ML021910518
| ML021910518 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Susquehanna  |
| Issue date: | 07/02/2002 |
| From: | Susquehanna |
| To: | Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Security and Incident Response |
| References | |
| EP-PS-104 | |
| Download: ML021910518 (66) | |
Text
Jul. 02, 2002 Page 1 of 1 MANUAL HARD COPY DISTRIBUTION DOCUMENT TRANSMITTAL 2002-3183 USER INFORMATION:
FL-A-IM*LAUREL B= EMPL#:23244 CA#: 0386 Phone#: 254-3658 TRANSMITTAL INFORMATION:
mo-* PLAII'LrAunL -, *07/02/2002 LOCATION: DOCUMENT CONTROL DESK FROM: NUCLEAR RECORDS DOCUMENT CONTROL CENTER NUCSA-2) t.'..HE FOLLOWING CHANGES HAVE OCCURRED TO THE HARDCOPY OR ELECTRONIC MANUAL ASSIGNED TO YOU:
104 - 104 - RADIATION PROTECTION COORDINATOR (RPC):
EMERGENCY PLSN-POSITION SPECIFIC PROCEDURE REMOVE MANUAL TABLE OF CONTENTS DATE: 05/24/2002 ADD MANUAL TABLE OF CONTENTS DATE: 07/01/2002 CATEGORY: PROCEDURES TYPE: EP ID: EP-PS-104 ADD: PCAF 2002-1439 REV: N/A UPDATES FOR HARD COPY MANUALS WILL BE DISTRIBUTED WITHIN 5 DAYS IN ACCORDANCE WITH DEPARTMENT PROCEDURES. PLEASE MAKE ALL CHANGES AND ACKNOWLEDGE COMPLETE IN YOUR NIMS INBOX UPON RECEIPT OF HARD COPY. FOR ELECTRONIC MANUAL USERS, AND ELECTRONICALLY REVIEW THE APPROPRIATE DOCUMENTS ACKNOWLEDGE COMPLETE IN YOUR NIMS INBOX.
PROCEDURE CHANGE PROCESS FORM
- 1. PCAF NO. 2002-1439 2. PAGE 1 OF 6 3. PROC. NO. EP-PS-104 REV. 14
- 4. FORMSREVISED - C R7, I 7
!C R RR , - R -_ R_,
- 5. PROCEDURE TITLE Radiation Protection Coordinator: Emergency Plan Specific Instruction
- 6. REQUESTED CHANGE PERIODIC REVIEW [ NO LI YES INCORPORATE PCAFS
- NO [-- YES # # ##
REVISION - PCAF Z DELETION E] (Ct* ONLY)
- 7.
SUMMARY
OF / REASON FOR CHANGE This PCAF replaces the term '"assembly" with "accountability" to be co . ,i,,@1rnges made in Revision 39 of the Emergency Plan.
Sections impacted are major tasks list; supporting information list;,,d TAB Continued j
- 8. DETERMINE COMMITTEE REVIEW REQUIR," S (Refer to Section 6.1.4)
"PORO REVIEW REQ'D? yES 9. PORCMTG# na BLOCKS 11 THRU 16 ARE ON PAG4 fFORiI
- 17. Cynthia Smith j06/14/2002 18. COMMUNICATION OF CHANGE REQUIRED?
PREPARER "TN DATE LQ NO F-l YES (TYPE)
(Print or Type) ;i ,
"(Prin or.SIGNATURE ATTESTS THAT RESPONSIBLE SUPERVISOR HAS
- 19. !.CONDUCTED QADR AND TECHNICAL REVIEW UNLESS OTHERWISE IrA6,I#A
- -,,A J. 5F4
... DOCUMENTED INBLOCK 16 OR ATTACHED REVIEW FORMS.
- CROSS DISCIPLINE REVIEW (IF REQUIRED) HAS BEEN COMPLETED RESPONSIBLE"kERVISOR "DATir~z- BY SIGNATURE IN BLOCK 16 OR ATrACHED REVIEW FORMS.
20.
( UUFUM APPROVAL DATE
- 21. RESPONSIBLE APPROVER ENTER N/A IF FUM HAS APPROVAL AUTHORITY INITIALS DATE FORM NDAP-QA-0002-8, Rev. 8, Page 1 of 2 (Electronic Form)
PROCEDURE CHANGE PROCESS FORM
- 1. PCAF NO. 2002-1439 12. PAGE 2 OF 6 13. PROC. NO. EP-PS-104 REV. 14
- 11. This question documents the outcome of the 50.59 and 72.48 Review required by NDAP-QA-0726. Either 1 a, b, c or d must be checked "YES" and the appropriate form attached or referenced.
- a. This change is an Administrative Correction for which 50.59 and 72.48 are not r YES Z N/A applicable.
- b. This change is a change to any surveillance, maintenance or administrative [ YES r N/A procedure for which 50.59 and 72.48 are not applicable. , _...---"
- c. This change is bounded by a 50.59/72.48 Screen/Evaluation, therefore, no new E] YES Z N/A 50.59/72.48 Evaluation is required.
Screen/Evaluation No.
- d. 50.59 and/or 72.48 are applicable to this change and a 50.59/72.48 r-L YES Z N/A Screen/Evaluation is attached.
- 12. This change is consistent with the FSAR or an FSAR change is required. Z YES Change Request No. na
- 13. Should this change be reviewed for potential effects on Training Needs or Material? F-1 YES Z NO IfYES, enter an Action Item @ NIMS/Action/Gen Work Mech/PICN
- 14. Is a Surveillance Procedure Review Checklist required per NDAP-QA-0722? r YES Z NO
- 15. Is a Special, Infrequent or Complex Test/Evolution Analysis Form required per r YES Z NO NDAP-QA-0320? (SICT/E form does not need to be attached.)
- 16. Reviews may be documented below or by attaching Document Review Forms NDAP-QA-01 01-1.
REVIEWED BY WITH DATE REVIEW NO COMMENTS, QADR TECHNICAL REVIEW REACTOR ENGINEERING/NUCLEAR FUELS IST **
OPERATIONS NUCLEAR SYSTEMS ENGINEERING NUCLEAR MODIFICATIONS MAINTENANCE HEALTH PHYSICS NUCLEAR TECHNOLOGY CHEMISTRY OTHER 10CFR50.54Q ____-____
Required for changes that affect, or have potential for affecting core reactivity, nuclear fuel, core power level indication or impact the thermal power heat balance. (n)
"" Required for changes to Section Xl Inservice Test Acceptance Criteria.
FORM NDAP-QA-0002-8, Rev. 8, Page 2 of 2 (Electronic Form)
PCAF PAGE. #2Q2-U3 EP-PS-104 PAL -;ý0F,..= Revision 14 Page 2 of 4 RADIATION PROTECTION COORDINATOR IRPC): Emergency Plan-Position Specific Procedure WHEN: Technical Support Center (TSC) is activated
- HOW NOTIFIED: Paged, phone backup REPORT TO: TSC Emergency Director WHERE TO REPORT: TSC OVERALLDUTY-Quantify and assess radiological conditions both on- and off-site, then recommend emergency classification and protective actions.
MAJOR TASKS: TAB: REVISION:
Obtain briefing on the emergency. TAB A 2 Activate TSC Health Physics group and, if TAB B 4 needed, request EOF activation.
Make sure initial habitability is assessed. TAB C , T Take inventory of information required to TAB D 4 analyze the radiological situation..
Brief Emergency Director in the TSC on what TAB E 1 you know about radiological conditions and Health Physics staff.
Assess emergency classification and confirm TAB F 4 or recommend changes to the Emergency Director.
Assess and recommend protective actions to TAB G 8 the Em.ergency Director.
Communicate with DEPIBRP. TAB H 4 Continue assessing radiological situation, TAB I 6 updating Emergency Director, TSC staff, and Health Physics staff.
Evaluate and approve emergency exposure TAB J 1 extensions.
rp # 2002 143 EP-PS-1 04 Revision 14 Page 4 of 4 SUPPORTING INFORMATION: TAB:
Emergency Telephone Instructions TAB 1 Emergency Organization TAB2 Response Levels for Protection Action Guides TAB 3 SSES Contamination Response Plan TAB 4 Emergency Facility Form Flow TAB5 Emergency Classification TAB 6 Public Protective Action Recommendation Guide TAB 7 PPL Emergency Personnel Dose Assessment and TAB 8 Protective Action Recommendation (PAR) Guide TSC Rad Staff Responsibilities TAB 9 Personnel emb..le"y =nAccountability TAB 10 Emergency Exposure Extensions TAB 11 Emergency Forms TAB 12
- Protective Action Recommendation Form
- Emergency Exposure Extension Request Intentionally Blank TAB 13 Liquid Discharge Data Sheets TAB 14
- PPL Radiological Representation/Participation in TAB 15 FRMAC
REFERENCES:
SSES Emergency Plan NUREG-0654, Planning Standards and Evaluation Criteria NUREG-0731, Guidelines for Utility Management Structure and Technical Resources, September 1980 SP-00-308, Emergency Medical Response
- 2~ 0f~2-1W9 TAB C EP-PS-104-C RevisiorZ" t Page 1 of 2 MAJOR TASK:
Make sure initial habitability is assessed.
SPECIFIC TASKS: HOW:
- 1. Check-that initial habitability is assessed in the TSC, Control 1a. Upon TSC activation, assess habitability based on:
I Structure, Chem Lab In-plant Team Staging Area and (1) CREOASS rad and chlorine Accountability Areas. monitors.
NOTE:
Chem Lab ventilation has no filters or recirculation system for airbome/chlorine protection.
(2) TSC rad Conditions.
(3) In-plant ARMICAMS.
(4) SPING and wind direction..
I
- 2. See that initial habitability is 2a. Consider habitability at other inhabited assessed at other inhabited areas such as:
areas if warranted by radiological conditions. (1) North Gate house.
(2) South Gate house.
(3) West Building.
(4) Energy Information Center.
(5) Nuclear Learning Center. II (6) Ecology Ill.
(7) White House.
(8) Sewage Treatment Plant.
(9) Access Processing Facility.
(10) Peach Stand.
(11) Vehicle Maintenance Shed.
(12) Security Firing Range.
2b. Provide guidance as needed.
PCAF # 2002__1439 TABC PAGL.L.(.OLm.0 EP-PS-104-C Revision-,l Page 2 of 2 SPECIFIC TASKS: HOW:
2c. Consider both radiological and non-radiological, (for example, chlorine),
conditions.
2d. Consider mobilizing (remote) ARM's or CAM's to onsite habitability areas.
HELP Personnel*aseembly-ap Accountability See TAB 10
- 3. When required, check habitability of 3a. Assess habitability of the offsite lab when the Offsite Chemistry Lab located in notified by chemistry that samples from the West Building. the site are to be taken there for analysis.
TAB 4 EP-PS-1 04-4 SSES CONTAMINATION RESPONSE PLAN TABLE OF CONTENTS PAGE 1.0 OVERVIEW 2 2.0 DEFINITIONS 2 3.0 CONTAMINATION ASSESSMENT 3 4.0 DECONTAMINATION 5 4.1 Building, Structure, Removable Equipment 5 4.2 Water 5 5.0 RELEASE CRITERIA IN RESTRICTED AREA 6 5.1 Structures and Equipment 6 5.2 Personal Property 7 EP-AD-000-133, Revision 2, Page 1 of 7
TAB 4 EP-PS-1 04-4 SSES CONTAMINATION RESPONSE PLAN 1.0 OVERVIEW This plan describes actions to be taken in response to emergency conditions which result in deposition of radioactive contamination as a result of a release from the Susquehanna Steam Electric Station. Deposition may be within the restricted area, within the site boundary, offsite or a combination of these.
This plan considers only actions to be taken which are PPL's responsibility and does not describe emergency response agency actions outside the PPL site boundary or public protective action implementation.
This plan is applicable when an emergency condition has been declared at SSES, an accidental release of radioactive material has occurred and the release has been terminated.
Ground contamination occurs as a result of the deposition of radioactive particulate material released into the atmosphere. It may be in the form of particulates at the time of release or it may result from the decay of gaseous radionuclides. Since these materials, and the resultant dose rates, may persist for an extended period of time following termination of a release, qualitative and quantitative analysis is necessary to assess long-term exposures. In addition, variability of levels within the affected area is expected to be high, due to meteorological and terrain conditions, and ultimately may require days or weeks of sampling to ensure adequate characterization.
2.0 DEFINITIONS 2.1 LEGAL SITE BOUNDARY - 'That line beyond which the land is not leased, owned, or otherwise controlled by the licensee."
2.2 RESTRICTED AREA - The area encompassed by the inner security fence.
2.3 EMERGENCY PLAN BOUNDARY - Same as the Exclusion Area, i.e. that area around Susquehanna SES within a radius of 1800 feet determined in accordance with 10CFR1 00.16.
The EPB is used to calculate offsite dose rates, project dose to the public, and to determine necessary Protective Action Recommendations for the public.
2.4 EMERGENCY PLANNING ZONE - An area approximately ten miles in radius around SSES for which emergency planning consideration of the plume exposure pathway has been given in order to ensure prompt and EP-AD-000-133, Revision 2, Page 2 of 7
TAB 4 EP-PS-104-4 effective actions can be taken to protect the public in the event of an accident at SSES.
2.5 INGESTION PATHWAY ZONE - An area approximately fifty miles in radius around SSES for which emergency planning consideration for the ingestion exposure pathway has been given.
3.0 CONTAMINATION ASSESSMENT 3.1 Upon termination of a release, the following actions should be done:
3.1.1 Perform smear samples and direct frisk of ground, building and temporary structure surfaces inside the restricted area which are believed to be in the plume pathway in order to determine the extent of the affected area.
Results which exceed 1000 dpm/1 00 cm 2 removable (smear survey) contamination or exceed 100 cpm above background on a frisker shall be designated contaminated.
Affected areas and/or equipment shall be roped/taped off as appropriate and posted as contaminated.
3.1.2 Perform isotopic analysis of a representative sample of onsite smears if not previously performed. Use of portable gamma spectroscopy equipment may be considered to assist in
- characterization of the depositions.
3.1.3 Perform smear samples and direct frisk survey of ground surfaces and all vehicles, equipment, and facilities outside the restricted area and within the site boundary believed to be in the plume pathway to determine the extent of affected areas.
NOTE: Results which exceed 1000 dpm/1 00 cm 2 removable contamination or exceed 100 cpm above background on a frisker shall be designated contaminated.
Use of the portable gamma spectroscopy system may be considered to assist in the characterization of the deposition.
3.1.4 Initiate surveys of building ventilation intakes to determine if airborne radioactive material was drawn into air supply systems.- Surveys of noncontrolled zone areas such as the S&A Building, South Building, trailers, etc. should be performed prior to allowing personnel to re enter these areas. Air conditioners running at the time of the release should also be surveyed.
EP-AD-000-133, Revision 2, Page 3 of 7
TAB 4 EP-PS-1 04-4
- a. Initiate surveys of building areas in unrestricted areas (such as APF, SLC, etc.) believed to be in the plume pathway prior to allowing personnel to re-enter these areas.
- b. Perform surveys of the service air and instrument air intakes and components to determine if these systems are contaminated. Air samples from the service air system should also be considered.
Use of supplied air respiratory protection should be prevented until the evaluation is complete.
3.1.5 Direct Chemistry personnel to:
- a. Sample standing water in the storm drainage system, roofs, equipment, pools, etc.
- b. Sample the site drinking water supply. Prevent the use of drinking water until water evaluation is complete.
- c. Initiate sampling of the Sewage Treatment Facility. If influent conditions permit, discharge should be prevented until analysis is complete. Liquid release dose calculations may be required if the discharge cannot be diverted.
3.1.6 Perform contamination surveys of areas outside the site boundary as directed by the Emergency Director or Recovery Manager. The State has primary responsibility for survey of these areas; however, it is expected that PPL assistance will be requested to assist in delineation of affected areas. Survey locations outside the site boundary should be as accurately described as possible by the monitoring teams. Isotopic analysis of a representative sample of smears should be performed as soon as practical.
3.1.7 Perform environmental sampling in accordance with EP-PS-248, Field Team Director.
3.1.8 Consider covering contaminated surfaces (building roofs, grounds and/or equipment) with reinforced plastic covering to minimize the spread of contamination until decontamination can take place.
3.1.9 Plug applicable building roof drains to prevent runoff of contaminated water.
3.1.10 Consider use of bladders to isolate storm drains and/or drainage channels in the event of precipitation. The Spill Response Team and PPC plan maybe used to assist in these actions.
EP-AD-000-133, Revision 2, Page 4 of 7
TAB 4 EP-PS-104-4 3.1.11 Request that engineering personnel identify any other normally clean plant systems which may have become contaminated during the release and survey, as necessary.
3.1.12 Coordinate with the Field Team Director to have Ecology-Ill personnel perform soil sampling of affected areas within the site boundary in accordance with the EREMP procedure for soil sampling.
4.0 DECONTAMINATION 4.1 Building(s), Structure(s), Removable Equipment Decontamination 4.1.1 Should be performed as soon as practical following termination of the release.
NOTE: Methods used for decontamination should generate limited quantities of waste water. Run off into the plant drainage system should be avoided if possible. Water generated should be collected, sampled, analyzed and treated as necessary.
4.1.2 Decontamination methods include, but are not limited to:
- a. Wipe down with approved decontamination chemicals
- b. Strippable paint
- c. Washing (water must be collected, sampled and treated, if contaminated, prior to disposal)
- d. Transport of movable equipment into radiologically controlled areas for decon
- e. Fix contamination using paint, plastic sealants, concrete, etc.
- f. Control areas until activity decays to acceptable levels, if release into environment is unlikely 4.2 Water Decontamination 4.2.1 Treatment of contaminated water from the following sources may be required:
- a. Roof drains previously plugged or routed to temporary tanks EP-AD-000-133, Revision 2, Page 5 of 7
TAB 4 EP-PS-1 04-4
- b. Water collected in the storm drainage system
- c. Decontamination of buildings, equipment and vehicles
- d. Collected water on site such as in the CST berm or Spray Pond
- e. Hydrolasing and/or flushing of roof drains, drainage systems, etc.
4.2.2 Contractor assistance and a portable demineralizer may be required.
5.0 RELEASE CRITERIA IN RESTRICTED AREA 5.1 Structures and Equipment 5.1.1 Release criteria for structures and equipment inside the Restricted Area are:
- a. Surfaces should be decontaminated to levels below the following:
(1) Removable contamination: <1000 dpm/1 00 cm2 (2) Fixed contamination: <100 cpm above background on a frisker or equivalent instrumentation
- b. If decontamination below these levels is not possible, alternatives include:
(1) Disposal of the material as waste (2) Fix contamination using paint, plastic sealants, etc.
resulting dose rate shall be less than 10 mrem per year (see NOTE on next page).
- c. Ground contamination of soils, rocks, paved surfaces, etc. inside the restricted area should be removed if the area is small. For larger areas, levels which would not result in dose to an individual in excess of 10 mrem/year are acceptable.
NOTE: This guidance is in accordance with NUREG/CR-289, PNL-5429, "Residual Radionuclide Contamination Within and Around Commercial Nuclear Power Plants,"
February 1986.
This level is considered sufficiently low so as not to endanger the health and safety of either SSES site EP-AD-000-1 33, Revision 2, Page 6 of 7
TAB 4 EP-PS-1 04-4 workers or members of the general public. Records of these areas and final levels of radioactivity must be maintained for the life of the Plant and should be included in the decommissioning plan.
5.2 Personal Property 5.2.1 Contamination levels on personal property being removed from the restricted area, including vehicles, must be reduced to less than the following:
2
- a. Removable - <1000 dpm/1 00 cm
- b. Fixed - <100 cpm above background on a frisker (or equivalent instrumentation)
EP-AD-000-1 33, Revision 2, Page 7 of 7
TAB 6 EP-PS-1 04-6 EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION CHECK 0 1.0 TIMING OF CLASSIFICATION o 1.1 UNUSUAL EVENT An UNUSUAL EVENT shall be declared within 15 minutes of having information necessary to make a declaration.
o1 1.2 ALERT An ALERT shall be declared within 15 minutes of having information necessary to make a declaration.
01 1.3 SITE AREA EMERGENCY A SITE AREA EMERGENCY shall be declared within 15 minutes of having information necessary to make a declaration.
01 1.4 GENERAL EMERGENCY A GENERAL EMERGENCY shall be declared within 15 minutes of having information necessary to make a declaration.
EP-AD-000-200, Revision 16, Page 1 of 39
TAB 6 EP-PS-104-6 CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCY CONDITIONS USE OF EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION MATRIX NOTE: CONFIRM THAT INDICATORS AND/OR ALARMS REFLECT ACTUAL CONDITIONS PRIOR TO TAKING ACTION BASED ON THE INDICATOR OR ALARM.
The matrix is worded in a manner that assumes parameter values indicated are the actual conditions present in the plant.
The matrix is designed to make it possible to precisely classify an abnormal occurrence into the proper emergency classification based on detailed Emergency Action Level (EAL) descriptions. It is impossible to anticipate every abnormal occurrence.
Therefore, before classifying any abnormal occurrence based on the EALs in the matrix, one should verify that the general conditions prevalent in-plant and offsite meet the general class description of the emergency classification. In addition, prior to classification, one should be aware of the ramifications in-plant and particularly offsite of that classification. Special consideration of offsite consequences should be made prior to declaring a GENERAL EMERGENCY.
EP-AD-000-200, Revision 16, Page 2 of 39
TAB 6 EP-PS-104-6 POLICY STATEMENT ON EMERGENCY DECLARATIONS Policy When an emergency action level (EAL) is exceeded but the plant quickly returns below the EAL, the emergency should be declared. If appropriate, the emergency can also be downgraded or terminated at essentially the same time and the Emergency Notification Form can say the emergency was declared and terminated (or downgraded) minutes later.
Example The main steam lines isolate on high radiation due to a large oil intrusion into the vessel. The isolation on high radiation is a trigger to declare an Alert. If it can quickly be determined that the cause was not damage to the fuel and we should not be in an Alert, then the Alert should be declared and terminated with the same notification report.
Basis Declaring the emergency will notify interested offsite personnel and will demonstrate that we recognize that we exceeded an EAL. Immediately terminating or downgrading will avoid activation of company and offsite facilities that are not required for this event.
EP-AD-000-200, Revision 16, Page 3 of 39
TAB 6 EP-PS-104-6 CLASS DESCRIPTIONS UNUSUAL EVENT Events that are occurring or have occurred which indicate a potential degradation of the level of safety of the plant. No releases of radioactive material requiring offsite response or monitoring are expected unless further degradation of safety systems occurs.
ALERT Events that are occurring or have occurred which involve an actual or potential substantial degradation of the level of safety of the plant. Any releases are expected to be limited to small fractions of the EPA Protective Action Guideline exposure levels.
SITE AREA EMERGENCY Events that are occurring or have occurred which involve actual or imminent major failures of plant functions needed for protection of the public. Any releases are not expected to exceed EPA Protective Action Guideline exposure levels except inside the emergency planning boundary.
GENERAL EMERGENCY - Events that are occurring or have occurred which involve actual or imminent substantial core degradation or melting with potential for loss of containment integrity. Expectation is that releases will exceed EPA Protective Action Guideline exposure levels beyond the emergency planning boundary.
EP-AD-000-200, Revision 16, Page 4 of 39
TAB 6 EP-PS-104-6 CATEGORY INDEX TO THE MATRIX FOR THE CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCY CONDITIONS TABLE OF CONTENTS CATEGORY EVENT PAGE 1 AIRCRAFT/TRAIN ACTIVITY ............................................................. 6 2 CONTROL ROOM EVACUATION .................................................... 7 3 FUEL CLADDING DEGRADATION .................................................... 8 4 G EN ERA L ...................................................................................... 11 5 INJURED/CONTAMINATED PERSONNEL .................................... 12 6 IN-PLANT HIGH RADIATION .......................................................... 13 7 LOSS OF AC POW ER ...................................................................... 14 8 LOSS OF CONTROL ROOM ALARMS AND ANNUNCIATORS ....... 15 9 LOSS O F DC POW ER ..................................................................... 16 10 LOSS OF DECAY HEAT REMOVAL CAPABILITY ......................... 17 11 LOSS OF REACTIVITY CONTROL .................................................. 18 12 LOSS OF REACTOR VESSEL INVENTORY .................................. 20 13 NATURAL PHENOMENA ............................................................... 22 14 ONSITE FIRE/EXPLOSION ......... ............................ 24 15 RADIOLOGICAL EFFLUENT ............................................................ 26 16 SECURITY EVENT .......................................................................... 30 17 SPENT FUEL RELATED INCIDENT ............................................... 32 18 STEAM LINE BREAK ..................................................................... 34 19 TOXIC/FLAMMABLE GASES ........................................................... 37 20 TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION SAFETY LIMIT ............................... 38 21 DRY FUEL STORAGE ..................................................................... 39 EP-AD-000-200, Revision 16, Page 5 of 39
TAB 6 EP-PS-104-6 1 - AIRCRAFT/TRAIN ACTIVITY UNUSUAL EVENT EAL# 1.1 Aircraft crash or train derailment onsite as indicated by:
Visual observation or notification received by control room operator.
ALERT EAL# 1.2 Aircraft or missile strikes a station structure as indicated by:
Direct observation or notification received by control room operator.
SITE AREA EMERGENCY EAL# 1.3 Severe damage to safe shutdown equipment from aircraft crash or missile impact when not in cold shutdown, determined by:
(A and B and C)
A. Direct observation or notification received by control room operator.
and B. Shift Supervisor evaluation.
and C. Reactor Coolant temperature greater than 200OF as indicated on Panel 1C651 (2C651).
GENERAL EMERGENCY EAL# 1.4 None.
EP-AD-000-200, Revision 16, Page 6 of 39
TAB 6 EP-PS-104-6 2 - CONTROL ROOM EVACUATION UNUSUAL EVENT EAL# 2.1 None.
ALERT EAL# 2.2 Control Room evacuation as indicated by:
(A and B)
A. Initiation of control room evacuation procedures.
and B. Establishment of control of shutdown systems from local stations.
SITE AREA EMERGENCY EAL# 2.3 Delayed Control Room Evacuation as indicated by:
(A and B)
A. Initiation of control room evacuation procedures.
and B. Shutdown systems control at local stations not established within 15 minutes.
GENERAL EMERGENCY EAL# 2.4 None.
EP-AD-000-200, Revision 16, Page 7 of 39
TAB 6 EP-PS-104-6 3 - FUEL CLADDING DEGRADATION UNUSUAL EVENT EAL# 3.1 Core degradation as indicated by:
(A or B)
A. Valid Off-gas Pre-treatment Monitor high radiation alarm annunciation on Panel 1C651 (2C651) or indication on Panel 1C600 (2C600).
or B. Reactor coolant activity, determined by sample analysis greater than or equal to 2 ýiCi/cc of 1-131 equivalent.
ALERT EAL# 3.2 Severe fuel cladding degradation as indicated by:
(A or B or C or D)
A. Valid Off-gas Pre-treatment monitor High-High radiation alarm annunciation on Panel 1C651 (2C651) or indication on Panel 1C600 (2C600).
or B. Valid Reactor coolant activity greater than 300 pCi/cc of equivalent 1-131, as determined by sample analysis.
or C. Valid Main Steam Line High radiation trip annunciation or indication on Panel 1C651 (2C651).
or D. Valid containment post accident monitor indication on Panel 1C601 (2C601) greater than 200 R/hr. (An 8R/hr correction factor must be added manually to the indication to offset a downscale error if primary containment temperature exceeds 225 degrees Fahrenheit.
Reference EC-079-0521.)
(CONTINUED ON NEXT PAGE)
EP-AD-00O-200, Revision 16, Page 8 of 39
TAB 6 EP-PS-1 04-6 3 - FUEL CLADDING DEGRADATION (continued)
SITE AREA EMERGENCY EAL# 3.3 Severely degraded core as indicated by:
(A or B)
A. Reactor coolant activity greater than 1,000 j.Ci/cc of equivalent 1-131 as determined by sample analysis.
or B. Valid containment post accident monitor indication on Panel 1C601 (2C601) greater than 400 R/hr. (An 8 R/hr correction factor must be added manually to the indication to offset a downscale error if primary containment temperature exceeds 225 degrees Fahrenheit.
Reference EC-079-0521.)
(CONTINUED ON NEXT PAGE)
EP-AD-000-200, Revision 16, Page 9 of 39
TAB 6 EP-PS-1 04-6 3 - FUEL CLADDING DEGRADATION (continued)
GENERAL EMERGENCY EAL# 3.4.a Fuel cladding degradation. Loss of 2 out of 3 fission product barriers (fuel cladding and reactor coolant pressure boundary) with potential loss of the third barrier (primary containment) as indicated by:
(A or B)
A. (1 and 2)
- 1. Valid containment post accident monitor indication on Panel 1C601 (2C601) greater than 400 R/hr. (An 8 R/hr correction factor must be added manually to the indication to offset a downscale error if primary containment temperature exceeds 225 degrees Fahrenheit. Reference EC-079-0521.)
and
- 2. (a or b or c)
- a. Containment pressure greater than 40.4 PSIG, indicated on Panel 1C601 (2C601).
or
- b. A visual inspection of the containment indicates a potential for loss of containment (e.g. anchorage or penetration failure, a crack in containment concrete at tendon).
or
- c. Other indications of potential or actual loss of primary containment.
or B. (1 and 2)
- 1. Reactor coolant activity greater than 1,000 itCi/cc of equivalent 1-131 as determined by-sample analysis.
and
- 2. Actual or potential failure of reactor coolant isolation valves to isolate a coolant leak outside containment as determined by valve position indication on Panel 1C601 (2C601) or visual inspection.
OR EAL# 3.4.b Core melt as indicated by:
(A and B)
A. Valid containment post accident monitor indication on Panel 1C601 (2C601) greater than 2000 R/hr. (An 8 R/hr correction factor must be added manually to the indication to offset a downscale error if primary containment temperature exceeds 225 degrees Fahrenheit. Reference EC-079-0521.)
and B. Containment high pressure indication or annunciation on Panel 1C601 (2C601).
EP-AD-000-200, Revision 16, Page 10 of 39
TAB 6 EP-PS-104-6 4-GENERAL UNUSUAL EVENT EAL# 4.1 Plant conditions exist that warrant increased awareness on the part of plant operating staff or state and/or local offsite authorities as indicated by:
Events that are occurring or have occurred which indicate a potential degradation of the level of safety of the plant. No releases of radioactive material requiring offsite response or monitoring are expected unless further degradation of safety systems occurs.
ALERT EAL# 4.2 Other plant conditions exist that warrant precautionary activation of PP&L, State, County, and local emergency centers as indicated by:
Events that are occurring or have occurred which involve an actual or potential substantial degradation of the level of safety of the plant. Any releases are expected to be limited to small fractions of the EPA Protective Action Guideline exposure levels.
SITE AREA EMERGENCY EAL# 4.3 Other plant conditions exist that warrant activation of emergency centers and monitoring teams or a precautionary notification to the public near the site as indicated by:
Events that are occurring or have occurred which involve actual or imminent major failures of plant functions needed for protection of the public. Any releases are not expected to exceed EPA Protective Action Guideline exposure levels except inside the emergency planning boundary.
GENERAL EMERGENCY EAL# 4.4 Other plant conditions exist, from whatever, source, that make release of large amounts of radioactivity in a short time period available as indicated by:
Events that are occurring or have occurred which involve actual or imminent substantial core degradation or melting with potential for loss of containment integrity. Expectation is that releases will exceed EPA Protective Action Guideline exposure levels beyond the emergency planning boundary.
EP-AD-000-200, Revision 16, Page 11 of 39
TAB 6 EP-PS-104-6 5.- INJURED/CONTAMINATED PERSONNEL UNUSUAL EVENT EAL# 5.1 Transportation of externally contaminated injured individual from site to offsite medical facility as deemed appropriate by Shift Supervisor.
ALERT EAL# 5.2 None.
SITE AREA EMERGENCY EAL# 5.3 None.
GENERAL EMERGENCY EAL# 5.4 None.
EP-AD-000-200, Revision 16, Page 12 of 39
TAB 6 EP-PS-104-6 6 - IN-PLANT HIGH RADIATION UNUSUAL EVENT EAL# 6.1 Unanticipated or unplanned concentrations of airborne activity exist in normally accessible areas, which are not due to planned maintenance activities, as indicated by:
Concentrations exceed 500 times the DAC values of 10CFR20 Appendix B, Table I values for a single isotope, or for multiple isotopes where CA A+
C__ Cc C__
+
> 500 DACA DAC,3 DA CC"DACN ALERT EAL# 6.2 Unexpected in-plant high radiation levels or airborne contamination which indicates a severe degradation in the control of radioactive material as indicated by:
Area Radiation Monitor reading 1000 times normal annunciation on Panel 1C601 (2C601) or indication on Panel 1C600 (2C600).
SITE AREA EMERGENCY EAL# 6.3 None.
GENERAL EMERGENCY EAL# 6.4 None.
EP-AD-000-200, Revision 16, Page 13 of 39
TAB 6 EP-PS-104-6 7 - LOSS OF AC POWER UNUSUAL EVENT EAL# 7.1 Loss of offsite power or loss of all onsite AC power supplies as indicated by:
(A or B)
A. Loss of power to Startup Transformer 10 and 20 annunciation or indication on Panel 0C653.
or B. Failure of all diesel generators to start or synchronize to the emergency buses by indication or annunciation on Panel 0C653.
ALERT EAL# 7.2 Loss of all offsite power and all onsite AC power supplies as indicated by:
(A and B)
A. Loss of power to Startup Transformer 10 and 20 annunciation or indication on Panel 0C653.
and B. Failure of all diesel generators to start or synchronize to the emergency buses by annunciation or indication on Panel 0C653.
SITE AREA EMERGENCY EAL# 7.3 Loss of all offsite power and loss of all onsite AC power supplies for greater than 15 minutes as indicated by:
(A and B and C)
A. Loss of offsite power.
and B. Failure of all diesel generators to startup or synchronize to the emergency buses by indication or annunciation on 0C653.
and C. The above conditions exist for greater than 15 minutes.
GENERAL EMERGENCY EAL# 7.4 None.
EP-AD-000-200, Revision 16, Page 14 of 39
TAB 6 EP-PS-104-6 8 - LOSS OF CONTROL ROOM ALARMS AND ANNUNCIATORS UNUSUAL EVENT EAL# 8.1 None.
ALERT EAL# 8.2 Loss of all control room annunciators as indicated by:
In the opinion of the Shift Supervisor, all Control Room annunciators and the Plant Process Computer are lost, or insufficient annunciators are available to safely operate the unit(s) without supplemental observation of plant systems.
SITE AREA EMERGENCY EAL# 8.3 All annunciators lost and plant transient initiated while annunciators are lost as indicated by:
(A and B)
A. In the opinion of the Shift Supervisor, all Control Room annunciators and the Plant Process Computer are lost, or insufficient annunciators are available to safely operate the unit(s) without supplemental observation of plant systems.
and B. (1 or2 or3 or4)
- 1. Low-Low reactor water level indication on Panel 1C651-(2C651) followed by ECCS initiation on Panel 1C601 (2C601).
or
- 2. Reactor coolant temperature change greater than 100OF per hour indication on recorder TR-1 R006 on Panel 1C007 (2C007) (Reactor Building elevation 683').
or
- 3. High reactor pressure indication on Panel 1C651 (2C651) and followed by scram indication on Panel 1C651 (2C651).
or
- 4. Any indication that transient has occurred or is in progress.
GENERAL EMERGENCY EAL# 8.4 None.
EP-AD-000-200, Revision 16, Page 15 of 39
TAB 6 EP-PS-1 04-6 9- LOSS OF DC POWER UNUSUAL EVENT EAL# 9.1 None.
ALERT EAL# 9.2 Loss of onsite vital DC power as indicated by:
(A and B)
A. Less than 210 volts on the 250 VDC main distribution Panel buses, 1D652 (2D652) and 1 D662 (2D662) as indicated by trouble alarms on Panel 1 C651 (2C651).
and B. Less than 105 volts on the 125 VDC main distribution buses 1D612 (2D612), 1D622 (2D622), 1D632 (2D632), and 1D642 (2D642) as indicated. by trouble alarms on Panel 1C651 (2C651).
NOTE: Buses are not tripped on undervoltage condition.
SITE AREA EMERGENCY EAL# 9.3 Loss of all vital onsite DC power sustained for greater than 15 minutes as indicated by:
(A and B and C)
A. Less than 210 volts on the 250 VDC main distribution Panel buses, 1D652 (2D652) and 1D662 (2D662) as indicated by trouble alarms on Panel 1C651 (2C651).
and B. Less than 105 volts on the 125 VDC main distribution buses 1D612 (2D612), 1D622 (2D622), 1 D632 (2D632), and 1D642 (2D642) as indicated by trouble alarms on Panel 1C651 (2C651).
and C. The above condition exists for greater than 15 minutes.
NOTE: Buses are not tripped on undervoltage condition.
GENERAL EMERGENCY EAL# 9.4 None.
EP-AD-000-200, Revision 16, Page 16 of 39
TAB 6 EP-PS-104-6 10 - LOSS OF DECAY HEAT REMOVAL CAPABILITY UNUSUAL EVENT EAL# 10.1 None.
ALERT EAL# 10.2 Inability to remove decay heat while in plant condition 4, inability to maintain the plant in cold shutdown as indicated by:
Inability to maintain reactor coolant temperature less than 200OF with the reactor mode switch in shutdown; exception is when testing per Special Test Exception TS 3.10.1 which allows maximum temperature of 212 0 F.
SITE AREA EMERGENCY EAL# 10.3 Inability to remove decay heat while the plant is shutdown as indicated by:
(A and B and C)
A. Reactor Mode switch in shutdown.
and B. Reactor Coolant System temperature greater than 200OF and rising.
and C. Suppression Pool temperature greater than 120OF and rising.
GENERAL EMERGENCY EAL# 10.4 Inability to remove decay heat while the plant is shutdown with possible release of large amounts of radioactivity as indicated by:
(A and B and C)
A. Reactor mode switch in shutdown.
and B. Reactor coolant system temperature greater than 200OF and rising.
and C. Suppression pool temperature greater than 290°F indicated on the computer output (MAT 12,13,14,15 or 16).
EP-AD-000-200, Revision 16, Page 17 of 39
TAB 6 EP-PS-1 04-6 11 - LOSS OF REACTIVITY CONTROL UNUSUAL EVENT EAL# 11.1 Inadvertent Criticality as indicated by:
Unexpected increasing neutron flux indication on Panel 1C651 (2C651).
ALERT EAL# 11.2 Failure of the Reactor Protection System or the Alternate Rod Insertion System to initiate and complete a scram that brings the reactor subcritical as indicated by:
(A or B) and (C and D and E)
A. Trip of at least one sub-channel in each trip system (RPS A and RPS B) as indicated by annunciators and trip status lights on Panel 1C651 (2C651).
or B. Trip of both trip systems (ARI A and ARI B) as indicated by annunciators on Panel 1C601 (2C601).
and C. Failure of control rods to insert, confirmed by the full core display indication on Panel 1C651 (2C651) or process computer indications.
and D. Failure to bring the reactor subcritical confirmed by neutron count rate on the neutron monitoring indication on Panel 1C651 (2C651).
and E. Reactor power >5% as indicated on Panel 1C651 (2C651).
(CONTINUED ON NEXT PAGE)
EP-AD-000-200, Revision 16, Page 18 of 39
TAB 6 EP-PS-1 04-6 11 - LOSS OF REACTIVITY CONTROL (continued)
SITE AREA EMERGENCY EAL# 11.3 Loss of functions needed to bring the reactor subcritical and loss of ability to bring the reactor to cold shutdown as indicated by:
(A and B and C and D)
A. Inability to insert sufficient control rods to bring the reactor subcritical as indicated by count rate on the neutron monitoring instrumentation on Panel 1C651 (2C651).
and B. (1 or2)
Failure of both loops of standby liquid control to inject into the vessel indicated by:
- 1. Low pump discharge pressure indication on Panel 1C601 (2C601).
or
- 2. Low flow indication on Panel 1C601 (2C601).
and C. Reactor coolant temperature greater than 200 0 F, indicated on Panel 1C651 (2C651).
and D. Reactor power >5% indicated on Panel 1C651 (2C651).
GENERAL EMERGENCY EAL# 11.4 Loss of functions needed to bring the reactor subcritical and transient in progress that makes release of large amounts of radioactivity in a short period possible as indicated by:
(A or B) and (C and D)
A. Trip of at least one sub-channel in each trip system (RPS A and RPS B), indicated by annunciation or trip status lights on Panel 1C651 (2C651).
or B. Trip of both systems (ARI A and ARI B) as indicated by annunciators on Panel 1C601 (2C601).
and C. Loss of SLC system capability to inject, indicated by instrumentation on Panel 1C601 (2C601).
and D. Reactor power greater than 25% of rated, indicated on Panel 1C651 (2C651).
EP-AD-000-200, Revision 16, Page 19 of 39
TAB 6 EP-PS-104-6 12 - LOSS OF REACTOR VESSEL INVENTORY UNUSUAL EVENT EAL# 12.1 Valid initiation of an Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) System as indicated by:
(A or B)
A. Initiation of an ECCS System and low, low, low reactor water level (-129) annunciation or indication on Panel 1C651 (2C651).
or B. Initiation of an ECCS System and High Drywell Pressure annunciation or indication on Panel 1C601 (2C601).
ALERT EAL# 12.2 Reactor coolant system leak rate greater than 50 gpm as indicated by:
(A or B)
A. Drywell floor drain sump A or B Hi-Hi alarm on Panel 1C601 (2C601) and 2 or more drywell floor drain pumps continuously running as indicated on Panel 1C601 (2C601).
or B. Other estimates of Reactor coolant system leakage indicating greater than 50 gpm.
SITE AREA EMERGENCY EAL# 12.3 Known loss of coolant accident greater than make-up capacity as indicated by:
Water level below (and failure to return to) top of active fuel for greater than three minutes as indicated on fuel zone level indicator on Panel 1C601 (2C601).
(CONTINUED ON NEXT PAGE)
EP-AD-000-200, Revision 16, Page 20 of 39
TAB 6 EP-PS-1 04-6 12- LOSS OF REACTOR VESSEL INVENTORY (continued)
GENERAL EMERGENCY EAL# 12.4.a Loss of coolant accident with possibility of imminent release of large amounts of radioactivity as indicated by:
Water level below (and failure to return to) top of active fuel for greater than 20 minutes as indicated on fuel zone level indicator on Panel 1C601 (2C601).
OR EAL# 12.4.b Loss of Reactor Vessel inventory. Loss of 2 out of 3 fission product barriers (fuel cladding & reactor coolant pressure boundary) with potential loss of the third barrier (primary containment), as indicated by:
(A or B)
A. (1 and 2 and 3)
- 1. High drywell pressure annunciation or indication on Panel 1C601 (2C601).
and
- 2. (aorborc)
- a. Containment pressure exceeds 40.4 PSIG as indicated on Panel 1C601 (2C601).
or
- b. A visual inspection of the containment indicates a potential or actual loss of containment (e.g. anchorage or penetration failure).
or
- c. Containment isolation valve(s) fail to close as indicated by valve position indication on Panel 1C601 (2C601).
and
- 3. Reactor Vessel level drops below (and fails to return to) top of active fuel for greater than three minutes as indicated on fuel zone level indicator on Panel 1C601 (2C601).
or B. (1 and 2)
- 1. Failure of reactor pressure vessel isolation valves to isolate coolant break outside containment as indicated by valve position indication on Panel 1C601 (2C601) or visual inspection.
and
- 2. Reactor vessel level drops below (and fails to return to) top of active fuel for greater than three minutes as indicated on fuel zone level indicator on Panel 1C601 (2C601).
EP-AD-000-200, Revision 16, Page 21 of 39
TAB 6 EP-PS-104-6 13 - NATURAL PHENOMENA UNUSUAL EVENT EAL# 13.1 Natural phenomenon occurrence as indicated by:
(A or B or C)
A. Tornado impact on site.
or B. Hurricane impact on site.
or C. Earthquake detected by seismic instrumentation systems on Panel 0C696.
ALERT EAL# 13.2 Natural Phenomenon Occurrence as indicated by:
(A or B or C)
A. Tornado with reported wind velocities greater than 200 mph impacting on site.*
or B. Reported hurricane or sustained winds greater than 70 mph.*
or C. Earthquake at greater than operating basis earthquake (OBE) levels as indicated on Panel 0C696.
- Telephone numbers for the National Weather Bureau are Iocated in the Emergency Telephone Directory.
(CONTINUED ON NEXT PAGE)
EP-AD-000-200, Revision 16, Page 22 of 39
TAB 6 EP-PS-104-6 13 - NATURAL PHENOMENA (continued)
SITE AREA EMERGENCY EAL# 13.3 Severe natural phenomenon occurrence, with plant not in cold shutdown, as indicated by:
(A and B)
A. Reactor Coolant Temperature greater than 200OF as indicated on Panel 1C651 (2C651).
and B. (1 or2 or3)
- 1. Reported hurricane or sustained winds greater than 80 mph.*
or
- 2. Earthquake with greater than Safe Shutdown Earthquake (SSE) levels as indicated on Panel 0C696.
or
- 3. Tornado with reported wind velocities greater than 220 mph impacting on site.*
GENERAL EMERGENCY EAL# 13.4 None.
- Telephone numbers for the National Weather Bureau are located in the Emergency Telephone Directory.
EP-AD-000-200, Revision 16, Page 23 of 39
TAB 6 EP-PS-104-6 14- ONSITE FIRE/EXPLOSION UNUSUAL EVENT EAL# 14.1 Significant fire within the plant as indicated by:
(A and B)
A. Activation of fire brigade by Shift Supervisor.
and B. Duration of fire longer than 15 minutes after time of notification.
OR Explosion inside security protected area, with no significant damage to station facilities, as indicated by:
Visual observation or notification received by control room operator and Shift Supervisor evaluation.
ALERT EAL# 14.2 On-site Fire/Explosion as indicated by:
(A or B)
A. Fire lasting more than 15 minutes and fire is in the vicinity of equipment required for safe shutdown of the plant and the fire is damaging or is threatening to damage the equiprnent due to heat, smoke, flame, or other hazard.
or B. (1 and 2)
Explosion damage to facility affecting plant operation as determined by:
- 1. Direct observation or notification received by control room operator.
and
- 2. Shift Supervisor observation.
(CONTINUED ON NEXT PAGE)
EP-AD-000-200, Revision 16, Page 24 of 39
TAB 6 EP-PS-104-6 14 - ONSITE FIRE/EXPLOSION (continued)
SITE AREA EMERGENCY EAL# 14.3 Damage to safe shutdown equipment due to fire or explosion has occurred when plant is not in cold shutdown, and damage is causing or threatens malfunction of equipment required for safe shutdown of the plant as determined by:
(A and B and C)
A. Direct observation or notification received by control room operator.
and B. Shift Supervisor evaluation.
and C. Reactor Coolant Temperature greater than 200OF as indicated on Panel 1C651 (2C651).
GENERAL EMERGENCY EAL# 14.4 None.
EP-AD-000-200, Revision 16, Page 25 of 39
TAB 6 EP-PS-I104-6 15- RADIOLOGICAL EFFLUENT UNUSUAL EVENT EAL# 15.1.a Radiological gaseous effluents exceed 2 times the Technical Requirement Limits for 60 minutes or longer as indicated by:
(A or B)
A. Valid Building Vent Stack Monitoring System (SPING) indications on Panel 0C630 or 0C677.
- 1. Noble gases >1.70E+6 gCi/min., or
- 2. 1-131 >2.08E+2 !iCi/min., or
- 3. Particulate >1.54E+3 ttCi/min., or or B. Confirmed sample analyses for gaseous releases indicating total site release rates exceed:
- 1. Noble gases >1000 mrem/year whole body, or
- 2. Noble gases >6000 mrem/year skin, or
- 3. 1-131, 1-133, H-3, and particulates with half-lives >8 days >3000 mrem/year to any organ (inhalation pathways only).
OR EAL# 15.1.b Radiological liquid effluents exceed Technical Requirement Limits for instantaneous release as indicated by:
Report of radiological liquid effluent exceeding Technical Requirement Limits. This includes effluent sources such as Service Water or RHR Service Water Loops A or B.
(CONTINUED ON NEXT PAGE)
EP-AD-000-200, Revision 16, Page 26 of 39
TAB 6 EP-PS-104-6 15 - RADIOLOGICAL EFFLUENT (continued)
ALERT EAL# 15.2.a Radiological gaseous effluents exceed 200 times the Technical Requirement Limits for 15 minutes or longer as indicated by:
(A or B)
A. Valid Building Vent Stack Monitoring System (SPING) indications on Panel 0C630 or 0C677.
- 1. Noble gases >1.70E+8 gtCi/min., or
- 2. 1-131 >2.08E+4 ýLCi/min., or
- 3. Particulate >1.54E+5 jiCi/min.
or B. Confirmed sample analyses for gaseous releases indicating total site release rates exceed:
- 1. Noble gases >1.OE+5 mrem/year whole body, or
- 2. Noble gases >6.OE+5 mrem/year skin, or
- 3. 1-131, 1-133, H-3, and particulates with half-lives >8 days >3.OE+5 mrem/year to any organ (inhalation pathways only).
OR EAL# 15.2.b Radiological liquid effluents exceed 10 times Technical Requirement Limits for instantaneous release as indicated by:
Report of radiological liquid effluent release exceeding 10 times Technical Requirement Limits. This includes effluent sources such as Service Water or RHR Service Water Loops AorB.
(CONTINUED ON NEXT PAGE)
EP-AD-000-200, Revision 16, Page 27 of 39
TAB 6 EP-PS-1 04-6 15- RADIOLOGICAL EFFLUENT (continued)
SITE AREA EMERGENCY EAL# 15.3 Radiological effluent corresponds to greater than 50 mrem W.B.(0) or 250 mrem thyroid(2) for a half-hour or 500 mrem W.B.(0) or 2500 mrem thyroid(2 ) for 2 minutes at the emergency plan boundary as indicated by:
OR Emergency plan boundary dose is projected to exceed 500 mrem W.B. (1)within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> as indicated by:
(A or B)
A. Dose projections based on:
(1 or2)
- 1. Building vent stack monitoring system indications on Panel 0C630 or 0C677.
or
- 2. Field monitoring data onsite or offsite.
or B. Dose projections based on:
(1 or2)
- 1. Building vent stack monitoring system indications on Panel 0C630 or 0C677.
or
- 2. Field monitoring data onsite or offsite (CONTINUED ON NEXT PAGE)
(1) The sum of the Effective Dose Equivalent resulting from the exposure to external sources and the Committed Effective Dose Equivalent incurred from all significant inhalation pathways during the early phase.
(2) Committed Dose Equivalent to the thyroid from radioiodine.
EP-AD-000-200, Revision 16, Page 28 of 39
TAB 6 EP-PS-1 04-6 15 - RADIOLOGICAL EFFLUENT (continued)
GENERAL EMERGENCY EAL# 15.4 Radiological effluent release corresponds to 1 rem whole body(i) or 5 rem(2) thyroid at the emergency plan boundary as indicated by:
OR Offsite doses are projected to exceed 1 rem whole body(1 ) or 5 rem thyroid(2 ) due to the event as indicated by:
(A or B)
A. Dose projections based on:
(1 or 2 or 3)
- 1. Building Vent Stack Monitoring System indication on Panel 0C630 or 0C677.
or
- 2. Field monitoring data onsite or offsite.
or
- 3. In-plant conditions.
or B. Dose projections based on:
(1 or 2 or 3)
- 1. Building Vent Stack Monitoring System indication on Panel 0C630 or 0C677.
or
- 2. Field monitoring data onsite or offsite.
or
- 3. In-plant conditions.
(1) The sum of the Effective Dose Equivalent resulting from the exposure to external sources and the Committed Effective Dose Equivalent incurred from all significant inhalation pathways during the early phase.
(2) Committed Dose Equivalent to the thyroid from radioiodine.
EP-AD-000-200, Revision 16, Page 29 of 39
TAB 6 EP-PS-104-6 16 - SECURITY EVENT UNUSUAL EVENT EAL# 16.1 Security threat or attempted entry or attempted sabotage as indicated by:
(A or B or C)
A. A report from Security of a security threat, attempted entry, or attempted sabotage of the owner controlled area adjacent to the site.
or B. Any attempted act of sabotage which is deemed legitimate in the judgment of the SHIFT SUPERVISOR/EMERGENCY DIRECTOR, and affects plant operation.
C. A site specific credible security threat notification.
ALERT EAL# 16.2 Ongoing Security Compromise as indicated by:
(A or B)
A. A report from Security that a security compromise is at the site but no penetration of protected areas has occurred.
or B. Any act of sabotage which results in an actual or potential substantial degradation of the level of safety of the plant as judged by the SHIFT SUPERVISOR/EMERGENCY DIRECTOR.
SITE AREA EMERGENCY EAL# 16.3 An ongoing adversary event threatens imminent loss of physical control of plant as indicated by:
(A or B)
A. Report from Security that the security of the plant vital area is threatened by unauthorized (forcible) entry into the protected area.
or B. Any act of sabotage which results in actual or likely major failures of plant functions needed for protection of the public as judged by the SHIFT SUPERVISOR/EMERGENCY DIRECTOR.
(CONTINUED ON NEXT PAGE)
EP-AD-000-200, Revision 16, Page 30 of 39
TAB 6 EP-PS-104-6 16 - SECURITY EVENT (continued)
GENERAL EMERGENCY EAL# 16.4 Loss of physical control of facilities as indicated by:
(A or B)
A. Report from Security that a loss of physical control of plant vital areas has occurred.
or B. Any act of sabotage which results in imminent significant cladding failure or fuel melting with a potential for loss of containment integrity or the potential for release of significant amounts of radioactivity in a short time as judged by the SHIFT SUPERVISOR/EMERGENCY DIRECTOR.
EP-AD-000-200, Revision 16, Page 31 of 39
TAB 6 EP-PS-104-6 17 - SPENT FUEL RELATED INCIDENT UNUSUAL EVENT EAL# 17.1 Unanticipated or unplanned concentrations of airborne activity exist in normally accessible areas, which is not due to planned maintenance activities, as indicated by:
Concentrations exceed 500 times the DAC values of 10CFR20 Appendix B, Table I values for a single isotope, or full multiple isotopes where CA + C + Cc... CN >500 DACA DACB DACC DACv ALERT EAL# 17.2 Unexpected in-plant high radiation levels or airborne contamination which indicates a severe fuel handling accident as indicated by:
Refuel floor area radiation monitor reading 1000 times normal annunciation on Panel 1C601 (2C601) or indication on Panel 1C600 (2C600).
(CONTINUED ON NEXT PAGE)
EP-AD-000-200, Revision 16, Page 32 of 39
TAB 6 EP-PS-104-6 17 - SPENT FUEL RELATED INCIDENT (continued)
SITE AREA EMERGENCY EAL# 17.3.a Major damage to irradiated fuel with actual or clear potential for significant release of radioactive material to the environment as indicated by:
(A and B)
A. Dropping, bumping, or otherwise rough handling of a new OR irradiated fuel bundle with irradiated fuel in the pool.
and B. (1 or2)
- 1. Refueling floor area radiation monitor reading 1000 times normal annunciation on Panel 1C601 (2C601) or indication on Panel 1C600 (2C600).
or
- 2. Reactor Building vent stack monitoring system high radiation annunciation or indication on Panel 0C630 or 0C677.
OR EAL# 17.3.b Damage to irradiated fuel due to uncontrolled decrease in the fuel pool level to below the level of the fuel as indicated by:
(A and B)
A. (1 or2)
- 1. Uncovering of irradiated fuel confirmation by verification of significant leakage from spent fuel pool.
or
- 2. Visual observation of water level below irradiated fuel in the pool.
and B. (1 or2)
- 1. Refueling floor area radiation monitor annunciation on Panel 1C651 (2C651) or indication on Panel 1C600 (2C600).
or
- 2. Reactor Building vent stack monitoring system high radiation annunciation or indication on Panel 0C630 or 0C677.
GENERAL EMERGENCY EAL# 17.4 None.
EP-AD-000-200, Revision 16, Page 33 of 39
TAB 6 EP-PS-104-6 18 - STEAM LINE BREAK UNUSUAL EVENT EAL# 18.1 None.
ALERT EAL# 18.2 MSIV malfunction causing leakage as indicated by:
(A and B)
A. Valid MSIV closure signal or indication on Panel 1C601 (2C601).
and B. (1 or2)
- 1. Valid Main Steam Line flow indication on Panel 1C652 (2C652).
or
- 2. Valid Main Steam Line radiation indication on Panel 1C600 (2C600).
(CONTINUED ON NEXT PAGE)
EP-AD-000-200, Revision 16, Page 34 of 39
TAB 6 EP-PS-104-6 18 - STEAM LINE BREAK (continued)
SITE AREA EMERGENCY EAL# 18.3 Steam line break occurs outside of containment without isolation as indicated by:
(A or B or C or D)
A. (1 and 2)
- 1. Failure of both MSIVs in the line with the leak to close as indicated by position indication on Panel 1C601 (2C601).
and
- 2. (a orb)
- a. High MSL flow annunciation on Panel 1C601 (2C601) or indication on Panel 1C652 (2C652).
or
- b. Other indication of main steam leakage outside containment.
or B. (1 and 2)
- 1. Failure of RCIC steam isolation valves HV-F008 and HV-F007 to close as indicated on Panel 1C601 (2C601).
and
- 2. (aorborcordoreorf)
- a. RCIC steamline pipe routing area high temperature annunciation on Panel 1C601 (2C601), or indication on Panel 1C614 (2C614).
or
- b. - RCIC equipment area high temperature annunciation on Panel 1C601 (2C601) or indication on Panel 1C614 (2C614).
or
- c. RCIC steamline high flow annunciation on Panel 1C601 (2C601).
or
- d. RCIC steamline tunnel ventilation high delta temperature annunciation on Panel 1C601 (2C601).
or
or
- f. Other indication of steam leakage from the RCIC system.
(CONTINUED ON NEXT PAGE)
EP-AD-000-200, Revision 16, Page 35 of 39
TAB 6 EP-PS-104-6 18 - STEAM LINE BREAK (continued)
SITE AREA EMERGENCY (continued) or C. (1 and 2)
- 1. Failure of HPCI steam isolation valves HV-F002 and HV-F003 to close as indicated by position indicator on Panel 1C601 (2C601).
and
- 2. (aorborcordoreorf)
- a. HPCI steamline pipe routing area high temperature annunciation on Panel 1C601 (2C601), or indication on Panel 1C614 (2C614).
or
- b. HPCI equipment area high temperature annunciation on Panel 1C601 (2C601) or indication on Panel 1C614 (2C614).
or
- c. HPCI steamline high flow annunciation on Panel 1C601 (2C601).
or
- d. HPCI steamline tunnel ventilation high delta temperature annunciation on Panel 1C601 (2C601).
or
or
- f. Other indication of steam leakage from the HPCI system.
or D. Any other un-isolatable steam line breaks.
GENERAL EMERGENCY EAL# 18.4 None.
EP-AD-000-200, Revision 16, Page 36 of 39
TAB 6 EP-PS-104-6 19 - TOXICIFLAMMABLE GASES UNUSUAL EVENT EAL# 19.1 Nearby or onsite release of potentially harmful quantifies of toxic or flammable material as indicated by:
Visual observation or notification received by the control room operator.
ALERT EAL# 19.2 Entry of toxic or flammable gases into the facility, with subsequent habitability problem as indicated by:
Visual observation, direct measurement, or notification received by the control room operator.
SITE AREA EMERGENCY EAL# 19.3 Toxic or flammable gases enter vital areas, restricting access and restricted access constitutes a safety problem, as determined by:
(A and B)
A. Shift Supervisor's evaluation.
and B. Visual observation, direct measurement, or notification -received by control room operator.
GENERAL EMERGENCY EAL# 19.4 None.
EP-AD-000-200, Revision 16, Page 37 of 39
TAB 6 EP-PS-104-6 20 - TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION SAFETY LIMIT UNUSUAL EVENT EAL# 20.1 Abnormal occurrences which result in operator complying with any of the Technical Specification SAFETY LIMIT ACTION statements indicated by:
(A or B or C or D)
A. Exceeding THERMAL POWER, low pressure or low flow safety limit 2.1.1.1.
or B. Exceeding THERMAL POWER, high pressure and high flow safety limit 2.1.1.2.
or C. Exceeding REACTOR VESSEL WATER LEVEL safety limit 2.1.1.3.
or D. Exceeding REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM PRESSURE safety limit 2.1.2.
ALERT EAL# 20.2 None.
SITE AREA EMERGENCY EAL# 20.3 None.
GENERAL EMERGENCY EAL# 20.4 None.
EP-AD-000-200, Revision 16, Page 38 of 39
TAB 6 EP-PS-104-6 21 - DRY FUEL STORAGE UNUSUAL EVENT EAL# 21.1.a. Situations are occurring or have occurred during the transport of the irradiated spent fuel to the onsite storage facility, which jeopardize the integrity of the spent fuel or its container as indicated by:
(A or B)
A. Radiological readings exceed 2 R/hour at the external surface of any transfer cask or horizontal storage module.
or B. Radiological readings exceed 1 R/hour one foot away from the external surface of any transfer cask or horizontal storage module.
OR EAL# 21.1.b. Situations are occurring or have occurred at the irradiated spent fuel storage facility, which jeopardize the integrity of the dry cask storage system as indicated by:
(A or B)
A. Radiological readings exceed 2 R/hour at the external surface of any transfer cask or horizontal storage module.
or B. Radiological readings exceed 1 R/hour one foot away from the external surface of any transfer cask or horizontal storage module.
ALERT EAL# 21.2 None.
SITE AREA EMERGENCY EAL# 21.3 None.
GENERAL EMERGENCY EAL# 21.4 None.
EP-AD-000-200, Revision 16, Page 39 of 39
TAB 8 EP-PS-1 04-8 PP&L EMERGENCY PERSONNEL DOSE ASSESSMENT AND PROTECTIVE ACTION RECOMMENDATION (PAR) GUIDE TABLE OF CONTENTS Section Paage 1.0 EMERGENCY DOSE LIMITS 2 2.0 EMERGENCY EXPOSURE/ACCIDENTAL OVEREXPOSURE 3 3.0 PROTECTIVE ACTIONS 3 4.0 EMERGENCY EXPOSURE NOTIFICATION AND HEALTH CONSEQUENCE INVESTIGATION 4 EMERGENCY EXPOSURE EXTENSIONS 5 HEALTH PHYSICS AND ALARA CONSIDERATIONS DURING AN EMERGENCY 8 EMERGENCY EXPOSURE EXTENSION REQUEST FORM and POTASSIUM IODIDE TRACKING FORM can be found immediately following EP-AD-000-125.
EP-AD-000-125, Revision 7, Page 1 of 10
TAB 8 EP-PS-104-8 PP&L EMERGENCY PERSONNEL DOSE ASSESSMENT AND PROTECTIVE ACTION RECOMMENDATION (PAR) GUIDE (continued)
CHECK 0 1.0 Limits for EMERGENCY doses.
0 1.1 An EMERGENCY DOSE AUTHORIZATION (see EMERGENCY EXPOSURE EXTENSIONS) may be granted in order to protect facilities, and or equipment to substantially limit the escape of radioactive effluents or control fires. The maximum planned doses are:
1.1.1 Whole body (TEDE)(') dose shall not exceed 10 Rem.
1.1.2 Dose to any organ (CDE)(2), including the skin and extremity (SDE)(3),
shall not exceed 100 Rem.
1.1.3 Dose to the lens of the eye shall not exceed 30 Rem (LDE)(4).
0 1.2 An EMERGENCY dose authorization may be granted for life-saving actions or protection of large populations. The maximum doses are:
1.2.1 Planned whole body (TEDE)(') doses shall not exceed 25 Rem.
1.2.2 Planned dose to any organ (CDE)(2), including skin and extremity doses, shall not exceed 250 Rem.
1.2.3 Dose to the lens of the eye shall not exceed 75 Rem (LDE)(4) 1.3 RARE situations may occur in which a dose GREATER THAN those specified in SECTION 1.2 above for emergency dose would be unavoidable to carry out a lifesaving operation or to avoid extensive exposure of large populations. It is not possible to prejudge the risk that one should be allowed to take to save lives of others, therefore no upper limit has been established.
(1) The sum of the Effective Dose Equivalent resulting from the exposure to external sources and the committed effective Dose Equivalent incurred from all significant inhalation pathways during the early phase.
(2) The Committed Dose Equivalent to the thyroid from radioiodine.
(3) Shallow Dose Equivalent.
(4) Lens Dose Equivalent.
EP-AD-000-125, Revision 7, Page 2 of 10
TAB 8 EP-PS-1 04-8 PP&L EMERGENCY PERSONNEL DOSE ASSESSMENT AND PROTECTIVE ACTION RECOMMENDATION (PAR) GUIDE (continued)
CHECK El 2.0 For any EMERGENCY EXPOSURE OR ACCIDENTAL OVEREXPOSURE, the assessment actions in step 2 of the EMERGENCY EXPOSURE EXTENSIONS must be performed.
3.0 PROTECTIVE ACTIONS El 3.1 Potassium Iodide 3.1.1 For emergency workers entering areas where a committed dose equivalent, (CDE)(2), to the thyroid from radioiodine could be 25 Rem or greater, the Consulting Radiological Physician should provide input concerning the administration and cessation of KI intake. (See Emergency Telephone Directory for telephone number.)
3.1.2 For thyroid exposures that are strongly expected to exceed 25 Rem, (CDE)(2', KI doses of 130 mg (100 mg - iodine) per day should be administered.
Unless the EMERGENCY DIRECTOR or RECOVERY MANAGER instructs personnel to do otherwise, the KI tablets should generally be taken as soon as possible after thyroid exposure exceeding 25 Rem (CDE)(2) is projected.
NOTE: Stable Iodine (KI) is most effective when administered immediately prior to exposure to radioiodine. Significant blockage of the thyroid dose can be provided by administration within one or two hours after uptake of radioiodine.
(1) The sum of the Effective Dose Equivalent resulting from the exposure to external sources and the committed effective Dose Equivalent incurred from all significant inhalation pathways during the early phase.
(2) The Committed Dose Equivalent to the thyroid from radioiodine.
(3) Shallow Dose Equivalent.
(4) Lens Dose Equivalent.
EP-AD-000-125, Revision 7, Page 3 of 10
TAB 8 EP-PS-1 04-8 PP&L EMERGENCY PERSONNEL DOSE ASSESSMENT AND PROTECTIVE ACTION RECOMMENDATION (PAR) GUIDE (continued)
CHECK 0 3.1.3 Onsite issuance of KI for iodine prophylaxis requires the approval of the EMERGENCY DIRECTOR. Issuance to EOF and FIELD EMERGENCY MONITORING/SAMPLING TEAM personnel requires the approval of the RECOVERY MANAGER when the EOF has relieved the TSC of emergency management activities. The EMERGENCY DIRECTOR will approve issuance prior to that time.
These approvals must be documented on the POTASSIUM IODIDE (KI) TRACKING FORM.
3.1.4 For an injured and/or contaminated worker sent to a hospital for treatment, the patient will be under the care of the attending physician.
As such, plant procedures no longer apply and KI issuance will be at the discretion of the attending physician. The physician can rely on a senior Health Physics Technician Level IIor Health Physics Management to provide the in-plant radiological data on which to base their decision.
o 3.2 Protective measures should be implemented for EOF personnel at the direction of the DOSE ASSESSMENT SUPERVISOR.
0 3.3. Exposures to members of local offsite support groups, (ambulance workers, fire fighters) shall not exceed 500 mirem (TEDE)(1 ) for the performance of support duties on the site of the Susquehanna SES.
4.0 EMERGENCY EXPOSURE NOTIFICATIONS AND A HEALTH CONSEQUENCE INVESTIGATION must be conducted for any emergency exposure as outlined in step 6 of the Emergency Exposure Extensions.
(1) The sum of the Effective Dose Equivalent resulting from the exposure to external sources and the committed effective Dose Equivalent incurred from all significant inhalation pathways during the early phase.
(2) The Committed Dose Equivalent to the thyroid from radioiodine.
(3) Shallow Dose Equivalent.
(4) Lens Dose Equivalent.
EP-AD-000-125, Revision 7, Page 4 of 10
TAB 8 EP-PS-1 04-8 EMERGENCY EXPOSURE EXTENSIONS CHECK El
- 1. Fill out the attached EMERGENCY EXPOSURE EXTENSION REQUEST Form.
- 2. Review the following factors:
"O Rescue personnel should be volunteers or professional rescuers.
"El Other considerations being equal (e.g., skill, potential need for person on another mission) personnel above the age of 45 are preferred.
"O Rescue personnel should be familiar and briefed with the consequences of exposure.
"El Women capable of reproduction should not take part in an effort requiring EMERGENCY exposure.
"El Use of personnel with high lifetime cumulative exposure should be discouraged.
"C All reasonable measures must be taken to control contamination and internal exposure.
"El Exposure under these conditions shall be limited to once fn a lifetime.
"El For exposures greater than 25 Rem whole body (TEDE), the persons undertaking any emergency operation in which the dose will exceed 25 Rem to the whole body (TEDE) should do so only on a voluntary basis and with full awareness of the risks involved, including the numerical levels of dose at which acute effects of radiation will be incurred and numerical estimates of the risk of delayed effects. See the following two tables for general information concerning Health Effects & Cancer Risks.
EP-AD-000-125, Revision 7, Page 5 of 10
TAB 8 EP-PS-104-8 EMERGENCY EXPOSURE EXTENSIONS (continued)
CHECK 0 Health Effects Associated with Whole Body Absorbed Doses Received Within a Few Hours(a)
Whole Body Absorbed Early Fatalitiesb Whole Body Absorbed Prodromal Effectsc Dose (rad) percent) Dose (rad) (percent affected) 140 5 50 2 200 15 100 15 300 50 150 50 400 85 200 85 460 95 250 98 a Risks will be lower for protracted exposure periods.
b Supportive medical treatment may increase the dose at which these frequencies occur by approximately 50 percent.
c Symptoms (nausea, vomiting) which occur within a few hours after exposure to large doses of radiation and which usually precede more serious health effects.
Approximate Cancer Risk to Average Individuals from 25 Rem Effective Dose Equivalent Delivered Promptly Average Years of Life Lost if Age at Exposure Approximate Risk of Premature Death Premature Death Occurs (years) (deaths per 1,000 persons exposed) (years) 20 to 30 9.1 24 30to 40 7.2 19 40 to 50 5.3 15 50 to 60 3.5 11
- 3. Review the HEALTH PHYSICS AND ALARA CONSIDERATIONS DURING EMERGENCIES which is attached.
- 4. Obtain appropriate approval signatures as outlined in the table below.
EXTENSION APPROVAL ACTIONS FROM TO mrem mrem (TEDE) (TEDE) 4000 <25000 ED and RPC/RM and DASU ALARA REVIEW AND APPLY EMERGENCY EXPOSURE CONSIDERATIONS ALL OF ABOVE AND
>25000 ED and RPC/RM and DASU BRIEFING ON RISKS EP-AD-000-125, Revision 7, Page 6 of 10
TAB 8 EP-PS-104-8 EMERGENCY EXPOSURE EXTENSIONS (continued)
CHECK 0l
- 5. Ifthe Emergency Dose Extension is for greater that 4 Rem (TEDE), have the volunteer sign the EMERGENCY EXPOSURE REQUEST Form acknowledging that they are a volunteer and are fully aware of the radiological risks of acute and delayed effects.
- 6. Upon completion of the activity requiring the Emergency Exposure perform the following:
"El Collect, process, and evaluate personnel dosimetry devices when technically appropriate.
"El Investigate the circumstances of all emergency exposures and confirm the dose received.
"El Notify the NRC of emergency exposure as follows:
Immediate notification of the NRC is required for:
Notification of the NRC within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> is required for:
- 0. Assess the health consequences of all emergency exposures. Consult with a physician to determine the need for and extent of physical and biochemical examinations.
"El Whole body greater than 25 Rem (TEDE) should result in an examination of the exposed person by a physician.
"El If internal exposure is suspected, quantitative measurements should be made immediately. Bioassays are required based on the following:
"*Nasal smear or facial contamination greater than 1,000 cpm above background.
"*Greater than 4 DAC-HRS in a day or less, or 20 DAC-HRS in a week or less.
EP-AD-000-125, Revision 7, Page 7 of 10
TAB 8 EP-PS-1 04-8 HEALTH PHYSICS AND ALARA CONSIDERATIONS DURING EMERGENCIES CHECK 0 1.0 Evaluate radiological conditions.
0 1.1 Obtain detailed survey data to ascertain:
1.1.1 Beta-Gamma radiation levels 1.1.2 Need for neutron measurements 1.1.3 Contamination levels and protective clothing requirements 1.1.4 Airborne radioactive materials 1.1.5 Variability of conditions over space and time 0 1.2 Evaluate personnel status.
1.2.1 Determine available dose under normal administrative dose objectives.
1.2.2 Ifessential, obtain approval from RADIATION PROTECTION
- COORDINATOR/EMERGENCY DIRECTOR for persons expected to exceed administrative objectives.
1.2.3 Follow criteria in PP&L Emergency Personnel Dose Assessment and Protective Action Recommendation Guide when emergency exposures are deemed appropriate by EMERGENCY DIRECTOR.
1.2.4 Assess individual's history of exposure to airborne materials.
1.2.5 Assess individual's skills in relation to proposed task.
1.2.6 Assess individual's lifetime exposure history.
EP-AD-000-125, Revision 7, Page 8 of 10
TAB 8 EP-PS-1 04-8 HEALTH PHYSICS AND ALARA CONSIDERATIONS DURING EMERGENCIES (continued)
CHECK 0l 0 1.3 Determine proper type and placement of dosimeters.
1.3.1 Evaluate need for additional whole body dosimeters.
NOTE: For emergency exposures above 4 rem, the placement of several dosimeters on an individual is recommended to determine spatial distribution of dose to the individual.
1.3.2 Evaluate need and placement of extremity dosimeters.
1.3.3 Evaluate need for additional dosimetry devices such as high range self-reading dosimeters, electronic dosimeters, and neutron dosimeters.
1.3.4 Evaluate need for time keeping.
0 1.4 Determine proper respirator equipment required to perform task.
NOTE: For tasks expected to last more than several hours, consider need for relief of team members.
El 1.5 Review the following ALARA items:
NOTE: The detail and scope of ALARA reviews are to be commensurate with the magnitude of doses expected, numbers of people involved, and urgency of required task.
1.5.1 Consider the trend of exposures vs. the importance of the task:
- a. Important and critical task with rising exposure rates will require the dispatch of teams as quickly as possible to reduce exposures.
- b. Unimportant or less critical task could be delayed until- exposure rates begin to trend downward.
EP-AD-000-125, Revision 7, Page 9 of 10
TAB 8 EP-PS-1 04-8 HEALTH PHYSICS AND ALARA CONSIDERATIONS DURING EMERGENCIES (continued)
CHECK 0 1.5.2 When time permits the following should be included in the ALARA review:
- a. Consider the use of remote handling devices or other special tools.
- b. Consider the use of portable shielding.
- c. Consider the need for mock-ups or other practice exercises.
- d. Assess the number of people required to assure all have essential productive roles.
- e. Consider the magnitude of doses received by team members in transit to work location.
EP-AD-000-125, Revision 7, Page 10 of 10
TAB 10 EP-PS-104-10 PERSONNEL ACCOUNTABILITY (As defined in SP-00-309, Personnel Accountability)
ACCOUNTABILITY READER LOCATIONS SITE BUILDING READER LOCATION Service & Administration Building - North S&A Cafeteria S&A Large Conference Room 2 nd Floor Effluents Management Meeting Area Facilities Management Meeting Area Warehouse Facility Large Conference Room 2 "d Floor South Building - Two Story First Floor Main Hallway - East Doorway Main Hallway- West Doorway Main Hallway - Center Second Floor Main Hallway - North Exit Main Hallway - South Exit Main Hallway - West Exit South Building - Three Story First Floor North End Near Elevator South End Near Doorway to Maintenance Center Hallway Second Floor North End Near Elevator South End Near West Stairway Third Floor North End Near Elevator South End Near West Stairway EP-AD-000-445, Revision 8, Page 1 of 3
I TAB 10 EP-PS-104-10 PERSONNEL ACCOUNTABILITY AREAS AND LEADER ASSIGNMENTS Accountability Area Accountability Area Designator Accountability Area Work Groups Leader ACCOUNTABILITY S&A Building Cafeteria All Personnel located PRIMARY: Industrial AREA A ETN 254-1624 in S&A Building Safety Supervisor All floors except those noted in Assembly Area B ACCOUNTABILITY Effluents Management Effluents Management PRIMARY: Effluents AREA-B Meeting Area Facilities Management Mgmt. Supervisor ETN 254-1644 Chemistry Admin ISI-ISD ACCOUNTABILITY Warehouse Large Procurement PRIMARY: Mgr.-Nuc AREA C Conference Room Procurement ETN 254-3186 ACCOUNTABILITY Electrical Maintenance All Personnel located PRIMARY: Production AREA D I&C Shop in the Two Story Supervisor I&C 1st Floor Two Story South Building South Building ETN 254-3713 ACCOUNTABILITY Cafeteria All Personnel located PRIMARY: Production AREA E Conference Room on the 1s Floor of the Supervisor 1 st Floor Three Story Three Story Maintenance South Building South Building ETN 254-1685 ACCOUNTABILITY Conference Room 211 All Personnel located PRIMARY: Radiation AREA F 2 nd Floor of the Three on the 2 nd and 3rd Floor Protection Manager Story South Building of the Three Story ETN 254-1211 South Building ACCOUNTABILITY Technical Support All Personnel PRIMARY: TSC AREA G Center Responding to Fill Administrative Control Structure Emergency Plan Coordinator Elevation 741 Positions in the TSC ETN 254-3045 .1 EP-AD-000-445, Revision 8, Page 2 of 3
I TAB 10 EP-PS-1 04-10 ACCOUNTABILITY ROSTER ACCOUNTABILITY AREA: DATE: / I ACCOUNTABILITY AREA LEADER:
Name (Last, First) Badge# Name (Last, First) Badge #
o I I = 4
.4 - 4
.9 - 4 a 4.
a
- 4-
.4 - I-4 - L U I-U I.
U I.
$ U 5-INSTRUCTIONS:
- 1. The Accountability Area Leader will direct all personnel in the assembly area to complete this roster in the event the Accountability Card Reader system is inoperable.
- 2. On-site Personnel will print their name and SSES badge number in the areas provided on this form.
- 3. After completion, notify Security and follow their direction to forward the rosters.
EP-AD-000-445, Revision 8, Page 3 of 3