ML20214G210

Insp Rept 50-416/86-36 on 861014-17.No Violations or Deviations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Svc Water Sys Problems,Review of Previous Enforcement Items & Review of Previously Identified Inspector Followup Items

ML20214G210
Person / Time
Site:	Grand Gulf
Issue date:	11/12/1986
From:	Bernhard R, Jape F, Matt Thomas NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
To:
Shared Package
ML20214G203	List: ML20214G202 ML20214G210
References
50-416-86-36, NUDOCS 8611260016
Download: ML20214G210 (8)

See also: IR 05000416/1986036

Text

UfAITED STATES

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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

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' Report No.: 50-416/86-36

Licensee: Mississippi Power and Light Company

Jackson, MS 39205

Docket No.: 50-416 License No.: NPF-29

Facility Name: Grand Gulf

Inspection Conducted: October 14-17,~1986

Inspectors: 6 f, , //!/2 [g/.

M. ~homas 0 /Date/ Signed

$&5Date Signed

R. H. Be'rnhard

Approved by:

F. Jape, Chief, Test Programs Settiod

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Date Signed

Engineering Branch

Division of Reactor Safety

SULMARY

Scope: This routine, unannounced inspection was conducted in the areas of

service water system problems, review of previous enforcement items and review of

previously identified inspector followup items (IFIs).

Results: No violations or deviations were identified.

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8611260016 861113"

PDR ADOCK 05000416

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REPORT DETAILS

1. Persons Contacted

I Licensee Employees

• J. E.-Cross, Site Director

• C. R. Hutchinson, General Manager, Grand Gulf Nuclear Station

• J. W. Yelverton, Operations Tec5nical Assistant

• R. V. Moomaw, Maintenance Manager

• L. F. Daughtery, Compliance Superintendent

• J. V. Parrish, Chemistry / Radiation Control Superintendent

• J. D. Bailey, Compliance Coordinator

J. Lasseter, Acting Plant Chemist

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+ Other licensee employees contacted included engineers, technicians,

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operators, mechanics, security office members, and office personnel.

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NRC Resident Inspectors

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• R. C. Butcher, Senior Resident Inspector

, *W. F. Smith, Resident Inspector

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• Attended exit interview

l- Exit Interview

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The inspection scope and findings were summarized on October 17, 1986, with

those persons indicated in paragraph 1 above. The inspector described' the .

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areas inspected and discussed in detail the inspection findings.

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The

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inspector informed the licensee that unresolved item 416/86-01-02, which was

I closed in NRC report 416/86-06, was incorrectly listed in that repor.t as

item 416/86-01-01. Item 416/86-01-01 was a violation. The violation is

i still open. No dissenting comments were received from the licensee. The

i following new items were identified during this inspection. -

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l - IFI 416/86-36-01, Establish Criteria for Determining When to Clean ESF .

Electrical Switchgear Room Coolers Piping.- paragraph 5.b.(1)

- IFI 416/86-36-02, Adequacy of Plant Service Water Flow to Containment -

i Penetrations - paragraph 5.b.(1)

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3. Licensee Action on Previous Enforcement Matters

This subject was not addressed in the inspection.

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4. Unresolved Items

Unresolved items were.not identified during the inspection.

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L 5.- Service Water System

l Inspection of the service water system involved reviews of systems design

requirements, service water system problems which have been identified by

the licensee, Technical Specification (TS) requirements, preventive

maintenance program, and chemistry control.- The reviews in ea:h of these

areas are discussed below along with determinations made by the inspectors.

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a. Review of System Design

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The inspectors reviewed the service water system design for the standby

service water (SSW) and plant service water (PSW) systems. The systems

are described in subsections 9.2.1 and 9.2.8 of the Grand Gulf Final

Safety Analysis Report (FSAR), Mississippi' Power and Light (MP&L)

system descriptions, and applicable drawings (M-1061A,1061B,1061C,

10610, 1072A, 1072B, 1072C, 1072D). The intent was to identify the

safety-related components cooled by service water and subsequently

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determi ne w eh ther MP&L's plans and procedures for detecting and

l controlling fouling addressed all of these components.

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i The SSW system, containing the plant ultimate heat sink, is designed to

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remove heat from plant auxiliaries that are required for a safe reactor

shutdown following a design basis loss-of-coolant-accident (LOCA).

' The PSW system has no safety design function. The PSW system provides

makeup to the SSW system cooling tower basins, but this makeup

capability is not required to safely shut down the reactor following a

r LOCA. The PSW system also provides cooling water to the control room

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air conditioning unit and the engineered safety features (ESF)

electrical switchgear room coolers (both of which have safety functions

! during a LOCA) during normal plant operations because the SSW system

! operates only during reactor shutdown, reactor isolation, and post

LOCA.

b. Service Water System Problems

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The licensee has identified three problems associated with the SSW

system. These problems are low flow to essential components couled by

SSW, piping corrosion, and seismic qualification of ESF electrical

switchgear room cooler nozzles. Each of the problems are discussed

below.

(1) Inadequate Flow to Essential Equipnent

The licensee has reported that during flow testing with the SSW

system aligned in the post LOCA configuration, they were unable to

obtain design-flows to loop A control room air conditioning unit,

ESF electrical switchgear room coolers, reactor core isolation

cooling (RCIC) room cooler, residual heat removal (RHR) pump seal

cooler A, and loop B ESF electrical switchgear room coolers. The

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low flow problem is discussed'in licansee event report (LER)

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86-029-00 dated September 25, 1986, and licensee letters

AECM-86/0283, 0309, and 0319, dated September 10, October 3, and

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October 8,-1986, respectively. This problem is also discussed in

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NRC. inspection reports 416/86-32 and 416/86-34.

The licensee stated that the low flows were due in part to partial

blockage of the small diamete" piping supplying these components.

- The blockage was determined to be iron reducing bacteria and

chemical deposits from the PSW (which supplies the components

during normal operation) combined -with low flow through the

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coolers. In order to reduce future blockage, licensee plans

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include maximizing SSW flow through'the room coolers to obtain the "

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highest velocities possible. . In addition, the small diameter

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piping is being modified to allow periodic flushing and hydro-

lazing. Monthly flow measurements of the ESF electrical

switchgear room coolers will be performed to detect signs of flow

blockage. Based on the results of the trended data, flushing or

hydrolazing will be performed to :naintain system design flow rate.

< The licensee has issued procedures to perform the flow tests. The

inspector reviewed procedure 04-1-03-T46-1, 'A" ESF Switchgear

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Room Coolers Flow Test, Revision 0, ~ dated September 19, 1986.

i During review of the procedure and discussions with -cognizant .;

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licensee personnel, the inspector raised the question concerning

whether a flow criteria had been established.for personnel to use

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in determining when the piping needed cleaning. Licensee

!. personnel stated that no criteria had been developed yet. Nuclear ,

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Plant Engineering (NPE) will develop the criteria to be used based '

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on data obtained during monitoring of flow to the ESF switchgear

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coolers during this outage. The inspectors informed the licensee

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that the question will be tracked as IFI 416/86-36-01, Establish

Criteria for Determining when to Clean ESF Switchgear Room Coolers

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Piping. ,

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While reviewing PSW system drawings, the inspectors noted that

several containment penetration cooling water jackets receive PSW

which is supplied through small diameter piping. The penetrations

are high energy line penetrations. Given the fouling problems

attributed to the PSW supplied portions of the SSW system with '

small diameter piping, the inspectors raised the question

concerning whether the PSW lines supplying the penetrations had

been inspected to determine if there was any blockage due to

fouling. If the penetrations do not receive adequate cooling, the

concrete temperatures in the vicinity of the penetrations could

possibly exceed design values. Licensee personnel stated that

most of the high energy line containment penetrations are not

cooled by PSW. Applicable drawings will be reviewed to identify

the containment penetrations which are still supplied by PSW. The

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PSW piping will be inspected for fouling. If fouling is found to

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be - a problem, an evaluation will be performed to determine

! appropriate corrective actions. The inspector informed the.

licensee.that this question will be tracked as IFI 416/86-32-02,

Adequacy.of Plant Service Water Flow to Containment Penetrations.

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(2) Stand ~by Service Water System Piping Corrosion

Report Number 50-416/06-34 discussed microbiological 1y induced

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corrosion -(MIC) problems discovered in the "A" standby service

l water basin. Inspection 86-36 coincided with the initial draining

of the "B" service water basin. The inspectors examined piping in

L the upper portions of the B standby service water basin. Evidence

it of MIC damage was present. The licensee was removing the external

- tubercles by mechanical means - with sanders and chippers,

inspecting the pipe to verify minimum wall thickness, applying a

, weld overlay or replacing the sections.of pipe as required, and

painting the pipe with a protective coating. The "A" loop service

water basin had been returned to service prior to taking "B".out

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of service. A molybdate cerrosion inhibitor had been added to the

"A" loop standby service water basin as a preventative measure.

j Upcn completion of "B" basin cleaning and inspection, the same

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chemical treatment is planned. The licensee anticipates the

molybdates will be distributed through the associated loops'

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piping as the periodic equipment surveillances are performed. The

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chemical distributors furnishing the inhibitor have indicated to

the licensee that molybdate in the system could also restrict

growth of the sulfur reducing bacteria responsible for.the MIC.

Inspections performed by the licensee on the loads served by the

"A" Standby service water loop showed evidence of MIC in the -

i Division 1 Diesel generator and RHR heat exchangers. The .

! Division 3 Emergency Diesel Generator, which is served by loop "C"

SSW also showed evidence of MIC. The inspectors examined pictures

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of the heat exchangers prior to and after cleaning. The corrosion

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appeared to be superficial. Tne licensee indicated the heat

l exchangers would be inspected in the future to monitor for

additional MIC. The "B" loop load, will be inspected while loop

"B" is out of service.

Administrative Procedure 01-S-08-16, Revision 9, " Chemical

, Treatment Program", Chemistry Procedure 08-S-03-10, Revision 6, l

l' " Chemistry Sampling Program", and Chemistry Procedure 08-S-03-14

Revision 5, " Chemical additions to Plant Systems" were reviewed.

The molybdate additions are not specifically addressed in the

procedures reviewed. The licensee indicated the procedure will be

revised to incorporate the necessary changes to allow monitoring ,

and addition of molybdate to maintain proper concentration.

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Current chemical additions were made per 08-S-03-14 which allows

the Plant Chemist to make additions not specifically addressed by -

the procedures. Current sampling is performed under 08-S-03-10, 1

which allows sampling not specifically addressed in the procedures  !

to be performed if directed by the plant chemist.

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The licensee indicated moritoring of other closed loop systems

with conditions that might allow MIC would be performed as

conditions permit, possibly during planned outages. The licensee

indicated no specific program for chemical addition to the Fire

Protection System exists.

(3) Seismic Qualification of ESF Electrical Switchgear Room Cooler

Nozzles

Although not related to potential fouling problems within the SSW

system, the licensee nctified the NRC on October 17, 1986, that

the nozzle loads for several ESF electrical switchgear room

coolers appeared to be in excess of that specified by the vendor.

The licensee was still evaluating this problem at the conclusion

of this inspection. It was stated that corrective actions will be

completed during the current refueling outage.

c. Review of Technical Specification

The inspectors reviewed Grand Gulf Technical Specification (TS)

requirements to determine the extent to which related surveillance

testing was being used to detect system or component fouling.

Specifications 4.7.1.1.a and 4.7.1.2.a of TS require verification at

least once per 31 days, that each SSW system subsystem and high

pressure core spray (HPCS) service water system valve in the flow path

that is not locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in position, is in its

2 correct position. Specifications 4.7.1.lb and 4.7.1.2b require

verification, at least once per 18 months during shutdown that each

automatic val */e servicing safety-related equipment actuates to its

correct positicn on an actuation test signal. The inspectors reviewed

the following procedures that are to be used to satisfy these

surveillance recuirements: .

06-0P-1P41-M-0001, High Pressure Core Spray Service Water and Standby

Service Water Loops A and B Operability Check

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06-0P-1P41-Q-0004, Standby Service Water Loop A Vt.lve and Pump ,

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Operability Test

06-OP-1P41-Q-0005, Standby Service Water Loop B Valve and Pump

, Operability Test

06-0P-1P41-Q-0006, High Pressure Core Spray Service Water System Valve

and Pump Operability Test

06-0P-1P75-R-0003, Standby Diesel Generator 11 (SDG) 18 Month

Functional Test

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06-0P-1P75-R-0004, Standby Diesel Generator 12 (SDG) 18 Month

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Functional Test

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The inspectors concluded that of the surveillance requirements related

- to SSW operability, none are useful for detecting fouling in small

diameter. lines supplying the various coolers. The surveillance

requirements related to the above TS can be satisfied.

d. Review of Preventive Maintenance Program

' The inspectors reviewed MP&L's preventive maintenance program for the

SSW system to identify provisions for detecting and controlling

fouling. This review revealed that, prior to the recent fouling

problems which resulted in lower than SSW system design flows to

various components, the control room air conditioning unit was the.only ,

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component supplied by SSW through small diameter piping which was

covered by the preventive maintenance program. The inspectors reviewed

related procedure 07-S-24-Z51-B002-1, Control P,oom Air Conditioning

Unit Inspection and Maintenance.

As a result of the ' fouling problems, the licensee is developing a

preventive maintenance program. Portions of the plan were included in

the corrective actions discussed in the MP&L letters referenced above,

e. Review of Chemistry Control Program

The inspectors reviewed MP&L's chemistry control program for the SSW

loop SSW

system. A molybdate corrosion inhibitor was added to the "A" i

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basin and is 7.lso scheduled to be added to the "B" loop SSW basin. The

effects of the molybdate on microorganisms in the SSW system are

discussed above. Cognizant licensee personnel stated that the

chemistry procedures referenced above will be revised to include the

molybdate as one of the chemicals being added to the SSW basins. The

SSW system will be sampled on a regular basis to ensure that the

molybdate concentration is being maintained within specified limits.

Licensee -personnel also indicated that selected components will be

inspected during the next refueling outage to determine the effective-

ness of tha chemical treatment in reducing the corrosion rate.

f. Conclusions of Service Water System Review

Based on the existing fouling problems, the inspectors concluded that

MP&L's plans and procedures for detecting and controlling SSW fouling '

appear to be adequate. The most likely fouling agents are fron

reducing bacteria combined with chemical deposits from the PSW system

and MIC. The ongoing chemistry control program, the planned preventive

maintenance and flow monitoring programs, and the system modifications

to allow periodic flushing and hydrolazing, appear to be adequate for

detecting and controlling these agents.

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No violations or deviations were identified.

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6. Followup on Previously Identified Items (92701)

a. (0 pen) IFI 416/85-29-02, concerning licensee commitment to include a

revised thermal power versus core flow curve (graphical partion of FSAR

Figure 14.2-4) in the Startup Report. It was stated that MP&L and the

NSSS vendor (General Electric) are reviewing this item to assess

whether there is a need to revise the curve.

b. (0 pen) IFI 416/85-29-03, which is related to the above it.em, concerns a

licensee commitment to submit the corresponding change to the FSAR and

Bases of the Technical Specification for NRC/NRR review concurrently

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with the Startup Report. This item is also being reviewed by MP&L and

General Electric.

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