IR 05000302/1982005

IE Insp Rept 50-302/82-05 on 820304-26.Noncompliance Noted:Failure to Adhere to Administrative Procedure During Plant Operation & Failure to Perform Type C Leak Rate Testing

ML20054H076
Person / Time
Site:	Crystal River
Issue date:	04/20/1982
From:	Brownlee V, Beverly Smith, Stetka T NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
To:
Shared Package
ML20054H038	List: IR 05000302/1982005 ML20054H037 ML20054H048 ML20054H054 ML20054H062
References
50-302-82-05, 50-302-82-5, NUDOCS 8206220549
Download: ML20054H076 (15)

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d ^ UNITED STATES N Y h NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION g a REGION II

• 101 MARIETTA ST., N.W., SUITE 3100 o ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30303

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Report No. 50-302/82-05 Licensee: Florida Power Corporation 3201 34th Street, South St. Petersburg, FL 33733 Facility Name: Crystal River Unit 3 Nuclear Generating Plant Docket No. 50-302 License No. DPR-72 Inspection at Crystal River site near Crystal River, Florida Inspectors: N I- W///9%

V F. Stetka // // g/ Ddte S1gned

', // N//82 B? W. , Smith } g Date Signed Approved by: 61 @ M'lk #d!8L D6te Signed V. L. Bfownlee, Section Chief, Division of Project and Resident Programs SUlltiARY Inspection on 11 arch 4-26,1982 Areas Inspected This routine, inspection involved 146.5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br /> on site by two resident inspectors in the areas of operations, security, radiological controls, Licensee Event Reports (LER's) and Nonconforming Operations Reports (NCOR's), non-routine events, reactor core physics,10 CFR Part 21 reports, and licensee action on previous inspection items. Numerous facility tours were conducted and facility operations observe Some of these tours and observations were conducted on back shi f t Resul ts Two violations were identified (Failure to adhere to administrative procedure during plant operation, paragraph 5.a; Failure to perform Type C leak rate testing, paragraph 5.b(7)).

8206220549 820611 DR ADOCK 05000302 PDR

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DETAILS

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- Persons Contacted Licensee Dnployees

• G. Boldt, Technical Services Superintendent C. Brown, Nuclear Compliance Supervisor 1 J. Buckner, Security Officer J. Cooper, QA/QC Compliance Manager G. Claar, Nuclear Maintenance Specialist

, * Culver, Reactor Specialist l *Q. Dubois, Technical Assistant to the Nuclear Plant Manager S. Ford, Licensing Consultant

W. Herbert, Technical Specification Coordinator

• S. Johnson, Nuclear Technical Support Engineer W. Johnson, Operations Engineer

• J. Kraiker, Nuclear Shift Supervisor

• T. Lutkehaus, Nuclear Plant ihnager

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P. McKee, Operations Superintendent 1 *D. Nusbickel,fianager, Quality Programs

*G. Perkins, Health Physics Supervisor G. Ruszala, Chemistry / Radiation Protection ibnager i D. Smith, Security and Special Projects Superintendent 1 *J. Lander, liaintenance Superintendent

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• K. Lancaster, Senior Quality Auditor

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• E. Welch, Nuclear Computer and Controls Specialist G. Williams, QA/QC Supervisor i K. Wilson, Nuclear Licensing Specialist Other licensee employees contacted included office, operations, engineering maintenance, chem / rad, and corporate personnel.

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• Attended exit interview

{ Exit Interview The inspectors met with licensee representatives (denoted in paragraph 1) at the conclusion of the inspection on March 26, 1982. During this meeting, the inspectors summarized the scope and findings of the inspection as they are detailed in this repor During this meeting, the violations and inspector followup items were discusse . Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings

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(0 pen) Unresolved Item (302/82-02-11): The licensee's testing and cal-i culation of the RCPPii response times indicates that the 470 millisecond (MS)

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time specified in TS 3.3.1.1 was incorrect and that the correct time is 560 itS. On March 4,1982 the licensee was allowed by Nuclear Reactor Regulation

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(NRR) to start up the plant and operate at no greater than 75% of full power

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while NRR evaluated the licensee's findings. On flarch 9,1982 NRR completed their evaluation, determined that 56011S was acceptable, and allowed the plant to resume full power operation. An amendment to this TS is pending and will be issued in the near future. In the TS Change Request No. 94 dated itarch 9, the licensee stated that they would accomplish the following items:

Develop methodology for in-place response time testing of the entire RCPPf1 string by June 15, 1982. One string will be tested at the first plant outage of 4 weeks or greater duration; further investigate causes of spurious RCPP!1 trips; and, within 6 months either acquire actual type-test data on the GE supplied current and potential transformers or justify continued use of analytical methods as equivalent to testin Until these issues are resolved, this item remains ope (Closed) Inspector Followup Item (302/81-21-05): The licensee has revised Operating Procedure 406, Spent Fuel Coolant System, to ensure that the fuel transfer canal low level alann is checked for operability and placed in service during fuel transfer canal filling operation The inspector verified the adequacy of the revision and has no further questions on this ite (Closed) Inspector Followup Item (302/81-30-02): The inspector verified the installation of a protective cover over Rl1L-2 cable. The cover appears to be adequate to protect the cable against future damage. The inspector has no further questions on this ite (Closed) Inspector Followup Item (302/81-30-03): The strip chart recorder used during the performance of CH-120 is now under the calibration labo-ratory control and is included in a periodic calibration cycle. The inspector has no further questions on this ite (Closed) Inspector Followup Item (302/82-02-01): SP-135 has been revised to change the brush recorder hookup locations to minimize the possibility of an electrical shor In addition, labeling has been added to the ESFAS cabinets to help in identifying cabinet channels. The inspector has no further questions on this item. Unresolved Items There are no unresolved items in this inspection report. Review of Plant Operations This inspection period commenced with the plant in flode III, Hot Standby, making preparations to startup following a reactor trip that occurred on March The plant entered liode I, Power Operations, on flarch 4 and continued in this mode for the duration of the inspection perio _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

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i a. Shif t Logs and Facility Records The inspectors reviewed the records listed below and discussed various entries with operations personnel to verify compliance with TS and the licensee's administrative procedure Shift Supervisor's Log; Reactor Operator's Log; Equipment Out-of-Service Log; Shift Relief Checklist; Control Center Status Board; Auxiliary Building Operator's Log; Chemistry / Radiation Log; Daily Operating Surveillance Log; Work Requests; and Short Term Instruction In addition to these record reviews, the inspector independently verified selected clearance order tagout During review of the Shift Supervisor's Log on March 9, the inspector noted that Nonconforming Operating Report (NCOR) 82-75 had been written due to inadvertent isolation of both Boric Acid Storage Tanks (BAST's).

Technical Specification (TS) 3.1.2.9.a requires a borated water source with a minimum volume of 6730 gallons which the licensee can meet with either of the two BAST's being available. Since both tanks were isolated, the licensee violated TS 3.1.2. The licensee took immediate corrective action and unisolated the tank The licensee recirculates both BAST's on a daily basis to prevent a loss of suction to the boric acid pumps (CAP-1A and CAP-1B) (see NRC Report 50-302/82-02, paragraph 6.a(7) for further details). The licensee then restores the tanks for normal operation, usually in accordance with procedure SP-320, Operability of Boron Injection Sources and Pumps. The licensee may also use procedure OP-403, Chemical Addition System, for restoration of the syste On 11 arch 6, the licensee used SP-320 to restore the BAST lineup. On ilarch 7 and 8, OP-403 was utilized and at about 1426 on fiarch 8, the licensee identified that both tanks were isolated. The licensee then determined that the cause of the isolation was the inadequacy of OP-403 due to a failure to revise the procedure to reflect a recent modifi-cation to the chemical addition system (SP-320 had been revised to reflect this modification). Procedure OP-403 was revised on itarch 11 to reflect the system modificatio The inspector reviewed this event and verified completion of the corrective actions. During this review the inspector interviewed the operators involved and determined that while the operators stated they used OP-403 to perfonn the restoration lineup, they also stated that they had not initialed or signed each step of the procedure as required by procedure AI-500, Conduct of Operation The isolation of the BAST's is considered to be a licensee identified violation for which adequate and prompt corrective action has been take n. The BAST's provide a backup borated water source for the reactor coolant system with the borated water storage tank representing

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the main source. Since TS action statement 3.1.2.9a allows 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> to return the BAST's to operation and since the BAST's were isolated (e.g., inoperable) for less than 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br />, no notice of violation will be issued. This position is consistent with the Interim Enforcement Policy, 45 FR 66754 dated October 7,198 The failure to initial or sign step of procedure OP-403 as required by procedure AI-500 and TS 6.8.1 is considered to be a violatio Violation (302/82-05-01): Failure to adhere to the requirements of procedure AI-500 to initial each step of procedure OP-40 The following corrective action has been taken by the licensee:

A Nuclear Shift Supervisor (NSS) meeting was held on Friday, March 12 to review this event; Short Term Instruction (STI) 82-32 was written on March 12 to remind all operators to initial or sign all step-by-step procedures as required by AI-500; and, STI 82-40 was issued on ftarch 25 to clearly delineate those procedures that will be initialed and/or signed for completio Based on these actions no further response to this item is require Facility Tours and Observations Throughout the inspection period, facility tours were conducted to observe operations and maintenance activities in progress. Some operations and maintenance activity observations were conducted during backshifts. Also, during this inspection period, numerous licensee meetings were attended by the inspectors to observe planning and management activitie The facility tours and observations encompassed the following areas:

Security Perimeter Fence; Control Room; Emergency Diesel Generator Rooms; Auxiliary Building; Intermediate Building; Reactor Building; Battery Rooms; and, Electrical Switchgear Room During these tours, the following observations were made:

(1) tionitoring instrumentation - The following instrumentation was observed to verify that indicated parameters vere in accordance with the Technical Specifications for the current operational mode:

Equipment operating status; Area, atmospheric and liquid radiation monitors; Electrical system lineup; Reactor operating parameters; and, Auxiliary equipment operating parameter On flarch 12, while touring the Intermediate Building (IB), the i < transmitter

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FW-312-FX was indicating -20.5 to -21.5 gpm with the EF system secured. The inspector investigated this finding and noted that procedure SP-349, Emergency Feedwater System Operability Demon-stration, acceptance criteria requires the transmitter to have no

" fault" light and to, te zero checked to within i 19 gpm of "0".

, Procedure SP-300, Operating Daily Surveillance Log, requires FW-312-FX (and FW-313-FX for the opposite FW train) to be checked each shift. However, this procedure also states that the units for these instruments is "0PBLE" (instead of GPil) and that the

" NORMAL RANGE" for'these instruments is " operable". The inspector questioned several operators to assess their understanding of the term " operable" for these instruments and determined that no operator correctly identified the operability critieria of SP-34 The licensee has had considerable drift problems with these flow transmitters and is planning to replace them. On the date of the inspectors findings, the flow transmitters were immediately rechecked by an operator, was found to be reading within the SP-349 limits, and was subsequently determined to be operabl The licensee will revise SP-300 to specify the operability criteria for these flow transmitter Inspector Followup Item (302/82-05-02): Review the revision to procedure SP-300 that will include operability criteria for FW-312-FX and FW-313-F (2) Safety Systems Walkdowns - The inspectors conducted walkdowns of the following safety systems to verify lineups were in accordance with license requirements for system operability:

Emergency Diesel Generator Control Switch Lineup verification; Ernergency Diesel Generator Air and Fuel Oil Systems; Raw Water System; Service Water System; and, Nuclear Services and Decay Heat Closed Cycle Cooling Systems.

I No discrepancies;were noted in this are (3) Shift Staffing - The inspectors verified by numerous checks that operating shift staffing was in accordance with Technical Specification requirements. In addition, the inspectors observed shift turnovers on different occasions to verify the continuity of plant status, operational problems, and other pertinent plant information was being accomplishe No discrepancies were identified in this are (4) Plant housekeeeping conditions - Storage of material and co3ponents and cleanliness conditions of various areas throughout

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the facility were observed to determine whether safety and/or fire hazards exis No discrepancies were identifie (5) Radiation areas - Radiation control areas (RCA's) were observed to verify proper identification and implementation. These obser-

vations included selected licensee-conducted surveys, review of

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step-off pad conditions, disposal of contaminated clothing, and area posting. Area postings were independently verified for '

accuracy through the use of the inspector's own monitoring instrument. The inspectors also reviewed selected radiation work permits and observed personnel use of protective clothing, respirators, and personnel monitoring devices to assure that the licensee's radiation monitoring policies were being followe No discrepancies were identified in this are (6) Security Controls - Security controls were observed to verify that security barriers are intact, guard forces are on duty and access to the protected area (PA) is controlled in accordance with the facility security pla Personnel within the PA were observed to insure proper display of badges and that personnel requiring escort were properly escorted. Personnel within vital areas were observed t3 insure proper authorization for the are No discrepancies were identified in this are (7) Surveillance Testing - Surveillance testing was observed to verify that: approved procedures were being used; qualified personnel were conducting the tests; testing was adequate to verify equip-ment operability; calibrated equipment, as required, were utlized; and Technical Specification requirements were being followe The following tests were observed: SP-130, Engineered Safeguards Monthly Functional Test (conpleted procedure review); SP-435, Valve Testing During Cold Shutdown (MSV-130 stroke time testing

, due to maintenance); SP-335, Radiation Monitoring Instrumentation l Functional Test (post maintenance testing for RNA-12 and 13);

SP-179, Containment Leakage Tests Type 8 & C (leak rate testing

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for LRV-46 and SAV-23 and 122); SP-354, Emergency Diesel Fuel Oil Quality and Diesel Generator Monthly Test; SP-355, Operational Engineered Safeguards Monthly Functional Test (completed procedure review); and SP-300, Operating Daily Surveillance Lo As a result of these reviews, the following violation was identified:

During a review of SP-179 for the purpose of verifying compliance with Technical Specifications (TS), the inspector discovered that station air valves SAV-23 and 122, and leak rate valve LRV-46,

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were not included in the leak rate test procedure. This issue was discussed with the licensee and the inspector's findings were acknowledged. A further review of this issue indicated that these valves were last leak rate tested in February,198 T.S. 4.6.1.2.d requires type C testing to be conducted on containment isolation valves at intervals no greater than 24 months. Contrary to the above, leak rate testing on containment isolation valves, SAV-23, SAV-122, and LRV-46, was not conducted within the required 24 month interva This is a Violatio Violation (302/82-05-03): Failure to perfona required Type "C" leakrate testing on containment isolation valves as required by T.S. 4.6.1. (8) liaintenance Activities - The inspector observed maintenance activities to verify that:

Correct equipment clearances were in effect; Work Requests (UR's),

Radiation Work Permits (RWP's), and Fire Prevention Work Permits, as required, were issued and being followed; Quality Control personnel were available for inspection activities as required; and, Technical Specification requirements were being followe The following maintenance activities were observed:

Repair of itSV-130 (OTSG blowdown containment isolation valve);

lieteorological monitoring system inverter troubleshooting; Repair and calibration check of BS-16-PT (work package review); MAR 81-3-62, Installation of Redundant HPI and LPI transmitters; itAR T82-2-14, B4C Water Sample Holder for Spent Fuel Pool "A" (MAR package review); MAR 81-6-37. Reactor Building Purge Valve (review of itAR package and verification of new valve settings); and, itAR 82-1-17, AHV-1A and 10 Positive Valve Stop (itAR procedure review).

As a result of these observations, the following item was identified:

During a review of MAR 81-3-62 it was noted that the work r' 4 "+

associated with this itAR referenced the MAR test procedure im post maintenance test requirements. A review of the itAR test procedure indicated that testing was only performed on the transmitters installed by the MAR but did not address the necessary post maintenance testing required on the existing transmitters that were affected by this modification (e.g.,

filling, venting and calibration check). This issue was discussed with the licensee and the inspector's comments were acknowledge The licensee initiated corrective action to ensure that adequate post maintenance testing was accomplished for this modificatio Several other NAR packages were reviewed for post maintenance testing requirements and no additional problems were discovere __ _ _ _ _ - _ - _ - _ _ _ _ _ _

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The licensee's corrective action on this issue appears to be adequate and the inspectors have no further questions on this issue at this tim (9) Radioactive waste controls - Selected liquid and gaseous radio-active releases were observed to verify that approved procedures were utilized, that appropriate release approvals were obtained, that required samples were taken, and that appropriate release control instrumentation was operable. Solid radioactive waste processing was also observed on a sampling basis to insure that the licensee's controls were implemente No discrepancies were identified in this are (10) Pipe hangers seismic restraints - Several pipe hangers and seismic restaints (snubbers) on safety-related systems were observed to insure that fluid levels were adequate and no leakage was evident, that restraint settings were appropriate, and that anchoring points were not bindin . Review of Licensee Event Reports (LER's) and Nonconfoming Operations Reports (NCOR's) The inspector reviewed Licensee Event Reports (LER's) to verify that:

The reports accurately describe the events; the safety significance is as reported; the report satisfies requirements with respect to infor-mation provided and timing of submittal; Corrective action is appro-priate; and, action has been take >

LER's 81-64, 81-66, 81-67, 82-10, 82-11, 82-14, and 82-18 were reviewed. As a result of this review, the following items were identified:

(1) LER's 81-64 and 81-66 discussed the inoperability of numerous instruments in the engineered safeguards system (ESFAS) and reactor protective system (RPS). Many of these instruments were -

rendered inoperable due to instrument drift problems. The inspector noted that the licensee has taken the position that if a portion of an instrument string is found to be out of tolerance in an unconservative direction, then the entire string is assumed to be inoperable. The licensee has made no attempt to resolve the continual instrument drift problem (other than realignment) to prevent recurrence. The licensee must review this area to examine what actions must be taken to minimize recurrenc Inspector Followup Item (302/82-05-04): Review licensee's action to minimize recurrence of inoperable RPS and ESFAS instruments due to instrument drif J

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(2) LER 82-10 reportd the failure of radiation monitoring instrument Rf1G-14. The cause of the failure was attributed to water entering the electrical connector of the instrument resulting in a detector mal function. The source of this water is a leaky roof in the auxiliary building. The licensee has had other problems with this leaky roof that has led to other instrument failures. The initial corrective action will be to patch this roof with final corrective action being a total roof replacemen Inspector Followup Item (302/82-05-05): Review the licensee's progress to repair and replace the auxiliary building roo (3) LER 82-14 reported the failure of containment isolation valves (CIV's) CFV-26 and WDV-94 to clos The failure of CFV-26 was due to a failed air supply regulator and the failure of WDV-94 was due to a failed torque switch. The licensee will add rebuilding of the air supply regulators and replacement of the torque switches to the preventative maintenance (P!1) program, inspector Followup Item (302/82-05-06): Review Pl! program to assure addition of rebuilding of air supply regulators and replacement of torque switches to the progra The inspector reviewed NCOR's to verify the following:

Compliance with Technical Specifications; Corrective Actions as identified in the reports or during subsequent reviews have been accomplished or are being pursued for completions; Generic items are identified and reported as required by 10 CFR Part 21; and, Items are reported as required by the Technical specificatio The following NCOR's were reviewed:

82-10 82-61 82-73 82-29 82-62 82-74 82-44 82-63 82-75 82-46 82-64 82-76 82-48 82-65 82-77 82-54 82-66 82-78 82-56 82-67 82-80 82-57 82-68 82-83 82-58 82-69 82-82

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82-59 82-72 82-84 82-60 82-79 82-90

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As a result of this review, the following items were identified:

(1) flC0R 82-79 reported the inoperability of a flux / delta flux / flow channel., The inoperability of this instrument was missed during the responsible supervisor's review subsequent to the performance of the weekly surveillance procedure (SP-110) and was identified during a subsequent review. The inspector reviewed the data sheet and discovered that the notation used for the acceptance criteria was conflicting. This was discussed with the licensee and the inspector's comment acknowledged. The licen%e stated that a procedure change would be made to SP-110 to ensure that the acceptance criteria is clearly defined to avoid any confusion in the futur Inspector Followup Item (302/82-05-07): Review SP-110 to ensure accep,tance criteria for flux / delta flux / flow setpoint is clearly defined and not conflictin (2) tiCOR 82-76 reported a disagreement between the onsite and offsite fuel oil analysis for fire service tank (FST) 28. The licensee has resampled the tank and is awaiting the analysis result Inspector Followup Item (302/82-05-08): Review the fuel oil i'u's reanalysis resul ts for FST-2 ,c ,

(3) flC0R's 82-58 and 82-65 reported weld failures on tL recirculation line vents for liakeup Pumps (!10P's) 1A and I The welds have been repaired and the pumps are operable. The licensee is performing an engineering evaluation to detennine to cause of these weld failures and to

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Inspector Followup Item (302/82-05-09 : Review results of ( 6g) l'

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engineering evaluation for !!UP 1A and)1C recirculation line vent valve weld failure (4) liCOR 82-64 reported the failure of containment isolation valve WDV-94 to close following normal system operation. The problem was traced to a defective torque switch on the Limitorque valve operator. The switch was replaced and the valve tested for operability. During the operability test, the valve operator mounting bolts were observed to pull through the valve yoke. The four mounting bolts were replaced and flat washers were added under the bolt heads to prevent recurrenc The inspector questioned licensee personnel to determine if other instances of bolts pulling through the yoke had been observed. The licensee could not respond to this question and will investigate to determine if this problem is generic to other Limitorque-operated valve I J

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Inspector Followup Item (302/82-05-10): Review investigation into Limitorque valve operator bolt failure (5) NCOR 82-63 reported the failure of a cylinder air start line on Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG-1B). The inspector's review of this event indicates that the licensee believes the EDG will continue to start within the TS time limit of less than 10 seconds, however the licensee has no test data to support this position. The inspector stated that unless the licensee has test data to substantiate this claim, they must assume that the EDG will not meet required start times. The licensee is continuing to review the issue and will determine whether a check of all EDG cylinder air start lines is necessary and whether the diesel start times can be met with a failed lin Inspector Followup Item (302/82-05-11): Review investigation into EDG cylinder air start line failur (6) NCOR 82-57 s eported a failure to start on EDG-A due to dirty oil in the diesel speed control governor. The licensee will revise Procedure Pf t-133, Equipment Lubrication Procedure, to require use of a filter while adding oil to this governo Inspector Followup Item (302/82-05-12): Review procedure Pit-133 to require use of a filter while adding oil to the EDG governor (7) During the refueling outage that ended in December,1981, the licensee replaced the Bailey plant computer with a computer manufactured by flodular Computer Systems, Inc. , (flodcomp). The flodcomp canputer improved the ability of the plant to monitor reactor core parameters and to follow plant transient events. Therefore, in addition to the normal routine inspection activities in this area, the inspectors placed emphasis on the methods the licensee utilized to apply the new compu te .

The inspector reviewed facility procedures and completed data and interviewed plant computer and reactor engineering personnel to verify the following:

- The plant computer has been properly updated and tested for the latest reactor core operating parameters including cycle updates (Cycle 4) and core operatin~g history;

- Reactor Core power distribution and thermal limit determination procedures and computer routines are adequate;

- Required reactor core power surveillance is being accomplished as required by the Technical Specifications (TS); and,

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- Reactor engineering and plant computer personnel are knowledgeable of the reactor core computer analysis code and are capable of analyzing the dat To accomplish these reviews the following procedures and data were reviewed:

Computer data printout for 12/26/81, 12/30/81, and 1/1/82 through 1/8/8 Including in these data printout reviews, were the following computer groups:

Groups 23 and 24 - NAS Calculation Summaries Group 25 - Heat Balance Calculation Group 33 and 34 - Fuel Assembly Power Map Group 35 - Symmetric Detector Segment Power Group 51 - Rod Map Group 55 - Core Average Thermal Conditions Group 58 - Nuclear Instrumentation Group 59 - Tilt / Imbalance / Rod Index Group 61 - 3-D Power Map Group 62 - Control Rod Exposure Group 63 - Rod Patch Log Group 64 - Core fbp of Thermal Conditions Group 66 - Fuel Assembly Power Ratio thp Group 67 - Thermal Limiting Conditions-SP-104, Hot Channel Factors Calculations, and completed data obtained on 2/14/81;

- "ilodcomp Source Editor" computer printouts dated 11/5/81 and 3/25/82;

- SP-312, Heat Balance Calculations; and,

- " Crystal River III Cycle 4 Pills Data initialization File" and the Software

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Change Notification dated 11/12/8 As a result of these reviews the following items were identified: Changes to the computer software may be initiated by the plant or Babcock and Wilcox (B & W) and then are compiled into a " Software Change Notification" which is then implemented by the plant. The licensee has no procedures to delineate how these software changes are handle A similar finding was identified during a recent Institute of Nuclear Power Operations (INP0) audit. The licensee is developing a procedure to accomplish these change Inspector Followup Item (302/82-05-13): Review new computer software change procedur The computer Group 59 that is used to calculate reactor core quadrant power tilt has alann setpoints of 3.33 for the steady state limit and 8.83 for the transient limit. These alarm setpoint exceed the TS limits of 3.31 and 8.81 and therefore could cause these tilt limits to be exceed prior to an alarm occuring which would warn operators that the limits were being approached. The licensee will reset these alarm pcu setpoints to assure that the alarm occurs prior to exceeding the TS limit Inspector Followup Item (302/82-05-14): Verify revision to computer Group 59 quadrant power tilt alann setpoint The inspectors' extensive review of the new computer application and the updating of the ractor core parameters for the new operating cycle indicate that the onsite reactor engineering and plant computer staff personnel are not familiar vith the computer software. These licensee personnel rely very heavil on B & W to supply the correct software inpu The onsite staff cai only identify the software input data after considerable effort is expended identifying the source term Improvement in the ability of the onsite staff to readily identify software data will provide a positive check of new data and improve their ability to analyze computer problems. The licensee will review this area and determine what improvements could be mad Inspector Followup Item: (302/82-05-15): Review the licensee's progress to improve computer software data results by the onsite staf The nuclear steam supplier, B & W, perfonas Integrated Systems Tests (IST's) on all major computer software changes to insure the licensee has properly entered the new software. These IST's are accomplished by providing known data to the licensee for input into their computer and then comparing the computed results with that obtained on a B & W in house computer utilizing the same input data. The results of the last IST conducted for the new Cycle 4 software indicate some minor dis-crepancies between the two computers. In a letter dated 12/8/81, B & W

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identified these discrepancies and suggested that these discrepancies be investigated. These investigations remain to be complete '

( 3o 9/D ' V' ' Inspector Followup Item (302/82-05-16): Paview the licensee's progress in resolving discrepancies identified during the last IST for computer software, The minimum Departure from Nuclear Boiling Ration (DNBR) for CR-3 is 1.30. The computer software alann point for the DNBR is 1.30 which means that at the time an alarm occurs to warn operators that they are at the limit, they may not be able to respond to prevent exceeding the limit. The licensee will review this situation and determine if conservatism should be added to this alann poin Inspector Followup Item (302/82-05-17): Review licensee's determi-nation as to whether the computer DNBR alann setpoint should be chadedd Procedure SP-312 requires a hand calculation of the ractor core thermal power by heat balance measurements only if the computer is inoperativ Based on experiences at other facilities where computers received erroneous data and therefore computed erroneous thermal power results, the inspector questioned the licensee to determine if any periodic check of the computer calculated core thermal power is made. The licensee responded in the negative but acknowledged the inspector's concern and agreed that such a cross check would be prudent. The licensee will revise SP-312 to require a periodic cross check of the computer calculated thermal power utilizing a hand calculation.

, Inspector Followup Item (302/82-05-18): Review SP-312 to verify the l procedure is revised to require a periodic cross check of the thermal power calculatio . 10 CFR 21 Report The licensee has issued a 10 CFR 21 Report on problems associated with hydraulic snubbers. The inspectors reviewed this report to ensure reporting requirements were met, proper evaluations were made, and appropriate corrective actions implemented. With the exception of the air in hydraulic fluid, the rest of the issues (cracked aluminum adapter bushings, cracked radial bearings, and contaminants in the hydraulic fluid) have been i addressed in NRC Inspection Report 50-302/81-2 The licensee is conducting l further evaluations on air entrapment, cracked radial bearings and hydraulic I fluid contaminants to determine if they meet reporting requirements of 10

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CFR 21. The inspector will review these evaluations as they become avail-a bl e .

Inspector Followup Item (303/82-05-19): Review licensee's evaluation of air i

entrapment, cracked radial bearings and hydraulic fluid contaminants for 10

! CFR 21 reporting.

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9. Nonroutine Event Unusual Event - On March 16, 1982 at approximately 6:30 p.m. the licensee declared an unusual event in accordance with their emergency plan due to an unexplained high radiation alarm on two auxiliary building (AB) ventilation radiation monitor The waste gas sample system was being restored to a normal lineup subsequent to maintenance on a waste gas valve. During this restoration the sample roan radiation monitor (RflA-4) and the AB ventilation radiation monitor (Rt1A-2) alarmed and tripped the AB supply fans. An unusual event was declared and proper notifications were mad The cause of the radiation monitor alarms was an improper return to service lineup that resulted in a release path from the makeup tank gas space to the sample sink hood exhaust ventilation system. The release path was discovered and the release terminated. The percentage of the allowable whole body and skin dose instantaneous release limits were .19% and .06%

respectively. The unusual event was terminated on March 16 at 7:00 The inspectors reviewed this issue and discussed it with the licensee. The cause of this event appears to be an interface problem between valves controlled by operations and valves controlled by the chemistry department.

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This interface problem is being reviewed by the licensee for specific corrective actions associated with this event and generic corrective actions in other interface areas. The inspector will review the licensee's corrective actions and implementation of these corrective actions to determine if they are adequate to prevent recurrenc Inspector Followup Item (302/82-05-20): Review implementation of licensee's corrective actions associated with chemistry / operations valve interface problems.

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