ML20204E916

Rev 0 to Part 21 Rept JPE-L-86-75 Re Potential for Overloading Emergency Diesel Generators (EDG) Prior to Dec 1985.EDG Levels Exceed Highest FSAR Value Levels.Test Data Demonstrates That EDG Could Not Accept High Levels

ML20204E916
Person / Time
Site:	Turkey Point
Issue date:	06/30/1986
From:	Flugger F FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT CO.
To:
Shared Package
ML20204E921	List: ML20204E916
References
REF-PT21-86, REF-PT21-86-282-000 JPE-L-86-75-R, JPE-L-86-75-R0, PT21-86-282, PT21-86-282-000, NUDOCS 8608010355
Download: ML20204E916 (4)

Text

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5UBSTANTIAL SAFETY HAZARD EVALUATION TURKEY POINT UNITS 3 & 4 (PTPN)

EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR LOAD EVALUATION l

POWER PLANT ENGINEERING DEPARTMENT FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY 3UNO BEACH, FLORIDA i i

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l Introduction 1

The evaluation hereinaf ter is responsive. to the Nuclear Energy Departments' l

request (REA No. TPN-56-011) to evaluate Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) loadings with regard to their potential reportability under 10 CFR 21. Prior to

' December 1933, a potential existed for placing loads on the EDGs that exceeded the1TPN Technical Specification auto-connect !!mit of 2730 kWI the Emergency Operating Procedure (EOP) limit of 2930 kW and the 1/2 Hour Exceptional Rating of 3030 kW. This evaleatlon assesses whether or not these !!mits could have been exceeded, and whether a substantial safety hazard (as defined by 10 l

i CFR 21) existed prior to December 1983.

Evaluation 1

A load evaluation, conoucted in Decommer 1985, Indicated that the loads on the EDG for the case with one EDG in operation were as follows:

1 I

Aute-Connect 2747 kW 1-30 minutes 2873 kW 30 minutes - I hour 2794 kW ,

The December 1983 evaluation was based on the then current estimate of total

> ump kW on the EDC. Early in 1986,inplant testing of the ICW and CCW pumps

.ndicated that these pumps would oprate at higner flows than their design values. Additional inplant testing anc, analysis confirmed that this results in a nigher kW per pump than was ut!!! zed in the December 1985 evaluation. The total pump kW assumed in December 1985 and the value currently expected compare as follows:

Expected Delta M

0 - 30 minutes 2211 kW 2236 kW 43 1931 kW '964 kW +33 30 minutes . I hour This comparison confirms the fact that the pump loads used in the December 1983 analysis were underestimated. Had the current expected pump kW values been aval!able and included in the Cecember 1985 evaluation, the Technical -

Specification auto-connect limit of 2730 kW would have been exceeded.

The current two-EDG running toad evaluation Indicates that the maximum auto connect load based on exp6cted pump kW 1: 2399 kW. This evaluation assumes the implementation of speelfic plant changes that delete the auto-connect feature of the Normal Containment Coolers (NCC) and certain boric acid.related loads. Prior to.Decem>er 1983, these loads would have auto-connected to the EDG. Thus, they must be added to the current 2199 kW 4

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' JPE-L-86-73 Rev. O Page 3 of 4

= ** to determine the maximum auto connected two EDG running load prior to December 1983. The following loads mast be added: -

NCCs 128 kW i s ;ank Heaters 30 kW B A Transfer Pumps St kW 212 kW i

As a resuit, the auto-connect load prior w December 1983 coulo nave been 2811 Therefore, the 2730 kW auto-connected load kW for the two EDG case. ,

liinitation could also have been exceeded for the two (2) EDG case.  !

Prior to December 1983, the Instrument Air Compressors and certain turbine re:ated loads could have auto-connected subsequent to Safety injection Signal l (515) reset without the operators' knowledge. These loads could have ralsed the j EDG load as follows:

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IACs 186 kW  ;

i Turbine-Related Loads 178 k%

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j in November 1983, a Plant Change Modification was Installed to prevent the motor-driven fire pump from auto connecting to the EDG. Starting of the fire pump could have p aced an additional 21C 4W load on the EDG.

l PC/Ms 84 84 and 84-8) for Control Rod Drive Mechanism cooling fan power f source mod!fications were implemented such that they could automatically connect to the EDCs upon loss of offs.te power (REA No. TPN 86-11). This  !

j potential existed on PTPN 4 from May 24, 1984 to June 22,1983, and on PTPN 3 l from February 17, 1983 to June 22, 1913. (PTPN 3 was in a refueling outage from March 30, 1983 to July 17,1983). The CRDMs on the hot shutdown unit l could potentially add 33 kW to the EDC.

The various loads cited above could hate auto-connected to the EDG In either the 1-30 minute or 30 minute-1 hour load intervals. All of these loads may not-l add concurrently. The turbine loads engage as the turbine rolls to a stop, and the 4

IACs and fire pumps engage on low header pressure. This notwithstandin5, there

. , r .. ,,..p' cal reason <nown that would preclude their concurrent auto-connectlen to the EDG. Additionally, the operator would not have prior knowledge of these auto-load additions. Thus, success of any operator diagnostic and corrective actions to mitigate a potential EDG overloading condition is i questionable.

Based on the above, there was a potential for loading the EDGs to the following sevels prior to November 1983:

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7 JPE-L-86-73 l Rev.0 Page 4 of 4 f

1-30 MinJtes_ 30 Minutes - : Hour i j

2873 kW 2794 kW i

December 1983 Estimate  !

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+45 +33 .

Increase in Pump kW  !

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+186 +186 r UNCs

+178 +178 Turbine Loads i

+210 +210 ,

! Fire Pump

+50 3LO, 4

CRDM Fans 3344 kW 3431kW l'

. i These potential EDG toad levels exceed the highest F5AR value of 3030 kW by a l substantial margin. There is no test data available to demonstrate that the EDG could accept these load levels.

i Conclusions '

i 2

Based on the above, the following can be concluded with regard to EDG loadings prior to November 1985:  ;

- ' The 2730 kW Technical Specification auto-connect limit could have been ,

exceeded.

- The F5AR 3030 kW 1/2 hour exceptional rating could have been exceedad. l I

- EDG loadings could have reached levels that could t-lp the EDG.

l

$1nce the Technical Specification 11rntt could have been exceeded and the i probability of malfunction of the I,DG was increased, operation prio.- to -

f November 1955 involved an unreviewed safety questjon.

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! Since the one (1) operating EDG could have been overloaded to the point where it l woule trip, operation prior to November 1985 involved a substantial safety-l l

hazard.  !

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1r/ Disc 0PTP EMERG.4/JPE L-86-73/0586/PG l

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