IR 05000348/1990016

Insp Repts 50-348/90-16 & 50-364/90-16 on 900611-0710. Violations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Review of Operational Safety Verification,Monthly Surveillance & Maint Observation & Evaluation of Licensee QA Program Implementation

ML20055H427
Person / Time
Site:	Farley
Issue date:	07/13/1990
From:	Cantrell F, Maxwell G, Miller W NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
To:
Shared Package
ML20055H426	List: IR 05000348/1990016 ML20055H425
References
50-348-90-16, 50-364-90-16, NUDOCS 9007260192
Download: ML20055H427 (13)

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}nna;oq UNITED STATES .

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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMIS$10N -

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.e REGION ll 101 MARIETTA STREET, N *

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Report Nos.: 50-348/90-16 and 50-364/90-16 .

Licensee': ' Alabama Power Company .

600 North 18th Street

. Birmingham, AL 36291'

Decket Nos.-: 50-348 and 50-364 License-.Nos.: - NPF-2 and NPF-8= ,

Facility'name: Farley 1 and 2 ,

Inspection Conducted: June 11lthrough July 10,,1990-Inspection at Farleyl site near Dothan, Alabama- g 4 Inspectors: 4 /d- 'l G.T. Pfaxwell,, Senlo sid9fft Inspector '

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V8&euf8A W. W. Viller, Jr. , Reside t' ns ctor

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WO/98:

Date Signed

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Approved by:

F. SfTantren

% /b Section Chief, Division of =

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D' ate Signed '

Reactor Projects # *

l_ -SUMMARY ~

Scope:

This routine onsite inspection involved 'a' review' of operational safety ~

verification, monthly surveillance observation, = monthly maintenance 1 observation, evaluation of licensee QA program implementation, evaluation o licensee's self-assessment, licensee event repo'rts, and - action on. previous .

L inspection finding .

I Results:

. . Unit 1 ramped down on June 12 to.about 15 percent power to: allow clean-up. of the

feedwater system. The feedwater -had;a high cation conductivity measurement

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l which was caused by an inadvertent. injection of a'smalll amount of Freon-22 into the condensate system. The plant was returned to full power on-June 1 Unit 2 operated at approximately .100 percent reactor power throughout the-

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reporting perio An evaluation .of the licensee quality assurance program indicates that ' efforts are being made to reduce personne1 ' error and -in general to improve the' site l maintenance progra These improvements . included providing training work'

shops for all plant employces to-enhance employee job performance. Also, the

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site organization has been adjusted to include a new group for maintenanc [.O f A O N Q

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The new group has been tasked to provide more technical evaluation and review for purchasing, maintenance, procedures, equipment reliability, and in general ;

techn; cal. guidance concerning plant equipment (paragraph 5).

A non-cited licensee identified violation is documented in the report in paragraph 2.b.(1), Service water system did not meet design basis in the event-of a LOSP/ seismic even :

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REPORT DETAILS ,

i Licensee Employees Contacted

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R. G. Berryhill, Systems Performance and Planning Manager

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R. M. Coleman, Modification Manager, .

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L._W. Enfinger, Administrative Manage ' S. Fulmer, Supervisor Safety Audit and, Engineering Review -

R. D. Hill, Assistant General Manager,.- Plant Operations D. N. Morey, General-Manager - Farley Nuclear Plant'

C. D. Nesbitt, Technical Manager J. K. Osterholtz, Operations Manager L. M. Stinson,-Assistant General Manager -' Plant Support i J. J. Thomas, Maintenance Manager ,

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L. S. Williams, Training Manager Other licensee employees contacted' included, technicians, operations _ -

personnel, maintenance and I&C personnel, security force members. and office personne Acronyms and abbreviations used throughout 'this report are listed in the ,

last paragraph.

! Other Inspections: Operational Safety Verification (71707) Plant Tours The inspectors conducted routine plant tours during-this inspection ;

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period to verify that the licensee's requirements and' commitments-were being implemented.. These tours were performed to verify that:

systems, valves, and breakers required.for safe plant operations were-in their correct position; fire protection _ equipment, spare equipment and materials were being maintained and' stored properly; . plant operators were aware of the current plant status;. plant operations !

i personnel were documenting the status. of. out-of-service equipment;-- !

l there were no undocumented cases of - unusual ' fluid . leaks, = piping

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vibration, abnormal hanger or seismic restraint movements; all -',

reviewed. equipment requiring calibration-was current; and in general, housekeeping was satisfactory.-

Tours of the ' plant included review of, site documentation. and interviews'with plant personnel. The inspectors reviewed the control room operators' logs,: tag out logs, chemistry;and health physics'.

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logs, and control boards and panels. During these tours the  !

inspectors noted that the ~ operators appeared to be alert, aware of changing plant conditions and manipulated plant controls properl . . . -

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The inspectors = evaluated operations shift turnovers and attended _ ,

shift briefings. - They observed that the briefings and turnover-  ;

provided sufficient detail for the next shift crew and verified tbt

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the staffing met the TS requirement '

Site security:was evaluated by observing personnel in' the protected l and vital areas to ensure that these persons had the-proper authori- ,

zation to be-in the respective' areas. The inspectors also verified 1 that vital area portals.Were kept locked and alarmed. The security-personnel . appeared to be alert and attentive .to their' duties, and those officers - performing personnel and vehicular searches were- .

thorough- and- systematic. Responses to security alarm / conditions -l appeared to be prompt and adequat '

Selected activities of the. licensee's radiological protection program'

were reviewed by tha inspectors. to verify conformance with plant-procedures and L NRC regulatory requirement The areas reviewed: ;i included: operation and management of the plant's health ' physics staff, "ALARA" implementation,- radiation worktpermits for compliance '

to plant procedures, personnel exposure records, observation -of work s and personnel in radiation areas to verify compliance to radiation-protection procedures, and control of radioactive materials.-

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Plant Events and Observations '

(1) Service Water System As reported in NRC Report 348,364/89-14, APC0, conducted a .

't self-initiated safety system assessment (SSSA) of the Farley service On June 16, 1989, the licensee determined that

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water syste sufficient calculations.were not available:to demonstrate that thei

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service water system was capable of maintaining the design flow to ,

safety related loads 'in the event of a LOSP, seismic event, or

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combination of these events. Compensatory procedure revisions' were implemented .to isolate significant service water non-safety related loads upon indication 'of an LOSP or due to a ' service water pipe rupture'during a seismic even On September 13, 1989, the licensee briefed NRC Region 11 management ,

on the status of the problems- identified 'during the SSSA and_ the proposed corrective actions. The corrective action included detailed analyses and evaluations of the service water system design flow-requirements. Field flow measurements were also taken to verify that -

the design flows would be available. The results of the- review l indicated that the worst-case design condition for the ' service water "

L system was a LOSP or a combination LOSP/ seismic even Following one of these events, sufficient cooling water would be available to-safety related components without operator. action during the first <15 minute However, operator action would be necessary to establish ,

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-I sufficient cooling- water flow to the emergency diesel generators ,

- after this first~ 15 minutes.- The compensatory measures.previously )

. implemented were determined. to_ be sufficient-to increase the flow of l service water to the diesel generators.- Refer to LER -348/89-04 1 (Revision 1) for additional information on this proble CFR 50 Appendix B Criterion:III requires measures to'be established I to assure applicable regulatory requirements and design basis for  !

safety related system and components are correctly translated into l

procedures and instructions. The failure to. implement = adequate procedures to assure that the service' water system would meet the - 2 appropriate design requirements is' a violation. However, this

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I violation-was ~ identified by the-licensee, reported to the NRC and

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appropriate corrective actions were implemented. This . violation -

meets the criteria specified' in Section V of the NRC Enforcement'

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' Policy for not issuing a Notice of Violation andt is identified as '

Non-cited Violation 348,364/90-16-01,- Service water ' system did 'nct l meet design basis in the event of a LOSP/ seismic even !

(2). Freon-22 Leak into Unit 1 Main Feedwater System (

At about 6:30 a.m. on June 12, ~ the shift-supervisor was notified that the' Unit I cation conductivity for main _ feedwater was trending up. A quick inquiry revealed that maintenance personnel had been testing 1B feedwater_ level transmitter- LT-527. In an attempt.to try and locate a possible leak in the lines.for LT-527, the technicians '

pressurized the-lines with Freon-22. Apparently about one pound of freon leaked _ by the isolation valves and ultimately into the main ,

feedwater syste When the Freon-22 (Chlorodifluoromethane) entered l the feedwater system it dissociated into Chlorine' arJ ' Fluorine, which resulted in the increased cation conductivity readings.-.

The normal cation conductivity for the main = feedwater typically is measured at about .6 micromhos per centimeter. However, when the Freon-22 entered the system the readings jumpedito a maximum -of about 3.79 micrombos. Site abnormal operating procedures 11-A0P-25, Condenser Tube Leakage; provides guidance for operations when a high conductivity measurement occurs. - Paragraph 5.3.1 of 1-A0P-35 requires

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, that an orderly reactor power reduction .to less than or equal to .35%

when the measurements exceed 2.0 micromhos. .The_ operators began this power reduction at about 8:02 a.m. on June 12,.and began taking the other actions prescribed by 1-A0P-25 .The steam generator main feedwater clean-up operations began-imediately and -continued until about 5:30 p.m. on. June 13, then the plant began a ramp up in powe While the plant was at low pcwer, a problem _ was experienced. due to the condensate pump 1A motor bearing temperature increase. .As a result, the plant was maintained at about 85% power until-the motor was replaced and the pump was returned to servic !

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y The performance of---the chemistry staff byl promptly detecting the-increase in ' cation conductivity and. their vigorous ~ efforts in ,

tracking the cause of the _ increase and ltheir efforts with the

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i clean-up . activity was .a good example: of a dedicated professional

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The licensee has identified the above event invol'ving the: Freon-22 on incident report IR 1-90-171. This incident report willitrack -i this -item to assure that thel appropriate corrective action .is taken to reduce the likelyhood of another similar occurrent: (3): Single Switch to Control'Two= Safety. Trains-Recently at another RII nuclear plant the licensee reported that the plant design had allowed the installation of a single switch to-control both electricci . trains for containment spray rese Westinghouse evaluated the design and determined that allowing- one-single switch to affect two electrical- trains could potentiall ,

violate the- IEEE 279-1968,' Standard for Nuclear. Plant Protection- 1 System The type of switch in question was-identified as a type "0Tl 2." The resident -inspectors- evaluated the design. installation- for - Farley Units 1 and 2 and found- that each train for the containment spray ;

systems have their separate reset-switches. _However, the inspectors- !

were informed by the licensee that engineering ~ is ' evaluating the applicability of = a Westinghouse Bulletin which addressed the potential for the design mis-use-of reset switche !

I No violations or deviations were identified. .The results- of the ,

inspections in this area indicate that the, program was effective with !

respect to meeting the safety objective ~

3. MonthlySurveillanceObservation(61726)

The inspectors witnessed maintenance surveillanceLtest activities - on safety-related systems and components to verify that these activities were performed in-accordance with TS and licensee requirements.- These ,

observations included witnessing selected portions of each surveillance, 1 review of. the surveillance ' procedures to ensure that. administrative- ;

controls and tagging ' procedures were in force, determining, that. approval '

was obtained . pri.or to conducting the surveillance test, and- the-individuals . conducting the test- were qualified in accordance with: .

plant-approved L procedure Other observations included ascertaining that i test instrumentation used was calibrated, data collected was within the-specified requirements of TS, any identified discrepancies were properly '

noted, and'the systems were correctly returned to service. The fo' lowing specific activities were-observed:

0-STP-8 Diesel Generator 1-2A Operability Test ~

0-STP-80.2- Diesel Generator 2C Operability Test

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-1-STP- Operations Daily: Shift Surveillance Requirements 1-STP-5.0- Full Length Control Rod Operability Test 1-STP-6 EQ Area Temperature Monitoring-1-STP-121 ,

Power Range Axial Off-Set Calibration

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l 2-STP-2 CCW Pump 2C Quarterly IST '

2-STP-63.3- EQ Area Temperature Monitoring 2-STP-8 Diesel. Generator 2B Operability Test 0-ETP-3610 Determination of Movable Detector Operating .f Voltage - Unit l Surveillance tests 1/2-STP-63.3 indicate' that the-temperature in the main steam . valve rooms exceed _the acceptable level of 104 degrees F. The licensee's engineering organization is evaluating this problem- to detennine the appropriate action. This-will continue: to -be monitored as part of the residents routine inspection progra No violations or deviations were identified. The results of the: -

inspections in this area . indicate -that the program was effective'with '

respect to meeting the safety objective . Monthly Maintenance Observation-(62703) l The inspectors reviewed maintenance activities to verify the following: .

maintenance -. personnel were obtaining .the appropriate tag' out and clearance approvals prior to commencing work activities; correct _

documentation was available for all requested parts and material prior to sse; procedures were available for all requested parts and material prior to use; procedures were available and adequate for: the- work being conducted; maintenance personnel performin; work ' activities were qualified to accomplish these tasks; activities ~ reviewed .were: not

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violating any limiting conditions for operation: during the specific I

evolution; post-maintenance testing activities were completed; .and that equipment was properly returned to service after the completion of wor activities. Activities reviewed included:

L MWR 197900 Replace agastats for Unit 2 RHR heat exchanger room sump pump MWR 212293 Check breaker for Unit 1 mini-purge exhaust fan using i procedure EMP-1530.0 MWR 214249 Installation of 1/4-inch fuel oil. vent line from -

accumulator to vent pipe for diesel generator 2B per PCN 87-2-439 MWR 226584 Repair leaking pump discharge valve for motor driven auxiliary feedwater pump 1 MWR 228913, Correct oil leaks-on diesel generator 1 ,2146808 and 228919

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. Secure retainer bands for exhaust manifold on; diesel

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MWR:228914-generator I MWR 228915 Recalibrate lube oil: sump temperature indicator for diesel i generator 1B using procedure 1-IMP-22 MWR 229006 Condensate pump 1A motor bearing over heated.- Replace ,

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the motor with a'new motor from spares. -The new motor was tested and the condensate pump was returned to servic MWR 229009 . Diesel generator IB jacket water inner. cooler heat-exchanger developed a tube leak. The _ leaking tube was-plugged, the heat ~ exchanger ~' was then pressures tested, flushed, and returned to servic NWR 229624 Investigate slow start on diesel generator 18 and perform necessary repair WA-00329430 Clean and adjust smoke detectors in auxiliary building in :

accordance with procedure EMP-1220.0 No ' violations or deviations were identified.: The results of the -!

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inspections in this area indicate that the program was effective.with respect to meeting the safety objective . Evaluation of Licensee Quality Assurance Program Implementation (35502)

The inspectors evaluated the effectiveness of the. licensee's quality assurance program implementatio The. evaluation required a review of:

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the evaluation of recent Region II inspection. reports 'and findings; the'

Region II outstanding item list for the Farley plant; the latest Farley- ,

SALP report; licensee's corrective actions for NRC and'SAER' findings; and LERs written within the past 12 months. Also, the inspectors interviewed the site supervisor of SAER and evaluated the findings which 'SAER-has '

identified to site management for the past 12 month The inspectors reviewed the minutes of meetings which were conducted on or about September 21, 1989 and December,14, 1989- concerning-the design adequacy for Farley. ' The correspondence identified a new comittee, l " Design Adequacy Review Comittee" (DARC) which was formed to provide

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independent verification, recomendations, and improve 'comunication between Southern Company Services,_ Bechtel and Westinghous The independent verifications and recomendations made by this comittee  !

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cover significant design issues. Several design-activities were selecte by DAR The activities were carefully reviewed and several comments and recommendations were made by the member <

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The, resident inspectors noted- that the - issues identified and

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recomendations made by DARC provided APC0 with increased management :

involvement concerning design tasks which may: affect the Farley plan The formation of DARC appears .to be = a - positive step by licensee

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management to improve performance in: the area ~of design engineering and'

engineering technical revie '

The site organization has been adjusted 'to' include a new group in the maintenance area. This new group has~ been chartered- as an' engineering support group for maintenance. Their tasks'will include such things as:

providing technical guidance for purchasing; technical review of vendor manuals and other guidelines 'tocimprove equipment reliability; and in y general = provide technical- guidance concerning plant-- equipment - and-components. The licensee increased personnel in the system performance group for: ' trending, probabilistic risk- assessment, configuration _ _

management, and to facilitate resolution of long: term maintenance: problems (i.e.; S.G. issues, dissolved oxygen, -SW, _ thermalo performance). 0utage' .

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planning and. daily planning was combined and readjusted to = improve overall~ j coordination of work scheduling'and performance. TheLtrainingl staff-has been- increased and re-adjusted due to additional: demands by .the operator re-qualification program. The site administrative staff has;been increased to relieve the~ site staff from many of thei_r administrative-duties.-

A review of licensee and NRC. audits and LERs indicates Limprovement However, personnel errors still needs management attentio . Plant management has recognized the need for continued improvement and has provided training work shops for 'all plant employees 1to enhance employee =

job perfomance. Also, individuals are made more ' accountable for? their job performance, including following procedures.;

Recent plant events involving equipment failures have shown > that .

improvements may be needed in the preventive maintenance. program :at "

Farley. Specifically, it ! appears that the failure. to . follow vendor maintenance recomendations may have been a factor:1n these equipment failures. Licensee management states that one of the . tasks of the:new: '

maintenance engineering ^ support organization-willbbe ,to evaluate the

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vendors maintenance recommendation and to incorporate- these  ;

recommendations into the preventive maintenance program as' require The above observations did not identify any major deficiencie ' Evaluation of Licensee's Self-Assessment (40500)

The inspectors attended an SAER post audit conference-on July 6. Dusing this conference the SAER group presented preliminary inspection finding r for audits conducted on- the surveillance . testing program, control of measuring and test equipment and I&C maintenance.- A total of five potential "noncunpliance" and eight " concern" items were identified. .The !

plant management acknowledged a noncompliance item involved with inadequate test equipment deficiency reports on precision tools which 1

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1 l were found to be- out of calibration ~. However, plant management did not, y L agree on the following. four. noncompliance items: precision tools were

not calibrated within their specified calibration frequency; independent

inspections were not performed for a new card being installed in a feedwater ,

bypass control cabinet; . surveillance. requirements were not available to l demonstrate proper: operation 1 for- design-accident-loading-sequence ; to : 1 design-1oad= requirements for diesel-generator.1-2A; and functional' testing i not being performed -on the hot shutdown panels.- The plant management i acknowledged the " concern" items and indicated appropriate corrective '

actions would be initiate l The1 site SAER group will forward. their, findings to the-. corporate SAER i manager'for-final revie l

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No violations or deviations were' identified in the areas inspecte , LicenseeEventReports(90714)

The following Licensee Event Report was reviewed for : potential generic problems to determine trends, to determine whether information included-in the report meets the NRC reporting requirements and to consider whether the corrective action discussed in; the report appears appropriate. Licensee actions were reviewed to. verify that the event has been reviewed and evaluated by the licensee as required by the Technical Specifications; that corrective action was taken by the licensee; and that safety limits, limiting safety settings and LCOs were not exceede The inspector examined ' the incident' report -~ 1ogs- and records, an interviewed selected- personnel. The following report .is considered .i closed:-

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LER 88-20 Personnel error results in TS action statement i requirements not. being- met when fire protection systems l were inoperabl No violations or deviations were identifie . Action on Previous Inspection Findings (92702)-

(Closed) TI 2500/19 Unresolved Safety L Issue A-26, Reactor vessel *

pressure transient protection. This item was_ reviewed and closed in NRC .

Report 348,364/88-19, Refer to this report for details on this item.-  !

(Closed) TI 2515/65, TMI ~ Item I.D.2.2, Plant-safety parameter display system-(SPDS). The Farley SPDS was reviewed and' inspected on Februar , 1990 by the NRC/NRR' staff. -This review found that the SPDS met six

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of the eight requirements of NUREG 0737. The two requirements not met were: safety status -information is not continuously displayed; and safety status display of the SPDS does not include radioactivity control l

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function For details of NRR's_ review refer to NRC'1etter_ of May 30, 1990 to APC For tracking purposes the original item number will be closed and will be identified by NRR with a new tracking numbe Therefore, this item is close (Closed) TI 2515/65.TMI Item I.D.2.3, Plant-SPDS fully implemented. The licensee has developed procedures and trained operators on the installed -

SPD Plant administration procedures will ~ require the existing SPDS procedures to be revised and additional training to be performed if any modifications are made to the installed SPDS- system. Therefore, this '

items is close (Closed) TI 2515'/65 THI Item II.E.4.1.2, Dedicated hydrogen penetration The Farley plant does not use external hydrogen recombiners. .The post-accident venting system which is a backup system to the electric recombiners is a dedicated purge exhaust syste Therefore, this TMI action item is not; applicable to Farley and. i close (Closed) 'TI 2515/65- TMI. Item II.F.2.4',. Instrumentation - for detection of '

inadequate core cooling. The licensee has installed a reactor . vessel

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level monitoring system and has upgraded : the reactor core exit )

thermocouple cables and subcooling margin monitor. These'are described ;

in FSAR Section 7.5.4 and meet the NRC requirements of NUREG 0737 Section 1 II.F.2. The NRC/NRR review of this item is documented in 'NRC SER <

NUREG-0117, Supplement 5 to NUREG-75/03 Therefore, this item is <

close !

(Closed) TI~2515/65 TMI Item- II.K.3;1.B. Final recommendations, B; and 0 t task force - automatic PORV isolation valv The licensee provided' a .l justification for not installing this valve. This was reviewed and found ;

acceptable by the NRC/NRR. For. details refer to NRC letter to APCO of :

September 23, 1983. This item is close !

(Closed) TI 2515/65 TMI Item. III.D.3.4.3, Control.' room habitability -

implement modifications. The'_ licensee determine that no changes were-

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required for the . control room complex to meet :the requirements of NUREG

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0737. This was reviewed and found acceptable'by.NRC/NRR. Refer to NRC'

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SER, NUREG-0117, Supplement 5 to NUREG 75-034' of March 1981 for details; ;

This item is close ,

(Closed) Unresolved Item 348,364/89-14-02, Licensee's -re-evaluation of service water system for adequacy of design. LERt 348/89-04 ' provides additional -information- on this licensee identified -violation. The inspectors verified that the licensee's: corrective action listed in the

'LER, including the revision of appropriate procedures, had been accomplishe However, this item meets the criteria of - the NRC

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Enforcement Policy ~ for licensee-identified violhtions for which a " Notice of Violation" is not- issued. Therefore, as_ discussed ir, above paragraph

= 2.b this item is closed and is reclassified as a non-cited violatio l t

(Closed) Inspector: Followup Item -348,364/89-31-01, Revise service water IST procedures to indicated location pump vibration readings are to be

.take Procedures-1/2-STP-24.1 and 2:have'been revised to stipulate'the location that IST vibration readings are to be taken from. .Therefore,  !

l this item is close 't Exit Interview

The inspection scope and findings: were . summarized duringcmanagement interviews throughout the report period, and on July 10,'with the plant  ;

manager and selected members of his staff. The inspection findings were ,

discussed in- detail. 'The licensee acknowledged the inspection findings-  !

and did not identify as proprietary any material reviewed by the i inspectors during this inspection. ' ,

i STATUS ITEM N . DESCRIPTION l

Open/Close 348,364/90-16-01 Non-cited Violation: Service:

water system didinot meet-design >

basis in 'the event of a .

LOSP/ seismic event -

paragraph 2.b.(1).

Licensee was informed that the items discussed in paragraphs 7 and 8 ~were close ;

10. Acronyms and Abbreviations

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AFW - Auxiliary Feedwater AOP - Abnormal Operating Procedure AP -

Administrative Procedure APC0 - Alabama Power Company CFR -

Code of Federal Regulations CVCS - Chemical and Volume Control System CCW - Component Cooling Water DC -

Design Change ECP -

Emergency Contingency Procedure EIP -

Emergency Plant-Implementing Procedure EQ -

Environmental Qualifications ESF -

Engineered Safety Features EWR -

Engineering Work Request F -

Fahrenheit GPM -

Gallons Per Minute ISI - Inservice Inspection IST - Inservice Test

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i LC0 - Limiting Condition'for Operation-LER -

Licensee Event Report LOSP - Loss of.0ffsite Power Event MOV - Motor-0perated Valve MOVATS - Motor-Operated Valve Actuation' Testing

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MWR -

Maintenance Work Request NCR - Nonconformance Report .

NRC - Nuclear Regulatory Commission hRR -- NRC Office of Nucicar Reactor Regulation PMD -

Plant Modifications Department RCP - Radiation Control and' Protection Procedure RCS -

-Reactor Coolant System RHR .

Residual Heat Removal SI -

Safety Injection SAER - Safety Audit and Engineering Review SALP - Systematic Assessment of Licensee Performance Report SSPS - Solid State Protection System SPDS - -Safety Perameter Display System STP -

Surveillance Test Procedure SW -

Service Water TS -

Technical Specification  !

TMI -

Three Mile Island-TSC -

Technical Support Center l WA -

Work Authorization i i

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