ML17261A530

Part 21 Rept Re Potential Util Failure to Comply W/Component Containment Isolation Licensing Commitment If Proposed Mods to Component Cooling Water Sys Instituted.Utils Advised to Evaluate Containment Isolation Sys

ML17261A530
Person / Time
Site:	Kewaunee, Point Beach, Turkey Point, Ginna, Robinson, 05000000
Issue date:	06/18/1987
From:	Johnson W WESTINGHOUSE ELECTRIC COMPANY, DIV OF CBS CORP.
To:	Berlinger C Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
REF-PT21-87, REF-PT21-87-107-000 NS-NRC-87-3236, PT21-87-107, PT21-87-107-000, NUDOCS 8707020404
Download: ML17261A530 (5)

Text

REGULATORY RNATION DISTRIBUTION SYS (RIDS)

< 'ACCESSION NBR: 8707020404 DOC. DATE: 87/06/18 NOTARIZED: NO DOCKET 0 FAC IL: 50-000 Generic Docket 05000000 50-244 Robev t Emmet Qinna Nucleav Plant> Unit i. Rochestev Q 05000244 50-266 Point Beach Nucleav Plant> Unit ii Wisconsin Electric 0500026m 50-301 Point Beach Nuclear Planti Unit 2i Wisconsin Electric 05000301 50-250 Turkey Point Planti Unit 3i Florida Powev and Light C 05000250 50-251 Tuv keg Point Planti Unit 4i Florida Powev and Light C 05000251 50-261 H. B. Robinson Planti Unit 2i Carolina Powev Zc Light C 05000261 50-305 Kewaunee Nuclear Power Plant> Wisconsin Public Servic o5aoo3o5 AUTH. NANE AUTHOR AFFILIATION JOHNSON'. A. Westinghouse Electv ic Cov p.

RECIP. NANE RECIPIENT AFFILIATION BERLINQERn C. Generic Communi cat i ons Bv anc h

SUBJECT:

Pav t 21 rept e potential util fai luv e to comp lg w/component v

containment isolation licensing commitment if pv oposed mods Initially epov ted to component cooling watev sos instituted. v on 840713. Util notif i ed.

DIBTRIBUTION CODE: IEI9D COPIEB RECEIVED:LTR i ENCL 0 BIIE:

TITLE: Part 21 Rept (50 DKT)

NOTES: License Exp date in accov'dance with 10CFR2i 2. 109(9/19/72). osooa244 RECIPIENT COPIES RECIPIENT COPIES ID CODE/NAl'fE LTTR ENCL ID CODE/NAME LTTR ENCL PD1-3 LA PD3-3 LA PD2-2 LA PD2-1 L*

PD1-3 PD PD3-3 PD PD2-2 PD PD2-1 PD STAHLEi C WAGNER' NcDONALDe D ECCLESTONI K QUAY' INTERNAL: AEOD/DOA 1 *EOD/DSP/TPAB 1 ARN TECH ADV 1 NRR CRUTCHFIELD 1 NRR VARGAI 8 NRR/DEBT/ADE 1 NRR/DEST/ADS 1 NRR/DLPG/GAB NRR/DOEA/EAB 1 NRR/DOEA/GCB d~~

NRR/DRIS/VIB RES/DE/ElB Oi 1 NRR/PNAS/ILRB RES DEPY QI RGN1 1

1 RGN0 RGN3 RGN4 1 RGN5 1 EXTERNAL: INPO RECORD CTR LPDR NRC PDR NSIC SILVER> E TOTAL NUMBER OF COPIES REQUIRED: LTTR 41 ENCL

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Box 355 Westinghouse Power Systems Pittsburgh Pennsylvania 15230 0355 Electric Corporation June 18, 1987 NS-NRC-87-3236 Hr. Carl Berlinger, Chief Generic Communications Branch Division of Operational Events Assesement U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555

Dear Hr. Berlinger:

This is to confirm the telephone conversation on June 18 between Messrs.

Johnson and HcIntyre of Westinghouse and Hr. Carl Berlinger of the NRC. In that conversation, Westinghouse notified the NRC of a reportable item per 10CFR21 associated with a previously recommended modification to the component cooling water system of two operating plants: Point Beach 1 and 2. Had these recommended modifications been implemented by the utility, the above plants would have Failed to comply with the containment isolation licensing commitment. This item may also affect five other plants: Turkey Point 3 and 4, H. B. Robinson, Ginna and Kewaunee. However, we lack sufficient information to complete an evaluations Westinghouse has advised the owners of these plants of this issue.

The issue relates to an item that Westinghouse rep'orted earlier concerning a potential overpressure condition in the component cooling water systems designed by Westinghouse. This earlier issue was reported under 10CFR21 as a Substantial Safety Hazard For ll operating plants and 7 plants under construction in a July 13, 1984 letter to Hr. R. C. OeYoung, Division of Inspection and Enforcement, from Hr. E. P. Rahe, Jr., Westinghouse (NS-EPR-2938). Specifically, the overpressure condition could result from closure of the surge tank vent valve on a high radiation signal from the radiation detectors within the component cooling water system. This pressure increase (above the normal atmospheric pressure) in the surge tank results from a system inleakage and increases in system heat load. The pressure in the surge tank could increase to the set pressure of the surge tank relief valve. System overpressurization oF up to 1705 of the design pressure may occur downstream of the CCW pumps as a result of the pump developed head.

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Hr. Carl Berlinger June 18, 1987 NS-NRC-87-3236 Based on a generic review oF typical plant designs, Westinghouse determined that the potential for overpressuization could be reduced or eliminated by minor modifications to the component cooling water system. Each Utility was notified by letter of the potential overpressure condition and recommendations were made for plant modifications. Specifically, it was recommended that:

1. The circuitry which automatically closes the CCWS surge tank vent valve on a high radiation or surge tank level signal be disabled and, in the long term, the air operated, fail closed vent valve be converted to a normally open, locked open, local valve; and

2. The surge tank relieF valve be removed or the internals of the relief valve be removed.

These measures effectively achieve a low pressure drop overflow path from the surge tank which would be sufficient to ensure that the maximum pressure in the CCWS would not exceed 110 percent oF the design pressure in the event of operation with a water solid surge tank coincident with the maximum anticipated inleakage through a ruptured tube in one of the system heat exchangers. Additional review of these recommended changes indicates that implementation could have lead to a violation of containment isolation requirements for Point Beach Units 1 and 2 The design For these units depends on the CCWS outside of containment being a closed system which serves as an extension of the containment boundary. The above changes, if implemented, would make the CCWS outside of containment an open system.

The individual utilities mentioned in this letter have been advised to evaluate their respective containment isolation systems with regard to this potential item.

If you have any questions, please contact myself (412-374-4868) or Hike Shannon (412-374-5590) of my staff.

Very truly yours, WESTINGHOUSE ELECTRIC CORPORATION t

W J J hnson, Manager N Safety Oepartment HHS/bek/2908n