ML20064E295
| ML20064E295 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Fort Saint Vrain  |
| Issue date: | 11/13/1978 |
| From: | Justin Fuller PUBLIC SERVICE CO. OF COLORADO |
| To: | Gammill W Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| P-78182, NUDOCS 7811160096 | |
| Download: ML20064E295 (88) | |
Text
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PUBLIC SERVICE COMPANY OF COLORADO P. O. SOX 840 OCNVER, COLORA00 80201 1 K. FULLER November 13, 1978 vice -es.oce Fort St. Vrain Unit No. 1 P-78182 Mr. William P. Gammill I Assistant Director for
/ .Sgandardi5ation and Advanced Reactors
- h Mision of Project Management U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 , . .
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Docket #50-267 m
Subject:
Evaluation of Fire Protection Provisions for Fort St. Vrain
Reference:
(1) NRC letter from Themis P. Speis to J. K. Fuller dated 9/22/78 (2) PSC letter P-78158 from J. K.
Fuller to William Gammill dated 9/29/78 (3) PSC letter P-78167 from J. K.
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Fuller to William Gammill dated 10/13/78 Gentlemen:
This letter transmits Section 4.0 of our report entitled " Fire Protection Program Review for Fort St. Vrain Nuclear Generating Sta-tion in Response to Branch Technical Position 9. 5-1" . Six (6) copies
- are enclosed.
Section 4.0 contains the fire hazards analysis for the station and should be inserted into our earlier report submittal of Sections 1, 2 and 3, dated October 13, 1978 (reference 3). Also being forwarded are new pages for the Table of Contents, Figure List, and Planned Action Items which were expanded to reflect Section 4.0.
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'P-78182 This submittal completes our evaluation of the fire protection provisions at Fort St. Vrain using the guidelines of Appendix A to Branch Technical Position 9.5-1. If you have any questions, please contact us.
Very truly yours,
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J. K. Fuller, Vice President Engineering and Planning I JKF/FWT:ers Enclosures I
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[,- g(ai Page 4 L 3.4 General Guidelines for Plant Protection 3-19
{ 3.4.1 Building Design 3-19 3-26 3.4.2 Control of Combustibles 3.4.3 Electrical Cable Construction, Cable Trays, and Cable Penetrations 3-34 3.4.4 Ventilation 3-37 3.4.5 Lighting and Communication 3-44 3.5 Fire Detection and Euppression 3-46 3.5.1 Fire Detection 3-46 3.5.2 Fire Protection Water Supply Systems 3-47 3.5.3 Water Sprinklers and Hose Standpipe Systems 3-52 3.5.4 Halon Suppression Systems 3-56 3.5.5 Carbon Dioxide' Suppression Systems 3-57 3.5.6 Portable Extinguishers 3-58
( 3.6 Guidelines for Specific Plant Areas 3-60 3.6.1 Primary and Secondary Containment 3-60 3.6.2 Control Room 3-62 3.6.3 Cable Spreading Room 3-63 3.6.4 Plant Computer Room 3-65 3.6.5 Switchgear. Rooms 3-65 3.6.6 Remote Safety Related Panels 3-66 3.6.7 Station Battery Rooms 3-66 3.6.8 Turbine Lubrication and Control Oil 3-67 Storage and Use Areas
( 3.6.9 3.6.10 Diesel Generator Areas Diesel Fuel Oil Storage Areas 3-68 3-69 3.6.11 Safety Related Pumps 3-71 3.6.12 New Fuel Area 3-72 3.6.13 Spent Fuel Pool Area 3-73 3.6.14 Radwaste Building 3-73 3.6.-15 Decontamination Areas 3-74
\ 3.6.16 Safety Related Water Tanks 3-75 3.6.17 Cooling Towers 3-75 3.6.18 Miscellaneous Areas 3-76 3.7 Special Protection Guidelines 3-77 3.7.1 Welding and Cutting, Acetylene-Oxygen 3-77 Fuel Gas Systems 3.7.2 Storage Areas for Dry Ion Exchange Resins 3-78 ,
3-78 1 3.7.3 Hazardous Chemicals 3.7.4 Materials Containing Radioactivity 3-80 4.0 FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS 4-1 4.1 Reactor Building 4-7 4.2 Turbine Building 4-32 Fire Water, Pump House 4.3 4-53 j 4.4 Service Water Pump House 4-56
- 4.5 Circulating Water Makeup Pump House 4-57
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i Table 4-1 Fire Hazards Analysis Summary ii
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f Figure No. PSC Dwg. No. Drawing Title 1.1-18 PA-17 Turbine Plant Arrangement, Operating Floor Plan EL 4829' l.1-19 PA-18 Turbine Plant Arrangement, Mezzanine Floor Plan EL 4811' l.1-20 PA-19 Turbine Plant Arrangement, Grade Floor Plan EL 4791' l.1-21 PA-20 Turbine Plant Arrangement, Section J-J 1.1-22 PA-21 Turbine Plant Arrangement, Section K-K 1.1-23 PA-22 Turbine Plant Arrangement, Sections L-L and M-M 1.1-24 PA-23 Turbine Plant Arrangement, Miscellaneous Plans 3.4 -
Ventilation Systems Supply Air Intake and Exhaust Air
( Outlet Locations 3.5-1 172-9.4 Fire-Protection System Plot "
Plan 4.0-1 -
Fire Areas - Overall Station 4.0-2 -
Fire Areas - Reactor Building Elev. 4906'-8" and 4916'-8"
'and Turbine Building Access Control Bay Area Elev. 4904' and 4921' r 4.0-3 -
Fire Areas - Reactor Building i
Elev. 4881'-8" and Turbine -
, Building Access Control Bay Area Elev. 4885'-3" 4.0-4 -
Fire Areas - Reactor Building Elev. 4864' and Turbine Building Access Control Bay Area Elev.
l 4864' 4.0-5 -
Fire Areas - Reactor Building Elev. 4849' and 4854', and
, ( Turbine Building Access Control l
Bay Area 4846'-6" iv
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.'. . 1 Figure No. PSC Dwg. No. Drawing Title 4.0-6 -
Fire Areas - Reactor Building Elev. 4839' 4.0-7 -
Fire Areas - Reactor Building.
Elev. 4829' and Turbine Building Elev. 4829' 4.0-8 -
Fire Areas - Reactor Building ~
Elev. 4811' and 4816', and Turbine Building Elev. 4811' 4.0-9 -
Fire Areas - Reactor Building
. Elev. 4801' and 4791', and Turbine Building Elev. 4791' 4.0-10 -
Fire Area - Reactor Building
( Elev 4781' 4.0-11 -
Fire Area - Reactor Building Elev. 4769' and 4771' 4.0-12 -
Fire Area - Reactor Building Elev. 4759' and 4756' 4.0-13' -
Fire Area - Reactor Building
( Elev. 4740'-6' 4
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Action Applicable Item No. Planned Action Item Description Guideline
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- 13. Remove lubricating oil stored in Fire Hazards i drums from the Fuel Handling Purge Analysis 4.1.3 System Equipment Room.
- 14. Replace-the open wood storage cabinet Fire Hazards containing polyethylene sample bottles Analysis 4.1.10 with a closed metal cabinet.
i 15. Remove the temporary flexible ventila- Fire Hazards j tion duct presently routed through the Analysis 4.2.7 south entrance to the Auxiliary Boiler Room, and' shut and lock this fire door.
- 16. Close the openings in the ceiling of Fire Hazards
the Turbine Lube oil Reservoir Room Analysis 4.2.9 with appropriate fire stop.
- 17. Replace the existing spray water barrier Fire Hazards
- enclosing MCC #1 in the Turbine Build- Analysis 4.2.4 ing with a non-flammable barrier.
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4.0 - FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS Preface This section reports the results of the fire hczards analysis.
This analysis was performed to provide information for the PSC responses made in Section 3.0, as follows:
a) to provide quantitative evidence that a guideline has been met, or b) to provide the basis for the corrective action being taken, or c) to provide the basis for not taking corrective action
< when a guideline has not been met.
Fire hazards analyses were performed in those station buildings containing safety related equipment requiring fire protection, namely the Reactor Building, Turbine Building, Fire Water Pump House, Service Water Pump House, and Circulating Water Makeup Pump House. On this basis, a fire hazards analysis was performed in each of the following areas:
4.1 Reactor Building 4.1.1 Reactor Building Refueling Floor Mezzanines -
Elev. 4916'-8" and 4906'-8" 4.1.2 Reactor Building Refueling Floor - Elev. 4881'-8" 4.1.3 Reactor Building PCRV and Auxiliary Equipment t Area - Elev. 4864'-0" 4.1.4 Reactor Building Auxiliary Equipment Area -
Elev. 4054'-0" and 4849'-0" 4.1.5 Reactor Building Auxiliary Equipment Area -
Elev. 4839'-0" 4.1.6 Reactor Building PCRV and Aux. Equipment Area - -
Elev. 4829'-0" 4.1.7 Reactor Building PCRV - Elev. 4811'-0" and Auxiliary Equipment Area - Elev. 4816'-0" 4.1.8 Reactor Building PCRV - Elev. 4801'-0" and Aux. Equipment Area - Elev. 4791'-0" 4.1.9 Reactor Building Auxiliary Equipment Area -
Elev. 4781'-0" ,
4.1.10 Reactor Building PCRV - Elev. 4769'-0" and Auxiliary Equipment Area - Elev. 4771'-0" 4-1
e 4.1.11 Reactor Building PCRV - Elev. 4759'-0" and Auxiliary Equipment Area - 4756'-0" 4.1.12 Reactor Building PCRV and Auxiliary Equipment Area - Elev. 4740'-6" 4.2 Turbine Building 4.2.1 Turbine Building Access Control Bay Area -
Elev. 4864'-0" and above.
4.2.2 Turbine Building Access Control Bay Area -
Elev. 4846'-0" 4.2.3 Turbine Building Turbine Generator Floor -
Elev. 4829'-0"
. 4.2.4 Turbine Building Mezzanine - Elev. 4811'-0" 4.2.5 Turbine Building Grade Level - Elev. 4791'-0" 4.2.6 Turbine Building Standby Diesel Generator Rooms -
Elev. 4791'-0" 4.2.7 Turbine Building Auxiliary Boiler Room - Elev. 4791'-0" 4.2.8 Turbine Building Turbine Lube Oil Storage Room -
Elev. 4791'-0" k 4.2.9 Turbine Building Turbine Lube Oil Reservoir Room -
Elev. 4791'-0" 4.2.10 Turbine Building Hydrogen Storage Room - Elev. 4794'-6" 4.2.11 Condensate and Makeup Water Treatment Room -
Elev. 4791'-0" 4.3 Fire Water Pump House 4.3.1 Electric Motor Driven Fire Water Pump Room 4.3.2 Diesel Engine Driven Fire Water Pump Room 4.4 Service Water Pump House 4.5 Circulating Water Makeup Pump House The fire area identification numbers correspond to the ntmbers reported on arrangement sketches, Figure's 4.0-1 through 4.0-13.
The analysis for each section contains the following information as described in Section 1.4:
( o Fire Area Description o Fire Area Boundary Description o Fire Load o Fire Protection System o Design Basis Fire 4-2
Assumptions
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- 1) The design basis fire for a given area is considered to be the fire that causes the most damage in the area of concern. In most cases, the design basis fire assumes ,
that all combustible materials in the affected area are consumed. In other cases, the consequences of several independent, localized fires are evaluated. Spatial separation of combustibles within a given fire area is considered, such that multiple fires, or spread of the fire to fire areas above or below the area of concern, are postulated only if fires could credibly spread without suppression. The consequences of the design basis fire are primarily evaluated without credit for fire suppression. However, the effectiveness of the available fire suppression system for control and sup-pression of the design basis fire is also analyzed.
- 2) If it is reasonable to assume that a given fire will be localized within a fire area, then the fire load is cal-culated based on the floor area within a localized fire zone.
- 3) The duration of a fire, indicated parenthetically after the fire load, is based on the equivalent fire loadings listed on Table 6-8A of the NFPA Fire Protection Handbook, 14th Edition.
- 4) In evaluating the adequacy of fire area boundaries, a fire barrier rating of 3 hours3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> is generally considered to pro-vide acceptable protection against the propagation of a fire. The adequacy of installed fire doors, portable steel floor panels, ventilation ducting and other pene-trations through a fire area boundary is evaluated on the basis of the calculated fire load contained within the fire area rather than by comparison with the fire rating of the installed boundary.
- 5) When postulating the design basis fire, potential ignition sources are assumed to exist for all fire hazards.
- 6) Section 7, Chapter 4 of the NFPA Fire Protection Handbook -
states that in the thicknesses commonly used, ventilation ducts which pass through fire barriers can be assumed to present no extraordinary hazard if properly hung and adequately firestopped. The Handbook also states that "if the. wall, partition, ceiling, or floor is required -
to have a fire resistance rating of more than one hour, a fire damper is required to properly protect the
- opening". Based on a comparison of these requirements with the ventilation ducts installed at the Fort St. Vrain Station, the ventilation ducts passing through fire bar-(- riers without fire dampers provide an acceptable fire barrier when the calculated fire load is one hour or less.
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! , 7) In evaluating the effects of a design basis fire, it is
( assumed that if only one redundant safety related com-ponent or electrical channel is affected by the fire, safe shutdown capability still exists.
- 8) It is generally assumed'that the magnitude of a fire is limited by the amount of combustibles present and that sufficient oxygen is available to support complete combustion. This assumption is not applicable to the turbine lube oil storage or turbine lube oil reservoir rooms, where the magnitude of the fire is assumed to be limited by the availability of oxygen, due to the large quantity of fuel present in these areas and the ability to isolate ventilation to the rooms. ,
- 9) In determining the quantity of combustibles in a given fire area, all cable not Flamemastic coated was accounted for and included in the area fire load. For cables that have been Flamemastic coated, tests have verified that the cable will neither propagate fire nor contribute to the fire load.
Definitions Automatic - means self-acting, operating by its own mechanism
( when actuated by some impersonal influence as, for example, a change in a current strength, pressure, temperature or mechanical configuration.
Combustibles - any materials which will burn or sustain the com-bustion process whether or not they exhibit flame under exposure fire conditions that can exist at their point of application.
Concealed - if space containing combustible material is inaccessible to the extinguishing agent, the combustibles are considered to be concealed.
Design Basis Fires - are those that are considered to cause most damage, and are fires that may develop in local areas assuming no r.anual, automatic or other firefighting action has been ,
initiated and the fire has passed flash over (i.e., the tempera-ture at which auto-ignition of other combustibles in the area will occur) and has reached its peak burning rate.
Electrical Conduit - rigid or flexible tubing, usually either s, teel or aluminum, in which electrical cables are run.
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Enclosed - surrounded by a case which will prevent a person from accidentally contacting live electrical parts. Can also apply to flammable liquids which are contained or encased in fire resistive materials or buildings.
Fire Area - that portion of a building or plant that is separated from other areas by boundary fire barriers (walls, floors, or roofs).
Fire Barrier - those components of construction (walls, floors and roofs) that are rated by approving laboratories in hours for resistance to fire to prevent the spread of fire.
Fire Break or Fire Stop - a feature of construction which prevents fire propagation along the length of cable (c) or prevents spreading of fire to nearby combustibles within a given fire area or fire zone.
Fire Detectors - a fire detector is a device designed to automati-cally detect the presence of fire and initiate an alarm system.
Fire Rating - refers to the endurance period of a fire barrier or structure and defines the period of resistance to a standard fire exposure elapsing before the first critical point in behavior is observed. ( Refer to NFPA 251.)
k Fire Suppression - refers to capability for control and extinguish-ing of fires (firefighting). Manual fire suppression activities refer to use of hoses or portable extinguishers. Automatic fire suppression refers to fixed systems such as water sprinklers, Halon, or carbon dioxide.
Fire Zones - subdivisions of fire areas in which the fire suppres-sion systems are designed to combat particular types of fires.
NFPA - National Fire Protection Association.
Non-combustibles - materials no part of which will ignite and burn when subjected to fire.
Safety Related Systems and Components - systems and components required to mitigate the consequences of postulated accidents and to shut down the reactor and maintain it in a safe shutdown condition.
Sprinkler System - A system of overhead piping and components from the first supply valve to the point where water discharges from the system to the fire area. The system is usually activated by heat or smoke from a fire and generally includes a device for actuating an alarm when the system is in operation.
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i Sprinkler Systems Classification
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Wet-Pipe - A system employing automatic closed head '
(fusible-link operated) sprinklers attached to a piping system containing water and connected to a water supply so that water discharges immediately from sprinklers opened by a fire.
Deluge System - A system employing open head sprinklers and/or nozzles attached to a piping system connected to a water supply through a valve which is opened by the operation of a fire detection system or pilot line with a fusible head installed in the same areas as the sprinklers and/or no*zzles. When this valve opens, water flows into the piping system and discharges from all sprinklers and/or nozzles attached thereto.
Standpipe and Hose Systems - fixed piping system connected to a water supply to provide effective fire hose streams in the shortest possible time to specific areas inside the buil' ding.
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4.1 REACTOR BUILDING
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General The Reactor Building contains the PCRV, fuel handling and storage areas, decontamination and radioactive waste handling areas, and reactor plant auxiliary syctems.
The Reactor Building above grade outer walls are constructed i
of dual, corrugated steel enclosing mineral wool thermal insulation. The fire rating of the steel walls, although not confirmed by fire test, are considered adequate for the highest fire load in the building. The Reactor Building roof is a metal deck-type structure covered with asbestos felt, asphalt and* gravel, which complies with the applicabic requirements of the Underwriters Laboratory for a Class A rating. Below grade walls are reinforced concrete con-struction as are numerous equipment cells and rooms within the building. Much of the safety related equipment is afforded fire protection by being totally enclosed in concrete cells.
The building is divided into fire areas by floor level.
These fire areas are further divided into two (2) fire zones (PCRV fire zone and auxiliary equipment fire zone) by a steel missile barrier wall which extends vertically -
from Elevation 4756' to the refueling floor, Elevation s 4881'. Construction of this wall is similar to the reactor building walls. The open structure design concept employed in the building consists of open steel floor grating, open stairways, and machinery and personnel access openings in walls and floors.
Access doors, emergency exits, and the elevator doors penetrating the building outer walls and missile barrier wall are non-fire rated steel doors. System piping, electrical cable in trays, , risers and conduit, and venti-lation ducts penetrate the floors (fire areas) and missile barrier wall (fire zones) without fire stops or ventilation fire dampers. Penetrations in the wall (fire boundary) separating the Reactor Building and the Turbine Ouilding are sealed for air tightness except electrical cable .
panetrations into the Auxiliary Electrical Equipment Room and 480V Switchgear Room, which are scaled with 3-hour fire rated fire stops. Penetrations without fire rated fire stops or fire dampers are considered acceptable, based on consideration of the fire load calculated for each fire area. Two sets of open stairways are provided in the Reactor Building which span all levels of the building.
Both sets of stairways are in the Auxiliary Equipment side, east of the missile barrier wall.
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When evaluating the effects of the design basis fire, e consideration has been given to safety related equipment which, on the basis of vertical proximity, could be involved in the fire. Similarly, any combustibles above or below the design basis fire area, and the effects of using hose water on safety related equipment in and below the design basis fire area, have also been considered.
Safety related equipment items contained within the PCRV are considered protected from fire by the concrete reactor vessel. Exposed safety related attachments to the PCRV, such as penetrations, safety valves, electrical cable and piping, were cons {dered in the appropriate fire area.
A fire in the electrical cable tray system anywhere in the Reactor Building is not considered a threat to the capa-bility for safely shutting down the plant. Safe plant shutdown is made possible in the event of a fire in the electrical cable tray system by the ACM system and by loop and bus cable separation. The Alternate Cooling Method (ACM) system provides an independent source of electric power and independent electrical cables to supply power to vital plant equipment needed for plant shutdown. ACM system cable has been routed away from congested cable areas or cables providing the same vital functions.
i Communication during a fire situation is main'tained primarily by the station's public address (GAI-Tronic) system. Several two-way hand sets are provided on each level of the Reactor Building. As a backup, eight radio transceivers are provided for the exclusive use of the fire brigade. Emergency lighting is provided at stairways and for access to essential plant
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equipmmt required to shut down the reactor. The Reactor Build-ing ventilation system provides for the removal of smoke and corrosive gasses during and following a fire situation.
4.1.1 Refueling Floor Mezzanines - Elevations 4916'-8" and 4906'-8" Area Description
, Located on the upper mezzanine are safety related expansion l tanks, surge tanks, piping and cabling associated with the i
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l reactor plant cooling water and Helium purification. cooling
( water systems. The lower mezzanine contains non-safety related nitrogen recondensers and associated control consoles and cabling. ,
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Fire Area Boundary i The mezzaninos are located against the west wall of the
- Reactor Building above the refueling floor. The upper i mezzanine floor is open steel grating. The lower mezzanine
- floor is steel decking with openings. This fire area is bounded by the steel Reactor Building west wall and roof structure. It is open to the refueling floor, fire area 4.1.2. ,
4 j The redundant expansion and surge tanks on the upper mezzanine are separated by a 12-inch thick concrete i barrier. Minimum distance be* ween redundant components is approximately 19 feet.
- Fire Load The fire load in this area is insignificant, consisting of small quantities of electrical cables, machinery lubricating oil, and waste consisting of paper, cloth and film plastic in trash containers. The calculated fire load for this area is~6300 Btu /Ft2 (less than 5 minutes) . . These combustibles
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are not a sufficient quantity to be considered a hazard to redundant safety related equipment.
Fire Protection Systems ;
Fire detection for the arca is provided by an ionization type duct detector in the ventilation return air duct inlet which i
alarms and annunciates in the Control Room. Primary fire suppression for both mezzanine levels is by hose water and
! portable CO2 extinguishers. The upper mezzanine has two hose water stations. The lower mezzanine has one hose '
water station and one CO2 extinguisher. Floor drains are not required due to the grating and openings in the steel deck floor.
I Design Basis Fire The design basis fire for this area assumes the total com-bustion of the pape.. combustible waste materials that could be contained in a 20 71 trash container, or the lube oil (1-1/4 gal.) containec in one of the three nitrogen recon-4 densers, all located on the lower mezzanine level. Ignition a
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is based on a transient source. As a result of the low
( area fire load (6300 Btu /Ft2) and the separation distance between redundant safety related equipment located on the upper mezzanine level, and the distance from the combus-tibles located on the lower mezzanine level, the design basis fire will not involve redundant safety related equipment.
4.1.2 Refueling Floor -_ Elevation 4881'-8" Area Description The refueling floor provides access to the PCRV, Helium purification regeneration equipment, and the storage wells within the floor structure for reactor fuel and associated equipment. Portable fuel handling machinery and transfer cask operate on this floor. An enclosed fuel handling control room and a cooling water valve operating station serving the storage wells are located in this area of this equipment, the storage wells, fuel handling machine and the valve operating station are safety related.
k A safety related liquid nitrogen storage tank, enclosed in a steel walled room, is also located in this area.
Other non-safety related equipment items include an over-head crane, electrical panels, a liquid nitrogen surge tank and two nitrogen recondenser chillers.
Fire Area Boundary The fire area boundary consists of the steel constructed Reactor Building walls and roof and a floor primarily of concrete with some open grating and steel decking. Two steel entry doors and one elevator door are provided at the fire area boundary. None of these doors are fire rated. .
Fire Load The fire load in this area is very small (less than
! 2000 Btu /Ft2) . It is attributable to electrical cable
! insulation, lubricants in the overhead crane, hydraulic
- fluids in the refueling machine, and hydrogen gas stored i
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in two 220 SCF cylinders. Electrical cable is located predominantly below portable steel deck plates covering the PCRV. Lubricants in the overhead crane mech. sms are of small c antities and approximately 50 feet above the refueling _loor. Hydraulic fluid in the refueling machine is contained in two variable displacement pump-drive units remotely located near the top of this unit.
One hydrogen gas cylinder is located at each of the two H2 stations near the northwest and southwest corners of the refueling floor.
Fire Protection S'ystems Fire detection for the area is provided by ionization type duct detectors in the return air ventilation ducts which alarm and annunciate in the Control Room. Four hose water stations, four portable CO2 and three dry chemical extinguishers are located in the area for general fire suppression. One floor drain is provided in the area where normal decontamination of the fuel handling equipment is performed.
Design Basis Fire The fire load in this area, including consideration of transient combustibles, is not sufficient to affect the safety related equipment.
4.1.3 PCRV and Auxiliary Equipment Area - Elevation 4864'-0" Area Description i
This fire area is divided by the missile barrier wall into the PCRV and the auxiliary equipment fire zones.
The PCRV zone contains the PCRV electrical cable, safety .
related MCC No. 3, and the Reserve Shutdown Stations.
i The auxiliary equipment zone contains the safety related fuel storage wells which are totally enclosed in reinforced concrete, and the non-safety related hot service facility and Helium purification regeneration system, both totally 1
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enclosed in reinforced concrete. Also included in this zone are the non-safety related Fuel Handling Purge System Vacuum Pumps located in a concrete enclosed room.
Fire Area Boundary This area is bounded by the Reactor Building walls and divided into two fire zones by the steel missile barrier wall. The floor in both zones is primarily cpen steel grating. The ceiling is the refueling area floor composed of concrete and open steel grating. The fuel handling purge system equipment room is of concrete construction and con-sidered as a separate fire zone.
Fire Load The major fire load in the PCRV zone results from the electrical cable insulation. Complete combustion of all this material produces a fire loading of 27,000 Btu /Ft2 (21 minutes). Reserve lube oil (110 gallons) and oil containedwithinthefuelhandlingpurgesystemequigment (20 gallons) produce a fire loading of 50,800 Btu /Ft (40 minutes) and 9,200 Btu /Ft2 (7 minutes) respectively, in this separate fire zone. No other significant com-bustibles exist in the auxiliary equipment fire area.
Fire Protection Systems Fire detection for the PCRV zone is provided by ionization detectors in the return air ventilation ducts which alarm and annunciate in the Control Room. Two hose water stations and three portable CO2 extinguishers are located in this
. zone for general fire suppression.
Due to the open steel decking on this elevation and other elevations in the PCRV zones, drains are not required.
Redundant equipment items to those controlled on MCC No. 3, located in this area, are controlled from MCC No, lA and No. 1B and MCC No. 2 located on the opposite side of the missile barrier wall in fire areas 4.1.4 and 4.1.10 respectively.
Redundant safety related cables are loop and bus separated.
Fire detection for the auxiliary equipment zone is provided by ionization detectors in the return air ventilation ducts and detectors along the south ("J") wall. The auxiliary equipment zone is provided with two hose water stations, one portable dry chemical and two portable CO2
, extinguishers for general fire suppression. The safety 4-12
related equipment located in this fire zone are enclosed in concrete, providing adequate protection from any fire.
( Openings and open steel floor gratings provide for water drainage.
The fuel handling purge equipment (not safety related) is.
located in a separate room constructed of concrete walls, floor and ceiling. Fire suppression in this zone is provided by the hose stations and portable extinguishers located outside the room.
Design Basis Fire The design basis fire for the PCRV zone is an electrical cable fire caused
- by either an electrical fault or tran-sient ignition source. A fire of this type could impair the safety function of one loop or bus, and could impair parts of tiCC No. 3. However, the Fort St. Vrain cable separation criteria and the separation between MCC No. 3 and its redundant control centers prevent the involvement of both safety systems in a single fire situation. In addition, the ACM system provides an alternate power source for safety related equipment needed to shut down the plant. The small fire loading (27,000 Btu /
Ft 2 ) will not impair PCRV cooling or the operation of safety related equipment located on floor levels above or below this fire area.
(
The room containing the fuel handling purge system equip-ment is treated as a separate fire zone and contains the major combustibles in this fire area. Action will be taken to remove stored lube oil (in drums) from this zone, thus significantly reducing its fire loading. The design basis fire in this zone is then based on a transient ignition source leading to the ignition of the lube oil contained in the pump units. Although unlikely, due to spatial separation, it is assumed that both units will be involved with the resulting fire loading of 9200 Btu /Ft2 (7 minutes). This fire will be contained within this zone (room) and is not seen as a hazard to any safety related equipment.
4-13
( 4.1.4 Auxiliary Equipment Area - Elevation 4854'-0" and 4849'-0" Area Description This fire area encompasses the auxiliary equipment area east of the missile barrier wal.1 at this level of the Reactor Building. The safety related fuel storage wells and non-safety related hot service facility are totally enclosed in a concrete structure. Reactor plant cooling water filters and demineralizers, both safety related, and non-safety related chemical injection systems are located in a concrete enclosed room with a concrete wall separating redundant equipment. MCC's No. 1 A and 1B, both safety related, are located along the south wall of this fire area.
Fire Area Boundary This area is bounded by the steel Reactor Building walls, missile barrier wall, and steel grating floors and ceilings with large openings to the fire area above and below. Within this area, concrete enclosures provide further fire zone sebdivisions.
F.re Load f The only combustible material in this fire area is anhydrous A
ammonia gas stored in a cylinder in the reactor plant cooling water filter /demineralizer equipment room. This gas, mixed with water in a mixing tank, is used for reactor plant cool-ing water pH control. The storage cylinder is normally valved shut. If it is assumed that all of this gas escaped undetected and was ignited, a fire loading of 217 Btu /Ft2
( (less than 1 minute) would result in this room.
Fire Protection Systems Fire detection for this area is provided by ionization type duct detectors in return air ventilation ducts and ionization detectors mounted over cable trays along the south ("J") wall. .
All cf these detectors alarm and annunciate in the Control Room. The "J" wall detectors also alarm locally. Two hose
- water stations, two portable CO7 and two portable dry chemical extinguishers are provided for general fire sup-pression. Two floor drains are provided in the reactor plant cooling water filter /demineralizer room. Redundant safety related domineralizers and filter units are separated by a 12-inch thick concrete wall. The safety related fuel storage wells are totally enclosed in a concrete structure. Redun-dant circuits for MCC No. lA and No. 1B are in MCC's No. 2 and 3, located in fire areas 4.1.10 and 4.1.3 respectively.
MCC's No. lA and 1B are separated from MCC No. 3 by the missile barrier wall.
4-14
Electrical cables in this area are routed primarily in conduit.
. Design Basis Fire Due to the negligible fire load and spatial separation of safety related equipment, a fire originating in this area would not be of sufficient magnitude to affect safety related equipment or systems.
4.1.5 Auxiliary Equipment Area - Elevation 4839'-0" Area Description This fire area encompasses the auxiliary equipment area cast of the missile barrier wall at the level of the Reactor Building. Major components and systems include the Helium purification system hydrogen getter units, filters and economizer, purified Helium compressors and filters, reactor plant cooling water pumps, fuel storage wells, gas waste vacuum tank and the hot service facility. The purified Helium filters (2), fuel storage wells, and reactor plant cooling water pumps are safety related.
(
The fuel storage wells, gas waste vacuum tank and hot service facility are totally enclosed in a concrete struc-ture. The Helium purification and hydrogen removal com-ponents are also contained in totally enclosed concrete rooms. The safety related purified Helium filters are
.each totally enclosed in concrete rooms. Access to this equipment is through removable ceiling plugs from the level above. The safety related reactor plant cooling water pumps are contained in a room with concrete walls, floor, and ceiling. A 6' wide floor to ceiling opening is provided in one wall for equipment removal. A concrete wall within the room separates redundant equipment items.
Fire hrea Boundary .
This area is bounded by the steel Reactor Building walls, steel missile barrier wall, and steel grating floors and ceilings with several large floor and ceiling openings.
Within this area, concrete enclosures provide further zone subdivisions. ,
4-15
Fire Load
( Combustible material in this fire area is limited to small quantities of lubricating oil in each of the four reactor plant cooling water pumps. On the basis of complete combustion of all oil, the fire load in this fire zone is 750 Btu /Ft2 (less than 1 minute) .
Fire Protection Systems Fire detection for this fire area is provided by ionization type duct detectors in return air ducts and ionization detectors mounted over the electrical cable trays along the south ("J") wall. All detectors alarm and annunciate in the Control Room.' The "J" wall detectors also alarm locally.
For general fire suppression, the area is provided with two hose water stations and four portable CO2 extinguishers.
Floor' drains are provided in each of the System 46 pump spaces.
The safety related reactor plant cooling water pumps are a f forded fire protection by a 12-inch thick concrete wall which separates the redundant pair of pumps. All cabling in this fire area is conduit protected.
( Redundant safety related purified Helium filters are located in separate concrete cells having 12-inch thick walls, floor and ceiling. Small wall openings are provided for ventilation.
The safety related fuel storage wells are afforded fire protection by their encasement in a totally enclosed concrete structure.
Design Basis Fire The design basis fire assumes transient fuel and a transient ignition source resulting in the total involvement of lubri-cating oil present in one pair of safety related reactor plant cooling water pumps. Based on the limited amount of combustible material (2 quarts lubricating oil per pump), ,
! the concrete barrier wall between the redundant pairs of pumps
! and the physical arrangement of these units will prevent involvement of redundant pumps in the fire. The reactor plant cooling water system is also backed up by the fire water system.
s 4-16
[
- . -- =__ . - . . .- _ - -
Due to the negligible fire load and barrier separation provided between safety related equipment, a fire origina-l- ting in this area would not be of sufficient magnitude to
- affect safety related equipment or systems.
4.1.6 PCRV and Auxiliary Equipment Area - Elevation 4829'-0" Area Description
- This fire area is divided by the missile barrier wall into 4
the PCRV and auxiliary equipment fire zones. The PCRV zone J
of this fire area extends from Elevation 4829'-0" upwards to 4864'-0" and contains the PCRV, piping, ventilation equipment and ducting, and electrical cables. No major safety related equipment items are located in this zone.
The auxiliary equipment zone contains the safety related fuel storage wells, and the non-safety related gas waste vacuum tank and hot service facility, all totally enclosed in a concrete structure. The Instrument Room, enclosed by ,
(' concrete walls, floor and ceiling, contains no safety related equipment.
Fire Area Boundary This area is bounded by the. steel Reactor Building walls
. - and divided into two zones by the steel missile barrier 2
( wall. Floors and ceilings in both zones are open steel gratings with large floor openings. Penetrations into the Instrument Room for piping, cable and ventilation ducting are sealed for air tightness. The room is maintained at '
a small negative pressure relative to Reactor Building j pressure.
Fire Load .
i Combustibles in the PCRV fire zone are confined to small quantities of lubrication oil in four widely separated air handling units. Complete combustion of the eight gallons of oil contained in the four units would produce a fire load of only 200 Btu /Ft2 (less than 1 minute). The only known combustible in the auxiliary equipment fire
)
4-17
zone is the small quantity of alcohol (less than 1 gallon) located in the Instrument Room. Complete combustion of the alcohol would produce a fire load of only 270 Btu /Ft2 (less than 1 minute) in the Instrument Room.
Fire Protection Systems Fire detection for this fuel area is provided by ionization type duct detectors located in return air ventilation ducts.
Additional detection for the auxiliary equipment zone is provided by ionization detectors mounted over cable trays along the south ("J") wall of the Reactor Building. All detectors "J"
alarm and annunciate in the Control Room. The wall detectors also alarm locally.
Two hose water stations and three portable dry chemical extinguishers are provided in the PCRV zone. Two hose water stations, two portable dry chemical and one portable CO2 extinguishers are provided in the auxiliary equipment zone. Due to the open steel grating type floors, water drains are not provided.
Design Basis Fire Due to the negligible fire load in this area and the fact that safety related equipment located in this area is totally enclosed in a concrete structure, a fire origina-ting in this area will not impair a safe plant shutdown.
4.1.7 PCRV and Auxiliary Equipment Area - Elevation 4811'- 0" E 4816'-0" Area Description This fire area is divided by the missile barrier wall into the PCRV and auxiliary equipment zones. The PCRV zone con-tains the PCRV, PCRV relief valve, piping, valves, ventila-tion equipment and ducting and electrical cables. The PCRV relief valve is safety related. It is contained in a hori-zontal steel vessel attached to the PCRV.
The auxiliary equipment fire zone contains gas waste surge tanks and liquid waste receivers and monitor tank. These tanks are all totally enclosed in concrete cells. None of the equipment in this zone is safety related.
A 4-18
i I . .
Fire Area Boundary
( This area is bounded by the Reactor Building walls and divided into two zones by the steel missile barrier wall.
The floors and ceilings in both zones are open steel gratings with large openings.
Fire Load The major combustible in the PCRV fire zone is a small quantity of electrical cable insulation. Cables are bus and loop isolated. Cable trays are lightly loaded. The fireloadresultingfromcompletecombusgionofallcable insulation in this zone is 3,800 Btu / Ft (3 minutes).
The major combustible in the auxiliary equipment zone is also electrical cable insulation. The fire load in this zone, as a result of complete combustion of this material, is 7,850 Btu /Ft 2 (6 minutes).
Fire Protection Systems Fire detection for this fire area is provided by ionization type detectors located in return air ventilation ducts. Ad-ditional detection for the auxiliary equipment fire zone is provided by ionization detectors mounted over cable trays along the south ("J") wall of the Reactor Building. All detectors alarm and annunciate in the Control Room. The "J" wall detectors also alarm locally.
The PCRV fire zone is provided with two hose water stations and two portable dry chemical extinguishers. The auxiliary equipment fire zone is provided with two hose stations and two portable dry chemical extinguishers.
i Design Basis Fire The design basis fire for this fire area (either zone) is based on a fire originating in a cable tray due to'an electrical fault or a transient ignition source. Redundant safety rc.ated cables are separated by bus and loop, in-suring that a fire in any tray will not affect redundant
- safety circuits. In addition, the ACM system provides an alternate power source for safety related equipment needed to shut down the plant. The safety related PCRV pressure relief valve is afforded adequate protection by its secondary enclosure and would not be affected by the small fire load calculated for the area.
In conclusion, a fire originating in this area will not impair redundant safety systems or prevent a safe plant shutdown.
4-19
i
. 4.1.8 PCRV and Auxiliary Equipment Area - Elevations 4801'-0" 4 ( and 4791'-0" Area Description This fire area is divided by the missile barrier wall into the PCRV fire zone and auxiliary equipment fire zone. The PCRV fire zone contains the PCRV, piping, ventilation equipment and ducting, electrical cables, and four liquid i nitrogen cooled moisture monitors. Only the moisture monitors are safety related.
! The auxiliary equipment fire zone contains liquid waste receivers, monitor tank, and gas waste surge tanks that are totally enclosed in concrete cells. None of this equipment is safety related. A truck bay, enclosed by steel and concrete walls, is included in this zone.
Fire Area Boundary These fire zones are bounded by the steel Reactor Building walls and divided into two zones by the steel missile barrier wall. The floor and ceiling in the PCRV zone is '
open steel grating. The floor in the auxiliary equipment zone is reinforced concrete and fitted with numerous concrete floor plugs providing access to equipment cells located on the floor below. The elevation is at station grade level. One emergency exit door (not fire rated) ,
leading to the outdoors, is provided in each zone. A 10-ft. wide x 14-ft. high set of double doors (not fire
, rated) is provided in the outside wall of the truck bay.
j Fire Load The major combustible in the PCRV fire zone consists of a small quantity of electrical cable insulation. The cable trays are lightly loaded. The complete combustion of all cable insulation would result in a fire load of 2200 Btu /
Ft2 (less than 2 minutes) . Due to the absence of com-bustible material in the auxiliary equipment zone, the -
fire loading is zero.
Fire Protection Systems Fire detection for this fire area is provided by ionization type detectors located in return air ventilation ducts. Ad-d1tional detection for the auxiliary equipment zone is provided 4-20
"- 9 2---r --,m----- +-3--- - , , - - - - - , - - - - - - - - , * , , - - - - - - , . ~ - - + - - - --
v,---ww.= -
by ionization detectors mounted over cable trays a'long the south ("J") wall of the Reactor Building. All detectors alarm and annunciate in the Control Room.
The "J" wall detectors also alarm locally. The PCRV fire zone is provided with two hose water stations and three portable dry chemical extinguishers for use in fire suppression. The auxiliary equipment zone is equipped with two hose water stations and three portable dry chemical extinguishers.
Design Basis Fire The design basis fire for this area assumes a fire originating in one end of the cable risers in the PCRV zone, initiated by a transient ignition source or elec-trical fault. To be considered a plausible potential hazard to safety related equipment, the. fire would have to involve a cable riser near one of the four LN2 cooled moisture monitors. Due to the low fire load and spatial separation, redundant monitors would not be affected.
Furthermore, loop and bus separation precludes the involvement of redundant safety circuits as a result of a single fire.
In addition, the ACM system provides an independent source of power and independent cable system to equipment needed to perform s safe plant shutdown. An electrical cable
- fire originating in this area will not involve redundant
( safety circuits or prevent a safe plant shutdown.
4.1.9 Auxiliary Equipment Area - Elevation 4781'-0_"
Area Description This fire area encompasses the auxiliary equipment area cast of the missile barrier wall. This area contains '
liquid and gas waste collection equipment; tanks, filters, demineralizers, transfer pumps, compressors and associated controls. All of this equipment is either totally encloced in concrete cells or enclosed in concrete walled rooms.
None of the equipment in this area is safety related.
t l
4-21
. .- .- _ ~ .- _. - . . - - . _ -.
Fire Area Boundary i
{ This fire area is bound on three sides by reinforced l concrete walls that are the below grade structure of the !
Reactor Building,and on the west side by the steel missile !
. barrier wall. The ceiling in this area is concrete; the floor predominantly concrete with large openings and steel i grating walkways along the west and south walls. There i are several concrete walled cells in this area; some accessible at this level,.and the remainder having plug access from the level above, l
t Fire Load
]
- The major combustible material in this fire area is electri-cal cable insulation. The cable trays are lightly loaded.
Complete combustion of all cable insulation in this area results in a fire load of 3500 Btu /Ft2 (less than 3 minutes) .
I Fire Protection Systems i
Fire detection for this area is provided by duct type
- ionization detectors in return air ventilation. ducts and
, ionization type detectors mounted over cable trays along the south ("J") wall of the Reactor Building. These detec-tors alarm and annunciate in the Control Room. The "J"
( wall detectors also alarm locally. This area is provided with two hose water stations and four portable dry chemical extinguishers.
Design Basis Fire The design basis fire for this area assumes a fire origina-l ting in one of the cable trays initiated by a transient ignition source or an electLical fault. Loop and bus isolation assures the continued functioning of redundant electrical equipment. There is no safety related equipment 3
in this fire area. .
(
f 4-22
( 4.1.10 PCRV and Auxiliary Equipment Area - Elevations 4771'-0" and 4769'-0" Area Description This fire area is divided by the missile barrier wall into the PCRV and auxiliary equipment zones. The PCRV zone extends from Elevation 4769'-0" upward to Elevation 4801'-0" ,
outside the PCRV and PCRV support ring. This fire zone includes auxiliary system piping, ventilation ducting and valve stations, and twelve safety related hydraulic oil operat;ed valves.
The auxiliary equipment zone at this elevation contains two of the four safety related reactor plant cooling water heat exchangers, safety related MCC #2, and a radiochemistry room, decontaminant solution tank and solid waste storage area which are not. safety related. The decontaminant solution tank is totally enclosed in a concrete cell.
Fire Area Boundary The walls of the Reactor Building at this below grade level are reinforced concrete. The area is separated in'to two
( fire zones by the steel missile barrier wall. Floors and
( ceiling of the PCRV fire zone are open steel grating.
Floors in the solid waste storage area and reactor chemistry room are concrete. The floor under the reactor plant cool-ing water heat exchangers is closed steel decking. The ceiling above this area is concrete. The remaining floors and ceilings in the auxiliary equipment fire zone are open steel grating. Reinforced concrete walls, with communica-ting holes, separate the waste storage area from the reactor plant cooling water heat exchangers. Floor drains are provided in the solid waste storage area.
Fire Load The major combustible in the PCRV fire zone is hydraulic oil contained in twelve hydraulically operated valves and .
associated piping. Assuming total combustion of the hydraulic' oil in all twelve valve operators and associated piping, the fire load would be 6400 Btu /Ft2 (less than .
5 minutes). Assuming total combustion of all oil that could be supplied to a valve operator from the hydraulic oil power unit 2 (520 gallons) , the fire load would be 13,900 Btu / Ft (less than 11 minutes).
(
4-23
In the auxiliary equipment fire zone, the radiochemistry '
room contains various chemicals, reagents and several k combustible solvents. Total combustion of these materials produces a fire loading of 1150 Btu /Ft2 (less than 1 minute) in the radiochemistry room. The only other sig-nificant fire load in the auxiliary equipment zone arises from the open steel drums containing low-level solid wastes located in the solid radwaste compacting and storage area. There are normally about two open drums that are being filled as a normal plant function. Combustion of all material stored in both open and closed drums results in a fire load of 2150 Btu /Ft2 (less than 2 minutes) .
Fire protection Systems Fire detection for this fire area is provided by duct ionization detectors in return air ventilation ducts servicing the Reactor Building which alarm and annunciate
- in the Control Room. Additional detection for the auxiliary i equipment zone is provided by ionization detectors mounted along the south ("J") wall of the Reactor Building. A fire detector will be added in the radwaste compacting and storage area. These detectors alarm and annunciate in the Control Room and alarm locally. The PCRV fire zone is provided with two hose water stations and two portable dry chemical extinguishers. -
1 The auxiliary equipment zone is provided with two hose water stations, three portable dry chemical extinguishers and two CO2 extinguishers.
Two floor drains are provided in the solid waste storage area. The remaining areas have open steel gr.ating or steel plate decking with holes and provide for adequate water removal during fire suppression.
1 Design Basis Fire The fire loads calculated for the combustible materials contained in the PCRV fire zone are all insignificant l except for the hydraulic oil stored in the hydraulic power unit (Elevation 4740'-6") which could be released .
( in the area as a result of a mechanical seal (flange) leak or pipe failure at one of the twelve hydraulic oil operated valves located in this fire area (PCRV fire zone) . The ,
probability of a fire resulting from oil leakage is con-sidered very small. The temperature of the process fluid in the hydraulic oil operated valves located in this fire
- area is below the ignition temperature of the hydraulic oil. In addition, spray shields have been placed around l potential oil leak points to prevent oil sprays or oil x
b
, 4-24 i
[
vapors from spreading to a potential ignition source. '
( These spray covers greatly minimize the potential for an oil fire in this area. The separation distance between redundant safety related equipment and systems, and their distance from the hydraulic oil opekated valves prevents the involvement of redundant systems in a hydraulic oil fire.
There are no significant fire loads in the auxiliary equipment zone.
Polyethylene sample bottles are stored in a fire retardant treated open wooden cabinet located adjacent to the safety related MCC #2. While the bottles do not, in themselves, represent a sig'nificant fire load, they are considered a fire hazard because of their proximity to the MCC.
Therefore, action will be taken to replace the open wooden f
t cabinet with a closed metal locker.
A fire originating in the solid waste storage area will not affect the safety related reactor plant cooling water heat exchangers due to spatial separation of these units and the redundant loop units located in the level bel.ow.
1
(
4.1.11 PCRV and Auxiliary Equipment Area - Elevations 4759'-0" l and 4756'-0" Area Description This fire area is divided by the missile barrier wall into the PCRV and auxiliary equipment zones. The PCRV zone of this fire area eRtends from Elevation 4759 '-0" to Elevation 4769'-0" outside the PCRV support ring and from Elevation 4759'-0" to the bottom of the PCRV inside the PCRV support ring. This fire zone includes the lower part of the PCRV .(inside the support ring) , namely the .
steam generator and Helium circulator penetrations, high pressure separators, and main steam, reheat steam and feedwater piping (all safety related). Outside the sup-port ring are four safety related hydraulic oil operated valves and auxiliary system piping.. The auxiliary equipment zone includes the area to the east of the barrier between Elevations 4756'-0" and 4771'-0". The auxiliary equipment zone contains a data acquisition room,
, 4-25
i . ,
=
MCC #6, a bearing water makeup pump, two purification cooling water heat exchangers and two
(,
reactor plant cooling water heat exchangers. The pump l
i and heat exchangers are safety related equipment.
Redundant reactor plant cooling water heat exchangers are located on the level above, separated by a closed steel plate deck. . Redundant purification cooling water i heat exchangers are separated by a 12" thick concrete barrier. A redundant bearing water makeup pump is
! located in fire area 4.1.12, deparated by the steel missile barrier wall.
Fire Area Boundary The PCRV fire zohe is bounded by the concrete Reactor Building foundation walls, the missile barrier wall, and
. the PCRV annular support ring. Ceilings and floors 1 throughout the area are open steel grating.
i The auxiliary equipment fire zone is bounded by concrete walls. The floors and ceiling are predominantly open steel grating. Located within this zone is a concrete
~; enclosed data acquisition room. Two concrete walled rooms, with floor to ceiling openings, enclose the reactor plant cooling water heat exchangers and purifi-cation cooling water heat exchangers. The ceiling above the reactor plant cooling water heat exchangers is steel
- plating and the floor is open. steel grating. The ceiling above the purification cooling water heat exchangers is e
concrete, and the floor is open steel grating.
Fire Load i The major combustible in the PCRV fire zone outside the PCRV support ring is hydraulic oil contained in four hydraulic operated valves and associated piping. Assuming total combustion of the hydraulic oil in all four valve
- operators and associated piping,- the fire load would be 3500 Btu /Ft2 (less than 3 minutes). Assuming total com-bustion of all oil that could be supplied to a valve j operator from the hydraulic power unit (520 gallons), the fire load would be 22,700 Btu /Ft2 (less than 18 minutes).
- Total combustion of all electrical cable insulation would
, be 19,800 Btu /Ft2 (less than 15 minutes). There'are no significant combustibles inside the PCRV support ring. ,
The major fire load in the auxiliary equipment zone is located in the data acquistion room. Within the data acquisition room, a fire load of 38,800 Btu /Ft2 (29 minutes) results from total combustion of all cable insulation. The remainder of the combustible materials
\ .
4-26 e - . _
. - - _-~ ___ . - _ - . -.
in the auxiliary equipment zone consists of lubricating i
t' oil and cable insulation distributed in the area of the heat exchangers and along the north wall leading to the data acquisition room. Resultant fire loading is 1
5000 Btu /Ft2 .(less than 4 minutes). -
Fire Protection Systems Fire detection for the PCRV zone is provided by duct ionization detectors in return air ventilation ducts servicing the Reactor Building which alarm and annunciate in the Control Room. Fire detection for the auxiliary equipment area is provided by ionization detectors mounted along the south ,("J") wall of the Reactor Building in
. addition to return air duct detectors. The detectors
!' along the "J" wall also alarm locally. Two hose water stations, two portable CO2 and one dry chemical type ex-
, tinguishers are located in the PCRV area for general fire suppression. The auxiliary equipment area has two hose water stations and two dry chemical extinguishers.
~
A floor drain is provided in the concrete floor area adjacent to the bearing water makeup pump. The remainder of the areas is open steel grating or steel plate decking with openings which provide for removal of water in the
, event fire water is used.
- i .
( Design-Basis Fire The design basis fire and the consequence of such a fire-l for the PCRV zone,outside the support ring, is similar to that described for the PCRV zone in fire area 4.1.10. The design basis fire for the PCRV zone, inside the support ring, is included in fire area 4.1.12. The design basis l fire for the auxiliary equipment zone would be an electri-cal cable fire involving the cables leading to and inside '
the data acquisition room. Data acquisition cable is not safety related. The effects of such an electrical cable fire will not involve redundant electrical circuits or impair the operation of safety related equipment.
\.
t 4-27
. 4.1.12 PCRV and Auxiliary Equipment Area - Elevation 4740'-6" k
Area Description This fire area encompasses the entire basement floor, including a sub-floor pit directly below the PCRV. The steel missile barrier wall is partial in this area; therefore, the entire space is treated as a single fire area.
For convenience in addressing the large number of equip-ment and sites where combustibles exist, the fire area is broken into several regions. Safety related equipment will be identified in this section by the letters (SR) .
Located in the southeast quadrant are the two Helium purification cooling water pumps (SR) , the Helium transfer compressor, and the waste gas surge tank. The northeast quadrant consists of concrete rooms containing two gas waste compressors, two liquid waste sump pumps, the liquid drain tanx and decontaminant chemical supply pump.
Located in the west half of the fire area and inside the PCRV support ring is the Helium circulator turntable with its associated lift cylinders and hydraulic power unit.
Two PCRV ventilation air handling units and.four buffer
(. Helium chillers are also located along the inside wall of the PCRV support ring. A 25' deep Helium circulator removal trench inside the PCRV support ring and extending a short distance to the east provides the passage way for removing a Helium circulator. Two Reactor Building sump pumps are located in this trench.
1 The southwest quadrant of this fire area outside the PCRV support ring contains two redundant bearing water cooling and pumping units (S R) , a steam / water dump tank (SR) and two hydraulic power units (SR) . The bearing water cooling and pumping units in this area are separated from the redundant units, located in this same quadrant, by concrete walls.
The two hydraulic power units are separated by a concrete wall. The steam / water dump tank is located in a concrete
- enclosure.
The northwest quadrant of this fire area, outside the PCRV support ring, contains an emergency bearing water makeup pump (SR) , a turbine water drain tank (SR) , and two turbine water removal pumps (SR) , four buffer Helium recirculators (SR) , four buffer Helium coolers (SR) , a circulator auxili-ary chemical injection system, two backup bearing water k
4-28
- 4 6
coolers and filters, a trap drain tank and return pump, two bearing water accumulators (SR) and removal pumps, two
' gas compressors and pressurizers (S R) , two Helium recovery compressors, and a Helium dryer unit (SR) .
Fire Area Boundary Walls, floors, PCRV support ring, separating walls and rooms are predominantly reinforced concrete in this fire area. The floor inside the _CRV support ring is partly open steel grating. Ceilings are predominantly the open steel grating floor of Elevations 4756 '-0" and 4759 '-0".
The ceilings in the northeast quadrant are reinforced concrete. A 1/4" thick solid steel deck covers the two hydraulic power units at an elevation approximately 10 ft.
above the unita.*
Fire Load Major fire loads for this fire area are 33,400 Btu /Ft 2 (27 minutes) resulting from complete combustion of the hydraulic oil contained in the hydraulic power units for the Helium circulator turntable located inside the PCRV support ring, and 26,700 Btu /Ft2 (20 minutes) resulting from complete combustion of the hydraulic oil contained in the System 91 hydraulic power units. The remaining combustibles are reserve hydraulic oil stored in 55-gallon drums, small amounts of lubricating oil in pumps
(- and motors, and electrical cable insulation. The total fire load from all combustibles in this fire area is 75,100 Btu /Ft2 (56 minutes).
Fire Protection Systems The two hydraulic power units (System 91) are each enclosed on three sides by concrete walls, including a concrete wall which separates the units and extends above the units. Each unit is protected by an indepen-dent wet pipe sprinkler system. Actuation of the sprinkler system alarms locally and in the Control Room. Curbs with drains and floor drains are provided at each unit to re-move fire water. The curb drains will be modified to increase the flow capacity to exceed full sprinkler
- design flow rate.
The hydraulic power unit mounted on the Helium circulator turntable assembly is protected by a wet pipe sprinkler system. This sprinkler system consists of two spray rings.
One spray ring is located approximately 10 feet above the hydraulic unit and a second spray ring is below the turn-4-29
i table. This system is designed to suppress a fire at the hydraulic power unit and prevent a fire from spreading to k safety related equipment on the underside of the PCRV. '
Area fire detection is provided by ionization type detectors !
located in return air ventilation ducts serving the Reactor Building which alarm and annunciate in the Control Room. A j fire detector is also being added above each System 91 l hydraulic power unit.
] General area fire suppression equipment includes four hose water stations, four portable dry chemical and two portable l CO2 extinguishers. Five floor drains are provided for the removal of fire water.
Design Basis Fire The design basis fire for this area is assumed to be a fire originating in one of the two hydraulic power units. The fire would most likely originate near the base of the unit
! resulting from a pipe or component leak ignited by an electric spark. Such a leak could discharge up to 500 gallons of oil into the concrete curbed enclosures, t
The accumulators, located within the power package, store 4
sufficient fluid to perform their assigned safe shutdown functions. The location of the hydraulic oil accumulators
( does not preclude them from being engulfed in the fire, but would leave them capable of performing their function. In
- the event the operation of one or more accumulators were impaired, only one of the'two secondary cooling loops (main steam, reheat steam, and feedwater) would be rendered
, inoperable. Concrete curbs and the concrete barrier wall separating the two units protect the other hydraulic power unit from the effects of such a fire. Weir drains are pro-
~
vided in the curbs to direct fire water to nearby floor drains. These weir drains will be modified to prevent water i
and oil spillage over the curb during applications of fire water.
A fire detector will be installed over each hydraulic power unit to provide early warning of a fire condition and rapid investigation of the fire situation. Normally, a fire at a *
, hydraulic power unit will be suppressed automatically by the
! fixed wet pipe sprinkler system installed at each unit. If
. the automatic system should fail, the fire will be suppressed manually by using hose water or dry chemical extinguishers.
Small, high pressure fluid leaks can produce an atomized fog that is potentially explosive within certain flammability limits. Since there is currently no provision for the early g
1 4-30
_. +m g gg 7o. vm
, . - - . ,~. . . . - x -g er** e +'p-- +- - - = ' ' - -
i detection of such a condition, a mist detector will be
, installed near each hydraulic power unit to detect an oil mist in this area and to provide alarm and annunciation in the Control Room.
i 2
The present and planned provisions are considered adequate to combat a fire of either type that may occur in a hydraulic power unit.
A second fire hazard in this fire area that was considered
, because of its location relative to safety related equipment and systems is the Helium circulator turntable hydraulic power unit. This unit is located inside the PCRV support ring at Elevation 4740'-6", directly below PCRV penetrations for steam generators and helium circulators, and associated piping and cabling. The nearest safety related items are electrical cables, which are separated by bus and loop, at Elevation 4752'-1". A fire originating in the hydraulic oil unit is not considered a threat to i safety related equipment o'r safe shutdown for the following reasons: The Helium circulator turntable hydraulic power unit is used exclusively for handling Helium circulators, steam generator modules, associated components, and the i
tube plugging equipment. As such, it is used only when the plant is shut down. The hydraulic power unit is located directly over the Helium circulator removal trench -
which extends downward to Elevation 4712'-6". Oil leakage from the unit flows to the bottom of the trench where, i
(' along with water drainage, one of the two sump pumps will pump it out of the Reactor Building. The type of fire that is most likely to occur at the power unit is a smokey, low flame fire that would not be capable of reaching the safety related equipment.
It is concluded that there are no fire hazards in this fire area that could affect redundant safety related equipment.
or adversely impact safe shutdown capability.
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( 4.2 TURBINE BUILDING The Turbine Building houses the secondary plant equipment including such major components and systems as the turbine-generator, main condenser, steam, condensate, and feed systems, and HVAC systems. The building is essentially a three-level structure, except for the access control bay portion attached to the south side of the Reactor Building.
Like the Reactor Building, it is constructed with insulated dual corrugated steel walls and a Class A metal deck type roof. Its physical configuration, also similar to the Reactor Building, is an open structure design consisting of open steel floor grating, open stairways and, except as noted in the fire hazards analysis, contains unsegregated machinery areas.
r' The Turbine Building has been divided into fire areas by levels and by segregated rooms. Barriers between fire areas are generally concrete or concrete block construction with the notable exception of open steel floor grating.
As was done in the Reactor Building, when considering the effects of the design basis fire consideration was given to safety.related equipment and additional combustibles that could be involved based on proximity to the fire area concerned.
Communication during a fire situation is provided by the station's public address (GAI - Tronic) system. As a backup, eight radio transceivers are provided for the exclusive use of the fire brigade.
Emergency lighting is provided in the Turbine' Building and
~
i, assures adequate illumination for personnel egress and access to essential equipment.
The normal ventilation systems provide for removal of smoke and other airborne products of combustion during and after a fire. The Turbine Building return fans move air out of the building, but normally recirculate a portion of it to
. conserve internal heat. The ' Turbine Building ventilation systems will be modified to permit manual operation of the exhaust air dampers for smoke removal.
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4.2.1 Turbine Building - Access Control Bay - Elevation 4864'-0"
/ and Above Area Description The access control bay is part of the Turbine Building adjoining the south side of the Reactor Building which provides personnel and equipment access to the Reactor Building. Contained within this fire area are the three safety related reactor plant exhaust filters and associated non-safety related HVAC, equipment including fans, chillers, chilled water pumps, control panels and ducting. Several large non-safety related tanks are located on the upper levels including the deserating feedwater heater tank, fire water storag'e tank, domestic water tank, and building heating system expansion tank. A large pipe chase area is centrally located on the south wall of the access control bay.
Fire Area Boundary This fire area is bounded on the~ north by the steel Reactor Building wall. The other three walls are exterior walls of similar steel construction. The fire area extends uoward from Elevation 4864'-0" to the roof at Elevation 4938'-0".
Three reinforced concrete floors and one partial steel 4
grating floor further sub-divide the art t.
A stairway and elevator pr6 vide accesr to the various levels of this fire area. At the 4864'-0" elevation, a steel wall provides further zoning of the fire area. All cable pene-trations in this fire area are provided with fire stops.
All fire area boundary doors are non-rated steel doors.
The reinforced concrete floor and fabricated steel wc11s
(. and doors are considered to-be of a fire rating greater than the calculated fire load for this area. Ducting penetrating these barriers is not fitted wi th fire dampers, and several unsealed openings are provided for piping penetrations.
Fire Load Fire loads in this area consist of charcoal contained in the filters, lubricating oil in the water chillers, on-hand replacement lubricating oil and cable insulation. Cables in this fire area are loop and bus separated with light tray loading. The fire loading resulting from complete
! combustion of all electrical cable is calculated as 5,000 i
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r ,
Btu /Ft2 (4 minutes) . Fire load resulting from combustion of all lubricating oil is 4,600 Btu /Ft2 (less than 4
( minutes). The fire load resulting from combustion of all filter charcoal is 7,850 Btu /Ft 2 (6 minutes).
Fire Protection Systems Fire suppression at the 4864'-0" elevation, where the majority of combustibles are located, consists of two hose water stations in the west zone, one on either side of the exhaust filter enclosures. The east zone of Elevation 4864'-0" is provided with a portable dry chemical extin-guisher. Each remaining level in this fire area is provided with a hose water station and portable dry chemical or CO2 type fire extinguisher except Elevation 4921'-6". This elevation is provided with a portable CO2 extinguisher and can be reached by the hose water station located on the elevation below.
The Reactor Building exhaust ventilation filters are enclosed in separate steel walled enclosures and fitted with indi-vidually alarmed thermal detectors. Each unit is protected by a built-in spray water system for automatic fire suppres-sion. The filter fire detectors alarm and annunciate in the Control Room.
Two floor drains are provided in the concrete floor at the
( 4864'-0" elevation, one on either side of the steel barrier wall. Machinery, motors, and other equipment located in this area are mounted a minimum of 6" above floor level.
Control cabinets are elevated a minimum of 3" above the floor.
In the event of a fire, smoke can be removed by the access 2
control bay ventilation system.
Design Basis Fire The design basis fire for the west zone assumes a fire in one of the reactor plant exhaust filters, initiated by the decay heat from a radioactive isotope trapped in the filter.
The heavy steel casing will limit the fire to one filter '
unit. During normal plant operation, two of the three filters are needed. The filter fire detection system will alert plant operators of the fire. The absence of an alarm indicating the actuation of the filters' fixed spray water system will also inform the Control Room operators that manual backup fire suppression is required. Either of the two hose water stations located near the filters can be used 4-34
by applying fire water directly on the charcoal filters
( through an access door provided on each filter. This backup action would be necessary only in the event the built-in suppression system fails to activate. In either case, the fire would be limited to one filter and not prevent an unsafe plant situation.
The design basis fire for the east zone assumes a fire is initiated by a transient ignition source and involves the lubricating oil in the water chiller machinery. None of the equipment is safety related and involvement of more than one machine or the electrical cables in this area is considered unlikely due to the low fire load. The steel wall separat,ing this zone from the west zone, where the safety related reactor plant exhaust filters are located, is considered adequate to prevent the spread of fire to that zone.
4.2.2 Turbine Building - Access Control Bay - Elevation 4846'-6" Area Description
\,
This fire area contains the safety related Control Room air handling unit, return air fan, and the three Reactor Building exhaust fans. Non-safety related equipment located in this area includes the remainder of the Control Room HVAC equip-ment (including chiller units, chilled water pumps, charcoal
' filters and control panel), the access bay ventilation fan, and the PCRV relief filter.
Fire Area Boundary This fire area boundary is similar to the boundary described for fire area 4.2.1, except this fire area is limited to one elevation. A steel barrier wall separates the Control Room ventilation equipment from the remaining equipment in the .
area. This wall has a non-rated double door and a 9"x18" opening. This wall is not considered to be a fire zone boundary.
Ventilation ducts are sealed and fire-stopped where they pass through the floor. Piping through the floor is not sealed.
Penetrations for ventilation entering the Reactor Building from this area are provided with flexible air-tight seals.
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Fire Load
( The only notable fire loads in this area would be produced by complete combustion of charcoal in the Control Room' ventilation filters. These would produce fire loadings in 2
thgareaof2200 Btu /Ft (less than 2 minutes) and'1100 Btu /
Ft (less than 1 minute).
Fire Protection Systems Fire suppression equipment provided in this area includes one hose water station and two portable dry chemical ex-tinguishers. A floor drain is provided near the center of this fire area.
, During a fire, smo'ke can be removed by the access control bay ventilation system.
Design Basis Fire The design basis fire for this area is postulated on the combustion of charcoal contained in either the Control Room Makeup Air Filter or the Control Room smoke filter. Neither of these filters are used for normal plant operation and neither are used to control or minimize the release of radioactive material to the outdoors. They are not exposed to the heat from decaying radioactive nuclei which is the principal source of ignition for this type of filter media. Assuming a fire did start due to a transient
(- ignition source, fire water from a local hose station would be used to suppress the fire. To apply fire water on the charcoal, access to the makeup filter is through a steel access door. Access to the smoke filter is accomplished by removing the side cover plate. The smoke from a fire in
. either filter will be detected in the Control Room. Upon
- detection, ventilation system dampers will be shut, isolating the control areas from the fire, and the ventilation system will be shut down. Shutting down the ventilation system to the Control Room does not limit the habitability of the Control Room. Due to the containment of the charcoal, the fire will not spread outside the confines of the ventilation i system. A fire in either filter will not affect plant safety or impair a safe plant shutdown. .
The safety related Reactor Building exhaust fans are in separate ducts approximately 8 feet apart. Only small amounts of combustible lubricants are present in these units. A fire in one unit, which consumed all of the lubricant, would be insignificant and not a hazard to the other units.
(
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$ 4-36 l
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4.2.3 Turbine Building - Turbine Generator Floor - Elevation 4829'-0" Are Description The turbine generator floor is the upper level of the Turbine Building which abuts the Reactor Building. Located around the periphery of this level are the Reactor Engineer's Office, the Control Room, Health Physics control room, personnel locker room and, in.the adjoining service building, a lavora-tory, lunch room, instrument shop, and instrument storage locker. The only two major equipment items are the turbine generator and the' Turbine Building overhead crane. None of the equipment in this fire area is safety related.
Fire Area Boundary The north wall of this fire area is the "J" wall, common'to the Reactor ^ Building and Turbine Building. It is primarily steel, as described in Section 4.2, except in way of the Control Room and Service Building, where all walls are re-inforced concrete with some glass on the west wall. This fire area extends upward to the steel roof of the turbine hall at Elevation 4885'. Open stairways and an elevator provide access between Turbine Building floor levels.
r The floor in this area is predominantly reinforced concrete with large-machinery access openings. Ventilation ducting I
(' penetrating the floor is tightly fitted, but not sealed.
All electrical cable in this area is routed in conduit.
Fire Load 1, -
Combustibles in this fire area are limited to lubricating
-oil, hydraulic oil, and hydrogen gas contained within the turbine generator unit, and lubricants in the overhead crane.
The fire load resulting from the complete combustion of these combustibles is negligible.
1 1 Fire Protection System i
Fire suppression for the turbine-generator floor is provided by four hose water stations, two portable dry chemical and '
one portable CO2 extinguishers.
A mobile fire cart, normally stored on this level, contains a one CO2 and two dry chemical extinguishers, two portable
! emergency air breathing units with four spare air cylinders.
This mobile fire cart provides additional portable fire suppression equipment for all levels of the Turbine-Building, as well as other areas.
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- - - . - , , - _ - . - _ - - - - - . - - , - ~ - _ . - .
- ~ _. _- -_ -_ . - ._ . _ -
Automatic fire detection is not provided, nor required in this area due to the negligible fire load.
Design Basis Fire Due to the absence of safety related equipment and negligible fire load calculated for this area, a fire originating in this area would not affect safe plant shutdown.
i 4.2.4 Turbine Building - Mezzanine - Elevation 4811'-0" Area Description This area contains secondary plant auxiliary equipment.
The major safety related equipment items contained in this area are one (1) instrument air dryer and receiver, MCC No. 1, six (6) reheat steam line activity monitors, and sixteen (16) hydraulic oil operated valves. A redundant instrument air dryer and receiver and an MCC, which controls safety related equipment redundant to equipment controlled by MCC No. 1, is located in fire area 4.2.5. Non-safety
- related equipment items include feedwater heaters, water j treatment equipment, a Turbine Building HVAC unit, two condensate storage tanks, generator cooling and excitation equipment, auxiliary steam equipment and miscellaneous system valves, piping and heat exchangers.
Fire Area Boundary This fire area is bounded by either concrete or steel building walls. The north wall is the steel Reactor Building "J" wall except for the concrete wall enclosing the Auxiliary Electrical
. Equipment Room. The west wall, which separates the Turbine Building and Service Building, is concrete, fitted with several 3-hour fire rated doors. The east and south walls are steel building walls as described in Section 4.2. Floors ,
and ceilings are reinforced concrete with large openings and open steel grating. Three open stairways and one elevator provide material and personnel access between floor levels.
Fire Load
- The largest fire load in this fire area arises from electrical cable insulation. The cable trays are lightly loaded and bus i
I b
1 4-38 i
i
. - - . _ _ _ . _ . - , _ - - - , ~ ~ . . , , _.,.______..,,,____..m., -
. and loop separated. Completecombustionofallcagle insulation results in a fire load of 21,500 Btu /Ft
( (16 minutes). .
The hydraulically operated main and reheat steam and feed-water valves and associated piping normally contain a relatively small quantity of hydraulic oil which does not represent a significant fire load for this fire area.
However, in the~ event of a hydraulic oil leak, it is inherent in the system design that additional oil from the hydraulic power unit will be pumped to the area. This could result in up to 520 gallons of oil being burned, pro-ducing a fire load of 4500 Btu /Ft2 (4 minutes). The ability to isolate the oil supply to each hydraulically operated valve minimizes the impact of such a fire.
Fire Protection Systems
/ Fire detectors will be added above the hydraulic operated high temperature steam valves located at the north end of the fire area. Fire suppression equipment provided for this area consists of four hose water stations and six portable dry chemical and three portable CO2 extinguishers.
Design Basis Fire The eight s8) hydraulic oil operated valves in steam and reheat steam lines operating at temperatures of about 10000F have actuators that are located above the valves, such that leakage of the hydraulic oil (Gulf Harmony 68 has an ignition temperature of 8500F on heated bare metal) could contact the hot piping.
The design basis fire for this area postulates such a fire at one of these valves. Oil leaking from a hydraulic oil
(' operator runs down the outside of the valve bonnet, passes through the crevice between the aluminum lagging and valve body, through the thermal insulation, onto the hot s. team pipe and valve body. Upon reaching the hot metal surface, the oil smolders,giving off a large quantity of smoke and heat which passes counter current to the oil flow path.
i The oil soaked insulation glows like charcoal at the hot I
(above 8500 F) metal interface. Only with a continuing -
supply of fresh oil could sufficient heat be produced to cause a break in the insulation and aluminum lagging. If the lagging ~did break, however, the admission of air to the hot metal surface could produce a flaming fire.
l 4-39
4 Such a fire would be limited to one valve but could spread to one of the safety related instrument air compressors located on the elevation below. It is con-sidered unlikely that both compressors would become involved in the fire due to the concreta barrier provided between the two units. Furthermore, a third instrument air compressor with associated dryer and receiver is located away from this potential fire region. Therefore, system function will not be impaired by this design basis fire.
To ensure the early, detection and rapid suppression of such a fire, the follow'ing actions will be taken:
- 1. Six fire detectors will be added above the eight hydraulic operated high temperature steam valves.
- 2. Supply oil isolation valves are provided upstream of each steam valve hydraulic operator. An investigation will be performed to determine if the supply oil isolation valves are accessible from a safe location during a fire.
- 3. Two additional CO2 hose reel stations will be added to the existing Turbine Building CO2 system to provide high capacity backup for the portable extinguishers. Each station will be equipped with 100 feet of 1" diameter hose.
The safety related Turbine Building motor control center
( MCC #1 has its essential switching functions duplicated in MCC #2 and #3, which are located in the next lower level of the Turbine Building. The spatial separation provided ensures that a fire in this cabinet will not af fect safe plant shutdown. MCC #1 is enclosed on three sides by a water spray barrier, constructed of a flammable composition board. This water spray barrier will be replaced by an enclosure constructed of non-flammable material. -
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/ 4.2.5 Turbine Building - Grade Level - Elevation 4791'-0" Area Description
, This elevation is at station grade level and in the lowest level in the Turbine Building. This fire area, like fire area 4.2.4, contains BOP equipment. This fire area includes seven concrete enclosed rooms. These rooms include two Standby Diesel Generator Rooms, Auxiliary Boiler Room, Hydrogen Storage Room, Turbine Lube Oil Reservoir Room, Turbine Lube Oil Storage Room, and the Condensate and Makeup Water Treatment Room. Each of these rooms are i treated as separate fire areas.
Safety related equipment in the fire area includes three instrument air compressors with after-coolers, a dryer and a separator, and MCC's No. 2 and No. 3. Non-safety i related equipment in this fire area includes the main I condenser, boiler feed pumps, condensate pumps, turbine-generator auxiliary equipment, service water return pumps, service air compressor, and the CO2 fire system storage tank.
Fire Area Boundary The north wall of this fire area is the Reactor Building "J" t wall except for the concrete walled 480 volt Switchgear Room.
The concrete constructed west wall separates -the Service Building and the Turbine Building. Doors penetrating this wall are fire rated. The south and east walls are steel building walls as described in Section 4.2. Doors pene-trating these walls and leading to the outdoors are not fire rated. The floor of this area is concrete with several concrete lined pits. The ceiling of.this area is partially
( reinforced concrete with many open areas and steel grating.
Three open stairways and one elevator provide access to the l other elevations in the Turbine Building. .
Truck and railcar access into the building is provided in the southwest corner of this fire area.- The flexible steel overhead door closing this access is not fire rated.
Fire boundary penetrations for piping, electric cable and ventilation ducting are generally not sealed except for penetrations in the high fire load area boundaries such as the Turbine Lube Oil Storage and Reservoir Rooms, Standby Diesel-Generator Rooms, the Auxiliary Boiler Room, and the Hydrogen Storage Room.
4-41 l
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. - , . , . - . - _ _ _ -_. , - - . , , - - _ _ _ _ - , - - , . . _ , . , , , - _ - , , , - , - - , . . . ,, , -.-- ---..,-,,,,,.av .
Fire Load The largest fire load in this area results from complete combustion of electrical cable insulation distributed throughout the area and is 37,500 Btu /Ft2 (30 minutes).
Additional fire loads arise from total combustion of lubricating oil contained in the boiler feed pumps, and reserve hydraulic oil stored in drums.
These fire loads were calculated to be 24,000 Btu /Ft2 (18 minutes).and 6,100 Btu /Ft2 (5 minutes), respectively.
The resultant fire load,considering all significant com-bustibles in the fire area, is calculated as 68,700 Btu /
Ft2 ( 52 minutes) . ,
Fire Protection Systems The two steam turbine driven boiler feed pumps and the hydrogen seal oil unit are each protected by a wet pipe sprinkler system. The boiler feed pumps are installed over concrete pits sized to collect and drain off any oil that might leak from the oil sumps.
General area fire protection is provided from five fire hose wcter stations, seven portable dry chemical extinguishers, two pump-type portable water extinguishers, and two CO2 hose reel stations, each equipped with 100 feet of 1-inch
( hose.
The three safety related instrument air compressors are afforded protection by concrete barrier or physical separation. Two compressors are separated by a 12-inch thick concrete barrier. The third compressor is located approximately 40 feet from the other two, and is separated I by a concrete room wall. This separation is of considerable importance in view of the potential for and results of a hydraulic oil fire at one of the hydraulic oil operated valves located above the floor grating in the fire area above. The separation presently provided is considered adequate to prevent a fire from involving all three instru-ment air compressors. Only one compressor is needed to pcrform a safe plant shutdown. .
The two safety related MCC's (2 and 3), located in this fire area, are installed end-to-end. The electrical cables are loop and bus separated such that a fire in one cabinet would not involve a redundant safety circuit. A fire detector will be installed above these two cabinets to 4-42
provide early warning to plant operators of a fire
( '
developing in the area near these two panels. The area around these two McC's is generally free of combustibles.
The nearby boiler feed pump is sprinkler protected and mounted to preclude a fire there from-involving.either safety related MCC.
Approximately thirty (30) floor drains are provided in this fire area. These drains will remove fire water used in this area.
Design Basis Fire The design basis fire for this area is predicated on a fire originating in the lubricating oil system of a turbine-driven boiler feed pump. The pump's lubricating oil system and sump are located in a concrete pit, designed to collect oil leakage from the lubricating oil system. The possibility of oil spreading to or spraying on the safety related MCC located approximately 10 feet away is considered very small.
In the event of a fire, rate-of-rise thermal detectors, located above each pump, will alarm in the Control Room to alert plant operators of the fire condition. This detector will also actuate the fixed wet pipe sprinkler system. If the sprinkler system were not actuated, the i.
fire, confined to the pump pit, could be extinguished by portable extinguishers or hose water. A fire in this fire area will not prevent safe shutdown of the plant.
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e a
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e a
( 4.2.6 Turbine Building - Standby Diesel Generator Rooms -
Elevation 4791'-0"
~.
Area Description This fire area is located in the southeast corner of the Turbine Building grade level, and contains two diesel generators, their day tanks, oil transfer _ pumps, heat exchangers, air compressors, air receivers, generator control and neutral grounding cabinets, and ventilation fans. All of this equipment is safety related.
Fire Area Boundary
- The standby diesel generators are located in separate, adjacent rooms, sharing two 3-hour fire rated doors The floor, ceiling, and walls in the area are all reinforced
' concrete with a minimum fire rating of 3 hours3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br />. There is no exposed structural steel. Each room is fitted with double steel doors of 3-hour fire rating communicating to the Turbine Building grade level area. All cables are in condult. Conduit and piping penetrations are sealed where they penetrate the rooms. External ventilation ducts are fitted with automatic closing fire dampers. A 12" diameter, open ended pressure relief duct penetrates the ceiling in the rear of each room.
Fire Load The combustibles in this area are lubricating oil in the diesel engines, generators, and air compressors, and the diesel fuel oil in the day tanks. Combustion of all
( lubricating and fuel oil would result in a fire loading of 178,600 Btu / Ft2 (2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> - 14 minutes) in each room.
Fire Protection Systems Fire detection is provided in each room by high temperature thermal detectors which alarm and annunciate in the Control Room. The fire detection system actuates an automatic
- flooding CO2 system which closes the ventilation dampers and releases a predetermined quantity of CO2 into the room.
This CO2 system can also be manually actuated from a local control panel immediately outside each room.
Portable dry chemical extinguishers are located in each room near the entry door. Backup fire suppression includes a CO2 hose reel station and a hose water station located outside the two rooms. i
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Self-contained emergency air breathing equipment is provided at a station approximately 30 feet from the rooms.
A Each room is provided with a floor drain connected to the Turbine Building drain system. .
Design Basis Fire The design basis fire assumes a fire originating in one of the diesel generators involving all the lube oil present in the unit, as well as the 550 gallons of fuel oil in the day tank. Since each of the two diesel generator units are totally independent and contained within separate 3-hour rated rooms, a fire originating in one room will not affect the redundant unit even if there is no active fire suppression.
Normally, the CO2 flooding system will provide automatic fire protection by flooding the room with CO2-As an added ' fire protection measure, the diesel fuel oil day tank vents will be fitted with screen-type flame arrestors.
4.2.7 Turbine Building - Auxiliary Boiler Room - Elevation 4791'-0" Area Description This fire area is located in the southwest perimeter of the
- Turbine Building at grade level, and contains two safety re-lated auxiliary boiler fuel oil pumps and the non-safety related plant auxiliary boiler, two boiler feedwater pumps, a valve
- rack, and a control panel. The two aux'iliary boiler fuel
! oil pumps are safety related because they can deliver fuel oil to the standby diesel generator day tanks in the event a diesel oil transfer pump is inoperable. Two ACM fuel oil transfer pumps, also located in this room, are classified as l
- safety related but are_ exempt from special fire protection .
j treatment as discussed in the introduction of this report.
Fire Area Boundary The floor and ceiling of this fire area are constructed of reinforced concrete. The west wall is an exterior wall constructed of dual corrugated steel, enclosing mineral wool thermal insulation. The remaining walls are of reinforced concrete and concrete block. A single 3-hour fire rated door .
1 is provided in the east wall and a double 3-hour rated 1
4-45 1
k- . _ _
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/
door is provided in the south wall. At the time of this fire hazards analysis inspection, the door in the south wall was blocked open and fitted with a flexible duct to provide for additional room ventilation.
Wall and ceiling penetrations are all sealed. Fire dampers are provided in ventilation ducts at wall penetrations.
Fire Load Combustibles in the area are limited to the fuel oil con-tained within piping and associated equipment and electrical cable insulation. Fire loading resulting from these com-2 bustiblesiscalculatedgobe 3000 Btu /Ft (less than 3 minutes) and 1000 Btu /Ft (less than 1 minute) respectively.
Fire Protection Systems This fire area is protected by a wet pipe sprinkler system which alarms and annunciates in the Control Room and alarms locally.
Additional fire suppression equipment serving the area consists of a portable dry chemical extinguisher immediately inside the east door and a hose water station just outside this door.
( All equipment in this fire area is mounted at least 3 inches above the floor. Two floor drains are provided.
Design Basis Fire The design basis fire for this area assumes that leakage cf fuel oil from a fuel oil pump is ignited by a transient ignition source. Little spatial separation and no effective barrier is afforded the safety related transfer pumps.
Therefore, it is assum'ed that the design basis fire will result in the loss of both redundant safety related pumps.
Loss of these redundant safety related pumps would not affect safe shutdown of the reactor plant because the normal function of these pumps is to supply fuel oil to ,
the auxiliary boiler which is not needed for plant shutdown.
They are classified safety related only because they are designed to backup the standby diesel generator diesel oil transfer pumps. There is no other safety related equipment in this fire area.
The temporary ventilation supply (flexible duct) 'to this fire area creates a breach in the fire area boundary. This will be corrected by removing the supply duct from the doorway and closing and locking the fire door.
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e 4.2.8 Turbine Building - Turbine Lube Oil Storage Room -
( Elevation 4791'-0" Area Description .
This fire area is located near the northwest corner of the Turbine Building grade level and contains a two-compartment 16,000 gallon turbine lube oil storage tank, purifier and transfer pump. None of the equipment in this fire area is safety related.
Fire Area Boundary Walls, floor and ceiling of this fire area are of reinforced concrete. The floor elevaticn is approximately 8 inches below defined grade level. Access to the area is through a 3-hour rated steel door on an elevated platform on the south side of the area. This arrangement provides a 2-1/2 ft.
deep room- capable of holding up to 12,000 gallons of lubricating oil. Floor drains are piped to the Turbine Building drain system.
All electrical cables are routed in conduit and grout sealed where they penetrate the room walls. Two supply air venti-lation ducts enter the area and are provided with automatic 3-hour fire rated dampers. The exhaust system employs a
( dedicated exhaust blower discharging into the Turbine Building and provided with an automatic 3-hour fire rated damper.
Fire Load Lubricating oil is the major combustible in the Turbine Lube Oil Storage Room. The Turbine Lube Oil Storage Tank is divided into two sections, with a capacity of 8,000 gallons each. The magnitude of the fire hazard in this area is limited by the amount of available oxygen. In the event of a fire in this area, the room will be sealed off by the automatic shutting of the ventilation duct fire dampers.
Depletion of the available oxygen results in a calculated 2
fire load of 2300 Btu /Ft (2 minutes) . .
Fire Protection Systems The Turbine Lube Oil Storage Room is protected by a thermal rate-of-rise type detector which automatically actuates a deluge system. The actuation of the deluge system simul-taneously sounds an alarm near the room and in the Control Room. In addition to automatic actuation of the deluge system, two manual control stations are provided; one near
. 4-47
[ the entrance to the room and one in the Control Room. One portable CO2 extinguisher is located inside the room and additional portable extinguishers and a hose water station are located in the Turbine Building in the immediate vicinity of the room.
Design Basis Fire The design basis fire for this area assumes leakage of lubricating oil from the turbine lube oil storage tank ignited by a transient ignition source. Since the tempera-ture of the oil is normally well below the flash point, initiation and propagation of a fire is unlikely.
The heat from such a fire, if it were to occur, would normally actuate the automatic deluge system and cause the
( ventilation fire dampers to shut. Alternatively, the deluge system could be actuated manually from the Control Room or at the Turbine Lube Oil Storage Room. The fire could also be extinguished using portable extinguishers, or fire hose water. Considering, in adi'* tion, the normally low bulk temperature of the oil (relative to the flash point) , the fire resistance of the room enclosures, the limited supply of air to support combustion and the absence of safety related equipment in this area, it is concluded that a fire'in this area could not breach the fire boundary or create a hazard
( to redundant sa fety related equipment.
k 4.2.9 Turbine Building - Turbine Lube Oil Reservoir Room -
Elevation _4791'-0" Area Description The Turbine Lube Oil Reservoir Room is located near the north-west corner of the Turbine Building, grade level, and contains a 4700 gallon capacity lube oil reservoir with associated -
pumps and filters. There is no safety related equipment in this fire area.
Fire Area Boundary This room is enclosed by reinforced concrete and concrete block walls and both the floor and ceiling are reinforced concrete. Penetrations for piping, conduit and ventilation ducting are sealed, except for a 24-inch diameter lube oil
- 4-48
g return line and a narrow opening (2" wide x 10' long) in the ceiling near Column F-3. Access to this room is through a 3-hour fire rated steel door on an elevated platform at the south wall. This arrangement provides a 2-1/2 ft. deep room capable of holding up to 8500 gallons of lubricating oil.
Two floor drains are piped to the Turbine Building drain system.
All electrical cables are routed in conduit with grout sealed wall penetrations. The two ventilation supply air ducts and one exhaust air duct are equipped with 3-hour fire rated automatic dampers.
Fire Load The major combustible in this area is the lubricating oil stored in the turbine lube oil reservoir. The capacity of the reservoir is 4700 gallons. The magnitude of the potential fire in this area is limited by the amount of available oxygen. In the event of a fire in the Turbine Lube Oil Reservoir Room, the room will be sealed off by the automatic shutting of the ventilation system dampers.
Depletion of the available oxygen results in a calculated fire load of 2300 Btu /Ft2 (2 minutes).
Fire Protection Systems
( The Turbine Lube Oil Reservoir Room is protected by a thermal rate-of-rise type detector which automatically actuates a deluge system. The actuation of the deluge system simul-taneously sounds an alarm near the room and in the Control Room. In addition to automatic actuation of the deluge system, two manual control stations are provided; one near the entrance to the room and one in the Control Room. A
( portable dry chemical extinguisher is located inside the room and additional portable extinguishers and a hose station are located in the Turbine Buil, ding in the vicinity of this room.
Design Basis Fire The design basis fire for this area is postulated to be ,
combustion of lubricating oil affecting the turbine lube oil pumps and filter equipment. The heat from such a fire would normally actuate the automatic deluge system and .
cause the ventilation fire dampers to shut. Alternatively, the deluge system could be actuated manually from the Control Room or from a station outside the Turbine Lube Oil Reservoir Room. The fire could also be extinguished using portable extinguishers or hose water from the local hose station.
Considering, in addition, the normally low bulk temperature of the oil (relative to the flash point) , the fire resistance
(
4-49
of the room enclosure,-the limited supply of air to support
( combustion and the absence of safety related equipment this area, it is concluded that a fire in this area could not breach the fire boundary or create a hazard t'o any redundant cafety related equipment. _The openings in the ceiling of this fire area will be sealed to completely seal this fire area.
4.2.10 Turbine Building ' Hydrogen Storage Room - Elevation 4794'6" Area Description F
The Hydrogen Storage Room is located in the southwest perimeter of the Turbine Building on a dock-level platform elevated approximately 3-1/2 feet above grade level. It is completely-separated from the interior of the Turbine Building with the only entrance being from the outside loading dock. Six 200 SCF, 2200 psig hydrogen bottles are normally connected to a manifold system and there is storage space for up to 60 more bottles., The Hydrogen Storage Room and the equipment therein are designed to meet-the requirements of NFPA SOA, t Gaseous Hydrogen Systems at Consumer Sites. There is no safety related equipment in the Hydrogen Storage Room.
The room is ventilated by an independent exhaust fan which draws outside air into the room through an exterior wall louver and returns it directly outdoors.
( Fire Area Boundary The fire area boundary consists of concrete block walls between the room and the interior of the Turbine Buildina, concrete floor and ceiling, and steel exterior walls. The walls and ceiling have been sprayed with " Blaze Shield",.a i fire-proofing compound to provide an additional 2-hour fire rating. A blowout panel in the exterior wall and a blowoff ,
door is provided in accordance with the NFPA standards. All piping and conduit penetrations into the Turbine Building i' are sealed. -
l Fire Load The total heat of combustion of the maximum amount of hydrogen gas that can be stored in the Hydroggn Storage Room However, produce a fire load of 37,500 Btu /Ft (1/2 hour).
would 3 the more likely hazard in this room is a hydrogen explosion, which has been accounted for in the design of this room.
4-50
[
Fire Protection Systems i
Hydrogen fires are not normally extinguished until the supply of hydrogen has been shut off because of the danger of re-ignition or explosion. In this particular case, due to the limited amount of hydrogen stored in the room and
, the method of storing the reserve gas (independent cylinders) a fire would most likely be allowed to burn until all fuel-being supplied to the system from the inservice cylinder (s) was consumed. System check valves and isolation valves provided in the Turbine Building prevent loss of hydrogen from the user systems. In addition, two redundant manifolded
- hydrogen systems are provided. Hose water from a yard fire hydrant-would be used to cool the shut cylinders to prevent further release of hydrogen fuel.
In the event of overpressure in the hydrogen supply system, relief valves discharge through a flame arrestor to the outside atmosphere.
Design Basis Fire The design basis fire for this area is a hydrogen gas explosion. Adequate provisions have been made to relieve the destructive force of such an incident so that it could not impair the bperation of safety related equipment.
k.
- 4. 2.11 Condensa te and Makeup Water Treatment Room - Elevation 4791'-0" Area Description ,
The Condensate and Makeup Water Treatment Room is located in the southeast corner of the Turbine Building on the grade level. There is no safety related equipment in this room.
The major equipment items in :he room consist of storage tanks, pumps, and associated components for acid, caustic, ammonia and hydrazine treatment ~ of condensate and deminer-alization of makeup water.
Fire Area Boundary This room is enclosed on the interior sides (north and west sides) by concrete block walls fitted witn non-rated steel doors. The south and east sides are exterior Turbine
< ~
4-51
~ '
Building steel walls constructed of dual corrugated steel
< enclosing mineral wool thermal insulation. Both the floor and ceiling are constructed of concrete.
Fire Load The fire load in this area is negligible, consisting of a small quantity of electrical cable in open ladder-type trays.
Fire Protection Systems Fire protection systems for this area consist of portable dry chemical extinguishers and fire hose. station in the vicinity. Two self-contained air breathing apparatus are stored just outside the entrance to the room.
The storage conditions meet the requirements of NFPA 49 with the exception of separation requirements. No corrective action is considered necessary, however, because of the negligible fire load and the absence of safety related equipment in this room. The area is provided with a dedicated ventilation exhaust system which discharges through the east wall to the outdoors.
Adequate drainage is provided by floor drains leading to the. Turbine Building sump.
.. Design Basis Fire The design basis fire for this-area would involve the electrical cabling. Considering the small amount'of combustibles and the absence of safety related equipment, there is no potential hazard to safety ~related equipment or safe plant shutdown.
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, _ _ _ . - , _ , . . _. . . _ _ - . . . - . , _ _ . _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ . . _ , , _ . ~ . _ _ _ _ _ , . _ _ _ _ - , _ . , _ _
4.3.1 Fire Water Pump House - Electric Motor Driven Pump Room
( Area Description This fire area contains the electric motor driven' fire water pump and associated control panel for local pump control.
This pump and the diesel engine driven fire pump are located in a reinforced concrete pump house with a solid concrete wall separating the two pumps. The pump house is located near the main cooling tower basin. The door to this pump room is kept locked at all times. The diesel engine driven fire pump, located'in a separate room, provides a backup redundant function. Ventilation is provided by a thermo-statically controlled once-through system with a louvered intake in the wall over the door and an exhaust fan penetration in the ceiling.
Fire Area Boundarv This pump house is constructed entirely of reinforced concrete with a minimum fire rating of 3 hours3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br />. The fire area boundary is the building itself. Electrical cable is routed in conduit. All piping and conduit penetrations are sealed. The room entry door is not fire rated.
Fire Load ,
k There is not a significant amount of combustible material in this pump room. Furthermore, transient combustibles are not considered a potential hazard because of the location and construction of the pump house and the fact that the door is kept locked at all times. Therefore, the fire load associated with this pump room is negligible.
Fire Protection Systems Fire suppression for this pump room is provided by a portable dry chemical extinguisher located outside the room and the yard hyd' rant fire hose stations. The ventilation system provides smoke removal capability. Water drainage is provided by the pump pit in the floor.
Design Basis Fire Due to the absence of combustible material in this room, there is no design basis fire in this area that could impair the operation of the motor driven pump or the engine driven fire pump located in a separate room. Additional fire de-tection or suppression systems are not considered necessary due to the absence of combustibles and separation provided between redundant pumps.
4-53 -
4.3.2 Fire Water Pump House - Diesel Engine Driven Pump Room
('
Area Description This fire area contains the safety related diesel engine driven fire water pump and local control panel located in a concrete room, and an 850 gallon capacity diesel fuel oil day tank located in a separate concrete enclosure attached to the pump room. The fuel oil tank space com.-
municates with the pump room through a large ventilation opening in the concrete room dividing wall. This opening is provided with ~a 3-hour fire rated fusible link fire damper. The pump room is located in the fire water pump house beside the electric motor-driven fire water pump room. All electrical cabling is routed in conduit.
Ventilation is provided by a thermostatically controlled once-through system which draws air in through a. louvered opening over the door in the pump room and exhausts through the roof of the pump room and the fuel oil tank enclosure'. The fuel oil tank enclosure is accessible through a steel access hatch on the roof, in addition to the wall opening in the pump room.
Fire Area Boundary The pump room and day tank enclosure are both constructed entirely of reinforced concrete with a mi:timum fire rating
(' of 3 hours3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br />. The pump room and tank enclosure are separated by a concrete wall with a large opening for ventilation.
The ventilation penetration is provided with an automatic fire damper having a 3-hour fire rating. The pump room door is not fire rated. All piping and conduit penetrations through the fire boundary are sealed.
Fire Load The significant combustibles in this are the 850 gallons of fuel oil st'ored in the fuel tank and the 30 gallons' of lubricating oil contained in the pump.
The total combustion of all fuel oil produces a fire load of 309,700 Btu /Ft2 (3 hours3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br />, 52 minutes). Total combustion .
of lubricating oil produces a fire load of 14,600 Btu /Ft2 (11 minutes). Total fire load for this ar'ea is approximately
- 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />.
Fire Protection Systems Fire protection for this fire area is provided by a portable i dry chemical extinguisher located outside the pump room and
. 4-54
the yard hydrant fire hose stations. The ventilation system provides smoke removal capability. Water drainage from the diesel engine pump room is provided by the pump
. pit in the floor, which leads to the main cooling' tower basin.
Design Basis Fire The design basis fire is assumed to originate in the pump room as a result of leaking fuel oil contacting hot engine parts. The combustion of all fuel oil and lubrica-ting oil would produce a room fire load of about 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />.
This seems unlikely, however, because either the leak will be of low flow which will produce a low burning fire or, if high flow, most of the fuel oil will run off into the water filled pump pit. In any event, it could impair the opera-tion of the diesel engine driven pump. The concrete wall
( structure separating the two pump rooms would, however, prevent the involvement of ,the electric motor driven pump.
In conclusion, system function will not be impaired and, above all, a safe plant shutdown will not be prevented by the loss of the diesel engine driven fire water pump. The safety function of the fire water system is a third backup system used for driving the Helium circulator pelton wheels.
4 During a fire in either fire pump room, the reactor could be shut down by,the normal method.
( Fire detection or fixed fire suppression is not considered necessary for this area due to low probability of a fire and insignificant consequence resulting from a fire in relation to plant safety.
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. 4-55
4.4.1 Service Water Pump House Area Description ,
The Service Water Pump House is a reinforced concrete building located adjacent to the service water cooling tower. It contains three 50% capacity safety related service water pumps, the safety related service water strainer,and associated piping instrumentation and controls. There are no barriers separating the safety related component's.
Fire Area Boundary The service water pump house consists of reinforced concrete walls, floor and ceiling. The walls and ceiling are generally free of penetrations except for one supply air louver and one exhaust air opening. The single access door is not fire rated. Large steel covered floor openings open into the service water pump pits and piping below the pump house.
Fire Load The fire load in this area is negligible, since the only combustible present is the lubricating oil (2 qts. each)
(, in the three pump motors. In addition, storage of tran-sient combustible materials in this area is not likely due to its location and limited access (locked entrance).
Fire Protection Systems Fire protection for the service water pumps is provided by
. the yard hydrant fire water system.
The ventilation system provides for smoke removal during a fire. Water drainage from the service water pump house is provided by the floor openings to the pump pits below the building.
Design Basis Fire -
The lubricating oil in one or all service water pumps is insufficient to produce a fire in this area that could impair the operation of more than one pump. The design basis fire must, therefore, be based on a transient com-
. bustible. It is considered very unlikely that any form of combustible would be brought into this safety related building and be of the magnitude needed to impair the operation of all three service water pumps. In the event o
4-56 -
a of such a fire and if the service water pumps became
(' inoperable, either the circulating water system or the fire water system would be used to supply the cooling water needed to safely shut down the plant.
Because of the lack of barrier separation between the redundant service water pumps and their remote location, a fire detector will be added to provide early warning of a developing fire condition.
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4.5.1 Circulating Water Makeup Pump House Area Description The circulating water makeup pump house is a reinforced concrete building located approximately 150 feet north of the main cooling tower. It contains three 50% capacity pumps and their control panels, which are safety related.
The pumps are separated from each other by floor-to-ceiling concrete barriers.
Fire Area Boundary The circulating water makeup pump house is constructed entirely of reinforced concrete with a minimum fire rating of 3 hours3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br />. The fire area boundary includes two normally locked non-rated steel doors, a supply air louver and exhaust air opening. All cable is routed in conduit and penetrations are sealed. -
Fire Lo'ad There is not a significant amount of combustible material in this pump house.- Furthermore, transient combustibles .
are not considered a significant hazard because of the location and construction of the pump house and the fact that the doors are locked at all times. Therefore, there is no significant fire load associated with this pump house.
Fire Protection Systems Fire protection provisions for this area consist of two portable dry chemical extinguishers located outside the 4-57
pump house and the yard hydrant hose station. Smoke
( would be removed from the pump house by the once-through ventilation system. Floor drains are provided at each pump. ,
Design Basis Fire Due to the absence of combustible material in this area, there is no design basis fire that could_ impair the operation of more than one pump. Only two of the three pumps are needed during normal plant operation or during plant shutdown. 'A fire detector will be added in the-i area to provide early warning detection of a developing fire because of the lack of full barrier separation t between redundant pumps and the remote location of the building.
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4-58 f
1
TAIILE 4-1 FORT ST VKAIN NUCLEAR CEELRATING STATION FIRE IfAZARDS ANALYSIS SL'? MARY f
- Item Fire Area 1.ocation Safety combustible No. M. Jor Equipment Related Quantity Heat content Fire Load Fire Fire Separation o.
Material (Bru/lb) (BTU /ft2) Detection Suppression Redundant Available SR Equipment 4.1 F r.:.CTN twlLDING 4.l.1 Fctuellor Floor Mezzanine FIce.itinn 4916'-8" Elevation 4916'-ga
- a El evat ion 4916'-8" Sys. 46 Surge Tanks (2) Yes t'able insulation 3 ft 12,000 2,500 b Sys. 47 Expansion Tanks (2) Ionization Detecto Ho sa. Water Stations (2) Concrete Barrier 1.. in Return Air Petwen RedunJant Ventil. tion Duct Tanks.
flevation 4906'-8" ~
Elevation 4906'-8" c Elesation 4906'-8" Sys 25 Nit rogen Recondensers (4) No Lubricating Oil 5 gal 20,400 2,000 d My Recond. Cont rol C4 binet s (4) Hose Water Ststion No Paper, Cloth ( Misc. 20 f t3 7,500 1,800 Portable CO 2 4.1.2 R.- f u e l i nLFl oo r th varson 4nslT_gn f
a Sp. 2i Liq. N2 Storage Tank Yes Cable Insulation 8ft3 12,000 '
Negligible b ruel & Equip. Storage Wells Hose Water Stations (4; LN2 Tank Yes lenization Detector Enclosed in Steel c
in Return Air Portable Dry Chemi:al Wiled Ros=a.
Valve Operating Stations For Fuel Yes Ventilation l>uct ' '#U" * * "#
Stor nu Facility Hydraulic and Lubri- 3d gal 20,400 Negligible (31 cating Oils Portable CO 2 I4) d fuel Handl{ng Machine * " " ' ' ' * **
Yes Crease 2 gal 20,400 Negligible e Rod Drive Traasfer Cask No' Hydrogen 61,000 440 f t3 Negligible C r e Bar i roel llandling Cont rol Rmen No g
Valve Operating CRD. M. .C , a F? Swit(L'oards (4) No Startons.
h Nit rogen Reconde nser Chillers (2) No i
He P ir l f in at ion Cont rol Panel N j
He For 6 ile .it ton Regs n Equip. No k liq N2 Surgg Tank No l Ov.rI..ad Lt.ne Do O
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TABLE 4-1 Fol(T ST VialN NUCLE;Ji CLNEIL4 TING STATION FIRI ILCARDS A*.ALYSIS SMi".ARY Item Fir e Area Locat ion Safety Combustible' Quantity No .- Pt.e j o r Equipment IIca t Content Fire Load Fire Fire Seratation of Related Nterial (BTU /lb) Detection (gTU/ftI) Suppression Redundant Available ,R Equ igmen t 4.1.5 Any, g g g,.ut Area i1.v.itson 43 W -0" a Syn. 23 Purified Felium Filters (2) Yes b s, 4 t. Ftactor Plant Cooling Wat er loni zat ion Dr t ec tor ' lose Wt er Stations (2) 12" C*ostete tarrier Lubricating Dil 2 Cal. 20.400 Punp a (4)
Yes Nsgligible in retutn air venti. Fortable CO2 (4) 1,etwesa RedunJant Sys, lat ion Joc t s and 46 ruaps.
c Sys. 23 Hydrogen Cetter Units. along Seatt.( . I") ual t a l ter. .Ei on< mizer aM Compressor No '
nellum Illters in d
Separate Conc rete Cell e
sys. til r'a n Wst e vacuum Tank W N Service Facility % Fue! Storage Wells ese i
tuvt anJ Equipment Storage Wells Yes located in concrete 4.1..b enc losure.
PtaV and Aux. Fqu ipment A r e a - f Irv.o r ton 4329'-O" PrkV e we PCRV Zone a Air Nndling Un!'t s (4) No Lubricating 011 PCRV Tone PCRV Zone f 2 Cal. eaci, 20.400 Negligible lon'iilt'iInn Detector: W se Wter Stations (2)
Any s_l i r y_Ijgu.sp. Zone in ta turn air venti- Portable Dry Cl=>sical Auxiliary E qu_Ip . Zon. I.at ion duct n b Sys. t>3 cu %st e vacuum Tar.k (3)
No Tus.._J!guip. Zone Auw. Fquip Zone c lustrume nt Rous ionizat ion bet ectort No Alcohol (Instr.Rm.) 1 Cal. 16.000 along Evac tor Eldg. llose Wter Station (2) ruel Storage Wella are d
Negligible Portable Dry Clienical ht Service Facilit; No y loc as a-d in a to..c ret e e fuel and Eqalp. Storage Wells in return air venti- Portable CO2 -(l)
Yes lation ducts.
4.1.7 [4 rV ar4 Au.x._Fju l). men t, A r . .i - ric v.a t l ons 4tt ll'- 0 " amt 4 4 I f. _' - u_",.
poV yon--
PtRV Zone a PLhV Pic a.ure Relief Valve ""#
Yes cable Insulation 3 Aux _ F ju ip ., 7.me 22 ft 12,000 3.d t>0 fonization detectors Hose Water Stations (2)
Aux. T '1" .If. Zone in ret urn air vent i- Pe r t able Dry Chessical :t ee l sect,nd a r y c on t a i n-b 14 t iva duc t s. . eat tank encloses PCuv Sys. 62 Liquid Wast e Peccive h 3 (2) etessure relief valve.
% nitor 1...e' Cable Insulation 10 ft 12,000 us . rquip. 7one 7.850 -
Auu. T l -
c gg9, g ,,- gu p. Tonc Sys. 63 sies W ate Surge 1 No
- along Reactor Bldg. Portable Dr y Cl mic.si
%.t i.("J") w e l l . nJ (2)
, ,, ,g,,
f lation da ta, a
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l TA2LE 4-1 TORT ST nAIN NUCLI1J CLNEMTING STATION TIRE liA2.AADS ANALYSIS Sn?tARY l
Item Fire Area 1.ocation Safety Combustible' Quantity ifca t Content Fire 1. cad Fire Fire Separation at No .. !bjor Equipment Med bn MMM Related Material (BTU /lb) (BTU /ft2) km Mn Avaliable SR Fquf geent 4.1.8 h RV a,J Aou. E pigme n t A r . .a - L l e va t wo
- 4e ol '-0" and 4 / 91 '- O" N F V . . . ie PCRV Ton, PCity ZoEe POV Tone a Sys. 25 IN y Cooled Moisture Ionizat ion de t ec tor ,tose Wter Station (2) Moisture monitors (4)
M.>niturn Yes 3 in return air venti. Portable Dry Cleansical located near opposite Cable insulation 13 t t 12,000 2,200 Ist ion duct s. (3) corners of Itav area.
Anm. I'q g . Zone Auu. Fq's t p . Zone
- t. Sp. 63 Liquid W ste Receivers and u. n u. Fgy. Tw
- .mitor Tad No lon trat ion dete<. tor- llose tater Station (2)
None along Sout h ("J"? wall Portable try Clwinical
- c. Sys. (3 (:as Waste Surge Tanks No 4.1.9 vent ila t ion duc t s.
Lo. i l l.e rv F. u f went Area i li v .: b,n - 4/c1'-o"
( a Sys. 21 N, Compressors and Costp renor Heat Exc haaige rs No Cable Insulation 3 12.5 ft 12,000 3,500- Ionization detector + Nose Waer Stations (2) b Sys. 61 Decontaminant Solution e safety related Tank, Filt er s and Pumps along Soutf("J') wall Portable Day Chemical equipment in this area No and in return air (4) c Sys. 62 Lisaid W ste Filters, ventflatson duets.
Dealocralleers and Pusps No d Sys. 63 Wste cas Filters and "
rahaust Blowers- No 4.1.10 h.KV, and Ap u . rqu ipow nt Arca
- l 1 va t t on 4111'-O" and 4 76 4'-O" h 6V To n.- pc.py yone a Evdraulic Operated Valves'(12) PruV Zone PCPV Zone Yes Hydraulle Ojt 520 Cal. 20,400 d d P3 P I '*E
- 13.900 fonisation Jetector Hose Water Stat ions (2) Backup I, caring water (BaseJ on in return air van- Portable Dry Clonal accurmletore (4 uts) tutal sombus. t ilat ion duc t s. G) are spaccJ apart en th.
tson of all E.* actor Bldg. " alls.
.all al t could seJuedant equipment he supplied to
.ae li ab ing i t s es t o El.ose control.
. valve operatus itJ on "t.C #2 are son-trolled f rom of f
- r M C' euelsi_.ry J3ilp. Tune f ..s s t eJ in et t r fase Aux. Ups,ip. Fone areas.
/ b MCC (2 kou . Equip. Tone Auw. Fereip. Zone Yes t on< rs te Wil Bet ws n c lb stor Pl. ant Cooling Wat er IIcat Tonizat ion .let es tor. Ilose Weer Stations (2) 'ys. 46 Ileat Fu l aage s 3
Ful..ogers (2) Yes
'Io"C S*"st l.("J") wall Por table Dr y Cle micata inJ W s ! c (t er.sge Ar c.s ,
1*m.pt y Plast ic 5 lbs. '" " '"'"'
g,,, , j y ,
. 20.000 Negligible '# (" " ' ' ' ' ' ' ~ "' ""
(4 . ,it b. u J . .a n6mt pi7) , <* nt i l .a t ion ."lui t e..
Portable (Oy (2) ' a ve l la low.
~ .
I TABLE 4-1 FORT ST VRAIK f.TCLLAR CE!. ERAT!hG STATION FIRE !!AZAkDS MALYSIS Sl??tARY Item Fire A re. location Safety Combustible Quantity Heat Content Fire Load Fire Fire S*P4 ration of No. Mjor Equipment RelateJ Neerial (BTU /lb) (grg/gg7 I h tection NWdu Md" Availabic R Equipment 4.1.10 (Corit ' 8 J RaJ f ot l.emist ry Rxa No Various Solvents 5 gal 17,000 1.150
= So11J Waste Storage ho Flastic Film, Cloth 60 f t3 7.500 2,150
. Minc. Dry k*aste 4.1.11 PCRV and Aux. Fquipown t Av. - tlev
--- ;p,p g...itu.n 4759'-0" and PCFV Zone PCRV Zone
- r Stations (2)
We t ec - 51 %te m generators, a Stian Generator. Penetrations (12) s etu Portat.le Dry N att t um e a are Yes Cable Insulation 65 ft3 12.000 19,80J g
(- b ilellem Circulator Penet rat ions (4) Yes Portable CO2 (2)
ReduaJant Bearing b;ater e ilirh Pressure Separators (4) Yes %keup Pump located in lowrIoni separ.eteJ d H,J raulic 011 Opera tcJ Valves (4) Yes 520 gal 20,400 Hydraialle Oil 22,700 (Based on tot 6' RedunJant Pur if ic a t ion iombustion of cooling wat er twat
.ill oil that esthaugers separateJ
.culd 1.e sup- by 12" thick conc rete iIted to one wall.
'#* "E "P*##~
'*') ReJunJ. ant Reactor Pl. ant cooling water heat Aw _goip. 7.ine Auw. Tgulp. Z e exch.senga rs tax ate J on Aou. F3 .lp. Zone 4a,s . Q.s t p . Zone, e Mcc fb No y ,y ,g ,_,,py ,g,a
' loaization detec- Hiise Wter St at ions (2) by treet plate decking.
tors alvo g South Portab!e Dry Ct s. (2) f Sys. 21 Bearing Wter Makeup Pump Yes Lt.bricating 011 1 Cal. 20,400 Negligible '"J" wall and in return air venti-g Sys. 4 7 Purificat ion Cooling Wat er la t ion der t s.
He.a t Ec h. sneers (2) Yes h S y +. . 4(,F:nsctor Plant Couling Cable Insulation 15ft 12.000 5.000 W ter Haat !!xcle mgers (2) Yes (Caperal area) i
...t a Ar.io l w i t n on k..v. Ib c ble inwl at lan lo f t3 12,000 18,6 %
(tuta Ac<tuisit tori Rm)
{
l TABLE 4-1 FORT ST VR>.IN NUCLIAA CU.IkATING STATION FIRE ILAZARDS ANA:.YSIS Str.ARY Itea Fire Area Location Safety Combustible No. Major Equipment Quantity Heat Content Fire Load F1Ie Fire Separat ion of Related Puterial (BTU /lb) e ec n g, gong,,g (EEU/ft?) g)aT ga re t
, SR Equipment 4.1.12 r_fk t ant Aux._rggipment Area -
113vLtion 4740'-c" Ionization Ho se Water Stat ions (4)
Iktectors la Re- Portable Dry Clweical a Hel a ua Pu rificat ion Cooling Wat er actor Building (4)
Pu ps (2) Yes return air venti-Lubricating 011 1/2 Cal. 20,4D0 Negligible Portable CO2 (2) He, Pur if t. Cool Wa r.
lation Juc t s b Hellum Transfer Compressor No Pumps separateJ by Lubricating 011 33 6a1, 20,400 2D00 ("" "I**II*
c Waste cas surge Tank betrier.
No Cable Insulation 20 Ft2 12,000 3700 d Weste Cas Compressors (2)' No Lubricating 011 kegligible e Liq 91J Waste Sump Pump 6 (2) No Crease Negligible i 1.11uid Drain Tank No g I'wc ont aminan t Cheatcal Supply P s.p No Crease Negligible h Helium circulator Turntable and bea.sval Cas k Ass'y Hydraulic Oil I 13 o 1250 Cal. 20,400 33,400 Wet Pipe Sprinkler 1
Buf f er Helium Recirculator Chiller System above and below l'a i t (4) No Res. Hyd oil drums 385 Cal. 20,430 (2 ringF) CirculaIOT 10,300 turntable.
j Sys. 21 Bearing Water Coolers (2) Yes RcJundant Bearing Water k Syn. 21 Bearing Wat er S torage Tank Yes ,
System equipment separat ed by conc ret e 1 Syn. 21 Esaring Water Pumps (3) Yes. Lubricating cil 4 Cal. 20,400 wall.
Negligible Total-a Sys. 21 Bearing Water Filters (2) Yes n Sti am Wat er Dump Tank -
Yes team ater u*P tank n tusep Tank D:ain Pump enclosed on 3 sides by No Crease Negligible c onc r e t e wall .
P Sys. 91. Hydraulic Power Unit (2) Yes Hydraulic 011 20,400 500 Cal (ea. 26,700 Wet Pipe Sprinkler RedunJant Hydraulic i nc ludi ng System above each Units separated by bac kup Hydraulic Power Unit, cuncrete wall.
storage tanks.
q Sys. 21 Reartog Water Conters (2) Yes
(
t
T.u S 4-1 .
FORT ST VRAIN NLCLEAk GESIRATit.C STATION r
FIRE HA7.ARDS AnLYS15 SD?tARY Item Fire Area I.ocation Na. Safety Coebustible Njor Equipacnt Related Quant it y :Icat content Fire Load Fire Fire SeP*ratloa a terial (ETU/lb) crion (BTU /ftI) Suppression Redundant Available SR Equignent 41.12 (6. . n t ' t )
r Sya, 21 h aring Wate r Storage Tank Yes Redundant 1k a ring a
sys. 21 Bearirg Water Pumps (3) Yes
- Lter System Equipmes Lutricatirg 011 4 Cal. 20,400 Negligible separated by cosw rete e
Sys. 21 ficaring Water Filters (2) '?otal wall.
Yes u
llelium Rec irculat or C(stre sser (c.n ra j an.e r,t Ta rth s ard enc.1c t ed (crgtetects (4) Yes JIelium rec irculatur compre sors enclosed v in separate steel tas Puf f er lit llum Cccle rs (4) Yes w
lie t h:= c i r c u'a r or Aun . rhesical Jap <tten Svstem Na x Backup Pearing Water Pfitars (2) No y Badup Ecar trg btcr Coclers (7) be a
l'm rE . Bearing Water Nkeup Pep g, a .a frap Drain Tank No ab Trop Drain Return Pump No Crease Negligible ac Turt.Ine Wter Drain Tank Yes Turbine water drain pamps, Iwaring water ad Turbine Lter Removal Pumps (2) accumulat ors and gas Yes !=hricating 011 ( 2 Cal. 20,400 Negligible prem.urinra are me Rearing Lter Accumulators (2) Yes separat=J by distance af ras Pre $.t urizers (2) Yes ag fiel ha ke< uvery CtAbprC%kors (2) Ho tubrl(ating Oil 3 Cal. Fa. 20,400 Negligible ah Pa ar i ng L t e r Removal Pun.ps (2) No Crease Negligible al lie t t on ():yer 55 nit Ya- s
. I.
TAE'J 4-1 FORT ST VRAIN NUCLEAs ca.LOTING STATION f FIRE HAZARDS ANALYS15 SU?mRY Item Fire Area Location No. Safety Combustible' Ljor Equireent Qua nt it y Ifca t Content Fire 1. cad Fire Fire Related Material separatim M (BTU /lb) (BTU /ft2) Detection Surpression ReJundant 4.2.1 Available SR Equiseent T..r M na 1%11 dine - Acceu Cont rol n.s v - II v. tion 63 h4 '-0" anJ a bove L st 7m - - F. lev. 4064' War Zone tle.4864 ' West tone-Flev.4F64' a Contin =ous strip kes.: tor Plant Ex hau s t Filters (3) Yes Charcoal % se Water Stations (2 i ttractor Plant Eahaust b
3360 lbs. 12,900 7,850 th**I 'letector Aut a tic Sprinklef Filters housed in P(E V Piping Cavity Air Handling in each Reactor System in eac% separate steel l'n i t (1) No Plant Exhau.t Reactor Plant Filter, enclosures c
h haust Filtet Rex tor Plant HVAC Panels (2) No Cable Insulation 26 f t3 12,000 5,000 E.g t 7one - Elev. 48 _64'
.d Zast Zone -El e. 4 864 ' Fast Zone-I Peactor Plant Water Chillers (3) No None. Portable Trlry,4864' y O.em (1) e ChillcJ Water Pumps (3) No Lubricating 011 170 Gal. 20,400 4,600
( .r.!.< v a t i on s above 4564' Elevations above llevations above f
Reactor Plant Air Handling Unite (2) No 4864' 4864' g Filters anJ Cooling coils Ene . One 1.o.e stat ion and No either a portable CO y h Deaerat ing Feedwater Heat er or Dry Cheinical No extinguisher on each i
Fire Wect Storage Tank No elevation encept j
elev. 4921'-6" Dome s t ic W.at er Tank No k Doll ling Heating Sys. Expansion Taak Mo 4.2.2 (.sy_bine_B f id_in6 - Access e ont rol Pay - Elevatton 4846'-6" a Cont rol koo's Air Handling Unit None ** *# * "
Yes Portable Dry b
Control R um Peturn Air Fan Yes Chemical (2) e control Room Charcoal Falters (2) No" Cha rcoal
- 00
{
d Cont rol Room Chillers (2) and chill Wate r rumps (2) No i Lubricant s Negligible e c ontrol Foom HVAC Contrul P.snel No (Coot inm <l on ne xt p.1p)
a I
TABLE 4-1 .
FORT ST VkAIN NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS Sb?P1ARY l'
Itca Fire Area 14 cation Safety Combustible' No. Major Equipacat Quantity Heat Content Fire Load Fire Fire Separation of Related Material Detectior. Redundant (BTU /lb) (BTU /ft2) Suppression Available SR Equipment 4.22 (Cont'J) ,
f ccus Control Bay Ventilation Fan No =
Reactor Building Enhaus 4 ar tor Building Exhaust Fans (3) Yes * " * ' ' ' "" *
- Separate ducts - 8 ft.
h .tRV Relief Filter No **
4.2.3 orbine RestlJing-Turbine Generator leer - t leva t ion 48 2 9'-O" Rose Water $ tat ions (41 No SR Equipment l oc a t e.1 Portable Dry Chcaical in this area.
a Jurbane Generator No (2)
Portable CO 2 II) b iarhine Hall Overhead Crane No (Abricants Negligible 4.2.4 urbine Bu t id ing-Me z zanine-g- L i<vation - 4s11'-O" None -Hose dater Stat ions (4) Loop 1 & 2 Activity Portable Dry Chemical Monitors are separated a N hs a t St eam line Activit y Monitors (6) by 64'
( f> ) Yes Portable CO2 (3)
RedunJant inst. air b instrument Air Dryer (1) dryer 6 receiver are on Yes next lower level.
c Instsim cat Air Receiv-r (1) Yes AcJundant MCC panels on next lower level.
J rurbanc Plant M.C.C #1 (1) Yes Cable Insulation 354 ft3 12,000 21,500 e lyJs 4olic operated valves (16) Yes Hydraulic 011 520 cal. 20,400 4,500 (based on t otal cum-bustion of all oil that c ould be supplied to one leaking valve oper-ator) f m.hnsate Srprate Tanks (2) No g i . Jsat er th 4t e rs, (4) rea g h uplina & W. ster Treatment Equipment No Anhydrous Armnonia 24 11,s. 7,000 Negligible i . .rator Stat-r rotellog Equipment go .
O
TABLE 4-1 l' ORT ST VRAIN NECLLu CLhERATIL STATION TIRE IIA 2ARDS AM1.YSis SemRY f
Item Fire Area 1.ocat ion Na. Pujor Equipment Safety Combustible Qua n t it y IIca t Content Fire Load Fire Related Puterial Fire Separation e (BTU /lb) (BTU /ftI ) "
$g ,,
4.2.4 (C.m t ' d )
) wen licat Renoval Exchanger No k
dydrogr-n Seal 011 Det raining Tank No Lubricating 011 I 100 Cal. 20,400
'scitat ion Switetgea r No Negligible a
sal,orat ive Cuoling Unit No n
tur bine B.silJing Ret urn Air Fan No 4.2.5 ru r t i ne Butiding - CraJe Icvel W v_ation 4791'-O" eneral Area aa I n st r u:nent Air Compressors (3)
Concrete barrier wall b
Yes ese Water Stations (S) between redundant fra Instrument A ir D'ryer '(1) Yes
O, Hose Stations (2) air compressors.
- c Portable bry Chemicalt7 RedunJant inst. air Ins t rument Air iteceiver (1) Yes Portable Pump Water (2) dryer & receiver are d located in n o t highu
% tor Control Centers (2) Yes level Cable Insulation 48C ft e I2.000 37,500
'.c rv ic e Air Comp re s sor s (1) No i
rurbine Elect ro-llydraulic Cont rol(l) No R
oiler FeeJ Pimps (2 turbine 1 elec.) No Lubricating 011 2,150 cal.- 20,400 24,000 h Rate-of-t ise and unde nsate Pumps (4) det Pipe Sprinkler Na fusible link system over ep h steam 1
.iln Condsn<cr (1) thern.al det ector Iriven BFP Na over ech steam j y driven MP l.lrenen Stator Cooling Control (1) No llydrogen k fy 50 cu. ft. 61,000 Negligible '
drocen Seal 011 Urit (1) % Seal 011 I 100 Cal. 20,400 1.100 crvice Eater Return Pumps (3) No Rit u vi-rs% anJ Wet ripe Sprinkler a funibic 1)nk System uver 1yJrogen m.erator Neutral GrounJing Pal (1) No tlwreal Jetes tor seal oil unit.
n over 1.ydrui.cn e
m r at or Sgree Protert fun (fnit (1) No seal oil unit.
o us Dut Cem i t ng Un i t (1) 30 a
4 (Cont inocJ on m at paEe)
I
TA2LE 4-1 TORT ST VRAIN NUCLEAR CLKERATING STATION g FIRE HAZARDS A511TSl$ LD1HARY Itca Fire Ace.s Location Safety Combustible Quantity No. Kajor Equipinent Heat Content Fire Load Fire Five Separation of Related Nterial I" (BTU /lb) (BTU /ft2)
I "P P " " ""
Available Sit Equiseent 4.2.5 (Cr.t'J) p
'at or cont rol Centers 2 6 3 Yes q t0 2Fire System Storage Tank (1) No .
r Sys 91011 Catch Tanks (2) No flydraulic 011
, 10 Cal. 20,400 Negligible a Iruck Bay No HyJraulic 011 $50 Cal. 20,400 6.100 G
f b
I l
s .
l TAtLE 4-1 FORT SI VRAIN KLCLLu CU.LRAT1hc STAT 16 FIEE MA1ARDS AMLYSIS StimRY Ites Fire Area Location Safety Combustible No. Major Equipment Related quantity Heat Content F?re LoaJ Fire Fire Separation a Material (BTU /lb) (stu/gt?) Detection u r on Re g g nt 4.2.6 Turbine P.u i l d i ng - standh ait .1 u nerator p urs -
l'....tson - 47vi'-0"
-{JM iur one roos) a ab ut t-Crnerators (1) Yes Lubricating 011 250 cal 20.400 57.375 b D-C U. 6t Exc hang e rs(2) Late-of-Pise Yes FlooJing CO 2 Thermal Detector Sy st em 'ach r:Jundant Diesel c Air Receivers (2) Yes tenerator located in a separate concrete room 4 Ai r Coe.p re s sors (2) Yes Lubricating 011 ,1\ Gal 20.400 Negligible e
Crna rator Cunt rol Cabinet (1) Yes Cable Insulation 1 cu. ft. 12.000 Negligible f Diesel Oil Traasfer Pumps (2) Yes g 'rnt11ation Fan (1) Yes h bay Tank (1) Yes Diesel Fuel 011 550 cat. 19.7CO 121.250 4.2.7 Ta r t;i ne !:o t id in e- Aux ili a ry Pgh r R....re-E l ev a t t on-4 7 91 '-O
a Auxiliary Bailer No b
- Fusible Link Wet Pipe Sprinkler Aux, ball r'Feedwater Pumps (2) No Thermal Detector System Small concrete barrier bet ween reJunJait Aus.
e aus 1, oiler tuel 011 Pumps (2) boiler Fuel oil pumps, Yes Fuel 011 (la piping) 30 Cal. 19.700 3.000 d
Valse Rack & Control Panel 1;o Cable Insulation 1-1/2 ca. ft. 12.000 1.000
, 's C I Fuei 011 Transfer Punps (2) Yes 4.1.8 79ttine FIui1 Jing-Turbloc 1.ube oil Storage Ros.e Elevation 4791*-0" a Turbine L.O. Storage Tank No lutricating Oil 16.000 Cal 20,400 2. 3J' o b Ra t e -of-R i se Turbine L.O. Trr.nsfer Pump No Automat ic L'ater Delug. No SR Fquipment in t ht.
The r sal Det ec t o r System c area
/
1..rbine L.O. Purifier No Portable CO2 4
l L
I TABLE 4-1 FORT ST VRAIN NUCLLAR CENLilATIN". STATION FIFE HAZARDS ANALYSIS SUt?tARY l .
Itra Fire Arca Location Safety Combustible Quantity Heat Content No. N jor Equipsient Related Fire load Fire Five Separ.et too of Ntcrial (BTU /lb) Detection Suppression Redundant (BTU /ft2)
Available SR Equiguent 4.2.9 Turt,ine h ilding-Tarbine lube Oil kes.a mir N us ETevation 451Cn'-
a Turbine L.O. Reservoir No Lubricating 011 4 700 Cal. 20,400 2.300 Rate-of-Rise b Turbine L.0, Filter Set Automatic W ter Deluge No SR l'quipment in No
. -real De t ec t or System this area 4.2.10 Turbine fN ilding - liv.f roy,en Portable CO2 S t i-r a,e L..m - 1.-l ev a t s on 4 7 44 '-6" a Hydrogsn Storage Bottles (maximu:n of 66) Up to No Hydrogen Cas 13,200SCF 60,958 37,500 4.2.11 Con!cesare and NkeQWater, _ None Yard Hydrant hose No SR Equipment in Tra tm nr %m I l eva t ion 4191 *- O water station this area a
C..ndensate Treatment and NLe-up Wier D*.inierallration Equip. No Cable Insulation Negligible 4.3.1 Fire Wi er Pumpj buSe - Flectric None Portable Dry Ctemical No SR Equipment in Nt or Dr Ava n Pomp _ggg (3) this area a Fire Weer Pump Hose Water Station (1)
Yes Lubricating 011 Negligible None 4.3.2 Fire Wt er Pumpjicce - Dieset Portable dry chemical Reinfo..e4 concrete F y oic Dr iven Pw.p 10mm (g) wall separates pump Yard bydrant hose rooms a fire Weer Pus:p waser station Yes Die'>et Fuel 011 5 Cal. 19,700 2, 300 Por table dry chemical Lubricating 011 30 Cal. 20,400 14,600 ReinforceJ concrete wal b (1) **pa ra t e s pump r uous .
Dicael fuel 011 rank Yes Yard hydrant home Diesel Fuel Oil 850 Cal. 19,700 307,400 Diesel f uel oil tank 4.4.1 5. rvice Otcr Pump House water station located in independent a
h rvice Weer Pumps (3) conc ret e enclosure.
Yes Lubricating 011 b '
2 qts, each 20,400 Negligible None Service Weer Strainer Yes Yard hydrant bose Circ. water & fire w.stu water station systema can perforls 4.5.1 Circulatinedtg _M acup PurP2 safety function.
.e House a Ciri ulat ing Wt er Makeup Pumps (3) Yes Lubricating 011 5\ qt s. ea. 20,400 3,600 .None -ortable dry chemical Foncrete barrier walls (2) between redunJJnt pumpu.
i.ard Ilydrant hose
.ater station 3
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