ML19260A807

Responds to NRC 790828 Ltr Re Violations Noted in IE Insp Rept 50-219/79-10.Corrective Actions:Revised Plant Emergency Procedures 511.1,514 & 532 to Include Restrictions Re Open Valves

ML19260A807
Person / Time
Site:	Oyster Creek
Issue date:	09/17/1979
From:	Ross D JERSEY CENTRAL POWER & LIGHT CO.
To:	Brunner E NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I)
Shared Package
ML19260A803	List: ML19260A807
References
NUDOCS 7912030248
Download: ML19260A807 (4)

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Jersey Central Power & Ught Company W ~

Madison Avenue at Punchbowl Road Mornstown New Jersey 07960 201 509-6111 September 17, 1979 Mr. Eldon J. Brunner, Chief Reactor Operations and Nuclear Support Branch United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region 1 631 Park Avenue King of Prussia, Pennsylvania 19406

Subject:

Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station Docket No. 50-219 IE Inspection 50-219/79-10 This is in reply to your letter of August 28, 1979, regarding the inspection conducted by Mr. L. Briggs on May 3-4, 1979, at the Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station.

In Appendix A of your letter, there is noted an activity which was not conducted in full compliance with the conditions of the Oyster Creek NRC Facility License.

The specific violation identified and the actions that have been taken to correct it and to prevent its recurrence are given below:

Violation:

10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Quality Assurance Criteria for Nuclear Power Plants and Fuel Reprocessing Plants, Criterion V, Instruction, Procedures, and Drawings, states in part: " Activities affecting quality shall be prescribed by documented instructions, procedures, . . . appropriate to the circumstances and shall be accomplished in accordance with these instructions, procedures, . . ."

The accepted Operational Quality Assurance Plan, 1973, Page 4, states, in part, "It is the policy of Jersey Central Power and Light Company to meet the requirements of the Code of Federal Regulations, 10 CFR 50, Appendix B . . . relating to the operation . . . of the Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station."

Contrary to the above, Emergency Procedure 532 - Automatic and Manual Scram, Dnergency Procedure 511.1 - Feedwater Pump Failure, and Energency Procedure 514 - Reactor Isolation Scram, all of which were applicable to the circumstances and were implemented during recovery from the reactor scram on May 2,1979, did not incorporate a suitable restriction such as the one in Operating Procedure 301 - Nuclear Steam Supply System, which states, in Section 7.2.2: "Never 1461 147 7912030 Jersey Central Power & Light Company is a i mber of the General Putlic Ut/ t:es System MF

Mr. Eldon J. Brunner September 17, 1979 It. Inspection 50-219/79-10 isolate all recirculation loops at the same time. The suction and discharge valves of at least one recirculation loop c'1all always remain open and, if possible, at least one pump should always be running to provide continuous circulation and indication of reactor vessel water level." As a result of these deficient emergency procedures, the scram recovery actions included shutting of the discharge valves of all recirculation loops, an action which had the following consequences:

1. Dropping of the water level above the active core below the 7 foot 2 inch Limiting Safety System Setting established by Technical Specification 2.3 for initiation of core spray, without core spray t.eing initiated;

2. Dropping of the water level above the active core below the 4 foot 8 inch level established by Technical Specification 2.1 as the Safety Limit during the shutdown mode; and

3. Starting of pumps in two idle recirculation loops with the temperature of the loops about 72 degrees F and 92 degrees F less than the reactor coolant temperature, exceeding the 50 degrees F thermal transient limit for pump starts established by Technical Specification 3.3.c.2.

This violation caused, or contributed to, an occurrence related to safety.

Response

By May 25,1979, Plant Emergency Procedures 511.1 - Feedwater Pump Failure, 514 - Reactor Isolation Scram, and 532 - Automatic and Manual Scram were revised to include a suitable restriction such as the one in Operating Procedure 301 -

Nuclear Steam System. These emergency procedures and Operating Procedure 301 now contain restrictions to the effect that the main suction and discharge valves of at least two (2) recirculation loops will be in the full open position during all modes of operation.

The corrective steps taken to avoid further items of noncompliance were:

(1) All plant operating and emergency procedures were reviewed in light of the May 2,1979, event and IE Bulletin 79-08.

The following is a list of the procedures revised resulting from this review.

(a) Procedures Revised as a Result of the May 2,1979 Event 317, Revision 5, May 22, 1979, Feedwater System (Reactor Feed Pumps to ReactorVessel) 318, Revision 4, May 22, 1979, Main Steam System and Reheat System 501, Revision 28, May 25, 1979, Annunciators and . inns 1461 148

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ME.EldonJ.Brunner September 17, 1979 IE. Inspection 50-219/79-10 505.2, Revision 2, May 23, 1979, Recirculation Flow Decrease 506.5, Revision 1, May 10, 1979, Scram System Failure 301, Revision 10, May 23,1979, Nuclear Steam Supply System 307, Revision 5, May 22, 1979, Isolation Condenser System (Standing Order #23 - related to isolation condenser operation was deleted as a result of this revision.)

(b) Procedures Revised as a Result of May 2, 1979 Event and Bulletin 79-08 507.2, Revision 2, May 10, 1979, Turbine Building Closed Cooling Water System Failure 516.5, Revision 6, May 22, 1979, Piping Rupture Inside Drywell with Loss of Offsite Power and One Diesel Inoperable 525, Revision 3, May 10, 1979, Loss of Drywell Cooling 527.3, Revision 0 (new procedure), May 10, 1979, Loss of Feedwater, Electromatic Relief Valve Stuck Open 532, Revision 3, May'22, 1979, Automatic and Manual Reactor Scram 534, Revision 2, May 22, 1979, Loss of Reactor Cooling Mechanisms During Reactor Shutdown (c) Procedures Revised as a Result of Bulletin 79-08 502.1, Revision 4, May 10,1979, Loss of Offsite Power 502.6, Revision 2 May 11, 1979, Loss of Offsite Power - Failure of Diesel Generators 503, Revision 6, May 10, 1979, Instrument Air Failure 510, Revision 3, May 10, 1979, Turbine Trip 511.1, Revision 2, May 10, 1979, Feedwater Pump Failure 515.3, Revision 2, May 10, 1979, Small Piping Leaks in Drywell 516.1, Revision 6, May 10, 1979, Main Steam Line Rupture Outside Drywell 516.2, Revisitsr. 6, May 22, 1979, Piping RJoture Inside Drywell -

Offsite Power Available 517, Revision 6, May 10, 1979, Significant Increase in Off-Gas Release Rate 1461 149

Mr. Eldon J. Brunner September 17, 1979 IE' Inspection 50-219/79-10 526.2, Revision 2, May 10, 1979, Fire in the Control Room 527.1, Revision 6, May 10, 1979, Inadvertant Relief Valve Actuation While at Power 527.2, Revision 5, May 10, 1979, Failure of Relief Valve to Reseat (d) Other Procedure Revisions Related to the May 2, 1979 Event or Bulletin 79-08 511.2, Revision 1, May 10, 1979, Condensate /Feedwater System Rupture 514, Revision 5, May 25, 1979, Reactor Isolation Scram 516.3, Revision 5, May 10, 1979, Piping Rupture Inside Drywell with Loss of Offsite Power 516.4, Revision 6, May 10, 1979, Isolation Condenser Line Break Outside Drywell 519, Revision 3, May 10, 1979, Loss of Containment Integrity 529, Revision 3, May 11, 1979, Emergency Containment Purge

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604.4.013, Revision 0 (new procedure), ;4ay ll,1979, Pressure Suppression Chamber (Torus) External Inspection 636.2.001, Revision 3, May 11, 1979, Diesel Generator Automatic Actuation Test (2) Operations personnel were trained on the relevant revisions to these procedures prior to plant startup.

Full compliance with respect to the May 2, 1979, event was achieved prior to plant startup.

Ver truly yours, H!- -

Donald A. Ross, Manager Generating Stations-Nuclear 1461 150