IR 05000302/1982012

IE Insp Rept 50-302/82-12 on 820616-18.No Noncompliance Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Action on Previous Insps, Followup on IE Bulletin 80-11,quality Records for Reactor Bldg Tendon & Bldg Dome Surveillance Programs

ML20058H316
Person / Time
Site:	Crystal River
Issue date:	07/07/1982
From:	Conlon T, Lenahan J NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
To:
Shared Package
ML20058H285	List: IR 05000302/1982012 ML20058H279
References
50-302-82-12, IEB-80-11, NUDOCS 8208030539
Download: ML20058H316 (8)

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1. 'o UNITED STATES ,

8 n NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION .

t r REGION il o * 101 MARIETTA ST., N.W., SUITE 3100

ATLANTA, GEORGIA 303o3

Report No. 50-302/82-12 Licensee: Florida Power Corporation 320134th Street, South St. Petersburg, FL 33733 Facility Name: Crystal River Docket No. 50-302 License No. DPR-72 Inspection at Crystal River te near Crystal River, Florida Inspector: S 7/ //'E--

J. J. Le@$n Date Signed Approved b Mfc T. E. Conlon, Section Chief M' 7-7-F2-Date Signed

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Engineering Inspection Branch Division of Engineering and Technical Programs

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SUMMARY Inspection on June 16-18, 1982 Areas Inspected This routine, unannounced inspection involved 16 inspector-hours on site in the areas of licensee action on previous inspector findings, followup on IE Bulletin 80-11, quality records for the reactor building tendon surveillance program, and the reactor building dome surveillance progra Results Of the areas inspected, no violations or deviations were identifie _

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REPORT DETAILS Persons Contacted Licensee Employees

• C. Brown, Nuclear Compliance Supervisor

• Q. Dubois, Assistant Nuclear Plant Manager

• T. Lutkehus, Nuclear Plant Manager G. M. Williams, QA/QC Supervisor

• J. Cooper, Nuclear QA/QC Compliance Manager J. D. Martin, Electrical Engineer J. Dillion, Mechanical Engineer T. Fay, Performance Engineering Supervisor G. Oberndorfer, Auditor, Quality Programs Section

• J. L. Bufe, Nuclear Compliance Auditor Other Organizations

• G. Coulson, Liaison Engineer, Gilbert Associates T. Austin, Engineer, Catalytic, In ,

NRC Resident Inspector

• T. Stetka B. Smith

• Attended exit interview Exit Interview The inspection scope and findings were summarized on June 18, 1982, with those persons indicated in paragraph 1 abov . Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings (Closed) Unresolved Item (302/80-36-03): Tendon Surveillance Procedure Acceptance Criteri The licensee's surveillance procedure, number SP-182, reviewed by the inspector during inspection 50-302/80-36 (September 29 - October 1,1980) did not appear to meet the require-ments of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B relative to equipment calibration, personnel training and qualification, and inspector acceptance of completed work. The inspector reviewed the contract (number PRO-00289)

with the tendon surveillance contractor (VSL Corporation). The contract states that the contractor's QA program meets the requirements of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B. The inspector reviewed the evaluation of VSL Corporation's QA program which was conducted by the licensee's Quality Programs Section. This evaluation included the results of an audit of VSL performed by Bechtel Power Corporation acting as an agent for the licensee. The conclusion of the Bechtel audit and the evaluation

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performed by the licensee's Quality Program Section was that VSL's QA program met the requirements of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B. This conclusion is summarized in a memo from the Quality Programs Scction to the Nuclear Plant Manager dated July 22, 1981, Subject: VSL Corporation contract PRO-00289. In addition, the licensee modified VSL's contract to require the following:

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(1) Licensee review and approval of VSL personnel prior to start of work on site (2) Certificates af calibration for equipment to be used in the tendon surveillance (3) Performance of work using only licensee approved procedures (4) Provisions for inspection and acceptance of tendon surveillance work by licensee QC personnel The inspector verified that the four items listed above had been accom-plished by the licensee during an inspection conducted on October 13-16,1981 (See report number 50-302/81-22). This item is close b. (Closed) Violation (302/81-09-01): Failure to have documented instructions for performance of IEB 80-11 site survey wor The inspector reviewed the licensee's responses dated July 17, 1981 and December 23, 1981. The inspector re-examined the discrepancies he had noted during inspection number 302/81-09 (June 3-4, 1981) which resulted in this violation and examined the licensee's reasons for disagreement with the discrepancies and the resulting violatio Results of this re-examination are as follows:

(1) During inspection 81-09 the inspector noted that cracks in the wall enclosing ventilation equipment on the elevation 119 level of the turbine building / control complex had not been identified by the licensee. The licensee stated in their responses that these cracks were small in size, were not extensive, and had no impact on the structural integrity of the wall. The inspector agrees with the licensee that the cracks are not extensive and have no impact on the structural integrity of the wall. In addition, at the time the violation was written, there was no safety related equipment in the proximity of this wall. Therefore this item had no safety significanc (2) During inspection 81-09 the inspector noted that the licensee had not prepared as-built drawings for that portion of wall I west of wall 2 on the elevation 145 level of the control complex. The reason for not preparing the as-built drawing for this portion of the wall was that the licensee had not identified any safety related equipment in the proximity of this wall. During the inspection, the inspector noted that a conduit (number ACC-29)

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passed through the wall which was color coded as safety-relate Therefore, the inspector concluded at this time that it was necessary to prepare an as-built drawing and perform a design evaluation for this portion of the wall. The licensee investi-gated the function of the cable in conduit ACC-29 and found that this cable is a reliability feed for control complex lighting which has no safety-related function. The reliability feed is a non safety-related circuit to a lighting distribution panel fed from a safety-related engineered safeguard motor control cente The inspector discussed the function of the cable with licensee engineers and reviewed electrical drawing numbers E-220-003 and EC-220-224. The inspector concurs y ;th the licensee that the cable in this conduit is not safety related. Therefore it was not necessary to perform a design re-evaluation for the portion of wall 1, west of wall 2 since there is no safety-related equipment in the proximity of this portion of wall (3) The violation was based on lack of documented instructions for accomplishment of the IEB 80-11 work. The above 2 discrepancies were cited as examples of deficiencies in the licensee's IEB 80-11 site survey work which, in the inspector's opinion, were due to lack of documented instructions. The licensee stated in their July 17,1981 response that sufficient instructions were available to accomplish the IEB 80-11 work in the Bulletin instructions provided by NRC due to the limited extent of the use of block walls at the site. Af ter re-review of the above items, and the licensee's responses to IEB 80-11, the inspector concurs with the licensee that documented instructions were not required to accomplish the IEB 80-11 wor Based on a review of the licensee's responses, telephone discussions with licensee personnel, and re-examination of the item during this inspection, the inspector concurs with the licensee that this item was incorrectly identified as a violation. NRC records will be corrected to reflect the revised status of this item. This item is close (Closed) Violation (302/81-22-01): Inadequate Training of QC Inspectors. The licensee's letter of response to this item dated December 1,1981 has been reviewed and determined acceptable by the inspecto The inspector held discussions with responsible licensee personnel and reviewed the licensee's corrective action for this item which included reassignment of the inspector involved and re-emphasis of inspection responsibilities to all FPC and contractor inspection i personnel. This item is close . Unresolved Items Unresolved items were not identified during this inspection.

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% Independent Inspection Effort The inspector reviewed records relating to th.e reactor building structural integrity dome surveillance conducted in November, 1981 (5

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years after the SIT). Acceptance criteria examined by the inspector appear in Technical Specification a.6.3.6.4 and. Surveillance Procedure SP-180. The inspector examined the following records:

(1) Gilbert report entitled " Dome Surveillance Report Evaluation",

dated February 23, 1982 (2) Gilbert repo}t entitled " Dome Surveillance Report Evaluation",

dated March 5,198 (3) Surveillance Report - Crystal River Mnit 3 - SP-180 - Reactor Building Dome Elevation Change SurW), pr epared by..G. F. Young, Inc., dated February 9, 198 Review of the above reports disclosed that the dome surveillance was conducted in accordance with the SP-180 and Technical Specification requirements. However, the dome survey results slightly exceeded the acceptance criteria stated in Table 1 of SP-18 This was verbally reported to the NRC Resident Inspector. Since the survey results did not comply with the acceptance criteria, an engineering evaluation of the results was conducted. The conclusions of the engineering evalua-tien was that seasonal variation of temperature of the reactor building affected the survey results. All previous dome surveys, including the baseline survey were conducted in the summer, while the 1981 survey was conducted in late fall. To confirm this, the dome survey will be repeated this summer (in July and August . 1982) during an outage. In performance of the engineering evaluations, the Architect-Engineer, Gilbert concluded that the survey results did not indicate any de-gradation of the reactor building, The inspector examined quality records relating to the third reactor building tendon surveillance inspection which was conducted in October-November, 1981. Acceptance criteria examined by the inspector appear in Technical Specification F 6.1.6 and Surveillance Procedure Sp-182. The inspector examined the following records:

(1) Prestress Fcce confirmation test (lift-off) results and anchorage assembly inspection data for tendons listed in the table belo Table Vertical Tendons Dome Tendons Hoop Tendons

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, 12 V1 D 123 13 H 19 34 V6 0 212 13 H 46 34 V19 0 215 42 H 20

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45 V16 0 322 42 H 40 56 V11 D 329 51 H 26

. 61 V5 51 H 45 53 H 35 .

53 H 40 62 H 34 64 H 10 (2) VSL report entitled " Third Tendon Surveillance Test of the Reactor Containment Building", dated December,198 (3) Gilbert report entitled " Evaluation of Results of Thira Tendon Surveillance Inspection" dated April,198 (4) Results of laboratory chemical analysis performed on bulk filler grease sampler obtained from surveillance tendons listed in the table abov (5) Records of tendon anchorage area crack inspection for tendons listed in table above

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(6) Results of physical tests performed on tendon wire samples obtained for tendon number D 322, 64 H10 and 34 V1 . The inspector examined Modification Approval Record (MAR) 81-4-7 During the first and second tendon surveillance inspections, tendon 12 V20 was found to be stressed slightly above the limit of 1721 kips specified in Technical Specification 4.6. MAR 81-4-73 was developed to check the lift-off force in tendon 12 V20 and, if necessary, reduce it to be within the technical specification limit of 1721 kips. In the check of the lift-off force, tendon 12 V20 was found to have a lif t-off force of 1675 kip Since this is within the technical specification limits no additional action was required to complete this MA Within the areas examined, no violations or deviations were identifie . (0 pen) IE Bulletin 80-11, Masonry Wall Desig Summary of Licensee's Responses to IE Pulletin 80-1 Florida Power Corporation submitted its 60 day response to IE Bulletin 80-11 for Crystal River to NRC Region II on July 7, 1980. In a letter dated November 7,1980, the licensee requested an extension for com-pletion of the IE Bulletin design reanalysis (180-day response) from i November 7, 1980 until November 20 1980. The licensee submitted its 180 day 'esponse to the Bulletin in a report attached to a letter dated November 17, 1980. In response to an item identified by the inspector on a violation (withdrawn during this inspection, see paragraph 3.b) the licensee submitted some additional data on the IE Bulletin 80-11 design evaluation to NRC Region II in a letter dated December 23, 1981. This

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letter stated that re-evaluation of one masonry wall by the Architect-Engineer, Gilbert, resulted in minor changes to the original analysis which revealed that a portion of the wall would be over-stressed. The letter stated that the wall would be modified to correct the problem. In a letter dated March 23, 1982, the licensee stated that the emergency feedwater (EFW) system was not considered as a safety-related system when the orginal IEB 80-11 analysis was completed. The March 23 letter stated that this system in now con-sidered as a safety-relcted system and as a result, 2. areas were identified where masonry walls are in proximity of components of the EFW system, b. Previous RII Inpsections of IE Bulletin 80-11 Inspections of IEB 80-11 work at the Crystal Miver sita were made by NRC Region II in September 29 through October I,1980 ( see Inspection Report number 50-302/80-36) and June 3-4,1981 (see inspection report 50-302/81-09).

c. Review of Walls in Proximity of EFW Components The inspector examined walls identified by the licensee in their March 23,1981 letter to be in the proximity of components of the EFW system. These walls and the EFW components in their proximity were listed in an FPC interoffice memo dated September 24, 1580, subject:

" Cry stal River Unit 3 Concrete Masonry Walls - Field Survey - NRC Bulletin 80-11" which was reviewed by the int pector in the September 29

- October 1, 1980 inspection. At that tima, the EFW components were not considered safety-relate The inspector reviewed as-built drawings of the walls prepared by the Gilbert liaison engineer which show penetrations in the walls. The inspector compared the drawings to the walls and verified that they were accurat The inspector discussed the results of the design re-evaluation which has been performed on these walls with licensee engineer These discussions disclosed that the analysis has been completed for the walls in one area and that these walls were found to be acceptable. The analysis for a wall in the other area (the turbine building air shaft) is still incomplete due to problems the licensee is experiencing in modeling these wall for the stress analysis.One approach the licensee is considering is an assumption that the walls will collapse and either relocating the EFW comporents or protecting them from damage from the collapsed wall. The licensee will submit the results of the completed analysis for the walls in proximity of the EFW components to NRC Region II when it is complete d. Review of Masonry Wall Modifications The inspector reviewed modification package MAR 80-12-13 which was issued to remove a portion of wall 1 on elevation 145 of the control complex. The inspector discussed the Modification Package with

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Catalytic and licensee engineers. The work was completed in December, 198 IE Bulletin 80-11 remains.open pending completion of the evaluation of the walls in proximity of EFW components by the licensee and further review by NR Within the areas examined, no violations or deviations.were identifie .

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