ML20077M508

Forwards Listing of Facility & Procedure Changes,Tests & Experiments Requiring Safety Evaluations Completed During Month of Nov 1994 for Quad-Cities Station Units 1 & 2

ML20077M508
Person / Time
Site:	Quad Cities
Issue date:	12/22/1994
From:	Aitken P COMMONWEALTH EDISON CO.
To:	NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM)
References
PCA-94-011, PCA-94-11, NUDOCS 9501130072
Download: ML20077M508 (44)

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i Commonwealth Edison Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station 22710 206 Avenue North Cordova, Illinois 61242 Telephone 309/654-2241 PCA-94-011 December 22, 1994 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: Document Control Desk Washington, D.C. 20555

SUBJECT:

Quad Cities Nuclear Station Units 1 and 2 Changes, Tests, and Experiments Completed NRC Docket Nos. 50-254 and 50-265 Enclosed please find a listing of those facility and procedure changes, l tests, and experiments requiring safety evaluations completed during the month of November, 1994, for Quad-Cities Station Units 1 and 2, DPR-29 and DPR-30. A summary of the safety evaluations are being reported in compliance with 10CFR50.59 and 10CFR50.71(e). i i

Respectfully, Comed )

Quad-Cities Nuclear Power Station l uA -

7 --

Paul C. Aitken System Engineering Supervisor ]

j AMS/dak 12003o Enclosure cc: J. Martin, Regional Administrator C. Miller, Senior Resident Inspector sAnmac.t;ra

/ l l 9501130072 941222 PDR ADOCK 05000254 i R PDR  ;

SE-94-083 Movement of Fuel Assembly LYT 196 Within the Unit 1 Spent Fuel Pool With a Bent Bail Handle.

DESCRIPTION: i This change allowed the use of the monorail hoist and the  !

jet pump (JP) grapple to move fuel assembly (FA) LYT 196 from the fuel prep machine (FPM) to a Unit 1 spent fuel pool (SFP) location.

SAFETY EVALUATION

SUMMARY

1. The change described above has been analyzed to determine each accident or anticipated transient described in the UFSAR where any of the following is true:

The change alters the initial conditions used in the  :

UFSAR analysis. j The changed structure, system or component is explicitly or implicitly assumed to function during or i after the accident.  ;

Operation or failure of the changed structure, system, or component could lead to the accident. .

The accidents which meet these criteria are listed below:

Bundle drop UFSAR Section 15.7.2 For each of thesa accidents, it has been determined that the change described above will not increase the probability of i an occurrence or the consequence of the accident, or malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in the UFSAR.  ;

2. The possibility for an accident or malfunction of a ,

different type than any previously evaluated in the UFSAR is '

not created because neither grapple will unlatch if a loss-of-air condition were to occur. The JP Grapple will only be used to move the FA within the fuel pool only. The Monorail  ;

Auxiliary Hoist is designed to move fuel and all the ,

protective limits (overload, and overtravel) will be checked s prior to use.

3. The margin of safety, as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification, is not reduced because all of the Technical Specification requirements will be met during the use of this procedure.

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SE-93-43 E04-2-93-037 DESCRIPTION:

Changed the overall gear ratios on the limitorque actuators

• for valves 2-1001-186B and 2-1001-187B.

SAFETY EVALUATION

SUMMARY

1. The change described above has been analyzed to determine each accident or anticipated transient described in the UFSAR where any of the following is true:

The change alters the initial conditions used in the UFSAR analysis.

The changed structure, system or component is explicitly or implicitly assumed to function during or after the accident.

Operation or failure of the changed structure, system, or component could lead to the accident.

The accidents which meet these criteria are listed below:

Loss of Coolant Accident UFSAR Section 15.6 For each of these accidents, it has been determined that the ,

change described above will not increase the probability of an occurrence or the consequence of the accident, or malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously i evaluated in the UFSAR.  !

2. The possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated in the UFSAR is not created because this exempt change does not affect functions of the RHR Hx flow reversal valves; the. gear ratio being installed performs the same function as the previous i set. The overall design of the system is not affected since  ;

stroke times are consistent with the previous valve / actuator design. The actuator's output will be set within NED l guidelines to produce enough thrust for design basis )

conditions.

3. The margin of safety, is not defined in the basis for any Technical Specification, therefore, the safety margin is not reduced.

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E04-2-93-376 Replacement of the Anti-Rotation Key DESCRIPTION:

This exempt change improved accessibility for lubrication of the sliding surfaces of the stem anti-rotation device for valve 2-1301-60. Two 1/8" holes were drilled in the yoke, one to each key slot. Grease fittings were attached to the outside surfaces of the yoke. These fittings allowed for the injection of lubrication of the key and slot surfaces, thus reducing friction and wear between parts which aids in accurately predicting valve thrust requirements.

Additionally, the stem anti-rotational key was replaced with a harder material, AISI 4140 with polished surfaces, which helps reduce friction and wear.

SAFETY EVALUATION

SUMMARY

1. The change described above has been analyzed to determine each accident or anticipated transient described in the UFSAR where any of the following is true:

The change alters the initial conditions used in the UFSAR analysis.

- The changed structure, system or component is explicitly or implicitly assumed to function during or after the accident.

Operation or failure of the changed structure, system, or component could lead to the accident.

The accidents which meet these criteria are listed below:

Increase in Heat Removal by the Reactor Coolant System UFSAR Section 15.1 Decrease in Heat Removal by the Reactor Coolant System UFSAR Section 15.2 Reactivity and Power  ;

Distribution Anomalies UFSAR Section 15.4 l l

Anticipated Transients 1 Without SCRAM UFSAR Section 15.8  ;

For each of these accidents, it has been determined that the change described above will not increase the probability of an occurrence or the consequence of the accident, or malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in the UFSAR. )

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i E04-2-93-376 (Cont'd)  ;

Replacement of the Anti-Rotation Key  ;

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2. The possibility for an accident or malfunction of a j different type than any previously evaluated in the UFSAR is i not created because no new failure modes or system l interfaces are created. The addition of grease fittings to i the valve will not affect the seismic qualification of the  ;

valve. l t

3. The margin of safety, is not defined in the basis for any [

Technical Specification, therefore, the safety margin is not reduced.

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.$, 'a, SE-94-084 Interim Procedure for CRD Pump Flow Test DESCRIPTION:

Performed a test to gather data on CRD pump vibrations during changes in CRD system operating parameters. The test varied CRD system flow across most of the pump curve (40 gpm

- 220 gpm). Also the charging water pressure may be -

increased to 1650 psig.

SAFETY EVALUATION

SUMMARY

1. The change described above has been analyzed to determine each accident or anticipated transient described in the  ;

UFSAR where any of the following is true:

The change alters the initial conditions used in the UFSAR analysis.

The changed structure, system or component is ^

explicitly or implicitly assumed to function during or '

after the accident.

operation or failure of the changed structure, system, '

or component could lead to the accident. .

The accidents which meet these criteria are listed below:

None. ,

For each of these accidents, it has been determined that the change described above will not increase the probability of an occurrence or the consequence of the accident, or malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously ,

evaluated in the UFSAR.

2. The possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated in the UFSAR is not created because this testing could not impact the scram function of the CRD system since all rods are already at 00 and CRD movement is not required.

The additional cooling water flow (max 0.56 gpm/ drive) vs normal cooling water flow (normal 0.34 gpm/ drive) will not degrade CRD seals. The CRD insert seals routinely pass ,

1.5 gpm in a new drive with a Dp of 230 psid. During this test, cooling water Dp should not exceed 50 psid. i The increased pressure on the charging water haader (max 1650 psig) is within system piping design (1750 psig at 150*F). The piping was walked down (SESR-2488) and it was concluded that the system is adequately design for a working pressure of 1650 psig.

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SE-94-084 (Cont'd) i Interim Procedure for CRD Pump Flow Test i

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3. The margin of safety, is not defined in the basis for any Technical Specification, therefore, the safety margin is not l reduced. -

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SE-94-080 Special Test 1-179 and 2-113 DESCRIPTION:

Special Tests 1-179 and 2-113 were performed using a pressure source to pressurize the "A" Main Steam Pressure Sensor to a pressure greater than the pressure set setting.

The turbine bypass valve low vacuum interlock was bypassed, and all turbine trips were cleared. The turbine was then tripped, causing all turb.'.ne control valves, main stop valves, and combined intercept valves to go closed. At the same time, all turbine bypass valves were open. Three strip chart recorders were hooked up to various test points to provide information on bypass valve opening times and logic  ;

time delays.

SAFETY EVALUATION

SUMMARY

1. The change described above has been analyzed to determine each accident or anticipated transient described in the UFSAR where any of the following is true:

The change alters the initial conditions used in the UFSAR analysis.

The changed rtructure, system or component is explicitly or implicitly assumed to function during or after the accident.

Operation or failure of the changed structure, system, or component could lead to the accident.

The accidents which meet these criteria are listed below:

None.

For each of these accidents, it has been determined that the change described above will not increase the probability of an occurrence or the consequence of the accident, or malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in the UFSAR.

2. The possibility for an accident or malfunction of a ,

different type than any previously evaluated in the UFSAR is not created because these test; are being performed in the REFUEL and SHUTDOWN modes. The Main Turbine and EHC systems are not required to be operable in the SHUTDOWN and REFUEL modes. The scope of these tests is limited to the Main 1 Turbine and EHC systems. There will be no interactions with any other systems or components during performance of these test procedures. All evolutions being performed as part of these test procedures are within the design of the Main

SE-94-080 (Cont'd)

-Special Test 1-179 and 2-113 Turbine and EHC systems. Therefore, performance of these test procedures will not adversely impact systems or functions so as to create the possibility of an. accident or malfunction of a type different from.those evaluated in the UFSAR.

3. The margin of safety, is not defined in the bacis for any Technical Specification, therefore, the safety margin is not reduced.

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• l SE-94-079 Service Water Radiation Monitor i l

DESCRIPTION: l l

Per vendor (Eberline) recommended upgrade, installed capacitors and varistors for transient electrical noise suppression for the Service Water Radiation Monitor (SWRM) l DAM-4 field units.

8AFETY EVALUATION

SUMMARY

1. The change described above has been analyzed to determine each accident or anticipated transient described in the UFSAR where any of the following is true: ,

The change alters the initial conditions used in the  !

UFSAR analysis.

The changed ructure, system or component is  !

explicitly v. implicitly assumed to function during or after the accident.

Operation or failure of the changed structure, system, or component could lead to the accident. l The accidents which meet these criteria are listed below:

None. ,

For each of these accidents, it has been determined that the !

change described above will not increase the probability of ,

an occurrence or the consequence of the accident, or i malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously l evaluated in the UFSAR.  ;

)

2. The possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated in the UFSAR is i not created because the transient suppression devices will prevent SWRM indication spiking due to noise interference with no adverse affect on the proper operation of the SWRM.  !

The capacitors will serve to suppress AC electrical noise on ;

the DC power to help keep the DC power as clean as possible l to allow the components requiring DC power to function .

properly. The varistors will serve to suppress transients  !

on the 120 VAC power to therefore prevent electrical  !

interference from affecting SWRM indication.

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3. The margin of safety, is not defined in the basis for any Technical Specification, therefore, the safety margin is not l reduced. l l

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E04-1-94-203 Re-Scope RVLIS Reference Legs and Install Union at Excess Flow Check Valve DESCRIPTION:

This exempt change installed a pipe union upstream of the RVLIS reference leg excess flow check valves in lines 1-02109A-01"-RV and 1-02110A-1"-RV (A-loop) and 1-02110B-1"-RV and 1-02121B-1"-RV (B-loop).

The pipe support PS4 was reworked to allow cutting the reference legs and re-sloping them to achieve the design minimum slopes.

SAFETY EVALUATION

SUMMARY

1. The change described above has been analyzed to determine each accident or anticipated transient described in the UFSAR where any of the following is true:

The change alters the initial conditions used in the UFSAR analysis.

- The changed structure, system or component is explicitly or implicitly assumed to function during or after the accident.

Cperation or failure of the changed structure, system, or component could lead to the accident.

The accidents which meet these criteria are listed below:

Break of Instrument Line Outside Primary Containment UFSAR Section 15.6.2 For each of these accidents, it has been determined that the change described above will not increase the probability of an occurrence or the consequence of the accident, or malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in the UFSAR.

2. The possibility for an sccident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated in the UFSAR is not created because the potential for and consequences of a reference leg line break has been fully analyzed in the UFSAR.

The slope of the pipe is being increased (corrected to reflect design requirements). A union is added to facilitate excess flow check valve maintenance. The changes do not create a new piping failure mode other than the pipe break.

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• E04-1-94-203 (Cont'd)

Re-Scope RVLIS Reference Legs and Install Union at Excess Flow Check Valve i

The stress analysis for the piping has been reconciled so the potential for a piping failure that could impact other systems has not been increased. The re-sloping of the lines does not significantly change their location, so there is no new potential impact to other system or to the environmental qualification of equipment that has not already been previously evaluated. There are, therefore, no new system interactions identified.

3. The margin of safety, is not defined in the basis for any Technical Specification, therefore, the safety margin is not reduced.

m' SE-93-116 & SE-93-117 E04-0-93-151 & E04-1(2)-93-151 Replace Current 1/2" Turbocharger Air Supply With a 5/8" Supply Line DESCRIPTION:

This Exempt Change removed the current 1/2" turbocharger air supply line and miscellaneous fittings to the crankcase eductor and replaced them with a 5/8" supply line and fittings.

SAFETY EVALUATION

SUMMARY

1. The change described above has been analyzed to determine each accident or anticipated transient described in the UFSAR where any of the following is true:

The change alters the initial conditions used in the UFSAR analysis.

The changed structure, system or component is explicitly or implicitly assumed to function during or after the accident.

Operation or failure of the changed structure, system, or component could lead to the accident.

The accidents which meet these criteria are listed below:

LOCA (Loss of Coolant Accident) UFSAR Section 15.6 For each of these accidents, it has been determined that the change described above will not increase the probability of an occurrence or the consequence of the accident, or malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in the UFSAR.

2. The possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated in the UFSAR is not created because the EDG's are used to mitigate the consequences of an accident, therefore, no new accidents or malfunctions are created by this change.

3. The margin of safety, is not defined in the basis for any Technical Specification, therefore, the safety margin is not '

reduced.

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• E04-2-93-200, 201 & 202 Downsize the 2A RHRSW Vault Sump Pump Pit DESCRIPTION:

Tnis design downsized the sump pit surface area in each of the three RHRSW vault rooms. It also modifies the trough and floor slope to direct water into the sumps. By reducing the water surface area in the RHRSW vaults, humidity in the rooms will decrease.

SAFETY EVALUATION

SUMMARY

1. The change described above has been analyzed to determine each accident or anticipated transient described in the UFSAR where any of the following is true:

The change alters the initial conditions used in the UFSAR analysis.

l The changed structure, system or component is explicitly or implicitly assumed to function during or  !

I after the accident.

Operation or failure of the changed structure, system, or component could lead to the accident.

The accidents which meet these criteria are listed below:

1 Internal Flooding UFSAR Section 3.4.1.2 i

For each of these accidents, it has been determined that the change described above will not increase the probability of l an occurrence or the consequence of the accident, or l malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously 1 evaluated in the UFSAR.

2. The possibility for an accident or malfunction of a ,

different type than any previously evaluated in the UFSAR is i not created because the size of the sump pits is being decreased in each of the three RHRSW vault rooms. The troughs and the floor slope will be modified to direct water 4 into the sumps. Reducing the surface area of the water will l decrease the humidity in the rooms. The ability of the sump pits to collect water will increase, however, the ability of the sump pumps to remove water will remain the same. System logic and process parameters are not changed. There are no new accidents or malfunctions created by this design.

3. The margin of safety, is not defined in the basis for any Technical Specification, therefore, the safety margin is not reduced.

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MO4-0-86-011D Hydrogen Addition Farm Supply to Main Generator DESCRIPTION:

Purpose of modification was to suppress recirculation water oxygen by means of adding hydrogen to the feedwater thus mitigating the effects of Intergranular Stress Cerrosion Cracking (IGSCC). Hydrogen was added by injection into the condensate system. To ensure that all excess hydrogen is safely recombined  ;

in the recombiners, oxygen was injected into the off-gas system.

Dissolved oxygen concentration in the reactor coolant was i monitored. Oxygen concentration in the off-gas flow was also monitored. System control was from a self-contained panel to be added in the main control room, or from local control panels.

SAFETY EVALUATION

SUMMARY

1. The probability of an occurrence or the consequence of an accident, or malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in the UFSAR is not increased because the additional delay introduced into the main steam isolation sequence, due to the Main Steam Line Radiation Monitor (MSLRM) setpoint increase from 7 to 15 times normal full power background without hydrogen addition will result in a small increase in the consequences of the CRDA. A licensing document for this modification was prepared and sent to the NRC for review, and was subsequently approved via a January 19, 1989 SER.

2. The possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated in the UFSAR is not created because the hydrogen addition system design does not create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than previously evaluated in the FSAR. The '

storage areas have been analyzed to be located at a sufficient distance to mitigate the effects of a hydrogen  !

fireball or explosion, and to prevent hydrogen or oxygen rich air from entering any safety-related air pathways into the station. Excess flow check valves are located at the hydrogen and oxygen storage areas, and at the Turbine  ;

Building entrance point for hydrogen to prevent large hydrogen or oxygen releases due to a pipe break. Also, hydrogen area monitors are interfaced with a hydrogen supply isolation valve which will terminate hydrogen flow into each '

units' Turbine Building if there is a high area hydrogen concentration for that unit. In addition to these safety features, normal Hydrogen Water Chemistry System shutdown is performed by closure of the active train's flow control valve and each Hydrogen injection solenoid isolation valve, which are located just prior to the injection point to the condensate pump discharge piping. An electronic interlock between the Hydrogen Injection Solenoid Isolation Valve and its corresponding condensate pump motor also prevents

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MO4-0-86-011D (Cont'd)

Hydrogen Addition Farm Supply to Main Generator inadvertent hydrogen injection into a non-operating condensate pump. These features should prevent spurious hydrogen addition into the condensate system.

3. The margin of safety, as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification, is not reduced because the MSLRM setpoint is defined in the Tech Spec. Bases for the Reactor Protection System (Sec 7.1) and the Protective Instrumentation (Sec 7.2) as seven times normal full power l background. This modification will increase the MSLRM setpoint to fifteen times normal full power background. l This change does not reduce the margin of safety for the Reactor Protection System, however, it does promote an increase in the radiological consequences for the CRDA.

This is because the primary purpose of the MSLRM is to mitigate the radiological consequences of a CRDA once the 1 fuel damage has occurred and not to minimize the fuel damage !

from the CRDA. Therefore, a licensing document for this  !

modification was prepared and sent to the NRC for approval. j The NRC has approved the MSLRM setpoint increase to 15 times ,

normal full power background without hydrogen addition via a l January 19, 1989 SER. This SER has accepted the required Tech Spec changes and their insignificant effect on the total activity release and resulting dose to the public.

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M04-1-85-009 Alternate Water Supply to the HPCI Room Emergency Cooler DESCRIPTION:

This modification was designed to provide an alternate non-safety related source of cooling water to the HPCI Room Cooler. The alternate source allowed the coolers to operate independently of the Diesel Generator Cooling Water Pumps, thus increasing the availability of the coolers. This allowed for a reduction in the temperature of the rooms, and improve the environment for the electrical equipment and instrumentation located in the HPCI Room. The alternate source was provided from Service Water line 1-3912-16" and ties into cooler line 1-3956-2 1/2".

SAFETY EVALUATION

SUMMARY

1. The probability of an occurrence or the consequence of an accident, or malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in the UFSAR is n'at increased because the sanondary contair.rar.t leakage rate vill still meet original criteria. The criteria for internal pressure will be maintalacd, per Commonwealth Edison Operating procedure QOP 020-1, Opening a Penetration in Secondary Containment.

2. The possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated in the UFSAR is not created because Reactor Building penetrations of this design already exist, so no new malfunction type is created.

Failure of this new penetration will not cause failure of any existing penetration.

3. The margin of safety, as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification, is not reduced because the limits  :

of 10CFR100 will not be exceeded because leakage is  ;

maintained within FSAR requirements. Testing and i i

surveillance per Tech Specs will confirm that building leakage is not increased above this limit. l

C04-1-94-006 Replacement of the RHR M01-1001-7D Valve DESCRIPTION:

The Suppression Pool Suction Valves 1-1001-7A (B) (C) (D) currently demonstrate excess valve internal wear, and leak by when fully closed. The solution to the 7 valve issues was to replace the existing Crane 14"-150# gate valve. The Quality Assured Products, Inc. (Q.A. products) gate valve replacement eliminated the leak by issue and the need to go into the valves periodically to machine seats, etc for maintenance activities. Due to Generic Letter 89-10 ar.d the valves internal conditions, the RHR motor operated Suppression Pool Suction Valves 1-1001-7 ( A) (B) (C) (D) require the following components replaced and/or upgraded:

1) Replaced the Crane 14"-150# Gate Valves with Q.A.

Products 14"-150# gate valves. (The new valve replacements are inclusive of all necessary parts minus the actuator).

2) on the 7A valve only:

a) replacement Overall Gear Ratio (OAR) 49:1 b) replacement motor pinion teeth 31T c) replacement work shaft gear teeth 34T d) existing worm gear set ratio acceptable

3) The 7 (B) (C) (D) valves already contain the OAR of 49:1.

The upgrades and/or valve replacements increased the available thrust window, improved the overall operation and capabilities of the RHR 1-1001-7 A (B) (C) (D) valves.

SAFETY EVALUATION

SUMMARY

1. The change described above has been analyzed to determine each accident or anticipated transient described in the UFSAR where any of the following is true:

- The change alters the initial conditions used in the UFSAR analysis.

- The changed structure, system or component is explicitly or implicitly assumed to function during or after the accident.

Operation or failure of the changed structure, system, or component could lead to the accident.

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C04-1-94-006 (Cont'd)

Replacement of the RHR M01-1001-7D Valve The accidents which meet these criteria are listed below:

Fast Closure of Turbine Control UFSAR Section 15.2 Valves resulting in decreased Heat removal capability by the Reactor Coolant System.

Decrease in Reactor Coolant UFSAR Section 15.6.5 Inventory due to piping line breaks inside containment (LOCA).

Containment and Suppression Pool UFSAR Section 15.8.1 response due to Main Steam Isolation Valve (MSIV) closure.

For each of these accidents, it has been determined that the change described above will not increase the probability of an occurrence or the consequence of the accident, or malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in the UFSAR.

2. The possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated in the UFSAR is not created because the valve modification does not add any failure modes or interferences to the system. The function of the valve is also unchanged.

A NPSH calculation was performed on the RHR System with the replacement valves and it was determined that tl'ere will be no adverse affect on the flow requirements of their associated pumps.

Therefore, there are no additional accidents or malfunctions that have not been previously evaluated in the UFSAR.

3. The margin of safety, is not defined in the basis for any Technical Specification, therefore, the safety margin is not reduced.  ;

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4 E04-1-94-071 Replacement of the Limitorque Motor Gearing and Stem on RHR Valve MO 1-1001-19B l

DESCRIPTION: 4

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The scope of this Exempt Change was the replacement Limitorque motor gearing of 72.42. OAR with a 88.40 OAR and for the RHR Cross-tie valves MO-1-1001-19A(B) and stem replacement on the -19B to a 17-4 PH stainless steel material to increase the stem buckling load and to match the '

stem material on the -19A. ine purpose of this design change was to increase the motor gearing capacity in the opening and closing directions which resulted in a larger thrust window for the valve.

I SAFETY EVALUATION

SUMMARY

1. The change described above has been analyzed to determine each accident or anticipated transient described in the UFSAR where any of the following is true:

The change alters the initial conditions used in the UFSAR analysis.

The changed structure, system or component is explicitly or implicitly assumed to function during or after the accident.

Operation or failure of the changed structure, system, or component could lead to the accident.

The accidents which meet these criteria are listed below:

Decrease in Heat Removal by the UFSAR Section 15.2 Reactor Coolant System Loss of Coolant Accidents UFSAR Section 15.6.5 Resulting from Piping Breaks Inside Containment Closure of Main Steam.Line UFSAR Section 15.8.1 Isolation Valves For each of these accidents, it has been determined that the change described above will not increase the probability of an occurrence or the consequence of the accident, or malfunction of equipment irportant to safety as previously evaluated in the UFSAR.

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4 E04-1-94-071-(Cont'd)

Replacement of the Limitorque Motor Gearing and Stem on RHR Valve MO 1-1001-19B

2. The possibility'for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated in the UFSAR is not created because no new failure modes or system interfaces are created. These changes will not modify the function of the valves, nor will they affect any interactions with other Safety Related components or systems. Therefore, this change does not adversely impact systems or functions so as to create the possibility of an accident or malfunction of a different type from those evaluated in the UFSAR.

3. The margin of safety, is not defined in the basis for any Technical Specification, therefore, the safety margin is not reduced.

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E04-1-94-128 Modifications of the RHR Outboard Suppression Pool Spray / Cooling Valves 1-1001-34A(B) for GL 89-10 DESCRIPTION:

Due to Generic Letter 89-10 review the RHR motor operated outboard Suppression Pool Spray / Cooling valves 1-1001-34A(B), required the following components of the Crane / Chapman 16", 300# gate valve be replaced and/or upgraded:

1) Upgraded the existing SMB-1-60 operator with a SMB-2-80.

2) Upgraded the existing 60 ft.-lbs., 1800 rpm motor with an 80 ft.-lbs., 1800 rpm motor.

3) Upgraded the 3/C #14 AWG cable with a 3-1/C #8 AWG cable.

4) Replaced the valve yoke.

5) Replaced the valve disk.

6) Replaced the valve stem.

7) Replaced the spring pack 0701-212 with spring pack 0901-212.

8) Changed the gear ratio from 72.42 to 72.01 to accommodate the new actuator.

a) replacement motor pinion teeth 22T -

b) replacement work shaft gear teeth 48T c) replacement work gear set ratio 33:1

9) Replacement TOL heater CR123C9.55A The upgrades and/or valve part replacements increased the available thrust window and improved the overall operation and capabilities of the RHR 1-1001-34A(B) valves.

SAFETY EVALUATION

SUMMARY

1. The change described above has been analyzed to determine each accident or anticipated transient described in the l UFSAR where any of the following is true:

The change alters the initial conditions used in the UFSAR analysis.

1 The changed structure, system or component is  !

explicitly or implicitly assumed to function during or  !

after the accident.

Operation or failure of the changed structure, system, 1 or component could lead to the accident.

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E04-1-94-128 (Cont'd)

Modifications of the RHR Outboard Suppression Pool Spray / Cooling Valves 1-1001-34A(B) for GL 89-10 The accidents which meet these criteria are listed below:

Fast closure of Turbine Control UFSAR Section 15.2 Valves resulting in decreased '

heat removal capability by the Reactor Coolant System.

Decrease in Reactor Coolant UFSAR Section 15.6.5 Inventory due to pipe line breaks {

inside containment (LOCA).

Containment and Suppression UFSAR Section 15.8.1 Pool response due to-Main Steam Isolation Valve (MSIV) Closure.

For each of these accidents, it has been determined that the change dascribed above will not increase the probability of an occurrence or the consequence of the accident, or malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in the UFSAR.

2. The possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated in the UFSAR is not created because the valve modification does not add any failure modes or interferences to the system. The function of the valve is also unchanged. Therefore, there are no 1 additional accidents or malfunctions that have not been previously evaluated in the UFSAR.  ;

3. The margin of safety, is not defined in the basis for any  ;

Technical Specification, therefore, the safety margin is not  !

reduced.

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E04-1-93-307 1 Modification of the RHR Inboard Suppression Pool Cooling / Test Valves 1-1001-36A(B) for GL 89-10 DESCRIPTION:

The Inboard Suppression Pool Cooling / Test Valves 1-1001-36A(B) demonstrated significant cavitation induced valve and pipe vibration. Due to Generic Letter 89-10 and cavitation induced valve and pipe vibration, the RHR motor operated Inboard Suppression Pool Cooling / Test Valves 1-1001-36A(B), required the following components of the Crane 14", 300# globe valve be replaced and/or upgraded:

1) Replaced the valve yoke with Control components Inc. (CCI) yoke.

2) Replaced the valve trim with CCI DRAG Velocity Control Trim.

In addition to these modifications the RHR 1001-36B valve had the following components replaced / upgraded:

3) Replaced the springpack 60-600-0011-1 with springpack  ;

1101-211.

4) Changed the overall actuator ratio (OAR) from 123.12 to )

132.81.

a) replacement motor pinion teeth 18T b) replacement worm shaft gear teeth 42T ,

c) replacement worm gear set ratio 57:1 '

The springpack and OAR changes have previously been completed on the RHR 1-1001-36A. The upgrades and/or valve part replacements increased the available thrust window, reduced the cavitation induced valve and pipe vibration and improved the overall operation and capabilities of the RHR 1-1001-36A(B) valves.

SAFETY EVALUATION

SUMMARY

1. The change describec above has been analyzed to determine each accident or anticipated transient described in the UFSAR where any of the following is true:

The change alters the initial conditions used in the UFSAR analysis.

The changed structure, system or component is explicitly or implicitly assumed to function during or after the accident.

Operation or failure of the changed structure, system, or component could lead to the accident.

E04-1-93-307 Modification of the RHR Inboard Suppression Pool Cooling / Test Valves 1-1001-36A(B) for GL 89-10 ,

l The accidents which meet these criteria are listed below:

Decrease in Heat Removal UFSAR Section 15.2 by the Reactor Coolant System Loss-of-Coolant Accidents UFSAR Section 15.6.5 '

Resulting from Piping Breaks Inside Containment Closure of Main Steam UFSAR 15.8.1 Line Isolation Valves For each of these accidents, it has been determined that the change described above will not increase the probability of an occurrence or the consequence of the accident, or malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in the UFSAR.

2. The possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated in the UFSAR is not created because the valve modification does not add any failure modes or interferences to the system. The function of the valve is also unchanged. Therefore, there are no additional accidents or malfunctions that have not been previously evaluated in the UFSAR.

3. The margin of safety, is not defined in the basis for any Technical Specification, therefore, the safety margin is not reduced.

4, ,

MO4-1-93-002 Modification of the RCIC Inboard Containment Isolation Valve M01-1301-16 for GL 89-10.

DESCRIPTION:  ;

i The proposed design changes for the MO-1-1301-16 valve were as follows:

1) Replaced the SMB-000 actuator with a SMB-00

2) Replaced the 5 ft-lbf motor with a 10 ft-lbf

3) Replaced actuator gearing to achieve 94.0 OAR

4) Replaced spring pack

5) Replaced valve yoke l

6) Replaced circuit breaker and TOL heater The above changes were required to implement changes made necessary by analysis for GL 89-10 (through Suppl. 3).

SAFETY EVALUATION

SUMMARY

1. The change described above has been analyzed to determine each accident or anticipated transient described in the UFSAR where any of the following is true:

The change alters the initial conditions used in the  ;

UFSAR analysis.  !

i The changed structure, system or component is  !

explicitly or implicitly assumed to function during or j after the accident.

l Operation or failure of the changed structure, system, 1 or component could lead to the accident.

The accidents which meet these criteria are listed below:

Steam System Line Break UFSAR Section 15.6.4 Outside Containment Anticipated Transient Without UFSAR 15.8 Scram For each of these accidents, it has been determined that the change described above will not increase the probability of an occurrence or the consequence of the accident, or malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in the UFSAR.

MO4-1-93-002 (Cont'd)

Modification of the RCIC Inboard Containment Isolation Valve M01-1301-16 for GL 89-10

2. The possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated in the UFSAR is not created because no new failure modes or system interfaces are created. All new parts and components have been evaluated and are suitable for the application.

3. The margin of safety, as defined in the basis for any Technical specification, is not reduced because the margin of safety is provided by the regulatory limit (25 seconds). This margin of safety with respect to an analytical limit has not changed. The administrative limit (IST values) and design stroke time (21.6 seconds) has increased. This will not increase the analyzed offsite dose rate, which would be based on values equal to or greater than the Technical specification limit.

E04-1-94-133 Modification of the RCIC Inboard Containment Isolation Valve M01-1301-17 DESCRIPTION:

The design c:anges for the MO-1-1301-17 valve were to replace the 7.5 ft-lbf motor with a 10 ft-lbf and replace the valve yoke.

The changes were required to improve thrust and torque capabilities and increased the seismic structural limits as required by GL 89-10.

SAFETY EVALUATION

SUMMARY

1. The change described above has been analyzed to determine each accident or anticipated transient described in the UFSAR where any of the following is true:

The change alters the initial conditions used in the UFSAR analysis.

- The changed structure, system or component is explicitly or implicitly assumed to function during or after the accident.

Operation or failure of the changed structure, system, or component could lead to the accident.

The accidents which meet these criteria are listed below:

Increase in Heat Removal by the UFSAR Section 15.1 Reactor Coolant System Decrease in Heat Removal by the UFSAR Section 15.2 Reactor Coolant System Rerctivity and Power Distribution UFSAR Section 15.4 Anomalies Anticipated Transients Without UFSAR Section 15.8 Scram For each of these accidents, it has been determined that the change described above will not increase the probability of an occurrence or the consequence of the accident, or malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in the UFSAR.

2. The possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated in the UFSAR is not created because no new failure modes or system interfaces are created. All new parts and components have been evaluated and are suitable for the application.

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.. . I E04-1-94-133 (Cont'd)

Modification of the RCIC Inboard Containment Isolation Valve M01-1301-17 The margin of safety, is not defined in the basis for any  ;

3. '

Technical Specification, therefore, the safety margin is not reduced. i s

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l E04-1-93-120 Modification of the Core Spray Full Flow Test Valves M01-1402-4A(B) for GL 89-10 DESCRIPTION:

Valves MO-1-1402-4A(B) are full flow test valves for the Core _ Spray pumps. The valves are used to perform functional tests of the Core Spray system by providing a functional check of the pumps under conditions approximating their design basis of 4500 gpm at a total developed pump head ,

corresponding to a reactor vessel pressure of 90 psig plus system losses. Each valve has a single stage pressure reducing orifice [RO-1-1402-45A(B)] downstream of it.

In 1991, the Core Spray test valves were evaluated for possible cavitation problems (J. Ozol Letter, CHRON #166166, to R.L. Bax dated April 18, 1991). It was determined that the core spray test valves did not cavitate, but that the downstream orifices [RO-1-1402-45A(B)] were cavitating and inducing vibration and possible erosion to the piping downstream of the orifices.

To eliminate cavitation and damage occurring at the orifices and thus reduce system vibration, this exempt change installed cavitation control trim in the Core Spray test valves. The new valve trims are designed to handle the entire pressure drop required to test the pumps and therefore the downstream orifices were removed. r The new valve / actuator required a gearing and springpack (part no. 0701-212) change to maintain the stroke of the valve at approximately 4 inches per minute. The existing valve has a stem speed of 3.9 inches per minute resulting in a stroke time of 46 seconds. The new valve will have the actuators overall gear ratio changed from 124.1 to 103.7.

Therefore, the new valves stroked at 4.1 inches per minute.

The new valve's stroke length stroked at 4.1 inches per minute. The new valve's stroke length is 4.25 inches resulting in a new full stroke time of 62 seconds.

SAFETY EVALUATION

SUMMARY

1. The change described above has been analyzed to determine each accident or anticipated transient described in the UFSAR where any of the following is true:

The change alters the initial conditions used in the UFSAR analysis.

The changed structure, system or component is explicitly or implicitly assumed to function during or l after the accident.

l

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e a E04-1-93-120 Modification of the Core Spray Full Flow Test Valves M01-1402-4A(B) for GL 89-10 Operation or failure of the changed structure, system,  !

or component could lead to the accident. l The accidents which meet these criteria are listed below: ,.

Loss of Coolant Accidents UFSAR Section 15.6.5 Resulting from Piping Breaks Inside Containment .

For each of these accidents, it has been determined that the change described above will not increase the probability of an occurrence or the consequence of the accident, or malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in the UFSAR.

2. The possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated in the UFSAR is not created because no new failure modes of system interfaces are created. These changes will not modify the function of the valves, nor will they affect any interactions with other safety related components or systems. Therefore, these changes will not create a new l accident scenario or malfunction not already evaluated in the UFSAR.

3. The margin of safety, is not defined in the basis for any  ;

Technical Specification, therefore, the safety margin is not I reduced.

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l M04-1-92-010A Modification of t1 HPCI Inboard Containment Isolation Valve f01-2301-4 for GL 89-10 DESCRIPTION:

The design changes e the MO-1-2301-4 valve were as follows:

1) Replaced the SMB-1 actuator with a SMB-2

2) Replaced the 40 ft-lbf motor with an 80 ft-lbf

3) Replaced actuator gearing to achieve 72.01 OAR

4) Replaced spring pack

5) Replaced valve yoke

6) Replaced TOL heater

7) Replaced #6 cable with #2 The above changes were required to implement changes made necessary by analysis for GL 89-10 (through Suppl. 3).

SAFETY EVALUATION

SUMMARY

1. The change described above has been analyzed to determine each accident or anticipated transient described in the UFSAR where any of the following is true:

The change alters the initial conditions used in the UFSAR analysis.

The changed structure, system or component is explicitly or implicitly assumed to function during or after the accident.

Operation or failure of the changed structure, system, or component could lead to the accident.

The accidents which meet these criteria are listed below:

Steam System Line Break UFSAR Section 15.6.4 Outside Containment Anticipated Transient UFSAR Section 15.8 Without Scram For each of these accidents, it has been determined that the change described above will not increase the probability of an occurrence or the consequence of the accident, or malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in the UFSAR.

2. The possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated in the UFSAR is not created because no new failure modes of system interfaces are created. All new parts and components have been evaluated and are suitable for the application.

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M04-1-92-010A (Cont'd)  ;

Modification of the HPCI Inboard Containment Isolation Valve M01-2301-4 for GL 89-10 ,

3. The-margin of safety, as defined in the basis for any l Technical specification, is not reduced because the margin -l of safety is provided by the regulatory limit (50 seconds).

This margin of safety with respect to an analytical limit 1

-has not changed. The administrative limit (IST values) and design stroke time (48.6 seconds) has decreased. This will  !

not increase the analyzed offsite does rate, which would be  !

based on values equal to or greater than the Technical l Specification limit.  ;

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i MO4-1-92-010B l

Modification of the HPCI Outboard Containment Isolation Valve M01-2301-5 for GL 89-10.

DESCRIPTION:

The proposed design changes for the MO-1-2301-5 valve were as follows:

1) Replaced the SMB-1 actuator with an SMB-2

2) Replaced the 40 ft-lbf motor with an 80 ft-lbf

3) Replaced actuator gearing to achieve 72-01 OAR

4) Replaced spring pack

5) Replaced valve yoke '

6) Replaced TOL heater

7) Replaced #6 cable with #2 The above changes were required to implement changes made necessary by analysis for GL 89-10 (through Suppl. 3).

SAFETY EVALUATION

SUMMARY

1. The change described above has been analyzed to determine each accident or anticipated transient described in the UFSAR where any of the following is true:

The change alters the initial conditions used in the UFSAR analysis. I The changed structure, system or component is explicitly or implicitly assumed to function during or after the accident.

Operation or failure of the changed structure, system, or component could lead to the accident.

The accidents which meet these criteria are listed below:

Steam System Line Break UFSAR Section 15.6.4 Outside Containment Anticipated Transient UFSAR Section 15.8 Without Scram For each of these accidents, it has been determined that the change described above will not increase the probability of an occurrence or the consequence of the accident, or malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in the UFSAR.

2. The possibility for an accident or malfunction of a t different type than any previously evaluated in the UFSAR .is i

not created because no new failure modes or system interfaces are created. All new parts and components have been evaluated and are suitable for the application.

+ - - ; ..

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MO4-1-92-010B (Cont'd)  !

Modification of the HPCI Outboard Containment Isolation Valve  !

M01-2301-5 for GL 89-10 l i

- 3. The margin of. safety, as defined in the basis for any l

. Technical Specification, is not reduced because the margin i of safety is provided by the regulatory limit (50 seconds).  !

the margin of safety with respect to an analytical limit has l not changed. The administrative limit (IST values) and i design stroke time (43.2 seconds) has decreased. This will 1 not increase.the analyzed offsite does rate, which would be  ;

based on values equal to or greater than the Technical Specification limit. g i

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M04-0-91-009 Spurious EDG Field Ground Fault Relay Replacement / Installation DESCRIPTION:

The design for this modification replaced the FFCX relay with a Class 1E time delay relay (Time Delay on Drop Out).

This ensured that the FFC contractor de-energized before the FFCX relay. A new Class 1E relay (FSRX) was installed that operates off of the same emergency logic as the Auto Start Relay (ASR) to provide circuit separation and allow classification of the PJG relay as non-SR.

SAFETY EVALUA' LION

SUMMARY

1. The change described above has been analyzed to determine each accident or anticipated transient described in the UFSAR where any of the following is true:

The change alters the initial conditions used in the UFSAR analysis.

The changed structure, system or component is explicitly or implicitly assumed to function during or after the accident.

Operation or failure of the changed structure, system, or component could lead to the accident.

The accidents which meet these criteria are listed below:

EDG Failure to Start UFSAR Section 8.2.3 For each of these accidents, it has been determined that the change described above will not increase the probability of an occurrence or the consequence of the accident, or malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in the UFSAR.

2. The possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated in the UFSAR is not created because the modification affects the EDG control circuit, only. The only identified interface with other i systems is with the 125 VDC distribution system that supplies power to the EDG control circuit. By evaluating the impact on the EDG control circuit, fault protection for the circuit (i.e., fuse size), and the impacts on DC-ELMS l calculations, the designer has evaluated the impact on the interfacing system and shown that the changes are l acceptable.

The existing fault protection for the circuit has been evaluated by the designer and found adequate. There are no other failure modes, besides a fault to ground, identified  ;

that could impact other systems. l l

..~,:~. '.

M04-0-91-009 (Cont'd)

Spurious EDG Field Ground Fault Relay Replacement / Installation l The design, therefore, does not create any conditions that increase the probability of any accident other than the SFE evaluation for an EDG failure to start.

3. The margin of safety, as defined in the basis for.any Technical Specification, is not reduced because Technical Specification 3.9/4.9 and its basis were reviewed for the l

design of this modification. Since the affected EDG must be

}- considered inoperable while the_ work is being performed, the Limiting Conditions for Operation (LCO's) 3.9.A, 3.9.C, and 3.9.E, as applicable, must be complied with at all times.

Under no circumstances shall both the unit and 1/2 EDG be out of service or inoperable at the same time. BWRSD recommends that the installation be performed with the unit in cold shutdown.

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. t M04-0-90-022C Station Blackout Fire Protection Tie-In DESCRIPTION:  ;

1 The partial modification was installed to allow the future Station Blackout (SBO) building and its suppression system to be tied into the Station fire protection system with a new 6" diameter branch fire line.

The new line ties-in to the existing 10" fire protection ring header. A post indicating valve (PIV) provides isolation and classification break to separate the commercial construction of the SBO fire protection system from the Station's Regulatory Related fire protection system.

This partial included: excavating, cutting, and draining of the existing pipe; installing of a new tee, elbow, pipe and PIV; and a temporary 300# class blind flange to prevent debris from entering the pipe. This blank flange will be removed when the future Station Blackout (SBO) building and its fire suppression system is installed.

SAFETY EVALUATION

SUMMARY

1. The change described above has been analyzed to determine each accident or anticipated transient described in the UFSAR where any of the following is true:

The change alters the initial conditions used in the UFSAR analysis.

The changed structure, system or component is explicitly or implicitly assumed to function during or after the accident.

Operation or failure of the changed structure, system, or component could lead to the accident.

The accidents which meet these criteria are listed below:

Fire UFSAR Section 10.6 and UFSAR Section 9.5 For each of these accidents, it has been determined that the change described above will not increase the probability of an occurrence or the consequence of the accident, or malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in the UFSAR.

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. # 1

'l M04-0-90-022C (Cont'd) i Station Plackout Fire Protection Tie-In  ;

i

2. The possibility for an accident or malfunction of a i different type than any previously evaluated in the UFSAR is j not created because there are no new failure modes are  :

created by this partial modification. The design is in .

accordance with the fire protection codes and standards. l This system is similar to the existing fire: protection  :

system. The changes associated with this partial are to  !

fire protection piping and valves, only. The only new  !

interface is the fire protection syctem tie-in for the  :

Station Blackout building. Bechtel has evaluated the ,.

hydraulic effects of the new load on the existing fire  !

protection system. This interface, therefore, poses no new  ;

risks and does not overtake the existing system.

3. The margin of safety, is not defined in the basis for any Technical Specification, therefore, the safety margin is not  ;

reduced.

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. o E04-1-94-214 Add a Permanent Barrier Above Instrument Rack 2201-10 DESCRIPTION:

This exempt change added an additional barrier above instrument rack 2201-10B, located in the 1B RHR Room, to protect the rack from items dropped from above the rack.

The Main Steam Line High Flow Switches, which are sensitive  :

instruments, are located on this instrument rack. A disturbance of this instrument rack could result in a trip of one or more of the Main Steam High Flow Switches which ,

could give a Group I Primary Containment Isolation (PCI). A full Group I isolation would result in the closure of Group I PCI valves which would include the Main Steam (MS)

Isolation Valves, MS Drain Valves, and the Recirculation Sample Valves.

This barrier was securely attached by welding and bolting to an existing building structure above the instrument rack.

This additional barrier along with the existing barrier that surrounds the inotrument rack will protect the rack from disturbances due to objects bumping into or falling on the rack.

SAFETY EVALUATION

SUMMARY

1. The change described above has been analyzed to determine each accident or anticipated transient described in the UFSAR where any of the following is true:

- The change alters the initial conditions used in the UFSAR analysis.

The changed structure, system or component is explicitly or implicitly assumed to function during or after the accident.

Operation or failure of the changed structure, system, or component could lead to the accident.

The accidents which meet these criteria are listed below:

None.

For each of these accidents, it has been determined that the change described above will not increase the probability of an occurrence or the consequence of the accident, or malfunction of equipment important to safety as proviously evaluated in the UFSAR.

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a E04-1-94-214 (Cont'd) . ,

- Add'a Permanent Barrier Above Instrument Rack 2201-10  ;

2. The possibility for an accident or malfunction of a ,

different type than any previously evaluated in the UFSAR is i not created because the new barrier will be attached to an i existing building structure above the instrument rack. The i barrier will be attached to the structure by the use of ,

bolting and welding making it structurally sound. l The barrier doer, not interface with any system nor does it change or alter the function of any system. No new failure modes are generated by this exempt change; thus, a . ,

possibility of an accident of a different type will not be -i created by the installation of this barrier.

3. The margin of safety, is not defined in the basis for any Technical Specification, therefore, the safety margin is not  ;

reduced.

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l,n o e* O E04-2-94-206 Interposing Relay for U2 MPT Cooler Group Contactors DESCRIPTION:

The revised configuration of the Unit 2 main power transformer (MPT) cooler control circuitry involved a long cable run to a coolur trip contact off of the main generator field breaker auxiliary relay (41MX2). When both cooler groups were started simultaneously, the large starting power demand of the motor contactors (MC1/MC2) created an undesirable voltage drop in the cable run. The available voltage at the motor contactors was inadequate and has resulted in contactor burnout. The loss of cooling capability could lead to failure of the main power transformer.

The subject exempt plan change resolved the low voltage starting problems at the Unit 2 MPT cooling group contactors by installing an interposing relay (2-6200-MC-IR) in the local control panel. The design utilized a General Electric HGA relay that has a significantly lower pickup voltage than the motor contactors. The losses in the 41MX2 cable run was be reduced due to the lower current draw of the HGA relay.

The voltage drop to the MCs will be minimized by keeping the power feed cable length at a minimum.

This design change allowed the cooling control circuitry to function as originally intended. When the main senerator field breaker is closed, the contact from 41MX2 closes, energizing the interposing relay. The contact from the interposing relay closes, allowing one or both cooling groups to start, depending on the mode of cooling operation.

l Upon a trip of the main generator field breaker, the contact from 41MX2 opens, de-energizing the new interposing relay and tripping the Unit 2 MPT cooling.

SAFETY EVALUATION

SUMMARY

1. The change described above has been analyzed to determine each accident or anticipated transient described in the UFSAR where any of the following is true:

The change alters the initial conditions used in the UFSAR analysis.

The changed structure, system or component ic explicitly or implicitly assumed to Iunction during or after the accident.

Operation or failure of the changed structure, system, or component could lead to the accident.

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E04-2-94-206 (Cont'd) [

Interposing Relay for U2 MPT Cooler Group Contactors ,

1 The accidents which meet these criteria are listed below:

Generator Load Reject UFSAR Section 15.2.2 For each of these accidents, it has been determined that the change described above will not increase the probability of ,

an occurrence or the consequence of the accident, or malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously ,

evaluated in the UFSAR. f

2. The possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated in the UFSAR is not created because the subject exempt change reduces the  ;

probability of a geherator load reject event due to MPT

• transformer failure by increasing the reliability of the cooling control circuitry. The severity of this event is unaffected. The change affecte only the transformer cooling control circuitry. All changes are located within the transformer control cabinet. The function of the circuitry will remain unchanged. Therefore, this exempt change will not create a new type of accident or malfunction.  !

3. The margin of safety, is not defined in the basis for any Technical Specification, therefore, the safety margin is not reduced.  ;

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e-o ,4 o SE-93-181 Removal of T22 Using Cross-Ties (IP 384)

DESCRIPTION:

This interim procedure allowed for the supplying of shutdown loads on Unit 2 using the Bus 13-1/23-1 and Bus 14-1/24-1 cross-ties with reserve auxiliary transformer 22 de-energized.

8AFETY EVALUATION

SUMMARY

1. The change described above has been analyzed to determine '

each accident or anticipated transient described in the UFSAR where any of the following is true:

The change alters the initial conditions used in the UFSAR analysis.

The changed structure, system or component is explicitly or implicitly assumed to function during or after the accident.

Operation or failure of the changed structure, system, '

or component could lead to the accident.

The accidents which meet these criteria are listed below:

Loss of Offsite Power UFSAR Section 15.2.6 For each of these accidents, it has been determined that the change described above will not increase the probability of an occurrence or the consequence of the accident, or malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in the UFSAR.

2. The possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated in the UFSAR is not created because this procedure will remove Transformer 22 from service. In order to supply power to shutdown loads on Unit 2, this procedure will use the 13-1/23-1 and 14-1/24-1 crossties, as opposed to the U1/2 and U2 diesel generators. The diesel generators will be operable, however, should an emergency start signal be .

recalved. Use of the crossties has been previously evaluated and is controlled by approved procedure QOP 6500-8. Operation on the crosstie will not create the possibility of an accident or malfunction of a type '

different from those evaluated in the UFSAR.

3. The margin of safety, is not defined in the basis for any Technical Specification, therefore, the safety margin is not ;

reduced.

.