMENTAT PTN TO MAINTAINTHE NEWLY INSTALLEDCOATING SYSTEMS
PTN 3&4 ICW PIPING SYSTEM STRUCTURAL CONDITION E I
~ CEMENT-MORTARLINED CAST IRON PIPE PIPE SIZES 30" & 36" WALLTHICKNESS
.79 & 1.0
~ BELL& SPIGOT TYPE JOINTS
~ INSTALLEDUNDERGROUND
~ SALT WATER SYSTEM WITH COOLING CANALS
PTN 3&4 ICW PIPING SYSTEM STRUCTURAL CONDITION RE P
TI
~ INTERNALPIPE CRAWL-THROUGH INSPECTIONS
~ LOCALIZEDFAILURE OF LINING
~ LOCALIZEDPITS AND CORROSION CELLS
~ REPAIRED INDICATEDAREAS WITH AN EPOXY COATING
~ EPOXY REPAIR HAS PROVEN SUCCESSFUL
PTN 38@
ICW PIPING SYSTEM STRUCTURAL CONDITION
~ OVERALLWALLTHICKNESS
~ CONDITION OF PIPE WALL
~ EXTERNAL CORROSION RATE
PTN 3&4 ICW PIPING SYSTEM STRUCTURAL CONDITION
~ DURING DUALUNIT OUTAGE
~ COMPREHENSIVE INTERNALINSPECTION
~ UT MEASUREMENT OF WALLTHICKNESS
~ REPAIRED LOCALIZEDLININGFAILURES
~ CLEANED AND COATED OF ALLINTERNAL PIPE JOINTS WITH EPOXY COATING
PTN 3&4 ICW PIPING SYSTEM STRUCTURAL CONDITION R
LT
~ CEMENT-MORTARLININGIS IN GOOD CONDITION
~ WALLTHICKNESS MEASUREMENT RESULTS 3lI II
~II RANGE
.74-.86
..92-1.08 AVERAGE
. 81 1.0 NOMINAL
.79-. 85 1.0-1.06 MINWALLREQ..268
.291
~ EXTERNALCORROSION RATE = 2 MILS/YEAR
~ RATE CONSISTENT WITH C.I. PIPE HANDBOOK
PTN 3&4 ICW PIPING SYSTEM STRUCTURAL CONDITION
~ EXTERNALCORROSION RATE IS LOW
~
STING ICW PIPING SHOULD LAST THE LIFE OF T PLANT WITH MARGIN
PTN 38c4 ICW PIPING SYSTEM STRUCTURAL CONDITION
~ CONTINUE TO MONITOR CONDITION OF LINING
~ CONTINUE TO REPAIR LOCALIZEDLININGFAILURES AND CORROSION CELLS
10.
SEISMIC INSTRUMENTATION
~ KINEMETRICSSTRONG MOTIONACCELEROGRAPH (1VIODELSIVIA-1)
INSTALLEDAT UNIT 3
~ ADDITIONALSEISMIC STATIONS ADDED BY FPL TO MONITOR STATE ACTIVITIES-SYSTEM MAINTAINEDBY UNIVERSITYOF FLORIDA
~ TWO ADDITIONALSTATIONS ARE IN THE FUNDING PROCESS.
THESE WILLBE ADDED IN GEORGIA TO CONNECT THE FLORIDA AND USGS SYSTEMS AND ALLOWSEISMIC ATTENUATION FACTORS TO BE DETERMINED
~ TO DATE THERE HAS NOT BEEN ANY RECORDED SEISMIC ACTIVITYBY THESE UNITS.
0
~ FLORIDA HAS HAD FIVE PREVIOUS SEISMIC EVENTS WITH THE STRONGEST ESTIMATEDAT 2.6 MM
~ THREE PROCEDURES ARE USED TO IVIAINTAINTHE SEISMIC INSTRUMENT INSTALLEDAT TURKEY POINT
- O-PMI-103.1, SEISMOGRAPH QTR. FUNCTIONALCHECK AND SEMI-ANNUALBATTERY REPLACEMENT
- O-PMI-103.2, SEISMOGRAPH ANNUALFILM REPLACEMENT PMI'I03.3, SEISMOGRAPH 18 MO. REPLACEMENT FOR CALIBRATIONRECERTIFICATION
SEISMIC INSTRUMENTATION 4m~+
ASS
(
-~ t 0
1 1
I
(,
P f
)
I AJ l
~
I j~e ceo a~ e~
w~ 'e~%~%
021M ONO 02102 eno~o --~---~-
(
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g O5400 N4 I
\\
CLAPS'aS~m Osmaua FPL DIGlTAL SEISMIC IHONITORING STATlONS MAINTAINEDBY U of F GEOLOGY DEPARTMENT
CIVIL/STRUCTURAL LERS SINCE 198 DESCRIPTION 80-021 Discharged battery in a seismograph 81-013 Void in concrete below Unit 3 cont. equipment hatch 82%10 PIpe support no longer contacting the ground due to cracking grout 82%11 Surveillance test, of seisrr;ograph not compfe<ed on schedule 83-006 Masonry walls not ln complIance with desi
{no Internal reinforoIng steel 88-026 Flood protection deficiencies for diesel oil transfer pumps and North/West/South sides of, auxiliary buildIngs Unit 4 81%14 Defective area in concrete containment 83-001 InstallatIon deficiencies of framing steel and supports inside containment 83-002 Fuel assembly drop Into spent fuel rack
NRC STRUCTURAL INSPECTIONS 1991 1990 1989 1988 1987 1986 19&5 1984 1983 1982 1981
%80 1979
AS C
NSPEC 0
SSUES ZNSPECTION AREA REPORT NO.
RESULTS (COPIES OF INSPECTION REPORTS ARE HADE AVAILABLEHERE) 1.
ERECTION OF STRUCTURAL STEEL k 91-10 NO DEVIATIONS CABLE TRAY SUPPORTS IN THE NEW DG BLDG 2.
ERECTIOH OF NEW SECURITY BARRIERS 3.
INTAKE STRUCTURE REPAIR 4.
DESIGN VALIDATION INSPECTION 5.
WELDING PROGRAN l PIPE SUPPORTS 6.
EVALUATION OF DESIGN CAPACITIES OF INSTALLED WEJ-IT ANCHORS 91-10 91-10 88-17 91-201 89-203 91-17 90-42 90-32 90-32 89-47 89-01 88-24 86-13 IFI 89-203-12 CCW HT.
DCHAN GER SUPPORT PEDESTAL STIFFNESS ASSUHPTIOH.
IFI 89-203-16 CCW SURGE TANK SUPPORT PLATFORN ANCHORAGES.
(Both of these deficiencies were corrected before the 1991 restart of the units)
NO 'DEVIATIONS IFI 89-29-02 OH WEJ-ITS WAS CLOSED..
IFI 89-29-02 REPLACED IFI 86-13-01.
ALL WEJ-ITS NET FUNCTIONALITY CRITERIA.
ITEN 86-13-01 RENAINED OPEN.
IF I 86-13-91 INITIATED.
PAST HRC IHSPEC ION SSUES INSPECTION AREA 7.
HEM EDG CONCRETE PLACEHENT REPORT NO ~
90-29 90-10 89-04 19 RESULTS HO DEVIATIONS 8.
SOIL li FOUNDATION PREPARATION FOR THE NEM EDG BLDG.
9.
CONTAINNENT TENDON SURVEILLANCE 10.
HASONRY MALL DESIGN I).
SPENT FUEL RERACK 12.
CABLE TRAY LOADIHGS 13.
PIPE SUPPORTS (IEB 79-02) 89-19 89-04 88-17 80-29 88-17 80-29 85-11 85-05 85-04 84-12 91-10 83-14 88-24 87-52
, 87-01 86 13'5 28
~
85-09
, 82-23 80-27
, 80-18+,
80-05
, 79-38 89-01 e 89-47 o
86-48)85-120 81-27, 80-09, 79-32, 91-17 HO DEVIATIONS a
NO DEVIATIONS r
IE BULLETIN 80-11 MAS CLOSED.
HO DEVIATIONS NO DEVIATIONS IFI 83-14-02, HOV 83-14-03 (NRC LETTER 10-24-83 ACKHOMLEDGED FPL CORRECTIVE ACTION).
IEB 79-02 MAS CLOSED.
- HOV 86-13-02 (HRC LETTER 6-30-86 ACKNOWLEDGED FPL CORRECTIVE ACTION).
+IR 80-18 IDENTIFIED A VIOLATION.
NRC LETR 9-29-80 ACKHOMLEDGED FPL CORRECTIVE ACTION.
)0 CFR 50.59 EVALUATIONS 1.
PROCEDURE: QUALITYINSTRUCTIONS NO. JPN-Ql 3.9 2.
JPN STANDARD AND TRAININGPROVIDED IN RESPONSE TO NSAC-125 AND INDUSTRY INITIATIVES 3.
ALL ENGINEERING OUTPUT PRODUCTS CONSIDER AND DOCUMENT APPLICABILITYOF 50.59 4.
REPORT ON CURRENT STATUS OF PC/M's IS AVAILABLEFOR PC/M SELECTION
10 CFR 50.59 EVALUATIONS EVALUATION NO.
SUBJECT 1.
PC/H 90-472-00 PC/H 90-471-00 CCN SURGE TANK RIGIDITY; UPGRADE, UNIT 4 N
UNIT 3 2.
PC/H 90-460-00 PC/H 89-549-01 REPAIR 5 HODIFICATION OF UNIT 4 INTAKE STRUCTURE REPAIR OF CONCRETE AT THE UNIT 3 INTAKE STRUCTURE 3.
PC/H 89-159-01 FLOOD PROTECTION OF EDG FUEL OIL TRANSFER PUHPS, UNITS 3 L 4 4.
PC/H 88-319-01 PC/H 87-405-02 HODIFICATIONS TO SUPPORT SPENT FUEL POOL RERACKING, UNITS 3C4 INSTALLATION OF HIGH DENSITY FUEL STORAGE RACKS, UNIT 4 5.
PC/H 88-170-01 PC/H 88-171-00 REPLACEHENT OF SPENT FUEL POOL CRANE, UNIT 3 UNIT 4 6.
PC/H 87-259-07 PC/H 87-212-05 7.
PC/H 86-099-01 EDG ENHANCEHENT -
EDG BUILDING ADDITION, UNITS 3 5 4 EDG ENHANCEHENT - SITE PREPARAT10N ADDITION OF SECURITY GRATING AT INTAKE STRUCTURE 8.
PC/H 85-147-02 PC/H 85-148-04 9.
PC/H 85-066-01 SPENT FUEL POOL COOLING SYSTEH - SEISHIC QUALIFICATION SPENT FUEL POOL COOLING SYSTEH - SEISHIC UPGRADE
- REHOVAL, REPLACEHENT a
HOD IF ICATION OF CONTROL ROON
- DOOR, UNITS 3 a 4
10 CFR 50.59 EVALUATIONS EVALUATION NO 10.
PC/H 84-004-02 PC.H 84-005-01 SUBJECT CABLE TRAY HODIFICATIONS UNIT 3.
UNIT 4.
11.
PC/H 83-050-04 HASONRY WALI. HODIFICATIONS; UNITS 3 I 4 12.
PC/H 82-219-00 13.
PC/H 77-54A-01 REACTOR CAVITY L TRANSFER CANAL LINER REPAIR, UNIT 4 C
CONTAINHEHT HODIFICATIOH FOR STEAH GENERATOR REPAIR, UNIT 3.
14.
PC/H 76-006 Cl{ANGE OF THE SPENT FUEL PIT ROOH DOOR FROH CONCRETE SLAB DOOR TO PUSH-BUTTON ELECTRICALLY OPERATED SLIDING DOOR, UNITS 3 L 4 15.
JPN-PTN-SEHJ-89-111, Rev.
1, 1/31/90 16.
JPN-PTN-SEC-90-018, Rev. 0, 1/25/90 17.
JPN-PTN-SECJ-89-072, Rev. I, 11/3/89 ICW PlPING INSPECTION, UNIT 3 REPLACEHENT OF INFLATABLE BOOT SEAL OF SPENT FUEL POOL KEYWAY GATE, UNIT 3 FIRST LOADING OF THE OVERHANG ROWS IN THE SPENT FUEL STORAGE RACKS, UHITS 3 l 4 NOTE:
During the past few years, FPL Nuclear Engineering Discipline has. been providing training on 10 CFR 50.59 evaluations to FPL and A/E engineers, based on the guidelines of NSAC-125 document prepared by Nuclear Hanagement and Resources Council (NUHARC) and Nuclear Safety Analysis Center (NSAC) as well as JPN-()I 3'.9, "IOCFR50.59 EVALUATIONS".
A separate presentation on the procedural aspects and training
- provided, can be arranged during this week, if desired.
14.
EVER N
Y PLAN FOR NATURALEMERGENCIE
~ EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTINGPROCEDURES
- EPIP 20101, DUTIES OF THE EMERGENCY COORDINATOR
- EPIP 20106, NATURALEMERGENCIES
- EPIP 20107, FIRE/EXPLOSION EMERGENCIES
~ DUTIES OF EMERGENCY COORDINATOR
- DECLARATION
- NOTIFICAT)ONS/COMMUNICATIONS
- ACTIVATION
~ PREPAR'ATION ACTIVITIESFOR NATURALEMERGENCIES
- PERFORM WALKDOWNS
- SUPPLY CHECKS
- SECURE DOORS AND ROOF HATCHES
- INSTALLATIONOF STOPLOGS
- CLOSE VENT OPENINGS
- STAGE SANDBAGS
- STAGE DEWATERING PUMPS
- OPERABILITYCHECKS (EDG'S, BATTERY CHARGERS)
~ IN THE EVENT OF FIRE OR EXPLOS!ON, EMERGENCY TEAM IS ACTIVATED-TEAIIWILLTAKE ACTION TO PROTECT PLANT PERSONNEL AND MINIMIZEDAMAGETO EQUIPMENT
r 0
>I
URKEY PO N P
%DO'ER EAMa~~ C4v~ /~
/ /~
2.
Page /
oi'LDG/AREA ELEV LOC o COMPONENT/ZTEM PIC COMMENTS QNI T' QGQSoA g~ E.~R g ~~~ ~ @IV ZO J} ~ ~R P
I~vC g )z VS~
7~~ W~PJ r~4 Q qs.v3
I S,
ATTACHl'1ENT 4 FPL NUCLEAR ENGINEERING DEPARTMENT 1 OC FR50.59 PROGRAM AND INITIATIVES PROCEDURES AND GUIDANCE o
Ql SUPPLEMENT 3.1-3 "ENGINEERING PACKAGE"
-PROVIDED STANDARD FORMAT AND CONTENT FOR DESIGN MODIFICATION. SECTION 3 IS THE 50.59 SAFETY EVALUATION, o
Ql 3.9 "10CFR50.59 EVALUATIONS"
-PROVIDES REQUIREMENTS FOR COMPLIANCE TO 50.59.
o OTHER ENGINEERING PROCEDURES WHICH REQUIRE THE ENGINEER TO CONSIDER 10CFR50.59
-Ql 3.10 "DRAWING CHANGE REQUESTS (DCR'S)"
-Ql 3.14 "MINOR ENGINEERING PACKAGES (MEP'S)"
-Ql 8.3 "ITEM EQUIVALENCYEVALUATIONS (IEE)"
o NED GUIDANCE FOR PERFORMING 10CFR50.59 SAFETY EVALUATIONS
-BASED ON NSAC 125
-PROVIDES. DETAILED GUIDANCE
=DEFINITIONS
= FORMAT
FPL ENGINEERING DEPARTMENT 1 OCF R50. 59 PROGRAM AND INITIATIVES REVIEW AND APPROVAL PROCESS o
FULL INTER-DISCIPLINE REVIEW REQUIRED FOR 50.59 SE'S o NUCLEAR DISCIPLINE REQUIRED TO REVIEW AND APPROVE ALL50.59 SE'S
-PROVIDES A)N PROCESS REVIEW WITH FOCUS ON THE SE NUCLEAR DISCIPLINE MAINTAINS50.59 PROGRAM
-NUCLEAR DISCIPLINE MAINTAINSTHE FSAR
-NUCI.EAR DISCIPLINE CONDUCTS 50.59 TRAINING o
FSAR AND DESIGN BASIS DOCUMENT CHANGE PACKAGES REQUIRED AS PART OF PLANT CHANGE PACKAGES o
PLANT SAFETY COMMITTEE APPROVES ALL 50.59 SE'S FOR PLANT CHANGES o
CORPORATE NUCLEAR REVIEW BOARD REVIEW'S 50.59 SE'S
FPL NUCLEAR ENGINEERING DEPARTMENT 1 OCF R50. 59 PROGRAM AND lNITIATIVES TRAINING o 50.59 INTRODUCTION ADDED TO NED QA ORIENTATION TRAINING o
EPRI/NUMARC 60.69 COMMITTEE. CHAIRMAN PROVIDED INITIAL NED TRAINING AFTER NSAC-125 ISSUED o
NED HAS DEVELOPED A "CORE" TRAINING COURSE
-PROVIDED SEMI-ANNUALLYFOR NEW EMPLOYEES
-COURSE MAINTAINEDAND INSTRUCTED BY FPL NUCLEAR DISCIPLINE STAFF
FPL NUCLEAR ENGINEERING DEPARTMENT 10CFRC 3.69 PROGRAM AND INITIATIVES 1992 INITIATIVES o
REVISE THE NED 60.69 GUIDANCE DOCUMENT TO INCORPORATE SCREENING GUIDANCESELF ASSESSMENT FEEDBACK o
STREAMLINE ENGINEERING PACKAGE TO IMPROVE SE METHODS WHILE ELIMINATINGREDUNDANT OR NEGATIVE DECLARATIONS IN THE TEXT SELF ASSESSMENT FEEDBACK o
UPGRADE TRAINING MANUAL
FPL NUCLEAR ENGINEERING DEPARTMENT 10CFR50.59 PROGRAMS AND INITIATIVES 50.59 PCM SE FORMAT
-DESCRIPTION AND PURPOSE
--ANALYSIS OF EFFECTS ON SAFETY
-FAILURE MODES AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS
-EFFECTS OF TECHNICALSPECIFICATIONS UNREVIEWED SAFETY QUESTION DETERMINATION
-PLANT RESTRICTIONS
-CONCLUSIONS
~)
ATTACHNENT 5 TURKEYPOINT LAND UTILIZATIONSITE
'ITE DESCRIPTION INCLUDES APPROXIMATELY25,000 ACRES CONTAINS A COOLING CANALSYSTEM FOR 2000 MWOF GENERATION CANALSYSTEM CONSISTS OF 168 MILES OF 200 FOOT WIDE CANALS INCLUDES A LARGE PUBLIC RECREATION AREA INCLUDES FACILITIESFOR BOY/GIRLSCOUT CAMPING INCUDES AN AIR FORCE SEA SURVIVALSCHOOL HAS FACILITIESFOR FUEL OIL DELIVERIES VIABARGES INCLUDES A FPL BOAT RAMP RESPONSIBLITIES OF LANDUTILIZATION.
MAINTENANCEANDOPERATION OF CANALSYSTEM A 5 YEAR DREDGING PROGRAM IS IN PROCESS
- AMPHIBIOUSBACKHOES ARE USED FOR CLEARING, STRAIGHTENINGAND CONSTRUCTION OF SPOIL DISPOSAL AREAS FOR DREDGES MAINTENANCEOF ENTRANCE AND RECREATION AREAS OPERATION OF METEOROLOGICALTOWERS MAINTAINROADWAYS MAINTAINANDOPERATE ALLEQUIPMENT TO SUPPORT THE ABOVEACTIVITIES UPHOLD REGULATORYCOMMITMENTS(ENVIRONMENTALLYFOCUSED)
OPERATE AND MAINTAINASYSTEM FOR PREVENTION OF SALTWATER INTRUSION MANPOWER/CAPITALCOMMITMENTS ANNUALOPERATING BUDGET 4 2.2 MILUON ANNUALCAPITALBUDGET 4300,000 FPL PERSONNEL ON SIQE: 2 CONTRACT PERSONNEL ON SITE: 29 SPECIAL CHARARCTERISTICS SITE CONTAINS SEVERAL ENDANGERED SPECIES SITE HAS BOTH FOSSIL AND NUCLEAR REQUIREMENTS CANALSYSTEM IS UNIQUE IN THE WORLD XERISCAPED ENTRANCE TO PLANT
BISCAYHC BAY i v Sv mr
~SOP
~r rapist I
48<
Barge Canal ~
NOT(5 TV.C<
r
.~ ~10 3C~< 80v~~
p w( eev5)
IGTCR
~R[5TRiCTEO AREAS VltTH>'4 KYQ,VStoh AREA A, 80'COIT CAMP.
8 QiRg ScouT cAMP C. REO BAtK NEA g ~(ORO;OQCk TOWER LOCATK)HS.
A. l0 METER TOWER.
8 g METER TOWER.
QTE
~
80VRONV
/
E'/]
II II I
SEE rC 5.T-)
/
2.A.
Land U.
Met. Tower 2.B South Dade Neteorol ical Tower NE 80<OAR~
FIGURE 5.$-1 SlTE NDI, MAP lVRKEY POINT UNITS ) 4 4
I I
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~tl~a~ITl I
h II u
0 0
1lNK~TPOlkT
~
Chicl ls jII4
'IOC I/
/
/
WO ~
//
/
/
//
/
//
/
RKTVRH
'//
"//
t//
//
//
/
//
/
/
/
I
//
I
//
//
I
//
I I
II I
I I
/
/
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~~shel% ~
ZlO&QsN+
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P Figure 1-3.
Turkey Point cooling canal system.
(flap courtesy of Ray L. Lyerly 5 Associates.)
1-10
t
C MEN 6
TURKEY POINT NUCLEAR PLANT SITE AUDIT DESCRIPTION OF CIVIL/STRUCTURAL OBSERVATIONS Outside Containment Water accumulation in the Unit 3 containment vertical tendons has been observed during tendon surveillance.
- However, no water accumulation has been observed in Unit 4 containment vertical tendons.
Expanded vertical tendon surveillance for the presence of water for Unit 3 would provide additional data to determine the extent of water accumulation.
2 ~
3 ~
4 ~
In the Unit 3 tendon 'gallery, some of the bearing plates show signs of corrosion; there are cracks and voids in the concrete adjacent to the bearing plates; and there is a gap between the tendon gallery wall and the ceiling which allows water infiltration.
Near the junction of the Unit 3 containment dome and the ring girder there is a discoloration which appears to be due to poor water drainage.
Two spare penetrations in the Unit 3 containment wall at approximately elevation 30 ft. azimuth 226 degrees are not capped at the outside surface of the concrete containment.
They go completely through the concrete wall (approximately 4 ft.) and are capped at the liner plate.
Inside Containment (Based on ILRT report for Unit 4) 2 ~
3 ~
4 ~
5.
In some areas of the containment liner, the top.coat
- peeled, delaminated, and disbonded.
Surface corrosion of some of.th'ii ilier seam welds and a few penetrationwan'isters was-observed.
a-Joint Tiller'aterial between the>-liner and adjacent concrete;.structures was leaching:in some areas.
RadieFtly"inward bulging of the liner was observed at the operating deck level and above the polar crane girder level.
The bulging is random but widespread around the perimeter of the co~inment.
The bulges run the entire height of the 10 ft. liner panel, are about 15 inches wide (liner stiffener spacing),
and are deflected about 1/2 inch radially inward at the middle of the panel.
Two 1/16 inch cracks originating at the lower corners of a duct penetration through the 4B steam generator cubicle wall were found.
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We recognize that FPL is aware of the deteriorating condition of the intake structure and of the corrective actions it has taken for some of these areas.
The audit team reviewed a report on the intake structure prepared by a consultant to FPL.
The report indicates that the bay walls are also degrading and experiencing active corrosion of the reinforcing bars.
Therefore, the audit team recommended that the licensee also give close attention to other parts of the structure such as the intermediate and exterior walls.
S ent ue Bui di The ceiling of the Unit 3 spent fuel building has a discoloration over an area of. about 3 by 6 feet.
Tanks 1.
Unit 3 condensate storage tank:
There are bent plates on the anchor bolt chairs.
There is deterioration of the water seal at "the base of the tank'nd corrosion of the tank bottom plate is visible.
In a few places there are signs of corrosion and.scratches and gouges on the tank wall.
2.
The diesel oil tank does not have washers-.=:between the. nuts and the anchorage plates.
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For unreinforced.masonry walls. the seismic qualification* relies on the assumptiod,'that there=.;are no cracks in the wall.
- However, there appears to",be no fora+..monitoring program to confirm that no cracks develop'.
In the air handling room in the control building at elevation 30 ft., the angle support at the ceiling is not flush with the masonry wall.
Cathod c Protect S stem A cathodic protection system was installed during original construction to protect the containment-liner plate, reinforcing
- steel, and tendon assemblies.
The system is presently exhibiting low to very low readings in some of the anodes.
FPL is presently evaluating this condition.
e
ttac e t 6 - Co t'nued o es
'n Co crete Structures In some concrete walls, abandoned anchor holes, drilled holes, or holes from original construction have not been grouted.
One example is the 9 inch deep holes on the exterior concrete wall of the Unit 3 containment.
Se smic Inst ume tat o
The following item is not related to aging degradation effects but was brought to the attention of FPL for their benefit.
Appendix A to 10 CFR Part 100 states that if the vibratory ground motion from an earthquake exceeds the plants operating basis earthquake, the plant will be required to shutdown.
The NRC staff has developed guidelines it will use to make plant shutdown recommendations.
The consequences of the guidelines is based on the ability of the plant to provide prompt information about the earthquake.
Turkey Point has only one three-component accelograph that records photographically.
It requires three hours to develop the film after the instrument trigger is detected.
Prompt analysis of the photographic record could only provide peak ground accelerati'on.
To obtain response
- spectra, the records would have to be digitized and used to generate response spectra.
This could take a considerable time.
EPRI has developed an OBE exceedance criterion based on a damage threshold estimate.
To use the EPRI criterion, digital recording and the generation of response spectra and cumulative absolute velocity are required.
The ability-to do this can provide the information to avoid unnecessarily shutting the plant down in the event of a nondamaging earthquake which has short duration high frequency exceedance of the OBE.
ATTACHMENT 7 Representative Photographs of Key Observations
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Water Infiltration thru Joint Between Inside Wall and Ceiling in Vicinity of Tendon 45-V-1 (typical)
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U t 3 Co ta e t Spare Penetrations (2) Uncapped on Outside Surface at Azimuth 226', Elevation 30'
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ke Point Site Seismo ra Mounted on Unit 3 Containment Basemat at Azimuth 226'
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'I Air Handlin Room in Control uildin Gap Between Masonry Wall and Angle Support Installed at Ceiling as Part of Bulletin 80-11 Program (View Looking Up)
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Deterioration of the Water Seal at Base of Tank/
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Circulating Water pumps Mounted On top of Intake Structure; Supporting Concrete Beams Have Deteriorated and Currently Being Strengthened 4
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L View of Cooling Water Inlet, from North Side, Looking SW Intake St ucture