ML20134L511
| ML20134L511 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Hope Creek, 05000355  |
| Issue date: | 08/29/1985 |
| From: | Harpster T NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | Martin T Public Service Enterprise Group |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8509030309 | |
| Download: ML20134L511 (2) | |
Text
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. . , *5, AUG 29 W5 Docket Nos. 50-354; 50-355 Public Service Electric & Gas Company ATTN: Mr. T. J. Martin Vice President Engineering and Construction 80 Park Plaza - 17C Newark, New Jersey 07101 Gentlemen:
SU8 JECT: FEMA REPORT FOR THE SALEM / HOPE CREEK APRIL 23, 1985 REMEDIAL EXERCISE This letter transmits the Federal Emergency Management Agency repoi t of the Salem / Hope Creek remedial exercise conducted on April 23, bE5. The exercise was conducted to resolve Category A deficiencies resulting from the October 1984 full scale exercise at the Salem / Hope Creek site. FEMA's report specifies that the deficiency concerning the Sales congre-gate care center was resolved at the April 1985 remedial exercise and that the other three Category A deficiencies concerning the Salem County emergency operations center were reduced to a Category B level. FEMA states that: "In view of the improved performance ir connection with the previous Category A deficiencies, and the aggressive corrective actions being taken by the State, FEMA has reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public living in New Jersey in the vicinity of the Salem / Hope Creek site can be protected." If you have any questions concerning this matter please contact me at (215)337-5208. Sincerely, g /4 Te ry L. Ha pster, Chief Emergency Preparedness Section Division of Radiation Safety and Safeguards Attachments: As Stated cc w/ encl:
- A. E. Giardino, Manager, Quality Assurance Engineering and Construction R. L. Mitti, General Manager, Nuclear Assurance and Regulation A. J. Pietrofitta, General Manager, Power Production Engineering, i Atlantic Electric
( Rebecca A. Green, Dureau of Radiation Protection l PublicDocumentRoom(PDR) l / Local Public Nuclear Safety Document Information NRC Resident Inspector CenterRoom (LPDR) (NSIC) 'p State of New Jersey pon 850903 A Ml I g4 ( i
Public Service Electric & Gas Company 2 bec w/ encl: Region I Docket Room (with concurrences) C. Amato, NRC RAC Region II Representative P. Gaul Y
!(DRSS g d ll:;DRSS Harpster hellamy 5l2 tl% $ltsjW 0FFICI AL RECORD COPY L
>..a. A l I] - h Federal Emergency Management Agency Washington, D.C. 20472 1 JUL 31 1985 MEMORANDtN FOR: Edward L. Jordan Director Division of Emergency Preparedness and * ' Engineering Response Office of Inspection and Enforconent Nu ear R ul t ry Canetssion , FROM: . e nb ) Assistant Associate Director Office of Natural and Technological Hazards StJBJECT: Post-Exercise Assessment For The Sale / Hope Creek April 23,1985 Remedial Exercise This is to transmit the post-exercise assessnent for the April 23, 1985, reedial exercise for the Sale / Hope Creek Nuclear Power Plants, in Sala County, New Jersey. The assessment was prepared by Region II, Federal Emergency Managment Agency (FEMA). The exercise was conducted to resolve 4 Category A deficiencies (i.e., deficiencies that would lead to a negative finding) resulting from the October 1984 full-scal e exercise at' the Sal e/ Hope Creek site. The first three concerned the Salen County energency operations center (EOC). The , fourth concerned the Sala County congregate care center. To resolve the l deficiencies, it was necessary to activate fully the Salen County E0C. There was only partial activation and limited evaluation of the State energency response organization and municipalities. In brief, the deficiencies were: ,
- Weak overall managenent and coordination of infonnation in the Salen County EOC;
- Significant delays at the Sala County E0C in notifying some of the mun'cipalities of the stated decision to evacuate certain areas;
- Significant delays at the Sala County E0C in notifying some of the municipalities of the State decision to administer XI;
- There were no radiological monitoring teans or equipment at the congregate care shelter to monitor evacuees for possible contamination.
The deficiencies concerning the Sala County congregate care center were resolved at the April exercise. The other three Category A deficiencies were reduced to a Category B l evel . Improvenent is primarily attributed to the Deputy Director of the new Jersey Office of Emergency Management (OEM), who participated in the exercise as State liaison to Salen County and was instrumental in facilitating operations management at the Sal en County and successful denonstration of the exercise objectives. FEM A has g us2e WP 4 -
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detennined that New Jersey must devel op an interim pl an (pl an suppl snent) to provide management by the State in the. Sal em County E0C until the County is able to be in full control of the overall energency response. - e The State of New Jersey has taken immediate measures to rectify this situation. The State Of fice of Emergency Management fully recognized the inability of Salem County energency managment officials to coordinate the activities necessary to provide for the safety of Salen County residents in the event of a radiol ogical energency. Attached are two letters fram Major Harold Spedding, Deputy Director of the New Jersey OEM. The letters, dated May 17, 1985, and June 18, 1985, describe corrective actions being taken by the State to resolve conpl etely the deficient areas concerning the Sat. sn County E0C. The procedures described in the letters are now being incorporated in the pl ans. It is FEMA's view that the corrective actions schedule proposed by the State of New. Jersey is adequate to resolve the deficiencies still remaining in connection with the Salen County E0C. The State is addressing the problen aggressively and is keeping to its schedule. Some training has already taken pl ace. In addition, although not mentioned in the two letters fran the State, a drill has been scheduled for October 1,1985, to test the new, conpensatory management strategy proposed for the Sal en County EOC. The objectives for this drill have already been received and reviewed by FEMA's Region II office. In view of the improved perfonnance in connection with the previous Category A deficiencies, and the aggressive corrective actions being taken by the State, F8iA has reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the pub,lic living in New Jersey in the vicinity of the Salen/ Hope Creek site ' can be protected. If you have any questions, please don't hesitate to call me. Attachnents As Stated e 9
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State of Netu 3fersey
) DEPARTMENT OF LAW AND PUBLIC SAFETY DIVISION OF STATE POLICE
. t ui ac.tsu u.ss.u.i us si si cisos rtin g ul f it i HO\ 704.It IRWIN I MIMuLLMAN WI 58 )alNitis.NI% l! 14hli 0P624 COLONC L C. L. PAG ANO IbMe sh2 20NJ g , ,,,g q ,,, y, , g Alleene) Central ,
May 17, 1985
. Mr. Frank Petrone Regional Director FEMA, Region II 26 Federal Plaza New York, NY 10275 .
Dear Mr. Petrone:
The state Office of Emergency Management fully recognizes the inability of Sales County Emergency Management officials to coordinate the activities necessary to provide for the safety of salem County residents during an actual nucle.ar emergency at the Salem Nuclear Generating Station. Therefore, the state office of Emergency Management will actively ! participate in all operational functions at the Salem County Emergency operating Center during future drills and/or actual emergencies until it is satisfied salem County can adequately fulfill its responsibilities. Si erely, ,
. ! Y 3 Narold E. Speddi e Deputy state Director Office of Emergency Management l .
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T DEPARTMENT OF LAW AND PUBLIC SAFETY DIVISION OF STATE POLICE - t%lE RCLN(.) AIAN AGC\lt NI SLL. TION POST Or t K E 80% 7068 t R ! N 1. Kl%lMEL\l AN * . Wh5T TRENTON. NLW ILRSEY 08625 Attorney General (609)342 2000 COLONEL C. L. P AGANO Su perintendent June 18, 1985 Mr., Roger Kowieski e Federal Emergency Management Agency Region II - 26 Federal Plaza New York, NY 10278
Dear Mr. Kovieski:
The State office of Emergency Management functions as the Governors representative mder the Civil Defense and Disaster Control Act as amended. Under said act the Governor is autliorized to utilize and employ all available resources of the state and of each and every political subdivision of the state. This authority extends to equipment, facilities at.d personnel services. An extract of this Act is provided for your review. The OEM has assessed the situation at Salem County and concluded that the problem stems f rom a need for stronger coc: mand and control and the development of an operations staff similar than at the State Emergency Operations Center. Our intent is to provide the staffing for the command and control function and the operations staff until such time as Salem County has demonstrated an ability to operate without state assistance. at this time. A brief description of the We envision a staff of four from the state staff positions is attached. The state OEM will modify the Artificial Island Plan Salem County Appendix to provide for the expanded role of the state in the Salem EOC. The following plan elements will require changes; B. Emergency Facilities
- Emergency Operations Center, F. Plan Implementation, Notification and Com=unications, Com=and and coordination, Protective Actions and Parallel Actions.
The modified plan elements vill be developed according to the attached time line. If you have questions please feel free to en11 this i e.
... \
Sincere , *
.; h arold Spa eing, Major Deputy e Director
/ Office Emergengp agement
; Attachment New Jersey Is An Equdt Opportunity Employer Rev 0, 6l18I85
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I*.*' STATE STAFFING AT SALEM COUNTY 30C positions 1 State Directors Representative - The State Directors ! Representative (SDR) will be the State Directors personal liaison at the County E0C. The SDR will insure that sessages are transeitted and received in a timely manner and that Energency Action Levels and Protective Action Recommendations and relayed to the af facted municipalities and general population in accordance with Federal guidelines. ,
. The SDR will insure that all elements of the Sales County Covernment are utilised to the protection of the County residents. The SDR will act under the authority of the Covernor as captioned in the Civil Defense and Disaster
- Control Act, Chapter 433. P.L. 1953.
2 Operations Officer - The Operations Officer will follow the course of an emergency or exercise monitoring communications from the State and municipalities. The Operations officer will insure that messages are relayed and responded to by the appropriate government agency .in a timely manner. The operations officers will monitor the progress of all l protective and parallel actions as directed. I L Message Controller - The message controller will insure i that messages are directed to the appropriate government agency in a timely manner. The controller will also insure that responses from the County are made in a timely manner.
) The controller will insure that all pertinent messages are brought to the attention of the SDR and County Coordinator.
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sal.Ct INTERIM PLAN DEVELOPMENT i g Development of Interim Plan - June 17 - July 29 , 1 Staff review - July 29 - August 5 Print,ing - August 12 - 16 ,
- Submit to Agencies - August 19 training - August 12 - September 16 I
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l l i Partielpating Governments The State of New Jersey Salem County - Elsinboro Lower Alloways Creek Mannington Pennsville ' Quinton l Salem City Cumberland County Nonparticipating Governments Cumberland County Municipalities Greenwich Stow Creek The State of Delaware l
- e LLL 1
CONTENTS
SUMMARY
................................................................ Iz 1 INT RO D U CTIO N . . . . . . . . . . . . ,. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . I 1.1 Ezereise Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . , 1 1.2 Federal Observers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 IJ Evaluation Cri teria . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 1.4 Iserelse Objectives . . . . . . . . . . . . . , . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 1.4.1 State of New Jersey Emergency Operations Center (NJEOC) ........ .5 1.4.2 B RP- EO F (B R P/EO F) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 1.4.3 3RP - Forward Command Post (BRP/FCP) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 1.4.4 Radiologios! Fleid Monitoring Teams (RFMT) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 1.4.5 Salem County Emergency Operations Center (SCEOC) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 1.4.0 Salem County /Fleid Implementation of Actions to Protect the Public (FIELD) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 1.4.7 Salem County Muntelpal Emergency Operations Centers (SC M I O C ) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 1.8 Exercise Scenario . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 1.5.1 Major Sequence of Events On Site . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 1.8.2 Description of State and County Resources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 2 EXE R C!SE EVAL U ATIO N . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 2.1 New Jersey State Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 2.1.1 State EO C ................................................... 12 2.1.2 Bureau of Radiation Protection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 2.1.2.1 Sta te of New Jersey B RP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 2.1.2.2 BRP Forward Com mand Post . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 2.1.2.3 Radiological Field Monitoring Teams . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 2.2 Sale m County Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 2.2.1 Sale m County EOC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 2.2.2 Sale m County Municipal EOCs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 2.2.3 Fleid Implementation of Actions to Protect the Publia . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 3 SCHEDULE FOR CORRECTING DEFICIENCIES: APRIL 23,1985, EXERCISE . . . 21 4 SU MlWA R Y O F D EFICIENCIES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50 TABLES 3.1 Salem Nuclear Generating Station - Remedial Actions April 23,1985 and Previous Exercises . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 4.1 Recommendations to Remedy Def!clencies in Off-Site Radiological Emergency Response Preparedness at Exercises for the Salem Nuclear Generating Station on April 23,1985, October 23,1984 October 28,1983, October 13, 1982, and April 8, 19 81. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51 V
LIST OF ABBREV!ATIONS AND ACRONYMS ANL Argonne National Laboratory ARC American Red Cross . BNL Brookhaven National Laboratory BRP New Jersey Bureau of Radiation Protection CCEOC . Cumberland County Emergency Operations Center DOE U.S. Department of EnerTy EAL Emergency Act!on Level EBS Emergency Broadcast System - EMC Emergency Management Coordinator EMRAD Emergency Management Radio - A New Jersey State Police emergency radio system EOC ' ne y ency Operations Center EOF Lletasee Near-Site Emergency Operations Facility EPA Emergency Planning Area EPZ Emergency Planning Zone FCP Forward Command Post FEMA Federal Emergency Management Agency INEL Idaho National Engineering Laboratory KI Potassium lodide - LOCA Loss of Coolant Accident NJSP New Jersey State Police NRC U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission NUREG-0654 Criteria for Preparation and Evaluation of Radiological Emergency Response Plans and Nuclear Power Plants (NUREG-0654/ FEMA-REP-1, Rev.1) vll
OEM Offlee of Emesseney Management, NJSP PAG Protective Action Guides PSE&O Publie Servloe Electric and Gas Company RAC Regional Assistance Committee' RERP Radiologleal Emergency Response Plan SCAT Salem County Area Transit SCEOC Salem County Emergency Operations Center SNGS Salem Nuclear Generating Station SOP Standard Operating Procedure SRAO State Radiological Assessment Officer O e 4 0 9 vlLL
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SUMMARY
l } l ! There have been four joint full-scale exercises for the SNGS: Apell 8,1981, i J October 13, 1982, October 28, 1983, and October 23, 1984. These previous, full-scale ! j esereises differed from this latest, remedial exercise in several respects. During this I remedial eneroise, FEMA required only partial activation of state and some county and , munfelpal organisations. The focus was on those components related to defielenotes '; ! that, la FEMA's opinion, could lead to a negative finding. l Durlag the Ootober 23, 1984, esMilse, FEMA identified four deftalenotes la Salem County.that fell into this eategory. Belefly, these defiolenotes were - ! 1) Messages from the Salem County EOC (SCEOC) to some munlet- ! pelities concerning the deelston to shelter certain sectors were delayed or not received at all by at least one munlolpality, ; 3 2) Messages with the deelston to evacuate certain sectors were I
- delayed to some munfelpalities for up to 16 hours, !
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- 3) Messages with the deelston to distribute and administer potassium :
- lodide (II) for emergency workers were delayed for up to 16 hours, !
i and i ! i l 4) There were no radiologloal monitoring personnel or equipment at f j the Salem County Congregate Care Center to monitor evacuees l i for eentamination. i The remedial exercise was designed primarily to determine whether these four i defielenotes had been corrected. To accomplish this, it was necessary to activate l command and control in West Trenton, State Polloe Headquarters, effect full activation [ , of Salem County EOC, and partial activation of the Salem County munlolpal EOCs. > l FEMA did not observe the Cumberland County EOC. There was also limited l demonstration of fleid activities including simulation of school evacuation, congregate j care shelters, decontamination center and the New Jersey Bureau of Radiation Protecti:n (BRP) functions related to communloation with fleid monitoring team. . The remedial eneroise was evaluated by a 13-member federsi observer team ! comprised of FEMA, Agency representatives to the Regional Assistance Committee j ! (RAC), and contractors. A preliminary briefing for exercise participants and the general i
- publio was conducted by the RAC Chairman at the Pubile Servloe Electrio and Gas i Company (PSE&O) Salem Training Center in Salem, New Jersey on Apell 25, 1985. l l Subsequently, detailed evaluations have been reviewed by FEMA and compiled in this
- document.
I 't l Section 1 of this report presents background Information on the 1985 exercise, L describes the evaluation eriteria and exercise objectives, and presents a description of [ the exerols's scenarlo. ; l l l u ! C___
Each exerelse defielency and the corresponding recommendation is described by jurlsdiction in Sec. 2 of this report. Section 3 provides a form for developing a schedule for correcting deficiencies that would lead to a negative finding and other deficiencies based on the April 23, 1985, remedial exercise. Section 4 tabulates the status of deficiencies observed at all the rad!ological emergency preparedness exercises held in conjunction with the Salem Nuclear Generating Station. New Jersey State EOC (West Trenton) The staff participating in the exercfie displayed adequate training and knowledge of their responsibilities. Maps were equ!pped with new, colored, transparent overlays Indicating tho' direction of the plume and sectors where protective actions were implemented. Also, communication between the DRP staffs stationed at the EOF and State EOC staff was prompt and effective. This corrects a deficiency from the October 23, 1984, exercise. A number of other deficiencies pertaining to BRP operations were addressed and resolved adequately by BRP staff members in the EOF, Forward Command Post, and in the field. Back-up communication capability between the DRP Forward Post, the flold teams, and the EOF was successfully demonstrated. Direction and control of off-site radlological monitoring teams was adequate. !!owever, environmental monitoring, and the contamination control (cartridge handling) technique for handling air samples utilized by the off-site field teams should be improved. Salem County Emergency Operations Center (SCEOC) Alerting and notificat!on of SCEOC personnel occurred promptly and the SCEOC was staffed in a timely manner. Activation of each municipal EOC was properly verifled. Internal and external communications were improved since the October,1984, exercise by Internal message handlers, periodic staff briefings, and logging all incoming and outgoing calls. State protective action recommendations were received by telephone and confirmed by the telefax machine, thus correcting a deficiency from the previous exercise. Salem County Freeholders and legislators were present and carefully monitored the entire exercise. Although several improvements at the SCEOC were noted, emergency operations management needs to be strengthened. The continued preoccupation of the County Emergency Management Director with message initiation, review and telephone Interruptions impaired his ability to be in control of the overall emergency response. Relaying messages to the municipal EOCs regarding the state's recommendation to administer K! to emergency workers and clarifying the state's evacuation recommendatlon were not timely. A procedure should be developed for handling priority messages. The Deputy Director, New Jersey Office of Emergency Management participated in the exercise as the State llaison to Salem County and was instrumental in facilitating operations management at the SCEOC. For example, the state liaison officer encouraged operations room staff to take a more active role in coordinating and discussing their agency's actions. This was not being done early in the exercise. The x
state's presence in the SCEOC is essential to assure an effective emergency response and an Interim plan should be developed to deal with the issue of weak management at the SCEOC. Fleid Implementation of Actions to Protect the Public
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The bus evacuation demonstration was handled in a manner consistent with the e plan. However, improvements in disseminating information from the SCEOC to the American Red Cross shelter managers are necessary. Especially needed is information concerning number of expected evacuees and their arrival time. Properly calibrated monitoring instrumentation was available, but additional tralning Is necessary to assure that all monitoring personnel are aware of the decontamination action levels. Emergency workers at the Quinton emergency worker decontamination center had proper dosimetry. Sufflelent quantitles of properly calibrated monitoring instruments were available and decontamination personnel were aware of the decontamination action levels. , Salem County Municipals Six municipalltles participated in this remedial exercise. These municipalltles resolved a group of def!clencies noted during the October,1984, exercise. xl
i... ' . . . 1 INTRODUCTION 1.1 EXERCISE BACEGROUND On December 7, 1979,. the President directed the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) to assume lead responsibility for all off-site nuclear planning and response. - e FEMA's responsibilities in radiological emergency planning for fixed nuclear
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facilltlee include the followings , e Taking the lead in off-site emergency planning and in the review and evaluation of radlological emergency response plans developed by state and local governments. e Determining whether such plans can be implemented, on the basis of observation and evaluation of exercises of the plans conducted by , state and Iccal governments. e Coordinating the activities of federal agencies with responsibilities la the radlological emergency planning process
- U.S. Department of Commerce
- U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
- U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
- U.S. Department of Energy
- U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Food and Drug Administration
- U.S. Department of Transportation
- U.S. Department of Agriculture
- U.S. Department of Interior.
Regresentatives of these agencies serve as members of the Regional Assistance Committee (RAC), which is chaired by FEMA. Formal submission of the radiological emettency response plans for the Salem i Nuclear Generating Station (SNGS) to the RAC by the state and Involved local jurisdictions was followed by a critique and an ongoing evaluation of these plans. A public meeting was held to acquaint the public with the plans' contents, answer questions, and receive suggestions for changes in these plans. A first joint radiological emergency preparedness exercise was conducted for SNOS on April 8, 1981, and post-exercise assessments for that exercise were i subsequently issued. A second joint exercise on October 13,1982, was also followed with post exercise assessments issued by FEMA Regions !! and !!!. A third joint exercise, conducted on October 26, 1983, was also followed with a post-exercise assessment. A fourth joint exercise was conducted on October 23, 1984, to assess the capability of state, county, and municipal emergency preparedness organizations to implement their
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radiologloal emergency preparedness plans and procedures, and to protect the public during a radiologloal emergency at Public Service Electrio and Gas Company's (PSE4G's) SNGS. A medical drill at the Salem Cour.ty Memorial Hospital was also conducted on September 27, 1984, in order to evaluate the adequacy of hospital and ambulance feet 11 ties and procedures' for handling injured and contaminated individuals. This drill was evaluated by a federal observer. During the Ootober 23, 1984, exercise, four deflelenotes in emergency ' preparedness response were identitled whleh, in FEMA's opinion, required immediate attention. These deflofoneles were: .
- 1) Messages from the Salem County EOC (SCEOC) to some munici-pelities concerning,the deelston to shelter certain sectors were delayed or not received at all by at least one munfelpality,
- 2) Messages with the deelston to evacuate certain sectors were delayed to some muntelpelities for up to 16 hours,
- 3) Messages with the decialon to distribute and administer potassium lodido (E!) for emergency workers were delayed for up to 16 hours, and
- 4) There were no radiologloal monitoring personnel or equipment at the Salem County Congregate Care Center to monitor evacuees for contamination.
On April 23, 1985, a remedial eseroise was held, the primary purpose of whleh was to determine whether these four defleteneles had been corrected. This determination required activation of command and control in West Trenton, State Polloe Headquarters, full activation of the Salem County EOC, and partial activation of the Salem County munlolpal EOCs. FEMA did not observe the Cumberland County EOC. There was also !!mited demonstration of fleid activities including simulat!on of school evsountion, congregate care shelters, decontamination center and the New Jersey Bureau of Radiation Protection (BRP) functions related to communloation with one field monitoring team. An observer team consisting of personnel from FEMA Region !!, the RAC, j FEMA's contractors, and federal and state agenotes evaluated the Apell 23, 1988, j eseroise. Thirteen federal observers were assigned to evaluate the activities of state ! and local jurisdictions. Observers were trained in radiological emergency planning ! ooncepts and given an evaluation kit, whleh included Information on eneroise objectives, l the eneroise scenario, and other lasues relating to the eneroise. Team leaders i esordinated team operations. t l Following the exercise, the federal observers met to compile their evaluations. l Observers presented observations speelfte to their assignments, the teams of observers I. developed preliminary assessments for each jurisdlotion, and team leaders consolidated the evaluations of Individual tes'm members. Based on these preliminary assessments, a
3 . public critique of the exercise was held by the RAC Chairman for exercise participants and the general public at 1000 on Thursday, April 25,1985, at the PSE&G Salem Training Center in Salem, N.J. The findings presented in this report are based on evaluations of the federal observers and have been reviewed by FEMA Region IL FEMA requests that state and local jurisdictions submit a schedule of remedial actions for correcting the deficiencies discussed in this report. The Regional Director of FEMA is responsible for certifying to the FEMA Associate Director of State and Local Programs and Support, Washington, D.C., that all deficiencies observed during,the exercise have been corrected and that such corrections have been incorporated into state and local plans, as appropriate. 1.2 FEDERAL OBSERVERS Thirteen federal observers evaluated off-site emergency response functions. These ladividuals, their affiliations, and their exercise assignments are given below. Observer Agency Exercise Location / Function R. Kowleski FEMA General Observation /RAC Chairman R. Acerno FEMA State Emergency Operations Center (SEOC)/ Team Leader C. Gordon NRC PSE&G Off-site Emergency Operations Facility (EOF)/ State State Bureau of Radiation Protection A. Hull BNL State Bureau of Radiation Protection - Forward Command Post / Accident Assessment B. Salmonson INEL Forward Command Post / Radiological monitoring teams T. Baldwin ANL Salem County EOC/ Team Leader H. Fish DOE Salem County EOC/ Communications L. Poch ANL Salem County EOC/ Operations L. Slagte INEL Salem County / School bus evacuations congregate care shelter (Woodstown H!gh School) J. Keller INEL Salem County / Decontamination Center (Centerton Fire House) and Emergency worker Decontamination Center (Quinton Fire Station) R. Reynolds FEMA E!sinboro and Lower Alloways Creek municipal EOCs/ Team Leader
l 4 , Observer Agency Exercise Location / Function R. Bernacki FEMA Pennsville and Salem City municipal EOCs J. Nagle ANL Quinton and Mannington municipal EOCs 1.3 EVALUATION CRITERIA The exercise evaluations presented.Jn Sec. 2 are based on applicable planning standards and evaluation criteria set forth in Section II of NUREG-0654/ FEMA REP-1, Rev.1 (Nov.1980). Following the overview narrative for each jurisdiction or activity, deftelencies and accompanying recommendations are presented. Deficiencies are pre-sented in two categories. The first category includes those deficiencies that would lead to a negative finding, that is, a finding that off-site emergency preparedness was not adequate to provide reasonable assurance that appropriate measures can be taken to pro-teet the health and safety of the public living near the site in the event of a radiological emergency. A negative finding would be based on at least one deficiency of this type. The second category includes all other defielencies where, although demon-strated (and observed) performance during the exercise was substandard and corrective actions are necessary, other factors gave FEMA reasonable assurance that, in a real radiological emergency, the health and safety of the public could be protected. These other deficiencies also include all other problem areas, where performance was considered adequate but where a correctable weakness was observed. Correction of the weakness would enhance the ability of the organization to respond to radiological emergencies. , 1.4 EXERCISE OBJECTIVES The licensee (Public Service Electric and Gas Company), FEMA, NRC, the State of New Jersey, and a municipal representative planned a coordinated exercise of their respective emergency plans for both the on-site and off-site support agencies. The exercise involved activation and participation of the staff and response facilities of SNGS as well as emergency organizations and emergency facilities of the State of New
, Jersey, Salem County, and the six Salem County municipallties.
The exercise was Intended to demonstrate many, but not necessarily all, of the SNGS capabilities to respond to a wide range of emergency conditions. This scenario was
- designed to activate the radlological emergency response plans (RERPs) for SNGS and PSE&G's corporate radiological emergency response plan through their various levels.
Although the scenario accurately simulates operating events, it was not Intended to assess all of the operutor's diagnostic capabilities, but rather to provide sequences that ultimately demonstrated the operator's ability to respond to events and that resulted in exercising both on-site and off-site emergency procedures. The exercise demonstrated a number of primary emergency preparedness functions. At no time was the exercise permitted to interfere with the safe operations of SNGS, and the plant management at its discretion could have suspended the exercise for any period of time necessary to
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I t - 1 5 ' ensure this goal. Free play was encouraged and the referees interfered only if operator ; j or player action would have prematurely terminated the exercise or deviated excessively l from the drill schedule.
! Federal agencies were notified during the exerci.:e according to existing emergency response procedures. Federal agencies with radiological emergency preparedness responsibility did not actively participate in the play of this exercise.
Federal representatives, however, did act as e'xercise evaluators. - e i To provide a conservative exercise in terms of off-site doses and areas affected, 4 exercise meteorology was used. Actud meteorology might have led to projected radio-
) logical doses below established protective action guides (PAGs) within the areas of j interest.
t . The following objectives were developed for this exercise based upon deficiencies 4 noted in the previous exercise and have been referenced in the narrative of the exercise j evaluation section in Sec. 2 of this report by organizational abbreviation and by number, i for example, NJEOC 2. , I l 1.4.1 State of New Jersey Emergency Operations Center (NJEOC)
- 1. Demonstrate that overlays indicating sectors in which protective
! actions have been implemented are available in State, County, and l Municipal Emergency Operating Centers.
- 2. Demonstrate that communications between the BRP liaison in the I State EOC and the decision making executive can be accomplished l promptly.
l 1.4.2 BRP-EOF (BRP/ EOF)
; 1. Demonstrate the ability to transmit dose projections, plant status, and protective actions between the EOF and the Forward l
r Command Post (FCP) in a timely manner.
- 2. The BRP Lead Assessment Off!cer at the EOF will demonstrate transmission of final protective action recommendations to the BRP liaison at the State EOC.
i 3. Demonstrate the effectiveness of back-up communications j systems. I
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. . s l 1.4.3 BRP - Forward Command Post (BRP/FCP)
- 1. Demonstrate more efficient use of field monitoring capability by accurately positioning teams both in and out of the plume based upon timely information transmission from the EOF.
- 2. Demonstrate the capability to communicate with field teams.
- 3. Demonstrate its ability to transmit emergency status and/or pro-tactive action recommendations.to field teams in a timely manner.
1.4.4 Radiological Field Monitoring Teams (RFMT)
- 1. Demonstrate that monitoring equipment has been properly calibrated and will function properly.
1.4.5 Salem County Emergency Operations Center (SCEOC)
- 1. Demonstrate the ability to activate, staff, and mobilize agency representatives at the SCEOC in a timely tr nner.
- 2. Demonstrate that messages are transmitted and logged accurately and in a timely manner and that there is adequate communication within the EOC.
- 3. Demonstrate effective information management in coordinating protective and parallel actions with the municipalities.
- 4. Demonstrate the ability to transmit plant status, personnel ,,
protection information, parallel actions and protective actions to the municipalities in a timely manner.
- 5. Demonstrate sound management and coordination of Information in
, the SCEOC as well as improved flow of information to the municipalities.
- 6. Demonstrate that the communications center is adequate to the message flow.
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- 7. Demonstrate the transmission of hard copy between the County
. and State EOCs.
- 8. Demonstrate that the County Freeholders will provide executive authority at the SCEOC.
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- 9. Demonstrate a procedure for the efficient response by the SCEOC a to requests for Information and assistance from the local EOCs.
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7 144.8 Salem County /Fleid Implementation of Actions to Protect the Public (FIELD)
- 1. ' Demonstrate that emergency workers at the congregate care shelter (at the Pittsgrove Fire Station) know the contamination level for determining the need for decontamination.
- 2. Demonstrate that radiological monitoring equipment at the '
congregate care shelter (at the Pittsgrove Fire Station) is properly calibrated.
- 3. Demonstrate there are s ficient radiological monitoring personnel and equipment at the congregate care shelter in Woodstown and that these personnel have the ability to monitor evacuees and vehicles.
- 4. Demonstrate that sufficient monitoring equipment is available to insure the optimum efficiency of the decontamination center.
- 5. Demonstrate that sufficient personnel dosimetry are available for emergency workers at the decontamination center.
- 6. Demonstrate sufficient knowledge of decontamination levels to conduct operation of the decontamination center in an efficient manner.
- 7. Demonstrate that forms can be used to identify locations on the '
body where contamination is monitored.
- 8. Demonstrate that emergency workers at congregate care shelters are informed of pertinent Information in a timely manner.
- 9. Demonstrate that security and traffic control can be provided at congregate care shelters.
- 10. Demonstrate that emergency workers at the Salem' County Area Transit (SCAT) are familiar with evacuation routes and locations of congregate care shelters.
- 11. Demonstrate the ability to direct the SCAT drivers during the -
evacuation in a manner consistent with the plan.
- 12. Demonstrate that all SCAT drivers involved in evacuation busing are provided with dosimeters. The listing on distribution of dosimetry should also be provided to FEMA.
- 13. Demonstrate that all SCAT drivers are fully trained in radio-logical exposure controlincluding the use of dosimeters and KI.
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1.4.7 Salem County Municipal Emergency Operations Centers (SCMEOC)
- 1. Demonstrate that sufficient personnel dosimetry is available at the Elsinboro EOC for emergency workers.
- 2. Demonstrate that callout IIsts at the Mannington EOC are current.
- 3. Demonstrate that the Salem City EOC dispatcher can notify the Emergency Management Coordinator (EMC) in a timely manner.
- 4. Demonstrate that the Pennsville Office of Emergency Management (OEM) has route alerting maps and written messages for l emergency workers.
- 5. Demonstrate that emergency power is available at the Elsinboro l Township and Salem City EOCs.
1.5 EXERCISE SCENARIO 1.5.1 Major Sequence of Events on Site Given below is a listing of exercise events, the approximate times that they were projected to occur by the scenario, and the actual times that they occurred (as reported to the EOF). Projected by Actually Scenario Occurred Event 1600 1605 Salem Operations Manager receives a telephoned bomb threat. After assessing the situation with Security Force, it is determined that the threat is credible. Security implements Contingency Procedure (SCP 5). An Unusual Event is declared per ECG Section 13B, threat against the
. station.
1715 1715 Protected area alarm. Intruders observed on closed circuit . TV apparently unarmed. Reconnaissance Team reports sighting intruders in the area of the Sewage Treatment Plant. Security irrplements SCP 6, discovery of intruders. An Alert is declared per ECG Section 13D. 1800 1805 Security Force Reconnaisance Team discovers bomb by Unit 2 BIT,78 ft. Elevation Auxiliary Building, Mechanical Penetration Area. Security Lieutenant implements SCP 10, 1
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Projected by Actually Scenario Occurred Event - discovery of sabotage device. A Site Area Emergency is declared per ECG Section 13 E. Unit 2 commences controlled shutdown. 1830 NRa Unit 2 in Mode 3, Hot Standby. Unit 1 commences controlled shutdown. 1900 NR Unit 1 in Mode 3, Hot Standby. " 1915 1923 Unit 2 large break LOCA in progress. General Emergency declared per ECG Section SA (SSS/EDO judgment of probable failed fuel before completion of RCS analysis) and 5B, Loss of Primary Coolant. Predetermined Protective Action Recommendation Case B is provided to the States. Based on Core degradation and LOCA with no immediate potential for Containment Boundary Failure, 0-5 mile evacuation in downwind quadrant and 0-5 mile sheltering in unaffected quadrants is recommended. Actuation of Safety Injection, Accumulator dump and . Containment Spray. RWST level decreasing rapidly, Containment Sump level increasing. Loss of 2A Vital 4K bus during power transfer (diff. on bus). The following are unavailable: 21 CCW Pump 21 AFW Pump 21 Containment Spray Pump 21 & 22 Service Water Pump 21 Safety Injection Pump I 218. A. Pump 21 Containment Fan Coil Unit 23 Charging Pump (PDP) 21 RHR Pump 1945 NR Failure of 22 RHR Pump
Projected by Actually Scenario Occurred Event - 1 1950 NR RWST level decreasing rapidly. Containment pressure >15 psig. No ability to recirculate containment sump water. SI pump'(22), 22 Spray pump, 21 & 22 CCP still using RWST water. , j 2015 NR Containment pressure relief isolation valves fall and vent the containment to the plant vent. Release is in progress, estimated to last 4 to 5 hours. - Projected peak dose rate at LPZ Centerline: i Whole Body 20 mR/hr Thyroid 2.7 rem /hr 1 Integrated Dose: Whole Body 50 mR Thyroid 8 rem 2030 NR RWST depleted. Core exit thermocouples exceed 1200*F. 2100 NR 22 RHR pump returned to service. 2115 NR Unit 2 on cold leg recirculation (containment sump) 2120 NR Cool down (very slowly) initiated. 2215 NR Plume arrives at LPZ. i 2300 2220 Consideration to terminate the exercise upon consent of FEMA and OEM. 2400 NR Release terminated due to containment pressure equalizing to atmospheric pressure and/or isolation of leak path. 0015 NR EPZ peak dose rate: Whole Body <5 mR/hr Thyroid 900 mrem /hr
- i PAG exceeded at 6 miles for Thyroid and at 7 miles exceeded on dose rate but not integrated dose. .
aNR = not reported.
it .. .. 1.5.2 Description of State and County Resources All State exercise participants were to be pre-positioned in accordance with the exercise time line. Initial notification was to be provided by EOF referees to the State EOC Operations Room and to Salem County. Verification calls were to be made to the EOF. The State EOC Operations Staff and State referees in the EOF and Salem County EOC were to serve as the Exercise Control Team in conjunction with the PSE&G referees h the EOF. ' Initiating events were provided to the Salem County municipalities by the Salem County EOC. Salem County Municipal EOC's and the Cumberland County EOC was to be operational only for the receipt and transmission of radio and telephone communications; and for the correction of site-specific exercise objectives as shown in Sec.1.4.7. All county-level requests for resource support, exclusive of standard mutual aid requests, from out-of-county sources were to be directed to the state EOC using normal message procedures. One State Monitoring Team was to be dispatched from the FCP for actual field assignment by a BRP participant. The team was to be supplied with one referee / observer. The referee was to provide simulated survey instrument readings which would be used to determine dose rates. Several demonstrations of emergency response capability were to be made outside of the State EOC, EOF, FCP, and the Salem County EOC. First, notification of the Salem City EMC was to be accomplished by standard contact from the SCEOC to the Salem City Police located on the first floor of the Administration Building at 94 Market l Street. The Salem Police were to then contact the EMC by phone. This was to occur at the Alert Level. The municipal EMC's were also to be notified by radio pager. l Second, the Salem County Area Transit (SCAT) was to be notified by radio from the SCEOC to the depot in Deepwater. Dispatch was to occur upon instruction from the SCEOC as dictated by exercise conditions. Third, the Quinton Decontamination Center was to be set up at the Site Area Emergency Level Decontamination personnel were to be put on standby at the Alert Level from the County Dispatch Center.
, Fourth, the Woodstown Congregate Care Shelter was to be activated at the Site Area Emergency Level with appropriate staffing, communications, security, monitoring, decontamination capability, and traffic control. Personnel were to be put on standby at the Alert Level. "
Fifth, the Pittsgrove (Shalick H.S.) decontamination capability was to be demonstrated at the Centerton Fire House. The exercise was to be terminated upon mutual consent of New Jersey and FEMA Region 11 that participants had sufficiently demonstrated their capabilities. e
, , _ - - - - - - - - ,.c,-----. . . - - , -
3 12 '. -
. 2 EXERCISE EVALUATION I
This section provides a narrative overview of the observer evaluations from the April 23,1985, radiological emergency preparedness remedial for the Salem Nuclear i Generating Station (SNGS). These evaluations are referenced by organizational abbreviation and number to the exercise objectives listed in Sec.1.4. t j 2.1 NEW JERSEY STATE OPERATIONS _ 2.1.1 State EOC This remedial exercise did not require full activation of State EOC in West Trenton, New Jersey. Approximately 28 individuals participated in the exercise, staffing the command room, Bureau of Radiation Protection (BRP), communications room, and the message center. The staff present displayed adequate training and knowledge of their responsibilities. Maps in the State EOC were equipped with new, colored, transparent overlays indicating the direction of the plume and sectors where protective actions were implemented. This satisfied an exercise objective (NJEOC 1). The BRP Liaison Officer was stationed near the Command and Control center, which eliminated any delay in the presentation of protective action recommendations to the designated State Director. This successfully demonstrated another exercise objective (NJEOC 2). The role of the Bureau of Radiation Protection Liaison Officer was also clarified. His responsibility was to pass information from the BRP staff at EOF directly to the designated State Director. Also, communication between BRP staffs stationed at EOF and State EOC staff was prompt and effective. This corrects a deficiency from the October,1984, exercise. Deficiencies That Would Lead to a Negative Finding No deficiencies that would lead to a negative finPng were observed at the State EOC during this remedial exercise.
' Other Deficiencies .
No other deficiencies were observed at the State EOC during this remedial - exercise. 2.1.2 Bureau of Radiation Protection
.A number of other deficiencies pertaining to Bureau of Radiation Protection operation were addressed and resolved adequately by BRP staff members in the Emergency Operation Facility, Forward Command Pogt, and in the field.
13 .. .. 2.1.2.1 State of of New Jersey BRP
~
The BRP team at the EOF was comprised of a full complement of staff including the State Radiological Assessment Officer (SRAO) and Assistant SRAO. The SRAO was clearly in charge and effectively demonstrated transmission of final protective action recommendations to the BRP liaison at the State EOC, thus satisfying an exercise objective (BRP/ EOF 2). A new " EOF Transmission Sheet" was developed which provided the following information for transmission from BRP staff in the EOF to their counterparts at the FCP: Emergency Action Level (EAL), meteorological conditions, status of radioactive release, dose projection data at the site boundary, 5 miles, and 10 miles, and protective measures recommended to the public. Transmission of information was observed at 30 minute intervals or when there were significant changes in data or information. The above measures satisfied an exercise objective (BRP/ EOF 1). After interfacing with the utility liaison in the EOF, transmission sheets were prepared by team members and 4 reviewed by the BRP team leader. Information flow appeared adequate in that such messages were communicated to the FCP immediately following the leader's review. It is recommended that the team leader sign or initial transmission sheets after review to indicate that he/she concurs that the information is accurate. In addition to the EOF Transmission Sheet, another form, the "FCP Transmission Sheet to BRP" was used to provide EOF staff with a permanent record of information and data obtained by field monitoring teams. Finally, the BRP met an exercise objective by demonstrating the effectiveness of back-up communications systems (BRP/ EOF 3). A portable radio was available and observed for transmission of information between the EOF, FCP, and f!ald monitoring teams. BRP staff indicated that training on radio use was provided during practice drills. Deficiencies That Would Lead to a Negative Finding i No deficiencies that would lead to a negative finding were observed at the State of New Jersey BRP during this remedial exercise. l Other Dedelencies No other deficiencies were observed at the State of New Jersey BRP during the remedial exercise. 2.1.2.2 BRP Forward Command Post All of the staff at the Bureau of Radiation Protection Forward Command Post (BRP-FCP) demonstrated a high level of competence in the performance of their duties. The lead field assessment officer made decisions in conference with the appropriate members of his staff. 1
-- . . , _ _ . - - . -. -----,.,----n..
14 4 The staff at the BRP-FCP effectively deployed the field monitoring teams (one team was actually deployed, the remaining two were simulated) to the projected and actual location of the plume throughout the exercise. This action satisfied an exercise objective (BRP/FCP 1). Communication capability between the BRP-FCP and the field monitoring teams had also been improved, thus meeting an exercise objective (BRP/FCP 2). Clear, two-way communications were maintained throughout the exercise. A field transmitter malfunction was quickly remedied. Also, the plant status and protective action recommendations were regularly and promptly transmitted to the field tea'ms. This demonstration satisfied another exercise objective (BRP/FCP 3). Deficiencies That Would Lead to a Negative Finding i No deficiencies that would lead to a negative finding were observed at the State of New Je:wy BRP-FCP during this remedial exercise. Other Deficiencies - No other deficiencies were observed at the BRP-FCP during the remedial exercise. 2.1.2.3 Radiological Field Monitoring Teams Only one radiological field monitoring team was deployed during this remedial exercise. As noted in Sec. 2.1.2.2, radio communications between the BRP-FCP and the field team were very good in all routes traveled. No " dead spots" in communications were noted. The radio in the original field team vehicle was found to be defective while the team was in the field, but this was quickly remedied by providing the team with another vehicle equipped with a functional radio. However, it is recommended that radios be thoroughly tested before they are dispatched into the field. Plant status and protective action recommendations were also effectively communicated to the field team from the BRP-FCP. Radiological monitoring instruments were properly calibrated, but the air j sampling pump was not calibrated and could not draw the required 3 ft3 / min flow rate j with the particulate filter in place. Hence, the exercise objective for the field teams ! was only partially met (RFMT 1). Also, environmental monitoring and the contamination
- control (cartridge handling) technique for handling air samples utilized by the field teams l should be improved. Specifically, counting of air samples should have been performed l outside the plume as specified in the State plan. Furthermore, the high range ion j chamber remained in the field kit without batteries until this practice was questioned by the observer. The field monitoring team SOPS requiring preoperational check of
! calibration and battery installation should be followed for all instrumentation. I l i
,, . . , , _ . ,. . . _ . . _ . - - _ , . - - _ - _ , -_..m -._ . . , , - , _ _ - - - . , . . . -
15 Defielencies That Would Lead to a Negative Finding No deficiencies that would lead to a negative finding were observed for tlke radiological field monitoring team during this remedial exercise. Other Defielencies e
- 1. Deficiency: The air sampler of the Vanguard A field team was not properly calibrated (NUREG-0654, II, H.10, I.8).
Recommendatiom The air sampler should be properly calibrated.
- 2. Deficiency: The air sampler of the Vyard A field monitoring team could not draw the required 3 ft / min flowrate with the particulate filter in place (NUREG-0654, II, H.10, I.8).
Recommendatiom The air sampler should be adjusted so that the required flowrate can be achieved.
- 3. Def!clency: The field monitoring team did not take the air sampler cartridge out of the plume into a low background area for counting (NUREG-0654, II, I.8).
Recommendatiom The counting of air samples should be performed outside the plume as specified in the state plan.
- 4. Deficiency: The high range ion chamber remained in the field kit without batteries until this practice was questioned by the observer (NUREG-0654, II, I.8).
Recommendatiom The field monitoring team SOPS requiring preoperational check of calibration and battery installation should be followed for all Instrumentation.
. 2.2 SALEM COUNTY OPERATIONS
~
2.2.1 Salem County EOC The exercise objective relating to initial notification and mobilization of emergency response personnel was satisfied (SCEOC 1). Staffing of the Salem County EOC was completed in a timely manner and activation of each municipal EOC was properly verified. External and internal communications were improved since the October,1984, exercise. The communications room has been relocated since the last exercise and now l i _=
i
- has adequate space and a reduced noise level which satisfied an exercise objective
- (SCEOC 6) concerning improved message flow. All external communications including incoming and outgoing calls were handled expeditiously and records of each communication were maintained. The Emergency Management Radio (EMRAD) link to municipalities located within the 10-mile EPZ was used effectively. State protective action recommendations were received by telephone and confirmed by hard copy l received on the telefax machine, thus correcting a deficiency from the previous exercise i
as well as satisfying an exercise objective (SCEOC 7). i i The operations room had sufficient space and each agency had a separate telephone. A public address system was periodically used by the Emergency Management
- Director to provide updates on the status of the emergency to the operations room l staff. Internal communication throughout the EOC was expedited by message handlers.
4 These improvements in internal and external communications satisfied an exercise
- objective (SCEOC 2).
Maps showing protective actions implemented within the 10-mile EPZ, access 1 control points, and shelters were posted in the operations . room. This satisfied an exercise objective (NJEOC 1). l Although several improvements at the SCEOC were noted, there is a continuing need to strengthen emergency operations management. The County Emergency Management Director is to be recognized for improvements that have been made since the October,1984, exercise with regard to the coordination of internal communications and the dissemination of information to municipal EOCs. However, the continued preoccupation of the County Director with message initiation, review and telephone interruptions impaired his ability to be in control of the overall emergency response. l There was a lag of approximately thirty (30) minutes between receipt of the state , recommendation to administer potassium iodide (KI) to emergency workers and transmission of these instructions to the municipal EOCs. However, based on the exercise scenario (wind speed and direction) no one would have been exposed to radiation due to the delay. Also, a reply to a request for clarification from the Pennsville EOC regarding the state's evacuation recommendation was not timely. Similar delays in responding to requests for information from Salem City, Quinton, and Mannington were
- also noted. Although message control has been improved since the last exercise, procedures should be developed for the handling of priority messages. As a result of these observed deficiencies, the three SCEOC objectives that dealt with the coordination of protective and parallel actions with the municipalities, transmitting this information in a timely manner to the municipalities, and responding in a timely manner to requests for information and assistance from the municipalities have been only partially met "
(SCEOC 3, SCEOC 4, and SCEOC 9). 5 It is important to note that the Deputy Director, New Jersey Office of
, Emergency Management, participated in the exercise as the State Liaison to Salem County. The Deputy Director was instrumental in facilitating operations management of the SCEOC. Throughout the exercise there was little interaction among agency representatives regarding the actions taken by their agencies to deal with the State protective action recommendations. The State Liaison Officer noticed this problem and encouraged the EOC staff to take a more active role in coordinating and discussing their M
-m, ,-,--,.v ,e.+ . - - . ~ -
o . .
, 17 agency actions. It is Imperative that each agency carefully analyze the protective action recommendations with respect to their agency's role and the resources to deal with an emergency. The Instructional experience afforded by this exericse should be reinforced by continued training to insure the improvement of Salem County's radiological emergency management capabilities. Due to this deficiency, the objective dealing with demonstration of sound management and coordination of information in the SCEOC was only partially met (SCEOC 5).
e At the present time, it is evident that the State's presence in the SCEOC is essential to assure an effective response to radiological emergency. The State should
- develop an interim plan to deal with the issu~e of weak management of the SCEOC. .
Finally, it was encouraging that the Salem County Freeholders and legislatoms were present and carefully monitored the entire exercise. This satisfied an objective of the exercise (SCEOC 8). Deficiencies That Would Lead to a Negative Finding , No deficiencies that would lead to a negative finding were observed at the , SCEOC during this remedial exercise. l f Other Deficiencies l
- 1. Deficiency: There were some delays at the Salem County EOC in l notifying some of the municipalities of the message to administer KI to emergency workers (NUREG-0654, II, J.10.e).
I Recommendation: Staffing, procedures, and training at the SCEOC should be reviewed to determine how better overall management and more timely information flow from Salem County to the municipalities need further improvement.
- 2. Deficiency: Pennsville, Salem City, Quinton, and Mannington reported that requests for information and other assistance from the SCEOC did not always receive a prompt response (NUREG-0654, II, F.1.d).
Recommendattom Implement a procedure for more prompt responses by the SCEOC to requests for information and assistance from local EOCs.
- 3. Deficiency: The SCEOC emergency activities were not always well integrated and appropriate organizations did not always coordinate their agency's actions (NUREG-0654, II, A.1.d, A.2.a).
6
18 '. . Recommendation: A more effective management system for ] Salem County, including better information dissemination among . j the staff and better use of staff resources is required. Salem
- i County staffing, procedures, and training should be reviewed to determine how improvements will be implemented. The State j must develop an interim plan (plan supplement) to provide manage-j ment by the State, in the SCEOC until Salem County is able to be j in full control of the overall emergency response. This plan should
- j specify the scale of assistance and personnel involved.
0 -- 2.2.2 Salem County Municipal EOCs Federal observers evaluated activities at the following municipal EOCs in Salem County during the exercise: ] i e Salem City e Mannington i . ) e Pennsville o Quinton 4
- e Elsinboro e Lower Alloways Creek 4
An excellent degree of participation was observed in each of the six municipal EOCs. In each Instance the local Emergency Management Coordinator (EMC) as well as j a group of volunteers used the remedial exercise as another opportunity for training and { practice. In addition, the various municipalities successfully resolved a group of { deficiencies noted at the October 23, 1984, exercise. All exercise objectives for the
- Salem County municipal EOCs were satisfied.
f Emergency power is now available at all local Salem County EOC's (SCMEOC j 5). Quinton Township has improved its response capabilities by establishing a new EOC. t The callout lists at the Mannington EOC are current (SCMEOC 2) and route alerting maps and written messages for emergency workers are available at Pennsville (SCMEOC 4). Elsinboro displayed a complete set of dosimeters for emergency workers (SCMEOC 1) and the Salem City EOC dispatcher notified the EMC in a timely manner (SCMEOC 3). ! 'Ine capability to maintain current displays in each EOC was further improved by { the addition of overlays which satisfied an exercise objective (NJEOC 1). t i Deficiencies That Would Lead to a Negative Finding j No deficiencies that would lead to a negative finding were observed at the Salem
, County municipal EOCs during this remedial exercise.
l l Other Deficiencies No other deficiencies were observed at the Salem County municipal EOCs during the remedial exercise. i
3, 2.2.3 Field Implementation of Actions to Protect the Public There was a limited demonstration of field activities during this remedial exercise. These activities included simulation of a school evacuation and activation of congregate care shelters and one decontamination center. Security and traffic control for the congregate care shelters was provided by fire police at both the Woodstown High School and Centerton Fire House. This satisfied an , exercise objective (FIELD 9). Properly calibrated monitoring instrumentation was available. This corrected a deficiency from the previous exercise and satisfied an exercise objective (FIELD 2). At the Centerton Fire House, the standard forms were correctly used to record the location of any contamination. However, personnel were not fully familiar with decontamination limits. Additional training is necessary to assure that all monitoring personnel are aware of the predetermined contamination level for determining the need for decontamination. Hence, this exercise objective was only partly met (FIELD 1). At the Woodstown congregate care shelter there were sufficient numbers of trained personnel to provide radiological monitoring capability fo'r evacuees and vehicles. Emergency clothing was available and monitoring procedures were adequate. This satisfied an exercise objective (FIELD 3). Improvements are still needed in the dissemination of information to the American Red Cross (ARC) shelter managers. Little information concerning the number evacuees to be expected or their anticipated arrival time was passed from the Salem County EOC to the shelter managers. Hence, this exercise objective was only partly met (FIELD 8). Propse personnel dosimeters (both self-reading and permanent record devices) were used by all emergency workers at the Quinton emergency worker decontamination center. This satisfied an exercise objective (FIELD 5). Standard forms for recording the location of contamination were properly used, thus satisfying an exercise objective (FIELD 7). Sufficient quantities of properly calibrated monitoring instrumentation were available to monitor both personnel and vehicles. This also satisfied an exercise objective (FIELD 4). Finally, the decontamination personnel were aware of the levels of contamination that would require decontamination. This corrects a deficiency from the previous axercise and satisfied an exercise objective (FIELD 6). The Salem County Area Transit (SCAT) bus driver, who participated in the school evacuation, had a list of congregate care centers, with addresses, and a map showing , approved evacuation routes. Upon direction from the Salem County EOC, the bus driver went to Mannington School to simulate picking up students and then proceeded to 'the Woodstown congregate care shelter, which is the shelter identified for this school in the plan. This corrected two deficiencies from the previous exercise as well as satisfying two exercise objectives (FIELD 10 and and FIELD 11). The SCAT driver was equipped with a self-reading dosimeter but had no permanent record dosimeter. Also, more training is needed in the use of dosimetry and in the use and availability of KL This repeats previous deficiencies and only partly satisfied two exercise objectives (FIELD 12 and FIELD 13).
Defleiencies That Would Lead to a Negative Finding No deficiencies that would lead to a negative finding were observed during the fleid implementation of actions to protect the public at this remedial exercise. Other Defleiencies t
- 1. Deffelency: Emergency workers at the Salem County congregate care shelter (Centerton Fire. Station) did not know the contamination level for determining the need for decontamination (NUREG-0654, II, K.5.a).
Recommendatiom Emergency workers should receive additional training on the contamination level for determining the need for decontamination.
- 2. Deficiency: The Salem County Congregate- Care Shelter (Woodstown High School) was not apprised of when and how many evacuees to expect (NUREG-0654, II, J.10.h).
Recommendatiom The ARC representative at the SCEOC should inform representatives at the Congregate Care Shelters of the number of evacuees and their expected time of arrival.
- 3. Def!clency: The SCAT driver was not provided with a permanent record dosimeter (NUREG-0654, II, K.3.a).
Recommendatiom Permanent record dosimeters should be provided to all drivers involved in evacuation busing. A dosimeter distribution list should be provided to FEMA.
- 4. Deffelency: The bus driver for the school evacuation was not trained in the use of dosimeters or KI (NUREG-0654, II, K.3.a).
Recommendatiom All emergency workers, including bus drivers, should be fully trained in radiological exposure control including the use of dosimetera and KI. The training schedule for all emergency workers should be furnished to FEMA. - I a--,,,ee,-e ~ - - ---.,nnm er -- -
! . i
, 21 3 SCHEDULE FOR CORRECTING DEFICIENCIES: APRIL 23,1985, EXERCISE Section 2 of this report lists deficiencies based on the findings and a recommendations of federal observers at the radiological emergency preparedness
! remedial exercise for the Salem Nuclear Generating Station held on April 23, 1985. These evaluations are based on the applicable planning standards and evaluation criteria set forth in NUREG-0654-FEMA-1, Rev.1 (Nov.1980), and objectives for the exercise ' agreed upon by the state, FEMA, and the RAC. The Regional Director of FEMA is responsible for certifying to the FEMA Associate Director, State and Local Programs and Support, Washington, D.C., that any def!ciencies that require corrective actions have been corrected and that such corrections have been incorporated into the plans as appropriate. l FEMA requests that both the state and local jurisdictions submit a schedule of actions they have taken or intend to take to correct these deficiencies. FEMA recommends that a detailed plan, including dates of completion for scheduling and implementing recommendations, be provided if corrective actions cannot be instituted immediately. FEMA further recommends that an additional effort be made by alllevels of gcvernment to improve intergovernmental coordination in all aspects of the
. emergency planning process. A meeting between state, county, local, and FEMA l officials is advisable.
No deficiencies were observed that would cause a finding that off-site 4 emergency preparedness was not adequate to provide reasonable assurance that
- appropriate measures can be taken to protect the health and safety of the public IIving in l the vicinity of the site in the event of a radiological emergency.
1 The deficiencies observed at the April 23, 1985, remedial exercise for the SNGS, as well as outstanding deficiencies from previous exercises, require that a schedule of l corrective actions be developed. These deficiencies are summarized in the following Table 3.1. Cross-referencing is provided in Table 3.1 to the corresponding deficiency and corrective action in Table 4.1. The cross-referencing appears at the end of the l corrective action description on Table 3.1 and Indicates the number of the item as it appears in Table 4.1. i 1 i I,
Table 3.1 SALEN NUCLEAR CENERATINC STATION - REMEDIAL ACTION SCHEDULE April 23, 1985 and Previous Esercises 6/19/85 Page 1 of 2 0 N q-0 y g -. -. o 3: N: 13 33 j'J 3 *i k.33: GDR
~
1l dU 3 3.IS ens n un US$ $14 MS
$N RAC Recosamendation Corrective Action Uw State (S)/ County (C) Response (ACTION) FEMA Evaluation of State /Comty Resposee I. State of New Jersey * .13. . 1. New Jersey uses compass sectors to I ea define protective action areas, N whereas PSE&C designates Emergency Planning Areas (EPAs). State and utility representatives should agree on a single method for areas where protective actions may be implemented. This deficiency regarding the designation of areas to be evacuated has been opera-tionally addressed during the 1984 esercise. The use of EPAs has been replaced at the State EOC by the use of compasq sectors which are then converted to narrative descriptions of the affected areas for EBS messages. Although this system works well, the use of EPAs is still referenced in the New i
Jersey Radiological Emergency ,
- Response Plan (RERP). Practice is not consistent with the plan. The New Jersey RERP should be revised . .
to remove the EPA concept, and , 8 9 .. l . j . .
- i
d Table 3.1 SALEM WUCLEAR CENERATINC STATION - REMEDIAL ACTION SCHEDULE April 23, 1985 and Previous Esercises 6/19/85 Page 2 of 2 e D nt 4 m - g 6: 8
- 3* N* 12 * !q :
oSa yd gt 8 'i k3tyd gN
.: ~:
Ud 45 State (S)/ County (C) Response (ACTION) p: p, 05 ma
- l 4 FEHA Evaluation of State /Consity Response ,s M3, RAC Recossmendation corrective Action re pl ace it with the procedure presently in use based on compass l t
sectors (Table 4.13 26). L J.Il 2. No messages were posted in the I accident assessment area or the State EOC regarding protective actions implemented for the ingestion pathway. Protective actions implemented should be clearly posted on the status boards and maps (Table 4.13 44). J.10.r 3. Assurance should be given that I A.3 buses are available for evacuating the public in a timely fashion. (NJOEH and NJ Transit should finalize a memorandum of under-standing) (Table 4.13 31). J.10 3 4. Although evacuation procedures I were generally clearly stated in
- the EBS messages, there were no clear instructions given for the
- evaguation of school children.
The E85 evacuation messages should . . make it clear whether e school children are to be evacuated or ' nut (Table 4.13 32). . ,
Table 3.1 SALEM NUCLEAR CENERATING STATION - REMEDIAL ACTION SCHEDULE April 23, 1945 and Previous Esercises 6/19/85 Pase 3 f 21 k; -
-e e a . e sa s. - nnp: tu :312 d q anna g3 .:
d RAC Recommendation Corrective Action State (S)/Coimty (C) Response (ACTION) FEMA Evaluation of Stata/Coimty Response ,e f 31.4 5. Some problems with determining I , where to locate field monitoring I teams were caused by the lack of , 4 sufficient re fe re e s . There were four teams and only three referees. 1he state BRP should insure that a sulficient number of trained referees are provided for esercises (Table 4.13 12).
.l.d 6. Duplic at e ex pl anat ions of plant 1 .4.j events, current meteorology, and dose projection checks to BRP were delayed. Procedures for the prompt receipt of such data by BRP headquarters should be improved (Table 4.11 42).
,.l.e 7. The aRP was not notified of the X i c.calation of the plant emergency action level (EAL) from unusual event to alert. The BAP was un- , aware of the change until it con-tacted the utility approslastely
- t 30 minutes after the change. The plan provisions for notifying each .
j response organization of the plant . EAL aust be followed (T'a ble 4.11 . 41). en
~ .
4 Table 3.1 sal.EM NUCLEAR CENERATING STATION - REMEDIAL ACTION SCllEDULE April 23, 1985 and Prolous Esercises 6/19/85 Page 4 of28 N i O a . E 72 G"
*3 o 3" U" lt
- 3 ! Q 34
,) ja
.: a dU E S' '
I I IUC 2 N Ud Is5 State (S)/ County (C) Response (ACTION) etta U8$ er: ms ItAC Recommendation Corrective Action FEMA Evaluation cf State /Consity Response E443484 10 8. The, air sampler of the Vanguard A I I l 8 field monitoring team could not g draw the required flourate with the particulate filter in place. The air sampler should be adjusted so that the required flowrate can be achieved (Table 4.13 17). .30 9. The air sampler of the Vanguard A I .8 field monitoring team was not properly calibrated. The air . sampler should be prope rly cali-brated (Table 4.13 18). >8 10. The high range ion chamber re- I meined in the field kit without batteries until this practice was questioned by the observer. The field monitoring team SOPS requir-ing preoperational check of cali-bration and battery installation . should be followed for all instru-mentation (Table 4.11 19). e W 9
Table 3.1 SALEM WCLEAR CENERATING STATI0tl - REMEDIAL ACTI0ll SCHEDULE April 23, 1985 and previous Isercises 6/19/85
. rase s .f za E C A E Q' G a -
8 *: ~3 o 3" N" 10 33!1 34 dU E* E IICI
!I jij
." w &23 2:n 3::23 IN RAC Recommendation Corrective Action U Is5 State (S)/ County (C) Response (ACTICII) M33 FEMA Evaluation of State /Cototy Response Elf 2$34 8 11. The field monitoring team did not I take the air s ampl e'r cartridge l out of the plume into a low back- p ground area for counting. The e counting of air samples should be performed outside the plume as specified in the state plan (Table 4.13 20).
- 10 12. Calculation of cumulative popu- I lation dose should be performed periodically (Table 4.13 34). ,
- ll 13. BNP shoul d better coordinate the I responsible agencies in ingestion pathuay sampling and measurements (Table 4.11 35).
l o . ., 14 Some problems were observed in I 10,3 follouing the proper evacuation 'I routes. This was because the bus drivers and police escorts were unfamiliar with the area, road- . ways were poorl y marked, and route maps were segmented. Consideration should be given to . ! installing additional road name , ! signs and/or route e nupiber , l
e
. Table 3.1 SALEM WUCLEAR CENERATING STATION - REMEDIAL ACTION SCNEDULE April 23, 1985 and Previous Esercises -
6/19/85 Fase 6 of 2d M R Q;'
. . g ~. -.II'
- 8" U" 10 .
- 331 :3 a
jt" dY EA a 3 IGE B'
.g ut &R e r; g::gg N, RAC Becomumendation Corrective Action Us4 4 5 State (S)/Cosmty (C) Response (ACTION) UOd FEMA, Evaluation of State / County Response $lf MOS markers, and providing better maps and written descriptions of l the routes. Esisting small maps y could be improved by placing an N "a" or a match line at the point where the previous map ends. A larger map showing the entire evacuation route should also be included for reference in each bus driver's packet of ma g.s (Table 4.15 28).
10 15. The bus drivers had no training I 3 in radiation record keeping or knouledge of exposure control procedures. No dosimeter chargers were available at t he mustering point. The bus drivers should receive further training in radiological esposure control (Table 4.11 47). 1.c 16. The bus drivers' knowledge of I I radiation protection and dosin-etry varied greatly between the two drivers involved in the . . 8 1 e
l 2 3 u0 f c aJe.dts4 g8 * ^ 1LnM e 5 7 & 8
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e t a . t S f o n o l e i t a u l a v E A M E E L F U D E I I C e.$. S N gtNkO O iI.U I s Te C s ) Ai N c O Lr I A e T I s DE C A EI s ( Du e R o s i 1 - v n e p o 3N r s OP e eI l Td R bA n ) aT a C TS ( 5 G8 y N9 t I 1 T n A , u R3 o E2 C N / El ) Ci S r ( R p AA e E t L a C t U S H M " $.[a E L A LO .N Q~E S
.
- E aN I 3S.U
* - gt enf e gl eA ef e- es ed 1 unal oos nal M s oh ub er e1 guw cihbi oinuE u t c ant at e d eodF e n
vi e a e gi ea s bi e t h e nn vadl ass sl h oie u pc oe 4 u esee ho mer lb rrdd ric o od s o t i t uea t y sl re f dag d t c s u nu h le e b e su s t eT a v A 'b eon t b s n t ad l b s a nh ona( r u ve vo e l aok gur ae eid vne l ot v no nt et e il nouiit i s i oid r a d eat i minni s c ei iaro t eta es er t c it idt eair uac dl eet crim e uird uv e or b . r s t c i r r l adi s pl d vr o c r e s7u) o e r lais nn ar sa dr uA oer poh t t u ue e C o p r vpan t T 3 o v pm m o p pi p ,d 1 eni g rompo o t s n r a r. s and e, 1 a s d C ge u o e, d or e .I se s a nvb i I i e 4 s wsu dii s t a l a .d u t t ,i r c e sr ud e e mI b l a .entv r cl l d n r nl bt e mt osl l eou ut iih oub K r noee a e or ct . e niol oos mt poa e enip no ) m et hl b r oiushT hf h et mor y0 s gas aapdl aes( T ot gaicpb3 s o c e . R 7 1 C A R
- o. I.
$.N JJ
Table 3.1 SALEN NUCLEAR CENERATING STATIOli - REMEDIAL ACTIOli SCHEDULE April 23, 1985 and Frevious Esercises 6/19/85 Fase a of 2: M C C
" Q~
T e - $ "3
- - 3* N: 12 -
- "c s:
s2 4 : 8 3 itagg
- l ! 3.0 V &23 203
- :23 r' d RAC Recosmeadation Corrective Action UM D5 State (S)/Cossity (C) Response (ACTI0tt) UdE FDIA Evaluation of State /Consity Response El[ Mfj 33.o 18. The permanent record dosimeters I
.3.b utilised by the bus ' drivers in- l wolved in the general population y bus evacuation were not iden-tified by a visible identifi-cation ausbar or code. All permanent record dosimeters must have a specific identificatloa number so as to be traceable to the individual sdno used the device (Table 4.18 38). II. Emergency Operations Facility L.I.b 19. With the dose assessment func- I 1.2 tions of the BRF. transferred to the EOF. the allocated space in the EOF was insufficient for the additional staff and equipment, and the arrangement of allocated space hindered interaction between dose assessment and man- - agement personnel for the BEF and those of the utility. If it is decided to transfer the dose assessment functions of the BEF , , to the EOF permanently, the SAF W 6
Table 3.1 SAlbl MUCLEAR CENERATlWC STATION - REMEDIAL ACTION SalEDULE April 23, 1985 and Previous Esercises 6/19/35 Fage 9 of 24 d < m
- -t .2
. . g 5. 3 - 3: N: it 331 :3
>j p: g ?, 3 ." - I 3 ;g:t
- i. . - er: m as EN RAC Recosamendation Corrective Actica UM E[a State (S)/ County (C) Response (ACTION) M0$ TDtA Evaluation of State / County Response $ % / M4 should negotiate with the utility and obtain additional space as l velt as rearrangement of space w throughout the EOF to allow o grouping of dose assestment pe r-sonnel in one a rea and key utility and SRP/Of.sd management representatives in another (Table 4.11 48).
.5 20. The transfer of the BRP dose 1 4 assessment function from the b State t.OC to the EOF was esperi-mental and is not in accord with the current New Jersey RERP. If it is decided to permanently
. transfer the dose assessment functions of the RRP to the EOF, the necessary procedures to implement the ne w arrangement should be prepared and the ,
current RERP revised to reflect the changes (Table 4.13 57). 9 e est
Table 3.1 SAlIN NUCLEAR CENERATINC STATION - REMEDIAL ACTION SCHEDULE April 23, 1985 and Previous Esercises 6/19/85 Page 10 of 28 N 0 C
. p g-a . g -. -. - 3: 0: 10 :331 :3 j'J a U I" d: 33 E3IU"J R m"g &R: O n 3::gg N RAC RecosamenJation Corrective Action Uw IO State (S)/ County (C) Response (ACTION) U d [a FDIA Evaluation of State /Cotssty Response Eld M84 l 21. A status board was not present in X the NJS P-FCP and th're e was no l posting of the emergency classi- u fication level. A status board W displaying the emergency classi-fication level should be dis-played and maintained in the MJSP-FCP (Table 4.11 51).
p 22. The NJS P-FCP room was not I l].= shielded like the nearby EOF room in the same building. When Lt.e FCP personnel were advised to move to the sealed EOF room for radiation esposure protection they could not do.so since there were no comununications hookups available in the EOF room. It is recommended that the FCP room in the Nuclear Training Facility buildies I,e protected similar to that in the EOR room. oe that the
- FCP be relocateJ te the NJSP Woodstown station (Table 4.13 55). - -
1 e em
Table 3.1 SALEM WUCLEAR CENERATING STATION - REMEDIAL ACTION SQlEDULE April 23, 1985 and Previous Esercises 6/19/85 Page !! of 28 d e n
% nt 4 m . g da 8m a 3" U" it 2 3 !q 33 J .J dU 3" a 3 I U8A R S
C"3 wt &&B Rin g::gs N RAC Recommendation Carrective Action Uid E 5 State (S)/ County (C) Response (ACTION) Mdd FEMA Evaluation of State /Consity Response 5 % A 248,Q 0.c 23. The NJSP reported to a etightly I J.) different location for one of the .I' two access control pointa demon- N strated during the esercise. This became apparent when the NJSP a t t empt ed to relieve the Lower Alloways Creek police at the indicated post. It is recom-mended that coordination between the NJSP and local police be implemented in order to obtain agreement on the precise location . of the traffic control / access control points. In particular, the esact location of post #6A needs to be confirmed (Table 4.13 56). e e*
. e 9
.r 1
Table 3.1 SALEN NUCLEAR CENERATING STATIDM - REMEDIAL ACTION SCHEDULE April 23,1985 and Previous Esercises 6/19/85 Page 12 of 20 5 0 R: g Q' G'
- v. -.-
s .
- 3: N: it a s i g 33 l
!j yt" at sa - I s t ag: e at j lr3 lHn 3::25 RAC Recommendation Corrective Actica I[a State (S)/ County (C) Response (ACTION) e a.l $ FEMA Evaluatise of State /Cosaty Response ElfS fl III. Joint News Center and Public Education [! , ,1 24. Public information materiala have I k ,2 been developed indicating evacua-tion routes and the location of congregate care centers. These materials have not been distri-buted by PSE&G due to printing problems. Distribution of public information informing residents of protective actions should be . continued. In aJdition, informa-tion should be disseminated to those locations where transients might bel e.g., Salem Colf and Country Club, and the Salem Motor Lodge. Although the results of the formal survey conducted by the State and utility regarding public awareness are not yet available, a spot check of EPZ , residents during the 1984 eser-cise indicated that, even though e a , W
--__t - -w
8 e 2 sd yS-g c gw 0M e e G 53 81 Rwm38'a@ con f e e
/ .
93 QV c3 1 g
/a 6P CweiFml*E E e
s n S o p s e R y t n u
- o C
/
e t a e t ~ S f . o n o l i t a u l a v E A M E E L F U D E H $ C S ltA 0 N O I s iE m$ Te C s ) Ai N c O Lr I A e I s T DE C E A Ms ( E u R o e i s 1 - v - n e o p 3N r OP s eI e l Td R bA n aTa ) TS C 5 ( C8 y N9 t I1 T n A , u R3 o E2 C N / El ) Ci ' S r ( R p _ AA e E t L a C t _ U S N _ N :Ut5 _ E L A 5s.N d 4 S _ a:tiw I 3j $ nos - gt cef esl dt s ee ot s enaib ob na natdh i emi l oc . u iat ta ngnound es b u s sii) oek m ep t et g8 c o2 rl t . n mi r n ra s t r i v t ni gb o n s et al o 1 k a a be a )2 fo n w a o eeud n i cl i 6 a a ai d t c nl w c bT sh mis uovdei3 , b a e d s 3 _ A i
'p c sa o eCia6 r ga vMn se1 in r t a r e yl oss d c I n p4
_ v .m ne i t _ i d cb i ia enut s a e at a !. o g4 no .de e l ep c s w es rh i n r r el t l c gt r rn a t et eptah Tb ig e ar aiti o e pi r e a r me , h acr ob l nr oe n er ( c wecpo _ r m seTh r ps mf ub o et v t e uod a t r C ni x C s et a gd ck .yc e d e e en (T s n oae e _ o n h ini e a ns ofni dna rk y ac i t iib en t e k tae d l i st t ne o ewiot e uiis awta n e b c d a Ce r r r p ci a n s eg ar mmdl al a n & c ti vc eeeb r e i o uii e m E nZ af eut l r df eoad a S oPfh e rd na oom e nhh v e s P cE owd peiS mt e Hit s am o c e . R 5 2 C A R _ 1l mj!N +
~
W Table 3.1 SALEM NUCLEAR CENERATING STATION - REMEDIAL ACTION SCHEDULE April 23, 1985 and Previous Esercises 6/19/85 rage 14 of 2 5 2;' Tn a ". g w; wg 3" N" it 2 3 !1 af a 8A 8 3 Mig:jt sj H. g : ;tt 9 &&3 2:r: 3:38 M0$ FEMA Evaluation of State / County Response E %[ 2"c8J
^
N RAC Recossendation Corrective Action Uw Ed State (S)/ County (C) Response (ACTION) IV. Salem County a f ta 6.1.4 26. The SCEOC emergency activities I I " 6.2.e were not always well lategrated and appropriate organizations did not always coordinate their agency's actions. A more ef fec-Live management system for Salem County, including better informa-tion dissemination among the staff and better use of staff resources is required. Salem County staffing, procedures, and training should be reviewed to determine how improvements will be impl emented. The State smast develop an interim plan (pl an supplement) to provide management by the State, in the SCEOC until Salem County is able to be in full control of the overall emergency response. This plan
- should specify the scale of assistance and personnel involved . .
(Table 4.11 65).
' e 9
Table 3.1 SALEN NUCLEAR CENERATING STATION - REMEDIAL ACTION SCHEDULE April 23, 1985 and Previous Exercises 6/19/85 Page 15 of28 N G g ~i 7 m
- E f *3 a 3 N* It 231M l j 3" dY EA en Ce 83'
. my a er ras N EAC R1 commendation corrective Action sha EUs State (S)/Cotaity (C) Response (ACTION) M a3,1 FEMA Evaluatica of State /Cototy Response ElfMSS
.d 27. Etsinboro, Salem City, Penns- I I I
wille, Hannington, and Quinton reported that requests for infor- ta mation and other assistance from the SCEOC did not always receive a prompt response. Implement a procedure for more prompt responses by the SCEOC to re-quests for information and assistance from municipal EOCs (Table 4.13 81). 3.j 28. The 1982 Post Exercise Assessment I stated " Salem County must demon-strate the capability to imple-ment protective measures. The county should demonstrate its capability to relocate the popu-lace, evacuate residents from the EPZ, and control access." At the 198) exercise, the county demon-strated the ability to evacuate , residents from the EPZ. Access control was not an objective for the county for this exercise and
- should be demonstrated in a .
future exercise (Table 4.11 6J). .- emp
~
Table 3.1 SAIJ!N NUCLEAR CENERATING STATION - REMEDIAL ACTION SCHEDULE April 23,1985 and Previous Esercises 6/19/35 rage 16 .f 2 N 3
". g -
Q W m . B" N: it 3~3 atu : 'l. -s: s, ig a : n- 33 IEa State (S)/ County (C) Response (ACTICH)
~p d8 FEMA Evaluation of State /Cosmety Response E as M&S l RAC R1cossendation Corrective Action .s 29. Thereweresomedelay~sintheEOC I I notifying some of the municipall- 'l ties of the message to administer ta j N
K1 to emergency workers. Staff-ing, procedures and trainlag at the SCEOC should be reviewed to determine how better overall management and more timely infor-nation flow from Salem County to the municipalities need further l'aprovements (Table 4.11 69).
- 30. Although 24-hour staffing cap- I ability of the SCEOC was demon-strated by presentation of a roster, the SCEOC staff indicated that supplemental personnel from the State OEM or from other coun-ties might be required for pro-longed operations. The potential need for supplemental resources from other counties and/or the ,
State should be identified in the Plan, and written agreements reached with these other jurls- , dictions for providing these
- resources. Appropriate waiming should also be provide 4 (Table .
4.11 71). , 1
i .
~
i I i i i 1 Table 3.1 SALEM MUCLEAR CENERATING STATI0ll - RDIEDIAL ACTlou SMEDULE April 23, 1945 and Previous Esercisee 6/19/45 Fase 17 of28 d nt nt$ a . g d. S a N: 1t J mi d,3'a: t'33as u a p=s d IEa a State (S)/conesty (C) Response (ACTICII) n me RAC Reco==endation Corrective Action p.
- a. d 2 FEMA Evaluettaa of State /Conanty Resposee 14 MJ b.e 31. Emergency workers at the Salem I 1 county congregate e ra shelter c'
l (Centerton Fire Station) did not ta know the contamination level for 08 determining the need for decon-tamination. Emergency workers should receive additional train-ing on the contamination level
- for determining the need fos decontamination (Table 4.18 119).
B O .li 32. The Salem County congregate care X X , center (Woodstown High School) was not apprised of when and how many evacuees to espect. The ARC representative at the SCEOC should inform representatives at the congrega'te care shelters of the number of evacueen and their , espected time of arrival (Table 4 18 95). e .
Table 3.1 SALEM NUCLEAR CEMERATING 3T471001 - AsMEDIAL ACTICII SCNEDULE April 23,1985 and Previous Esercises 6/19/85 Pase is .f as k; a - g qt y
- . g - = in s
[ ;!=at .t Is!2 3iss N RAC Recommendation Corrective Action State (S)/ County (C) Besponse (ACT1010) FEMA Evaluettaa of State /Coestty Response as a p.b 33. At the Salem County decontamina- I s ties center only one 'hower stall l l was available for decontamina-
- La I tion, which would be lasefficient l during emergency worker shift -
- changes or peak processing of people at the center. Additional shower facilities should be available at the decontamination center. Separate showers should be available for men and women (Table 4.11 105). .
D.e 34. At the SA traffic control point, I dosimetry equipment was not ob-served. Police officers assigned to traf fic control points should be equipped with personal desle-etera and should be trained in their use (Table 4.13 111). D.e 35. Radiological esposure control I dosimeters were not issued by the Count y for the bus driver in-volved in the avecuation of . . transit dependent individuals. , , ,
- x. . _ _ - - - _ - - -
s' Table 3.1 SALEN NUCLEAR CENERATING STATIOli - SENEDIAL ACTION SCNEDULE April 23. 1985 and Previous Esercises 6/19/45 Pase 19 .f 2s 2 - n a . g - 3e E og N: 10
- 3 i g ga i dB*at te me-.
ne N BAC Recommendation Corrective Action w3 I State (S)/ County (C) Response (ACTimI) Ud8 FEMA Evaluaties of State /Conesty Response bo,M a E ma Moreove r, the driver appeared to have had no training' in the use ) of dosimeters. Radiological en- e posure control dosimeters and o training in their use le required for personnel lavolved in evacus-tion busing (Table 4.!: 109). ,
).d 36. The ability to evacuate mobility I impaired individuals in Setem County was not demonstrated.- The ability to evacuate mobility ,
impaired individuate should be tested in a future esercise (Table 4.!! 91). . .e 3I. In the 1984 esercles, the bue I I driver for the school evacuation in Sales County did not have a dosimeter. In the 1945 remedial esercise, the bus driver had a self-reading doelmeter but no , permanent record doelmater. ? Appropriate dosimetry should be provided to all drivere in evacu- . ation busing. The listing on
- distribution of dealmstryeshpeld
- be provided to FEMA (Ta>Is 4.18 . .
101). e
. ~
Table 3.1 SALEM WUCLEAR CENERATING STATION - REMEDIAL ACTIDH SCHEDUI.E April 23, 1985 and Previous Esercises 6/19/C5 Fase 20 of 28 i C
.N. q- 7 m . g va we - 3" j2 0: it
- 8 3hi ug:t
- 3 l
- ees e n ::n I RAC Recommendation corrective Actica $d E5 State (S)/Coimty (C) Response (ACTION) U0$ FEMA Evaluation of State / County Response Eif2434 o the school I 1
- 38. The bus driver evacuation for
- County was in Salem !
not trained in the use of desier- d eters or KI. All emergency workers, including bus drivers, s houl d be fully trained in radiological espesure control including the use of dosimeters and Kl. The training schedule for all emergency workers should be f urnished to FEMA (Table 4.15 92).
- 39. During the September 27, 1984 1
.c medical drill, the ambulance crew membe r de called in to Sales County Memorial Hospital over the radio neglected to say "This is a drill". All radio transmissions - maJe as part of future medical drills should be clearly iden-tified as such (Table 4.13 !!6). ,
=
__ - - --_ .-__ -. -__ _ _ _ _ - _ (L ~
8 pea _ 2 e3S'ad , 5 f c aAS0Mg@ 1!m; 81 9 /2 rta3i:f
- 9 1 e
/ g nd282E 03Tl '
6 a P e s n
- o p
s e R _ y _ t - i s n o - C -
/
e - t a , t _ S f
- o m
o I t t , a u l a v E A M E E F L U D E lQ 3$ S E2"* N O 1 E 8' M , I s Te Cs ) Ai N c O Lr I A e T I s DE C E A ( M s E u R o e s i n 1 - v e op 3N r s OP e eI R l Td bA n ) aT a C TS ( 5 G8 y N9 t I 1 i T a t A , o R3 C E2 / N ) El 5 Ci ( r R p e AA t E a L t C S U N M E
*Ut5 L
A L% N daE S a" t"34 a I I 3ysU ms em! l l e8 aigb erc n.y- - e - rn- r-r o o gi ri r l o! ae9 p n een ef t neee aci r1i i r ma s gi h t h S r oF cl t eF et r eennt nt n o n d t ei e n d o ti ena n i.f nht trnonimf arp . 4 nHe v heo di t e e i s n a op 8 l pa t e a end ns oim c A c i
,t a eo sh f psr pe hei n 9
1 mMd o n r oTno C of es ab dt ei e p t c a e i np a s o pi r en m.i v l a oig af t dd a oe hr t e hi do i s t a i p tgiicn wol l y l p t n r l n t ue uB t a f s s a ooei c i c nt n rss cs o c oe f n bn t evdr e i ri . ed ee v n ah o i r i n naa t r rl ewsd und l e g i a o sd l o semor l e nco r u n p r )2 t a r ae na es o a M leo B a e eet H t8 C d h ms r nc i s rb E enio y 8 s t eicfo rt s oor n e d n .lu n1 ad s e as t o t n na r x bi sh i n i u or ohi4 o h a ef eey rf o ee hl T Cs apa t o o t g ss os a sp et E Oi cn a C b s ae us ri e Mr e d n cl or ec y e yh h t
, .E io n m i yi b h od r n r d ct e s ti e
m e st na t yl eoeeel n s eC nr t a l l i uT l a osih vh oef nihO oa c
. s o a ECm( AMh et t Et h go OctE t pa S
c e . . R . 0 1
. C V 4 4 A
R "IN l !a.
O
~
Table 3.1 sal.EM NUCLEAR CENERATING STATION - RDtEDIAL ACTION SCHEDULE April 23, 1985 and Previous Esercises 6/19/a5 Pase 22 ef28 5 C C
. . g ~Q '. G".
~
p 3" N: it ja" att SA
~a:
E"31S ict d d
- m @am RAC Recommendation Corrective Action U I5 State (S)/ County (C) E'esponse (ACTION) 05 FEHA Evalu ,)n of State / County Response $ 1 A M3S staff could not be fully evalu-ated. A system should be imple- l mented to increase the participa- e W
tion levels of volunteer staf f at the Elainboro and Mannington EOCs. The timing of the exercies should be given greater consider- - ation in the scenario development (Table 4.!! 72). 4 42. The radiological officer at the I Lower Alloways Creek EOC was not . sware of the esposure threshold for recalling fleid staff. Emergency staff should be trained to be knowledgable in El.e assimum allowable dose for field staff (Table 4.!! 142). ) 43. The Pennsville EOC is too small I for effective operation. Con-sideration should be given to re- , locating the Penneville E3C to a larger facility (Table 4.11 158). e Wh
~
Table 3.1 SALEM WUCLEAR CENERATINC STATIOtt - REMEDIAL ACTI0tt SQIEDULE April 23, 1985 and Previous Esercises 6/19/85 Page 23 of 28 N U qsi y
. . H *! ~3
- 5 N* 10 ' 3 ! c 34 e g 3"at
.: we eas is:me e:n ma d RAC Recospendation Corrective Action d State (S)/ County (C) Response (ACTICII) Udd FEHA Evaluation of State /commty Response .314,1484 lo.c 44. The Lower Alloways Creek police I officer at one access control !'
l.b point was not completely familiar p A with the use of dosimeters and KI. Police should receive KI and additional training on the use of dosimeters and KI (Table 4.18 153). 1.a 45. Personnel of the Lower Alloways I Creek rescue squad had no dosimeters (Table 4.13 143). 3.a 46. Host emergency workers responding I , 1.b to an impediment to evacuation left their dosimeters in their vehicles. All emergency workers should be instructed to carry dosimeters with them at all times in the field (Table 4.13 141). 30.. 47. Not all emergency workers I res ponding to the impediment to evacuation were aware of pro-cedures for use and authorization - of KI. All emergency workers ~ should be fully trained ein , the ,. use of KI (Table 4.13 148). . . eD
Table 3.1 SALEN HUCLEAR CENERATINC STATION - REMEDIAL ACTION SCHEDULE Aprl! 23,1985 and Previous Esercises 6/19/85 Page 24 of 28 Gi e n O at m:1 m . g 6 S. n' 3* N* 12 "351 d
$3 at 34 pa 8 3 t eg':t enam W ! RAC Recosamendation Corrective Action s i <at
- a. N d State (S)/Comty (C) Response (ACTION) a. 0 $ FEHA Evaluation of State /Comty Response E l f J,@4 l2 48. All municipal EOCs should perform I reentry procedures to the estant ,l possible in the time frame of the esercise (Table 4.13 150).
VI. Cumberland County 6 41. The facilities at the Cumberland I I County EOC were marginal. Space and furniture were limited. Cumberland County should investi-gate the possibility of providing , additional space and facilities for entended ope rations at the EOC (Table 4.13 126). 2.o 50. The Cumberland County EOC oc- 1 3 casionally became overcrowded and noisy because of the presence of non-essential personnel who were not identified in the county's RERP staffing list. A means should be developed to limit the number of personnel in the CCEOC. For ex ampl e, only those indivi- . duals with a pre-established EOC
- or field assignment shoalde be .
e
Table 3.1 SALEM WUCLEAR CENERATING STATION - REMEDIAL ACTICII SCHEDULE April 23, 1985 and Previous Esercises 6/19/85 Page 25 of 28 N E E
- G" e - 8 Tl "y
- Bj N" it 3 !13A I" jg ut
.. at 3X
&R3 8 8 t act 2 0 2 23 N RAC Recossacadation Corrective Action UM Ed State (S)/ County (C) Response (ACTION) UdE FEMA Evaluettom of State /Coastry Response Elf 2434 allowed access into the EOC with-out s peci fic permission of the l ENC (Table 4.18 124). y os 3 51. Cumbe rland County should pa r- I ticipate in comunanication training and drills (Table 4.13 82). &
l.h 52. Changes in plant status and other I 1.o important exercise develogments 1 were not promptly relayed by the CCEOC to the Creenwich and Stow Creek EOCs. Communications pro-cedures with local EOCs should be clarified, and . cosaunications personnel trained. The CCEOC should review its plan to assure that appropriate messages are transmitted to the local EOCs, and participate in cossaunications training drills with the local . EOCs (Table 4.18 133). e O e
~.
Tchte 3.1 SALEM NUCLEAR CENERATINC STATIOli - BENEDIAL ACTION SCHEDULE April 23, 1985 and Previous Exercises 6/19/85 Page 2f, of 28 g a Q :' G m . : . y :: :: :: n s:
- h. , ui.! Ed . !!. !. :ra.,et I.
b UN I O State (S)/ County (C) Response (ACTION) ar NOE FEMA Evaluatlos of State / County Response ElfM84 RAC RecoseenJation Corrective Action 2.o 53. Some minor problems with message I handling and documentation were l observed at the CCEOC, including $ incorrectly identifying the source of a message, not includ-ing the times that some of the messages were received, and not knowing with certainty how to identify messages to the state as esercise messages. Additional training of comsmanications per-sonnel should be conducted to , ensure accurate documentation of messages (Table 4.11 125). .l.4 54. The Cumberland , County radio- I logical field team's radio was not adequate for contacting the CCEOC and the FCP from all field monitoring locations. Cumberland County should investigate the need for a more powerful radio
- system for use by their radio-logical field teams for com-munications with the EOC and FCF . ,
(Table 4.13 127). ,
~.
O o 6
4 Table 3.1 SALEM MUCLEAR CENERATING STATION - REMEDIAL ACT10el SCMEDULE April 23,1945 and Previous Esercises 6/19/05 Page 27 of 24 N 0 C
. ". g Q '.
- T.
. 3: N: 10 333 1 33
$.3 di. - P or.
[. &.!.40[ = ., O RAC secommendation corrective Action Uma EE State (S)/ County (C) Response (ACTION) $dE FEMA Evaluation of State /Cosanty Response E / j d D.e SS. Some of the volunteer staff at I the Cumberland County'EOC as well ^l* as the health department repre- p Co sentative seemed to have a limited knowledge of the dis-tribution and use of Kl. Addi-tional training should be imple-mented to familiarise selected staf f members with the use of El (Table 4.15 131). Cil. Cumberland County h oicipalities
- 56. Emergency backup power supplies I were either inadequate or lacking at the Creenwich and Stow Creek municipal EOCs. Emergency generators of appropriate capac-ity should be procured to assure uninterrupted operation of these local EOCs (Table 4.15 152).
- 17. Creenwich should participate in I communication training and drills (Table 4.18 52). -
e e o e e
i Table 3.1 sat.EN NUCLEAR CENERATIIIG STATI0tl - RBIESIAL ACTICII SCHEDULE Apelt 23,1945 and Previous Isercises 6/19/85 F.s. as of asi s e a
- . -t 4
. . g . de S.
m 3: N: it *331 33 j ja- ,1%
- A re:
(3 r:%48
.j]/ t RAC RecosamenJation Corrective Action I5 State (S)/Cototy (C) Besponse (actions) s.82 FEMA Evaluaties of State /Coseity seaponse g= 3 l 2 58. Both Cumberland County municipal I EOCs should perform reentry pro- l cedures to the estent possible in s.l the time frame of the esercise * '
(Table 4.13 150). e e 1 em
. , ,, 50 .- -
4
SUMMARY
OF DEFICIENCIES Section 3 of this report provides a schedule for the correction of deficiencies noted during the April 23,1985, exercise. Table 4.1 summarizes recommendations to correct those defielencies. For i purposes of verification, the table compares these recommendations with ' the '
- recommendations based upon the previous exercises. The current status of all recommendations is Indicated. __.
Cross-referencing is provided for the 1985 exercise deficiency recommendations i appearing in Table 4.1 The cross-referencing appears at the end of the corrective action description and consists of the section rumber of this report in which the deficiency is l described, and the number of the deficiency as listed in the section. 1 i ? . J t I i h a l i I e
51 . Table 4.1 Secauseadations to Remedy Deficiencies la Off-Site Radiological Emergency Resposee Preparedeces ac Esercises for the Sales Nuclear Generating Statioe se April 13, 1985, October 23, 1984, October 26, 1983, October 13, 1982, and April 8, 1981
. 6/19/85 Deficieser Identified ,
FDtA-REF-1 Remedial Rev. 1 Previeue Exercise Esercise Esercise Preseng b No. Receummeded Corrective Acties Reference" Esercisee 10/26/83 10/23/84 4/23/45 Jurisdicties* Status
- 1. The Boreas of Radiation Protecties A.I.h a Stare C (BEF) 11aises officer and his staff are located es the seceed floor of the State ROC, hampering ceMaettoes one protective action deciates making with the Command and Costrel soster which te located se the first fleer of the EOC. Comunications between the Burses of Radiatise Protecties Office and the Command sad Coetrol Center should be strengtheaed to facilitate and espedite protective acties deciales making at ,
the State EOC. Camaideration eheuld be gives to eeving the Bar liaisee office to the first fleer of the 20C and deftains the rete of this liaises office es one of relaftes and interpreting, se necessary, technical informattee free the EOF (Secties 2.1.1; 3).
- 2. Precedures for commanicaties with A.3 a state C federet egeestes should be taproved.
The state precedures ebeeld be modified concerning calla to 3reekhaves Mattomal Laboratory for federal assistence.
- 3. There is e need for precedures for A.3 a State C requesting moeitorias eseistance and coordiasting such assistance with the State.
- 4. Based on the previeue esercise there A.3 State C wee a generel agreeeeet that federal agencies should be 1 evolved La eser-cases. Bowever, FDtA wee the only federal egency tavolved in this esortise.
- 5. Checkliets, which were to be developed D.4 m State C es a result of the 1981 enerstee, were not ebeerved.
6
52 . e Table 4.1 (Cost'd) 6/19/85 Deficioney tdentified NUtss-0454 FEMA-REF-8 Remedial
- e Rev. 1 Previous Exercise Esercise Exercise Preseeg ze. seeseended Corrective Acties Reference
- Emeraisee b 10/26/83 10/23/84 4/23/83 Jurisdicties' Status
- 6. le roepense to a criticise regarding E.1 ~$t a State C estifiestion precedures at the 1931 F.1 s Sales C esorties, a maified *1aitial Centact s Cumberlded C Message Fors* hae' been developed. Its a 11simboro C ene, heuever, use sporadic. Seen a immer Alloweys C somnicipalities have met yet received a Mammington C the forms. Procedures for their use a reemoville C should be developed. These forme s Quieton C should be utilised by all levels of a Sales City C governeset. s Cteeswich C a Stew Creek C
- 7. All aseestes should respeed promptly to E.1 m State C motificaties as required by the plan.
- 8. Care should to takes to have the stres E.3 z a Seite C somed befste the E3g to activated. A precedural cheese requiring that. prior to 133 activation, the county emergency eneagement caerdinator setify the state that the strees had eeuedad would en=
sure the timely sequencing of alerting and eetification.
- 9. m tar-rCP should improve its internal F a State C e - aicatione, especially its enesage board.
- 10. The radio co m icettees 11ek between F.1 s State C the FCF and the EDC obould be esistaised throughout the accident.
- 11. The tedividual is charge et the BEF-PCF F.1.4 s State C did set obtate easiumas use of the field moeiterieg teses due to teefficient peettioning of the tease. The stF-FCF eheeld improve its coordisation with the EOF with regard to the projected locatise of the plume and the seed for data at specific locations (Section 2.1.2.23 1).
- 12. Seen probleme with detereisteg where to F.1.4 : State N/Chj($$)
loeste field moeitertog teams were caused 1, the lack of sufficiest referees. There were four tease and
- eely three referees. The State SEF eheeld insure that a euf ficient neaber of troised referees are provided for esercises (Secties 2.1.2.23 2). .
4 I
' a
, 53 '
1 Table 4.1 (Cest'd) 4/19/83
. Deficioney identified IEFREC-0434 FEMA-REF-1 Beendial Rev. 1, Freviene Esercise Exercise Esereise i Exerciaee b g
se. seeemeended Corrective Acties Reference
- 10/26/83 10/23/84 4/23/85 Jurisdicties* Preseng Status
-13. Radie - - *cattees between the FCF F.1.4 ~
s a State C and all of the field moeitettag taase should be assured. Radio equipment ehem14 he evaluated and improved to
- eliminate difficolties in estataining contact with the field teams. Radio comessicattees between the field amat=
toring teams and the FCF eestinued to be a probles during the 1984 esertise. Radio contact was intermittently leet threeghest the esercise by both field teams eheerved. The adequacy of the esisting eseessications systes utilised between the FCF and the field esattering temes should be reviewed and leprovemente impleaseted ta order to seeere the capability for uninterrupted comeications between the FCF and the field teams. Isotallaties of the radio teuer planned for the FCF cae improve the seensaicattees (Secties 2.1.2.23 3).
- 14. Netificatione regarding the status of F.1.4 s a State C emersemey er protective actises is 0.4.j ,
effect were set relayed to the field somitorias teses with the encepties of the receemendettee to take EI dutieg the 1984 esercise. The FCF should keep field tease better inferned with respect to the status of emergency or protective acties rocammendations (Secties 2.1.2.23 4).
- 15. The receiver is the state EOC C.4.a a a State C apparently was not sensitive enoug 4 te z =
Stata=JMC C pick up the first EBS test essaage. At the Media Center there are new radise to the state FIO work area.
- 16. Seth tease did not have deeseestaties 3.10 s State C of the last es11bestice for all of the radiattee detection lastrumente. Ind1=
widual instrumente either did set have calibrettes labels er the labels Ladicated detes that were over one year eld. Instrument calibratise
, deeunentation procedures should be strengthened to esaure that calibra=
tiene are perfereed according to plae and that evidence of the calibractees to present (secties 2.1.2.33 2). . l [ l i I t l l l L
= . . e. , . 54 .
Table 4.1 (Cent'd) 6/19/83 Deficiency tdentified 35350-0634 FEMA-REP-1 Somedial Previeue Esercise Saarcise tsarcise preseng Rev. 1. s taference g,,,,g,,,b 10/26/83 10/13/84 4/23/85 Jurisdictice** Statue t so. Rose m oeded Corrective Astice
- 17. The air emepler of the Tanguard A field 5.10 m a state I mesitoring team could est drew the 1.8 _
required flowrote with the partituiste a filter is place. The air esepter
- sheeld be adjusted,se that the required fievrete can be achieved. (Sectice 2.1.2.3 1 and Secties 2.1.2.3 2)
- 18. The air esoplar of the Teaguard A field E.10 State 1 (3) team una set properly calibrated. The 18 air sampler should be properly salibrated (Section 2.1.2.33 1).
- 19. The high range les chamber reemined is 1.8 x State 1 (N) the field kit without betteries until
- this practice une questiemed by the ebeerwer. The field emettertag team Sope requiring proeperatteeal cheek of calibrattee and bettery insta11atlee eheuld be followed for all tastrumme=
tatise (Secties 2.1.2.38 4).
- 30. The field eseitorias tese did set taka 1.8 : State 1 (N) the air esepter cartridge out of the plume inte a low background area for ceuating. The counting of air samples should be perferend outside the plume as specified to the state plae (Secties 2.1.2.3s 3).
- 21. The power eeeverter for the air sampler 1.4 x State C of the Vaaguard 4 tese failed. The cause of the failure of the Tanguard A teen power converted should be deter ,
eined and corrected (section 2.1.2.3 3).
- 22. The field moeitering equipment is kept 1.4 State C
, to the 3RP-TCF. rather thee with field uette. The equipment used for thie Sales esercise to the very same equip = emet that wee used at Oyeter Creek. Distributing the equipenet secording to where the nest esercise will be leaves see of the two New Jersey sites without equipases. This deficiency should be corrected by providing each atte with its sua field moeitering equipenet, the equipeset would be available for use by backup perseeeel eves if the moeitering teams were delayed by unexpected prehlees such se bed meather. 12 the equiposet were etered with the field teams, setmsp and calibrettee could be performed duttag tremett. 3
55 ' Table 4.1 (Cent'd) 6/19/0S 0 Deficiency Idestified NUR35-06$4 FEMA-s3F=1 Seendial Rev. 1 Previene Esercise taercise Emereise
- pe. Beesammeded Carreesive Aectee Referesse" Esercieea b 10/26/83 10/13/84 4/23/83 Jurtediettee' Preseeg States -
- 23. Ceessientions between the taF-FCF and I.8 .;t State C moeitering tease eheuld be improved by ,
using a standardised format for trame-
- alttal of the data.
24 Thyroid dose data sheeld always he , 1.9 s State C takes and treaseitted.
- 25. The thyroid dose rate moeitering equ1P* !.9 a State C meet (see II) eheeld use silver ses11:e -
cartridges and shoute be operated et the proper air f1sw rate. The silver seelite eartridges were availables charcoal eartridges were need due te seet of silver seelite. *
- 26. New Jersey sees eenpass oestets to J.10.a a a state N/0bj(SS) define preteettee settee areas, whereas FSt&G deetgaatee Energemey F1sening Areas (EFAs). State and utility representatives should agree se a stagle mothed for areas where protective actione ear be impleensted.
This deficioney regarding the desig-sattee of areas to be evacuated has beee operatiseally addressed dettag the 1964 esereise. The as a of IFAs has been rettsaed at the Stato 80C by the use of esepees seatste ' shish are the.t eenverted to serrative leseriptione of the affected areas for EBS messages. Although this system works welle the I see of EFAs te still referessed is the New Jereer Radielegical Emergeoey teopease Flae (R237). Practice is set constatest with the plas. The New l Jersey 3217 sheeld be revised to remove the EPA coecept, and replace it with I th. ,re.ed.re ,re..ett, i. e b .d - l esepees sectors (Sectice 2.1.! 1).
- 87. Mape in the State 80C did set indicate J.10.a a State C the sectore la which preteettre settese had bees topleensted. Mape to the State EOC should be equipped with everlefe t*et ledicate seaters where pret eet tre actices have been imple=
emeted (Sectise 2.4.13 2). O
56 ' Table 4.1 (Cest'd) 6/19/85 Deftetenev Identified ugnas-0634 resA-ast-1 Saeedial gev. 1 Previeue taereise taeretoe Beeresse i
- 4. aseemanaded Ceeressive Amstee anferseee* Esercieee n 10/26/83 10/23/8A 4/23/05 Jurisdicties'
- Preseeg Statue
- 28. Seas prehtees were ebeerved la follow = J.10.a s State tag the proper eveemettee routes. This 3/0b)(83)
J.10 3 wee bessues the bus drivets and state 0.1 pelles eseerte were oefea111er with the
- area, reedueye were peerly esthed, and route empe were segueeted. Ceesidere-tien should be gives to taste 111eg additteest reed amas eiges and/or route nuebet mathere. and providieg better espe end written descriptione of the routes. taisting ses11 espe could be taproved by placing en *s* er a esteh line et the point where the previene esp ende. A larger esp shaving the eettre eveemettee route should aise be -
instuded for reference la eseh bue driver's peaket of aspe (setties 2.1.33
!).
- 19. The preteettve hate for the field ese- J.10.e a itoring teses eheoid eestate 11 es State C called for la the pies. E1 wee avail-able et the StP-fCF and would have beee distributed to a real emergeoey.
- 10. The enesage to stamiste the use of KI J.10.e s State N/0bj(85) wee set received by see of the bus J.10.f drivere 1 evolved La the general population bue eveeuettee. Ceemseica-tiens eheuld be tapteved to essere that aseeagee seeseretag radiettee espeeere protective meeeeree are retelved by all bue drivere (Seettee 2.1.38 3).
Bl. Aseursese should be given that husee J.10.s a a State N/Obj(83) are available for eveausties the publis A.3 to a timely faehtee. fMJ006 and EJ Trenett eheeld f aaellee e esseraedue of understeedteg.)
- 12. Altheech evesestice preceduree were J.10.g a State r generally eleerly stated to the Ett N/0b)(t$)
messegee, there were se teatruettoes gives for the eveemastee of scheel en11dres. 180 oveewettes eseeagee i cheeld enke it sleet whether scheel childres are to be evaseated or eet , e (Secties 2.l.18 4)., I
- 13. Very little dose projoettee. plaat 18 a $ tete C esedittee. or preteettre settee taformattee wee tresemitted been to the
- 3RP-PCP free 347 headquarters. More spee eschenge of date and teformattee sheeld be esistained betwees 387 l headquarters and the SSP-PCP.
J l I l l L
e 57 . Table 4.1 (Cent'd) 6/19/85 Defielene, Identified WWE30-0434 pW4AatEF=1 Reendtal Bew. 1 previene Beeretoe leerstee Beereise h preeeeg me. seeemoeded Certeetive Aettes Sefereese* Seerstees 10/26/83 10/13/84 4/13/05 Juttediatise** Statee f
- 34. Celeutettee of amnistive popalettes 1.10 s State s/Obe(43) dose should be performed pertedically. -- 5/06)(84 89)
- 33. 3BF ehould bettet toerdieste the te* J.11 e State N/Obj(83) openethle ageselee la tegeettee pathuey 3/Obe(84) semptieg and _ to. . 5/06)(83)
- 34. Hope er displete ideetafyled dairF J.!! s State C forme se feed preseestas pleets were met posted er eve 11ebte. Mepe er displete ladisettag key leadw ee date (e.g., foreleg), deletes feed procese*
ing please, seter empply. 1stekee . vecer treetemet please, sed reservette , thould be developed.
- 37. The bue drivers' baseledge of radiettee 2.3.e. s State 9/06)(43) preteettee and deelectry verted greatly 01 betweee the two drivers tevolved to the genere1 populettee bue eveawattee.
Additteest tratelag should be preetded to secure that all bee drivere are koestedgeable about appropriate redte= ties protettise Seelmetag the use of destantere, ellenoble deee 11ette, and precedures for holes authertsed to rese19e additional esteeers. The treteleg eehedule should be submitted to patA (Seetles 2 1.3 21.
- 14. The permanent record doetestere 2.3.e a state g/0bj(33) utilised by the lese delvete levolved te E.3.b the genere1 populettee bue eveemettee were est identified by a vietble idenstfiesties nueher er sede. All permaneet record deelsetere meet have a eteetite identifisettee mueber se se to be traseeble to the tedividual who need the devise ($esties 3.3 33 4).
- 39. $1mstated retenee of rediettee she=14 p.9 s State C be 1erge seemet to allow for elgelf-1sent estivity to the stee of field emetterieg eed deee seeeeeemet aspe*
bility.
- 60. There te a need for toproved seerste. J.10. g a State C estee betweee the NJSp and nJ freeelt detteg esereisee te onesuting eveeme*
time of the genere! pubits. proceduree need to be elettfied totweee RJ5p eed , itJ frenett designeting lead and dis
- patch roepeeeibilittee for eveemettee .
bueee.
58 *
- Table 4.1 (Cent'd) 4/19/01 Reflataear identified 15 W 8 44S4 paneesP=1 tonedtel .
t too. l. Freetsee b testeise testeise Bestelee preseng so. Reesemanded Cetteettve Asetee Referenee" testaleoe 10/26/03 10/13/04 4/13/05 Jettadietten* States
- 48. The IAF une est meetited of the sees 1** F.I.e ~
s State N/0hj($$) ties of the pleet cestgeoef settee level (EAL) free wesenet event to
- alert. The IRp use unemate of the ebenge unett is eesteeted the estilst appeemseseelt M eteetes after the a sneage. The ples prooteless for nett*
fyleg eeen toeposee ergenteettee of the pleet EAL meet he fellemed.
- 61. Dwelleese espleestiene of pleet eveese. F.1.4 s $sete settoet esteetelegy. and deee ptejee* N/06J(43) ttee shoebe to 8AF were deleted.
Ptooederee fee the ptempt resetpt of
- eweh date by BAp heedgeottete should to tapteved.
- 41. taptoper teetteettoes and tentates have J.10.e a State C been given togetdass the mothetteettee E.3.6 and edete&eeteelse of Rt to esorgeoey too delvete howe been ende. Kapteved pteetetene and tratalag see regutted let the use of redtepretective drage by seeeeeeep weeheee.
64 No aseseges vote posted to the eeeident J.11 s State eseeeeemet stee et the Beste ROC te* R/04)(01) garding peeeeetive settees taptemented for the legeettee pothmey. Proteettee settene topteaseted eheeld be sleetly poeted es the oestos toeges and este.
- 41. The PCF tedte opetetet did set elooye 3.4 e state C i todt este that the tresselectees uste pett of the emettlee. The FCp todte opetetet steeld eluore testede 'this to e drill...* 1e the tremonteetene. Pet
- hope reteet etemptog the tafermettee se the esesege fete will enhenee the treeseleelee of thte tafeteettee.
- 44. Ceessateettees espebility between the Fel.a e State C RJ tremett diepetehet eed eveeeestee beoes to toesteg. BJ treests tweee ense14 he egeteped with redtee. The 1stette ese of state peltee seeert vehtelee enemad eesttaue mett1 the todtoe ete teetalled.
47 The bee deteete hed se tretelog to 8.10 e state N/0bj(es) todtattee reeerd toeptog et beestedge 0.4 et cepeeste eesteel precedutee, se
- doetestet ehergere vote eve 41ste et the =
emelettes pelet. The bee dettete l theeld tegelse lefther tretetog to I todtelegiset esteente sentret. e
Tette 4.1 (Cent'd) 6/19/03 Dettetene, tdentified Nunes-0454 F384-88F-1 tsendtel
- e Rev. 4 Previces n
teettlee Beattlee teettlee Freeeng No. Seeemoeded Cetteettve aattee Refereese* Seereisee 10/16/83 10/13/84 4/23/83 Jettedtastes* States
~
l 64. With the dose ^^ _ _ _ _ ^t fumettoes of A.I.b s State-SOF N/Obj(83) the 3RF tremeferred to the 80F, the 5.2 elleested spese to the SOF une
- 1eeeffletees fee the additteaal staff and egetenes, and the atteeseeses of elleested opese hiedered totereettes' between dose seeeeeeeet and emeegement potecomet for the 307 and these of the utiller. Il 18 to deelded to treaefer the deee aseeeeeeet fonettees of the 387 to the Sor pereseestly, the 387 enemid eagettete with the esility med i ettete addittemel spese es well as teettengeeset of space threughest the BOF to allow groeptog of dose eseeee-uset potocomen to ese eree and her ettlity and 887/088 emesseemet tepteeeetettees to eeether (Section 3.2.84 3).
- 49. De deelgested Set official et the 80F A.I.d a State-ROF C wee met enegelweestly to emettet and his authority fet deelstee-easteg wee est sleet. Rosemoedettene fee pretee*
tive settene had to tetelve espport free the Sat staff et the State tot pttet to betag eest to Get. If is te deelded to treeefst deee eseeeement fumettees of the 90F to the 80F peruseentir, the faaetteoal telee of the BSP tepteeentettees to the tot vetowe these to the State ROC eheeld be todefteed. This to needed te order to sleetly ideettfr ese tedteidual to esegulvetelty setty set tar toeposet* t111:10e (Seettee 2.2.83 !).
$0. lefere the 80F eteee, the ettlity teet= 0.4 s State-tor C sise t esppets eestet should hevo the cetteet telephone museeto to enke sectest with oppropftete state tepte=
eestattees.
$1. A esotee board ese ses preeest to the 3.3 s State-ROF N/0tj($3)
NJ87-fCF end there wee se peesteg of the eastseeer sleeetiteetles level. A etetue boord displefteg the eastgeoey
#1eeetiteettee level should be displayed and estatetoed to the IWSF*
PCP 19eestee 3.3.34 l).
l * , I e ..
- 60 Table 4.1 (Cest'd) 6/19/83 Dettetency identified 5D330-0434 l
FMA-tEP-1 Remedial
- r, l Rev. 1 Previene b
toercise Beereise Emeraise Preseeg No. seeseemedad Corrective Asties Referesee* toersteee 10/26/83 10/23/84 4/2J/85 Jertediettee" statue l
~
$2. The 1942 Poet teereise aseeeeeses F.1.b s state-g0F C l stateds etese the pheme to immer l A11euere Creek at the ROF 1e est to be eseverted to state . ether same .
steeld be tahme se that there are este l telephones for state essesiae et tho' 30F. At the 1943 eseretee. it wee ebeerved that the phone to Lower Alloweye Creek had bene diessenested. Dedicated and senaeretal phone linee had been added. There are new suf ficient tele-pheaea for state aseestee et the 10F. -
$1. The teF-FCP was heapered by a lash of F.1.4 state-ROF C l esaueanteettees. free the 20F regarding I.11 emergeoey settee levele, deee projeetten date, sad preteettve acties esseures. &attee should be tahee to taprove esordinettee end essere a timely flat of teformation free the 20F to the FCF. Future tretetes should strees the tapertanee of se spee eneheese of Laformattee free the 80F regarding protective settee esseures and deoe projoettee date (Secties 2.2.18 4).
See As ettempt by the 8tf-FCF to costaet F.1.4 s State-ROF C l the EOF usteg the beehup redte method wee useueseesful during the esereise besseee the 50F etaff did set have adequate treistog to the operettee of the equipeset. Future treintes should strees the esed to have the boekup redte operettesel duties se emergeoey roepense 1e seee prettees develop with use of the primary efeten. The ese of the beehup redte eyetse should be demonettsted to e future emeratee (Section 1.2.1 5). l 11. The BJSF-FCF reos wee set shielded 11he J.9 s State-t0F N/Obj(85) j the see by ter rose to the ease J.10.m buildteg. Whee the FCF perseeeel were e advised to save to the seeled ROF rose for radiettee espeewre preteettee they i esuld set de se stese there were se l commettesteme heetute eve 11atte to the l 10F rose. It to ressammeded that the
- l FC7 reos le the Neeleet Trateteg feellity be!! ding be protested eleitar .
to that le the EOF rose. er that the FCF be toisested to the NJ$F Woodeteve stettee (Seettee 2.2.23 2). k
. 61 Table 4.1 (Cest'd) 6/19/83 Deftetenev identified Nuess-06S4 FEMA-REP-1 temedial i Rev. 1, Freviene Esercios taercise Esercise Prosesg No. geoemended Corrective Aestee teierence* Emereisee b 10/26/03 10/23/84 4/23/03 Jurisdicties' Statue
- 36. The WSF reported to a slightly J.10.a x State-ROF N/Obj($$)
differest leestion for ese of the tus J.10.J
- essees esmerol ' potata dessestrated dartog the esercise. This besses apparest when the NJSP attempted te, relieve the Leser Alloweye Creek police at the indicaced poet. It to reese-esaded that esordination between the NJSP sad local police be taptemented ta order to obta ta agreeemet se the precise 1eesttee of the treffle sentrol/sesses aestrel potete. Ze pertteelar, the emnet lesattee of poet
#6A moede to be eenfirmed (Sectice
- 2.2.21 3).
- 37. The tremefer of the BEF dose aseeeeenet F.3 x State-EOF N/Obj(SS) insettee free the State ROC to the 80F F.4 was esportenstal and to set to esserd F.3 with the entreet New Jersey RERF. If 1t te desided te peresseet17 tTnesfar
. the dose seeeeeeest fumettoes of the Str to *he 20F, the necessary procedures to implesmet the new arrassemeet should be prepared and the cutteet RERP revised to reflect the chassee (Seettee 1.2.11 3).
SS. Satellite ESS statisee shoeld be better E.3 s State-JMC C briefed to proper precedures eescoretag transetttal of safermettee free the state regarding redlelegical emergeselee. St. aard sepiee of the tas eseessee shoeld 1.5 s State-JMC C be available for the state F10s.
- 60. Additteest trateing of the rueer c.4.s a State-JMC C' eestret statf to seeeeeery if they are to convey saformattee properly regarding en unfolding eastgeoey.
- 61. It wee met ebeerved whether the C.4.b a State-2tC C meethead used by the endle coster F10 had the .elepheme nuehet of the state F10 to the goverser's office.
e
- 62. Media kite esetatetag boekstened C.$ z State-JMC N/Obj(IS) teferanstee were set eve 11stle as the endia center. Media kite should be propered and be ande available to the prese et the media coster (Seetten 2.33 1).
62 '. .
~
Table 4.1 (Cest'd) 6/19/8$ Deficioney identified ugnas-0654 FER&-REP-1 tenedial , I Bew. 1, Previous Esercise Esercise Esercise Preseeg go, aseesy*eded Corrective estaea geferesse* Esercisee h 10/26/83 10/23/84 4/23/05 Jurisdicties' Status
- 63. Public inforuettee meterials have bees C.1 -a x x State-JMC n/Obj(85) developed indicating evessattee restee C.2 (1981) and the laestice of esegregate care centers. These meterista have met been distributed by PSt&4 due to pristing
< problems. Distributies of public - tafeguaties informies roeidsete of protective aetices should be con = timmed. In addittee, information sheeld be diesentaated to those leastices where treestante eight bes e.g., Salen Gelf sad Constry Club, and the Sales Meter imdse. i Although the resulte of the formal ~ servey esedusted by the State and esility regarding publia emeresses are est yet eve 11able, a opet eheck of EFE reetdeets during the 1934 esercise tedicated that, even though PSE&G has matted informattee coseersing emergency i plaestag to EFE residente, public averesese of protective settees wee seeswhat unek. This is a costimming detteisocy that une eboerved at previene esercises. The public educe = tine progres must be intensified se the residence of Sales and Cumberland cemettee be more avere of protective actions to be takee during a radio-logical emergency (Secties 2.3 2). I 64 Cowary sheeld is embeequest esereises, A.I.h a Sales C dear,estrate a capability la fire and rescue, transportaties med public teformaties.
- 65. The SCEoc energency nativities were set A.t.d a m a m Salen I slueye well tetograted and appropriate A.2.a ergentsattees did set alueye esordinate their aseesy's astices. A este effee=
tive assagement system for Sales Cemety, imeloding better informattee diosamisation assag the staff and better mee of staff resources to regelred. Sales Cemety staffing, precedures, and training eheuld be reviewed te deteratee how teproweasets util be implemented. The State meet develop an interia plan (plas supple = ment) to provide assagement by the State. is the SCEOC until Sales County is able to be to full contret of the overall emergemey roepenee. This plas steeld specify the scale of eseistance and persensel involved (Secties 2.4.13 1 and Secties 2.2.l3 3). IMedical drill se 9/27/84 adequately demseetrated that r, injured, eastseimated persos could be handled and treated. t
- . . - . - - , - . _ - - , . _ . - , . . -,- ._..,,--..-_-..,_.n- - - - - - - - - - - . - - - . - - _ _ , . , - - - , - - - - - - - - - - - - - - . . . . - - - ,
i . 63 ' ' Table 4.1 (Cost'd) 4/19/85 Def tetency identified IRfREG-0454 FEMA-tEF-1 tamedial . Rev. 1 Previous Esercise Isercise Esercise Preseng* h se. Reseemended Corrective Action Reference" Esercises 10/26/83 10/13/84 4/23/85 Jurisdicties' Stacee
- 64. At the Salee Cemety 30C the A.I.4 "f a' s Salem tremeniseien of timely protective A.2.a .C nation aseoases to all the assiet- .
polities withie Sales Cemety coetiened to be a problea dortag the 1944 emeraise. This was slee identified to previene esercisee. Sees official State decisions to ' implement protective assises were oebetantially delayed is beleg received by the anettipelities free the SCEOC. Ze see case a protective acties message ves set received free the county. These casessaicatises probleen appear to be . l the result of lack of adequate amongement and a lack of as adequate sunber of trained pereeenet to the SCEOC. Better everall management end seerdinettee of internettee, as well as improved flew of informattee free Sales Ceuety to the maalcipalities are required. Staffing, precedures, and trateing at the SE0C should be reviewed to determine how taprovements can be tapteensted (Sectise 1.4.13 1). l l 67. The 1982 Poet Esercise Assesseont J.10.j z a s Sales N/Obj($$) l stated
- Sales Ceesty s.44t demonstrate the capability to taplement protective measures. The cemety she=14 demon-strate its capability to participate to weiseating the populace, evacuate reetdeets free the EFE, and centrol l accese.*
At the 1983 esercise, the cadety dessestrated the ability to ev m ate residente free the EFE. Access cr,etrel van est as objective for the e.svaty for l this esercise and shoes 14 he dessestrated to a feture esarcise.
- 64. There were significant delays to the J.9 s sales C Sales Cemety EOC notifying esse of the J.10.g ausicipalits ee of the evacuattee message. Sales Cour.ty's ability to eenage se orderly evacuation uns, to seiere, eut r,e westrates. 5.tter everall ameagermet and more timely taformattee flow free Salem Cemety to the manicipalities are required.
Staffing, precedures and training at the SCEOC should be veviewed to deter-eined how improveemet ces be imple= nested (Secties 2.4.13 2). e l l e
l' i . t 9 a e a
- j 64 ,
Table 4.1 (Cent'd) 6/19/83 Deficione, fdentified u0330-0654 FEMA-REF-4 Remedial Bew. 1 Previses Esercise Esercise Exercise Preseng ge. aseemanaded Corrective Action Beforesee* Esercisee b 10/16/83 10/23/84 4/23/83 Jurisdicties' Statue
- 69. There were esse delays to the Salee J.10.e --
a a sales g Ceaney EOC estifying eena of the . manicipalities of the message to administer El to emergency workers. Staffing, precedures, and training at the SCEOC should be revieued to ' determine how better everall eneagensat and more timely Laformattee flow free Sales County to the manicipalities esed further improveneste (Sectice 2.4.18 3 and sectise 2.2.13 t). 70 Even theagh there wee acceptable coer- A.2.s s a a Selee C diaattee of protective er parallel a a a Cumberland N/Obj(85) settees free the state perspective, 3 Manningtee C directives were set effectively acted s a Sales City C opes at the cemety and local level. s a a Elatabers N/obj(85) laformattee uneagement vos week and a lauer A11eweye C coordinaties of protective actises Creek iasifIciest. 3 Fesosville C s Quintee C s a Greenwich C z z Stew Creek C
- 71. Although 24-hour staffing capability of A.3 3 Sales N/Obj(85) the SCEOC wee demonstrated by presente- A.4 ties of a rester, the SCEOC staff indicated that suppleenetal perseeeet
. free the State cat er free other cavattee eight be required for pre =
longed operettees. The poteettal need for espplemental resources free other comettee sed /or the State should be identified in the Flaa. and writtee agreemente reached with these othe r jortsdictices for providing these resources. Appropriate traintag should alae be provided (seettee 2.4.1 6).
- 72. Altheagh a letter was eest to all A.4 s Sales C Mayere and Searde of Chosee Freeholdere a Cumberland C as a result of the 1981 esercise, the s tower A11eways C level of participattee of emergency a a Manningtes N/Obj(85) pereennel in the esercise wee z Sales City C disappoin'ing. Every effort steeld be a a s Elainbere N/Obj(85) made by the Meyers and Board of Free- a Feenev111e C
. beiders to educate their emergemey a Quintes C peresseel of the lepertence of the Greenwich C esercise esperience. Stow Creek C
e * . , e . 'e
- i
. 65
. s Table 4.1 (Cost'd) 6/19/85 Deficiency tdentified NU330-0654 FEMA-tEP-1 Semedial
- Rev. 1 Previous Esercise Exercise Esertise me. see-dad corrective Aattee Reference
- Exercisee h 10/26/83 10/23/84 4/23/83 Jurisdictiee' Presesg Status On the beeis of the 1944 esereise, this remains insemplete for the Elsistere and Neentestee IOCa. The Eletabore and Maestagtse E0Ca' amed to taprove their participattag levels. The isceraettee and coordinettee of their staff esuld met be fully evaluated. A system should be impleaseted to tacrosse the participettee levels of valuateer staff et the Elsistere med Managingtse EOCa. The tintag of the esercise eheuld be gives greater cessideraties in the seemario developeast (Secties 2.4.2s 3).
- 73. The checklist of actises to be takes et D.4 x Sales C different emergency classification levels contateed La the state plan should be used.
74 The county should tavastigate se ta= 1.2 Sales C preveneet ta the alerting system for I Cumberland C emergency roepease staff te order to reduce respeese ties.
- 75. The radiological officer and the Eed E.2 1 Sales C Crees representative were late is reporting to the SCE0C. Msbilisattee precedures eheuld be reviewed to essere that all perseasel can be setitied and i
settlined to the SCE0C in a timely ! esener to the event of an actual radiological oestgency (Section 2.4.13 4).
- 76. *Comunicatione between esegregate care F.1 Sales C and decentasiastion centere eheuld be taproved.
I n. ..re em o. -r oh u o u d to ,.i.. . 1 C handle EOC radio traffic.
- 78. A het line systes eheuld be installed F.1.b z Sales C in Sales Coasty, to allow eismitaneens calla ta all local goverseests.
- 79. Co m eications withis the SCEOC were F.' b z z Sales C limited and telepheme traffic did set i
flow seeethly. Salem County should coseider more space to ee - date an efficient placeanet of telephoems in the SCEOC. The county should slee coe= sider implementing a more effective telephone sneesse cactrel system to j recilitate the flow and use of
- energency taformattee.
l 1
< e e 66 . . I 1 j Table 4.1 (Cast'd) j 6/19/83 Deficiency toe.itified R! tag-0654 FEMA-REP-1 Samedial 4 Eev. 1 Previous Esercise Esercise Esercise me. Recommeeded Corrective Action Reference
- Esercieee b 10/26/83 10/23/84 4/23/45 Jurisdiction
- Prosesg Status
~
- 80. The herd-copy -af cettee device see F.1.b z Sales . C l est moved to the new SCIOC and was set 5.3 ,
ettlined during the esercise. It is suggested that the hard copy device be esved to the new EOC and that it be used during future esercises to* espedite the flow of key messages (Sectise 2.4.13 7).
- 81. Elstabers. Sales City, posseville. F.1.4 s a a Sales !
Massiegtee, and Quintos reported that requests for information and other eseistance from the SCEOC did not
- alueye receive a prompt reopease.
1eptement a procedure for more prompt respenses by the SCEOC to requesta for inforeettee and seeistance free local tocs (Section 2.2.13 2).
- 82. All couettee and menicipalities should F.3 x Sales C participate to ce M eation training x x Cumberland R/0bj(85) and drilla. a x Elstabero N/Obj(85)
Lower Allowere C a Mannington N/Obj(85) Feeeeville C z Quintos C z Sales City N/0bj(83) x Creeevich N/Obj(83) a Stow Creek C
- 83. Stiefing procedures at the SCEOC were E.3 a z Sales C net eutticient or timely and the public addresa system wee est coeeisteetly used to motify staff of the emergency ettuation. Sales Cauety should review internal commesications with the intest of taproving briefing procedures and consisteet use of the public addreas eyetoe to notify the staf f of changes in the emergency classificatica level.
84 The Sales ECC vea crowded on the day of 5.3 Sales C the esercise. Coseiderettoe should be gives to relocation of the EOC to a larger fa-111ty.
- 85. The county toc should have se emergency E.3 s u Sales C log, and the accident classification and the protective action la effect should be listed on the EOC status board. All seenages should be posted. Mape should be used to plot inforestion.
' 67 Table 4.1 (Cost'd) 6/19/83 Deficiency Tdestified IETEEC-0634 FEMA-REP-1 Remedial I Rev. 1, Previous Exercise Exercise Exercise No. e- - aded Carrective Actise Reference
- Exercisee b 10/26/83 10/23/84 4/23/83 Jurisdiction" Preseng Statue
~
- 84. Sedges ehem1d be teemed te ROC staff 5.3 z Sales , C eed viatters. Creater care should be takaa to determine whether Ladividuals
- e W d be admitted to the ROC.
- 87. The comications rose at the ase' E.3 Sales C Sales County ROC is small and the meise level wee high, making it dif ficult te hear whee using the telephees. Cassid-erecios should be given to relocattag the ensemaicatione equipeest to a larger rese at the SCE0C (Section 2.4.13 3). .
SS. There are no mape indicacias the 5 : Sales C locaties of scheele end tastituttees. J.10 This detail ehem14 he incledad, either se se overlay to be used with existing sector espe, er en a separate esp.
- 89. The bus driver for scheel evacostice le J.10.a a Sales C Sales Cemety did est kesw which receptise center school evacuees were to be takes to. All bus drivere for school evacuation should be trained to knew the reception center (s) to which school evacuees should be takes.
, (Sectios 2.4.33 13).
- 90. The Sales County E0C instructed the J.10.a a Sales C school has driver to take evacuees to a locattee set desigested to the plas for that specific scheel. The Sales County EOC should give inettuctione coesisteet with their plae (section 2.4.33 14).
- 91. The ability to evacuate mobility J.10.4 x Sales N/Obj(83) tapaired individuals in Sales Coesty wee not demonstrated. The ability to evacuate mobility ispaired individuale obc 414 be tested la future esercise (Section 2.4.38 13).
- 92. The bue driver for the scheel eveces- J.10.e z a Sales I tion la
- ales Cemety wee est trained in E.3.h the use of dosimeters or KI. All energency workers, taciuding bus drivers, eheald be fully trained to radiological espesure costrel including the use of desinatore and KI. The traintag schedule for all emergency workere should be fureiched to FEMA (Section 2.4.33 17 and Sectios 2.2.334).
= .
e , e, . 68 Table 4.1 (Cent'd) 6/19/03 Deffetency Tdentified NURIC-0654 PEttA-REP-1 Remedial Rev. 1 Previene Exercise Esercise Esertise me. Rese e meded Corrective Actise Reference
- Exerciseeb 10/26/83 10/23/84 4/23/45 Jerisdicties" Preseeg Status
- 93. There were se police officere er other J.10.h a Sales C peresseel available to provide traffic control or security at the Sales County ,
congregate care' shelter. Police officere er scher uniferend perseasel , should be assigned to the congregate care shelter to provide traffic centrol and security (Section 2.4.3 3). 94 seersency vehicles should be located at J.10.h a Sales C the coegregate care center. Security should be established at the facility. It should be staffed with ' radiological maattering and deeostaer-insties peroommel who are proficient to their assignmente. I
- 95. The Salem Ceesty congregate care shel- F.1.e z z s Sales I ter (ifeedecean Righ Scheel) uma set apprised of whee and how easy evaceees to espect. The ARC representative at the SCEOC sheeld infers representatives at the congregate care shelters of the maeber of evacueen and their espected time of arrival (Secties 2.4.33 2 and Section 2.2.33 2).
- 94. At congregate care costers, seperate J.12 x Sales C reens for individuals with special asede should be provided.
- 97. The espebility of Sales County to J.12 s Sales C provide coegregate care centers une est tested.
- 93. At the Sales County congregate care J.12 Sales C c'es ter, there were se radiological usetteries persossel er equipment to monitor evacuees for radielegical costas'. ration. The coegregate care center should deseestrate the ability to useiter evacuees med vehicles le l future exercises (Secties 2.4.33 1).
- 99. At the f tee County energency worker J.12 x Sales C l decentanteatise center, only about 15 1
- people per hour could be monitored due I to the limited mueber of low-range
( rediattee detectore ebeerved during the
- esertise. During shift chseges there cauld be lines of potentially ,
( contaminated workers waiting to be moeitered. Add 1ticeal low'= range radiation detectore eheuld be available at the decantaalascion center (Section 2.4.33 4). l i I
- a 69 r
Table 4.1 (Cont'd) 6/19/85 Deficionev Identified MIERIHM54 FEMA-REP =1 Reendial Bew. 1, Previene Esercise Emeraise tuercise pe. Rassemoeded Corrective Astian Referesee* Emeraisee b Preseng 10/26/83 10/23/84 4/23/85 Jurisdicties* Statue 100. At the Sales Ceesty d===ar and ma ries J.12 g gg, g emeter, the forme eve 11able for recording emergemey werker's ==p===w
- de not iamLda a place fer recording the leenties of body coer==8==*tes for, menttered workere. Emergemey worker espesure record forse ehem14 he revised to teclude a place for reeerding the leasties of body eestastanties (Sectica 2.4.33 7). .
101. Ze the 1944 emeraise, the bus driver L3.a a a Sales I for the seheel eveemetion in Sales , Cemety did set have a desienter. Is the 1945 remedial esercise, the bue driver had a self-reading desienter bec as petmaneet record desianter. Appropriate decimetry should be provided to all drivere involved ta eveemetica busing. The listieg of doeinstry should be provided to FEMA (Seetten 2.4.33 16 and Seaties 2.2.31 3). , 102. The precedures for initin screenlag L5.a a Sales C of poteettally testeminated persees were set perferend rapidly eseegt. 103. Pereennel at the sales Cemety L5.a m x x Sales emergeoey C merker deseera=8== ties center were set euere of the radiation levela aheve which dessetseienties abould be perfereed. Additiemal training should be provided for decentaminattee caster peroommel who are reopensible for deterateing whether emergency workers need to be decentantested (Secties 2.4.33 8). 104 The leyene of the decentanteation L5.b sales C coster should be changed la order to e11stante the possibility of eestan= insties of clean area. There eheuld be more them ese shouer, emengh to allee f - the setteipated eueber of eveemese. There should be more coe=
, semicactees between cemety and state porosame1. Meettering techniciano need more training.
9 9
a , S , 70 , Table 4.1 (Caet'd) 6/19/85 Deficioney tientified u! REC-0634
- rgnA-aEy=1 e m .1 e Rev. 1 Previous Esercise Esercise Esercise Preseng me. Emeeumended Carrective Asties Reference
- Esercisea h 10/26/83 10/23/84 4/13/83 Jurisdiction
- Statua 105. At the Salem cemety decostaatsstion 1.5.h z Sales N/0bj(85) emeter only one shower stall was ,
available for decoetaminettee. which would be tasofficient during emergency worker shift changes or peak proces-sies of people et the center. Addi-tional shower facilities ebeeld be available at the deeostaatsstion coster. Separate showere should be available for see and vomme (Section 2.4.33 5). 106. la 1982 it was met ebeerved whether L.1 x s , Sales C the etsif of the Sales County 5eepitel had been tratand te radiological mattere se bed been recomended af ter the 1981 esercise. 107. The coasty should demometrate reentry It z Sales N/obj(83 capability. 8a.85) s Cumberland N/Obj(83 84,85) 108. As Ineressed level of participation by N.1.h 2 Sales C respeese agencies in future esercisee z Cumberland C to required. Esercise objectives should be esecuted to the greatest degree practicable. 109. Radielegical espesure control desi- E.3.a x Sales N/Obj(SS) metere were est Leoned by the Camecy for the bue driver involved La the evacuation of tremeiset dependent individuale. Moreover the driver appeared to have had me training ta the use of desinatore. Radiological esposure control deetmeters and train-ing in their use le required for per esanel involved ta evacuation busing. 110. Activettom of the 45 traffic control E.2 s Sales C pelat was neither cimalated nor dessestrated. The ability to activate traffic control pelats should be tested la future esercises. 111. At the 5A traffic control point. E.3.a Sales N/Obj(83) doeinstry equipenet use not observed. Police efficere seeigned to traffic centrol pelate eheuld be equipped with pe rsonal dosimetere and should be trained ta their use.
e > e ,' , s
. 71 Table 4.1 (Cost'd) 6/19/85 Deficiesey identified umtsc-0654
- e FEMA-31P-1 Semedial Rev. 1, Previous Exercise Exercise Esercise so. Reference
- Exercises h Preseng
== - ded Corrective Astice 10/26/83 10/23/84 4/23/85 Jurisdictioe* Statee 112. Rescue equad perseasel need additteesi L3.a a Sales
- C eelf reading deelentera. As adequate .
espply of self reading desianters is required for the rescue equad. 113. A health physicist was set available L.1 Sales C to heepital staff during the esercise for consultattee. Because this was as off-site accident, en health physicist would have to be acquired from Philadelphia, approxiestely 30 minutes evey. Sales County should review the availability of health physica esper- - tiae for medical support and consider the use of utility assistance with off-site accideece. 114 1%e heepital had one teatrummet avail- E.5.a a Sales C able for radiological eseitoring and L.1 the available staff did met demse-strate adequate knowledge of contamin-ation levels. Available writtes pro = cedures were met referenced. Bospital staff members require additional radiological eseitoring equipeast. Further, the staff requires additional training for detereieing the emed for decontmetsatlos. 115. The hospital staff did not deusestrate E.5.a z Sales C somitoring and decontamination of the L.1 ambulance and its staff. The east-toring and decontamination of the ambulance and crew should be demos-strated to a future emergency drill. 116. During the September 27. 1984 medical F.2 x Salee N/Obj(85) drill, the ambulance crew eneber who N.2.c called is to Sales County Memorial Roepital over the radio eaglected to say "This is a drill." All radio transetesions made as part of future endical drille eheuld be clearly identified as such (Section 2.4.33 18). 117. The Sales Cemety coegregate care A.4 z Sales C shelter should be able ta desseetrate ennagement capability over a proloeged period. As aseistaat or standby shelter samager should be desigested and traised. 4
. a. s 72 * ' '
Table 4.1 (Cost'd) 6/19/85 Deffefene, Identified putEG-0634 FEMA-8EP-1 Eamedial a e Rev. 1, Previous Exercise Esercise Exercise Secommended Corrective Action Reference
- Exercises h Preseng me. 10/26/83 10/23/84 4/23/83 Jurisdistion* States 118. The radielegical asettertag equipment E.10 a gales C at the Sales County congregate care shelter had not been calibrated withia -
the poet year. Equ4,most ehesid be calibraced at the ties intervale re-wd by the supplier. 119. Emergency workere at the Salse County E.3.a a a Salee I ceagregate care shelter (Centertoe Fire Station) did not know the contam-ination level for detersiains the essd for decentamination. Emergency workere should receive additional training on the costasiastion level - for determinias the need for decee-taminatise (section 2.2.31 1). - 120. Perecomel as 'the Sales Canary decee- E.3.a x x Sales C camination center were not provided with pereenal dosimeters. Werkers at the decentaataation center should be supplied with personal doeinsters. In the 1934 esercise the eerkers had packet dosimetere but ne peraseest record desientere (Section 2.4.33 4). 121. The appropriate equipment for E.7 s Sales C assitoring vehicles wee est available
. et the decentamination cancer. The decontamination coster should be equipped with all oecessary radio-logical meettoring devices to effectively perfore their function.
122. Cumberland County emot dessestrate the A.I.a a Cumberland C establishemat of specific organisa-
-tione es part of the overall emergency response. All organisatiose listed La the plaa should participate la the ese rcise. The detereination of whether organisational functions and responsibilities have been properly seeigned can only be done with greater participation in radiological euer.
gency prayeredases exercises. e123. There eheuld be more than one pereen A.1.b a Cumberland C assisting the county emergency esmage-east coordinator. l .
. . . e ' '
. 73 Table 4.1 (Coat'd) 6/19/83 Deficioney identified NUREC-0634 FEMA-REF-1 Remedial Rev. 1 Previous Esercise Exercise Exercise Preseeg me. Recommended corrective Acties Reference
- Exercieee b 10/26/83 10/23/84 4/23/83 Jurisdictios* States 124 The Cumberland Ceesty Roc (CCEOC) A.2.a Cumberland N/Obj(83) eseamieselly became overcrouded and 5.3
- meter beesmee ,ef the presence of neur-essential perseenal who were not ident121ed to the county's REEP staffing list. A means should be developed to limit the member of perseenal is the CCEOC. For example, saly these individuals with a pre-established EOC er field assignment should be ellowed access teto the EOC without specific permission of the EMC (Section 2.3.13 I). ,
123. Some steer problems with message A.2.4 s Cumberland N/Obj(SS) headling and documentation were observed at the CCEOC, Lacluding ta= correctly identifying the source of a asseage, est teclading the times that some of the messages were received, and not kasving with certainty how to identify messages to the state as esercise messages. Additional trainias of commaatcatione persossel abould be conducted to ensure occurate documentation of meenages (Section 2.3.13 3). 126. The facilities et the Cumberland A.4 s Cusberland N/Obj(83) County EOC were marginal. Space and E.3 furniture were 11atted. Cumberland Causty should investigate the possibility of providing additional space and facilities for extended operations at the EOC (Sectios 2.3.18 2). 127. The Cumberland County radiological F.1.4 : Cumberland N/Obj(83) field teen's radio vas not adequate for concasties the CCIOC and the FCF free all field mesitoring locations. Cumberland County obeeld taveettgate the need for a more powerful radio eyeces for use by their radiological field teams for comications witI. the EOC and FCF (Secties 2.3.13 4). t 128. Residente of Cumberland and Salsa C.1 x x x Cumberland N/Obj(83) Couettee anst be ande swore of C.2 s x Sales N/Obj(83) protective actione to be takes during , a radiological emergency. 129. The county E0C required more space. I.3 : Cumberlead C Fossibly, as additional trailer could be used.
e e, . - . 74 . e . Table 4.1 (Cost'd) 6/19/85 Deficionev Identified NUBEC-0654 FEMA-REP =1 Remedial Rev. 1 Previous Esercise Esercise Esercise *Preseng # b Jurisdiction
- No. asesammeded Corrective Aetion Referesse* Exercisee 10/26/83 10/23/84 4/13/85 Statua 130. Mare could be larger and show greater J.10.b .z. Cumberland C detail.
131. Some of the valuateer staff at the J.10.e z Cumberleed N/Obj(85) Cumberland Couary EOC as well as the 0.1 health department represostantive seemed to have a limited knowledge of the distribution and see of EI.
- Additional training sheeld be implemented to familiarise selected staff members with the see of El (Secties 2.5.11 5).
132. The see of doetmetere neede improve- E.3. a a cumbe rland C meat. Emergency workers within E.3.h Cumberland Cemety require tare training. Detailed plamaiac and troising of Ledividuals in the area of radiological health needs to be taproved. Perumeent radiological record devices should be made available.
*? Cumberland N/Obj(85) 133. Changes in plant status and other F.1.b x important esercise developments were est prospely relayed by the CCEDC to the Creenwich and Stow Creek EOCo.
Co h eetione procedures with local E0ca should be clarified, and commsni-catione perseenet trained. The CCEOC should revsew its plan to secure that appropriate messages are transmitted to the local EOCs, and participate in comenseications tratains drills with the local EDCa. 134 The EHC held briefings of the staff A.I.b z Cumberland C only Lafrequently. The IOC staff A.2.a would benefit from periodic briefings and status updates. 135. Stow Creek firefighters were not E.3.b z Stow Creek C adequately trained in radiological esposure control procedures. including the use of personal dosimeters and dose reco.d keeping. Also, they did met have EI. Firefightere should receive periodic training ta radio-logical espesure control proceehares. They abould also have El. 136. A status beard ladicating the D.3. z x Stow Creek C eastgency claselfication level and
- important sessages should be utilized at Stow Creek. The status board indi-t cating the emergency claestfication -
level and important mesessee should be l used at the Stow Creek ECC. I I l l I l i l
s *
,e s n
. . e 75 .
Table 4.1 (Cost'd) 6/19/85 Deftetenev Identified WREG-0634 FEMA-REP-1 eM al , Rev. 1, Previous Esercise Esercise Exercise Preseng b pe, aseosameded Corrective Asties Reference
- Exercisee 10/26/83 10/23/84 4/23/85 Jeriodictios* Statua 137. As a result of the 1981 eseretee. D.3 *z' s- Elsishore C poetare displaying the current .
amerseesy class were presteestly . displayed is meet.EOCs. The Elsiebere IOC did set display or mee the re= quired emergemey preparedeces posters. This EOC should post and use the required poeters incinding status boerde, the . plues EFE. populaties distrihettee. evacuatise routes, necese emetret pointe and relocaties emeters. 538. At Sales City there wee over a ese E.2 x. Salem City C home delay la the IOC dispeecher motifying the IMC of the alert declarecies. Alerting preenderes et Salem City sham 14 he improved to emeure that the IMC is estified of the alert declaretten in a more tieely nameer (Section 2.4.23 1). 139. Not all of the telephone muebers os E.2 : Massington C the Mammington call &1st. used for alerting emergency etsff, had been updated. Telepheme eenbers listed on the Manningtoe staffing call list should be periodically reviewed and updated as needed (Secties 2.4.2; 2). 140. As in the pretteus year. La general A.4 Nanaington C there was little participattee is the 1 Feaseville C esercise by elected med appeteted a Greenwich C officials. Stee Creek C 141. Meet emergesey verkere respeeding to K.3.a x Sales City N/0bj(83) as tapediment to evacuation lef t their K.3.h
- Elstabore N/0bj(85) desientare in their vehicles. All emergency verkere should be instructed to carry doeinsters with thee at all times is the field (secties 2.4.33
( 11). 142. 2he radiological officer et the immer E. 4 x lower Allowere N/Obj(83) A11ousys Creek E0C wee est aware of the espos.re threshold for recalling tiaid start. seergeoey staff ebula be traised to be knowledgeable is ghe maaisen allowable dose for field staff 1 (Secties 2.4.23 8). ; 143. Persoesel of the immer Allowere Creek
- E.3.a z lower Allowaye N/Obj(83) l rescue equad had me desinators. )
1 l l
4 , o e
- e e . )
76 . Table 4.1 (Cost'd) 6/19/85 Deficionev Identified m 454 I' PENA-REP-1 Remedial Rev. 1 Previous Esercise Esercise Esercise Preseng me. Reseemeded Corrective Asties Reference
- Esercisee b 10/26/83 10/23/84 4/23/85 Jurisdiction
- Status 144. 50Cs should check for coordinattee of P.1.b a Elsinboro C sirene sed- E3s and notify the county a lower Allsweye C if there le a .probles with either a Maanlagton N/Obj(83, strees er ESS. 84.85) s Peaseville C s Quintos C s Sales City C s Creenwich C a Stow Creek C 145. Security wee taformal at the local E.3 s Masatastoe C EOC. Security should be provided. a Quintos C a Creenwich C Stow Creek C 146. A security program was set ta place at L3 s
- Elsiebere C the Elainborn EOC. A security systes should be developed at the Elstabere 50C.
147. Emergesey backey power was set avail- I.3 s Elsimboro C able and functioning at the Elainboro a Sales City C and Sales City E0Cs. Ene rgency generatore should be ende available and maintained at the Sales City and Elstabore EOCs to assure uninterrupted operettom of these local EOCs (Saction 2.4.2s 5). 148. Not all Elsinbere med Sales City J.10.e a Elsinboro N/obj(85) eastgency workers responding to the Sales City N/Obj(85) Lopediments to evacuation were aware of procedures for use and enthoriza-tion of II. All eeergency workers should be fully traised la the see of El (Sectice 2.4.38 12). 149. Population distribution espe are J.10.b : a Elainboro C aseded for Quintos, Stow Creek, and a Quinton C Elstabore. s Stow Creek C 150. Reentry procedures by emaicipal tocs J.12 s Elsinboro N/Obj(83, must be performed to the esteet 84.83) possible la the time frame of the a lower A11 obeys N/Obj (83, esercise. 84.85) a Maneington 5/Obj(83. 84.85) s Peenev111e 5/0bj(83, 84.85) Quintes N/Obj(q3, 84.85) s Sales City N/Obj(83, 84.85) x Creeswich N/0bj(83, 84.85) s Stow Creek N/Obj(83 84.85)
5
* , a e e er e e e
77 Table 4.1 (Cont'd)
, 6/19/85 Deftetenct Identified NUREG-0634 * ,
PENA-REP =1 Essedial Rev. 1 Previous Esercise tuercise Esercies Prosesg No. Reeeenneded Corrective Action Reference
- Eserciaeeb 10/26/83 10/23/84 4/23/85 Jurisdicties' Status 131. With the essepties of Sales City. K.3.a z a a Elatabere C desiasters were est generally dis- E.3.b z Leser A11essye C tributed (1981 and 1942). Inadequate z Massiastse C supplice of doetmetere were ebeerved N Obs a poemoviMe C at Elatabore and Poemsv111e (1983). m Quintes. C Self-reading desienters of both low- 5 Obe Creeswich C range (0-200 mR) and intermediate- x Stow Creek C reage (either 0-3 1 or 0-20 R) eensitivity and a permaneet record device eheuld be provided to all emergency workers. The Kleinbere EOC had an iseufficient amater (ealy 2) of doetmeter eets available during the -
1984 esercise. This deficiency wee oorrested et Poemoville (Secties 2.4.25 6,7). 152. Emergency back up power sepp 11ee were 5.3 a x Creenwich N/obj(83) either tandequate er lacking at the z z Stow Creek N/Obj(83) Creeswich and Stew Creek municipal EOCs. Emergency generatore of appro= priate capacity should be procured to escure uninterrupted operaties of these local E0Ca (Secties 2.3.23 !). 153. The lower Alloweye Creek police J.10.e z Lower Allowaye N/0bj(85) efficer at oss access concret peine E.3.b Creek wee set completely familiar with the see of decimetere and II. Police should receive II and additional training os the use of doetmetere and EI. El should be distributed as appropriate (Sectise 2.4.3; 10). 154 The Elainboro EOC staff lacked some of F.3 z Elstabers C i the necessary training to perform all of the correct enemusications pro-I cadures. Elstatore EOC staff usebers who are reopensible for impleaseting l the required communicaties preceduree l eheeld attend training eensioes. ISS. Procedural checklists were not used at D.4 x a Eletabere C the Elsta%re 20C. Procedural check-liste should be designed and used. 136. A 24-hour call list for toc staffing A.I.e z x Meaniastes C was set avetlable to the Meanington A.4 E0C. A 24-hour call list should be prepared and used. Safficient - ( energency reopease pereennel should be l recruited and trained to provida 24= hour continuous emergency resposee operations. .
- , - _ m .- - _ _ _ ._. _ _ _ - - _ _ -- .
w p
- O 6
- g , e >
78 s Table 4.1 (Cent'd) 6/19/85 Deficione, Identified IRinEG-0654 PEMA-REP-1 Benedial . f , tee. 1 Previous b Esercise Esercise Esercise Preseng se, teceassaded Corrective Acties Reference
- Exe rcisee 10/16/83 10/23/84 4/13/85 Jurisdicties* Statue
~
137. The route alerting teses ts Possest11e E.6 z Peeeevilla ,C are est supplied with espe er writtee eseeases. The route alerting teene should be supplied with aspe and writtee enesages to assure the effective route alerting. if seeded (Sectise 2.4.33 9). 158. The Poseeville IOC is too small for E.3 s x x Pesesville N/0bj(85) effective operation. Cassiderettoe z Quintos C should be gives to relocation of the Penesville ROC to a larger facility (secties 2.4.2; 4). 159. Traistag to eastsency respeese 0.1.b a Neeslagton C precedores and use of emergency equipeset is necessary for Memeinstem. an/R No NUREC-0454 reference. bPrevious esertises were held on October 13. 1982 med April E. 1981.
' State: Frieerily er wholly reisted to state er StoC (Vest Treetos) functions.
State-ROP: Primarily er wholly related to Emergency Operatione Pacility faectices. S tat e-JMC4 Primarily er wholly related to Joint Media Center faectione. Salees Primarily er wholly related to Sales Cemety fumetions. Cumberlands Primarily er wholly related to Cumberleed Geesty functions. Elstabers Creeswich
- r m e,e Creek M* 88 Primertly or wholly reisted to the respective manicipality's function Quietoe Sales City Stow Creek ks Corrective action complete Is Corrective action incomplete N/Obe(83): Net ebeerved dartog the 1983 esercise 3/0bj(83): Not re objective of the 1983 exercise s/0be(84): Not ebeerved durteg 1984 exercise 5/0bj(84): Not se objective of the 1984 exercise N/0bj(95): Not as objective of the 1985 remedial esercise (N): New defir'ency observed at the 1985 esercise l
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