IR 05000348/1993301

Exam Rept 50-348/93-301 on 931019-21.Exam Results:Four SRO & Three RO Candidates Received Written & Operating Exams.One Retake SRO Exam Given.One SRO Failed Exam.All Others Passed

ML20058J324
Person / Time
Site:	Farley
Issue date:	11/16/1993
From:	Aiello R, Lawyer L NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
To:
Shared Package
ML20058J320	List: IR 05000348/1993301 ML20058J317 ML20058J363
References
50-348-93-301, NUDOCS 9312140057
Download: ML20058J324 (7)

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UNITEo STATES

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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION AEGloN 11

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Report No.: 50-348/93-301 Licensee: Southern Nuclear Operating Company, In North 18th Street Birmingham, AL 35291-0400 Docket No.: 50-348 and 50-364 License No.: NPF-2 and NPF-8 facility Name: farley 1 and 2 Examination Conducted: October 19-21, 1993 [

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Chief Examiner: '

/ 'L 73 Ron'ald'f. Aiello '

Date Signed Accompanying Personnel: P. Steiner, DRS T. Guilfoil, Sonalysts  ;

G. Weale, Sonalysts 1

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Approved by,: "h -

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/,LawrenceL. Lawyer, Chief Date Signed

/ ' Operator Licensing Section

[ Operations Branch Division of Reactor Safety i

SUMMARY Scope:

HRC examiners conducted regular, announced operator licensing initial examinations during the period October 19-21, 1993. Examiners administered examinations under the guidelines of the Examiner Standards (ES), NUREG-1021, <

Revision 7. Four Senior Reactor Operator (SRO) and three Reactor Operator ,

(RO) candidates received written and operating examinations. One SR0 written  !

retake examination was administere :

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i 9312140057 931117 PDR ADOCK 05000348 I V PDR i d

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Results:

Candidate Pass / Fail: ,

SR0 Percent R0 Percent Pass 4 80 3 100%

t Fail 1 20 0 0%

I One weakness was identified in the area of transient and accident analysis (paragraph 2.b)

Examiners identified one inspector follow-up item. The follow-up item was in the area of operator knowledge of the intent of the Steam Generator Tube .

Rupture (SGTR) procedure and with the Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR)

regarding a SGTR (paragraph 2,b).

No violations or deviations were identifie t b

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REPORT DETAILS

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l Persons Contacted j Licensee Employees  !

• R. Bayne, SAER Site Supervisor  !

• G. Crone, Operations Superintendent  !

• R. Hill, Nuclear Plant General Manager l

• J. Osterholtz, Plant Support Assistant General Manager .;

• Vanlandingham, Nuclear Operations Training Supervisor .

• L. Williams,-Manager Training and Emergency Preparedness l

• C. Nesbitt, Operations Manager Other licensee employees contacted included instructors, engineers, technicians, operators, and office personne ,

• Attended exit interview NRC Personnel T. Guilfoil, Sonalysts l G. Weale, Sonalysts  ; Discussion Scope NRC. examiners conducted regular, announced operator licensing initial l examinations during the period October 19-21, 1993. Examiners i administered examinations under the guidelines of the Examiner Standards (ES), NUREG-1021, Revision 7. Four SRO and three R0 candidates received !

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written and operating examinations. The examination team administered one SRO written retake examinatio t

~ Candidate Performance

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Examiners evaluated candidate performance during three examination 1 phases: written, simulator, and walk-through. The examinatin team tested candidates in their knowledge of the plant and their ability to :

safely operate the plant in accordance with established plant ;

procedure Examiners found that candidate overall knowledge level was !

good, and that candidates were strong in their ability to supervise the :

use of Emergency 0. aerating Procedures (EOPs). However, examiners also !

noted several areas of candidate deficiencies: i

> Simulator The Westinghouse Owners Group (WOG) background document for E-3, Steam Generate Tube Rupture, stated, in part, that accumulation of water in i the secondary side can lead to an overfill condition which can severely :

aggravate the radiological consequences to the health and safety of the i public and increase the likelihood of complicating failures. The WOG J

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Report Details 2 e

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further stated that timely operator intervention is necessary to limit the radiological. releases and prevent Steam Generator (SG) overfil The Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) stated under " Analysis of Effects and Consequences" that "the operator identifies _the accident type and terminates break flow to the faulty SG within 30 minutes of accident initiation." One crew was able to terminate break flow by exercising the pressurizer Power Operated Relief Valves (PORVs) and spray valve. The other crew was not able to do so. The crew that was unable to maintain Reactor Coolant System (RCS) pressure less than SG pressure, isolated the RCS following depressurization while Safety -i Injection (SI) was ir, full force. Within minutes, RCS pressure, was ,

300 psig greater than SG pressure. The ensination team attributed this difference to the operator's knowledge of the intent of the procedur This issue is a concern and is identified as Ifi 50-348/93-301-01:

" Operator knowledge of the intent of the SGTR procedure and with the FSAR regarding a SGTR."

Two operators were unable to perform boration or dilution calculation One operator stated that they don't normally do the calculation. He said they just " shoot some acid or water in" to maintain "Tave" and

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Following the number one seal failure, one crew secured the Reactor Coolant Pump (RCP) after 10 minutes elapsed and the other crew never ,

secured it at all. The guidance of the System Operating Procedure -

(SOP)/ Annunciator Response Procedure (ARP) is to remove the RCP from service within 30 minutes after securing seal leakoff within 5 minute Neither crew informed plant personnel using the public address system l following significant plant event * Written One SRO candidate failed the written examination. The examination team performed an item analysis on the written examination. This analysis identified one question that was missed by all eight (R0/SRO)

candidates. This question gave a set of conditions that required the operator to emergency borate by opening the Volume Control Tank (VCT) ;

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outlet isolation valves. All of the candidates incorrectly chose to open the Refueling Water Storage Tank (RWST) to Centrifugal Charging Pump (CCP) Suction Valve I All of the SR0s missed question number 78 on the SRO examination (SR0 '

only). This question sulicited the design minimum water depth that '

would occur in the spent fuel pool during any spent fuel pool cooling system pipe failure and the basis for requiring this level to be maintaine I

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Report Details 3

• Job Performance Measures (JPMs)

The examiners noted that during the performance of JPl* NRC-5, several cand; dates failed to select " BYPASS" on the syncroscope switch, thus the ,

candidates were unable to shut the offsite supply breaker. As a result '

the diesel generator could not be removed from service as taske The examination team developed one question to investigate a weakness f that was previously identified by the examination team during the facility's 1993 requalification examination (Report No. 50-348/93-300). l Three of the four SR0s and two of the three R0s missed this questio This question tested the operator's knowledge of the RCS response to a loss of one RCP. All five candidates who missed this question stated '

incorrectly that the indicated flow in the affected loop would drop to

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zero and stay at zero. This indicated a continued area of weakness in operator knowledge of transient and accident analysis. Actual !

indication on the control board would reflect a significant amount of ,

reverse flow through the loop containing the secured RC i Results Three of four SR0s, one of one SR0 written retake, and three of three R0s examined passed for an 75 percent, 100 percent, and 100 percent pass rate respectively. The examiners judged that the written, walk-through c and simulator examinations were average and discriminating when compared ;

to the rest of the industr Simulator Facility The examiners observed simulation facility operation throughout the ;

simulator and walk-through portions of the examination. The examiners

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found that the simulation facility performed well in support of the examination. The simulator developed a minor' hardware problem near the ;

end of the day while conducting the simulator portion of the operating examination. The examination team identified one simulator configur- ,

ation item. The arrangement of the "0 PEN / CLOSED" lights above the t handswitch for HV 2935 A/B/C was different on the simulator and the control room. The simulator order was B/A/C as opposed to the control -

then in room was A/B/C. This deficiency was promptly corrected by the

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facility prior to the exit intervie ; Procedures Title 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, requires that activities affecting ,

quality shall be prescribed by documented instructions, procedures, or drawings, of a type appropriate to the circumstances and shall be accomplished in accordance with these instructions, procedures, or drawing It further requires that instructions, procederer: or drawings shall include appropriate quantitative or qualitative !

acceptance criteria for determining that important activities have :

been satisfactorily accomplishe !

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The inspector examined the following E0Ps for quality and usefulness and !

found them to be satisfactory: *

Procedure # Title Revision #

FNP-1-EEP-0 Reactor Trip or Safety 13 Injection FNP-1-EEP-1 Loss of Reactor or Secondary 13 Coolant FNP-1-EEP-2 Faulted Steam Generator 8 Isolation

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FNP-1-EEP-3 Steam Generator Tube Rupture 11'

ESP- SI Termination 9 i

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FRP- Response to Loss of Secondary 13 Heat Sink FRP- Response to Nuclear Power 13 ,

Generation System Operating Procedure-62.0, " Emergency Air System", paragraph 4.5, ,

contains instructions for placing the breathing air system in operatio The inspector determined that the note and its applicable paragraph were *

confusing and conflicted with its subsequent instruction. The note states that " NIP 18HV29350 is required to be open for Service Air to containment ;

and not if Breathing Air only is required." The applicable paragraph states " Verify that N1P18HV2935B and N1P18HV29350 indicates open, and N1P18HV2935A indicates closed. Do not proceed until the system is aligned this way." The examiner informed the facility of this discrepanc . Exit Interview ,

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At the conclusion of the site visit, the examiners met with representatives of the plant staff listed in paragraph one to discuss the results of the examinations. The licensee did not identify as proprietary any material provided to, or reviewed by the examiners. The examiners further discussed in detail the inspection finding listed belo Dissenting comments were not received from the license '

Item Number Description / Para 50-348/93-301-01 IFI - Operator knowledge of the intent of the SGTR procedure and with the FSAR regarding a SGTR (paragraph 2.b) ,

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ENCLOSURE 2 ',

SIMULATOR FACILITY REPORT ,

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Facility Licensee: Farley Nuclear Plant  ;

facility Docket No.: 50-348  !

Operating Tests Administered On: October 19-21, 1993 This form is to be used only to report observations. These observations do not ,

constitute, in and of themselves, audit or inspection findings and are not, ,

without further verification and review, indicative of non-compliance with 10 !

CFR 55.45(b). These observations do not affect NRC certification or approval of the simulation facility other than to provide information which may be used in-future evaluations. No licensee action is required solely in response to these observation :

The examination team identified one simulator configuration item. The $

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arrangement of the "0 PEN / CLOSED" lights above the handswitch for HV 2935 A/B/C was different on the simulator than in the contrcl room. The simulator order was "B/A/C" where as the control room order was "A/B/C." This deficiency has been correcte i

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