ML20197D222
| ML20197D222 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Seabrook  |
| Issue date: | 03/13/1987 |
| From: | Zech L NRC COMMISSION (OCM) |
| To: | Markey E HOUSE OF REP., ENERGY & COMMERCE |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19306D588 | List:
|
| References | |
| CON-#187-2881, RTR-NUREG-CR-4540 OL, NUDOCS 8703200260 | |
| Download: ML20197D222 (22) | |
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UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMA IlON O{> $ E CASHINGTON, D. C. 20555 cHamuaN March 13, 1987 The Honorable Edward J. Markey Committee on Energy and Commerce United States House of Representatives Washington, D.C. 20515
Dear Congressman Markey:
t I am enclosing staff's responses to the questions of your January 13, 1987 letter regarding the Seabrook Station.
Sincerely, W. \.
Lando W. Z h,J
Enclosure:
As stated cc: Rep. Philip Sharp
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], )M OUESTION 1. Both in the November 18 hearing and in response to the Chairman's questions to NRC on November 3, I inquired raqarding the Commission's current views regardino issues raised in the Janua ry 26, 1986 Minogue memorandum. In Mr. Minogue's memorandum the staff's position was stated unequivocally, f.e.,
that with regard to any prooosal to reduce the size of the emergency planning zone, the oublic interest would be better served by a generic rulemaking rather than a site-specifir approach. in the Commission's December 1, 1086 response to nur letter of November 3, 1986, the Commission listed tha final four bulleted items in Mr. Minogue's memorandum and wrote:
"These final four bullets in Mr. Minoque's letter elucidate the reasons supporting his earlier point that a generic rulemaking would serve the public better than a site-snecific one.
Further comments are not appropriate until such time that the applicant's formal recuest regarding a chance in the EPZ has been received."
Now that the applicant has filed a formal petition, please respond to thosa fcur items. Please explain in detail if this still eccurately reflects the staff's and/or the Commission's views; if not, please explain orecisely what has changed between January, 1986 and today that now suggests that a site-specific decision at Seabrook or any other reactor is des irable.
ANSWER.
"r. Minogue's opinions reflect the Office of Nuclear Deculatory Research.
They do not represent a coordinated staff position. Nor, do they raflect positions considered and adopted by the Commission. The staff is corducting a generic reassessment of the energency planning (EP) reoulations. However, Public Service of New Hamoshire has filed a petition for a waiver of the ten-mile EPZ which is not primarily based on considerations beino raviewed in the generic reassessment of the EP regulations. Because it is not based on the same considerations being reviewed in the ceneric review the Staff is reviewing the licensee's waiver request in accordance with 10 CFR Part 7, Section 2.758 of the Commission's regulations. Tha staf# is continuina to pursue the generic reassessment of the FD requirements.
In addition, alternative proposals regarding emergency orenaredness, such as the provisions for a graded emergency response, are under considera+ ion by the staff. The NRC staff intends to consider all relevant insichts regarding source terms and risk considerations from the NUREG-115n reference olants in making recommendations regarding aeneric EP requirements chances.
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.j QUESTION 1.(Continued) The NRC Staff has recently proposed a change to 10 CFR 50.47 which would establish specific standards for licensee plans in cases of lack of cooperation in emergency planning by State and local governments. This proposed change does not modify current requirements as to the size of the emergency planninq :one. Rather, the croposed rule provides renuirements for licensinn where state or local governments are not cocoerating in developinn emergency plans.
OUESTION 2a. According to NRC testimony at the November 18 hearing, Seabrook is one of the few plants in the country for which more than one state lies wi+hin the EPZ, and NRC has devoted little effort to considerino how multi-State particication in emergency planning and exercises -- and particularly the possibility of an interstate conflict regarding emercancy planning -- should be approached. fir. Vollmer assured the Subcommittee that he would try to suppl.v a written respense on this matter.
ANSWER.
There are 17 nuclear sites in the I!.S. whose 10-mile plume exoosure emergency planning zone (EPZ) includes more than one state. In addition, the majority of nuclear power plants have a 50-mile ingestion exoosure pathway EPZ that includes more than one state. Guidance on planning for j varied governmental and jurisdictional situations is given in NUREG-0654/
FEMA-REP-1,Section I.E, "Contiquous-Jurisdiction Governmental Emercency Planning." With the current exception of Seabrook, we are not aware of any interstate conflicts that have not been satisfactorilv resolved during the emergency plan devalopment process.
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-OVESTION ?b. Please forward to the Committee all documents and records pertaining to emergency planning in cases where an interstate conflict may arise in situations where more than one state lies with the EPZ and approval of two or more state's emergency olans are or may be required for licensino.
ANSWED..
As indicated in the response to question 2a, the only case where an interstate conflict in emergency planning may imoact the licensing of a nuclear ocwer plant is Seabrook. Documents related to energency planning for Seabrook have been provided to the Subcommittee in orevious corresoondence.
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QUESTION 2c.
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Please also provide the Subcommittee with the Commission's views regarding how an interstate conflict on eneroency planning prior to licensing should be approached. For example, what is the appropriate role for the NRC in such a case? What does the NRC feel is ao appropriate role for FEMA?
ANSWER.
In all instances except Seabrook, interstate cocoeration has been achieved through the integrated efforts of the utility aonlicant/ licensee, FEMA and the state and local governments. By oresidential directive of December 7, 1979, and as embodied in the NRC/ FEMA Menorandum of finderstanding, FEMA has the lead role for offsite radiological emergency response planning and nreparedness. The NRC would look to FE'4A to coordinate the resolution of any conflicts which nay arise. FEMA also has the lead role in assisting state and local governments in the development of plans through the Regional Assistance Conmittee located in each of the ten standard Federal Regions.
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i At the Amesbury hearing, the Subcommittee addressed the issue
-OUESTION 3. of whether the staff had crossed the line of impartiality in extensively reviewing Public Service of New Hampshire (P'SNH) studies intended to demonstrate a rationale for reducino the size of the emergency planning zone (EPZi at Seabrook. The staff's actions are particularly ouestionable in light of the fact that no petition or action of any kind had been filed with the Commission by PSNH regarding these studies. In his testimony before the Subcommittee. Mr. Vollmer stated that "a coaching or strategy [sicl is not what I feel the NRC should be doing in this regard." Does the NRC have specific guidance for staff, in terms of a policy statement or explicit regulations, regarding the degree of cooperation with a licensee that is deemed inappropriate? If so, please provide same. If not, why not? Please explain why the staff has not in this case violated Section 0.735-49a of the Commission's regulations which state: "An employee shall avoid any action...which might result in, or create the appearance of...(b) giving preferential treatment to any person."
ANSWER.
As previously discussed with your Committee's staff, the Seabrook PRA was prepared by PSNH in response to concerns raised by representatives of the State of New Hampshire concerning reactor safety. Representatives of New Hampshire also requested that the NRC raview the Seabrook PDA. The Seabrook PRA was initially submitted to NRC for review in February 1984 It is NRC's policy to review all PRAs which are submitted to the staff; the level of detail of the review varies and is deoendent upon the parceived safety significance and usefulness of the PRA. Because of the State of New Hampshire's concerns and because it was anticipated that the PDA minht be covered in the Seabrook hearing, a detailed review of the Seabrook PRA was undertaken.
In July 1986, the applicant submitted for staff review its update of the PRA and other technical information concerning features of Seabrock which might demonstrate lower risk than for other plants. The acolicant indicated that this information might subsequently be used as the basis for an exemption l
request. Again, the staff applied significant resources to the review bacause i
the issues were clearly important to all parties and would like'y be the subject of Licensing Board and Commission review. The NRC sta" began j- reviewing this information, with all technical meetinos or the matter open to the public. This information and staff actions were treated according to usual staff practices and partiality was not shown to any partv.
l I The staff discussed technical issues involved in the applicart's new analyses l
with the licensee as part of its responsibilities to keep abreast of and to j provide technical guidance to the development o' new technical information in the field; and as part of the staff's anticipated responsibility to provide l
s 00ESTION 3. (Continued) -?-
the staff's technical position to the Licensing Board and to the Commission at such time as the licensee in fact filed its anticipated petition. The Petition was filed with the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board on December 18, 1986.
The staff often discusses its perception of what is inportant to safety (cr risk) with licensees and members of the public. This is appropriate because it helps to focus resources on the areas needing the most attention. in fact, NRC has offered to meet with the State of Massachusetts to discuss whatever issues are of interest to Massachusetts and is awaiting a reply to that offer.
In the event the staff does give guidance to a licensee on what it perceives is important, there is no guarantee that NRC management, the Licensing Board, or the Commission will agree. This is particularly true where there is no established precedent for dealing with the issue. The NRC staff has long provided applicants with cuidance on appropriate means of meeting its regulations, as evidenced by the existence of Regulatory Guides which provide guidance on a variety of natters.
Discussions such as those held with the applicant in the Seabrook case are not improper. Indeed informal meetings with the staff are specifically recognized by 10 CFR 2.102 and by the Ooen Peetings Policy (43 FR ?80581 The NRC does not have specific guidance as to the " degree of cooperation" deemed inappropri-ate with licensees or with intervenors or with members of the public. However, the NRC does have policies relating to exchange of information with licensees and others. Those include the Open Meetings Policy and NRR Office Letter No. 43,
" Release of Draft Information - Policy on Control of D C and Other Documents" (enclosed).
To assure that concerned citizens, including intervenor parties in licensing proceedings, have an opportunity to observe meetings between the staff and licensees, the Commission in 1978 established an Coen Meetings Policy which provides an opportunity for such concerned citizens to attend technical meetings between the staff and licensees and also calls for the oreparation and public availability of minutes of all such meetings, in the Seabrnck case, the Open Meetings Policy has been followed with respect to technical meetings between the staff and the applicant on all aspects of the acolication, including the Petition for reduction of the EPZ.
NRR Office letter No. 43 provides quidance on the degree of cooperation that is deemed inappropriate with respect to making docunents available to licensees.
In addition, it includes instructions regarding communications with licensees and others for the purpose of (1) cainino factual information, (2) assessing i
the cost, feasibility and berefit of, or alternatives to, proposed actions, or
< (3) alerting licensees to initial staff positions or safety findings in *he normal course of conducting reculatory activities. Our review of the licensee's submittal and our communications with pSN4 regarding it were done in a manner similar to other information placed on the Seabrook docket.
I QUESTION 3. (Continued) The NPC is not aware of any action it has taken "which might result in, or create the appearance of ... any preferential treatment of any parson."
Enclosure:
NRR Office Letter No. 43, Rev. I
QUESTION 4. In response to a previous question from the Subcommittee the Commission provided a list of the plants for which Probabilistic Risk Assessments (PPA's) have been completed.
At that time, the Commission informed us that Seabrook is the only plant for which an update of the PRA has been undertaken. Along these same lines, for how many plants has the NRC retained an outside contractor to review one or more aspects of a utility-sponsored PRAT For each case, please provide details regarding tha nature of the contractor's review, the time scan over which it occurred, the reason for undertaking it, and the cost of the contract.
ANSWER.
The table below provides a list of utility-sponsored PRAs which NDC has reviewed with the assistance of an outside contractor. For each case, the approximate cost of the review, the time span over which it occurred and nature of the contractor's review (level 1, 2 or 3) are also tabulated.
In a level I review, a contractor concentrates exclusively on verifying, and modifying if necessary, the utility estimates of the core damage frequency (per reactor yearl associated with each type of accident sequence.
Generally, this type of review involves an assessment of the data, nethods and modelling assumptions, as well as a limited number of independent calculations for the most important core melt contributors.
i A level 2 review generally includes all the aspects of a lavel 1 review, as '.
i well as an assessment of the response of containment and the behavior of
) fission products for various types of core melt accidents. A level 2
! review is intended to verify or modify the utility's estimates of the magnitude and timing of fission product releases from containment 'ollowing a postulated core melt accident.
The level 3 reviews listed in the table included all the aspects o' lavels 1 and 2, in addition to validating the utility's calculatices of the offsite '
consequences associated with each type of fission product release from i containment. This type of review includes independent calculations of fission product transoort beyond the site boundary, radiation doses to the public and health effects based on site speci'ic weather conditions and population data. Generally these calculations examine the effect of energency response on the population doses and health effects.
The purpose of reviewing utility sponsored PRAs is outlined in NDR Of' ice 4 Letter 47, " Dissemination Of Plant Speci'ic PRA Results," dated March 25, 1986. These reviews are intended to identify signi'icent safety issues (plant-specific and generic) which require promot regulatory action, and to disseninate the safety insights derived from PRAs. In addition to this i overall motivation, several of the reviews listed in the table were conducted as part of specific raquiatory initiatives.
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t QUESTION 4 (Continued) .
Several of the utility sponsored PRAs were conducted in accordance with SECY-81-25, " Performance Of Probabilistic Risk Assessment Or Other Tvoes Of Special Analyses At High Population Density Sites." Three plants, 7. inn, Indian Point and Limerick, were identified as havino "substantially above average" population density. SECY-Al-?S committed the staff to review the risk analyses that were under way for those sites.
SECY-81-25 also stated tha staff's intention to perform a risk studv for Millstone Unit 3, a plant which at that time was in the early stanes of construction at a site with "above average" population density.
Two of the PRA's listed below,fli!1stona 1 and Connecticut Yankee, have been submitted and reviewed as part of the Integrated Safety Assessment Program (ISAP). This program was iritiated by NRC to assess, prioritize and resolve outstanding regulatory and safety-related issues on a plant specific basis.
participation by licensees in the program is on a voluntary basis and requires the performance of a PRA to idertify weaknesses in plant desion and to provide a nrobabilistic basis for resolvino safety issues that are amenable to probabilistic analysis.
The Diablo Canyon PRa is being cerformed as part of the loro Term Seismic Program. This reevaluation of the seismic design is required as a license condition based in part on a recommendation by the Advisory Committee for Reactor Safeguards (ACRSI. The purpose of the probabilistic risk analvsis is to assess the risk signi'icance of conclusions drawn from the seismic reevaluation studies.
The probabilistic analysis for Pig Pock Point was cerforrad for the purpose of assessing the risk significance of plant improvements prooosed as a result of the accident at Three Mile Island Unit 2. The staff review concluded that some of the proposed improvements were not of suf#icient risk significance to justify backfittino at Big Rock Point.
The Seabrook PRA was originally reviewed in accordance with the goals nutlined in NRR Office Letter 47 However, tha aoplicant subsequently rubmitted an updated risk analysis related to emergency olanning. On December 18, 1986, the applicant submitted a petition for an exception from the NRC requirements related to the nlume exposure pathway emerqancy planning zone (PEPZl. The NRC review of the updated risk analysis is in progress.
0,UESTION4.(Continued) Cost Of Contractor Aggro d gte Nature Of Contractor Review Tine Sgan Review P_lant ($1000) (Month / Year) (Level)*
Big Rock Point 210 5/01-11/82 1 Indian Point 2 & 3 + + 3 Zion 1 & 2 + + 3 Limerick 555 11/81-11/84 3 Millstone 3 575 8/83-12/85 3 Oconee 3 530 12/84-4/86 3 Seabrook 654 4/84-Ongoing 2 Shoreham 460 9/83-Ongoing ?
Millstone 1 500 6/86-1?/86 1 Connecticut Yankee 200 4/86-Ongoing 1 Yankee Rowe 82 9/85-1/86 2 Diablo Canyon 400(est.) 8/86-Ongoing 1 Midland 120 5/Pa-12/85 1 A level I review validates the estimatas of core damage frequency; level 7 also addresses the containment response and fission product releases from containment; level 3 encomoasses levels 1 & 2 and addresses offsite transport of #ission products, population doses and health effects.
+ The reviews for Zion and Indian Point were conducted under the same contracts. The total cost of both reviews was $1,360,000 The two reviews spanned a period from <luly, 1980 to . lune, 1986.
Enclosures:
- 1. NRR Office Letter 47
- 2. SECY-81-?S l
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OVESTION 5. At the November 18th hearing, the Subcommittee requested that the Chairman soecifically ask the Commission #or a commitment to hold a public hearing if and when PSNH were to file a formal request for a reduction of the emergency planninq zone. Now that the applicant has filed a formal petition, will the Commission make a commitment to hold a public hearing prior to issuing any decision on the applicant's petition?
ANSWER.
Our consideration of this matter is inappropriate in advance of its certification to the Commission by the presiding licensing Board. Powever, we assure you that the issues will be fully explored before final Commission action is taken.
The question of procedures to entertain the PSNH request will, if at all, reach us in the context of an engoing hearing on the application to operate the Seabrook nuclear plant. Typically, issues o# fact in such hearings are resolved by the presentation of written and oral testimony subject to cross-examination or when appropriate by submissions of affidavits. As explained in our January 93 letter, in circumstances where the Commission has been referred issues that have a significant factual component, the Commission has appointed special boards to hold hearings, and in some instances, to assist in other respects such as making reccmmended decisions.
Any further statement on the procedures that will apply to this case will have to await the question coming before the Commission. Indeed, even then our response must be one made on the record of the proceeding. We note that the parties, including the NRC staff have filed responses concerning the Petition with the presiding Licensing Board, i
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QUESTION 6. A copy of your response to question !? of the Subcommittee's letter to you of November 3,1986, is attached. Please note that the answer the Commission provided addresses only sta'f communications, whereas the Subcommittee's question also specifically asked whether or not there had been communications between any NRC Commissioner and/or Commissioner's staff and the named parties (i.e., the White House, nepartment of Energy, or FEMA). Please respond to that question as posed, for the time frame of June,1985 through the date of this letter.
ANSWER.
As stated in our November 14 letter, the status of FEMA' review o# offsite plans for Seabrook is routinely discussed at FEMA /NPC Stee-ing Committee meetings as well as'in informal discussions between FEMA at i NRC sta ". To the hest of our knowledge, these communications have not included discussions of the topics enumerated in your November 3, 1986 letter Regarding communications between the Commissioners and members of the Commissioners' staffs and the White House, n0E or FEMA, no Commissioners, nor any member of any Commissioner's staff has communicated with the White House, DOE or FEMA about Seabrook.
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g'5 TION 7. Critics of Pickard, Lowe and Garrick's "Seabrook Station Risk Management and Emergency Planning Study," (RMEPS) upon which
. the Seabrook Station Emergency Planning Sensitivity Stuoy" is i based, suggest that the analysis fails to adeouately consider j a number of significant phenomena and possible reactor accidant scenarios, the implications of which could radically challence the results of the study. For example:
o The optimistic conclusions of the report depend crucially on the assumption that containment failure pressure is 225 psi. This value is much hicher than estimated containment pressures for other nuclear plants, and may not he adequately supported, o The assumptions on the radioactive inventnry relaased under high pressure nelt ejection scenarios may at be consistent with recent analyses conducted by Sandia laboratory on these phenomena.
. o The report nay rot adequately consider the prospects that accident recovery actions could cause steam de-inertino by condensation, leading to hydrogen burns or detonation within containment.
o In examining earthquakes as a contributor to radioactive release scenarios, the report may not adequately consider
! after-shocks while the contairment is pressurized, which j adds an impluse pressure load, o The report's conclusions on radioactive relaases from steam generator tube runtures may not be consistent wi*h i recent analyses conducted by Battelle Columbus Laboratory on SG tube rupture scenarios.
The NQC staff has acknowledged that an anal" sis which included consideration of these phenomena and scenariot could significantly affect the validity of the study. However, the narrow scope of Brookhaven's necember 8, 1986 evaluation did not allow for such an analysis. Does NRC in+and to address i these issues in determininn whether the study does, in fact, establish a sound basis for the utility's assertion that il Seabrook's containment is uniquelv stronq and therefore may justify a reduction in the size of the emergancy planning zone? If not, why not?
ANSWER.
8 The question is inaccurate in its assertion that "the narrow scope o' Brookhaven's December 8,1986 evaluation did not allow for such analysis."
! In particular:
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QUESTION 7.(Continued) o The strenoth of the containment and its penetrations was addressed in Chapter 3 and the findings were incorporated into the risk estimates in Chapters 4 and 6.
o The direct containment beating phenomenon associated with hiqh pressure melt ejection is included in the estimation of containment pressure loads developed by Brookhaven National Laboratory (RNLI in Chapter 4 of their report, o The pressure loads from hydrogen were included in the estimation of containment loads developed by BNL in Chapter 4 of their report, o The source terms used by BNL to characterize the risk from induced steam generator tube rupture events are considerably more conservative than those in the Rattelle Columbus Laboratory report because RNL used the WASH-1400 source term methodology. Ilse of the new source term woo.d substantially reduce the risk estimates for induced SG tube rupture scenarios, v our question is accurate in its assertion that there has been no attempt by PLG or RNL to add after-shock seismic loads to containment pressure loads following a seismically induced core melt accident. The NGC sta'f will be evaluating this issue, as well as the other issues raised which were considered in the BNL evaluation as referenced above, in determinino the Staff's response to the Seabrook request for approval of a reduced EPZ.
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OllESTION 8. In response to the Subcommittee's November 3, 1986 request for information (Question 17), NPC provided updates of the chronologies requested in our August 28, 1986 letter pertaining to internal and public documents, telenhone calls, and reetings related to a reduction of the size of the emeroency planning zone and the review of the SSPSA Update, please provide updates of those chronologies for the Subcommittee which include all communications, includinn but not linited to meetings, telephone calls, and records, which have occurred since the last comunications and records enumerated in your previous answer. Additionally, please provide detailed summaries of these and each of the items listed in the November 14 updated chronningies, which were omitted fron the Commission's response.
AMSWER.
The updates to chronologies are provided en the enclosed lists. Copies of the listed documents are provided. However, many of the NoC staff have had many internal discussions and informal meetinos for which they cannot recall exact dates, participants or sub,iects.
Project Mananers involved in the review have similarly had numerous telephone conversations with PSNH personnel for which exact datas, topics and particinants cannot be accurately recalled. Attornevs in MC have had many telephone conversations over this period with all parties to the Seabrook proceedings. Where parsonal notes were available, they are provided and the associated meetinos or telephone calls have been listed. " Detailed sumaries" are provided where available.
Enclosures:
- 1. Mtgs A Telephone Conversations
- 2. External Cormunication Documents
- 3. Internal Documents 4 Personal Notes 1
QUESTION 9. In response to an August 28, 1986 request from the Subcomittee, the Commission provided a " Chronology of Meetings and Discussions with Utility and Other Groups" regarding Seabrook, the SSPSA Update, and emergency planning issues. A photocopy is attached.
Between June 2n, 1986 and July 30, 1986 approximately 8 telephone calls and meetings took place between members of the NRC's management and William Derrickson of New Hampshire Yankea. Please provide detailed summaries of these meetings and telaphone conversations, and provide all documents and racords partaining to these meetings and telephnne calls.
ANSWER.
Between June 20, 1986 and July 30, 1986, there were five telephone calls and one meeting between members o' NRC's management and Mr. Derrickson. The maeting and each telephone call involved either Mr. Stello or Mr. Denton of NRC. In response to your .lanuary 12, 1987 request, both Mr. Stello and Mr. Denton met with Mr. Lawrence Sidman of vour staff and briefed him on the content and circumstances of these discussions. There are no documents or records pertaining to these discussions other than calendar notations.
00ESTION 10. In its Decembar 1, 1986 response to Subcommittee question 28, l the Commission stated, "For the Seabrook containment an independent analysis of its "':apability pressure" is currently underway." Please explain in detail who is conducting this independent analysis, when was it initiated, and by whom.
ANSWER.
The irdependent analysis of the Seabrook containment was ner#ormed by Brookhaven National Laboratory (BNL) between September and December In86.
This activity was initiated by the NRC staff and the results of this independent analysis were reported in Section 3 of the BNL draft renort, t
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QUESTION 11. Regarding NRC's November 10, 1986 response to the Subcommittee's question 4 The Subcommittee reauested that the Commission provide all staff resoonses to the August 11, 1986 memorandum from Speis to Novak. The NRC's response notas only ~
that the memorandum "was considered by management in constructing a review plan for the Seabrook EPZ sensitiviti, study." Please respond to the question as posed in the Subcommittee's November 3, 1986 letter.
ANSWER.
There was no response to the August 11, 1996 memorandum from Soeis to Novak.
Our previous response to your ouestion regardino this memo is complete and i correct as stated, i
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QUESTION 12. In its September 24, 1986 response to Subcommittee question 11(b), the Commission provided a list of violations of emergency preparedness requirements since January 1, 1983.
However, the Subcommittee requested an explanation of the enforcement actions taken by the NRC in each instance. The Commission's response described only the " nature of violation." Please provide a complete listing as requested.
ANSWER.
A Notice of Violation is normally the only enforcement action taken except in cases where the severity level of a violation shows a need for escalated enforcement action such as the imposition of a civil penaltv. Followup inspections are performed to verify that the corrective actions indicated in the violation have been satisfactorily completed for both escalated and non-escalated enforcement actions. All of the violations listed in our September 24, 1986 response involved non-escalated enforcement action where issuance of a notice of violation was the only enforcement action except as descrihed below.
The only emer9ency preparedness violations issued since January 1, 1983 in which escalated enforcement action has haen taken have been the 1985 Salem violation for failure to denenstrate adequate response capability and the 1986 Rancho Seco violation for failure to adequately imolement certain emergency plan procedures during an event which occurred on December 26, 1985. In both of these cases, civil oenalties were assessed. (The September 7a, 1986 response incorrectly identified Duane Arnold as a site where escalated enforcement action has been taken.) All of the other violations listed in the attachment to this response, are non-escalated enforcement violations. The NRC Regions have verified through followup inspections that the indicated correcthe actions have been completed for each of the listed violations except for the following:
Monticello(1984) Waterford I19961 Kewaunee (19851 Turkey Point (1986)
Grand Gulf (1985) Brunswick (19a6)
Lacrosse (1986) Catawba (1986)
DiabloCanyon(1986) Hatch (1986)
Rancho Seco (1986) Sumner (19861 Fort St. Vrain (1986) Crystal River (1086)
Arkansas (1986)
Enclosure:
Additional EP Enforcement Actions i
QUESTION 13. What implications could a State's non-participation in emergency planning have for licensing proceedings as relates to the 50-mile ingestion pathway emergency planning zone?
ANSWER.
A state's non-participation in emergency plannino for the ingestion pathway emergency planning zone (EPZ) would have similar but less severe implications as the non-participation of a State in the emergency plannino for the plume exposure pathway EPZ. The extent o' planning for the inoestion pathway is less than for the plume exposure pathway and the time available to implement protective actiens is generally greater. If a state chose not to participate in emergency planning for the ingestion pathway EPZ, a licensee or an apolicant, under NRC rules, would have an opportunity to demonstrate that the lack of such participation is not significant, or that adequate interim compensating actions have been or will be taken promptly, or that there are other ccmpelling reasons to permit plant operation.
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