ML20063G759
| ML20063G759 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Indian Point  |
| Issue date: | 01/20/1982 |
| From: | Bayne J POWER AUTHORITY OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK (NEW YORK |
| To: | Haynes R NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| References | |
| IPN-82-7, NUDOCS 8207290206 | |
| Download: ML20063G759 (20) | |
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) POWER AUTHORITY OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK 10 CoLUMeus CIRCLE NEW YORK. N. Y.1o010 (2121 397 6200 GEORGET. BERRY OPE n A TING OFFICin TRUSTEES JOHN S.OYSON JOHN W. BOSTON HMFMCON Ea*"o*UEa'oc==ua**
""'**"^"C" GEORGE L. ING ALLS veCs cwAsnMAN JOSEPH R. SCHMIELER t.IDE T & CMIEF RICH AR D M. PLYNN ROBERT 1. MILLONZ3 LEROY.W~,. S. INCL AIR January 20, 1982 . . viC - . ..~1
&C EF FINANCI AL FREDERICK R. CLARK _g
".^.".",.'v"C..........
& GENERAL COWN.EL Mr. Ronald C. Haynes, Regional Administrator Office of Inspection and Enforcement U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region I 631 Park Avenue King of Prussia, Pa. 19406
Subject:
fIndian Point 3 Nuclear Power Plant Docket No. 50-286 Indian Point Site Emergency Preparedness Exercise Scenario
Dear Mr. Haynes:
By letter dated December 22, 1981,the Power Authority of the State of New York (Authority) and Consolidated Edison Company of New York, Inc. provided you with the objectives for the Indian Point site emergency preparedness exercise.
In response to your letter dated October 26, 1981, the Authority provides, herewith, the scenario for the Indian Point l site emergency preparedness exercise in which an accident is postulated at Indian Point Unit 3. The New York State Radio-logical Emergency Preparedness Group is providing the exercise scenario to FEMA.
Your October 26, 1981, letter stated that "The content of the exercise scenario should be handled on a Seed-to-know' basis, such that individuals who may be exercise ' players' do not have access to the scenario to be used.." For the reason setforth
,above, the Authority requests that the exercise scenario be with -
' held from public-disclosure until the exercise has been completed, to ensure that only individuals who have a "need-to-know" are cognizant of the scenario.
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l Should you or your staff have any questions please con- , ,
l tact us. y y/ s -
Very truly yours, coh 8207290206 820120 s PDR ADOCK 05000286 p PDR J.
J 3-
. Bayned l
l Senior Vice President cc: attached Nuclear Generation
cc: Mr. Brian K. Grimes, Director w/o attachment Division of Emergency Preparedness Office of Inspection _and Enforcement U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D. C. 20555 Mr. T. Rebelowski, Senior Resident Inspector w/o attachment.
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission P. O. Box 38 Buchanan, New York 10511 Mr. Donald B. Davidoff, Director w/o attachment-New York State Radiological Emergency Preparedness Group Tower Building Gov. Nelson A. Rockefeller Empire State Plaza Albany, New York 12237
l 0 l ATTACIIMENT A l
l INDIAN POINT SITE EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS EXERCISE Sri?NARIO POWER AUTIIORITY OF Tile STATE OF NEW YORK INDIAN POINT 3 NUCLEAR POWER PLANT DOCKET NO. 50-286 JANUARY 20, 1982
1982FEtlA-NRCOBSERVEDEXERdISE INDIAN POINT STATION
, With respect to exercising the State and local governments' components of emergenqy response, these objectives are provided for Indian Point Unit Nos. 2 and 3. &
1 RADIOLOGICAL Et1ERGENCY PREPAREDNESS PLANS
/
Evaluate the adequacy and capability of implementation of the New York State, Westchester, Rockland, Orange and Putnam Counties and the Indian Point radiological emergency plans.
Test the emergency response capabilities of State authorities, local support agencies, Indian Point and appropriate Federal agencies.
i Test the adequacy of the Westchester, Rockland, Orange and Putnam Counties Radiological Emergency Response Plans for FEMA /NRC acceptance. -
NOTIFICATION PROCEDURES Demonstrate the capability of Indian Point 3 to notify the State, local and Federal levels of government in accordance with Federal guidance and established protocols.
Demonstrate the capability to communicate technical information among Indian Point 3, the State, and Westchester, Rockland, Orange and Putnam Counties. Indian Point 3 will also demonstrate communicating technical information with the NRC via the NRC Hot Lines.
Demonstrate the capability of the State, Counties and Indian Point to notify and activate emergency responso personnel.
Demonstrate the capability of the Counties and the State to alert and notify the affected permanent and transient public within the Plume Exposure EPZ of an incident at Indian Point 3 and to follow up with information as required.
Demonstrate the notification and request for assistance to Brookhaven (USDOE) and to other Federal agencies as required.
Et!ERGENCY C0?!!!UNICATIONS Demonstrate the normal and back-up emergency communications capability among Westchester, Rockland, Orange and Putnam Counties, the State, and Indian Point, including the Radiological Emergency Communications System (RECS-hot line). The National Warning System (NAWAS) and/or commercial telephones will be utilized if l the RECS is postulated to be inoperative.
1 l Demonstrate the capability to communicate with other counties and State and Federal agencies as appropriate, t
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l PROPRIETARY 1
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Demonstrate tha adtqutcy of Indien Point, Local cnd Stata emergsncy communications to:
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- a. Give notification of the accident.
- b. . Transmit instructions to activate essential staff. ,
- c. Disseminate essential information to assisting agencies. -
- d. Operate a 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> per day alert and notification system.
Evaluate the ability of Indian Point and Westchester, Rockland, Orange and Putnam Countics/to deploy and communicate with radiological monitoring teams.
E!!ERGENCY RESPONSE FACILITIES (Indian Point 3, State, Westchester, Rockland, Orange and Putnam Counties)
Demonstrate the adequacy of the staffing and setting-up as appropriate of emergency response facilities as well as demonstrating the adequacy of space and habitability for management of radiological emergency at:
Indian Point 3 Control Room (CR) -
Indian Point 3 Technical Support Center (TSC)
Indian Point 3 Operational Support Center (OSC)
Indian Point Emergency Operations Facility (EOF)
State Emergency Operations Center (E0C)
ODP Southern District EOC Westchester County EOC including the City of Peckskill Rockland County EOC Orange County EOC Putnam County EOC Special News Center Demonstrate the adequacy of internal communications in the State and Counties' Emergency Operation Centers (EOC) including the use of status boards, charts, maps, diagrams or other displays.
N Evaluate the adequacy and competency of State, Westchester, Rockland, Orange a.nd i
Putnam Counties and Indian Point 3 staf f to operate the emergency roepsaso facilities.
Evaluate the adequacy of access control and security for emergency response facilities.
DIRECTION AND CONTROL l Demonstrate the ability of key emergency personnel at all levels of government and l
Indian Point to initiate and coordinate timely and effective decisions with respect l
to a radiological emergency and clearly demonstrate "who is in charge."
Demonstrate that there is ef fective organizational control (direction and control) and integrated radiological emergency response.
Demonstrate the capability of Federal, State and County emergency response agencies to-identify and provide for resource requirements. Any required Federal response
- activities may be simulated.
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Demonstrate the capability in coordinating (internally / externally) actions among organizations in order to obtain support and to make appropriate decisions.
Demonstrate the capability of elected and appointed of ficials in impicmenting l appropriate radiological emergency response actions.
I PROPRIETARY l 2 L 2
PUBh,ICINFORMATION s
Demonstrate the adequacy of the operation of and interaction among the State, Counties and Indian Point 3 public information systems.
Test the ability of Indian Point 3 staff to activate the Special News Center in I conjunction with State and County agencies and to provide for periodic public information releases and rumor control.
Demonstrpte that the offsite authorities and the licensee can effectively work with the media in the event of an accident.
ACCIDENT ASSESSMENT AND EVALUATION Demonstrate the activation, operations and reporting procedures of licensee'and County monitoring teams.
Demonstrate the Counties' ability to receive meteorological and radiological data ,
and evaluate such data for recommendations on appropriate protective actions.
Evaluate the ability of Indian Point 3 and the State to calculate dose projections to PAGs and recommend appropriate protective actions.
PROTECTIVE RESPONSE Demonstrate the capability of the State and Westchester, Rockland, Orange and Putnam Counties emergency response organizations to make decisions and to implement appropriate protective action response options. The response options may include sheltering and/or evacuation (simulated) of onsite and offsite areas, informing the public on the development of the accident, identification and provision for special populations, activation of reception and congregate care facilities and ingestion exposure pathway considerations.
RADIOLOGICAL EXPOSURE CONTs9L 8 Demonstrate the decision process for limiting exposure of emergency workers.
Demonstrate the processing of emergency workers through Personnel Monitoring Centers .
(PMC) including monitoring and decontamination.
Evaluate the capability of of fsite emergency response personnel to implement access
, control procedures.
1 Demonstrate methods and resources for distribution of dosimetry to emergency workers.
Demonstrate the cability of emergency personnel for keeping records of individual radiation exposures.
- MEDICAL SUPPORT Demonstrate the capability of transporting and evaluating.and providing medical support for radiation casualties in the plant and in a hospital.
REENTRY AND RECOVERY Demonstrate the capability of emergency personnel to identify requirements, assess and implement procedures for reentry.
Demonstrate the capability of emergency personnel to identify requirements, programs and policies governing damage assessment and recovery.
PROPRIETARY 3
GENERAL GUIDELINES FOR THE CONDUCT OF 1982 FEMA /NRC OBSERVED RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY EXERCISE A.
Purpose:
This document provides guidance for the conduct of the 1982 FEMA /NRC observed radiological emergency exercise. It shall be used by all participating Federal, State, and local agencies. It provides specific methods for simulating emergency actJons, conducting the exercises, scenario, and evaluating results.
B. Scope Of the IP-3 Emergency plan Exercise Scenario The scope of this exercise, with some exceptions, will ondeavor to demonstrate by actual performance, a number of primary emergency preparedness functions.
At no time will the exercise be permitted to interfere with the safe operation of the station and the station management may, at their discretion, suspend the exercise for any period of time necessary to ensure this goal.
j The following list represents the scope of the exercise.
- 1. Demonstrate the ability to classify actual or potential emergencies as per Emergency Plan Implementation Procedures:.
Notification of Unusual Event Site Area Emergency General Emergency
- 2. Demonstrate the ability to respond to each classification by properly
. manning the Technical Support Center - TSC, Emergency Operating Facility -
l EOF, Operations Support Center - OSC, and the Special News Center - SNC.
- 3. Demonstrate the communication capabilities between the Control Rode,,TSC, EOF, OSC, and SNC. and the ability to maintain communications with Federal, State and Local Governments.
- 4. The Special News Center (SNC) will be activated and manned by Utility, State and County Public Information personnel. Information will be dis-patched to media personnel as it would during an actual emergency.
- 5. The Station will demonstrate employee accountability following the require-ments of the Emergency plan Implementing Procedures.
- 6. A demonstration will be made that provides for the dispatch of radio-logical monitoring teams to the field within and beyond the site boundary.
The field monitoring teams will demonstrate their ability to send data back to the EOF for assessment. Teams will be provided with simulated data. This data will be provided at assigned times at specific locations and the contents will specify the data associated with the radiological release from the station. With this simulated data, the appropriate recommendations can be made to the State and counties.
PROPRIETARY A
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- 7. An injurad and contaminated individual will ba transportcd to ths Pask: kill Hospital as part of this drill scenario in order to accomplish a test of the diverse emergency conditions which are included in the Emergency Plan.
C. Intent of the IP-3 Emergency Plan Exercise Scenario The Power Authority of the State of New York intends to exercise its Indian Point Emergency Plan and verify the emergency preparedness and coordination of both the site and off-site support groups on March 2, 1982.
In order to minimize the impact on outside agencies' scheduling and agendas, the Authority is scheduling to complate this scenario within a routine working day.
This exercise is intended to demonstrate many, but not necessarily all, of the stations capabilities to respond to a wide range of emergency conditions.
Fundamentally, this scenario is designed to activate the Emergency Plan through its various action levels. Although this scenario accurately simulates operating events, it is not intended to assess all of the operators diagnostic capabilities, but rather provides sequences which ultimately demonstrate the operators ability to respond to events and exercise the Emergency Plan. Free play is encouraged and the referees will interfere only if operator / player action prematurely terminates the exercise or excessively deviates from the drill schedule.
In order to provide a conservative exercise in terms off-site doses adverse meteorology was developed since actual meteorology would probably lead to .
inconsequential radiological concerns off-site.
D. Concept of Operations and Control of the Exercise The exercise initiating events will be controlled by the lead referee at the Indian Point Nucler Power Plent. Simulated initiating events will consist of two types of information: (1) information and data provided to control room personnel by the Control Room referee and (2) onsite and offsite dose rate data (simulated gamma and iodine dose rate measurements) provided to site adi county monitoring teams by referees. The lead referee and the State Exercise Di, rector will have the responsibility to control and coordinate the time sequence of these initiating events to ensure an orderly flow of exercise events. All other actions during the exercise will occur through a free play response as the site, State, county, and municipal participants respond to the initiating events.
l As the initiating events are provided to the station staff, they will determine j the nature of the accident and implement the appropriate station emergency l response procedures. These procedures include a determination of the accident classification in accordance with NUREG-0654. After the accident classification has been determined, the appropriate Federal. State and local authorities will be notified in accordance with the emergency response procedures.
Upon notification of the simulated accident at the Indian Point Nuclear Power Plant, the State of New York will complete the initial notification sequence in
- accordance with their emergency response plans. State and local personnel and l facilities will be activated based on the initial accident classification provided by the site and confirmed by direct communication between appropriate agencies and the Indian Point Nuclear Power Plant.
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I PROPRIETARY
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Tha simulatcd accidant will continus to develop based on data and infor20titn provided to the control room pa.rsonnel by the control room' referee. As the !
situation develops, information will be forwarded to New York State and appropriate Counties Accident Assessment Groups. These agencies will analyze and act on the information as they would in a real emergency.
Where information would normally be confirmed via an independent source (such as Ludlam gamma radiation monitors) the confirmation data will be obtained.
If the confirmation data conflicts with simulation data provided by the site, thefsimulation data will be utilized for accident assessment purposes. If any inconsistencies are noted in the initiating events, these inconsistencies should be questioned by the accident assessment teams as they would be in a real emergency.
Certain inconsistencies (such as plume width, release duration, technical reason for the simulated release, etc.) may be intentional and required due to the nature of simulating an accident that has never occurred and the requirement to provide an exercise basis which tests the site, State, and local capabilities to the maximum extent feasible in a limited time intentional then the accident assessment group will note the inconsistency and ignore it. The lead referee shall have the authority to resolve or explain any inconsistencies or problems that may occur during the exercise.
With the exception of the aforementioned potential inconsistencies, the internal operation of the site, State, and local command centers shall be identical.
with their intended operation in a real emergency.
E. Public Information and Awareness A few days prior to the exercise, the public within the affected area will be informed of the impending conduct of a radiological emergency exercise. Joint press releases from the Power Authority of the State of New York, New York State and the counties will be used to accomplish this.
Agencies should make every effort to prevent the public from being misinf,ormed about the nature of the exercise. Therefore, it is important to inform members of the public that an exercise is in progress and that their involvement is not required, whenever public contact occurs in the field.
t Technical briefings will be conducted for the news media prior to the drill. A pre-drill briefing will be conducted a few days before the drill.
F. Maintaining Emergency Readiness l During the performance of an exercise, the ability to recognize a real emergency, terminate the exercise, and respond to the new situation must be maintained.
Therefore, the exercise scenario and actions of participants shall not include any actions which seriously degrade the condition of systems, equipment or supplies, or affect the detection, assessment, or response capability to radio-logical or other emergencies.
t PROPRIETARY 6
IP-3 EMERGENCY PLAN EXERCISE SCENARIO OVERVIEW 0730 Start of Exercise - NOTIFICATION OF UNUSUAL EVENT 0830 Exercise Escalated to Site Area Emergency 0 0915 Contaiminated and Injured Individual 1009 Exercise Escalated to General Emergency 1330 Release to Environment Secured 1530 Secured from Exercise The plant is at 100% reactor power with normal operating temperaturus and pressures. An RCS Leakage Surveillance was performed and an unidentified 2 gpm leak was indicated thus initiating a " Notification of an Unusual Event" emergency classification.
The rate of coolant Icakage will increase until it exceeds the capacity of two charging pumps thus initiating a " Site Area Emergency" emergency classification.
Plant Operators will be able to proceed with a controlled shutdown with applicable operating procedures since three charging pumps are capable of maintaining pressurizer level.
An employee working in the Primary Auxiliary Building will be involved in an injury. The transportation of this radiologically contaminated injured individual from the site to an offsite hospital will be required.
While in the " Site Area Emergency", a control rod will be dropped and the, operators will unsuccessfully try to recover the dropped rod.
The ECCS will be activated by a true safety injection signal because of an abrupt violation of RCS intregrity leading to a loss of coolant accident. The ECCS will initially be successful and the plant will indicate that the initially dropped rod was ejected from the vessel and some clad damage occurred.
Following a containment pressure spike the containment purge exhaust valves will indicate off their closed seat and the plant vent radiation monitor will verify that a release is being made from the vapor containment to the environmen't.
This will require the Emergency Classification to be raised to a " General Emergency".
Since efforts to remotely close these valves are futile, the release will l
- continue until the purge exhaust valvo located outside of containment can bc l manually closed.
The drill itself is expected to last approximately eight hours with the actual release to the environment lasting approximately three and one half hours.
The drill will be completed when the release is terminated and.the plant is in a controlled stable condition with the concerned agencies and support centers being notified of same.
l PROPRIETARY l 7
INDIAN POTNT STATION EXERCISE SCENARIO r
TIME IP-3 EVENTS AND INDICATIONS 0730 The plant is at 100% reactor power with normal operating temperatur'es and pressures. All equipment is operable and the board is clear of abnormal alarms. The following is the initial plant status:
/ Reactor
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Reactor Power - 100% Power Range, SE Int Range Rod Position - 200 steps Bank D RCS Tavg - 566*F Steam Generator S/G Level (31-34) - 45% ,
Steam header pressure - 730 psig Pressurizer Press Level - 41%
l'ressurizer pressure - 2235 psig ,
Miscellaneous PRT - 75% level, 75'F, 0 psig Weld Channel - 9.0 SCFM Charging Line Flow - 45 gpm with #3 charging pump operating RCP
- 1 Seal Leak off (31-34) - 1.7 gpm Seal Outlet Temp. (31-34) - 150 F .
Motor Amps (31-34) - 400 Amps Vapor Containment VC Dew Point - less than 70 F RFCU Wier Level - Normal VC Press - .15 psig VC Temp. - 81*F VC Sump - 7 inches Recirculation Sump - 0 inches Electrical DC Volt (31-34) - 128V DC Instrument Bus Volt (31-34) - 110 VAC Output - 1000 Mw PROPRIETARY 8
Rrdistian Monitors
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R-1 .1 mr/hr CCR -
R-2 1 mr/hr VC 80' el.
R-4 0 mr/hr Charge Pump Room ,
R-5 0 mr/hr FSB #
R-6 1 mr/hr Sampling Room R-7 5 mr/hr Incore Inst.
R-8 .2 mr/hr Drumming Station g' R-10 0 mr/hr ABFP Bldg.
R-11 90 K CPM VC Air Part R-12 3 K CPM 'VC Air Gas R-13 1.5 K CPM Plant Vent Part R-14 1.8 K CPM Plant Vent Gas R-15 200 CPM Cond Air Ejector R-16 19 K CPM FCU Mon #1 R-17A 400 CPM CCW Loop 31 R-17B 800 CPM CCW Loop 32 R-18 6 K CPM WDS Liquid -
R-19 6 K CPM S/G Blowdown i R-20 00 CPM WDS Gas R-23 30 K CPM FCU Mon #2 Iodine Monitors I 270 CPM Plant Vent II 390 CPM Containment III 66 CPM PAB IV 300 CPM S/G Blowdown Room Fuel Monitor GFFD Neutron 1E ,
GFFD Flow .45 GPM
- 4 FCU Motor Cooler 1 mr/hr
, Plant Vent Flow 65K CFM
! l Tank Levels RWST -
36.5 feet i
Spray Additive 80% l PWST -
26 feet l CST -
26.5 feet l BAST -
40%
VCT -
41%
PROPRIETARY 9
T ME IP-3 EVENTS AND INDICATIONS 0730. . . . . . . . . . . . . : . . An RCS Leakage Surveillance , SOP-RCS-4, was performed and a 2 gpm leak, excluding controlled Icakage sources, was identified. The source of the Icak is unidentified and the leakage surveillange .'
is accurate. <
Vindspeed -
5 m/sec Wind Direction -
200*
/ Pasquill Category- E 0745................R-11 -
100 K CPM System Operator informed of situation and because of a system emergency he requests a 100 mw/hr maximum load decrease.
0800................R-11 -
Off Scale R-12 -
Increasing Pressurizer level 36% and decreasing and 31 charging pump is at maximum speed -
VC Temp. - 82*
VC Dcw Point - Increasing Windspeed -
5 m/sec Wind Direction -
200*
Pasquill Category- E .
0815................A 30 minute leak surveillance Indicates leakage of approximately 110 gpm R-11 -
Off Scale
- R-12 -
Increasing R-2 - Increasing R-7 -
Increasing Press Level 35% and stabic (if 2 charging pumps running) 0830............... 15 minute leakage surveillance indicates leakage of appr'ox,imately 140 gpm Press level 38% and decreasing with 2 charging pumps at maximum speed 1 R-11 -
Off Scale l R-12 -
Increasing R-2 -
Increasing i R-7 -
Increasing i
VC Pressure - Increasing VC Sump Level - Increasing VC Temperature - Increased slightly RCS Tavg - 564*F Windspeed - 5 m/sec Wind Direction -
200*
Pasquill Category- E i
PROPRIETARY l
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TI'ME IP-3 EVENTS AND INDICATIONS 0845............. ..R-12 -
Increasing -
R-2 -
Increasing R-7 -
. Increasing ,
Press Level 36% and increasing (if three charging pumps) #
VC Dew Point Increasing RCS Tavg 563*F 0900. . . ./. . . . . . . . . . . Pressurizer level 41% and stable (with three charging pumps operating)
R-2 -
liigh but stable R-7 -
Off Scale R-12 -
liigh but stable VC Dew Point liigh but stable VC Temp. 90'F RCS Leakage Surveillance indicates a 155 gpm leak VC Pressure stable at 1.9 psig Windspeed -
5 m/sec Wind Direction - 200' Pasquill Category- E 0915........ . . . . . . . Nuclear NPO notifies Control Room that a IIcalth Physics Technician received a large laceration and the injured.
individual is lying in a puddle in the piping penetration area. (Investigations indicate that the IIcalth Physics Technician is contaminated and the wound requires trans-portation to Peckskill llospital.)
0930................All readings stable 0945................NIS power range dropped rod rod stop alarm rod bottom light N-13 illuminates (Investigations indicate dropped cbd.)
RCS Tavg 564*F ,
Control Rods at 210 steps Bank D 1000................ UNIT TRIP - Lo pressurizer pressure first out Safety lujection - lo lo presurizer pressure alarm VC Sump Level -
Increasing Recirculation Sump Level -
Increasing VC Temperature -
Increasing liigh VC Pressure Alarm -
VC Dew Point (llumidity !!eter) Off Scale R-ll -
Off Scale R-12 -
Off Scale R-2 -
Off Scale R-7 -
Off Scale GFFD Neutron Reading -
Off Scale Rod Bottom Light N-13 -
Not Illuminated PEP-ES-1 Immediate Auto Actions Successful R-10 -
Rapidly Increasing Windspeed - 5 m/sec Wind Direction -
200' Pasquill Category- E PROPRIETARY 11
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TIME IP-3 EVENTS AND INDICATIONS 1010.................A VC pressure spike is observed Containment Purge Exhaust Valves ,
PCV-1172 & PCV-1173 Position
- Lights indicate off closed seat R-13 -
Off Scale R-14 -
Off Scale
/
Windspeed -
5 m/sec Wind Direction -
200*
Pasquill Category- E 1015................ Insert radiological data (not included in this package) .
Access to manual isolation for valve FCV-1173 is prohibited because of excessive radiation fields Attempts for auto closure of FCV-1172 & 1173 are futile RWST Level - 33.8 feet -
Windspeed -
5 m/sec Wind Direction -
200*
Pasquill Category- E 1030................ Insert radiological data (not included in this package) .
Access to manual isolation for valve FCV-1173 is prohibited because of excessive radiation fields Attempts for auto closure of FCV-1172 & 1173 are futile RWST Level - 31.1 feet Windspeed -
5 m/sec Wind Direction - 200*
Pasquill Category- E
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1045................ Insert radiological data (not included in this package) ~ ,
Access to manual isolation for valve FCV-1173 is prohibited because of excessive radiation fields Attempts for auto closure of FCV-1172 & 1173 are futile RWST Level 28.4 feet Windspeed - 5 m/sec '
Wind Direction -
200*
Pasquill Category- E 1100................ Insert radiological data (not included in this package)
Access to manual isolation for valve FCV-1173 is prohibited because of excessive radiation fields Attempts for auto closure of FCV-1172 & 1173 are futile RWST Level 25.7 feet Windspeed - 5 m/sec Wind Direction - 200*
Pasquill Category- E PROPRIETARY
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12 a
TIME IP-3 EVENTS AND INDICATIONS 1115................ Insert radiological data (not included in this package)
Accesc to manual isolation for valve FCV-1173 is prohibited ,
b9cause of excessive radiation fields -
Attempts for auto closure of FCV-1172 & 1173 are futile RWST Level - 23 feet
, Windspeed -
' 5 m/sec Wind Direction -
200*
Pasquill Category- E 1130................ Insert radiological data (not included in this package)
Radiation fields in vicinity of FCV-1173 are decreasing due to decay of high energy contributors Access to manual isolation for valve FCV-Il73 is prohibited because of excessive radiation fields Attempts for auto closure of FCV-Il72 & 1173 are futile RWST Level - 20.3 feet Windspeed -
5 m/sec Wind Direction -
160*
Pasquill Category- E Il45................ Insert radiological data (not included in this package)
Radiation fields in vicinity of FCV-1173 are decreasing due to decay of high energy contributors Access to manual isolation for valve FCV-1173 is prohibited because of excessive radiation field 3 Attempts for auto closure of FCV-Il72 & 1173 are futile RWST Level - 17.6 feet Windspeed -
5 m/sec !
Wind Direction -
160' ,
Pasquill Category- E 1200................ Insert radiological data (not included in this package) l Radiation fields in vicinity of FCV-Il73 are decrenaing due to decay of high energy contributors Access to manual isolation for valve FCV-1173 is prohibited because of excessive radiation fields Attempts for auto closure of FCV-1172 & 1173 are futile RWST Level - 14.9 feet l Windspeed - 5 m/sec j Wind Direction -
160'
( Pasquill Category- E PROPRIEEDiRY l
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TibE IP-3 EVENTS AND INDICATIONS 1215................ Insert radiological data (not included in this package)
Radiation fields in vicinity of FCV-1173 are decreasing due tg decay of high energy contributors #
Access to manual isolation for valve FCV-1173 is prohibited because of excessive radiation ficids Attempts for auto closure of FCV-1172 & 1173 are futile
/ RWST Level - 12.2 feet Windspeed -
5 m/sec Wind Direction - 160*
Pasquill Category- E 1230................ Insert radiological data (not included in this package)
Radiation fields in vicinity of FCV-1173 are decreasing due to decay of high energy contributors
- Access to manual isolation for valve FCV-1173 is prohibited because of excessive radiation fields Attempts for auto closure of FCV-1172 & 1173 are futile RWST Level - 9.1 feet RWST lo lo level alarm annunciates Windspeed -
5 m/sec Wind Direction -
160*
Pasquill Category- E 1245................ Insert radiological data (not included in this package)
Radiation fields in vicinity of FCV-1173 are decreasing due to decay of high energy contributors Access to manual isolation for valve FCV-1173 is prohibited because of excessive radiation fields Attempts for auto closure of FCV-1172 & 1173 are futile Windspeed -
5 m/sec Wind Direction -
160*
Pasquill Category- E 1300................ Insert radiological data (not included in this package) l Radiation fields in vicinity of FCV-Il73 are decreasing due to l decay of high energy contributors Access to manual isolation for valve FCV-1173 is prohibited because of excessive radiation fields Attempts for auto closure of FCV-1172 & 1173 are futile i Windspeed -
5 m/sec l Wind Direction -
160*
I Pasquill Category- E l -
PROPRIETARY r
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l l -
14 I
TIME s IP-3 EVENTS AND INDICATIONS 1315................ Insert radiological data (not included in this package)
Radiation fields in vicinity of FCV-1173 are decreasing due t9 decay of high energy contributors #
Access to manual isolation for valve FCV-ll73 is prohibited because of excessive radiation fields Attempts for auto closure of FCV-Il72 & 1173 are futile Windspeed -
5 m/sec Wind Direction -
160' Pasquill Category- E 1330................ Access to manual isolation for valve FCV-ll73 is possible due to decay of high energy contributors Release secured 1345 - 1530......... Insert radiological data (not included in this package)
Windspeed -
5 m/sec Wind Direction - 160 Pasquill Category- E 1530................ Secure from exercise .
PROPRIETARY 1
t 2"
EMERGENCY RESPd SE IMPLEMENTATION AND OPERATIONS
- 1. Initial notification shall be performed in accordance with the procedures of the appropriate radiological emergency preparedness plans.
- 2. Activation of State, ODP Southern District and local EOCs and manning of the EOCs byfemergency response personnel shall occur in accordance with appropriate emergency plans and procedures.
- 3. The Indian Point emergency response facilities will be activated and operated in accordance with the licensee's plan. This includes the control room, technical support center, operational support center, emergency operations facility, and the special news center.
- 4. EBS transmissions will be simulated. Emergency messages will be prepared and forwarded to the EBS transmission center in accordance with standard procedures.
Simulated EBS messages shall be prefaced by explicit instructions not to broadcast them, but to log the message content and time of receipt.
- 5. Press releases to the media shall be made per the respective site and State plans, via the normal press release methods. The press releases shall contain all necessary information on the current status of the exercise.
- 6. Communication between the exercise participants shall occur in accordance with the procedures of the emergency response plans. However, should any primary communication path become ino' arative or prove inadequate, the appropriate backup means of communications will be used. Backup communications will be demonstrated periodically during the exercise.
EMERGENCY WORKER RESPONSE ACTIVITIES
- 1. Access Control Local agencies supplemented by State resources will deploy personnel to demonstrate activation of a suitable sample of access control points in each county. Road blocks will not be set up on the road but the necessary equipment will be deployed along the road side. The road access control points will be secured after the ability to assemble them has been demonstrated and prior to the end of the exercise. Once access control points have been secured, local government will will request Federal observers to release personnel l
to normal duties and simulate continuation of control points. The personnel re-lieved from access control shall not be used for any other exercise function.
Rotation of access control personnel will be simulated from personnel which would be available from off duty sections. For training, the access control per-l sonnel will report to personnel monitoring centers af ter they are secured from their I
access control duties.
- 2. Alerting means for Public Notification: The use of sirens will be simulated.
An actual test of the sirens and the accompanying Emergency Broadcast System (EDS) announcement will be demonstrated in e separate drill to be held within several I days of the exercice date.
l 3. Personnel Monitoring Centers: At least one personnel monitoring center for emer-gency worker will be set up in each county. During the exercise, the processing of selected emergency workers who have completed their exercise participation will be demonstrated. Decontamination actions will be simulated.
PROPRIETARY 16
At the personnel monitoring center, anything which may damage property - (such as parking vehicles on grass) will be simulated. All necessary equipment will be assembled at the personnel monitoring center, however, its use may ,
be simulated. Detailed simulation actions will be implemented at the cente'r by the personnel monitoring center leader.
The State will predesignate, prior to the exercise briefings, the location for State emergency worker personnel monitoring centers. These center locations need not be the same as those specified in the respective State plans, because of the inability to obtain access to and use of the designated emergency decontamination centers during a routine work day. In addition, because of the necessity to make prior arrangements, to gain access to a center during an exercise, these centers once designated will be used regardless of the location of the simulated plume.
- 4. Reception Centers: At least one Reception and Congregate Care Center will be opened and staffed for each county in accordance with the respective local emergency response plans. Supplies required for long term mass care (cots, blankets, fcod, etc.), need not be acquired or brought to the centers. However, the center personnel should obtain estimates on how many evacuees would be arriving had the exercise been a real emergency. The center personnel shocid then make the necessary estimates of supplies required for the potential evacuees.
Sources of the required supplies should then be located, and the means for transportation of the supplies should be determined. Volunteers will be processed through registration processing. Monitoring and decontamination of evacuees will be demonstrated at reception and/or congregate care centers.
- 5. Monitoring Teams: Each county will field at 1 cast one radiological monitoring team. Controllers will provide simulated field data or meter faces which will be used to determine local dose rate readings. These teams will be equipped with the necessary equipment which would enable them to determine actual area gamma dose rate readings.
The monitoring teams will not be suited up in anti-contamination clothing, but will have such equipment at their disposal.
- 6. Volunteer organizations: The members of volunteer organizations, notably firemen, have responsibilities such as their work that takes precedence over their participation in an exercise. Therefore, t hese volunteer organizations will participate in their emergency responsibilities on an as-available-basis.
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PROPRIETARY l
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