ML22136A158

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Technical Specification Bases Manual
ML22136A158
Person / Time
Site: Susquehanna Talen Energy icon.png
Issue date: 04/29/2022
From:
Susquehanna
To:
Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
Download: ML22136A158 (37)
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  • MANUAL HARD COPY DISTRIBUTION DOCUMENT TRANSMITTAL 2022-5907 USER INFORMATION:

GERLACH*ROSEY M EMPL#: 028401 CA#: 0363 Address: NUCSA2 Phone#: 542-3194 TRANSMITTAL INFORMATION:

TO: GERLACH*ROSEY M 04/29/2022 LOCATION: USNRC FROM: NUCLEAR RECORDS DOCUMENT CONTROL CENTER (NUCSA-2)

THE FOLLOWING CHANGES HAVE OCCURRED TO THE HARDCOPY OR ELECTRONIC MANUAL ASSIGNED TO YOU. HARDCOPY USERS MUST ENSURE THE DOCUMENTS PROVIDED MATCH THE INFORMATION ON THIS TRANSMITTAL. WHEN REPLACING THIS MATERIAL IN YOUR HARDCOPY MANUAL, ENSURE THE UPDATE DOCUMENT ID IS THE SAME DOCUMENT ID YOU'RE REMOVING FROM YOUR MANUAL. TOOLS ARoM THE HUMAN PERFORMANCE TOOL BAG SHOULD BE UTILIZED TO ELIMINATE THE CHANCE OF

~RRORS.

ATTENTION: "REPLACE" directions do not affect the Table of Contents, Therefore no TOC will be issued with the updated material.

TSBl - TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION BASES UNIT 1 MANUAL REMOVE MANUAL TABLE OF CONTENTS DATE: 04/27/2022 ADD MANUAL TABLE OF CONTENTS DATE: 04/28/2022 CATEGORY: DOCUMENTS TYPE: TSBl

Page 2 of 2

  • ID: TEXT 3.6.1.3.

REMOVE: REV:17 ADD: REV: 18 ANY DISCREPANCIES WITH THE MATERIAL PROVIDED, CONTACT DCS@ X3171 OR X3194 FOR ASSISTANCE. UPDATES FOR HARDCOPY MANUALS WILL BE DISTRIBUTED WITHIN 3 DAYS IN ACCORDANCE WITH DEPARTMENT PROCEDURES. PLEASE MAKE ALL CHANGES AND ACKNOWLEDGE COMPLETE IN YOUR NIMS INBOX UPON COMPLETION OF UPDATES. FOR ELECTRONIC MANUAL USERS, ELECTRONICALLY REVIEW THE APPROPRIATE DOCUMENTS AND ACKNOWLEDGE COMPLETE IN YOUR NIMS INBOX .

,,,, SSES MANUAL Manual Name: TSBl Manual

Title:

TECHNICAL SP~CIFICATION BASES UNIT 1 MANUAL Table Of Contents Issue Date: 04/28/2022 Procedure Name Rev Issue Date Change ID Change Number TEXT LOES 134 01/03/2019

Title:

LIST OF EFFECTIVE SECTIONS TEXT TOC 25 03/05/2019

Title:

TABLE OF CONTENTS TEXT 2 .1.1 7 03/29/2022

Title:

SAFETY LIMITS (SLS) REACTOR CORE SLS TEXT 2.1.2 1 TEXT 3.0 TEXT 3.1.2 11/16/2016 TEXT 3 .1.4 5 11/16/2016

Title:

REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS CONTROL ROD SCRAM* TIMES TEXT 3 .1.5 2 11/16/2016

Title:

REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS CONTROL ROD SCRAM ACCUMULATORS TEXT 3 .1. 6 5 03/29/2022

Title:

REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS ROD PATTERN CONTROL Page 1 of 8 Report Date: 04/28/22

SSES MANUAL Manual Name: TSBl Manual

Title:

TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION BASES UNIT 1 MANUAL TEXT 3*. 1. 7 4 11/16/2016

Title:

REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS STANDBY. LIQUID CONTROL (SLC) SYSTEM

.TEXT 3 *. 1. 8 4 11/16/2016

Title:

REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS SCRAM DISCHARGE VOLUME (SDV) VENT AND DRAIN VALVES TEXT 3.2.l 4 03/29/2022

Title:

POWER DISTRIBUTION LIMITS AVERAGE PLANAR LINEAR HEAT GENERATION RATE (APLHGR)

TEXT 3.2.2 5 03/29/2022

Title:

POWER DISTRIBUTION LIMITS MINIMUM CRITICAL POWER RATIO (MCPR)

TEXT 3.2.3 4 03/29/2022

Title:

POWER DISTRIBUTION LIMITS LINEAR HEAT GENERATION RATE (LHGR)

TEXT 3.3.1.1 7 11/16/2016

Title:

INSTRUMENTATION REACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEM (RPS) INSTRUMENTATION TEXT 3 . 3 . 1. 2 4 01/23/2018

Title:

INSTRUMENTATION SOURCE RANGE MONITOR (SRM) INSTRUMENTATION.

TEXT 3 . 3 . 2 . 1

  • 5 11/16/2016

Title:

INSTRUMENTATION CONTROL ROD BLOCK INSTRUMENTATION TEXT 3.3.2.2 3 11/16/2016

Title:

INSTRUMENTATION FEEDWATER MAIN TU~BINE HIGH WATER LEVEL TRIP INSTRUMENTATION TEXT 3.3.3.1 10 11/16/2016

Title:

INSTRUMENTATION.POST ACCIDENT MONITORING (PAM) INSTRUMENTATION TEXT 3.3.3.2 2 .u/16/2016

Title:

INSTRUMENTATION REMOTE SHUTDOWN SYSTEM TEXT 3.3.4.1 3 11/16/2016

Title:

INSTRUMENTATION END OF CYCLE RECIRCULATION PUMP TRIP (EOC-RPT) INSTRUMENTATION Page 2* of 8 Report Date: 04/28/22

jy SSES MANUAL

  • Manual Name: TSBl Manual

Title:

TECHNICAL SPECIFICAT°ION BASES UNIT 1 MANUAL TEXT 3.3.4.2 1 11/16/2016

Title:

INSTRUMENTATION ANTICIPATED TRANSIENT WITHOUT SCRAM RECIRCULATION PUMP TRIP (ATWS-RPT) INSTRUMENTATION TEXT 3.3.5.1 5 03/05/2019

Title:

INSTRUMENTATION EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEM (ECCS) INSTRUMENTATION TEXT 3.3.5.2 3 03/18/2021

Title:

REACTOR PRESSURE VESSEL (RPV) WATER INVENTORY CONTROL INSTRUMENTATION TEXT 3.3.5.3 0 03/05/2019

Title:

INSTRUMENTATION REACTOR CORE ISOLATION COOLING (RCIC) SYSTE.M INSTRUMENTATION

    • PREVIOUSLY TEXT 3.3.5.2 REV 1**

TEXT 3.3.6.1 9 03/05/2019

Title:

INSTRUMENTATION PRIMARY CONTAINMENT ISOLATION INSTRUMENTATION

  • TEXT 3.3.6.2 6 03/05/2019

Title:

. INSTRUMENTATION SECONDARY CONTAINMENT ISOLATION INSTRUMENTATION TEXT 3.3.7.1 4 03/05/2019

Title:

INSTRUMENTATION CONTROL ROOM EMERGENCY OUTSIDE AIR SUPPLY (CREOAS) SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION TEXT 3.3.8.1 4 03/18/2021

Title:

INSTRUMENTATION LOSS OF POWER (LOP) INSTRUMENTATION TEXT 3.3.8.2 1 11/16/2016

Title:

INSTRUMENTATION REACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEM (RPS) ELECTRIC POWER MONITORING TEXT 3.4.1 6 03/29/2022

Title:

REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM (RCS) RECIRCULATION LOOPS OPERATING TEXT 3.4.2 4 11/16/2016

Title:

REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM (RCS) JET PUMPS TEXT 3.4.3 3 01/13/2012

Title:

REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM.RCS SAFETY RELIEF VALVES S/RVS of 8 Report Date: 04/28/22

SSES MANUAL Manual Name: TSBl Manual

Title:

TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION BASES UNIT 1 MANUAL TEXT 3.4.4 1 11/16/2016

Title:

REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM (RCS) RCS OPERATIONAL LEAKAGE TEXT 3.4.5 2 04/13/2016

Title:

REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM (RCS) RCS PRESSURE ISOLATION VALVE (PIV) LEAKAGE TEXT 3.4.6 5 11/16/2016

Title:

REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM (RCS) RCS LEAKAG.E DETECTION INSTRUMENTATION TEXT 3.4.7 3 11/16/2016

Title:

REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM (RCS) RCS SPECIFIC ACTIVITY TEXT 3.4.8 3 11/16/2016

Title:

REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM (RCS) RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL (RHR) SHUTDOWN COOLING SYSTEM

- HOT SHUTDOWN TEXT 3.4.9. 2 11/16/2016 *

Title:

REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM (RCS) RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL (RHR) SHUTDOWN COOLING SYSTEM

- COLD SHUTDOWN TEXT 3.4.10 6 05/14/2019

Title:

REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM (RCS) RCS PRESSURE AND TEMPERATURE (P/T) LIMITS TEXT 3.4.11 1 11/16/2016

Title:

REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM (RCS) REACTOR STEAM DOME PRESSURE TEXT 3.5.1 7 03/29/2022

Title:

EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS (ECCS) REACTOR PRESSURE VESSEL (RPV) WATER INVENTORY CONTROL AND REACTOR CORE ISOLATION COOLING (RCIC) SYSTEM ECCS OPERATING TEXT 3.5.2 4 03/18/2021

Title:

EMERGENCX CORE COOLING SYSTEMS (ECCS) REACTOR PRESSURE VESSEL (RPV) WATER INVENTORY CONTROL AND REACTOR CORE ISOLATION COOLING (RCIC) SYSTEM ECCS OPERATING TEXT 3.5.3 6 03/05/2019

Title:

EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS (ECCS) REACTOR PRESSURE VESSEL (RPV) WATER INVENTORY CONTROL AND REACTOR CORE ISOLATION COOLING (RCIC) SYSTEM ECCS OPERATING Page 4 of 8* Report Date: 04/28/22

j,'

SSES MANUAL

  • Manual Name: TSBl Manual

Title:

TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION BASES UNIT 1 MANUAL TEXT 3.6.1.1 6 ll/16/2016

Title:

PRIMARY CONTAINMENT TEXT 3.6.1.2 2 11/16/2016

Title:

CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS PRIMARY CONTAINMENT AIR LOCK TEXT 3.6.1.3 18 04/28/2022

Title:

CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS PRIMARY CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES (PCIVS)

TEXT 3.6.1.4 2 11/16/2016

Title:

CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS CONTAINMENT PRESSURE TEXT 3.6.1.5 2 ' 11/16/2016

Title:

CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS DRYWELL AIR TEMPERATURE

  • TEXT 3.6.1.6 1 11/16/2016

Title:

CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS SUPPRESSION CHAMBER-TO-DRYWELL VACUUM BREAKERS TEXT 3.6.2.1 3 11/16/2016

Title:

CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS SUPPRESSIQN POOL AVERAGE TEMPERATURE TEXT 3.6.2.2 2 03/05/2019

Title:

CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS SUPPRESSION POOL WATER LEVEL TEXT 3.6.2.3 2 11/16/2016

Title:

CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL (RHR) SUPPRESSION POOL COOLING TEXT 3.6.2.4 1 11/16/2016

Title:

CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL (RHR) SUPPRESSION POOL SPRAY TEXT 3.6.3.1 2 06/13/2006

Title:

CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS PRIMARY CONTAINMENT HYDROGEN RECOMBINERS TEXT 3.6.3.2 4 04/22/2020

Title:

CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS DRYWELL AIR FLOW SYSTEM Page 5 of 8 Report Date: 04/28/22

SSES MANUAL Manual Name: TSBl Manual

Title:

TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION BASES UNIT 1 MANUAL TEXT 3.6.3.3 3 09/29/2017

Title:

CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS PRIMARY CONTAINMENT OXYGEN CONCENTRATION TEXT 3.6.4.1 16 12/16/2020

Title:

CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS SECONDARY CONTAINMENT TEXT 3.6.4.2 14 03/05/2019

Title:

CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS SECONDARY CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES (SCIVS)

TEXT 3.6.4.3 7 03/05/2019

Title:

CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS STANDBY GAS TREATMENT (SGT) SYSTEM TEXT 3.7.1 6 03/03/2020

Title:

PLANT SYSTEMS RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL SERVICE WATER (RHRSW) SYSTEM AND THE ULTIMATE HEAT SINK (UHS)

TEXT 3.7.2 4 03/03/2020

Title:

PLANT SYSTEMS EMERGENCY SERVICE WATER (ESW) SYSTEM TEXT 3.7.3 4 03/05/2019

Title:

PLANT SYSTEMS CONTROL ROOM EMERGENCY OUTSIDE AIR SUPPLY (CREOAS) SYSTEM TEXT 3.7.4 2 03/05/2019

Title:

PLANT SYSTEMS CONTROL ROOM FLOOR COOLING SYSTEM TEXT 3.7.5 2 11/16/2016

Title:

PLANT SYSTEMS MAIN CONDENSER OFFGAS TEXT 3.7.6 3 11/16/2016

Title:

PLANT SYSTEMS MAIN TURBINE BYPASS SYSTEM TEXT 3.7.7 2 11/16/2016

Title:

PLANT SYSTEMS SPENT FUEL STORAGE POOL WATER LEVEL TEXT 3.7.8 1 11/16/2016

Title:

PLANT SYSTEMS Page 6 of 8 Report Date: 04/28/22

SSES MANUAL Manual Name: TSBl Manual

Title:

TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION BASES UNIT 1 MANUAL TEXT 3.8.1 14 05/26/2021

Title:

ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS AC SOURCES - OPERATING TEXT 3.8.2 2 03/18/2021

Title:

ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS AC SOURCES - SHUTDOWN TEXT 3.8.3 7 08/07/20i9

Title:

ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS DIESEL FUEL OIL, LUBE OIL, AND STARTING AIR TEXT 3.8.4 4 11/16/2016

Title:

ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS DC SOURCES - OPERATING TEXT 3.8.5 2 03/05/2019

Title:

ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS DC SOURCES - SHUTDOWN

  • TEXT 3.8.6 I

TEXT 3.8.7 2

3 11/16/2016

Title:

ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS BATTERY CELL PARAMETERS 09/04/2019

Title:

ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS DISTRIBUTION SYSTEMS - OPERATING TEXT 3.8.8 2 03/05/2019

Title:

ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS DISTRIBUTION SYSTEMS - SHUTDOWN TEXT 3.9.1 1 11/16/2016

Title:

REFUELING OPERATIONS REFUELING EQUIPMENT INTERLOCKS TEXT 3.9.2 2 11/16/2016

Title:

REFUELING OPERATIONS REFUEL POSITION ONE-ROD-OUT INTERLOCK TEXT 3.9.3 1 11/16/2016

Title:

REFUELING OPERATIONS CONTROL ROD POSITION

.TEXT 3. 9 .4 0 11/15/2002

Title:

REFUELING OPERATIONS CONTROL ROO POSITION INDICATION Page 7 of 8 Report Date: 04/28/22

SSES MANUAL Manual Name: TSBl Manual

Title:

TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION BASES UNIT 1 MANUAL TEXT 3.9.5 1 11/16/2016

Title:

REFUELING OPERATIONS CONTROL ROD OPERABILITY - REFUELING TEXT 3.9.6 2 11/16/2016

Title:

REFUELING OPERATIONS REACTOR PRESSURE VESSEL (RPV) WATER LEVEL TEXT 3.9.7 1 11/16/2016

Title:

REFUELING OPERATIONS RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL (RHR) - HIGH WATER LEVEL TEXT 3.9.8 - 1 11/16/2016

Title:

REFUELING OPERATIONS RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL (RHR) - LOW WATER LEVEL TEXT 3.10.1 2 03/05/2019

Title:

SPECIAL OPERATIONS INSERVICE LEAK AND HYDROSTATIC TESTING OPERATION TEXT 3.10.2 1 11/16/2016

Title:

SPECIAL OPERATIONS REACTOR MODE SWITCH INTERLOCK TESTING TEXT 3.10.3 1 11/16/2016

Title:

SPECIAL OPERATIONS SINGLE CONTROL ROD WITHDRAWAL - HOT SHUTDOWN TEXT 3.10.4 1 11/16/2016

Title:

SPECIAL OPERATIONS SINGLE CONTROL ROD WITHDRAWAL - COLD SHUTDOWN TEXT 3.10.5 1 11/16/2016

Title:

SPECIAL OPERATIONS SINGLE CONTROL ROD DRIVE (CRD) REMOVAL - REFUELING TEXT 3.10.6 1 11/16/2016

Title:

SPECIAL OPERATIONS MULTIPLE CONTROL ROD WITHDRAWAL - REFUELING TEXT 3.10.7 2 03/29/2022

Title:

SPECIAL OPERATIONS CONTROL ROD TESTING - OPERATING TEXT 3.10.8 3 03/29/2022

Title:

SPECIAL OPERATIONS SHUTDOWN MARGIN (SDM) TEST - REFUELING Page 8 of 8 Report Date: 04/28/22

Rev. 18 PCIVs B 3.6.1.3 B 3.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS B 3.6.1.3 Primary Containment Isolation Valves (PCIVs)

BASES BACKGROUND The function of the PCIVs, in combination with other accident mitigation systems, including secondary containment bypass valves that are not PCIVs, is to limit fission product release during and following postulated Design Basis Accidents (DBAs) to within limits. Primary containment isolation within the time limits specified for those isolation valves designed to close automatically *ensures that the release of radioactive material to the *environment will be consistent with the assumptions used in the analyses for a OBA.

The OPERABILITY requirements for PCIVs help ensure that an adequate primary containment boundary is maintained during and after an accident by minimizing potential paths to the environment. Therefore, the OPERABILITY requirements provide assurance that primary containment function assumed in the safety analyses will be maintained. For PCIVs, the primary containment isolation function is that the valve must be able to

-* close (automatically or manually) and/or remain closed, and maintain leakage within that assumed in the OBA LOC_A Dose Analysis. These isolation devices are either passive or active (automatic). Manual valves, de-activated automatic valves secured in their closed position (including check valves with flow through the valve secured), blind flanges, and closed systems are considered passive devices. The OPERABILITY requirements for closed systems are discussed in Technical Requirements Manual (TRM) Bases 3.6.4. Check valves, or other automatic valves designed to close without operator action following an accident, are considered active devices. Two barriers in series are provided for each penetration so that no single credible failure or malfunction of an active component can result in a loss of isolation or leakage that exceeds limits assumed in the safety analyses. One of these barriers may be a closed system.

For each division of H202 Analyzers, the lines, up to and including the first normally closed valves within the H202 Analyzer panels, are extensions of primary containment (i.e., closed system), and are required to be leak rate tested in.accordance with the Leakage Rate Test Program. The H202 Analyzer closed system boundary is identified in the Leakage Rate Test Program. The closed system boundary consists of those components; pipirig, tubing, fittings, and valves, which meet the guidance of Reference 6. The closed system provides a secondary barrier in the event of a single failure of the PC IVs, as described below. The closed system boundary between PASS and the H202 Analyzer system ends at the process sampling solenoid operated isolation valves between the SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT 1 3.6-15

Rev. 18 PCIVs B 3.6.1.3 BASES BACKGROUND systems (SV-12361, SV-12365, SV-12366, SV-12368, and SV-12369).

(continued) These solenoid operated isolation valves do not fully meet the guidance of Reference 6 for closed system boundary valves in that they are not powered from a Class 1E power source. However, based upon a risk determination, operating these valves as closed system boundary valves is not risk significant. These valves also form the end of the Seismic Category I boundary between the systems. These process sampling solenoid operated isolation valves are normally closed and are required to be leak rate tested in accordance with the Leakage Rate Test Program as part of the closed system for the H2O2 Analyzer system. These valves

.are "closed system boundary valves" and may be opened under administrative control, as delineated in Technical Requirements Manual (TRM) Bases 3.6.4. Opening of these valves to permit testing of PASS in Modes 1, 2, and 3 is permitted in accordance with TRO 3.6.4.

Each H2O2 Analyzer Sampling line penetrating primary containment has two PCIVs, located-just outside primary containment. While two PCIVs are provided on each line, a single active failure of a relay in the control circuitry for these valves, could result in both valves failing to close or failing to remain closed. Furthermore, a single failure (a hot short in the common raceway to all the valves) could simultaneously affect all of the PCIVs within a H2O2 Analyzer division. Therefore, the containment isolation barriers for these penetrations consist of two PC IVs and a closed system. For situations where one or both PCIVs are inoperable, the ACTIONS to be taken are similar to the ACTIONS for a single PCIV backed by a closed system.

The drywell vent and purge lines are 24 inches in diameter; the suppression chamber vent and purge lines are 18 inches in diameter.

The containment purge valves are normally maintained closed in MODES 1, 2, and 3 to ensure the primary containment boundary is maintained. The outboard isolation valves have 2 inch bypass lines around them for use during normal reactor operation.

The RHR Shutdown Cooling return line containment penetrations

{X-13A(B)} are provided with a normally closed gate valve

{HV-151F015A(B)} and a normally open globe valve {HV-151F017A(B)}

outside containment and a testable check valve {HV-151 F050A(B)} with a normally closed parallel air operated globe valve {HV-151F122A(B)}

inside containment. The gate valve is manually opened and automatically isolates upon a containment isolation signal from the Nuclear Steam Supply Shutoff System or RPV low level 3 when the RHR System is operated in the Shutdown Cooling Mode only. The LPCI subsystem is an operational mode of the RHR System and uses the same injection lines to the RPV as the Shutdown Cooling Mode .

  • SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT 1 3.6-15a

Rev. 18 PCIVs B 3.6.1.3 BASES BACKGROUND The design of these containment penetrations is unique in that some (continued) valves are containment isolation valves while others perform the function of pressure isolation valves. In order to meet the 10 CFR 50 Appendix J leakage testing requirements, the closed system outside containment is the only barrier tested in accordance with the Leakage Rate Test Program. HV-151F015A(B) are not required to be Appendix J leak rate tested since the Appendix J testing exemption requirements are met.

Since these containment penetrations {X-13A and X-13B} include a containment isolation valve outside containment and a closed system outside containment that meets the requirem*ents of USNRC Standard Review Plan 6.2.4 (September 1975), paragraph I1.3.e, the containment isolation provisions for these penetrations provide an acceptable alternative to the explicit requirements of 10 CFR 50, Appendix A, GDC 55.

Containment penetrations X-13A(B) are also high/low pressure system interfaces. In order to meet the requirements to have two (2) isolation valves between the high pressure and low pressure systems, the HV-151 F050A(B), HV-151 F122A(B), 151130 and HV-151 F015A(B) valves are used to meet this requirement and are tested in accordance with the

    • APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES pressure test program.

The PCIVs LCO was derived from the assumptions related to minimizing the loss of reactor coolant inventory, and establishing the primary containment boundary during major accidents. As part of the primary containment boundary, PCIV OPERABILITY supports leak tightness of primary containment. Therefore, the safety analysis of any event requiring isolation of primary containment is applicable to this LCO.

The DBAs that result in a release of radioactive material within primary containment are a LOCA and a main steam line break (MSLB). In the analysis for each of these accidents, it is assumed that PCIVs are either closed or close within the required isolation times following event initiation. This ensures that potential paths to the environment through PCIVs (including primary containment purge valves) and secondary containment bypass valves that are not PCIVs are minimized. The closure time of the main steam isolation valves (MS IVs) for a MSLB outside primary containment is a significant variable from a radiological standpoint. The MS IVs are required to close within 3 to 5 seconds since the 5 second closure time is assumed in the analysis. The safety analyses assume that the purge valves were closed at event initiation.

Likewise, it is assumed that the primary containment is isolated such that release of fission products to the environment is controlled .

  • SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT 1 3.6-16

Rev. 18

    • BASES*

APPLICABLE The OBA analysis assumes that within the required isolation time leakage PCIVs B 3.6.1.3 SAFETY is terminated, except for the maximum allowable leakage rate, La.

ANALYSES (continued) The single failure criterion required to be imposed in the conduct of unit safety analyses was considered in the original design of the primary containment purge valves. Two valves in series on each purge line provide assurance that both the supply and exhaust lines could be isolated even if a single failure occurred.

The primary containment purge valves may be unable to close in the environment following a LOCA. Therefore, each of the purge valves is required to remain closed during MODES 1, 2, and 3 except as permitted under the Note of SR 3.6.1.3.1. In this case, the single failure criterion remains applicable to the primary containment purge valve due to failure*

in the control circuit associated with each valve. The primary containment purge valve design precludes a single failure from compromising the primary containment boundary as long as the system is operated in accordance with this LCO.

Both H202 Analyzer PCIVs may not be able to close given a single failure in the control circuitry of the valves. The single failure is caused by a "hot short" in the cables/raceway to the PCIVs that causes both PCIVs for a given penetration to remain open or to open when required to be closed. This failure is required to be considered in accordance with IEEE-279 as discussed in FSAR Section 7.3.2a. However, the single failure criterion for containment isolation of the H202 Analyzer penetrations is satisfied by virtue of the combination of the associated PCIVs and the closed system formed by the H202 Analyzer piping system as discussed in the BACKGROUND section above.

The closed system boundary between PASS and the H202 Analyzer system*ends at the process sampling solenoid operated isolation valves between the systems (SV-12361, SV-12365,

  • SV-12366, SV-12368, and SV-12369). The closed system is not fully qualified to the guidance of Reference 6 in that the closed system boundary valves between the H202* system and PASS are not powered from a Class 1E power source. However, based upon a risk determination, the use of these valves is considered to have no risk significance. This exemption to the requirement of Reference 6 for the closed system boundary is documented in License Amendment No. 195.

PCIVs satisfy Criterion 3 of the NRC Policy Statement. (Ref. 2)

SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT 1 3.6-17

Rev. 18

  • BASES*

LCO PCIVs B 3.6.1.3 PCIVs form a part of the primary containment boundary, or in the case of SCBL valves limit leakage from the primary containment. The PCIV safety function is related to minimizing the loss of reactor coolant inventory and establishing the primary containment boundary during a OBA.

The power operated, automatic isolation valves are required to have isolation times within limits and actuate on an automatic isolation signal.

The valves covered by this LCO are listed in Table B 3.6.1.3-1 and Table B 3.6.1.3-2.

The normally closed PCIVs, induding secondary containment bypass valves listed in Table B 3.6.1.3-2 that are not PCIVs, are considered OPERABLE when manual valves are closed or open in accordance with appropriate administrative controls, automatic valves are in their closed position, blind flanges are in place, and closed systems are intact. These passive isolation valves and devices are those listed in Table B 3.6.1.3-1.

Leak rate testing of the secondary containment bypass valves listed in Table 3.6.1.3-2 is permitted in Modes 1, 2 & 3 as described in the Primary Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program.

Purge valves with resilient seals, secondary containment bypass valves, including secondary containment bypass valves listed in Table B 3.6.1.3-2 that are not PCIVs, MSIVs, and hydrostatically tested valves must meet additional leakage rate requirements. Other PCIV leakage rates are addressed by LCO 3.6.1.1, "Primary Containment," as Type B or C testing.

This LCO provides assurance that <

the PCIVs will perform their designed safety functions to minimize the loss of reactor coolant inventory and establish the primary containment boundary during accidents.

APPLICABILITY In MODES 1, 2, and 3, a OBA could cause a release of radioactive material to primary containment. In MODES 4 and 5, the probability and consequences of these events are reduced due to the pressure and temperature limitations of these MODES. Therefore, PC IVs are not required to be OPERABLE and the primary containment purge valves are not required to be closed in MODES 4 and 5 .

  • SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT 1 3.6-18

Rev. 18

    • BASES ACTIONS The ACTIONS are modified by a Note allowing penetration flow path(s) to PCIVs B 3.6.1.3 be unisolated intermittently under administrative controls. These controls consist of stationing a dedicated operator at the controls of the valve, who is in continuous communication with the control room. In this way, the penetration can be rapidly isolated when a need for primary containment isolation is indicated .

. A second Note has been added to provide Clarification that, for the purpose of this LCO, separate Condition entry is allowed for each penetration flow path. This is acceptable, since the Required Actions for each Condition provide appropriate compensatory actions for each inoperable PCIV. Complying with the Required Actions may allow for continued operation, and subsequent inoperable PCIVs are governed by subsequent Condition entry and application of associated Required Actions.

The ACTIONS are modified by Notes 3 and 4. Note 3 ensures that appropriate remedial actions are taken, if necessary, if the affected system(s) are rendered inoperable by an inoperable PCIV (e.g., an Emergency Core Cooling System subsystem is inoperable due to a failed open test return valve). Note 4 en.sures appropriate remedial actions are taken when the primary containment leakage limits are exceeded.

Pursuant to LCO 3.0.6, these actions are not required even when the associated LCO is not met. Therefore, Notes 3 and 4 are added to require the proper actions be taken.

A.1 and A.2 With one or more penetration flow paths with one PCIV inoperable except for purge valve leakage not within limit, the affected penetration flow paths must be isolated. The method of isolation must include the use of at least one isolation barrier that cannot be adversely affected by a single active failure. Isolation barriers that meet this criterion are a closed and de-activated automatic valve, a closed manual valve, a blind flange, and a check valve with flow through the valve secured. For a penetration isolated in accordance with Required Action A.1, the device used to isolate the penetration should be the closest available valve to the primary containment. The Required Action must be completed within the 4 hour4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> Completion Time (8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> for main steam lines). The Completion Time of 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> is reasonable considering the time required tq isolate the

  • penetration and the relative importance of supporting primary containment OPERABILITY during MODES 1, 2, and 3. For main steam lines, an 8 hour9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> Completion Time is allowed. The Completion Time of 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> for the main steam lines allows a period of time to restore the MS IVs to OPERABLE status given the fact that MSIV closure will result in isolation of the main steam line(s) and a potential for plant shutdown.

SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT 1 3.6-19

Rev. 18 PCIVs B 3.6.1.3 BASES ACTIONS A.1 and A.2 (continued)

(continued)

For affected penetrations that have been isolated in accordance with Required Action A.1, the affected penetration flow path(s) must be verified to be isolated on a periodic basis. This is necessary to ensure that primary containment penetrations required to be isolated following an accident, and no longer capable of being automatically isolated, will be in the isolation position should an event occur. This Required Action does not require any testing or device manipulation. Rather, it involves verification that those devices outside containment and capable of potentially being mispositioned are in the correct-position. The Completion Time of "once per 31 days for isolation devices outside primary containment" is appropriate because the devices are operated under administrative controls and the probability of their misalignment is low. For the devices inside primary containment, the time period specified "prior to entering MODE 2 or 3 from MODE 4, if primary containment was de-inerted while in MODE 4, if not performed within the previous 92 days" is based on engineering judgment and is considered reasonable in view of the inaccessibility of the devices and other administrative controls ensuring that device misalignment is an unlikely possibility .

Condition A is modified by a Note indicating that this Condition is only applicable to those penetration flow paths with two PCIVs except for the H2O2 Analyzer penetrations. For penetration flow paths with one PCIV, Condition C provides the appropriate Required Actions. For the H2O2 Analyzer Penetrations, Condition D provides the appropriate Required Actions.

Required Action A.2 is modified by a Note that applies to isolation devices located in high radiation areas, and allows them to be verified by use of administrative nieans. Allowing verification by administrative means is considered acceptable, since access to the.se areas is typically restricted.

Therefore, the probability of misalignment of these devices, once they have been verified to be in the proper position, is low.

8.1 With one or more penetration flow paths with two PCIVs inoperable except for purge valve leakage not within limit, either the inoperable PCIVs must be restored to OPERABLE status or the affected penetration flow path must be isolated within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />. The method of isolation must include the use of at least one isolation barrier that cannot be adversely affected by a single active failure. Isolation barriers that meet this

  • criterion are a closed and de--activated automatic valve, a closed manual valve, and a blind flange. The 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> Completion Time is. consistent with the ACTIONS of LCO 3.6.1.1.

SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT 1 3.6-20

Rev. 18

    • BASES ACTIONS 8.1 (continued)

PCIVs B 3.6.1.3 (continued)

Condition B is modified by a Note indicating this Condition is only applicable to penetration flow paths with two PC IVs except for the H2O2 Analyzer penetrations. For penetration flow paths with one PCIV, Condition C provides the appropriate Required Actions. For the H2O2 Analyzer Penetrations, Condition D provides the appropriate Required Actions.

C.1 and C.2 With one or more penetration flow paths with one PCIV inoperable, the inoperable valve must be restored to OPERABLE status or the affected penetration flow path must be isolated. The method of isolation must include the use of at least one isolation barrier that cannot be adversely affected by a single active failure. Isolation barriers that meet this criterion are a closed and de-activated automatic valve, a closed manual valve, and a blind flange. A check valve may not be used to isolate the affected penetration. Required Action C.1 must be completed within the 72 hour8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> Completion Time. The Completion Time of 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> is reasonable considering the relative stability of the closed system (hence, reliability) to act as a penetration isolation boundary and the relative importance of supporting primary containment OPERABILITY during MODES 1, 2, and 3. The closed system must meet the requirements of Reference 6. For conditions where the PCIV and the closed system .are inoperable, the Required Actions of TRO 3.6.4, Condition B apply. For the Excess Flow Check Valves (EFCV), the Completion Time of 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> is reasonable considering the instrument and the small pipe diam_eter of penetration (hence, reliability) to act as a penetration isolation boundary and the small pipe diameter of the affected penetrations. In the event the affected penetration flow path is isolated in accordance with Required Action C.1, the affected penetration must be verified to be isolated on a periodic basis. This is necessary to ensure that primary containment penetrations required to be isolated following an accident are isolated.

The Completion Time of once per 31 days for verifying each affected penetration is isolated is appropriate because the valves are operated under administrative controls and the probability of their misalignment is low.

Condition C is modified by a Note indicating that this Condition is only applicable to penetration flow paths with only one PCIV. For penetration flow paths with two PCIVs and the H2O2 Analyzer Penetration.

Conditions A, B and D provide the appropriate Required Actions.

SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT 1 3.6-21

Rev. 18 PCIVs B 3.6.1.3 BASES ACTIONS C.1 and C.2 (continued)

(continued)

Required Action C.2 is modified by a Note that applies to valves and blind flanges located in high radiation areas and allows them to be verifieq by

  • use of administrative means. Allowing verification by administrative means is considered acceptable, since access to these areas is typically restricted. Therefore, the probability of misalignment of these valves, once they have been verified to be in the proper position, is low.

D.1 and D.2 With one or more H2O2 Analyzer penetrations with one or both PCIVs inoperable, the inoperable valve(s) must be restored to OPERABLE status or the affected penetration flow path must be isolated. The method of isolation must include the use of at least one isolation barrier that cannot be adversely affected by a single active failure. Isolation barriers that meet this criterion are a closed and de-activated automatic valve, a closed manual valve, and a blind flange. A check valve may not be used to isolate the affected penetration. Required Action D.1 must be completed within the 72 hour8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> Completion Time. The Completion Time of 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> is reasonable considering the unique design of the H2O2 Analyzer penetrations. The containment isolation barriers for these penetrations consist of two PCIVs and a closed system. In addition, the Completion Time of 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> is reasonable considering the relative stability of the closed system (hence, reliability) to act as a penetration isolation boundary and the relative importance of supporting primary containment OPERABILITY during MODES 1, 2, and 3. In the event the affected penetration flow path is isolated in accordance with Required Action D.1, the affected penetration must be verified to be isolated on a periodic basis. This is necessary to ensure that primary containment penetrations required to be isolated following an accident are isolated.

The Completion Time of once per 31 days for verifying each affected penetration is isolated is appropriate because the valves are operated under administrative controls and the probability of their misalignment is low.

When an H2O2 Analyzer penetration PCIV is to be closed and deactivated in accordance with Condition D, this must be accomplished by pulling the fuse for the power supply, and either determinating the power cables at the solenoid valve, or jumpering of the power side of the solenoid to ground.

The OPERABILITY requirements for the closed system are discussed in Technical Requirements Manual (TRM) Bases 3.6.4. In the event that either one or both of the PC IVs and the closed system are inoperable, the Required Actions of TRO 3.6.4, Condition B apply.

SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT 1 3.6-22

Rev. 18 PCIVs B 3.6.1.3 BASES ACTIONS 0.-1 and D.2 (continued)

(continued)

Condition D is modified by a Note indicating that this Condition is only applicable to the H2O2 Analyzer penetrations.

With the secondary containment bypass leakage rate not within limit, the assumptions of the safety analysis may not be met. Therefore, the leakage must be restored to within limit within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />. Restoration can be accomplished by isolating the penetration that caused the limit to be exceeded by use of one closed and de-activated automatic valve, closed manual valve, or blind flange. When a penetration is isolated, the leakage rate for the isolated penetration is assumed to be the actual pathway leakage through the isolation device. If two isolation devices are used to isolate the penetration, the leakage rate is assumed to be the lesser actual pathway leakage of the two devices. The 4 hour4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> Completion Time is reasonable considering the time required to restore the leakage by isolating the penetration and the relative importance of secondary containment bypass leakage to the overall containment function.

F.1 In the event one or more containment purge valves are not within the purge valve leakage limits, purge valve leakage must be restored to within limits. The 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> Completion Time is reasonable, considering that one containment purge valve remains closed, except as controlled by SR 3.6.1.3.1 so that a gross breach of containment does not exist. _

G.1 and G.2 If any Required Action and associated Completion Time cannot be met, the plant must be brought to a MODE in which the LCO does not apply.

To achieve this status, the plant must be brought to at least MODE 3 within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> and to MODE 4 within 36 hours4.166667e-4 days <br />0.01 hours <br />5.952381e-5 weeks <br />1.3698e-5 months <br />. The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required plant conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems .

  • SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT 1 3.6-23

Rev. 18

  • BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.6.1.3.1 PCIVs B 3.6.1.3 REQUIREMENTS This SR ensures that the primary containment purge valves are closed as required or, if open, open for an allowable reason. If a purge valve is open in violation of this SR, the valve is considered inoperable. If the inoperable valve is not otherwise known to have excessive leakage when closed, it is not con~idered to have leakage outside of limits. The SR is modified by a Note stating that the SR is not required to be met when the purge valves are open for the stated reasons. The Note states that these valves may be opened for inerting, de-inerting, pressure control, ALARA
  • or air quality considerations for personnel entry, or Surveillances that
  • require the valves to be open. The vent and purge valves are capable of closing in the environment following a LOCA. Therefore, these valves are allowed to be open for limited periods of time. The Surveillance Frequency is controlled under the Surveillance Frequency Control Program.

SR 3.6: 1.3.2 This SR verifies that each primary containment isolation manual valve

    • and blind flange that is located outside primary containment and not locked, sealed, or otherwise secured and is required to be closed during accident conditions is closed. The SR helps to ensure that post accident leakage of radioactive fluids or gases outside the primary containment boundary is within design limits.

This SR does not require any testing or valve manipulation. Rather, it involves verification that those PCIVs outside primary containment, and capable of being mispositioned, are in the correct position. The Surveillance Frequency is controlleq under the Surveillance Frequency Control Program.

Two Notes have been added to this SR. The first Note allows valves and blind flanges located in high radiation areas to be verified by use of administrative controls. Allowing verification by administrative controls is considered acceptable since access to these areas is typically restricted during MODES 1, 2, and 3 for ALARA reasons. Therefore, the probability of misalignment of these PCIVs, once they have been verified to be in the proper position, is low. A second Note has been included to clarify that PCIVs that are open under administrative controls are not required to meet the SR during the time that the PCIVs are open. This SR does not apply to valves that are locked, seal.ed, or otherwise secured in the closed position, since these were.verified to be in the correct position upon locking, sealing, or securing ..

  • SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT 1 3.6-24

Rev. 18 PCIVs B 3.6.1.3 BASES SURVEILL,ANCE SR 3.6.1.3.3 REQUIREMENTS (continued) This SR verifies that each primary containment manual isolation valve and blind flange that is located inside primary containment and not locked, sealed, or otherwise secured and is required to be closed during accident conditions is closed. The SR helps to ensure that post accident leakage of radioactive fluids or gases outside the primary containment boundary is within design limits. For PCIVs inside primary containment, the Frequency defined as "prior to entering MODE 2 or 3 from MODE 4 if primary containment was de-inerted while in MODE 4, if not performed within the previous 92 days" is appropriate since these PCIVs are operated under administrative controls and the probability of their misalignment is low. This SR does not apply to valves that are locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in the closed position, since these were verified tq be in the correct position upon locking, sealing, or securing.

Two Notes have been added to this SR. The first Note allows valves and blind flanges located in high radiation areas to be verified by use of administrative controls. Allowing verification by administrative controls is considered acceptable since the primary containment is inerted and access to these areas is typically restricted during MODES 1, 2, and 3 for ALARA reasons. Therefore, the probability of misalignment of these PCIVs, once they have been verified to be in their proper position, is low*.

A second Note has been included to clarify that PCIVs that are open under administrative controls are not required to meet the SR during the time that the PCIVs are open.

SR 3.6.1.3.4 The traversing incore probe (TIP) shear isolation valves are actuated by explosive charges. Surveillance of explosive charge continuity provides assurance that TIP valves will actuate when required. Other administrative controls, such as those that limit the shelf life of the explosive charges, must be followed. The Surveillance Frequency is controlled under the Surveillance Frequency Control Program.

SR 3.6.1.3.5 Verifying the isolation time of each power operated and each automatic PCIV is within limits is required to demonstrate OPERABILITY. MSIVs may be excluded from this SR since MSIV full closure isolation time is demonstrated by SR 3.6.1.3.7. The isolation time test ensures that the valve will isolate in a time period less than or equal to that assumed in the Final Safety Analyses Report. The isolation time and Frequency of this SR are in accordance with the requirements of the lnservice Testing Program .

  • SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT 1 3.6-25

Rev. 18

    • BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.6.1.3.6 PCIVs B 3.6.1.3 REQUIREMENTS (continued) For primary containment purge valves with resilient seals, the Appendix J Leakage Rate Test Interval of 24 months is sufficient. The acceptance criteria for these valves is defined in the Primary Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program, 5.5.12.

The Surveillance Frequency is controlled under the Surveillance Frequency Control Program.

SR 3.6.1.3.7 Verifying that the isolation time of each MSIV is within the specified limits is required to demonstrate OPERABILITY. The isolation time test ensures that the MSIV will isolate in a time period that does not exceed the times assumed in the OBA analyses. This ensures that the calculated radiological consequences of these events remain within regulatory limits.

The Frequency of this SR is in accordance with the requirements of the lnservice Testing Program.

SR 3.6.1.3.8

SR 3.6.1.3.9 This SR requires a demonstration that a representative sample of reactor instrumentation line excess flow check valves (EFCV) are OPERABLE by verifying that the valve actuates to check flow on a simulated instrument line break. As defined in FSAR Section 6.2.4.3.5 (Reference 4), the conditions under which an EFCV will isolate, simulated instrument line break, are at flow rates, which develop a differential pressure of between 3 psid and 10 psid. This SR provides assurance that the instrumentation line EFCVs will perform its design function to check flow. No specific valve leakage limits are specified because no specific leakage limits are defined in the FSAR. The Surveillance Frequency is controlled under the Surveillance Frequency Control Program. The representative sample consists of an approximate equal number of EFCVs such that each EFCV

  • SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT 1 3.6-26

Rev. 18 PCIVs B 3.6.1.3 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.6.1.3.9 (continued)

REQUIREMENTS (continued) is tested at least .once every 10 years (nominal). The nominal 10 year interval is based on other performance-based testing programs, such as lnservice Testing (snubbers) and Option B to 10 CFR 50, Appendix J. In addition, the EFCVs in the sample are representative of the various plant configurations, models, sizes and operating environments. This ensures that any potential common problems with a specific type or application of EFCV is detected at the earliest possible time. EFCV failures will be evaluated to determine if additional testing in that test interval is warranted to ensure overall reliability and that failures to isolate are very infrequent. Therefore, testing of a representative sample was concluded to be acceptable from a reliability standpoi_nt (Reference 7).

SR 3.6.1.3.10 The TIP shear isolation valves are actuated by explosive charges. An in place functional test is not possible with this design. The explosive squib is removed and tested to provide assurance that the valves will actuate when required. The replacement charge for the explosive squib shall be from the same manufactured batch as the one fired or from another batch that has been certified by having one of the batch successfully fired. The Surveillance Frequency is controlled under the Surveillance Frequency Control Program.

SR 3.6.1.3.11 This SR ensures that the leakage rate of secondary containment bypass leakage paths is less than the specified leakage rate. This provides assurance that the assumptions in the radiological evaluations of Reference 4 are met. The secondary containment le~kage pathways and Frequency are defined by the Primary Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program. This SR simply imposes additional acceptance criteria.

SR 3.6.1.3.12 The analyses in References 1 and 4 are based on the specified leakage rate. Leakage through each MSIV must be :,; 100 scfh for any one MSIV and :,; 300 scfh for total leakage through the MS IVs combined with the Main Steam Line Drain Isolation Valve, HPCI Steam Supply Isolation Valve and the RCIC Steam Supply Isolation Valve. The MSIVs can be tested at either~ Pt (24.3 psig) or Pa (48.6 psig). Main Steam Line Drain Isolation, HPCI and RClC Steam Supply Line Isolation Valves, are tested at Pa (48.6 psig). The Frequency is required by the Primary Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program .

  • SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT 1 3.6-27

Rev. 18

  • BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.6.1.3.13 PCIVs 8 3.6.1.3 REQUIREMENTS (continued) Surveillance of hydrostatically tested lines provides assurance that the calculation assumptions of Reference 2 are met. The acceptance criteria for the combined leakage of all hydrostatically tested lines is 3.3 gpm when tested at 1.1 Pa, (53.46 psig). The combined leakage rates must be demonstrated in accordance with the leakage rate test Frequency required by the Primary Containment Leakage Testing Program.
  • As noted in Table B 3.6.1.3-1, PCIVs associated with this SR are not Type C tested. Containment bypass leakage is prevented since the line terminates below the minimum water level in the Suppression Chamber.

These valves are tested in accordance with the 1ST Program. Therefore, these valves leakage is not included as containment leakage.

REFERENCES 1. FSAR, Chapter 15.

2. Final Policy Statement on Technical Specifications Improvements, July 22, 1993 (58 FR 39132) .
  • 3.

4.

5.

CFR 50, Appendix J, Option 8.

FSAR, Section 6.2.

NEDO-30851-P-A, "Technical Specification Improvement Analyses for BWR_Reactor Protection System," March 1988.

6. Standard Review Plan 6.2.4, Rev. 1, September 1975
7. NEDO-32977-A, "Excess Flow Check Valve Testing Relaxation,"

June 2000.

SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT 1 3.6-28

Rev. 18 PCIVs B 3.6.1.3 Table B 3.6.1.3-1 Primary Containment Isolation Valve (Page 1 of 11)

Isolation Signal LCO 3.3.6.1 Function No.

Plant System Valve Number Valve Description Type of Valve (Maximum Isolation Time (Seconds))

Containment 1-57-193 (d) ILRT Manual N/A Atmospheric 1-57-194(d) ILRT Manual N/A Control HV-15703 Containment Purge Automatic Valve 2.b, 2.d, 2.e (15)

HV-15704 Containment Purge- Automatic Valve 2.b, 2.d, 2.e (15)

HV-15705 Containment Purge Automatic Valve 2.b, 2.d, 2.e (15)

HV-15711 Containment Purge Automatic Valve 2.b, 2.d, 2.e (15)

HV-15713 Containment Purge Automatic Valve 2.b, 2.d, 2.e (15)

HV-15714 Containment Purge Automatic Valve 2.b, 2.d, 2.e (15)

HV-15721 Containment Purge Automatic Valve 2.b, 2.d, 2.e (15)

HV-15722 Containment Purge Automatic Valve 2.b, 2.d, 2.e (15)

HV-15723 Containment Purge Automatic Valve 2.b, 2.d, 2.e (15)

HV-15724 Containment Purge Automatic Valve 2.b, 2.d, 2.e (15)

HV-15725 Containment Purge Automatic Valve 2.b, 2.d, 2.e (15)

HV-15766 (a) Suppression Pool Cleanup Automatic Valve 2.b, 2.d (30)

HV-15768 (a) Suppression Pool Cleanup Automatic Valve 2.b, 2.d (30)

HV-157113 (d) Hardened Containment Vent Power Operated N/A (Air)

HV-157114 (d) Hardened Containment Vent Power Operated N/A (Air)

SV-157100A Containment Radiation Detection Automatic Valve 2.b, 2.d Syst SV-157100 B Containment Radiation Detection Automatic Valve 2.b, 2.d Syst SV-157101 A Containment Radiation Detection Automatic Valve 2.b, 2.d Syst SV-157101 B Containment Radiation Detection Automatic Valve 2.b, 2.d Syst SV-157102 A Containment Radiation Detection Automatic Valve 2.b, 2.d Syst SV-157102 B Containment Radiation Detection

  • Automatic Valve 2.b, 2.d Syst SV-157103 A Containment Radiation Detection Automatic Valve 2.b, 2.d Syst SV-157103 B Containment Radiation Detection Automatic Valve 2.b, 2.d Syst SV-157104 Containment Radiation Detection Automatic Valve 2.b, 2.d Syst SV-157105 Containment Radiation Detection Automatic Valve 2.b, 2.d Syst SV-157106 Containment Radiation Detection Automatic Valve 2.b, 2.d Syst SV-157107 Containment Radiation Detection Automatic Valve 2.b, 2.d Syst SV-15734 A (e) Containment Atmosphere Sample Automatic Valve 2.b, 2.d SV-15734 -B (e) Containment Atmosphere Sample Automatic Valve 2.b, 2.d SV-15736 A (e) Containment Atmosphere Sample Automatic Valve 2.b, 2.d SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT 1 3.6-29

Rev. 18

PCIVs B 3.6.1.3 Isolation Signal LCO 3.3.6.1 Function No.

Plant System Valve Number Valve Description Type of Valve (Maximum Isolation Time (Seconds))

Containment SV-15736 B (e) Containment Atmosphere Sample Automatic Valve 2.b, 2.d Atmospheric SV-15737 Nitrogen Makeup Automatic Valve 2.b, 2.d, 2.e Control SV-15738 Nitrogen Makeup Automatic Valve 2.b, 2.d, 2.e (continued) SV-15740 A (e) Containment Atmosphere Sample Automatic Valve 2.b, 2.d SV-15740 B (e) Containment Atmosphere Sample Automatic Valve 2.b, 2.d SV-15742 A (e) Containment Atmosphere Sample Automatic Valve 2.b, 2.d SV-15742 B (e) Containment Atmosphere Sample Automatic Valve 2.b, 2.d SV-15750 A (e) Containment Atmosphere Sample Automatic Valve* 2.b, 2.d*

SV-15750 B (e) Containment Atmosphere Sample Automatic Valve 2.b, 2.d SV-15752 A (e) Containment Atmosphere Sample Automatic Valve 2.b, 2.d SV-15752 B (e) Containment Atmosphere Sample Automatic Valve 2.b, 2.d SV-15767 Nitrogen Makeup Automatic Valve 2.b, 2.d, 2.e SV-15774 A (e) Containment Atmosphere Sample Automatic Valve 2.b, 2.d SV-15774 B (e) Containment Atmosphere Sample Automatic Valve 2.b, 2.d SV-15776 A (e) Containment Atmosphere Sample Automatic Valve 2.b, 2.d SV-15776 B (e) Containment Atmosphere Sample Automatic Valve 2.b, 2.d SV-15780 A (e) Containment Atmosphere Sample Automatic Valve 2.b, 2.d SV-15780 B (e) Containment Atmosphere Sample Automatic Valve 2.b, 2.d SV-15782 A (e) Containment Atmosphere Sample Automatic Valve 2.b, 2.d SV-15782 B (e) Containment Atmosphere Sample Automatic Valve 2.b, 2.d SV-15789 Nitrogen Makeup Automatic Valve 2.b, 2.d, 2.e Containment 1-26-072 (d) Containment Instrument Gas Manual Check NIA Instrument Gas 1-26-074 (d) Containment Instrument Gas Manual Check NIA 1-26-152 (d) Containment Instrument Gas Manual Check NIA 1-26-154 (d) Containment Instrument Gas Manual Check NIA 1-26-164 (d) Containment Instrument Gas Manual Check NIA HV-12603 Containment Instrument Gas Automatic Valve 2.c, 2.d (20)

SV-12605 Containment Instrument Gas Automatic Valve 2.c, 2.d SV-12651 Containment Instrument Gas Automatic Valve 2.c, 2.d SV-12654A Containment Instrument Gas Power Operated NIA SV-12654 B Containment Instrument Gas Power Operated NIA SV-12661 Containment Instrument Gas Automatic Valve 2.b, 2.d SV-12671 Containment Instrument Gas Automatic Valve 2.b, 2.d Core Spray . HV-152F001 A (b)(c) CS Suction Valve Power Operated NIA HV-152F001 B {b)(c) CS Suction Valve Power Operated NIA HV-152F005 A (h) CS Injection Power Operated NIA HV-152F005 B (h) CS Injection Valve Power Operated NIA HV-152F006 A (h) CS Injection Valve Air Operated Check NIA Valve HV-152F006 B (h) CS Injection Valve Air Operated Check NIA Valve HV-152F015A (b)(c) CS Test Valve Automatic Valve 2.c, 2.d (80)

HV-152F015 B (b)(c) CS Test Valve Automatic Valve 2.c, 2.d (80)

SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT 1 3.6-30

Rev. 18 PCIVs B 3.6.1.3 Table B 3.6.1.3-1 Primary Containment Isolation Valve (Page 3 of 11)

Isolation Signal Plant System LCO 3.3.6.1 Function No.

Valve Number Valve Description Type of Valve (Maximum Isolation Time (Seconds))

Core Spray HV-152F031 A (b)(c) CS Minimum Recirculation Flow Power Operated NIA (continued) HV-152F031 B (b)(c) CS Minimum Recirculation Flow Power Operated NIA HV-152F037 A (h) CS Injection Power Operated NIA (Air)

HV-152F037 B (h) CS Injection Power Operated NIA (Air)

XV-152F018 A Core Spray Excess Flow Check NIA Valve XV-152F018 B Core Spray Excess Flow Check NIA Valve HPCI 1-55-038 (d) HPCI Injection Valve Manual NIA 155F046 (b)(c)(d) HPCI Minimum Flow Check Valve Manual Check NIA 155F049 (a)(d) HPCI Turbine Exhaust Valve Manual Check NIA HV-155F002 HPCI Steam Supply Valve Automatic Valve 3.a, 3.b, 3.c, 3.e, 3.f, 3.g (50)

HV-155F003 HPCI Steam Supply Valve Automatic Valve 3.a, 3.b, 3.c, 3.e, 3.f, 3.g (50)

HV-155F006 HPCI Injection Valve Power Operated NIA HV-155F012 (b)(c) HPCI Minimum Flow Valve Power Operated NIA HV-155F042 (b)(c)

  • HPCI Suction Valve Automatic Valve 3.a, 3.b, 3.c, 3.e, 3.f, 3.g (115)

HV-155F066 (a) HPCI Turbine Exhaust Valve Power Operated NIA HV-155F075 HPCI Vacuum Breaker Isolation Automatic Valve 3.b, 3.d (15)

Valve HV-155F079 HP.Cl Vacuum Breaker Isolation Automatic Valve 3.b, 3.d (15)

Valve HV-155F100 HPCI Steam Supply Valve Automatic Valve 3.a, 3.b, 3.c, 3.e, 3.f, 3.g (6)

XV-155F024 A . HPCIValve Excess Flow Check NIA Valve XV-155F024 B HPCIValve Excess Flow Check NIA Valve XV-155F024 C HPCIValve Excess Flow Check NIA Valve XV-155F024 D HPCIValve Excess Flow Check NIA Valve Liquid Radwaste HV-16108 A1 Liquid Radwaste Isolation Valve Automatic VaJve 2.b, 2.d (15)

Collection HV-16108 A2 Liquid Radwaste Isolation Valve Automatic Valve 2.b, 2.d (15)

HV-16116 A1 Liquid Radwaste Isolation Valve Automatic Valve 2.b, 2.d (15)

HV-16116A2 Liquid Radwaste Isolation Valve Automatic Valve 2.b, 2.d (15)

Demin Water 1-41-017 (d) Demineralized Water Manual NIA 1-41-018 (d) Demineralized Water Manual NIA Nuclear Boiler 141F010A(d) Feedwater Isolation Valve Manual Check NIA 141F010 B (d) Feedwater Isolation Valve Manual Check NIA

    • SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT 1 3.6-31

Rev. 18

PCIVs B 3.6.1.3 Isolation Signal LCO 3.3.6.1 Function No.

Plant System Valve Number Valve Description Type of Valve (Maximum Isolation Time (Seconds))

Nuclear Boiler 141F039 A (d) Feedwater Isolation Valve Manual Check N/A (continued) 141 F039 B (d) Feedwater Isolation Valve Manual Check N/A 141818A(d) Feedwater Isolation Valve Manual Check N/A 141818B(d) Feedwater Isolation Valve Manual Check N/A HV-141F016 MSL Drain Isolation Valve Automatic Valve 1.a, 1.b, 1.c, 1.d, 1.e (10)

HV-141F019 MSL Drain Isolation Valve Automatic Valve 1.a, 1.b, 1.c, 1.d, 1.e (15)

HV-141F022 A MSIV Automatic Valve 1.a, 1.b, 1.c, 1.d, 1.e (5)

HV-141F022 B MSIV Automatic Valve 1.a, 1.b, 1.c, 1.d, 1.e (5)

HV-141F022 C MSIV Automatic Valve 1.a, 1.b, 1.c, 1.d, 1.e (5)

HV-141F022 D MSIV Automatic Valve 1.a, 1.b, 1.c, 1.d, 1.e (5)

HV-141 F028 A MSIV Automatic Valve 1.a, 1.b, 1.c, 1.d, 1.e (5)

HV-141F028 B MSIV Automatic Valve 1.a, 1.b, 1.c, 1.d, 1.e (5)

HV-141F028 C MSIV Automatic Valve 1.a, 1.b, 1.c, 1.d, 1.e (5)

HV-141F028 D MSIV Automatic Valve 1.a, 1.b, 1.c, 1.d, 1.e (5)

HV-141F032A Feedwater Isolation Valve Power Operated N/A Check HV-141F032 B Feedwater Isolation Valve Power Operated N/A Check xv.:141Foog Nuclear Boiler EFCV Excess Flow Check N/A Valve XV-141F070A Nuclear Boiler EFCV Excess Flow Check N/A Valve XV-141F070 B Nuclear Boiler EFCV Excess Flow Check N/A Valve XV-141F070 C Nuclear Boiler EFCV Excess Flow Check N/A Valve XV-141F070 D Nuclear Boiler EFCV Excess Flow Check N/A Valve XV-141F071 A Nuclear Boiler EFCV Excess Flow Check N/A Valve XV-141F071 B Nuclear Boiler EFCV Excess Flow Check N/A Valve XV-141F071 C Nuclear Boiler EFCV Excess Flow Check N/A Valve XV-141F071 D Nuclear Boiler EFCV Excess Flow Check N/A Valve

  • SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT 1 3.6-32

Rev. 18

.* (Page 5 of 11)

PCIVs B 3.6.1.3 Isolation Signal LCO 3.3.6.1 Function No.

Plant System Valve Number Valve Description Type of Valve (Maximum Isolation Time (Seconds))

Nuclear Boiler XV-141F072 A Nuclear Boiler EFCV Excess Flow Check NIA (continued) Valve XV-141F072 B Nuclear Boiler EFCV Excess Flow Check NIA Valve XV-141F072 C Nuclear Boiler EFCV Excess Flow Check NIA Valve XV-141F072 D Nuclear Boiler EFCV Excess Flow Check NIA Valve XV-141F073A Nuclear Boiler EFCV Excess Flow Check NIA Valve XV-141F073 B Nuclear Boiler EFCV Excess Flow Check NIA Valve XV-141F073 C Nuclear Boiler EFCV Excess Flow Check NIA Valve XV-141F073 D Nuclear Boiler EFCV Excess Flow Check NIA Valve Nuclear Boiler XV-14201 Nuclear Boiler Vessel Instrument Excess Flow Check NIA Vessel Valve Instrumentation XV-14202 Nuclear Boiler Vessel Instrument Excess Flow Check NIA Valve XV-142F041 Nuclear Boiler Vessel Instrument Excess Flow Check NIA Valve XV-142F043 A Nuclear Boiler Vessel Instrument Excess Flow Check NIA Valve XV-142F043 B Nuclear Boiler Vessel Instrument Excess Flow Check NIA Valve XV-142F045 A Nuclear Boiler Vessel Instrument Excess Flow Check NIA Valve XV-142F045 B Nuclear Boiler Vessel Instrument Excess Flow Check NIA Valve XV-142F047 A Nuclear Boiler Vessel Instrument Excess Flow Check NIA Valve XV-142F047 B Nuclear Boiler Vessel Instrument Excess Flow Check NIA Valve XV-142F051 A Nuclear Boiler Vessel Instrument Excess Flow Check NIA Valve XV-142F051 B Nuclear Boiler Vessel Instrument Excess Flow Check NIA Valve XV-142F051 C Nuclear Boiler Vessel Instrument Excess Flow Check NIA Valve XV-142F051 D Nuclear Boiler Vessel Instrument Excess Flow Check NIA Valve XV-142F053 A Nuclear Boiler Vessel Instrument Excess Flow Check NIA Valve XV-142F053 B Nuclear Boiler Vessel Instrument Excess Flow Check NIA Valve

  • SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT 1 3.6-33

Rev. 18 PCIVs B 3.6.1.3 Table B 3.6.1.3-1 Primary Containment Isolation Valve (Page 6 of 11) ls9lation Signal LCO 3.3.6.1 Function No.

Plant System Valve Number Valve Description Type of Valve (Maximum Isolation Time (Seconds))

Nuclear Boiler XV-142F053 C Nuclear Boiler Vessel Instrument Excess Flow Check N/A Vessel Valve Instrumentation XV-142F053 D Nuclepr Boiler Vessel Instrument Excess Flow Check N/A (continued) Valve XV-142F055 Nuclear Boiler Vessel Instrument Excess Flow Check N/A Valve XV-142F057 Nuclear Boiler Vessel Instrument Excess Flow Check NIA Valve XV-142F059 A Nuclear Boiler Vessel Instrument Excess Flow Check N/A Valve XV-142F059 B Nuclear Boiler Vessel Instrument Excess Flow Check N/A Valve

. XV-142F059 C Nuclear Boiler Vessel Instrument Excess Flow Check N/A Valve XV-142F059 D Nuclear Boiler Vessel Instrument Excess Flow Check N/A Valve XV-142F059 E Nuclear Boiler Vessel Instrument Excess Flow Check N/A Valve XV-142F059 F Nuclear Boiler Vessel Instrument Excess Flow Check N/A Valve XV-142F059 G Nuclear Boiler Vessel Instrument Excess Flow Check N/A Valve XV-142F059 H Nuclear Boiler Vessel Instrument Excess Flow Check N/A Valve XV-142F059 L Nuclear Boiler Vessel Instrument Excess Flow Check N/A Valve XV-142F059 M Nuclear Boiler ve*ssel Instrument Excess Flow Check N/A Valve XV-142F059 N Nuclear Boiler Vessel Instrument Excess Flow Check N/A Valve XV-142F059 P Nuclear Boiler Vessel Instrument Excess Flow Check N/A Valve XV-142F059 R Nuclear Boiler Vessel Instrument Excess Flow Check N/A Valve XV-142F059 S Nuclear Boiler Vessel Instrument Excess Flow Check N/A Valve XV-142F05.9 T Nuclear Boiler Vessel Instrument Excess Flow Check N/A Valve XV-142F059 U Nuclear Boiler Vessel Instrument Excess Flow Check N/A Valve XV-142F061 Nuclear Boiler Vessel Instrument Excess Flow*Check N/A Valve RBCCW HV-11313 RBCCW Automatic Valve 2.c, 2.d (30)

HV-11314 RBCCW Automatic Valve 2.c, 2.d (30)

HV-11345 RBCCW Automatic Valve 2.c, 2.d (30)

HV-11346 RBCCW Automatic Valve 2.c, 2.d (30)

  • SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT 1 3.6-34

Rev. 18

PCIVs B 3.6.1.3 Isolation Signal Plant System LCD 3.3.6.1 Function No.

Valve Number Valve Description Type of Valve (Maximum Isolation Time (Seconds))

RCIC 1-49-020 (d) RCIC INJECTION Manual N/A 149F021 (b)(c)(d) RCIC Minimum Recirculation Flow Manual Check N/A 149F028 (a)(d) RCIC Vacuum Pump Discharge Manual Check N/A 149F040 (a)(d) RCIC Turbine Exhaust Manual Check N/A FV-149F019 (b)(c) RCIC Minimum Recirculation Flow Power Operated N/A HV-149F007 RCIC Steam Supply Automatic Valve 4.a, 4.b, 4.c, 4.e, 4.f, 4.g (20)

HV-149F008 RCIC Steam Supply Automatic Valve 4.a, 4.b, 4.c, 4.e, 4.f, 4.g (20)

HV-149F013 RCIC Injection Power Operated N/A HV-149F031 (b)(c) RCIC Suction Power Operated N/A HV-149F059 (a) RCIC Turbine Exhaust

  • Power Operated N/A HV-149F060 (a) RCIC Vacuum Pump Discharge Power Operated N/A HV-149F062 RCIC Vacuum Breaker Automatic Valve 4.b, 4.d (10)

HV-149F084 RCIC Vacuum Breaker Automatic Valve 4.b, 4.d (10)

HV-149F088 RCIC Steam Supply Automatic Valve 4.a, 4.b, 4.c, 4.e, 4.f, 4.g (12)

XV-149F044 A RCIC Excess Flow Check N/A Valve XV-149F044 El. RCIC Excess Flow Check N/A Valve XV-149F044 C RCIC Excess Flow Check N/A Valve XV-149F044 D RCIC Excess Flow Check N/A Valve RB Chilled HV-18781 A1 RB Chilled Water Automatic Valve 2.c, 2.d (40)

Water System HV-18781 A2 RB Chilled Water Automatic Valve 2.c, 2.d (40)

HV-18781 B1 RB Chilled Water Automatic Valve 2.c, 2.d (40)

HV-18781 B2 RB Chilled Water Automatic Valve 2.c, 2.d (40)

HV-18782 A1 RB Chilled Water Automatic Valve 2.c, 2.d (12)

HV-18782A2 RB Chilled Water Automatic Valve 2.c, 2.d (12)

HV-18782 B1 RB Chilled Water Automatic Valve 2.c, 2.d (12)

HV-18782 B2 RB Chilled Water Automatic Valve 2.c, 2.d (12)

HV-18791 A1 RB Chilled Water Automatic Valve 2.b, 2.d (15)

HV-18791 A2 RB Chilled Water Automatic Valve 2.b, 2.d (15)

HV-18791 B1 RB Chilled Water Automatic Valve 2.b, 2.d (15)

HV-18791 B2 RB Chilled Water Automatic Valve 2.b, 2.d (15)

HV-18792 A1 RB Chilled Water Automatic Valve 2.b, 2.d (8)

HV-18792 A2 RB Chilled Water Automatic Valve 2.b, 2.d (8)

HV-18792 B1 RB Chilled Water Automatic Valve 2.b, 2.d (8)

HV-18792 B2 RB Chilled Water Automatic Valve 2.b, 2.d (8)

Reactor 143F013 A (d) Recirculation Pump Seal Water Manual Check N/A Recirculation 143F013 B (d) Recirculation Pump Seal Water Manual Check N/A

  • SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT 1 3.6-35

Rev. 18 PCIVs B 3.6.1.3 Table B 3.6.1.3-1 Primary Containment Isolation Valve (Page 8 of 11)

Isolation Signal LCO 3.3.6; 1 Function No.

Plant System Valve Number Valve Description Type of Valve (Maximum Isolation Time (Seconds))

Reactor XV-143F003 A Reactor Recirculation Excess Flow Check NIA Recirculation Valve (continued) XV-143F003 B Reactor Recirculation Excess Flow Check NIA Valve XV-143F004 A Reactor Recirculation Excess Flow Check NIA Valve XV-143F004 B Reactor Recirculation Excess Flow Check NIA Valve XV-143F009 A Reactor Recirculation Excess Flow Check NIA Valve XV-143F009 B Reactor Recirculation Excess Flow Check NIA Valve XV-143F009 C Reactor Recirculation Excess Flow Check NIA Valve XV-143F009 D Reactor Recirculation Excess Flow Check NIA Valve XV-143F010A Reactor Recirculation Excess Flow Check NIA Valve XV-143F010 B Reactor Recirculation Excess Flow Check NIA Valve XV-143F010 C Reactor Recirculation Excess Flow Check NIA Valve XV-143F010 D Reactor Recirculation Excess Flow Check NIA Valve XV-143F011 A Reactor Recirculation Excess Flow Check NIA Valve XV-143F011 B Reactor Recirculation Excess Flow Check NIA Valve XV-143F011 C Reactor Recirculation Excess Flow Check NIA Valve XV-143F011 D Reactor Recirculation Excess Flow Check NIA Valve XV-143F012 A Reactor Recirculation Excess Flow Check NIA Valve XV-143F012 B Reactor Recirculation Excess Flow Check NIA Valve XV-143F012 C Reactor Recirculation Excess Flow Check NIA Valve XV-143F012 D Reactor Recirculation Excess Flow Check NIA Valve XV-143F017 A Recirculation Pump Seal Water Excess Flow Check NIA Valve XV-143F017 B Recirculation Pump Seal Water Excess Flow Check NIA Valve XV-143F040 A Reactor Recirculation Excess Flow Check NIA Valve

  • SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT 1 3.6-36

Rev. 18 PCIVs B 3.6.1.3 Table B 3.6.1.3-1 Primary Containment Isolation Valve (Page 9 of 11)

Isolation Signal LCD 3.3.6.1 Function No.

Plant System Valve Number Valve Description Type of Valve (Maximum Isolation Time (Seconds))

Reactor XV-143F040 B Reactor Recirculation Excess Flow Check N/A Recirculation Valve (continued) XV-143F040 C Reactor Recirculation Excess Flow Check N/A Valve XV-143F040 D Reactor Recirculation Excess Flow Check N/A Valve XV-143F057 A Reactor Recirculation Excess Flow Check N/A Valve XV-143F057 B Reactor Recirculation Excess Flow Check N/A Valve HV-143F019 Reactor Coolant Sample Automatic Valve 2.b (9)

HV~143F020 Reactor Coolant Sample Automatic Valve 2.b (2)

Residual Heat HV-151F004 A (b}(c) RHR - Suppression Pool Suction Power Operated N/A Removal HV-151F004 B (b)(c) RHR - Suppression Pool Suction Power Operated N/A HV-151F004 C (b)(c) RHR - Suppression Pool Suction Power Operated N/A HV-151F004 D (b)(c) RHR - Suppression Pool Suction Power Operated N/A

  • HV-151F007 A (b)(c)

HV-151F007 B (b)(c)

HV-151 F008 (h)

HV-151 F009 (h)

HV-151F011 A(b)(d)

(h)

HV-151F011 B (b)(d)

RHR-Minimum Recirculation Flow RHR-Minimum Recirculation Flow RHR - Shutdown Cooling Suction RHR - Shutdown Cooling Suction RHR-Suppression Pool Cooling/Spray RHR-Suppression Pool Power Operated Power Operated Automatic Valve Automatic Valve Manual Manual N/A NIA 6.a, 6.b, 6.c (52) 6.a, 6.b, 6.c (52)

N/A N/A (h) Cooling/Spray HV-151 F015 A (f) (h) RHR - Shutdown Cooling Power Operated N/A Return/LPCI Injection HV-151F015 B (f) (h) RHR - Shutdown Cooling Power Operated NIA Return/LPCI Injection HV-151F016A(b) (h) RHR - Drywell Spray Automatic Valve 2.c, 2.d (90)

HV-151F016 B (b) (h) RHR - Drywell Spray Automatic Valve 2.c, 2.d (90)

HV-151 F022 (h) RHR - Reactor Vessel Head Spray Automatic Valve 2.d, 6.a, 6.b, 6.c (30)

HV-151 F023 (h} RHR - Reactor Vessel Head Spray Automatic Valve 2.d, 6.a, 6.b, 6.c (20)

HV-151 F028 A (b) (h) RHR - Suppression Pool Automatic Valve 2.c, 2.d (90)

Cooling/Spray HV-151F028 B (b) (h) RHR - Suppression Pool Automati(1: Valve 2.c, 2.d (90)

Cooling/Spray HV-151 F050 A (g) RHR - Shutdown Cooling Air Operated Check N/A Return/LPCI Injection Valve Valve HV-151F050 B (g) RHR - Shutdown Cooling Air Operated Check N/A Return/LPCI Injection Valve Valve HV-151F103A(b) RHR Heat Exchanger Vent Power Operated N/A HV-151F103 B (b) RHR Heat Exchanger Vent Power Operated N/A

  • SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT 1 3.6-37

Rev. 18

PCIVs B 3.6.1.3 Isolation Signal LCO 3.3.6.1 Function No.

Plant System Valve Number Valve Description Type of Valve (Maximum Isolation Time {Seconds))

Residual Heat HV-151 F122 A (g) RHR - Shutdown Cooling Power Operated NIA Removal ReturnlLPCI Injection Valve (Air)

(continued) HV-151F122 B (g) RHR - Shutdown Cooling Power Operated NIA ReturnlLPCI Injection Valve (Air)

PSV-15106 A (b)(d) RHR - Relief Valve Discharge Relief Valve NIA PSV-15106 B (b)(d) RHR - Relief Valve Discharge Relief Valve NIA PSV-151F126 (d) (h) RHR - Shutdown Cooling Suction Relief Valve NIA XV-15109 A RHR Excess Flow Check NIA Valve XV-15109 B RHR Excess Flow Check NIA Valve XV-15109 C RHR Excess Flow Check NIA Valve XV-15109 D RHR Excess Flow Check NIA Valve RWCU HV-144F001 (a) . RWCU Suction Automatic Valve 5.a, 5.b, 5.c, 5.d, 5.f, 5.g (30)

HV-144F004 (a) RWCU l:,uction Automatic Valve 5.a, 5.b, 5.c, 5.d, 5.e, 5.f, 5.g (30)

XV-14411 A RWCU Excess Flow Check NIA Valve XV-14411 B RWCU Excess Flow Check NIA Valve XV-14411 C RWCU Excess Flow Check NIA Valve X.V-14411 D RWCU Excess Flow Check NIA Valve XV-144F046 RWCU Excess Flow Check NIA Valve HV-14182 A RWCU Return Isolation Valve Power Operated NIA HV-14182 B RWCU Return Isolation Valve Power Operated NIA SLCS 148F007 (a)(d) SLCS Manual Check NIA HV-148F006 (a) SLCS Power Operated NIA Check Valve TIP System C51-J004 A (Shear TIP Shear Valves Squib Valves NIA Valve)

C51-J004 B (Shear TIP Shear Valves Squib Valves NIA

. Valve)

C51-J004 C (Shear TIP Shear Valves Squib Valves NIA Valve)

C51-J004 D (Shear TIP Shear Valves Squib Valves NIA Valve)

C51-J004 E (Shear TIP Shear Valves . Squib Valves NIA Valve)

SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT 1 3.6-38

Rev. 18 PCIVs B 3.6.1.3 Table B 3.6.1.3-1 Primary Containment Isolation Valve (Page 11 of 11)

Isolation Signal LCO 3.3.6.1 Function No.

Plant System Valve Number Valve Description Type of Valve (Maximum Isolation Time (Seconds))

TIP System C51-J004 A (Ball TIP Ball Valves Automatic Valve 7.a, 7.b (5)

(continued) Valve)

C51-J004 B (Ball TIP Ball Valves Automatic Valve 7.a, 7.b (5)

Valve)

C51-J004 C (Ball TIP Ball Valves Automatic Valve 7.a, 7.b (5)

Valve)

C51-J004 D (Ball TIP Ball Valves Automatic Valve 7.a, 7.b (5)

Valve)

C51-J004 E (Ball TIP Ball Valves Automatic Valve 7.a, 7.b (5)

Valve)

(a) Isolation barrier remains water filled or a water seal remains in the line post-LOCA, isolation valve is tested with water. Isolation valve leakage is not included in 0.60 La total Type B and C tests.

(b) Redundant isolation boundary for this valve is provided by the closed system whose integrity is verified by the Leakage Rate Test Program. This footnote does not apply to valve 155F046 (HPCI) when the associated PCIV, HV155F012 is closed and deactivated. Similarly, this footnote does not apply to valve 149F021 (RCIC) when it's associated PCIV, FV149F019 is closed and deactivated .

  • (c)

(d)

(e)

Containment Isolation Valves are not Type C tested. Containment bypass leakage is prevented since the line

  • terminates below the minimum water level in the Suppression Chamber. Refer to the 1ST Program.

LCO 3.3.3.1, "PAM Instrumentation," Table 3.3.3.1-1, Function 6, does not apply since these are relief valves, check valves, manual valves or deactivated and closed.

The containment isolation barriers for the penetration associated with this valve consists of two PCIVs and a closed system. The closed system provides a redundant isolation boundary for both PCIVs, and its integrity is required to be verified by the Leakage Rate Test Program.

(f) Redundant isolation boundary for this valve is provided by the closed system whose integrity is verified by the Leakage Rate Test Program.

(g) These valves are not required to be 10 CFR 50, Appendix J tested since the HV-151 F015A(B) valves (see note (h)) and a closed system form the 10 CFR 50, Appendix J boundary. These valves form a high/low pressure interface and are pressure tested in accordance with the pressure test program.

(h) Isolation barrier remains filled or a water seal remains in the line post-LOCA. Type C testing is not required.

SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT 1 3.6-39

Rev. 18 PCIVs B 3.6.1.3 Table B 3.6.1.3-2 Secondary Containment Bypass Leakage Isolation Valves (Not PCIVs)

  • (Page 1 of 1)

Isolation Signal LCO 3.3.6.1 Function No.

Plant System Valve Number Valve Description Type of Valve (Maximum Isolation Time (Seconds))

Residual Heat HV-151F040 RHR - RADWASTE LINE 18 ISO Automatic Valve 2.a, 2.d (45)

Removal VLV HV-151F049 RHR - RADWASTE LINE OB ISO Automatic Valve 2.a, 2.d (20)

VLV 1-51-136 RHR - COND TRANSFER OB SCBL Check Valve N/A CHECK VALVE 1-51-137 RHR - COND TRANSFER 18 SCBL Check Valve N/A CHECK VALVE Core Spray 1-52-F029A (U1 Only) CS LOOP A/8 FILL WATER OB Check Valve NIA 1-52-F0298 (U1 Only) SCBL CHECK VALVE 1-52-F030A (U1 Only) CS LOOP A/8 FILL WATER 18 SCBL Check Valve N/A 1-52-F0308 (U1 Only) CHECK VALVE SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT 1 3.6-40

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