ML20196K137
| ML20196K137 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Hope Creek  |
| Issue date: | 12/09/1998 |
| From: | Linville J NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | Keiser H Public Service Enterprise Group |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 9812180101 | |
| Download: ML20196K137 (29) | |
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3 -33 4 December 9,1998
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Mr. Harold W. Keiser President and Chief Nuclear Officer.m
- Nuclear Business Unit Public Service Electric and Gas Company l Post Office Box 236 '
Hancocks Bridge, New Jersey 08038
SUBJECT:
MID-YEAR INSPECTION RESOURCE PLANNING MEETING - HOPE CREEK On Novcaber 10,1998, the NRC staff held an inspection resource planning meeting I (IRPM). The IRPM provided a coordinated mechanism for Region I to adjust inspection l schedules, as needed, prior to the conclusion of the Plant Performance Review cycle in May 1999s l Enclosure 1 contains a historicallisting of plant issues, referred to as the Plant issues j Matrix (PIM), that were considered during this IRPM process to arrive at an integrated view I of licensee performance trends. The PIM includes only items from inspection reports or other docketed correspondence between the NRC and Public Service Electric and Gas Company. The IRPM may also have considered some predecisional and draft material that does not appear in the attached PIM, including observations from events and inspections ;
that had occurred since the last NRC inspection report was issued, but had not yet !
received full review and consideration. This material will be placed in the PDR as part of i the normalissuance of NRC inspection reports and other correspondence.
This letter advises you of our planned inspection effort resulting from the Hope Creek IRPM review. It is provided to minimize the resource impact on your staff and to allow for
- scheduling conflicts ad personnel availability to be resolved in advance of inspector arrival onsite. Enclosure 2 details our inspection plan for the next 6 months. Resident inspections are not listed due to their ongoing and continuous nature.
We willinform you of any changes to the inspection plan. if you have any questions, please contact me at (610) 337-5129.
Sincerely, Original Signed by:
James C. Linville, Chief 18gd Projects Branch 3 Division of Reactor Projects Docket Nos. 50-354
Enclosures:
- 1) Plant issues Matrix .O I
- 2) Inspection Plan I 9812180101 981209 PDR ADOCK 05000354 '
.G , ,P,DR /
Aaa. Res/oer .
4-fAr. Harold W. Keiser . 2 cc w/ encl:
' L. Storz, Senior Vice President - Nuclear Operations
~ E. Simpson, Senior Vice President - Nuclear Engineering E. Salowitz, Director - Nuclear Business Support A. F. Kirby, lit, External Operations - Nuclear, Delmarva Power & Light Co.
J. As Isabella, Manager, Joint Generation Atlantic Electric M. Bezilla, General Manager - Hope Creek Operations J. McMahon, Director - Quality Assurance & Nuclear Safety Review D. Powell, Director - Licensing, Regulation and Fuels R. Kankus, Joint Owner Affairs p
A. C. Tapert, Program Adrninistrator Jeffrey J. Keenan, Esquire
- Consumer Advocate, Office of Consumer Advocate William Conklin, Public Safety Consultant, Lower Alloways Creek Township State of New Jersey
' tate of Delaware l
1 I
P
Mr. Harold W. Keiser 3 Distribution w/ encl:
Region i Docket Room (with concurrences)
Nuclear Safety Information Center (NSIC)
NRC Resident inspector PUBLIC H. Miller, RA/W. Axelson,' DRA (irs)
J. Linville, DRP S. Barber, DRP - -
L. Harrison, DRP C. O'Daniell, DRP DRS Director, Region i DRS Deputy Director, Region i Distribution w/ encl: (Via E-Mail)
- 8. McCabe, OEDO R. Capra, PDI-2, NRR
R. Correia, NRR DOCDESK
)CUMENT NAME: G:\ BRANCH 3\1-HC\981 RPM.HC receive c copy of this document, indicate in the box: 'C' = Copy without attachment / enclosure *E' = Copy with attechment/ enclosure *N'=
copy FFICE Rl/DRP f / /
AME JLinville g//
-ATE 11/25/917/ 11/ /98 11/ /98 11/ /98 11/ /98 OFFICIAL RECORD COPY
HOPF REEK PIANTISSUES MATRIX :
Date Type Source ID SFA Code item Descriptfors .
8/25/98 Positive IR 98-07 N 1-OPS 2A The specific items that were in the adrrJnistrative program indicated that the actual number and 980825.06 plant impact of the operator burdens was not noteworthy.
8/25/98 Negative IR 98-07 N 1-OPS 3C The administrative program to track operator burdens was not being consistently updated or 980825.05 reviewed by operators.
8/25/98 Negative IR 98-07 N 1-OPS 3A Due to inadequate self-checking, weak supervisory oversight, and inattention to detail, several 980825.04 3B human performance errors by operations personnel oa:urred. These included inadvertent 3C bumping and actuation of components (radiation monitor and safety relief valve acoustic monitors) and manipulation of an incorrect fuse during an equipment tagout. PSE&G management responded appicys'd, to these minor self identified errors by initiating a common cause analysis to correct this performance weakness.
8/25/98 Negative IR 98-07 N 1-OPS 2A PSE&G did not properly restrain scaffold material in the torus room in accordance with 980825.03 2B administratrve procedures. Although no equipment operability concems were identified, this '
Identification by the inspectors demonstrated that housekeeping in the torus room was not closely monitored by Hope Creek supervisors 8/25/98 Negative IR 98-07 N 1-OPS 1A Control room operators exhibited a knowledge weakness in determining whether control room 980825.02 3B annunciators have reflash capability.
3A 8/25/98 Positive IR 98-07 N OPS 1A Hope Creek operators exhibited a proper safety focus and responded appropriately during 3A routine and off-normal conditions (ultimate heat sink elevated temperature, safety system valve 980825.01 3B failure, feedwater system transient).
7/21/98 Negative IR 98-06 N 1-OPS 1A There were two examples (inoperable indicating circuit for control room chiller circulating pump 28 at the Remote Shutdown Panel, and abnormal response from an unlabeled emergency diesel 980721.9 generator over-voltage relay during post-maintenance testing) where operators were slow to fully l document and process the bases for equipment operability when degraded ind' cations were apparent. In both instances, post-issue reviews demonstrated that operability was not challenged.
7/21/98 NegatNe IR 98-06 N 1-OPS SA A quality assessment audit of correcbve action effectNeaess at Salem and Hope Creek was 980721.8 SC comprehensive in scope and content. Although the audit findings reflected a probing review of the effectveness of correchve actions, the nature of these findings were similar from prior PSE&G and NRC corrective action system reviews, and were indicative of continued weaknesses in implementing the established correctve action program. These findings warrant increased management attention for effeebve and lasting resolution.
l Page 1 of 26 17 November 1998 FROM.11/15/97 TO: 8/25/98
i i
HOPE CREEKPLANTISSUES MATRIX 1
Date Type Source ID SFA Code item CM"a 7/21/98 NCV IR 98-06 N 1-OPS 3A Operators exhibited good performance during roubne and off normal events with one notable 980721.12 NCV 98-05-03 SA exception, where non-ficensed equipment operators failed to explicl0y follow a procedure and subsequently perform a correct second verification. Specifically, the 'A' station service water pump was improperty racked in when the normal and emergency trip coil fuses wereieft in the wrong position, and the second verifier checking the breaker lineup failed to identify that the fuse blocks were not properly oriented.
7/21/98 Negative IR 98-06 N 1-OPS 2A During frequent routine plant tours, the inspectors identified some instances of minor material 980721.11 condition and housekeeping deficiencies. Examples included excessive noise (elevated vibration) on an emergency diesel generatorjacket water keep warm pump, bumt out indicating light bulbs, and immovable louvers on sennce water intake structure ventilation doors Ahhough ;
i equipment was not rendered inoperable by these items, the number of deficiencies identified by the inspectors indicated a need for increase worter, supervisor and manager focus during the conduct of routine plant tours.
7/21/98 Positive IR 98-06 N 1-OPS 2A Hope Creek operators property initiated an operability determination for the excessive cycling of 980721.10 2B the 'D' torus to drywell vacuum breaker. The engineering department provided a thorough 4B evaluation of the problem and it was consistent with the operator's initial operability determination.
l 6/4/98 Negative IR 98-05 N 1-OPS 1A Control room operators were slow to declare safety-related equipment inoperable ('A' Service ,
980604.9 3A Water Pump, 'B' torus-to-drywell vacuum breaker and the 'A' safety auxiliaries cooling system i pump) when faced with unexpected results during survolliance testing on three separate occasions. Although PSE&G later determined that each problem did not in fact render the i equipment inoperable, the inspectors determined that the operators' delay in declaring safety-related equipment inoperable after the failed testing, demonstrated that operators did not always make conservative decisions. In response to these concems, PSE&G appropriately assessed l the human performance issues and intended to iri.s poiste the lessons leamed into requalification training.
6/4/98 Positive IR 98-05 N 1-OPS 1A Operations personnel conducted several high quality pre-achvity briefs for various activities, 980604.11 3A which focused on the potential consequences of planned activities and associated responses, and emphasized expectations regarding communications and self- and peer-check techniques.
Control room operators responded quickly and effeebvely to a reactor core isolation cooling (RCIC) system battery charger failure. A non-licensed equipment opa.is demonstrated a good questioning attitude when he identified that a RCIC flow controller located on the Remote ;
Shutdown Panelwas in manual. l FROM.11/15/97 TO: 8/25/98 Page 2 of 26 17 November 1998 - i
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HOPE CREEK PLANTISSUES MATRIX .
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Source ID SFA sCode nem Cz: ^, ^* , i Date Type I mummmmmmmmmu Negative IR 98-05 N 1-OPS 2A During tours of the lotus and 'B' residual heet removal pump room, the inspectors idenbfied ,
6/4/98 some motorial condition and haal: A- --/-,, deficiencies, such as a *B' core spray system test '
'980604.10 line orifice installed backwards, unsecured ledders, and exceaelve oestfolding storage. The identitled problems did not impact equipment operabigty. PSE&G Inflisted prompt and appropriate acilons to address the deficiencies IR 98-02 N 1-OPS 1A After a single control rod drive was . 4-;-M red one notch, Hope Creek reactor operators '
4/4/98 Positive meemenad core thermal performance. The operators recognized the sigmficance of reactmty 980404.27 management and they prompey reported the problem to Wie Hope Creek operatons manager. i The inspectors determined that the Hope Creek operators were conservauve and safe donng reecevity.. -; "ms IR 98-02 N 1-OPS 2A The inspectors toured the service water intake structure (SWIS) on a ftequent basis and nouced 4/4/98 VIO 2B three different examples of temporary equipment not pmporty controlled. Speelfically, (1) a 980404.26 VIO 98-02-03 SWIS floor drain system was modllled before the required 10 CFR 50.59 safety evaluston was .
completed (2) scaffold was erected without the edmmistraeve controls and inspections required by Hope Creel (s scaffold program, and (3) floor drain plugs were installed in both service water !
bays without following the requirements of Hope Creek's temporary modificallon procedure The Inspectors concluded that, although each problem considered alone was minor and in no :
instance d.J. . ngd the operability of the safety-related equipmentin the SWIS , the number of discrepancies suggests that PSE&G needs an increased awareness of SWIS material condition and equipment control.
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N 1-OPS 1B Control room operators acted deliberately and caubously during the conduct of a reactor power '
4/4/98 Positive 98-02 3A reducbon from 100% to 60%, as well as during a subsequent control rod pattem adjustment.
980404.24 When abnormalindications and response wero indicated with one of the control rods during the t pettom adjustment, operators prompUy and property implemented off-normal procedure guldence and consulted with cognizant reactor engineenng personnel. Good crew bnefings were held to discuss individual observations and establish R :T=nt plans. The operatons l superintendent implemented appropriate actions upon declaring the associated control rod l
Inoperable IR 98-02 N 1-OPS 2B Operatons, maintenance and engineering personnel effectively investigated an abnormal 4/4/98 Positive i MAINT 3A response of a torus-to drywell vacuum breaker during testing, and the appropriate actions were 900404.23 taken to correct the situation. However, some minor weaknesses were apparent related to test l ENG conduct and follow-up by control room operators 1-OPS 5B A Nuclear Review Board meeting was charactenzed by probing discussions and reflected a 4/4/98 Positive IR 98-02 N strong safety focus. The overall quality of the meeting was very good.
980404.22 l
17 November 1998 Page 3 of 26 i FROPE 11/15/97 TO: 8/25/98 !
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HOPE CREEKPLANTISSUES MATRIX Dete Type Source ID SFA Code item Desct# don 3/12/98 Weakness IR 98-03 N 1-OPS 38 PSE&G staff initially submitted an inadequate examination to administer to applicants for an l 980312.02 3C operator's license. A good majority of the test items of each portion of the examination required l SB replacement or significant iriodiTGMs. Significant interactions between the NRC and PSE&G
, and an exam postponement for two weeks were required to develop an exam that was
! consistent with the NRC Examiner Standards.
3/12/98 Negative IP 98-03 N 1-OPS 3A There was insufficient controls, enteria, or data recorded in the controlling documents as 980312.01 URl URI 98-03-01 3B evidence that the required control manipulations were significant and were property credited.
3C Because of this, not all of the applicants performed five significant control manipulations which had to be redone. This area is an unresolved item pending further enicicernent review by NRC staff with respect in meeting 10CFR55.31(a)(5).
2/21/98 Positive IR 98-01 N 1-OPS 1A Hope Creek operators exhibited good control over routine actmbes. Operators were sensitive to 980221.26 adverse equipment conditions and initiated additional equipment monitoring when necessary.
Control room operators effechvely implemented technical .p.ciTwM action requirements when necessary.
2/21/98 Negative IR 98-01 N 1-OPS 2B Station housekeeping and transient load control were generally adequate but had declined E80221.25 2A during recent months.
2/21/98 NCV IR 98-01 L 1-OPS 3A Two unrelated incidents involving standby liquid control system storage tank boron concentrabon 980221.24 NCV 98-01-02 SA resulted from weak communications, insufficient attention to detail, and ineffeebve supervisory oversight. Once identified, management response to the issues was prompt and thorough.
2/21/98 Positive IR 98-01 N 1-OPS 1B Operating crew performance during electrohydraulic control system oscillations was appropriate 980221.23 ENG 4B and safe. Each event was promptly identified and nobfications were made within the Hope Creek organization to ensure that problems were addressed Eng!aeering and operations department personnel worked closely to identify the cause of the failures and to determine an action plan for continued safe plant operation.
2/21/98 Negative IR 98-01 N 1-OPS 1B Operators did not formally assess the degraded condition in an operability determination for an 980221.22 ENG 4B electrohydraulic control system pressure regulator failure.
2/21/98 Positive IR 98-01 N 1-OPS SB The Nuclear Review Board completed a quality overall review of station achvibes, and provided 980221.21 2B good, objecbve performance feedback to station management.
1/3/98 Positive IR 97-10 N 1-OPS 1A Plant operators conducted an essentially error-free startup, in spite of numerous emergent plant 980103.14 3A equipment defictencies. Operators exhibited excellent control of planned evolutions and responded adequately to unanbcipated equipment malfunctions. Reactmty management during
- the evolution was good.
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Page 4 of 26 \ 17 November 1998 FROM: 11/15/97 TO: 8/25/98
HOP!' CREEK PIANTISSUES MATRIX .
Date Type Source ID SFA Code Nom DescrQ6cn 1/3/98 NCV IR 97-10 N 1-OPS 1A Operators generally exhibited good performance with respect to procedure compliance, peer 980103.13 Positive NCV 97-10-01 3A checking, and communicabon during infrequently performed evolutions while preparing for plant start up. Weaknesses were evident with respect to technical sps.G ;bi required equipment status control. Despite the weaknesses in maintaining the status log, the inspectorstietermined from narrative log reviews, shift tumover sheets, and individual interviews that operators were aware of the actualinoperable system conditions.
1/3/98 Positive IR 97-10 N 1-OPS 3B Operating crew performance during a requalification exam simulator scenario was adequate.
Though crew communications and event recognition were good, consistent with observed 980103.12 ;
performance in the actual control room, operators failed to perform or evaluate certain expected actions during event response. Fidelity between the Hope Creek simulator and the actual control room was adequate. Examination security measures were good.
Positive IR 97-10 N 1-OPS 1C The inspectors continued to observe good overall performance with respect to quality 1/3/98 improvement measures and oversight in operations. The inspectors noted that the recent 980103.11 management focus on operability determination backlog reduction was effective Negative IR 97-09 N 1-OPS 1A Operators demonstrated inconsistent performance overall, and exhibited notable weaknesses 11/15/97 2A with respect to attention-to-detail and awarenev of equipment status.
971115.15 IR 97-09 N 1-OPS 1A PSE&G personnel displayed excellent overall performance in the development, pre-briefing, and 11/15/97 Positive 3C implementation of the plan to drain down the reactor cavity and vessel to support core spray 971115.14 nozzle repair efforts.
ViO IR 97-09 N 1-OPS 1C Operators exhibited poor performance during the conduct of.an infrequently performed shutdown 11/15/97 eel-97-09-01 SA margin demonstration in that a stuck control rod procedure was not followed and conservative 971115.13 Negative decision making with regard to reactmty managementwas not demonstrated Additionally, these actions and decisions were not sufficiently challenged by control room observers. ,
IR 97-09 N 1-OPS 1C The inspectors judged that Quality Assurance findings were well-supported, independent, and 11/15/97 Positive SA promptly referred to station management for action. Quality Assurance oversight of control 971115.12 room activities was usually good.
N 1-OPS 3A Immediate plant operator response to operational transients was typically good in that proper 10/4/97 Positive IR 97-07 3C procedures were used, technical specification action statement requirernents were followed, and '
971004.29 three-way communications were demonstrated.
3B IR 97-07 N 1-OPS 3A Operators demonstrated proper implementation a;.d knowledge of all applicable TS 10/4/97 Positive 3B requirements during plant operation, shutdown, and refueling. Additionally, conservative 971004 27 decision making was avident during the course of various infrequentfy performed evolutions. i 3C 17 November 1998 l Page 5 of 26 FROM.11/15/97 TO: 8/25/98
HOPE CREEKPLANTISSUES MATREX Date Type Source ID SFA Code item C2p;
, 10/4/97 Positive IR 97-07 N 1-OPS 1C QA inspectors provided excellent oversight of plant operations, and routinely communicated
- 971004.26 observed deficiencies to shift management.
10/4/97 VIO . IR 97-07 N 1-OPS 3A On 9/15/97 the Operations shift supervisor determined that the electrk: motor driven 6te pump 971004 Negative VIO 97-07-01 3B had been inoperable for approximately 34 hours3.935185e-4 days <br />0.00944 hours <br />5.621693e-5 weeks <br />1.2937e-5 months <br /> Though a fire v iviwCv'en system trouble alarm was generated and acknowledged in the control room on 9/14/97, no actions were taken to determine the cause of the alarm and fire pivim,r,ca technicians were not notrfied of the l condition. Additionally, fire protecton technicians missed two opportunities to identify the ,
inoperable pump during routine operator rounds. The inspectors judged that this event highlighted weaknesses in degraded condition problem identification, specifically attention-to-detail, questioning attitude, and understanding fire as -- Mi-n system status 10/2/97 Positive IR 97-08 N 1-OPS 3B Five Hope Creek senior reactor operator (SRO) instant conddates were administered initial 971002 heensing exams. Four candidates poseed all portions of the license exam. One candidate failed the written exam. Overall, candidate p fvin nce during the operating tests was good. No
, generic performance weaknesses were identified.
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'FROM: 11/15/97 TO: 8/25/98 Page 6 of 26 17 November 1998 l
t
HOPE CREEK PLANTISSUES MATRIX .
i Date Type Source ID SFA l Code item Descr# don ,
8/25/98 Positive IR 98-07 N 1-OPS 3A The operators responded promptly and appicpd t'y during both transients, and plant response 980825.14 3B was normal.
8/25/98 Negative IR 98-07 N 2- SA There were two instances where plant transients resulled due to an in'ermittent problem with a 980825.13 MAINT 2A feedwater heater relay card in the trip circuit. Maintenance technicians did not identify and 3C correct the first occurrence of this equipment problem when a specific relay was replaced. As a consequence, operators were unnecessarily challenged a second time.
8/25/98 Positive IR 98-07 N 2- 3A An operations supervisor demonstrated a good questioning athtude when he identified [the 980825.12 MAINT 3B reactor building ventilation supply fan tagging deficiency dudng a plant tour.
8/25/98 Negative IR 98-07 N 2- 3A Due to poor communications and poor work control implementabon, maintenance personnel 980825.11 eel eel 97-07-01 MAINT 1A failed to follow the established equipment tagging process and worked on a reactor building ventilation supply fan without the appropriate tagging and controls in place as required by station procedures.
8/25/98 Negative IR 98-07 N 2- 3A The inspectors determined that PSE&G was not effectively posting protected equipment nor was 980825.10 MAINT the protected equipment consistently communicated to working groups.
8/25/98 Positive IR 98-07 N 2- 2B Preventive maintenance for the 'A' filtration recirculation ventilation system ventilation fan was 980825.09 MAINT property conducted.
8/25/98 Negatwe IR 98-07 N 2- 3A Problems encountered during the 'A' t'od block monitor e.hannel calibration procedure were not 980825.08 MAINT understood before steps were re-performed out of sequence with the procedure.
8/25/98 Positive IR 98-07 N 2- 3A PSE&G conducted safety-related surveillances in a safe and deliberate manner with one 980825.07 MAINT exception.
7/21/98 Positive IR 98-06 N 2- 3A The preparations to replace three single cells on safety-related batteries were thorough and well 980721.7 MAINT 3C developed. The battery cell rep!acements were completed in a timely fashion and without error.
PSE&G took initial steps to improve its performance monitoring of the safety-related batteries, which was a recent performance weakness, as the batteries approach their end of service life.
7/21/98 Negative IR 98-06 N 2- 3A Due to poor worker practice, scaffold was erected too close to a non-safety related electncal 980721.6 MAINT panel, which caused a vibration induced actuation of a low pressure feedwater heater isolation relay. This actuation resulted in an unnecessary challenge to control room Opm aivis and plant equipment.
7/21/98 Positive IR 98-06 N 2- 2B Operators appropriately researched and thoroughly understood the risk assessment associated 980721.5 MAINT 3B with concurrent unavailabilities of the 'B' reactor feed pump and the reactor core isolation cooling system. However, operators did not consult the probabilis5c safety assessment group to quantify or confirm their assessment prior to placing the plant in a configuration that may have impacted plant safety.
Page 7 of 26 25 November 1998 FROM.11/15/97 TO: 8/25/98
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HOPP CREEKPLANTISSUES MATRIX Date Type Source 10 SFA CCde item Desct#dort ,
Positive IR 98-02 N 2- SB The on-line mainte1ance program was effective at belancing the benefits gained through 4/4/98 MAINT preventive maintenance program against the costs of equipment unavailability. The licensee 980404.18 quantified the risk of con,panent and system unavailabilRy in the 12 week rolling schedule and limited preventive maintenance activities to manage these risks. A minor inconsistency was noted with evaluation of risk when maintenance was either deferred or added to a given work week. f IR 98-02 N 2- 3A The Work it Now team vras effective at screening new work entering the system. The team has '
4/4/98 Positive MAINT reduced existing correcfive maintenance beddags while memtaining a reasonable work-off rate 980404.17 for newwork.
Negative RI 98-02 N 2- 2B A wording ambiguity in a primary cordainment instrument gas compressor maintenance 4/4/98 MAINT procedure could have led to an expansion of work scope not spedTally identified by the !
980404.16 maintenance procedure. This deficiency was corrected prior to beginning work. However, an l
extent of condition review noted other instances of poorty worded preventive maintenance procedures. By not writing action requests in these cases, the accuracy ofinformation used for -
trending purposes could be suspect.
N 2- SB Root cause analyses were acceptable with one excwt;0n where certain aspects of one ar.Jysis 4/4/98 Positive IR 98-02 MAINT were not sufficiently probing and did not identify all of the root causes for the event.
980404.15 N 2- 5A PSE&G maintenance technicians methodically identified and wiiedad the source of unrelated r 4/4/98 Positive IR 98-02 MAINT 58 electrical grounds that developed on the "A" and "B" diesel generators' associated 125Vdc 980404.14 busses. The technician promptness was commensurate with the safety importan,,:e of the diesel generators PSE&G engineers initiated a followup analysis to ensure that the "A" EDG speed switch failurewaswellunderstood.
N 2- 3A PSE&G management performed a thorough review of the circumstances surrounohg a failed 4/4/98 Positive IR 98-02 MAINT 3C post-maintenance surveillance test of a filtration, recirculation, and ventilation unit. This 980404.13 investigation determined that inattention-to-detail by maintenance technicians and poor decision making by a supervisor led to the test failure.
N 2- SB PSE&G management was slow to recognize an apparent declining trend with respect to 2/21/98 Negative IR 98-01 !
MAINT SC technical specification surveillance program implementabon. Upon recognition, a focused team 980221.19 review was initiated in an effort to fully understand the issue and to develop acbons to 2B improvementfuture performance. ,
t i
17 November 1998 ;
Page 9 of 26 FROM.11/15/97 TO: 8/25/98 I
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^
HOPE CREEKPLANTISSUES MATRDC mm c Date Type Source ID SFA Code Neon Cz: ^ ^^:-n 2/21/98 Negative IR 98-01 N 2- 1A An on-line maintenance outage of the *D* emergency disesi generator was =-;--w2, ,
980221.18 IR 97-01 MAINT 3B planned and implemented. A quan6teeve risk == easement adequateh jusulted that the outage 4B resulted in a net safety benefit. Good maintenance, engineering, and operseons department oversight of the work and test activites was evident. Weelmesses were observed irt operator l l knowledge of associated techmcel speellicagon beoes informeBon and ;...,, . A -_^^:-r. of -
I required survelliance activi6es A No8ce of Deviadon was leeued in IR 97-01 for PSE&G failing ,
' to include these assump60ns in the TS bases Upon quessoning, on ehNt operators were l unaware of the assumptions. ..
I
- 2/21/98 Positive IR 98-01 N 2- SA in part because of inspector questioning, maintonence department management inlueled an -
980221.17 MAINT SC assessment of poor work performance during 9m recon 9y completed refueling outage. PSE&G ;
completed a high quaBly and thorough review, and developed several correc9ve actions which !
appropriately focused on the stated root causes. ,
2/21/98 Positivo IR 98-01 N 2- 4A An emergency diesel generator contml circuit relay modificagon package wec effec 9vely 980221.16 MAINT pierued and implemented, and incorporated lessons loomed fmm previous ;..,.; . J ^~ - of the modificollon in other diesel generators. j I
1/3/98 VIO IR 97-10 N 2- 28 Melntenance department performance, per9culerty witt respect to procedure development and Negative VIO 97-10-02 usage, was week. Repeat examples of inodoquete procedure C. :":;- .w ; and implementagon 980103.10 MAINT 1C ;
VIO 97-10-03 were iden6 fled in at least two cases, associated with meintenance on the reactor core leoleton !
VIO 97-10-04 cooling system and a control room ventilation system, the performance issues resulted in delays !
in retuming these safety systems to an operable stelus.
1/3/98 VIO IR 97-10 N 2- 2B A recently4;;;;; ped surveillance procedure which implemented technical specificebon !
980103.09 Negative VIO 97-10-09 MAINT 1C acceptance criteria for electncal protection assembly under-frequency teseng was inadequate in j that recorded frequency data could not be adequately evaluated for acceptablRty. j 1/3/98 Positive IR 97-10 N 2- 2A PSE&G personnel completed inservice testing of the "A" and "C" core spray pumps safely and in 980103.08 MAINT 28 accordance with the established procedure. }
I I
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FROM.11/15/97 TO: 8/25/98 Page 10 of 26 17 November 1998 '
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HOPF CREEKPLANTISSUES MATRIX .-
Date Type Source ID SFA Code nem DeecrQ6an .
mummmmmmmum nummmmmmma 1/3/98 NCV IR 97-10 L 2- 28 This event involved the self-identified discovery that outage planning perscanel failed to include 980103 LER LER 97-28 MAINT channel functional tests required by TS in the outage plan. As a rest 4t, surveillance activities NCV 97-10-07 required by TS 4.3.2.1 were not performed to demonstrate operability of the seccn-4.iy contalnment isolation actuation logic channels during core alterations or during operetions with a potential to drain the reactor vessel. PSE&G attributed this failure to personnel error in that outage planners inappivpiL/.0; used an uncontrolled TS surveillance matrix while developing the refueling outage testing schedule. This matrix did not accurately reflect all TS surveillance
' testing requirements. PSE&G procedures require that the controlled surveillance testing matnx, which was recently validated by the technical spm Tat;vn surveillance improvement project, be used for planning and scheduling TS-required testing activities Corrective actions to preclude recurrence of this issue involved individual disciplinary measures and re-emphasis on management expectations regarding the use of only controlled documents. This licensee identified and corrected violation of TS 4.3.2.1 is being treated r s a Non-Cited Violation.
1/3/98 NCV IR 97-10 L 2- 2B This LER describes operation in a technical spedreibn (TS) ,xohibited condition due to 980103 LER LER 97-27 MAINT improperty performed surveillances for determining specific gravity of the 125 Vdc and 250 Vdc NCV 97-10-06 batteries. TS 4.8.2.1.b.1 requires that specific gravity of the safety-related betteries be determined every 92 days and be within the spedTn iivm provided in Table 4.8.2.1-1. TS Table 4.8.2.1-1 requires that each celfs specific gravity be corrected for temperature for every individual cell. Hope Creek previously used, since initial operatio.:, every sixth cell to correct for temperature.
NCV IR 97-10 L 2- 2B On November 18,1997, during implementabon of a design change package (DCP) to replace 1/3/98 LER LER 97-29 MAINT 4C snubber 1-P-BC-144-H002 on the RHR shutdown cooling suction line, personnel identified that 980103 NCV 97-10-08 the snubber had been mistakenly removed in 1992 during the snubber reduction program.
PSE&G's investigation determined that individual work orders to remove snubbers were not generated from the approved snubber.reducDon DCP in 1992. PSE&G poifciined a comprehensive walkdown of the shutdown cooling suction Ene and did not identify any additional missing snubbers. PSE&G also performed a review of outage work orders and did not identify any activities that would have unintentionally removed snubbers All required system snubbers were replaced with a new model during RFO7.
11/15/97 Negative IR 97-09 N 2- 3A Maintenance department technicians exhibited inconsistent performance during the conduct of 971115.11 MAINT 2B outage work activities and testing. While procedure and work order usage was generally good, deficiencies in interdepartmental coordination and foreign material exclusion controls were evident Negative IR 97-09 N 2- 3C Numerous unplanned emergency diesel generator start attempts and equipment restoration 11/15/97 971115.10 MAINT 28 delays were encountered as a result of poor work controls over mechanical govemor maintenance and replacements.
Page 11 of 26 17 November 1998 FROM: 11/15/97 TC: 8/25/98
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HOPF CREEKPIANTISSUES MATRIX -
Type Source 10 SFA Code M t:::^%, -
Date ,
10/4/97 VIO IR 97-07 N 2- 2B in spite of proactive measures try PSE&G management to reinforce ecpectations reganfing 975004.19 Negative VIO 97-07-03 MAINT 3C maintenance procedure adherence and attentiorNHisteR several looues involving non-compliances and poor work quality were identified Supervloory oversight of contract
maintenance technicians was weak.
10/4/97 Positive IR 97-07 N 2- SA PSE&G personnel continued to document deficient conditions at the station with a low threshold 971004.18 MAINT SB for initiation Plant management demonstrated good reviews of each new issue and required resolution during the refueling outage when appropriate 10/4/97 Positive IR 97-07 N 2- 1C Procedure changes incorporated following the most recent failure of the residual heat removal MAINT SC shutdown cooling suchon line snubber, which modified the method used to place shutdown 971004.17 cooling in service, were effechve and prevented recunence.
Page 13 of 26 17 November 1998 F.".OM: 11/15/97 TO: 8/25/98 ,
HOPE CREEK PLANTISSUES MATRIX Date Type Source ID SFA Code item Description 8/25/98 Positive IR 98-07 N 3-ENG 48 PSE&G management conducted a detailed review and assessment of system engineering, 980825.16 4C reactor engineering, and other technical support departments in response to recent deficiencies 5B related to performance monitoring and trending. This review was sufficientfy critical and identified several areas of weakness requ! ring ccTecucn. In response, engineering - '
management developed appropriate short and long term corrective action plans to improve performance in these areas.
8/25/98 VIO IR 98-07 N 3-ENG 2B PSE&G had not corrected a known deficiency in venfying main steam isolation valves (MSIV) to 980825.15 VIO 98-07-02 3A be fully closed during " springs-onif full stroke closing tests by performing a loca! position SC indication observation. Also, PSE&G had not completed an intended Updated Final Safety Analysis Report change related to MSIV operation and design Although no operability issues resulted, PSE&G failed to accurately track and resolve these items in its corrective action program.
7/21/98 Negative IR 98-06 N 3-ENG 1C System engineering did not effectively monitor and trend particulate sample results for the 980721.4 VIO 98-06-04 48 emergency diesel generator (EDG) fuel oil storage tanks. As a result, increasing paniculate LER 98-04 concentrations were not questioned in a timely fashion, and two of the eight tanks subsequently were out of specification and the associated EDG was rendered inoperable. Also, chemistry personnel failed to property test and report particulate concentration results for new fuel oil i received at the station via tanker trucks since October 1997, which was contrary to station procedures. PSE&G responded effectively to the degraded condition of the tanks, and ,
implemented actions to quickly restore the tanks to an operable condition consistent with a Notice of Enforcement Discretion, which the NRC granted on May 22,1998.
7/21/98 Negative IR 98-06 N 3-ENG 48 Contract engineering personnel failed to ensure proper design and configuration control for a 980721.3 VIO 98-06-05 reactor core isolation cooling (RCIC) system modification during the Fall 1997 refueling outage.
Specificairy, the modification incorrectly changed the RCIC turbine steam line stop valve logic by ,
deleting it's sequenced opening feature. As a consequence, the RCIC turbine oversped rapidly ,
during a post-maintenance RCIC overspeed test (RCIC pump and turbine were uncoupMd).
This condition did not render tne RCIC system inoperable during the specific valve configuration because testing demonstrated operability of the system while in this condition. Station engineering responded appropriste!y to this design and testing error.
6/4/98 Negative IR 9805 N 3-ENG 4A PSE&G failed to establish sufficient preservice and inservice testing requirements for a design ,
980604.6 VIO 98 4C modification installed during refueling outage RF07 to the safety related control area chillers, 01.02,03 which was contrary to the requiremerits of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B (Test Control). Lack of inservice testing requirements allowed both trains of the safety-related control room chillers to be outside of its design basis and not able to perform its intended safety function. In addition, PSE&G failed to correct a known deficiency associated with the minimum cooling water design temperature for the chillers since December 1997.
Page 14 of 26 17 November 1998
- FROM.11/15/97 TO. 8/25/98
HOPE CREEK PIANTISSUES MATRIX -
- umam mum Date T)epe Sr".:ii.O ID Sh , Code item Descr$ dors 6/4/98 NCV IR 98-05 L 3-ENG 4B On two separate occasions, PSE&G did not adequately evaluate procedure changes that 980604.5 LER NCV 98-05-04 4C vedfied Filtration Rocin:ulation and Ventilation System (FRVS) technical specification LER 98-02 surveillance requirements, resulting in procedure non-compilances The inadequate procedures in one case led to inoperable FRVS components and in the other case, inadequate test requirements.
6/4/98 Negative IR 98-05 N 3-ENG 4B Operations, maintenance and engineering personnel responded apprep:;U; to degraded cell 980604.4 4C voltages in the CD447 safety related 125 Vdc battery System engineering demonstrated a performance weakness in that a system manager was not assigned to the DC systems, and consequently, the degraded cells had not been monitored and trended. Effective monitoring and trending may have predicted this degradation and pi,,.;.,"- d a challenge to plant staff.
6/4/98 Positive IR 98-05 N 3-ENG 4A During refueling outage RF03 in 1990, contrary to procedures, the RHR system was not 980604.3 VIO 98-05-05 4B operated in parallel with the fuel pool cooling and cleanup (FPCC) system during the time the full 4C core was offloaded into the fuel pool. More significantly, the RHR system was not maintained available to be placed in opemtion in the event that the FPCC system experienced a failure ^
during RF03. Although attemative means to ensure the decay heat could be removed from the ,
spent fuel pool during that period were evaluated, PSE&G did not perform such reviews as required by 10 CFR 50.59.
4/4/98 Positive IR 98-02 N 3-ENG 4B PSE&G engineers thoroughly evaluated the "B" residual heat removal pump minimum flow 980404.12 2A check valve failure. The engineers contacted the vendor, determined the failure mode, and performed radiographs of an expanded check valve population to support a conclusion that the failure was an isolated instance. The engineers wir4LLJ a comprehensive investigation of the problem to determine the extent of condition. The operability determination and the engineers' ,
followup assessment was thoroughly documented.
4/4/98 Positive IR 98-02 N 3-ENG 4B PSE&G engineers promptly evaluated a 10 CFR Part 21 nollfication made by a relay vendor.
980404.11 Equipment repairs were completed in a timely fashion on those relays that potentially impacted plant operations.
4/4/98 Positive IR 98-02 N 3-ENG 48 Hope Creek engineers evaluated inconsistent inservice Test' data from several "back to back" ,
980404.10 surveillance tests performed on the "A" service water pump. The engineers' deta!!ed analysis of '
the flow measuring device. test methodology, and current plant conditions discovered test induced errors and prevented unnecessary intrusive inspection of the "A" service water pump.
FROM: 11/15/97 TO: 8/25/98 Page 15 of 26 25 November 1998
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HOP CREEK PIANTISSUES " ATRIX .
Date Type Source ID SFA Code item Descr$ Mon Positive IR 97-10 N 3-ENG 4B PSE&G efforts at reducing the number of installed temporary modifications was eik-ctive.
1/3/98 4C Remaining modifications were property evaluated, with proper revisions made in associated 980103.06 drawings and procedures. However, several of the remaining modifications had been in place well beyond that which was intended by PSE&G's administrative control program.
IR 97-10 N 3-ENG 4B The material condition of the reactor core isolation cooling system and high pressure coolant 1/3/98 VIO 980103.04 Negative VIO 97-10-05 2B injection system was poor as indicated by failed technical specification operability testing during the reactor plant start up. inadequate engineering pracbces contributed to the failure of the reactor core isolation cooling system surveillance testing .
IR 97-10 N 3-ENG 4B Resolution of a potentially generic deficiency in safety-related swing check valves was timely 1/3/98 Positive 980103.03 1R 95-03 2A and effective IR 94-26 L 3-ENG 4A This LER describes a condition alone that could have prevented removal of residual heat -safety 1/3/98 NCV IR 97-10 LER 96-22 SB auxillaries cooling system (SACS) deficiencies. Three related self-identified issues were 980103 LER IR 96-10 SC reported: (1) SACS operability could not be assured under all allowable system configurations.
IR 97-06 (2) TS allowed outage times for SACS, station service water (SSW), and the emergency die:sei NCV 97-10-12 generators (EDG) were based on insufficient erg;r;;.tg L :e'"ess, and (3) plant operatire ,
procedures permitted a SACS configuration unsupported by the system's design basis. These issues were identified during an Independent SACS design basis review and validation effort performed as a corrective action for previously-identified similar issues. The stated root causes for these concems were sound, and not reasonably linked to current perfonwence.
IR 97-09 N 3-ENG 4A PSE&G promptly developed and implemented an acceptable design change package to resolve 11/15/97 Positive a self-identified issue invoMng bracket weld cracks on jet pump instrument lines.
971115.05 4B IR 97-09 N 3-ENG 4A Engineering department prepared safety evaluations were of good quality and were 11/15/97 Positive 4B appropriately focused on the potential nuclear safety impact of the plant design or equipment 971115.04 changes. The inspectors judged that the quality of the 10CFR50.59 process had improved over the past operating cycle. Process improvements such as evaluation " grading," cross <fisciplinary peer reviewing, independent auditing, and focused engineering department training resulted in better and more thorough safety evaluations.
L 3-ENG 58 This LER describes a design deficiency related to a potential unmonitored release path through 11/15/97 Positive IR 97-09 SC the station service water system. PSE&G acted promptly and effeebvely in the resolution of a 971115.03 LER LER 97-25 self-identified issue invoMng a potential secondary containment bypass leakage pathway.
N 3-ENG 4B Several examples of repeat equipment failures, extended system maintenance actnnbes, and 10/4/97 Negative IR 97-07 SC design change package deficiencies highlighted weaknesses in the quality of engineering 971004.16 support 17 November 1998 Page 17 of 26 FROM.11/15/97 TO. 8/25/98 .
HOPE CREEKPIANTISSUES MATRIX '
~ . ,
ummmmmmu Date Type Source ID SFA Code nem Cz:Q -5 10/4/97 Positive IR 97-07 N 3-ENG 48 System engineering efforts in identifying and resolving emergent equipment failures were prompt
- 971004.16 SC and effective. The targe scope of design change work scheduled for g,ii-y- , during the refueling outage demonstrated appropriate management focus on resolu#on of long standing equipment deficiencies An intamal review of an extended reactor water cleanup pump outage was thorough and self-cribcal. f ;
10/4/97 VIO IR 97-07 N 3-ENG 4A The program for designing and Installing configuration changes to plant systems was 971004.13 Negative VIO 97-07-04 3C seceptable. 'icee r ; , inadequate review of design documentation prior to implomantation of a 5 reactor core isolation cooling system modification resulted in a violation of 10 CFR 50.59 requirements in that no written safety evaluation was performed for the change as required
( This failure was also an example of week implementaGon of the peer review process t
1 10/4/97 VIO IR 97-07 N 3-ENG 4A For Struthers-Dunn relays in a harsh environment, the failure to include five relays in the EQ list 971004.12 Negative VIO 97-07-06 58 and to provide a reasonable technicaljustification for accepting a less than required reistive '
- humidity qualification resulted in a violation of 10 CFR 50.49. Also, the use of a calculated relay quahfied life without rea -uu s the difference with actual data indicated an excessive reliance on a theoretical life extension method that is highly dependerd on the conect selecuon of ,
independent variables. The delay in initiating a Struthers-Dunn relay failure analysis (24 relay !
replacements in three years) indicated a weakness in 9te program for monitoring the i performance of safety-related components in a mild environment.
Less than acceptable judgement was used in the selecilon of the coil temperature rise of i 10/4/97 VIO IR 97-07 N 3-ENG 3B 971004.10 VIO 97-07-07 4C normally energized, safety-related Ti.Md c4* and A0estat releys in a mild environment. I Failure to verify the acceptability of the values used in We extension calculations and tests .!
resulted in a violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Crfterton 3. ,
10/4/97 Positive IR 97-07 N 3-ENG 1C The QA audit of Hope Creek engineering was good and provided an accurate assessment of the 971004.09 wis;r.n.is programs.
i I
FROM: 11/15/97 TO: 8/25/98 Page 18 of 26 17 November 1998-w .m
- HOPP REEKPIANTISSUES MATRDC .
Date 7ype Source ID SFA Code nom CML , ,
L 3-ENG SB This LER described the inadvertent automatic M=": i, on August 7,1997, of the loop "C" 10/4/97 VIO IR 97-07 LER 97-19 SA Safety Auxillaries Cooling System (SACS) in response b a low flow signal from the Turbine 971004 Negative Auxiliaries Cooling System (TACS). The signal resulted ftom the closure of the TACS supply LER valve. A similar event occurred later on September 4,1997. In this second event theinitiating signal was from a low-low-low SAC expansion tank level alarm. After the letter event the licensee traced the problem to a loose fuse clip in the Class 1E Analog Bailey Cabinet that provxles inputs to the Digital Logic Control System. Although the licensee did not originary identify the inibating cause of the inadvertent engineered safety feature actuation, they were effective in identifying it after the second event, even though the symphms were different. A root cause analysiswas planned to address these failures. Based on the review of PSE&G's corrective actions and confirmation that the licensee had checked for other loose con the Bailey cabinets, the inspectors concluded that acceptable actions had been taken to address theseissues.
3-ENG 1C This LER describes operation in a technical specification prohibited condl6on due to failure b 10/4/97 EA IR 97-07 L LER 97-05 perform monthly flowpath verification surveillance checks of residual heet removal system cro 971004 Negative LER IR 97-01 tie valves. This issue is also described in section E8.1. An additional deTbildent LER involved the discovery that the cross-tie valves had not been previously included in a "
UNR 97-01-04 monthly flowpath verification procedure. Additionally, PSE&G submitted a TS amendment request to the NRC which would add an addibonal monthly survettence requirement to veri that these specific cross-tie valves are locked closed.
3-ENG SC This LER describes past inoperability of safety-related chillers due to operation with low safety ,
10/4/97 NCV IR 97-07 L 4A auxifieries cooling system (SACS) temperature. This issue involved a recent self-identfied 971004 LER LER 97-20 discovery that safety-related chillers would not perform their design funcbon with a loss of IR 97 05 iristrument air and SACS temperatures below 55 degrees F. Corrective actions described in this NCV 97-05-02 LER were judged to be appropriate, in that they focused on the implementation of a hardware design change to eliminate the deficiency. The inspwCus loamed subsequent to issuance of this LER that PSE&G had developed a modification to add dedicated instrument air accumulators for the safety-related chiller controls such that the impact of a loss of air would be tolerable. ,
t 17 November 1998 Page 19 of 26 FROM: 11/iS/97 TO: 8/25/98 i
HOPE CREEK PLANTISSUES MATRIX Type Source ID SFA Code itsm C;;, 4A;mi Date Positive IR 98-07 N 4-PS 3C The review of PSE&G's audit program indicated that the audits were comprehensive in swpe 8/25/98 4C and depth, that the audit findings were reported to the appropriate level of management, and 980825.22 SA that the program was being property administered. in addition, a review of the documentation applicable to the self-assessment program indicated that the program was being effechvely implemented to identify and resolve potential weaknesses Positive IR 98-07 N 4-PS 1C PSE&G conducted security and safeguards activities in a manner that protected public health 8/25/98 and safety in the areas of alarm stations, communications, protected area access control of 980825.21 personnel and packages. This portion of the program, as implemented, met PSE&G's commitments and NRC requirements. PSE&G's securtty facilities and equipment in the areas of protected area assessment sids, protected area detection sids, and personnel search equipment were determined to be well maintained and reliable, and were able to meet PSE&G's commitments and NRC requirements.
Positive IR 98-07 N 4-PS 3A The ALARA and laboratory techniques used by a Hope Creek chemistry technician while 8/25/98 980825.20 38 performing a reactor coolant chemistry sample were very good.
8/25/98 Positive IR 98-07 N 4-PS 3C The Hope Creek radioactive waste processing and radioactive material shipping procedures 980825.19 were of good quality and effectively implemanted regulatory requirements.
Negative IR 98-07 N 4-PS SA From earfy 1995 until this inspechon, the Hope Creek evaporators were not effectively contro#ed 8/25/98 980825.18 SB by radwaste operators to ensure that abandoned redweste processing equipment was property layed-up in a drained and tagged out condition. Two waste evaporators were known to have through-wall cracks and were not tagged out and one of the cracked evaporators was not drained. The abandoned equipment did not adversely impact operations and did not result in any release of materials to the environment and therefore, was not risk significant.
8/25/98 Positive IR 98-07 N 4-PS 2B Hope Creek spent resin wastes were effectively sampled, packaged, de ;;CM and placed in 980825.17 temporary storage in a condition ready for shipment and disposal.
Negative IR 98-06 N 4-PS 1C Due to a chemistry technician error, insufficient technician proficiency training, and ineffechve
- 7/21/98 980721.1 3C supervisory oveisight, unsatisfactory results were reached during the performance of a boron analysis for the standby liquid crmtrol system sodium pentaborate solution. PSE&G promptly l
confirmed via verification sample andyses that the actuel sodium pentaborate concentration did not fall below technical specification allewable values (the initial errant analysis yielded an l
inaccurate and out of specification resull).
l 6/4/98 Negative IR 98-05 N 4-PS 1C Chemistry and radwaste personnel non-conservatively attempted to increase the activity of a l 3B planned Ilquid release to raise the activity above the existing low level setpoint of the radiation 980604.2 3C monitor. Although this release did not occur because a radiation technician rejected the release permit, the actions by chemistry and radweste personnel demonstrated a poor safety perspective and a poor questioning attitude.
Page 20 of 26 17 November 1998 FROM.11/15/97 TO. 8/25/98 l-- _-. _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ __ _ _
HOPF CREEKPLANTISSUES MATRIX -
Date Type Source ID SFA l Code Ne m C z _- W s, .
6/4/98 Positive IR 98-05 N 4-PS 1C The site operations departments (Hope Creek and Salem) responded promptly and 980604.1 appropriately to a major loss of the telephone communications system. Following the restorabon of the majorloss, operators were slow to recognize a continuing minor degradsbon of the emergency nobfication system. -
/
FROM: 11/15/97 TO: 8/25/98 Page 21 of 26 17 November 1998
HOPE CREEKPIANTISSUES MATRIX mummmmmmmmmm - ummmmmmmmmmmmmme summmm ommmmma -
Date Type Source ID SFA Codle item t:::59 IR 98-02 N 4-PS 3C The various departments caubously considered the potential for radiation exposure while 4/4/98 Positive planning a recovery attempt for a stuck traversing incore probe 980404.09 IR 98-02 N 4-PS 1C PSE&G had good admtnistrative controls for proper storage of combustibles and control of hot-4/4/98 Positive 980404.08 work activities. "
IR 98-02 N 4-PS 2A Fire protection eouipment conditions and housekeeping were good. Continuous fire watches 4/4/98 Positive 3B were knowledgeable of station procedures for repciting fires, fire watch duties, and responding 980404.07 to fires. Eight hout emergency light operation and illumination pattems were good.
N 4-PS 2A Penetration seals were in good condition and the "as-built" condition met the test criteria outlined 4/4/98 Positive IR 98-02 1C in the vendor's test report for operational performance.
980404.06 IR 98-02 N 4-PS 2A The Hope Creek and Salem fire pumps were weII-maintained and ready for service. The fire 4/4/98 Positive
. main loop was in good repair, and capable of providing the necessary water supply for fire 980404.05 fighting needs at the facility.
IR 98-02 N 4-PS 1C Fire protection procedures met the requirements for fire p um.i;06 program implementation, 4/4/98 Positive contained sufficient detail, and were technically sound.
980404.04 IR 98-02 N 4-PS 3A Performance by the fire brigade team during a fire drill was very good. All expectations of the 4/4/98 Positive fire drill were met. Selected fire brigade members were current on all required training and 3B 980404.03 annual physicals. Training provided to the fire brigade members was comprehensive, well organized, and complete.
IR 98-02 N 4-PS SA Quality assurance audits focused appropriately on and verified dated fire program attributes 4/4/98 Positive SC for compliance with fire protecbon program requirements. Auditfindings were appropriately 980404.01 assessed and timely corrective actions were taken for identified defidencies.
N 4-PS 2B Radiation protection department support for emergent reactor water cleanup pump seal 2/21/98 Positive IR 98-01 2A maintenance was well planned and executed 980221.07 N 4-PS 2B PSE&G maintained low collective exposures at Hope Creek as compared to other boiling water 2/21/98 Positive IR 98-01 reactors, however, there were several areas of opportunity for reducing high exposure sources 980221.06 in the plant to maintain the plant in an as low as reasonably achievable condition.
N 4-PS 28 PSE&G effectively controlled and prevented intemal exposures at Hope Creek during refueling 2/21/98 Positive IR 98-01 outage number seven and maintained an accurate and reliable extemal exposure monitoring 980221.05 program.
r 17 November 1998 Page 22 of 26 FROM: 11/15/97 TO: 8/25/98
HOPT CREEKPLANTISSUES MATRIX Type Source ID SFA Code item Descr$ don Date PSE&G conducted several levels of RP goy.n6 oversight with varying degrees of 2/21/98 Negative IR 98-01 N 4-PS SA SB effecbveness. The Radiological Occurrence Report program did not provide consistently high 980221.03 quality results in that several low safety significance chronic issues remained unresolved after several months. The RP program reviews provided an adequate system of checks and balances, but did not contain significant recommendabons for program enhancements.
IR 98-01 N 4-PS SA A quality assurance department audit provided an effective and bmely assessment of 2/21/98 Positive SC emergency preparedness performance. Identfied deficiencies were properiy entered into the 980221.02 corrective achon process for resolution.
IR 98-01 N 4-PS SC PSE&G security department management acted promptly and apgegiately in resolving several 2/21/98 Positive minor site access badging issues.
980221.01 N 4-PS 5B PSE&G security personnel performed a thorough evaluation of an eventinvolving an 1/3/98 Positive IR 97-10 SC unauthorized protected area access. Correctrve actions were good. The emergency operations 980103.01 1C facility was well maintained and secured.
N 4-PS 1C PSE&G maintained an effective site security program. Management support of program 11/15/97 Strength IR 97-09 objecbves was evident. Performance of security department personnel and equipment were 971115.02 generally good.
IR 97-09 N 4-PS 1C PSE8G's provisions for land vehicle control measures satisfied regulatory requirements and 11/15/97 Positive licensee commitments. The site protected area barrier was property installed and maintained, 971115.01 and satisfied the requirements of the NRC-approved security plan. .
IR 97-07 N 4-PS 1C Generally good radiological control pracbees were observed during the penod, which included 10/4/97 Positive both operational and shutdown conditions. Radiologically controlled area access controls were 971004.07 effective IR 97-07 N 4-PS 1C Refueling outage radiation work permits generally provided effective contamination control 10/4/97 Positive requirements, however, exposure reduction plans were not specified as job requirements.
971004.06 N 4-PS 1C Some weaknesses were noted with drywell postings and electronic dosimetry setpoints.
10/4/97 Negative IR 97-07 971004.055 N 4-PS 1C PSE&G demonstrated good progress in developing and implementing an initial d ywell shielding 10/4/97 Positive IR 97-07 plan during the refueling outage.
971004.05 Some weaknesses in radiation protection controls were observed during the outage, including 10/4/97 Negative IR 97-07 N 4-PS 1C refueling tool contamination control and inside torus air sampling gsslicss.
971004.04 N 4-PS 1C Radiation protection planning activibes were not well integrated with outage work management 10/4/97 Negative IR 97-07 planning and scheduling which resulted in less than effective A1. ARA performance.
971004.03 i 17 November 1998 Page 23 of 26 FROM: 11/15/97 TO: 8/25/98
HOPE CBEETCPIANTISSUES MATRIX Defe Source D SFA Coele h Doocr$Nfort ammmmmmmmma 10/4/97 Negative IR 97-07 N 4-PS 1C The radiation protection continuing training program has been week as evidenced by poor 971004.02 technician pedeii.ence on a recent examination.
10/4/97 Positive .lR 97 07 N 4-PS 1C Generally good implementation of Hope Creek emergency plan requirements was observed 971004.01 during an unannounced drill. Appropriateprocedures were used, good communications were established, and a proper tumover from the senior nuclear shift supervisor was completed. :
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I 6
FROM: 11/15/97 TO: 8/25/98 Page 24 of 26 17 November 1998
- ABBREVIATIONS USED IN PIM TABLE -
e ALARA Aslow. moonablyAchievable EDG Emergency DieselGenerator IGSCC Inter-Granular Stress Corrosion Crocidng ISI InserviceInspection PSE&G Public Service Electric & Gas Company QA QualityAssurance SACS Safety Auxiliaries Cooling System SL Severity Level SLC Standby uguid Control SRO Senior Reactor Operator SRV Safety Relief Valve SSC Sheture, System, or Component SSW Station Service water SWSOPl Service Water System Operational Performance inspection TACS Turbine Auxiliaries Cooling System TS TechnicalSpecificebon UFSAR Updated Final Safety Analysis Report UHS Ulbmete Heat Sink FROM: 11/15/97 TO: 8/25/98 Page 25 of 28 17 November 1998
_ ._ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ . _ . _ . _ _ _ . _ . _ _ _ . _ _ ______m___ ___._ ____._ ..._. _ _ _ _ _ ___ _ _ . _ _________.___. _ _ ____.__..___..__.._________.____.m___
- p. ,
ENCLOSURE 2
' HOPE CREEK INSPECTION PLAN FOR-DECEMBER 1998 THROUGH APRIL 1999 "Pt
// IP Program Area / Title Planned Dates '"
C s i83750-1 Radiation Controls (Non-outage) 11/30/98 Core
.001238 Initial License Examination 12/07/99 OA B3750-2 Radiation Controls (Outage) 02/15/99 Core t.egend:
IP -
Inspection Procedure Number Tl -
Temporary Instruction Program / Sequence Number Core -
Minimum NRC inspection Program (mandatory at all plants)
OA -
_ Other inspection Activity RI -
Additional Inspection Effort Planned by Region I SI -
Safety initiative Inspection
'E 2 - 4
' " ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' " " ' ' ' ' ~
' ' ' '