ML20137F171
| ML20137F171 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Perry  |
| Issue date: | 01/14/1986 |
| From: | Silberg J CLEVELAND ELECTRIC ILLUMINATING CO., SHAW, PITTMAN, POTTS & TROWBRIDGE |
| To: | Johnson W, Rosenthal A, Wilber H NRC ATOMIC SAFETY & LICENSING APPEAL PANEL (ASLAP) |
| References | |
| CON-#186-752 OL, NUDOCS 8601170459 | |
| Download: ML20137F171 (2) | |
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- JAv E. SILetmo, P.C. saoas saa-soes January 14, 1986 Alan S. Rosenthal, Chairman Atomic Safety and Licensing Appeal Board U. S. Nuclear' Regulatory Commission Washington, D. C. 20555 Dr. W. Reed Johnson Atomic Safety and Licensing Appeal Board U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D. C. 20555 Mr. Howard A. Wilber Atomic Safety and Licensing Appeal Board U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D. C. 20555 Re: The Cleveland Electric Illuminating Company (Perry Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and 2)
Docket Nos. 50-440 and 50-441 ob Gentlemen:
Enclosed for your information is a December 13, 1985 NRC inspection report concerning the November 20, 1985 Perry Nuclear Power Plant emergency preparedness exercise.
ery truly yours, A O 40' & "
N vhrE. Silberg C nsa 1 for Appli anta 2
JES:L Enclosure I
cc Service List (w/ encl.)
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- UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING APPEAL BOARD 1:n the Matter of )
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THE CLEVELAND ELECTRIC ) Docket Nos. 50-440 ILLUMINATING COMPANY, ET AL. ) 50-441
)
(Perry Nuclear Power Plant, )
Units 1 and 2) )
SERVICE LIST Alan S. Rosenthal, Chairman Atomic Safety and Licensing Atomic Safety and Licensing Appeal Board Panel Appeal Board U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D. C. 20555 Washington, D. C. 20555 Dr. W. Reed Johnson Docketing and Service section Atomic Safety and Licensing Office of the Secretary Appeal Board U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D. C. 20555 Washington, D. C. 20555 Mr. Howard A. Wilber Colleen Woodhead, Esquire Atomic Safety and Licensing Office of the Executive Legal Appeal Board Director U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D. C. 20555 Washington, D. C. 20555 James P. Gleason, Chairman Terry Lodge, Esquire 513 Gilmoure Drive Suite 105 Silver Spring, Maryland 20901 618 N. Michigan Street Toledo, Ohio 43624 Jerry R. Kline Ms. Susan L. Hiatt Atomic Safety and Licensing Board 8275 Munson Avenue U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Mentor, Ohio 44060 Washington, D.C. 20555 Glenn O. Bright Donald T. Essone, Esquire Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Assistant Prosecuting Attorney U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Lake County Administration Center Washington, D.C. 20555 105 Center Street Painesville, Ohio 44077 Atomic Safety and Licensing Atomic Safety and Licensing Appeal Board Board Panel U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 Washington, D.C. 20555 John G. Cardinal, Esquire Prosecuting Attorney Ashtabula County Courthouse Jefferson, Ohio 44047
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e p aeo: UNITED STATES
. *: 0,, NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION g .P
- REGION lli 5 799 mOOSEVELT moAo 8, OLEN ELLYN, ILLINO15 60137
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DEC 131985 ,
1 Docket No. 50-440 Docket No. 50-441 The Cleveland Electric Illuminating Company ATTN: Mr. Murray R. Edelman Vice President Nuclear Group Post Office Box 5000 Cleveland, OH 44101 Gentlemen:
. This refers to the emergency preparedness exercise inspection conducted by Mr. J. P. Patterson and others of this office on November 19-21, 1985, of activities at Perry Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and 2, authorized by NRC Construction Permits No. CPPR-148 and CPPR-149, and to the discussion of our findings with Mr. A. Kaplan and others of your staff at the conclusion of the inspection.
The enclosed copy of our inspection report identifies areas examined during the inspection. Within these areas, the inspection consisted of a selective
- examination of procedures and representative records, observations, and 2
interviews with personnel.
No violations of NRC requirements were identified during the course of this inspection.
In accordance with Section 2.790 of the NRC's " Rules of Practice," Part 2, Title 10, Code of Federal Regulations, a copy of this letter and the enclosures will be placed in the NRC Public Document Room.
We will gladly discuss any questions you have concerning this inspection.
Sincerely, sL Shafer Chief Emergency Pre,paredness and Radiological Protection Branch
Enclosure:
Inspection Report
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No. 50-440/85075(DRSS);
No. 50-441/85025(DRSS)
See Attached Distribution
$7l2iy252-~1[{
The Cleveland Electric Illuminating Company Distribution cc w/ enclosure:
J. J. Waldron, Manager, Perry Plant Technical Department
.M. D. Lyster, Manager, Perry Plant Operations Department L. O. Beck, General Supervising Engineer, Nuclear Licensing and Fuel Management Section DCS/RS8 (RIDS)
Licensing Fee Management Branch Resident Inspector, RIII Harold W. Kohn, Ohio EPA Terry J. Lodge, Esq.
James W. Harris, State of Ohio Robert H. Quillin, Ohio Department of Health D.-Matthews, OIE, EPB W. Weaver, FEMA, RV l .
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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION III Report Nos. 50-440/85075(DRSS); 50-441/85025(DRSS)
Docket Nos. 50-440; 50-441 License Nos. CPPR-148; CPPR-149 Licensee: Cleveland Electric Illuminating Company Post Office Box 5000 Cleveland, Ohio 44101 Facility Name: Perry Nuclear Power Plant Inspection At: Perry Site, Perry, Ohio Inspection Conducted: November 19-21, 1985 hQ Inspector: J. . Patterson Team Leader
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. R. Williamsen l 2l/Dlfr7 Date i;t.JduA-M.JiSmith /.#/BIf Date R. T. ogan, E B / /MV Date Approved By: M. P. hillips, Chief / M6 Emergency Preparedness Section Date Inspection Summary Inspection on November 19-21, 1985 (Report Nos. 50-440/85075(DRSS);
50-441/85025(ORSS))
Areas Inspected: Routine, announced inspection of the Perry Nuclear Power Plant emergency preparedness exercise involving observations'by eight NRC representatives of key functions and locations during the exercise. The inspection involved 188 inspector-hours onsite by four NRC inspectors and four consultants.
Results: No violations, deficiencies, or deviations were identified.
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- - - - - _.- - .~4 DETAILS
- 1. Persons contacted NRC Observers and Areas Observed G. Bryan, Control Room (Simulator)
C. Haughney, Technical Support Center (TSC)
J. Davis, Operations Support Center (OSC)
R. Hogan, Medical Drill and Post-Accident Sampling System (PASS)
T. Essig, TSC and Emergency Operations Facility (EOF)
N. Williamsen, Offsite Radiation Monitoring Teams M. Smith, EOF, Joint Public Information Center (JPIC)
J. Patterson, TSC, OSC and EOF Cleveland Electric Illuminatina Company
- M. Edelman, Vice President, Nuclear Group A. Kaplan, Vice President, Nuclear Operation Division D. Hulbert, Emergency Planning Coordinator J. Anderson, Emergency Planning Assistant W. Coleman, General Superintendent, Community Relations R. Smith, Offsite Emergency Planner R. Farrell, Manager, Perry Project Services M. Lyster, Manager, Perry Plant Operations D. Takacs, General Superintendent, Maintenance R. Tadych, General Superincendent, Operations L. Vanderhorst, Plant Health Physicist J. Jastel, Quality Engineering, Lead T. Mahon, General Supervisor, Site Protection K. Novak, Security Training Coordinator C. Dixon, General Supervisor, Community Affairs T. Boyer, Shift Supervisor J. Goecker, Maintenance Supervisor T. Corbett, Training Department, Responsible Instructor F. Whitaker, Health Physics Supervisor W. King, Public Information W. Kanda, Plant Technical Engineer F. Stead, Manager, Nuclear Engineering Department
- Did not attend the exit interview on November 21, 1985.
- 2. General An exercise of the applicant's Perry Nuclear Power Plant Emergency Plan was conducted at the Perry Nuclear Power Plant (PNPP) on Ncvember 20, 1985, testing the response of the applicant to a hypothetical accident scenario resulting in a major release of radioactive effluent.
, Attachment 1 describes the Scope and Objectives of the exercise and Attachment 2 describes the exercise scenario. This was a utility-only exercise.
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- 3. G_eneral Observations
- a. Procedures This exercise was. conducted in accordance with 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, requirements using the PNPP Emergency Plan and the.
PNPP Emergency Plan Implementing Instructions.
- b. Coordination
- The applicant's respo'ise was coordinated, 'arderly and timely. If the events had been real, the actions taken by the licensee would have been sufficient to permit the State and local authorities to take appropriate actions.
- c. Observers Applicant's observers monitored and critiqued this exercise along with eight NRC observers.
- d. Exercise Critiques q
- i. The applicant held a critique on November 21, 1985, the day after the exercise. The NRC critique was held immediately after the applicant's critique. Personnel who attended are listed in Section 1.
- The NRC discussed the observed strengths and weaknesses daring the exit interview.
- 4. Licensee Actions on a Previously-Identified Open Item Related to Emergency Preparedness (Closed) Open Item No. 440/80-15; 441/80-15-88. This ite'ri relates to an NRC bulletin issued June 18, 1980 regarding a possible>1oss of the emergency notification system (ENS telephone) with a loss of offsite power. ,The inspector interviewed a member of the applicant's emergency
- planning staff and the applicant's Responsible Design Engineer, Nuclear Design and Analysis Section. The AT&T equipment package including the ENS line was powered by an independent uninterruptible power source.
This item is considered closed.
- 5. Specific Observations
- a. Control Room Because of potential interference with Unit 1 pre-testing activities, the PNPP simulator, on the first floor of the PNPP Training and Education Center, was used throughout the exercise. The Notice of Unusual Event (NUE) and the Alert declaration were both properly
- classified by the Control Room based on the appropriate Emergency Action Level (EAL) for each event. Notification to State, Counties, and the NRC were made in a timely manner for each of these levels of emergency. The U.S. Coast Guard was notified of the NUE and the 3
O' Alert before the NRC was notified. Emergency Plan Instruction, EPI-81, Revision 4, Section 5.2.2 lists the U.S. Coast Guard as the first Federal agency to be contacted after the State of Ohio and the three Counties. However, Section 5.2.3 of this procedure directed the Emergency Coordinator (EC) to have the communicator contact the NRC immediately after.the State and Counties. Procedure
' EPI-B1 should be consistent in the order of contacts outside the
, plant in the event of an emergency.
The Shift Technical Advisor (STA) performed his function well, and his actions integrated well with the control room staff. The Control Room staff was well trained and demonstrated coordination in their
, efforts to mitigate the effects of the accident.
-Immediately after the Plant Public Announcing System (PPAS) announced the Alert, the Control Room received a telephone call
, ensuring that an announcement regarding TSC and OSC activation
, is made; however, no such announcement was made according to other NRC observers. Shift of command and control, from the SS as initial EC to the Operations Manager as the new EC in the TSC, was made by a telephone call about 0923.
Good communications were maintained with the three other ERFs throughout the exercise. The Control Room team functioned well,
- was coordinated in effort, and responded appropriately to operational and rafety systems failure except for those listed above. ,
Based on the above findings, the following items should be considered for improvement: -
- The Shift Supervisor in the Control Room, upon declaration of the Alert, should follow Section 5.1.3 of EPI-A7, and make the appropriate announcements activating the TSC and OSC, or this section should be eliminated as a redundant measure.
- Procedure EPI-81 should be clarified and revised so that each section is consistent regarding immediate notifications.
- b. ' Technical Support Center (TSC)
Emergency assigned personnel began arriving shortly after 0857 when the Alert was announced on the PPAS. At 0926 the TSC was officially activated by the Emergency Coordinator, 29 minutes after the Alert declaration. The TSC Operations Manager conducted a transfer (by telephone) of command and control with the SS in I the Control Room at approximately 0923. However, no formal announcement of this was heard in either the TSC or Control Room.
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The TSC Operations Manager did not announce over the Plant Public Announcing System (PPAS) that the TSC was activated as required by EPI-A6, Section 5.1.3. Orderly, professional and intense participation by the TSC staff was demonstrated throughout the exercise. The Emergency Coordinator gave thorough.and frequent briefings to his support manager and all the TSC staff. Use of the adjacent auxiliary TSC room for offsite communications, as well as for reviewing plant and engineering systems drawings proved very useful, particularly for engineering troubleshooting of operational problems encountered in the emergency.
A good example of anticipating possible adverse consequences of
, future actions was demonstrated by a decision to shift to shutdown cooling. A shift rotation scheme was coordinated with counterparts in the EOF. Recovery planning was thorough, well organized and involved all appropriate emergency organizations managers.
The noise level in the main TSC room was high and the room seemed congested with emergency personnel most of the day; however, this may be difficult to alleviate because of the size of the room.
Continuous broadcast of several plant radio channels was distracting as well as adding to the noise level. One suggestion would be to move the Information Liaison Representative to the adjacent TSC room.
Habitability surveys were conducted two to three times; however, the results of these surveys were never reported to any of the TSC managers.
The TSC area is connected with an operational area radiation monitor with alarm indicator, which may have limited the EC's concern over the habitability monitoring. In general, the TSC status boards were highly readable and well used. A section on the status board should be designed to display the status of the electrical distribution system. The changing steam tunnel temperatures shculd have been logged and trended on the TSC status boards.
The Site Area Emergency (SAE) was properly declared and the announcerent was made on the PPAS, accompanied by a plant emergency alarm as required by EPI-A4.
Announcement was made by the EC that the EOF had been activated, and that he had been relieved of his EC duties at 1125. A TSC participant was observed at 1146 handing out plant data scenario forms to cognizant TSC personnel rather than waiting for a controller. This added to the artificiality of the controllers periodic distribution of plant data sheets due to ERIS being inoperative. Prior to the General Emergency, the Radiation Protection Coordinator announced preparation to obtain a reactor coolant sample, a normal requirement following reactor shutdown.
Initial dose assessment calculations were made in the TSC and completed in a timely manner. The first dispatch of offsite l radiation monitoring team was made a few minutes after the SAE I
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was declared. Subsequent transfer of authority for these teams from the TSC to the EOF was properly completed in an orderly manner i by the Radiation Protection Coordinator to his counterpart of the '
EOF.
, Based on the above findings, the following item should be considered for improvement.
- For activation of the TSC, procedure EPI-A6, Section 5.1.3, should be followed in its entirety including an announcement on the PPAS that the TSC is activated, or else this section of the procedure should be eliminated.
The OSC was activated in approximately 30 minutes in a systematic 4
and professional, manner. Air habitability checks were started early with a constant air monitor just outside the OSC office. A status board with five separate headings for the various support and repair teams, including Health Physics and Chemistry, was used throughout the exercise. This was well maintained and proved useful throughout the exercise. The status board listing chronological events was often behind time. Status reports by the TSC's EC were heard clearly over the PPAS. As requested by the OSC Coordinator, briefings were held by the Team Leader of each in plant team before the team was dispatched.
As reported in Section 4.b, there was some initial confusion over the activation of the OSC since no PPAS announcement was made.
Personnel correctly pursued activating the OSC because the Alert was previously declared which automatically triggered the activation process. The personnel pagers for some technical response personnel failed; however, they responded because they heard the Alert announcement.
Information from teams sent out to perform repair tasks or radiation surveys was not recorded in the chronological event log. The OSC Coordinator and the Health Physics Supervisor received most of the communications and recorded the information on note pads. The NRC observer recommended a full time communicator to permit the OSC l Coordinator and the Health Physics Supervisor to be available for emergency evaluation decisionmaking and monitoring of the OSC teams.
A maintenance team was sent to check the area where the water deluge valve had accidentally opened, which put the ventilation system out of service. This team appeared undecided as to what action to take after they arrived at the scene. The lack of concise instructions in a briefing on what was to be done appeared to be the cause. Some teams were observed not exiting properly through the control point.
l One team did not sign the Radiation Work Permit (RWP). While l~ observing an air sample being counted in the Healtti Physics Counting, t Room, cross-contamination of the air samples was observed. Two persons with beards were dispatched when a request was made for a ,
team to make a containment entry. The OSC Coordinator should have '
requested two others, clean shaven, since the two with beards would not qualify for wearing full face respirators.
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, i A PASS sample was requested by the TSC about 1235. The team was I dispatched without delay after a briefing, and was fully outfitted '
in anti-contamination clothing before departing to the PASS panel.
The team worked diligently and with some difficulty did obtain a reactor coolant sample. One problem with the PASS was in the collection of excess liquid, that overflowed the sample bottle into the shielded container. The sample was not labeled as delivered to the laboratory. The NRC observer. concluded that a remote handling tool should be used to transfer the sample vials from the sample cabinet to the shielded container for further transport. Besides better handling, greater distance from the sample would limit personnel exposure. Results on the PASS sample were reported about 1537, or 3 hours3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> after the initial request; however, the results were available about 1430.
In conclusion, OSC supervision and key support staff performed well; however, there were several examples of poor techniques and actions taken by the emergency response teams, which indicated reinforced training in these areas is needed.
Based on the above findings, the following items should be considered for improvement:
- A full time Communicator should be assigned to the OSC to relieve the OSC Coordinator and his support managers from answering the more routine messages.
- The log keeper should base his input on current, accurate information as it flows in and out of the OSC and not on brief status board postings.
- Emergency health physics practices should be improved,
- d. Medical Drill The medical drill was initiated when a Radwaste Operator was severely cut on his right arm while loading the Radwaste Trash Compactor. A First Aid Team arrived promptly after being called by another Radwaste Operator. The activities were all initiated quickly and correctly including the assistance by a Security representative. The injured and contaminated man, after initial evaluation, was sent in an ambulance to the Lake County Memorial Hospital East. The SS correctly classified this event as an NUE. The ambulance arrived and ambulance personnel quickly obtained their dosimetry plus guidance from Security with a negligible loss of time. A HP Technician accompanied the injured person in the ambulance. The hospital personnel were not informed that the injured man was contaminated also until notified by ambulance radio enroute to the hospital. Proper radiation protection procedures were followed in removing the patient from the ambulance and securing him on a cart in the emergency room decontamination facility. Additional health physics support arrived at the hospital shortly after the ambulance arrived. Contamination control was good, with the only instance of personnel contamination occurring when 7
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an X-ray Technician used poor handling techniques which were not intercepted by the HP technician. This X-ray Technician also went in and out of the room without being monitored.
- e. Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) !
The EOF was activated within one hour following the declaration of !
the Site Area Emergency. Transfer of command and control from the TSC l was objective and orderly. Plant status briefings by the Emergency Coordinator were thorough and timely. Direction and control of the emergency response activities were handled well from the EOF.
The General Emergency classification was timely and the notifications to offsite authorities were completed within 15 minutes. All press releases were reviewed and approved by the Emergency Coordinator prior to their release. Simulation of EOF placement on an independent HVAC system was demonstrated. Access control to the EOF was very good and included issuance of badges and dosimetry.
TLDs and instructions regarding their use were issued to all personnel. The access control individuals at the EOF entrance .
reminded personnel in the EOF to check their dosimeters rotn!nely. '
.All items coming into the EOF were checked for potential contamination.
Status boards were effectively used throughcut the exercise.
Protective actions recommended by the state were also displayed on the status boards.
Strong leadership was demonstrated in the EOF. The EC effectively made efforts to be continually apprised of what was happening at the staff level in the EOF. Three communicators were utilized full time to contact offsite agencies and the NRC, keeping them apprised of changing data on reactor parameters as well as protective action recommendations (PARS) and changes in emergency classifications.
Their proximity to the EC's desk at times interfered with his discussions and group announcements, since all three were often talking at the same time. A partial partition as a sound barrier could help alleviate this condition.
Good communication with the TSC was maintained throughout the E0F's activation. The Plant Operations Advisor kept in contact with his i
counterparts in the TSC and received and gave information and advice ,
where applicable to the Emergency Coordinator. '
i Initial dose assessment calculations began about 1118. Forecast data from the Weather Service Information was used as input for meteorology information. Meteorology data were updated every 15 minutes. Dose calculations were used in conjunction with release duration and evacuation time estimates to produce realistic ,
protective action recommendations (PARS). These calculations did, however, emphasize the importance of defining the release duration as soon as possible, rather than rely on default values. Although 4
the State and Counties were not officially participating, a State 8
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of Ohio representative was actively taking part in receiving information and counseling with the EC on PARS, offsite sampling, and other areas of joint interest. Also, one of the three counties had a representative at their Emergency Control Center (ECC) as a communicator. A separate map, divided geographically into sectors representing the areas included in the three counties within the 10 mile EPZ, was used to convert the sectors of the plant's EPZ map into meaningful areas that the county could relate to in its PAR. ,
Before any recommendation was made which included EPZ letter sectors, a close check was made superimposing the sector areas over the geographical areas designated by numbers. The EOF staff performed this conversion to county areas each time, and no errors were ncted by the NRC observers.
The length of time from collection of airborne radioactive samples until results were available for inclusion in the PARS seemed excessive, requiring up to one hour. This time span was due to the length of time required for field teams to collect, count, and report the results in counts per minute and to the E0F dose assessment staff having difficulty in getting the computer program to work smoothly. Another example of delayed analytical results was the Turbine Building Heater Bay Vent sample which was collected at 1245 and analyzed at 1300. However, results were not available at the EOF until approximately 1600, too late to be helpful.
The Offsite Radiation Advisor did an excellent job in coordinating
-the operations of the offsite radiation monitoring teams, interpreting radiological data and dose assessment values, communicating his evaluations to the EC, and being totally involved in the decision-making taking place in the EOF. Communications were well maintained with the three offsite teams from the EOF. Frequent briefings on plant status plus reminders to check dosimeters periodically were noted. e Logistics, administration, communications from and to the EOF, and responsibility for planning and executing a shift change for support personnel in the ERFs were well directed under guidance of the EOF Manager. The relief shift roster change was well discussed, acted upon, and coordinated with the new EC who took charge of the emergency from the EOF at about 1400. This second EC decided to delay a routine press release for about 30 minutes while considering downgrading from a General Emergency to the Alert level.
Good discussions and caucuses took place before and after the announcement at 1450 to downgrade to the Alert level. These discussions included a summary of current plant conditions, release paths,' condition of the previously open RHR valve (now closed),
current and projected dose assessments, and meteorological forecast data. A later caucus addressed reentry / recovery and included display of an organization chart for the recovery group as well as a listing of outside support and advisory groups that would be available. Plans 9
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were later made to meet at 1700 at Lake County with representatives of the three Counties and the State to plan re-entry sampling programs and other mutually related concerns.
Significant releases of radioactive material were still occurring in the environment, and projected doses were near or above protective action guides (PAGs) values due to this residual radioactive material when the decision to downgrade was made. The NRC observers had some concern that the downgrade to Alert was somewhat premature and instead a " recovery" mode should have been entered rather than a downgrade.
The Offsite Radiation Advisor maintained that if samples of soil and vegetation were taken by the offsite radiation monitoring teams, it would be 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> before the sample results could be obtained from an offsite contractor laboratory. The offsite teams as dispatched were not equipped for soil and vegetation sampling.
Based on the above findings, the following item should be considered for improvement:.
- Better coordination and execution of all phases of radiological sampling and reporting of values should be practiced, so that results can be obtained in a more timely manner.
- f. Joint Public Information Center (JPIC)
The JPIC demonstrated timely activation. Frequent, thorough briefings were held throughout the time JPIC was activated. Good coordination with State representatives was demonstrated. Communications were maintained with State and local Emergency Operating Centers (EOCs) through a five-way dedicated telephone. Personnel dosimetry was distributed and checked at regular intervals.
Timely approval of press releases at all levels of emergency activities.was aptly demonstrated. Utility personnel were responsive to all inquiries from the press and from several Kent State journalism students who served as inquiring newspersons.
Procedures for re-entry and recovery were well organized and demonstrated by JPIC personnel. Also, the final de-escalation announcement without a change in PARS was well addressed and projected to non-utility personnel.
Only one incident marred the performance of the JPIC. The JPIC General Supervisor and the Technical Liaison representative were having difficulties in understanding the EAL for the Alert classification. A Public Affairs Representatives had asked for the proper EAL for the Alert somewhat earlier. The JPIC Controller got a copy of the EPIs and told the participants to use the EALs as listed in the EPIs to clarify the classification. This was construed as prompting.
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- g. Offsite Monitoring Teams 1 i
Assembly, activation, and check-out of monitoring and sampling equipment were well done at the teams' assembly point in the EOF.
Teams Number 1 and 2 completed their check-out of equipment in 20 minutes and 22 minutes, respectively, from the time they entered the EOF. Their vehicles were four-wheel drive capable, with two-way radios and an electrical receptacle for the 12-volt powered air samplers.
The TSC, and subsequently the E0F, did a good job of directing the radiation monitoring teams (RMTs). Maps were used effectively.
Directions were clear and the teams followed them accurately. The transfer of control of the RMTs from the TSC to the EOF was clear and unambiguous.
The RMTs were informed of plant emergency conditions by their EOF Communicator who read the approved press releases over the radio.
All communications began and ended with the phrase, "This is a drill." During the exercise, Team No. 3 hit a " dead spot" where they could hear the transmissions from the TSC, EOF, and the other teams, but Team No. 3 could not be heard. As soon as they realized this problem, they properly drove to a pay phone which was listed on their procedure and drove to a higher elevation to make the telephone call.
The teams were well trained and did their plume-traversing very well.
Open window /close window readings were taken. Air sampling was performed expeditiously, and the teams were careful in the handling of the air-sampling silver zeolite cartridge to avoid cross-contamination.
ALARA considerations were generally followed.
Team No. 3 was ordered back to the EOF while the exercise was still in progress. They properly followed the procedures and carefully frisked their vehicle, paying particular attention to tires, radiator, and air-filter.
- 6. Exit Interview The inspectors held an exit interview on November 21, 1985, with the representatives denoted in Section 1. The NRC Team Leader discussed the scope and findings of the inspection. The applicant was also asked if any of the information discussed during the exit was proprietary. The applicant responded that none of the information was proprietary.
Attachments:
- 1. Perry Exercise Scope and Objectives
- 2. Perry Exercise Scenario Outline 11
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SECTION 1.0
- SCOPE AND OBJECTIVES 1
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1.0 SCOPE AND OBJECTIVES 1.1 Scoge The 1985 Emerges.cy Preparedness Exercise, to be conducted on November 20, 1985, will simuiste accident events culminating in a radiological accident with resultant off-site relea'ses from 'tle * *
- Perry Nuclear Power Plant (PNPP), located in North Perry Village, Lake County, Ohio. The Exercise will involve events that test the effectiveness o.f the PNPP Emergency Preparedness Program only.
- Successful demonstration of the emergency response capabilitieg of the State of Ohio, and the Counties of Lake, Geauga, and Ashtabuly
. was accomplished in the November 28, 1984 Emergency Preparedness Exercise and will not be demonstrated in this exercise.
1.2 Objectives The major objective of the exercise is to demonstrate the response capabilities of the PNPP Emergency Response Organization. Within this overall objective, numerous individual objectives are specified as follows:
1.2.1 Demonstrate the ability to mobilize, staff and activate Emergency Response Facilities promptly.
Demonstrate the ability to fully staff facilities and to i.2.2 maintain staffing on an around the clock basis through the use of relief shift resters (limited shift changes may occur to allow for operational restrictions).
f 1.2.3 Demonstrate the ability to make decisions and to coordi-nate emergency activities.
1.2.4 Demonstrate the adequacy of facilitics and displays to support emergency operations.
1.2.5 Demonstrate the ability to communicate with all appro-priate locations, organizations, and field personnel.
1.2.6 Demonstrate the ability to mobilize and deploy Radiation Monitoring Teams.
1.2.7 Demonstrate the appropriate equipment and procedures for determining ambient radiation levels.
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1.2.8 Demonstrate appropriate equipment and procedures for measurement of airborne radiciodine concentrations as low as 10E-7 uCi/cc in the presence of noble gases.
1.2.9 Demonstrate the ability to project dosage to the public via plume exposure, based on plant and field data, and to dstetaine appropriate protective measures, based on PNPP protective action guidelines, available shelter, evac; untion time estimates, and other appropriate factors.
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1.2.10 Demonstrate the ability to notify off-site officials and agencies within 15 minutes of an emergency.
1.2.11 Demonstrate the ability to periodically update off-site officials and agencies of the status of the emergency based on data available at PNPP.
1.2.12 Demonstrate the ability to notify emergency support pools as appropriate (i.e., INPO,~ ANI, etc.).
1.2.13 Demonstrate the ability to notify on-site personnel using plant ilares and public address systems.
1.2.14 Demonstrate the ability to effectively assess incident t
conditions and to properly classify.the incident.
. 1.2.15 Demonstrate the organizational ability and resources necessary to control accass to the site.
1.2.16 Demonstrate the ability to continuously monitor and control emergency workers exposure.
1.2.37 Demonstrate the ability to brief the media in a clear, accurate, and timely manner.
1.2.18 Demonstrate the ability to provide advance coordination of infoteation released to the public.
1.2.19 Demonstrate the ability to establish and operate rumor control in a coordinated fashion.
1.2.20 Demonstrate the adequacy of ambulance facilities and procedures for handling a contaminated, injured indivi-dual.
1.2.21 Dsmonstrate the adequacy of hospital facilities and .
procedures for handling a contaminated, injured indivi-dual. .
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l 1.2.22 Demonstrate the adequacy of on-site first aid facilities, i
equipment, and procedures for handling a contaminated, injured individual.
1.2.23 Demonstrate the ability to determine and implement appro-
, priate measures for controlled re-entry and recovery. -
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s 7.0 _ EXERCISE SCENARIO' Contents Of This Section Section 7.1 Initial Conditions Section 7.2 Sequence of Events
, Section 7.3 Narrative Summary of Exercise Scenario
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7.1 Initial Conditions e
o PERRY NUCLEAR POWER PLAST 1985 EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS EXERCISE INITIAL CONDITIONS
- 1. Unit i reactor is operating at 100% power. The unit has been operating continuously for the last 315 days. It has had a capacity factor of 95%
since the last refueling outage 15 months ago.
- 2. The diesel driven fire service pump (P54-C001) is out of service due to a scheduled maintenance overhaul. The pump and diesel are expected to be ready for testing at 1600 tomorrow.
- 3. RHR pump E12-C001B remains out of service due to seized pump bearings.
The pump is expected to the back in service within 2 days.
- 4. The motor driven reactor feed pump (N27-C004) is out of service due to the A.C. Auxiliary lube oil pump having failed. The lube oil pump is disassembled and is expected to be back in service within 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br />.
- 5. Surveillance test SVI-R43-T1319 " Diesel Generator Slow Start and Load-Division 1" must be accomplished today to meet the 31 day limiting condition for operation. Diesel generator 1R43-C001A problems prevented this test from being done earlier; those problems (specifically the air start distributor) have been corrected.
- 6. All other systems are operable.
- 7. New fuel receipt is scheduled to begin at approximately 2200 tonight.
- 8. Unit 2 remains under construction; no significant activities are scheduled for today.
- 9. Current weather conditions are as follows:
Wind Speed: 6 miles per hour (measured on the 10 meter level)
Wind Direction: 90' Temperature: 40*F Today's forecast calls for sunny and clear weather. Winds will be out of the North Northeast at 5-10 miles per hour for most of the day. Today's high temperature is expected to be 50*F.
7.2 Sequence of Events G
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PERRY NUCLEAR POWER PLANT 1985 EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS EXERCISE SEQUENCE OF EVENTS Approximate Time Key Event 0800 Initial conditions are established. Commence Exercise.
0805 ho radwaste operators are loading the radwaste trash compactor with low-level dry waste. One operator severly cuts his right forears. He is bleeding profusely. The other radweste operator witnesses the accident and calls for first aid assistance.
0813 The first aid team and health physics support arrive at
- the scene. The victim is still bleeding. An offsite ambulance is requested.
0815 h e Shift Supervisor' declares an Unusual Event (EPI-A1, Section N.I.1, " Transportation of contaminated, injured individuals from the site to offsite hospital.")
0835 The offsite ambulance arrives at the Primary Access Control Point (Security) Gate.
0850 Safety Relief Valve (SRV) B21-F051D inadvertently opens due to a spurious energizing of the "A" Solenoid. Efforts to close the valve fail. The suppression pool temperature begins to increase.
0853 As the Emergency Service Water (ESW) System is placed in service, ESW pump P45-C001A fails to start. An operator is sent to investigate.
0855 The victim is loaded into the ambulance. ,
0900 he ambulance leaves the site.
The operator reports that the pump appears fine.
, SRV B21-F051D closes.
The Shift Supervisor declares an Alert (EPI-A1, Section D.II.1c, " Loss of functions needed for Plant Cold' Shutdown"; in this case: Loss of A ESW loop and B RHR
- loop.)
' The TSC and OSC are activated.
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PERRY NUCLEAR POWER PLANT 1985 EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS EXERCISE SEQUENCE OF EVENTS Approximate Time Key Event 0930 The TSC and OSC should be declared operable. Efforts should concentrate on tracing the ESW electrical fault and then repairing the fault.
0945 An accidental actuation of the Auxiliary Building Ventilation Deluge System occurs. The ventilation system is rendered out of service.
1000 .
The ESW electrical fault is located and repaired. The operators implement PEI-2.
1005 The turbine expansion-joint on the high pressure condenser fails. A rapid loss of condenser vacuum occurs.
1007 .Tha turbine trips, the feedwater pumps trip and the Main S+,2m Isolation Valves close. The reactor scrams.
1009 Reactor Water Level is dropping rapidly, HPCS and RCIC inject at Level 2.
1015 Reactor level, pressure and power are now under control.
The operators maintain the reactor in hot standby, pending further information.
1020 Steam tunnel high temperature and high differential
- tempersture annunciators alarm. Outboard RCIC steam isolation valve E51-T064 is leaking into the steam tunnel.
All indications from E51-F064 are lost on panel P601.
Inboard RCIC steam isolation valve E51-F063 remains open and will not close.
1025 High pressure condenser seal trough data indicate that "
there has been a failure of the turbine expansion joint.
The operators implement 10I-6, and place the steam
-condensing mode of RHR into service.
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PERRY NUCLEAR POWER PLANT )
1985 EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS EXERCISE SEQUENCE OF EVENTS Approximate Time Key Event 1030 The Operations Hanager declares a Site Area Emergency (EPI-A1, Section C.III.1, "Steamline break outside containment without isolation"). The EOF and JPIC are activated.
The reactor is being cooled down by RHR steam condensing mode.
1130 The EOF should be operable by now. Survey results of the steam tunnel show expected levels of radiation.
1200 Cooldown continues.
1215 The reactor is cooled to approximately 125 psis and 350'F.
The operators begin to place the reactor in shutdown cooling mode. Inboard RER isolation valve E12-F009 is
+ opened. A shear in the 20 inch pipe between outboard isolation valve E12-F008 and containment occurs. Reactor water is released into the steam tunnel.
1216 Reactor water level is decreasing rapidly. HPCS initiates at reactor water level 2.
1217 At level 1, LPCS and LPCI-C inject cold water on the fuel causing fuel clad damage due to thermal shock.
- 1220 Leaking reactor water inventory is being made up by all available ECCS systems.
1230 The Emergency Coordinator declares a General Emergency (EPI-A1, Attachment 3, Condition 1: " Loss of two fission f, product barriers with a potential loss of third barrier.")
Turbine Building / Heater Bay vent monitors detect increasing levels of radiation. Fission product gases released by clad damage are channeled out of severed RHR pipe into the steam tunnel. From there the gases flow up through the Turbine Building and out the TB/HB vent.
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4 PERRY NUCLEAR POWER PLAST 1985 EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS EXERCISE SEQUENCE OF EVENTS Approximate Time Key Event 1245 Maintenance efforts focus on closing E12-F009. Upon investigation, an electrical fault has occurred in the motor control cabinet for E12-F009. When the MCC is repaired, E12-F009 can be closed (later at 1315). How-ever, the General Energency will remain, now due to projected / actual radiation readings.
1300 Radiation Monitoring Teams continue to report readings.
1315 Maintenance reports that E12-F009 can be closed.
1400 TB/HB vent monitors show decreased levels of radiation.
1430 TB/HB vent monitors show normal levels.
1500 Weather conditions begin to change. Offsite radiation levels are decreasing as wind speed changes disperse the plume.
1530 Offsite radiation levels return to background. The General Emergency is downgraded. Re-entry and recovery operations commence.
1600 The exercise is terminated.
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7.3 Narrative Summary of The Exercise Scenario f
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7.3 Narrative Summary of the Exercise Scenario The Perry Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 1, has been operating continuously for the last 315 days. The unit has had a capacity factor of approxi-mately 95% since the last refueling outage 15 months ago. Currently the unit is operating at about 100% power. Some equipment problems are ongoing but have been addressed through surveillance and maintenance actions. The first new fuel shipment for the upcoming refuelling outage is scheduled to be delivered at 2200.
Weather conditions are typical autumn weather for northeast Ohio with the forecast calling for a high of 50*F and winds out of the east-northeast at 5 to 10 miles per hour.
At 8:05 a.m., a radwaste operator severely cuts his right forearm while loading the radwaste trash compactor with low level dry waste. Another radwaste operator witnesses the accident and calls for help. The First Aid team and health physics support arrive to assist. A survey shows that the operator is also contaminated. An offsite ambulance is requested.
At 8:15 a.m., the Shift Supervisor declares an UNUSUAL EVENT (EPI-A1, Section N.I.1, " Transportation of contaminated, injured individuals from the site to offsite hospital.")
Lake County Memorial Hospital East is notified to prepare for the receipt of a contaminated, injured person. The ambulance leaves the site at approximately 9:00 a.m.
At 8:50 a.m., Safety Relief Valve (SRV) B21-F051D inadvertently opens due to a spurious energizing of the "A" Solenoid. Efforts to close the valve fail. The suppression pool temperature begins to increase.
As the Emergency Service Water (ESW) System is placed in service for the suppression pool cooling function of the Residual Heat Removal (RHR) Sys-tem, ESW Pump P45-C001A fails to start. An operator is sent to investi-gate. The operator reports that the pump appears fine.
Even though at 9:00 a.m. SRV B21-F051D closes, the Shift Supervisor declares an ALERT (EPI-A1, Section D.II.lc, " Loss of functions needed for Plant Cold Shutdown;" in this case: Loss of A ESW loop and B RER loop.)
Notifications are made and the Technical Support Center and Operations Support Center are activated. Plant assessment activities begin in order to troubleshoot the ESW system.
At '9:45 a.m. , a truck backs into a wall mounted solenoid, causing an accidental actuation of the Auxiliary Building Ventilation Deluge System to occur. The ventilation system is rendered out of service.
At 10:00 a.m., the ESW system electrical fault is located and repaired.
Downgrade discussions may commence.
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. At .10:05 a.m. , the turbine expansion joint on the high pressure condenser begins to tear. At- 10:07 a.m. , the joint fails, causing a loss of con-
, denser vacuum. The main turbine trips, the feedwater pumps trip, the reactor scrams, and the Main Steam Isolation Valves close. All' systems work, and by 10:15 a.m. , the unit is under operator control. The opera-tors should maintain the reactor in hot stsndby pending further informa-tion.
At 10:20 a.m., steam tunnel high temperature and high differential temperature annunciators alarm. Outboard RCIC Steam Isolation Valve E51-F064 is leaking into the steam tunnel. All indications from E51-F064 are lost on Panel P601. Inboard RCIC Steam Isolation Valve E51-F063 remains open and will not close. The operators cannot isolate the steam leak and proceed to bring the unit to cold shutdown.
At 10:30 a.m., the Operations Manager declares a SITE AREA EMERGENCY (EPI-A1, Section C.III.1, "Steamline break outside containment without isolation"). The Emergency Operations Facility and the Joint Public Information Center are activated.
The reactor is being cooled down by RHR steam condensing mode.
At 12:15 p.m., the reactor is cooled to approximately 125 psis and 350'F.
The operators begin to place the reactor in shutdown cooling mode.
Inboard RHR Isolation Valve E12-F009 is opened. A shear in the 20 inch pipe between Outboard Isolation Valve E12-F008 and containment occurs.
Reactor water is released into the steam tunnel. Reactor water level decreases rapidly. HPCS initiates at Reactor Water Level 2. At Level 1, LPCS and LPCI-C inject cold water on the fuel causing fuel clad damage due to thermal shock. Reactor Water Level is restored as leaking reactor water inventory is being made up by all available ECCS systems.
By 12:30 p.m., the Emergency Coordinator declares a GENERAL EMERGENCY (EPI-A1, Attachment 3, Condition 1: " Loss of two fission product barriers with a potential loss of third barrier.")
Turbine Building / Heater Bay vent monitors detect increa' sing levels of radiation. Fission product gases released by clad damage are channeled out of severed RHR pipe into the steam tunnel. From there the gases flow up through the Turbine Building and out the TB/HB vent.
Maintenance efforts focus on closing E12-F009. Upon investigation, an electrical fault has occurred in the motor control cabinet for E12-F009.
When the MCC is repaired, E12-F009 can be closed (later at 1:15 p.m.).
However, the General Emergency will remain, now due to projected / actual radiation readings. Radiation Monitoring Teams continue to report readings .
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'At 1:15 p.m., E12-F009 is closed, and at 2:00 p.m., the TB/HB vent moni-tors show decreasing levels of radiation. RMTs continue to track the
- plume. By 2:30 p.m., the TB/HB vent monitors show normal levels of radiation.
Weather conditions begin to change at 3:00 p.m. such that the radioactive plume disperses by 3:30 p.m. Re-entry and Recovery operations should commence by then.
After appropriate re-entry and recovery actions have been accomplished, the Exercise'will be terminated at 4:00 p.m.
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