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Insp Repts 50-338/86-04 & 50-339/86-04 on 860203-0302. Violation Noted:Failure to Maintain Required Electrical Load for First 2 H of 24 H Emergency Diesel Generator Run,Per Procedure 2-PT-83.4
	ML20140B601
Person / Time
Site:	North Anna
Issue date:	03/17/1986
From:	Branch M, Ignatonis A, King L; NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
To:	;
Shared Package
ML20140B567	List: ML20140B565; ML20140B577; ML20140B601;
References
	50-338-86-04, 50-338-86-4, 50-339-86-04, 50-339-86-4, IEB-85-001, IEB-85-1, IEIN-85-098, IEIN-85-98, NUDOCS 8603240247
	Download: ML20140B601 (7)
	v • d • e

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UNITED STATES

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Report Nos.: 50-338/86-04.and 50-339/86-04

~ Licensee: Virginia Electric & Power Company

. Richmond, VA 23261

Docket Nos.: 50-338 and 50-339

Facility Name: North Anna 1 and 2

Inspection Conducted: February 3 - March 2, 1986

Inspectors: Td Eb ub

M. W. Branch, Senior Resident Inspector

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Date Signed

LAAL D1 -

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L. P. King l Date Signed

Approved by: 6 4 d -a ', 3// 7/M

A. J. Ignitonis,gActing Section Chief Dat'e Sig'ned

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Division of Reactor Project.s

SUMMARY

Scope: This routine inspectionz by the resident inspectors involve'd 203

inspector-hours on ' site in the areas of licensee event report (LER) review,

engineering safety features (ESF) walkdown, operational safety verification,

monthly maintenance, and monthly surveillance.

Results: One violation was identified - failure to comply with the requirements

of a test procedure for emergency diesel' generator operation', paragraph 8.

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REPORT DETAILS

1. Licensee Employees Contacted

E. W. Harrell, Station Manager

D. B. Roth, Quality Control (QC) Manager

G. E. Kane, Assistant Station Manager

E. R. Smith, Assistant Station Manager

R. O. Enfinger, Superintendent, Operations

M. R. Kansler, Superintendent, Maintenance

A. H. Stafford, Superintendent, Health Physics

J. A. Stall, Superintendent, Technical Services

J. L. Downs, Supervisor, Administrative Services

J. R. Hayes, Operations Coordinator

D. A. Heacock, Engineering Supervisor

D. E. Thomas, Mechanical Maintenance Supervisor

E. C. Tuttle, Electrical Supervisor

R. A. Bergquist, Instrument Supervisor

F. T. Terminella, QA Supervisor

R. S. Thomas, Supervisor Engineering

G. H. Flowers, Nuclear Specialist

J. H. Leberstein, Licensing Coordinator

Other licensee employees contacted include technicians, operators,

mechanics, security force members, and office personnel.

Attended exit interview.

2. Exit Interview

The inspection scope and findings were summarized on March 5,1986, with

those persons indicated in paragraph 1 above. A violation described in

paragraph 8, failure to follow procedure requirements for emergency diesel

generator operation, was discussed in detail. The licensee acknowledged the

inspectors findings and took no exceptions. The licensee did not. identify

as proprietary any of the material provided to or reviewed by the inspectors

during this inspection. The licensee also formally committed to those ,

proposed corrective actions discussed in paragraph 12 of this report.

3. Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings

(Closed) Violation 338,339/85-16-02, including additional examples listed in I

paragraph 17 of inspection report 338,339/85-18: Failure to comply with

station procedures. The inspectors reviewed the licensee's corrective

action specified in their response dated September 19, 1985 (s/n 85-543) and

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later, in a revised response of December 19, 1985 (s/n 85-821). The

corrective action was found to be acceptable.

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4. Plant Status

Unit 1

Unit 1 operated at or near 100% for most of the inspection period. However,

on February 23, 1986, the unit tripped from 100% reactor power due to a

low-low level in the "B" steam generator. The low-low steam generator

level, caused by shrink, resulted when all four governor valves on the main

turbine went shut due to a failure of the Electro Hydraulic Control (EHC)

System. All safety systems responded normally; however, source range

nuclear instrument channel N31 failed when energized. After subsequent

detector replacement and testing, the channel was declared operable. The

unit was returned to power on February 25,1986, and it currently at 100%

power.

Unit 2

On February 20,1986, at 10:00 A.M. , a Unit 2 shutdown from approximately

80% power was initiated due to an increase in unidentified reactor coolant

(RC) leakage and leakage in steam generator "C". The calculated

unidentified RC leakage was near the Technical Specification (TS) limit of

1.0 GPM. At 2:36 P.M. of the same date, while entering mode 3, the unit

received a reactor trip on a high source range (SR) monitor N-31 signal

which spiked high. Both SR monitors became inoperable and probable cause

was suspected to be the high humidity in the containment prior to shutdown.

The backup Appendix "R" monitor was operable and the licensee verified

shutdown margin compliance per the TS. The unit entered into the 48-day

refueling and maintenance outage, previously scheduled for March 1986.

5. Licensee Event Report (LER) Follow-Up (92700)

The following LERs were reviewed and closed. The inspector verified that

reporting requirements had been met, that causes had been identified, that

corrective actions appeared appropriate, that generic applicability had been

considered, and that the LER forms were complete. Additionally, the

inspectors confirmed that no unreviewed safety questions were involved and

that violations of regulations or Technical Specification (TS) conditions

had been identified.

(Closed) 338/85-013; Revision 1: Operability of the Reactor Vessel Level

Indication System (RVLIS). In addition to the above review the inspectors

also verified that performance test procedure (PT) 1(2)-PT-44.7 was modified

to include the new acceptance criteria.

6. Follow-up of Previously Identified Items

(Closed) IFI 338,339/85-05-04: Feedwater temperature accuracy. The

inspectors reviewed and found acceptable the licensee's response to the

concerns identified in the inspection report. Temporary jumpers were

removed and the use of the manual method to perform calorimetric

calibrations was eliminated from 1 (2)-PT-24. Additionally, the

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installation and removal of any temporary equipment has been included in 1

(2)-PT-27.

7. Monthly Maintenance (62703)

Station maintenance activities affecting safety related systems and

components were observed / reviewed, to ascertain that the activities were

conducted in accordance with approved procedures, regulatory guides and

industry codes or standards, and in conformance with Technical

Specifications.

The inspectors observed the overhaul of the 2H Fairbanks Morse emergency

diesel generator. The removal of the upper crankshaft, the 24 pistons and

connecting rods and the number 1 thru 10 liners were observed. The

individual fuel injectors were removed and shipped to the factory for

modification. The number 1 thru 10 liners will be replaced with hign

temperature liners. The number 11 and 12 had been replaced on a previous

outage. Recordings were taken to determine the clearances in the air supply

blower.

8. Monthly Surveillance (61726)

The inspectors observed and reviewed TS required testing and verified that

testing was performed in accordance with adequate procedures, that test

instrumentation was calibrated, that limiting conditions for operation (LCO)

were met and that any deficiencies identified were properly reviewed and

resolved.

On February 4, 1986, the inspectors observed testing of solid state

protection system and tripping of B reactor trip breaker - Unit 2 test

2-PT-36.1A

On February 11, 1986, the inspectors observed performance of 2H emergency

diesel generator slow speed start per procedure 2-PT-82H.

On February 21, 1986, during the performance of 2-PT-70, " Main Steam Code

Safety Valve Setpoint Verification" for Unit 2, 8 of the 15 main steam

safety valves failed to relieve. Four of these valves were on the "C" steam

generator main steam line. The design basis require a minimum of two safety

valves per steam generator to be operable. 10 CFR 50.72(2) required that a

four-hour report be made. This incident was reported at 12:30 p.m. on

February 21, 1986. All 15 safety valves had been previously set offsite at

ITT Hensley. The inspectors requested that the licensee furnish the test

data from 2-PT-70 done offsite in September 1984. The valves have been sent

offsite to Wyle Laboratories (Huntsville, Alabama) for further testing.

The inspectors also reviewed the completed procedure 2-PT-83.4, " Blackout of

Emergency Bus for Shutdown Loads", performed on February 23, 1986, for the

2J emergency bus and on February 21, 1986, for the 2H emergency bus. The

purpose of this test is to verify that the emergency diesel generator (EDG)

operates satisfactorily for at least 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months with the generator loaded to

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an indicated target value of 2950 kw (between 2900-3000 kw) during the first

2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months of the test and between 2500-2600 kw for the remaining 22 hours2.546296e-4 days 0.00611 hours 3.637566e-5 weeks 8.371e-6 months .

During the performance of the 2J emergency bus portion of the test the

system load increased and for a 7.5 minute period the 2J diesel remained

loaded to approximately 3200 kw; and then again, for another 1.5 minute

period the 2J diesel was loaded to approximately 3450 kw. During both of

these periods, the operator failed to promptly intervene by bringing the

load back into the required band. There are several factors that might have

affected the operators response to the excessive EDG loading. First, the

operator who was operating the diesel during the test was the normal shift

backboard operator, and with his many other duties it was difficult for him

to closely monitor the diesel during a 24-hour run. Also, neither the

recorder nor the installed diesel instrumentation are equipped with an alarm

circuit to aid the operator in restricting diesel loading. These factors

combined with the adverse effects of electrically overloading the diesel

beyond it's design capacity, appears to warrant immediate licensee atten-

tion. The failure to follow the requirements of test procedure 2-PT-83.4 is

a violation of section 6.8.1 of the North Anna Technical Specifications,

which requires that written procedures be established and implemented,

(339/86-04-01).

9. ESF System Walkdown (71710)

The following selected ESF systems were verified operable by performing a

walkdown of the accessible and essential portions of the systems.

Unit 1

Auxiliary Feedwater (1-0P-31.2A dated December 23, 1985)

Unit 2

Auxiliary Feedwater (2-0P-31.2A dated April 25, 1985)

No violations or deviations were identified.

10. Routine Inspection

By observations during the inspection period, the inspectors verified that

the control room manning requirements were being met. In addition, the

inspectors observed shif t turnover to verify that continuity of system

status was maintained. The inspectors periodically questioned shift

personnel relative to their awareness of plant conditions.

Through log review and plant tours, the inspectors verified compliance with

selected Technical Specification (TS) and Limiting Conditions for

Operations.

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During the course of the inspection, observations relative to Protected and

Vital Area security were made, including access controls, boundary

integrity, search, escort and badging.

On a regular basis, radiation work permits (RWP) were reviewed and the

specific work activity was monitored to assure the activities were being

conducted per the RWPs. Selected radiation protection instruments were

periodically checked and equipment operability and calibration frequency was

verified.

The inspectors were kept informed, on a daily basis, of overall status of

both units and of any significant safety matter related to plant operations.

Discussions were held with plant management and various members of the

operations. staff on a regular basis. Selected portions of operating logs and

data sheets were reviewed daily.

The inspectors conducted various plant tours and made frequent visits to the

Control Room. Observations included: witnessing work activities in progress;

verifying the status of operating and standby safety systems and equipment;

confirming valve positions, instrument and recorder readings, annunciator

alarms, and housekeeping.

11. Inspection and Enforcement Bulletin (IEB) Followup (92703)

(Closed) IE Bulletin 85-01; Steam binding of Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps. The

inspectors reviewed the licensee's response dated February 18, 1986 (Serial

No.85-797) and found it acceptable. Additionally, the inspectors reviewed

the revisions to 1-LOG-6F and 2-LOG-6F as well as 1(2) PT-71.1, 1(2)-PT-71.2

and 1(2)-PT-71.3. New abnormal procedure AP-22.9, " Auxiliary Feedwater Check

Valve Backleakage", was also reviewed and found acceptable.

12. Westinghouse Reactor Protection Over-Power Delta Temperature (OP AT) Card

During the inspection period, the inspectors verified that the licensee

received the Inspection and Enforcement Information Notice (IEIN) No. 85-98.

This IEIN described a condition of missing low-limiting JA type jumpers from

the lead / lag circuit card in the Westinghouse 7300 process cabinet. Without

this jumper, a decreasing TAVE will raise the OP AT setpoint when certain

accident analysis assume a maximum limit for this setpoint.

Although the licensee had not fully evaluated the subject IEIN and they have

90 days to complete the review per their administrative procedure,due to the

nature of the concern the inspectors requested that the licensee expedite

their evaluation and verify the existe.1ce of JA jumpers. On February 12,

1986, the jumpers for Unit 1, Channelt 1 and 3, were discovered to be

missing. All three Unit 2 jumpers and the Unit 1, Channel 2, jumper were

verified to be correctly installed. TN missing jumpers were installed and

a card calibration was performed.

The licensee and the inspectors could not determine if the jumpers have

always been missing, or whether a replacement of the cards over the years

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resulted in the jumpers not being installed. To address a concern expressed

in this IEIN, the licensee has committed to modify the card repair test

procedure to require testing of both the positive and negative derivative

response. Additionally, the licensee has committed to issuing an Instrument

Department memo to require a specific jumper verification of all replacement

cards in addition to the component and loop calibration already being

performed.

The Westinghouse provided precautions, limitation and setpoint document for

North Anna does not establish a low-limit on the OP AT setpoint.

Additionally, the Technical Specification basis for the OP AT trip states

that "No credit was taken for operation of this trip in accident analysis;

however, its function capability at the specified trip setting is required

by this specification to enhance the overall reliability of the Reactor

Protection System".

The inspectors evaluated the violation against the criteria established by

10 CFR, Part 2, Appendix C. Considering the minimal safety significance,

combined with the licensee's prompt corrective actions and commitments to

correct root cause, no notice of violation will be issued.

13. Diesel Generator Problems

In inspection report 338, 339/85-27 the inspectors described previous diesel

generator failures and probable cause. At the time of that inspection the

licensee felt that stress-related damage to the wrist pin-to-connecting rod

and wrist pin-to piston bushing, was t.aused by cumulative mechanical

overload from past testing. TS testing raquirements for Unit 2 were modified

to reduce the number of cold fast starts and rapid loading of the diesel

generators. However, during the current complete engine overhaul the wrist

pin-to-connecting rod bushing was observed as having elongated; not as

severe as that seen during the October 1985 failures, but enough to cause a

concern. Since October 1985 when all piston assemblies including the bushing

were replaced, the 2H engine has seen very little run time; approximately 80

hours, with only 20 starts, three of which were fast starts.

The licensee plans to replace out-of-specification bushings and change the

lubrication oil in all four diesel engines. The new oil, Chevron Dello 6000,

has been approved by Colt and will replace the present Gulf XHD 40 oil. The

inspectors will continue to follow the diesel engine problems under IFI

(338,339/85-27-02).

ML20140B601

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