PLA-7279, Submittal of Revision 56 to Emergency Plan

Submittal of Revision 56 to Emergency Plan

ML15044A482
Person / Time
Site:	Susquehanna
Issue date:	01/19/2015
From:	Franke J Susquehanna
To:	Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
PLA-7279, FOIA/PA-2015-0025
Download: ML15044A482 (374)

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Jon A. Franke PPL Susquehanna, LLC -*W -,4'4f - I Site Vice President 769 Salem Boulevard Berwick, PA 18603 j* *,,.

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• jfranke@pplweb.com UW-9 2015B JAN1 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attn: Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555-001 SUSQUEHANNA STEAM ELECTRIC STATION EMERGENCY PLAN REVISION 56 Docket Nos. 50-387 PLA-7279 and 50-388 The purpose of this letter is to transmit Revision 56 to the Susquehanna Steam Electric Station (SSES) Emergency Plan. In accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 50.54(q), Revision 56 to the Emergency Plan has been made without prior Commission approval as it does not decrease the effectiveness of the Plan, and the Plan, as changed, continues to satisfy the applicable requirements of 10 CFR 50.47(b) and Appendix E to 10 CFR 50. Revision 56 was effective on December 19, 2014.

The specific changes contained in Revision 56 are listed in Attachment 1. The revised Plan is provided in Attachment 2. Attachment 3 contains the completed 10 CFR 50.54(q) screening and evaluation.

Should you have any questions regarding this submittal, please contact Mr. Jeff Grisewood, Manager - Nuclear Regulatory Affairs at (570) 542-1330.

There are no regulatory commitments identified in this letter.

Sincerely, 416n A. Franke

/ Site Vice President Attachment 1 - List of Changes Contained in Revision 56 to SSES Emergency Plan Attachment 2 - Revision 56 to SSES Emergency Plan Attachment 3 - 10 CFR 50.54(q) Screening and Evaluation

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Document Control Desk PLA-7279 Copy: NRC Region I (Attn: Chief, Emergency Preparedness Branch - DRS)

Mr. J. E. Greives, NRC Sr. Resident Inspector Mr. J. A. Whited, NRC Project Manager Mr. L. J. Winker, PA DEP/BRP Director, Division of Spent Fuel Storage and Transportation

Attachment 1 to PLA-7279 List of Changes Contained in Revision 56 to SSES Emergency Plan

Attachment 1 to PLA-7279 Emergency Plan Changes (Revision 55 to Revision 56)

(referenced page numbers are from Revision 55)

1) Change Revision 55 to 56 throughout the document.

2) Change Table 7.3 Protective Action Recommendations (Effective Pages98-100) to align with NUREG-0654, Supplement 3, Rev 1. Specifics on what changed are described below:

SSES will provide an initial PAR to the Senior State Official within 15 minutes from the declaration of a General Emergency as follows:

1. For a Rapidly Progressing Severe Accident (RPSA):

a. Evacuate 2 mile radius;

b. Evacuate 2-10 miles downwind sectors.

2. For a Hostile Action Based (HAB) GE event:

a. Shelter 5 mile radius.

3. For all other General Emergencies:

a. Evacuate 2 mile radius;

b. Evacuate 2-5 miles downwind sectors.

3.1 When there is a Controlled Containment Venting of less than an hour AND a valid dose assessment projects doses less than PAGs at EPB AND the PAR is issued by extended ERO (TSC or EOF):

a. Shelter 2 mile radius;

b. Shelter 2-5 miles downwind sectors.

Initial PAR shall also advise citizens to take KI in accordance with the state's emergency plans and advise remainder of the EPZ to monitor and prepare.

Continue assessment based on available plant and field monitoring information and evaluate for subsequent PARs in accordance with:

1. Until RPSA conditions do not apply any more, ERO shall consider the following subsequent PARs based on dose assessment results or changes in wind direction affecting new sectors, if conditions exist which would require classification of a General Emergency per EALs:

a. Evacuate additional affected sectors 2-10 miles downwind

b. Evacuate all sectors where PAGs were exceeded.

Page 1 of 2

Attachment 1 to PLA-7279 Emergency Plan Changes (Revision 55 to Revision 56)

(referenced page numbers are from Revision 55)

2. Until HAB conditions do not apply any more, ERO shall consider the following subsequent PARs based on dose assessment results:

a. Evacuate 2 mile radius

b. Evacuate all sectors where PAGs were exceeded.

3) If RPSA or HAB conditions do not apply, or for all other General Emergencies, ERO shall consider the following subsequent PARs based on dose assessment results or changes in wind direction affecting new sectors, if conditions exist which would require classification of a General Emergency per EALs:

a. Evacuate additional affected sectors 2-5 miles downwind

b. Evacuate all sectors where PAGs were exceeded.

When there is a Controlled Containment Venting of less than an hour AND a valid dose assessment projects doses less than PAGs at EPB AND the PAR is issued by extended ERO (TSC or EOF):

a. Shelter additional affected sectors 2-5 miles downwind.

The PAR methodology described above complies with 10CFR50.47(b)(10),

Appendix E to Part 50,Section IV Paragraph 3 and NUREG-0654, Supplement 3, Rev 1.

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Attachment 2 to PLA-7279 Revision 56 to SSES Emergency Plan

Emergency Plan, Rev. 56, Page 1 of 312 PPL SUSQUEHANNA LLC SUSQUEHANNA STEAM ELECTRIC STATION EMERGENCY PLAN REVISION 56 PORC MEETING: 14-12-12

Emergency Plan, Rev. 56, Page 2 of 312 PPL SUSQUEHANNA LLC SUSQUEHANNA STEAM ELECTRIC STA TION TEAM SUSQUEHANNA.,

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IV THIS DOCUMENT HAS BEEN UPDA TED TO INCLUDE REVISIONS THROUGH 56 DA TED: December19, 2014

Emergency Plan, Rev. 56, Page 3 of 312 EFFECTIVE PAGES NOTE: This revision of the Emergency Plan has updated all sections of the Emergency Plan to the same revision.

1. Changed Revision 55 to 56 throughout the document.

2. Changed Table 7.3 Protective Action Recommendations (Effective Pages98-100) to align with NUREG-0654, Supplement 3, Rev 1.

Emergency Plan, Rev. 56, Page 4 of 312 SECTION TITLE PAGE 1.0 DEFINITIONS 7 2.0 ACRONYMS 16

3.0 REFERENCES

18 4.0 SCOPE AND CONTENTS 20 5.0 EMERGENCY CONDITIONS 24 5.1 CLASSIFICATION SYSTEM 24 5.2 SPECTRUM OF POSTULATED ACCIDENTS 26 6.0 ORGANIZATIONAL CONTROL OF EMERGENCIES 58 6.1 NORMAL OPERATING ORGANIZATION 60 6.2 ON-SITE EMERGENCY ORGANIZATION - (PHASE II) 61 6.3 OFF-SITE RESOURCES AND ACTIVITIES - (PHASE III) 66 6.4 COORDINATION WITH PARTICIPATING GOVERNMENT AGENCIES 70 6.5 RESTORATION 74 7.0 EMERGENCY MEASURES 84 7.1 ASSESSMENT ACTIONS FOR ALL EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATIONS 84 7.2 CORRECTIVE ACTIONS 88 7.3 PROTECTIVE ACTIONS 88 7.4 AID TO AFFECTED PERSONNEL 91 8.0 EMERGENCY FACILITIES AND EQUIPMENT 101 8.1 ON-SITE EMERGENCY CENTERS 101 8.2 PPL OFF-SITE EMERGENCY CENTERS 109 8.3 COUNTY AND STATE EMERGENCY CENTERS 111 8.4 ASSESSMENT CAPABILITIES 112 8.5 PROTECTIVE FACILITIES 112 8.6 ADDITIONAL COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEMS 114 8.7 ON-SITE FIRST AID AND MEDICAL FACILITIES 114 8.8 DAMAGE CONTROL EQUIPMENT 114 8.9 INFORMATION SYSTEMS 114 9.0 MAINTAINING EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS 121 9.1 ORGANIZATIONAL PREPAREDNESS 121 9.2 REVIEW AND UPDATING 124 9.3 MAINTENANCE AND INVENTORY OF EMERGENCY EQUIPMENT/ SUPPLIES 125 9.4 PUBLIC EDUCATION AND INFORMATION 126 10.0 APPENDICES A LETTERS OF AGREEMENT 129 B WIND ROSES, DOSE/DISTANCE PLOTS AND JOINT FREQUENCY 132 DISTRIBUTION C SSES EMERGENCY PLAN POSITION SPECIFIC PROCEDURES (TYPICAL) 149 D EQUIPMENT INFORMATION LISTINGS 151 E PPL SUSQUEHANNA, LLC POLICY STATEMENT 167 F DEVIATIONS to NEI 99-01, Rev 4 169 G SSES EVACUATION TIME ESTIMATES 182 H DOWNSTREAM SUSQUEHANNA RIVER WATER USAGE 205 I POPULATION UPDATE FOR SSES EMERGENCY PLANNING ZONE 208 J NUREG-0654 PLANNING STANDARDS AND EVALUATION CRITERIA CROSS 210 REFERENCE TO SSES EMERGENCY PLAN K ON-SHIFT STAFFING ANALYSIS 220 Page 1 of 3

Emergency Plan, Rev. 56, Page 5 of 312 TABLE TITLE PAGE Section ABNORMAL RAD LEVELS/RADIOLOGICAL EFFLUENT 33 5-Table R Section FISSION PRODUCT BARRIER DEGRADATION 36 5-Table F Section SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONS 39 5-Table M Section HAZARDS AND OTHER CONDITIONS 42 5-Table 0 Section ISFSI MALFUNCTIONS 45 5-Table E Section COLD SHUTDOWN/REFUELING SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONS 46 5-Table C 5.1 TABLE DELETED N/A 5.2 EMERGENCY ACTIONS BASED ON CLASSIFICATION 51 6.1 STATION EMERGENCY PLAN MINIMUM STAFFING REQUIREMENTS 76 6.2 ADDITIONAL ASSISTANCE FROM OUTSIDE PPL 78 7.1

SUMMARY

OF IMMEDIATE NOTIFICATION AND RESPONSE FOR ALL 93 CLASSIFICATIONS 7.2 EMERGENCY EXPOSURE CRITERIA 95 7.3 PROTECTIVE ACTION RECOMMENDATIONS 98 8.1 RELATIONSHIP OF THE PRIMARY PARAMETER, SECONDARY DISPLAY, AND 116 ALGORITHMS ON SPDS 9.1 TRAINING OF SUSQUEHANNA SES EMERGENCY RESPONSE PERSONNEL 127 Page 2 of 3

Emergency Plan, Rev. 56, Page 6 of 312

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FIGURE TITLE PAGE 4.1 MAP OF SSES VICINITY 22 4.2 MAP OF SSES 50 MILE INGESTION EXPOSURE ZONE 23 6.1 DELETED (NUCLEAR DEPARTMENT ORGANIZATION - FSAR) FIGURE 13.1.3 N/A 6.2 TSC ORGANIZATION 79 6.3 OSC ORGANIZATION 80 6.4 EOF ORGANIZATION 81 6.6 LONG TERM RESTORATION ORGANIZATION 82 6.7 COMMUNICATION INTERFACES WITH OFFSITE AGENCIES 83 8.1 MAP OF THE SUSQUEHANNA SES EMERGENCY FACILITIES 117 8.2 TECHNICAL SUPPORT CENTER FLOOR PLAN 118 8.3 EMERGENCY OPERATIONS FACILITY/JOINT INFORMATION CENTER FLOOR 119 PLAN 8.4 SIREN LOCATION 120 Page 3 of 3

Emergency Plan, Rev. 56, Page 7 of 312 yI

1. ACCIDENT - an unforeseen and unintentional event which may result in an emergency.

2. ACTIVATE - an emergency response facility has sufficient staffing to perform required functions and the facility has taken over command and control of the emergency. The positions required to activate the TSC, OSC and EOF are specified with an

• in Figures 6.2, 6.3 and 6.4. The terms "activated", "activation" "activation time" and "take over management of the emergency" have the same definition.

3. AFFECTING SAFE SHUTDOWN - Event in progress has adversely affected functions that are necessary to bring the plant to and maintain it in the applicable HOT or COLD SHUTDOWN condition. Plant condition applicability is determined by Technical Specification LCOs in effect.

Example 1: Event causes damage that results in entry into an LCO that requires the plant to be placed in HOT SHUTDOWN. HOT SHUTDOWN is achievable, but COLD SHUTDOWN is not. This event is not "AFFECTING SAFE SHUTDOWN."

Example 2: Event causes damage that results in entry into an LCO that requires the plant to be placed in COLD SHUTDOWN. HOT SHUTDOWN is achievable, but COLD SHUTDOWN is not. This event is "AFFECTING SAFE SHUTDOWN."

4. ALERT - Events are in process or have occurred which involve an actual or potential substantial degradation of the level of safety of the plant or a security event that involves probable life threatening risk to site personnel or damage to site equipment because of HOSTILE ACTION. Any releases are expected to be limited to small fractions of the EPA Protective Action Guideline exposure levels.

5. ANNUAL - occurring within calendar year starting January 1 and ending December 31.

6. ALERT NOTIFICATION SYSTEM - sirens with ratings of 121 dB at 100' within the ten-mile EPZ around the Susquehanna Steam Electric Station. Siren location was determined by a detailed study including field surveys, actual determination of average background noise level, and consideration of population distribution within the 10-mile EPZ.

7. ASSESSMENT ACTIONS - those actions taken during or after an incident to obtain and process information that is necessary to make decisions to implement specific emergency measures.

8. BIENNIAL EXERCISE - NRC/DHS-FEMA exercise performed on alternate years, to be completed within the calendar year scheduled.

9. BIWEEKLY - occurring on alternate weeks, within the 7-day week.

10. BOMB - refers to an explosive device suspected of having sufficient force to damage plant systems or structures.

11. CDE - the Committed Dose Equivalent; dose to an organ due to an intake of radioactive material during the 50 year period following the intake.

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Emergency Plan, Rev. 56, Page 8 of 312

12. CIVIL DISTURBANCE - A CIVIL DISTURBANCE COULD BE FOREWARNED OR SPONTANEOUS. Information of a CIVIL DISTURBANCE could be expressed by telephone, mail, hand delivered or other means. Plans of a CIVIL DISTURBANCE may be given directly or indirectly through a law enforcement agency, mass media, organization or some other party. A group of unexpected or unauthorized individuals is observed outside the PROTECTED AREA or facility management is informed of plans to stage such a gathering (e.g. labor picket line, protest demonstrations, etc.)

13. COLUMBIA COUNTY EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY (CCEMA) - emergency response coordinating agency for Columbia County, responsible for implementing off-site action upon direct notification from Susquehanna SES or PEMA.

14. CONFINEMENT BOUNDARY - is the barrier(s) between areas containing radioactive substances and the environment.

15. CONTAINMENT CLOSURE - is considered to be Secondary Containment as required by Technical Specifications.

16. CONTROL ROOM - the location of the Control Panels from which the reactor and its auxiliary systems are controlled.

17. CORPORATE LEADERSHIP COUNCIL (CLC) - the PPL Management group which determines major policy commitments for the company. The CLC membership includes the President of the company and other senior executives.

18. CORRECTIVE ACTIONS - those emergency measures taken to ameliorate or terminate an emergency situation.

19. DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION/BUREAU OF RADIATION PROTECTION (DEP/BRP) - the State agency responsible to provide guidance and recommendations for specific off-site protective measures.

20. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY - Federal Emergency Management Agency (DHS-FEMA) - within the context of this plan, serves as the primary contact for requests for Federal assistance; lead coordinator all non-technical federal response.

21. DOSE PROJECTION - a calculated estimate of the potential radiation dose to individuals at a given location, normally off-site, (determined from the quantity of radioactive material released and the appropriate meteorological transport and dispersion parameters).

22. DOSE RATE - the amount of radiation an individual can potentially receive per unit of time.

23. EFFECTIVE DOSE EQUIVALENT (EDE) - the sum of the products of the dose equivalent to the organ or tissue and the weighting factors applicable to each of the body organs or tissues that are irradiated.

24. EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS (EAL) - operational or radiological parameters which, when exceeded, require the implementation of portions of this plan. EALs for various emergency conditions are specified in Section 5 Tables R, F, M, 0, E and C.

25. EMERGENCY ACTIONS - those steps taken, as a result of exceeding an Emergency Action Level in the Emergency Plan, to ensure that the situation is assessed and that the proper corrective and/or protective actions are taken.

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Emergency Plan, Rev. 56, Page 9 of 312

26. EMERGENCY ALERT SYSTEM (EAS) - radio and television broadcast system used by public emergency management officials to notify the public concerning protective actions to be taken in the event of natural disasters, radiological protective actions, and other information of immediate impact to the public. Formerly referred to as the Civil Defense Emergency Broadcast System.

27. EMERGENCY CONDITION - the characterization of several classes of emergency situations consisting of exclusive groupings including the entire spectrum of possible radiological emergency situations. The four classes of emergencies, listed in increasing severity, which PPL has incorporated into this Emergency Plan, are outlined in Section 5.0 of this plan.

28. EMERGENCY COORDINATORS - designated Susquehanna SES staff members responsible for coordinating specific emergency organization functions.

29. EMERGENCY DIRECTOR (ED) - the PPL individual responsible for direction of on-site activities during an emergency at the Susquehanna SES.

30. EMERGENCY OPERATIONS CENTERS - designated state and county emergency management agency headquarters facilities designed and equipped for the purpose of exercising effective coordination and control over disaster operations carried out within their jurisdiction.

31. EMERGENCY OPERATIONS FACILITY - PPL Emergency Response Facility co-located with the Joint Information Center in Plains Township, Pennsylvania, to provide continuous coordination and evaluation of PPL activities during an emergency having or potentially having environmental consequences (Reference REFERENCES, Section 3.19).

32. EMERGENCY PLAN BOUNDARY - same as the EXCLUSION AREA, i.e., that area around Susquehanna SES within a radius of 1800 feet determined in accordance with 10 CFR 100.11. The dose criterion of 10 CFR 50.67 applies at the EXCLUSION AREA boundary.

33. EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES - specific procedures defining in detail the action to be taken in the event of an emergency condition. The Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures will be separate from, but may incorporate and refer to, normal plant operating procedures and instructions, Emergency Plan Position Specific Procedures and Emergency Plan Technical Procedures.

34. EMERGENCY PLAN TECHNICAL PROCEDURES - procedures describing how to perform processes associated with the Emergency Plan. These procedures may include processes such as Emergency Classification or Protective Action. Used together with Emergency Plan Position Specific Procedures, these procedures are designed to implement the Emergency Plan during a declared emergency.

35. EMERGENCY PLANNING ZONE - there are two Emergency Planning Zones. The first is an area, approximately 10 miles in radius around the Susquehanna SES, for which emergency planning consideration of the plume exposure pathway has been given in order to ensure that prompt and effective actions can be taken to protect the public in the event of an accident. The second is an area approximately 50 miles in radius around the Susquehanna SES, for which emergency planning consideration of the ingestion exposure pathway has been given.

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Emergency Plan, Rev. 56, Page 10 of 312

36. EMERGENCY PLAN POSITION SPECIFIC PROCEDURES - procedures describing how to perform tasks assigned to emergency positions. Each procedure includes an overview of the position's tasks, detailed instructions, and relevant material. Used together, these procedures are designed to implement the Emergency Plan during a declared emergency.

37. EXCLUSION AREA - is a circle of radius 1800 feet with the center at the common release point on the Unit 1 and Unit 2 Reactor Buildings as determined in accordance with 10 CFR100.11. The dose criterion of 10 CFR 50.67 applies at the EXCLUSION AREA boundary.

38. EXPLOSION - An EXPLOSION is a rapid, violent, unconfined combustion, or a catastrophic failure of pressurized equipment that imparts energy of sufficient force to potentially damage permanent structures, systems, or components.

39. EXTORTION - is an attempt to cause an action at the station by threat of force.

40. FIRE - is combustion characterized by heat and light. Sources of smoke such as slipping drive belts or overheated electrical equipment do not constitute FIRES.

Observation of flame is preferred but is NOT required if large quantities of smoke and heat are observed.

41. FULLY FUNCTIONAL- all minimum required staff as defined in Table 6.1 and the positions designated by dashed lines in Figures 6.2, 6.3 and 6.4 are present.

42. GENERAL EMERGENCY - Events are in process or have occurred which involve actual or imminent substantial core degradation or melting with potential for loss of containment integrity or HOSTILE ACTION that results in an actual loss of physical control of the facility. Releases can be reasonably expected to exceed EPA Protective Action Guideline exposure levels offsite for more than the immediate site area.

43. HOSTAGE - is a person(s) held as leverage against the station to ensure that demands will be met by the station.

44. HOSTILE FORCE - one or more individuals who are engaged in a determined assault, overtly or by stealth and deception, equipped with suitable weapons capable of killing, maiming, or causing destruction.

45. HOSTILE ACTION- An act toward a Nuclear Power Plant or its personnel that includes the use of violent force to destroy equipment, take hostages, and/or intimidate the plant to achieve an end. This includes attack by air, land, or water using weapons, explosives, projectiles, vehicles, or other devices used to deliver destructive force. Other acts that satisfy the overall intent may be included. HOSTILE ACTION should not be construed to include acts of civil disobedience or felonious acts that are not part of a concerted attack on the power plant. Non-terrorism based EALs should be used to address such activities, (e.g. violent acts between individuals in the owner controlled area).

46. IMMEDIATELY DANGEROUS TO LIFE AND HEALTH (IDLH) - A condition that either poses an immediate threat to life and health or an immediate threat of severe exposure to contaminants which are likely to have adverse delayed effects on health.

47. INTRUSION / INTRUDER - is a person(s) present in a specified area without authorization. Discovery of a BOMB in a specified area is indication of INTRUSION into that area by a HOSTILE FORCE.

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Emergency Plan, Rev. 56, Page 11 of 312

48. INITIATING CONDITION (IC) - one of a predetermined subset of nuclear power plant conditions where either the potential exists for a radiological emergency, or such an emergency has occurred.

49. ISFSI - Independent Spent Fuel Storage Facility - A series of adjacent concrete structures located within the SSES Protected Area that contain spent fuel storage canisters.

50. JOINT INFORMATION CENTER - the designated location from which news releases, press conferences and other media interfacing can be provided.

51. LDE - Lens Dose Equivalent; the external exposure to the lens of the eye.

52. LOWER FLAMMABILITY LIMIT (LFL) - The minimum concentration of a combustible substance that is capable of propagating a flame through a homogenous mixture of the combustible and a gaseous oxidizer.

53. LUZERNE COUNTY EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY (LCEMA) - the host county emergency response coordinating agency, responsible for implementing off-site action upon either direct notification from the Susquehanna SES or from PEMA.

54. MONTHLY - occurring within the calendar month.

55. NORMAL PLANT OPERATIONS - activities at the plant site associated with routine testing, maintenance, or equipment operations, in accordance with normal operating or administrative procedures. Entry into abnormal or emergency operating procedures, or deviation from normal security or radiological controls posture, is a departure from NORMAL PLANT OPERATIONS.

56. NOTIFICATION OF UNUSUAL EVENT - Events are in process or have occurred which indicate a potential degradation of the level of safety of the plant or indicate a security threat to facility protection has been initiated. No releases of radioactive material requiring offsite response or monitoring are expected unless further degradation of safety systems occurs.

57. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (NRC) - within the context of this plan, the Federal agency responsible for verifying that appropriate emergency plans have been implemented and for conducting investigative activities associated with a radiological emergency.

58. OFF-SITE - any area outside the PPL Emergency Plan Boundary surrounding the Susquehanna SES.

59. OFF-SITE RADIOLOGICAL INCIDENT - any radiation incident affecting areas beyond the Emergency Plan boundary and posing a significant threat to public health and safety.

60. ON-SITE - the area within the EXCLUSION AREA boundary.

61. OPERATIONAL SUPPORT CENTER (OSC) - the primary on-site assembly area for operations support team personnel during the initial phase of an emergency. The primary OSC is not in the control structure but is located in an administrative building. In the event of a large radioactive release, the OSC may be relocated to the back-up OSC that is located in the control structure.

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Emergency Plan, Rev. 56, Page 12 of 312

62. OWNER CONTROLLED AREA - includes the area within the expanded security perimeter, i.e. the areas that are bordered by the Vehicle Barrier System. The OWNER CONTROLLED AREA encompasses the Monitored OWNER CONTROLLED AREA (MOCA) as defined in Security Procedures.

63. PENNSYLVANIA EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY (PEMA) - within the context of this plan, the lead state-agency for radiological emergency planning, response and recovery and for providing guidance to local government for development of radiological emergency plans and programs.

64. PLANT PROCEDURES - those procedures utilized by the plant operations staff to control and manipulate the plant under both normal and abnormal circumstances.

65. PPL SUSQUEHANNA, LLC - subsidiary company of PPL Corporation that owns and operates Susquehanna Steam Electric Station. The Emergency Plan will refer to this company as PPL.

66. PROTECTED AREA - the area within the station inner security fence (PROTECTED AREA Barrier) designated to implement the requirements of 10 CFR 73.

67. PROTECTIVE ACTION GUIDES (PAG) - the projected dose to reference personnel, or other defined individual, from an unplanned release of radioactive material at which a specific protective action to reduce or avoid that dose is recommended.

68. PROTECTIVE ACTIONS - those emergency measures taken for the purpose of preventing or minimizing radiological exposures.

69. QUARTERLY - occurring during the calendar quarter.

70. RADIATION DOSE - the quantity of radiation absorbed by the body or any portion of the body.

71. RADIATION MONITORING SYSTEM - an in-plant system consisting of ARMs, CAMs, and process monitors that contributes to personal protection, equipment monitoring, and accident assessment by measuring and recording radiation levels and concentrations at selected locations throughout the station. Reference Appendix D.

72. RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL - any solid, liquid, or gas which emits radiation spontaneously.

73. RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY RESPONSE TEAM - the response team from the Division of Radiological Health, State Board of Health, Pennsylvania Emergency Management Agency, and other State agencies, which will be dispatched to the scene of radiological emergencies. The team provides technical guidance and other services to local governments or an affected nuclear facility.

74. RADIOLOGICALLY CONTROLLED AREA (RCA) - any temporary or permanent area established by Health Physics, which is controlled for purposes of protection from exposure to radiation or radioactive materials. Typically, the Radiologically Controlled Area is defined by the outer perimeters of the Turbine, Reactor, and Radwaste Buildings, portions of the Control Structure, and portions of LLRWHF.

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Emergency Plan, Rev. 56, Page 13 of 312

75. RADIOLOGICALLY CONTROLLED AREA EVACUATION - evacuation of nonessential individuals from some or all of the Radiologically Controlled Area.

76. RECOVERY ACTIONS - those actions taken after the emergency to restore the plant as nearly as possible to its pre-emergency condition.

77. RECOVERY MANAGER - the PPL individual responsible for the management of emergency response activities in the EOF during an emergency at the Susquehanna Steam Electric Station.

78. REM (Acronym for roentgen equivalent man) - a unit of measure of radiation dose in biological tissue.

79. REMOTE ASSEMBLY AREA - a designated area, outside the exclusion area, for the assembly of evacuated plant personnel, if necessary, during a Site Evacuation. The Primary Remote Assembly Area is the Susquehanna Energy Information Center. The alternate assembly area is the West Building.

80. REMOTE MONITORING SYSTEM - fixed radiation detectors located near the site perimeter and mobile monitoring equipment to locate and assess elevated radiation levels.

81. ROUTE ALERTING TEAMS - a back-up to the siren system that is implemented, as necessary, in the event of siren failure or to alert persons or areas that may not be within the sound of the sirens. Route alerting is a municipal responsibility and is accomplished by municipal route alert teams traveling in vehicles along preplanned routes delivering the following message: 'There is an emergency at the Susquehanna Steam Electric Station; please tune to your Emergency Alert Station."

82. SDE - Shallow Dose Equivalent; external exposure of the skin or extremity which is measured at 0.007 cm in tissue.

83. SABOTAGE - is deliberate damage, mis-alignment, or mis-operation of plant equipment with the intent to render the equipment inoperable. Equipment found tampered with or damaged due to malicious mischief may NOT meet the definition of SABOTAGE until this determination is made by security supervision.

84. SAFE SHUTDOWN SYSTEMS/EQUIPMENT - consists of the following: Diesel Generators, HPCI, Core Spray, Standby Gas Treatment.System, RCIC, 4kV Safeguard Buses, ESW, ADS, RHR, RHRSW, Remote Shutdown Panels and DC Vital Buses.

85. SECURITY CONDITION - Any Security Event as listed in the approved security contingency plan that constitutes a threat/compromise to site security, threat/risk to site personnel, or a potential degradation to the level of safety of the plant. A SECURITY CONDITION does not involve a HOSTILE ACTION.

86. SHIFT MANAGER - the individual who acts in the capacity of Susquehanna Steam Electric Station emergency manager immediately upon concurrence of an emergency as described in the SSES Emergency Plan. The designation Shift Manager is synonymous with the designation Shift Supervisor and may be used interchangeably in the emergency plan. Both terms designate the same individual.

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Emergency Plan, Rev. 56, Page 14 of 312

87. SIGNIFICANT TRANSIENT - is an UNPLANNED event involving one or more of the following: (1) Reactor Re-circulation System runback involving a power reduction of over 25% thermal reactor power, (2) electrical load rejection >25% full electrical load, (3)

Reactor Trip, (4) ECCS Actuations, or (5) thermal power oscillations >10%.

88. SITE AREA EMERGENCY - Events are in process or have occurred which involve actual or likely major failures of plant functions needed for protection of the public or HOSTILE ACTION that results in intentional damage or malicious acts; (1) toward site personnel or equipment that could lead to the likely failure of or; (2) that prevent effective access to equipment needed for the protection of the public. Any releases are not expected to result in exposure levels that exceed EPA Protective Action Guideline exposure levels beyond the site boundary.

89. SITE BOUNDARY - that line, beyond which the land is not owned, leased or otherwise controlled by the licensee. (PPL drawing C243786, Sh 1, "Site Facilities and Boundary Map.")

90. SITE EVACUATION - evacuation of all non-essential personnel from the Exclusion Area.

91. STATE - the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania.

92. STATION ACCOUNTABILITY AREAS - areas designated for the gathering of individuals for the purpose of personnel accountability. Typically these are large areas with installed card readers to facilitate electronic accounting for personnel. Specific locations are defined in station procedures.

93. STRIKE ACTION - Is a work stoppage within the PROTECTED AREA by a body of workers to enforce compliance with demands made on SSES. The STRIKE ACTION must threaten to interrupt NORMAL PLANT OPERATIONS.

94. SUSTAINED HIGH WINDS - winds whose speed exceeds the specified value for greater than 1 minute. Wind gusts of shorter duration do not meet this criteria. SSES FSAR Section 3.3 '*Wind and Tornado Loadings specifies the 80mph design limit for SSES structures. FSAR Section 3.3.1.1 "Design Wind Velocity" references ASCE document:

'Wind Forces on Structures," ASCE paper No. 3269, Transaction Volume 126, Part II (1961), Pg. 1124. The ASCE paper provides guidance for the use of the term sustained when dealing with wind loadings of structures.

95. TECHNICAL SUPPORT CENTER - a designated on-site location where the conditions during and after an accident can be analyzed to provide technical and radiological assessments of the accident to the Emergency Director. In the event of certain hazards preventing site access or certain security related events, personnel who normally report to the Technical Support Center may report to the Emergency Operations Facility where arrangements will be made to accommodate TSC-specific functions not assumed by the EOF. The alternate TSC will be activated as soon as possible to support the site; however, it is recognized that the activation time for the alternate TSC may exceed 60 minutes.*

Letter dated February 25, 2002 from Samuel J. Collins, Director, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulations, to Robert G. Byram, Senior Vice President and Chief Nuclear Officer.

Subject:

Issuance of Order for Interim Safeguards and Security Compensatory Measures for - Susquehanna Steam Electric Station, Units 1 & 2.

Page 8 of 9

Emergency Plan, Rev. 56, Page 15 of 312

96. TEDE - Total Effective Dose Equivalent; integrated doses consisting of the sum of external doses from plume shine, 50 year committed effective dose equivalent from inhalation (CEDE), and 4 day ground shine doses.

97. THYROID DOSE - radiation exposure to the thyroid resulting from an intake of radioactive materials.

98. TRANSMISSION POWER DISPATCHER - individual manning the transmission and distribution system for PPL Corporation.

99. UNPLANNED - a parameter change or an event that is not the result of an intended evolution and requires corrective or mitigative action.

100. VALID - an indication, report, or condition is considered to be VALID when it is verified by (1) an instrument channel check, or (2) indications on related redundant indicators, or (3) by direct observation by plant personnel, such that doubt related to the indicator's operability, the condition's existence, or the report's accuracy is removed. Implicit in this definition is the need for timely assessment.

101. VISIBLE DAMAGE - is damage to equipment or structure that is readily observable without measurements, testing, or analysis. Damage is sufficient to cause concern regarding the continued operability or reliability of affected safety structure, system, or component. Example damage includes: deformation due to heat or impact, denting, penetration, rupture, cracking, paint blistering. Surface blemishes (e.g., paint chipping, scratches) should not be included.

102. VITAL AREAS - is any area, normally within the PROTECTED AREA, which contains equipment, systems, components, or material, the failure, destruction, or release of which could directly or indirectly endanger the public health and safety by exposure to radiation. Plant VITAL AREAS include the following: SCC, Control Structure, Diesel Generator Buildings, ESSW Pump House, Spray Pond and Reactor Buildings.

103. WHOLE BODY EXPOSURE - direct radiation exposure to the body from external sources.

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Emergency Plan, Rev. 56, Page 16 of 312 2.1 ANS - Alert Notification System 2.2 ARI - Alternate Rod Insertion 2.3 ARM - Area Radiation Monitors 2.4 ASCC - Alternate Security Control Center 2.5 CAM - Continuous Air Monitors 2.6 CCEMA - Columbia County Emergency Management Agency 2.7 CEDE - Committed Effective Dose Equivalent 2.8 CR- Control Room 2.9 CREOASS - Control Room Emergency Outside Air Supply System 2.10 CSAR Certified Safety Analysis Report 2.11 CTN- Centrex Telephone Network 2.12 DAC- Derived Air Concentration 2.13 DCS- Document Control Services 2.14 DEP/BRP - Department of Environmental Protection/Bureau of Radiological Protectiol 2.15 DHS - FEMA Department of Homeland Security - Federal Emergency Management Agency 2.16 DOE- U.S. Department of Energy 2.17 EAL- Emergency Action Levels 2.18 EAS- Emergency Alert System 2.19 ECCS - Emergency Core Cooling Systems 2.20 ED- Emergency Director at Susquehanna SES 2.21 EDE- Effective Dose Equivalent 2.22 EMA- Emergency Management Agency 2.23 EMC- Emergency Management Coordinator (Municipality) 2.24 EOC- Emergency Operations Center 2.25 EOF- Emergency Operations Facility 2.26 EP- Emergency Plan of Susquehanna SES 2.27 EPA- Environmental Protection Agency 2.28 EP-PS - Emergency Plan Position Specific Procedures 2.29 EPZ- Emergency Planning Zone 2.30 ERDS - Emergency Response Data System 2.31 ERF- Emergency Response Facility 2.32 ETN- Electronic Tandem Network 2.33 FPC- Fuel Pool Cooling 2.34 FRC- Federal Response Coordinator 2.35 FRERP - Federal Radiological Emergency Response Plan 2.36 FRMAC - Federal Radiological Monitoring and Assessment Center 2.37 FSAR- Susquehanna SES Final Safety Analysis Report, Units 1 and 2 2.38 FTS- Federal Telecommunications System 2.39 HHS- Health and Human Services 2.40 HPCI - High Pressure Coolant Injection System 2.41 JIC - Joint Information Center 2.42 LCEMA - Luzerne County Emergency Management Agency 2.43 LCO- Limiting Condition for Operation 2.44 LER- License Event Report 2.45 LLRWHF - Low Level Radwaste Holding Facility Page 1 of 2

Emergency Plan, Rev. 56, Page 17 of 312 2.46 LOCA - Loss of Coolant Accident 2.47 MOCA - Monitored Owner Controlled Area 2.48 MIDAS - Meteorological Information and Dose Assessment System 2.49 MSIV - Main Steam Isolation Valve 2.50 MSL - Main Steam Line 2.51 NEP - Nuclear Emergency Planning 2.52 NERO - Nuclear Emergency Response Organization at PPL 2.53 NRC - Nuclear Regulatory Commission 2.54 NRP - National Response Plan 2.55 NSSS - Nuclear Steam Supply System 2.56 ODCM - Offsite Dose Calculation Manual 2.57 OSC - Operations Support Center 2.58 PAGS - Protective Action Guides from EPA 2.59 PASS - Post Accident Sampling System 2.60 PEMA - Pennsylvania Emergency Management Agency 2.61 PICSY - Plant Integrated Computer System, synonymous with Plant Process Computer (PPC) or R*TIME 2.62 PORC - Plant Operations Review Committee 2.63 PPL - PPL Susquehanna, LLC (subsidiary company of PPL Corporation) 2.64 PSP - Pennsylvania State Police 2.65 RCA - Radiologically Controlled Area 2.66 RCIC - Reactor Core Isolation Cooling 2.67 RDAS - Remote Data Analysis System 2.68 RHR - Residual Heat Removal 2.69 RMS - Remote Monitoring System 2.70 RPS - Reactor Protection System 2.71 Rx- Reactor 2.72 SCC - Security Control Center 2.73 SDE - Shallow Dose Equivalent 2.74 SDS - Satellite Display System 2.75 SEIC - Susquehanna Energy Information Center 2.76 SGTS - Standby Gas Treatment System 2.77 SLC - Standby Liquid Control 2.78 SOCA - Security Owner Controlled Area 2.79 SPDS - Safety Parameter Display System 2.80 SPINGs - System Particulate, Iodine, and Noble Gas Monitor (Vent Monitoring System) 2.81 SRC - Susquehanna Review Committee 2.82 SSE - Safe Shutdown Earthquake 2.83 SSES - Susquehanna Steam Electric Station 2.84 TEDE - Total Effective Dose Equivalent 2.85 TR- Temperature Recorder 2.86 TSC - Technical Support Center 2.87 UMC - Unit Monitoring Console (PCS) 2.88 UPS - Uninterruptible Power Supply 2.89 USDA - United States Department of Agriculture Page 2 of 2

Emergency Plan, Rev. 56, Page 18 of 312 7 . ftMCES 3.1 Columbia County Radiological Emergency Response Plan to Nuclear Power Plant Incidents.

3.2 DEP/BRP Emergency Plan - Bureau of Radiation Protection "Plan for Nuclear Power Generating Station Incidents".

3.3 NRC Generic Letter 91-14, "Emergency Telecommunications".

3.4 Luzerne County Radiological Emergency Response Plan to Nuclear Power Plant Incidents.

3.5 NUREG 0654/FEMA-REP Criteria for Preparation and Evaluation of Radiological Emergency Response Plans and Preparedness In Support of Nuclear Power Plants.

3.6 NUREG 0696 - Final Report - Functional Criteria for Emergency Response Facilities.

3.7 NUREG 0737 - Clarification of TMI Action Plan Requirements.

3.8 NUREG 1392 - Emergency Response Data System Implementation.

3.9 PEMA Emergency Plan - Annex E to Commonwealth of Pennsylvania "Disaster Operations Plan", Nuclear Incidents (Fixed Facility).

3.10 Susquehanna SES Emergency Plan Position Specific Procedures.

3.11 Susquehanna SES Letters of Agreement with off-site emergency organizations (Appendix A).

3.12 Susquehanna SES Physical Security Plan.

3.13 Susquehanna SES Plant Procedures.

3.14 10CFR Part 50 - Domestic Licensing of Production and Utilization Facilities.

3.15 Design of the Siren Alerting System for the Susquehanna Steam Electric Station: Final Report.

3.16 SSES Preparedness, Prevention and Contingency Plan.

3.17 EPA 400-R-91-001 - Manual of Protective Action Guides and Protective Actions for Nuclear Incidents.

3.18 NEI 99-01 Revision 4, "Methodology for Development of Emergency Action Levels".

3.19 NRC Letter dated April 17,1996, MOVING THE EOF TO THE NORTHEAST DIVISION HEADQUARTERS (TAC NOS. M91377 AND M91378), Docket Nos. 50-387/50-412.

Page 1 of 2

Emergency Plan, Rev. 56, Page 19 of 312 3.20 Letter dated February 25, 2002 from Samuel J. Collins, Director, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulations, to Robert G. Byram, Senior Vice President and Chief Nuclear Officer.

Subject:

Issuance of Order for Interim Safeguards and Security Compensatory Measures for - Susquehanna Steam Electric Station, Units 1 & 2.

3.21 Susquehanna SES Security Training and Qualifications Plan.

3.22 Regulatory Guide 1.101 Emergency Planning and Preparedness for Nuclear Power Reactors (Revision 3, August 1992).

3.23 NRC Bulletin 2005-02 Emergency Preparedness and Response Actions for Security Based Events July 18, 2005.

3.24 Regulatory Issue Summary 2004-15, Supplement 1, Emergency Preparedness Issues:

Post-9/1 1.

3.25 EC 690275/AR 850156, Extended Power Uprate (EPU) Impact Evaluation.

3.26 NEI 03-12, Template for Security Plan and Training and Qualification Plan, June 2004.

Page 2 of 2

Emergency Plan, Rev. 56, Page 20 of 312 SSES includes two boiling water reactor electrical generating units. The station is located in Salem Township, Luzerne County, in east central Pennsylvania, about five miles northeast of Berwick, Pennsylvania (see Figure 4.1). This Emergency Plan applies to the operation of Unit 1 and Unit 2.

4.1 SCOPE This Plan provides guidance for both on-site and off-site emergency situations. It ranges in scope from relatively minor events and occurrences involving small releases of radioactive material, up to and including a major nuclear emergency having significant off-site radiological consequences. This Plan, together with the state, county, and municipal radiological emergency response plans, provides detailed guidance and direction for taking emergency measures by the NERO to ensure the health and safety of the public living within the 10-mile EPZ of SSES. Additional guidance is provided in state and county plans for ingestion pathway preventive measures out to 50 miles (see Figure 4.2).

Additional guidance on specific emergency actions for non-radiological releases of hazardous materials can be found in the SSES Preparedness, Prevention, and Contingency Plan.

4.2 CONTENTS 4.2.1 Classification This Plan provides for a graded response for distinct classifications of emergency conditions, action within those classifications, and criteria for escalation to another classification. This classification system is also used by PEMA, DEP/BRP, LCEMA, AND CCEMA. This system is covered in Section 5.0.

4.2.2 Orgqanization Control The PPL organization for control of emergencies begins with the on-shift station personnel and contains provisions for augmentation and extension to include other station personnel, PPL corporate personnel, and outside emergency response organizations.

The total emergency program includes the support of state, federal and local emergency organizations. Detailed provisions are made for implementing protective measures against direct radiation exposure for the public within a radius of at least ten miles from the SSES. Additional preventive measures may be taken beyond that distance to preclude ingestion pathway exposures.

Specific agreements are also made with local off-site support organizations to provide fire fighting, medical, law enforcement, and traffic control services.

State, County, and Federal agencies have lead responsibilities specifically related to this Plan.

Organizational control is covered in Section 6.0.

Page 1 of 2

Emergency Plan, Rev. 56, Page 21 of 312 4.2.3 Emergency Measures The mechanisms through which this Plan provides for the proper response to emergency conditions at SSES include identification of the event, initial and ongoing assessment, and initial and ongoing emergency actions.

Emergency actions include classification of event, completion of notifications, activation of onsite and offsite NERO, requests for offsite assistance, implementing onsite protective actions, recommending offsite protective actions, and activation of the restoration organization. These mechanisms are discussed in Section 7.0.

4.2.4 Emergency Facilities Emergency facilities and equipment are provided to ensure the capabilities for prompt, efficient assessment and control of situations over the entire spectrum of probable and postulated emergency conditions.

The facilities and associated equipment and their emergency functions are described in Section 8.0.

4.2.5 Emergency Training A concept of in-depth preparedness is employed regarding the SSES emergency preparedness program. This concept is emphasized in the training program and in preparedness drills and exercises. Personnel are trained to provide an in-depth response capability for required actions in an emergency situation. Section 9.0 includes the means to achieve and maintain preparedness and to ensure maintenance of an effective emergency program.

Page 2 of 2

Emergency Plan, Rev. 56, Page 22 ot 312 SUSQUEHANNA STEAM ELECTRIC STATION UNITS 1 AND 2 MAP OF SUSQUEHANNA SES Miles VICINITY 0 1.5 3 6 9 12 FIGURE 4.1 fln-dn 4 -fl I

Emergency Plan, Rev. 56, Page 23 ot 312 SSES 50 Mile Buffer Dn n rf I

Emergency Plan, Rev. 56, Page 24 of 312 5.1 CLASSIFICATION SYSTEM Emergency conditions are grouped into four classifications that cover the entire spectrum of probable and postulated accidents. These classifications are Notification of Unusual Event, Alert, Site Area Emergency, and General Emergency. Action level criteria are specified for determining and declaring each emergency classification.

Planning is coordinated with State and county agencies to ensure that this classification system is compatible with the system used by those agencies. The system provides for notification of appropriate emergency response organizations and for implementation of actions immediately applicable to a specific condition. Provisions are included for upgrading the classification level and the corresponding response in the event of a change in the emergency condition.

Recognition and action level criteria are based on readily available information such as Control Room instrumentation. Immediate actions for response to conditions involving plant operating parameters, such as Technical Specification Limiting Conditions for Operation (LCOs), are detailed in the Plant Procedures.

The emergency classification system, initiating conditions, and EAL thresholds for each initiating condition are defined in Tables R, F, M, 0, E and C. This table demonstrates how an initiating condition leads directly to the appropriate emergency classification based on the magnitude of the event. In many cases, the proper classification is immediately apparent from in-plant instrumentation. In other cases, more extensive assessment is necessary to determine the applicable emergency classification.

Continuing reassessment is required to ensure that the classification is consistent with the conditions. The emergency actions that will be taken for each of the four emergency classifications are shown in Table 5.2.

5.1.1 Notification of Unusual Event Events are in process or have occurred which indicate a potential degradation of the level of safety of the plant or indicate a security threat to facility protection has been initiated. No releases of radioactive material requiring offsite response or monitoring are expected unless further degradation of safety systems occurs.

Conditions that constitute a Notification of Unusual Event classification are outlined in Tables R, F, M, 0, E and C.

The ED declares a Notification of Unusual Event within 15 minutes of having information necessary to make a declaration.

Page 1 of 9

Emergency Plan, Rev. 56, Page 25 of 312 The emergency actions that will be taken by PPL and offsite agencies for an unusual event are listed in Table 5.2. In general the table states that the plant emergency management personnel and offsite agencies will be notified by plant staff if a Notification of Unusual Event is declared. Plant staff will request assistance as necessary to disseminate information, make critical decisions and resolve the unusual event.

5.1.2 Alert Events are in process or have occurred which involve an actual or potential substantial degradation of the level of safety of the plant or a security event that involves probable life threatening risk to site personnel or damage to site equipment because of intentional malicious dedicated efforts of HOSTILE ACTION. Any releases are expected to be limited to small fractions of the EPA Protective Action Guideline exposure levels.

Conditions that constitute an Alert classification are outlined in Tables R, F, M, 0 and C.

The ED or Recovery Manager declares an Alert within 15 minutes of having information necessary to make a declaration.

The emergency actions that will be taken by PPL and offsite agencies for an Alert are listed in Table 5.2. In general the actions will be similar to a Notification of Unusual Event but will also include the dispatch of monitoring teams if a radioactive release is involved.

5.1.3 Site Area Emerqency Events are in process or have occurred which involve actual or likely major failures of plant functions needed for protection of the public or HOSTILE ACTION that results in intentional damage or malicious acts; (1) toward site personnel or equipment that could lead to the likely failure of or; (2) that prevent effective access to equipment needed for the protection of the public. Any releases are not expected to result in exposure levels that exceed EPA Protective Action Guideline exposure levels beyond the site boundary.

Conditions that constitute a Site Area Emergency are outlined in Tables R, F, M, 0 and C.

The ED or Recovery Manager declares a Site Area Emergency within 15 minutes of having information necessary to make a declaration.

The emergency actions taken by PPL and offsite agencies for a Site Area Emergency are listed in Table 5.2. In general, the actions will be similar to the actions taken for an Alert with increased emphasis on information dissemination, more senior technical and management staff in the emergency response facilities, and additional field radiological monitoring.

Page 2 of 9

Emergency Plan, Rev. 56, Page 26 of 312 5.1.4 General Emergency Events are in process or have occurred which involve actual or imminent substantial core degradation or melting with potential for loss of containment integrity or HOSTILE ACTION that results in an actual loss of physical control of the facility. Releases can be reasonably expected to exceed EPA Protective Action Guideline exposure levels offsite for more than the immediate site area.

Total activation of the onsite and offsite emergency organizations is required for such events. Actions involving offsite populations are probable. Conditions that constitute a General Emergency are outlines in Tables R, F, M, 0 and C.

The ED or Recovery Manager declares a General Emergency within 15 minutes of having information necessary to make a declaration.

The emergency actions taken by PPL and offsite agencies for a General Emergency are listed in Table 5.2. In general the actions will be similar to the actions taken for a Site Area Emergency with additional resources dedicated to the health and safety of the general public. Additional actions include the initiation of predetermined protective actions for the public.

5.2 SPECTRUM OF POSTULATED ACCIDENTS The classification and corresponding protective actions relative to significant emergency conditions are based primarily on the resultant or potential radiation doses. Methods are described in this Plan and in EP Procedures for measuring, projecting and evaluating those doses.

The discrete accidents addressed in this section are those which are defined in the SSES FSAR as "design basis accidents" resulting in off-site dose consequences and accidents involving the spent fuel storage facility (ISFSI). The following discussion of these postulated accidents and Tables R, F, M, 0, E and C identify the instrumentation and other mechanisms for prompt detection and continued assessment, and demonstrates how each accident is encompassed within the emergency classification system of this Plan. When an event also involves elevated off-site radiological consequences or other specific conditions, the event classification will be adjusted to reflect actual conditions.

5.2.1 Control Rod Drop Accident This accident is described in FSAR Section 15.4.9 and is postulated to occur with the reactor in hot startup condition, and very conservative calculations indicate failure of fuel rods. The main steam line radiation monitors detect the significant increase in activity and initiate an alarm to alert operations personnel. Operations personnel would then validate the alarm condition, manually SCRAM the reactor and initiate closure of the main steam isolation valves (MSIV) and isolation of the main condenser.

During the MSIV closing time period, noble gases and radioiodines are transported with the steam to the condenser. Release of radioactivity to the environment is by way of leakage from the turbine building.

Page 3 of 9.

Emergency Plan, Rev. 56, Page 27 of 312 Initial assessment of this accident, performed by the Control Room Personnel under the direction of the ED includes evaluation of radiation levels. Data are direct radiation levels at the locations of various turbine building ARMs, and an indication of the airborne radioactivity concentration from the turbine building vent exhaust monitor. EP-Procedures provide guidance for dose projections based on radiation readings. Data from the Turbine Building vent exhaust monitors is supplemented by information obtained by the radiological monitoring team.

The emergency actions include:

a) Evaluate Emergency Action Levels per Tables R, F, M, 0 and C b) Declare the appropriate classification as warranted c) Implement Radiologically Controlled Area Evacuation 5.2.2 Fuel Handling This accident is described in FSAR Section 15.7.4 and is postulated to occur with the reactor in shutdown condition with the vessel head removed and results in fuel failure. The reactor building ventilation exhaust duct radiation monitoring system alarms, isolates the ventilation system, and starts operation of the Standby Gas Treatment System (SGTS). Noble gases and radioiodines are released to the fuel pool, migrate to the secondary containment, and are released to the environment after filtration through the SGTS.

Initial assessment of this accident includes the performance of dose projections in accordance with EP-PSs. Dose projections utilize data from the reactor building vent monitor, standby gas treatment vent monitor, and meteorological instrumentation.

The emergency actions include:

a) Evaluate Emergency Action Levels per Tables R, F, M, 0 and C b) Declare the appropriate classification as warranted c) Implement Radiologically Controlled Area Evacuation 5.2.3 Main Steam Line Break This accident is described in FSAR Section 15.6.4 and is postulated to occur with the reactor in operating status. The steam line break occurs outside the containment and releases steam until complete closure of the MSIVs. Noble gases and radioiodines in the coolant are assumed to be released directly to the environment.

Page 4 of 9

Emergency Plan, Rev. 56, Page 28 of 312 The initial assessment of this event includes the performance of dose projections. An estimate of the resultant doses can be made and compared to those shown in Table 15.6-9 of the FSAR for worst case conditions. Actual doses are proportional to the fission product activity in the steam, as monitored by the off-gas release rate, prior to the accident.

The doses in Table 15.6-9 of the FSAR are based on the assumption that the off-gas release rate is at the upper limiting condition for operation.

Actual dose estimates, and corresponding emergency actions, may be taken, based on the off-gas release rate prior to the accident.

Consideration may also be given to the relative benefit from taking or not taking specific protective action, based on the short-term duration of exposure associated with this accident.

The emergency actions include:

a) Evaluate Emergency Action Levels per Tables R, F, M, 0 and C b) Declare the appropriate classification as warranted c) Implement Radiologically Controlled Area Evacuation 5.2.4 Instrument Line Break This accident is described in the FSAR section 15.6.2 and is a circumferential rupture of an instrument line connected to the primary coolant system postulated to occur outside the primary containment but inside the secondary containment. This failure results in the release of primary system coolant to the secondary containment, until the reactor is depressurized. Operator recognition of the accident is by a combination of alarms or abnormal readings or by comparison of radiation, temperature, humidity, fluid and noise readings with several instruments monitoring the same process variable such as reactor level, jet pump flow, steam flow, and steam pressure.

Design Basis analysis shows that the event analyzed in Subsection 15.6.5 is bounding. The following describes a realistic analysis of the event. The iodine concentration prior to the break is assumed to be 0.2 micro-curies/gram dose equivalent 1-131, which is the maximum equilibrium concentration for continued full-power operation permitted by the Technical Specifications. All of the iodine activity in the steam from the flashed liquid and steam from the steam dome and 10 percent from the remaining liquid released from the break are assumed to become airborne. A plateout factor of 2 is assumed for airborne iodine inside secondary containment. Although there will be some activation and corrosion products released the isotopes of primary importance are the iodine isotopes.

The emergency actions include:

a) Evaluate Emergency Action Levels per Tables R, F, M, 0 and C Page 5 of 9

Emergency Plan, Rev. 56, Page 29 of 312 b) Declare the appropriate classification as warranted c) Implement Radiologically Controlled Area Evacuation 5.2.5 Loss of Coolant Accident (LOCA)

This accident is described in FSAR Section 15.6.5 and is postulated to involve a complete circumferential break of a recirculating loop pipe inside the primary containment, with the reactor operating at full power. The accident results in release of a significant quantity of fission products into the primary containment, leakage into the secondary containment, and release to the environment through the SGTS. Containment failure, although not likely, must be considered possible.

The occurrence of a design basis LOCA is uniquely identified by low-low reactor water level and high drywell pressure signals from the reactor protection system sensors and high radiation signal from the containment accident radiation monitor(s). A reactor scram and MSIV closure occur.

Operation of the emergency core cooling system is initiated.

The radiological exposures resulting from the activity released to the environment as a consequence of the LOCA have been determined for the realistic and design basis cases. The design basis and realistic LOCA doses are presented in FSAR Table 15.6-18. The radiological exposure of the Control Room personnel for the design basis case is given in Table 15.6-21.

The emergency actions include:

a) Evaluate Emergency Action Levels per Tables R, F, M, 0 and C b) Declare the appropriate classification as warranted c) Implement Radiologically Controlled Area Evacuation 5.2.6 Off-Gas Treatment System Failure This accident is described in FSAR Section 15.7.1.1 and is postulated to be initiated by an occurrence such as earthquake (greater than design basis), explosion, or fire. The accident results in release of the stored inventory of radionuclides in the system including that contained in the charcoal adsorption beds. In addition to recognition of the initiating event, the operator is provided with recognition and assessment information from alarmed instrumentation such as ARMs and vent radiation monitors.

The emergency actions include:

a) Evaluate Emergency Action Levels per Tables R, F, M, 0 and C b) Declare the appropriate classification as warranted c) Implement Radiologically Controlled Area Evacuation Page 6 of 9

Emergency Plan, Rev. 56, Page 30 of 312 5.2.7 Air Eiector Line Failure This accident is described in FSAR Section 15.7.1.3 and is postulated to result from a seismic event more serious than the system is designed to withstand. The noble gas and radioiodine activity from the air ejector, which is normally processed by the off-gas treatment system, is discharged to the environment via the turbine building ventilation system.

The accident is recognized by the off-gas system loss of flow indication and ARMs. Assessment of the severity includes evaluation of the off-gas activity release rate prior to the accident and results of on-site monitoring.

The emergency actions include:

a) Evaluate Emergency Action Levels per Tables R, F, M, 0 and C b) Declare the appropriate classification as warranted c) Implement Radiologically Controlled Area Evacuation 5.2.8 Liquid Radwaste Failure This accident is described in FSAR Section 15.7.3 and is postulated to be a rupture of the RWCU phase separator in the radwaste enclosure.

Airborne radioactivity released during the accident passes directly to the environment via the turbine building vent. A high water level alarm on the radwaste building sump alarms and activates the sump pumps.

Radwaste building ARMs and on-site monitoring provides data for assessing the magnitude of the radiological consequences.

The emergency actions include:

a) Evaluate Emergency Action Levels per Tables R, F, M, 0 and C b) Declare the appropriate classification as warranted c) Implement Radiologically Controlled Area Evacuation 5.2.9 Recirculation Pump Seizure This accident is described in FSAR Section 15.3.3 and is postulated to result in the nearly instantaneous stoppage of the pump motor shaft of one of the recirculation pumps to occur with the reactor in operating status. As a result of the very rapid decrease in core flow in response to the large hydraulic resistance produced by the stopped pump impeller, a resulting level swell in the reactor may initiate a trip of the main and feedwater turbines, a scram due to stop valve closure, and a trip of the recirculation pumps.

Page 7 of 9

Emergency Plan, Rev. 56, Page 31 of 312 Fuel damage is not expected for the pump seizure accident for either two loop or single loop operation. Any rods that experience boiling transition may be conservatively postulated to fail and potentially causing an Emergency Plan entry per the fuel cladding degradation Emergency Action Level. The radioactivity released from the fuel is transported into the steam line and is released to the environment via leakage from the condenser.

The occurrence of recirculation pump seizure is identified by the indication of recirculation flow loss and pump differential pressure in the control room.

The emergency actions include:

a) Evaluate Emergency Action Levels per Tables R, F, M, 0 and C b) Declare the appropriate classification as warranted 5.2.10 Feedwater Line Break - Outside Containment This accident is described in FSAR Section 15.6.6 and is postulated to be an instantaneous, circumferential break of the largest feedwater line outside of containment. The break releases coolant to the turbine building until the feedwater line check valves isolate the reactor from the feedwater system. The reactor will scram on low water level. At low-low water level, RCIC and HPCI initiate and maintain reactor water level above the low-low-low level trip point and eventually restore the reactor water level to its normal elevation.

There is no fuel damage as a result of this accident scenario.

Radioactivity will be released from the feedwater piping prior to isolation of the break location. Activity concentrations are the same as those found in the main condenser hotwell. Activity release will occur through flashing and partitioning into the turbine building atmosphere, and then to the environment through the turbine building ventilation system.

The estimated activity released to the environment for the worst case condition is shown in FSAR Table 15.6-25. Actual doses are proportional to the fission product activity in the coolant. Fission product activity can be determined from coolant grab samples or off-gas grab samples. Area Radiation Monitors, Main Steam Line Radiation Monitors, or Off-Gas radiation monitors may also indicate fission product activity.

The emergency actions include:

a) Evaluate Emergency Action Levels per Tables R, F, M, 0 and C b) Declare the appropriate classification as warranted c) Implement Radiologically Controlled Area Evacuation.

Page 8 of 9

Emergency Plan, Rev. 56, Page 32 of 312 5.2.11 Accidents Affecting Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation as described in the CSAR The design basis accidents postulated to affect the Dry Fuel Storage System include:

• Reduced Horizontal Storage Module air inlet and outlet shielding

• Natural phenomena events as defined in the CSAR

• Accidental transfer cask drop with loss of neutron shield

• Lightning effects

• Debris blockage of Horizontal Storage Module air inlet and outlet opening

• Postulated Dry Cask Storage leakage

• Pressurization due to fuel cladding failure within the Dry Cask Storage The consequences of the postulated accidents are as specified in the CSAR. Impact of the postulated accidents would be detected by radiological monitoring during transport and storage of spent fuel.

a) Evaluate Emergency Action levels per Table E.

b) Declaration of a Notification of Unusual Event as warranted.

c) Implement recovery actions.

Page 9 of 9

Emergency Plan, Rev. 56, Page 51 of 312 TABLE 5.2 EMERGENCY ACTIONS BASED ON CLASSIFICATION Page 1 of 7 Classification ] Licensee Actions I Off-Site Agency Actions

1. Notification of Unusual Event 1. Promptly notify plant emergency 1. Notify key officials and public if deemed management personnel of event particulars necessary by county/state Emergency Class Description and an assessment of safety significance of Director.

the event.

Events are in process or have and occurred which indicate a and potential degradation of the level 2. Provide assistance if requested and able.

of safety of the plant or indicate a 2. Notify PEMA, LCEMA, CCEMA and NRC of security threat to facility "Unusual Event".

protection has been initiated. No releases of radioactive material Under certain security-related events, such as requiring offsite response or a site-specific credible threat, the TSC and monitoring are expected unless EOF will be activated at the Unusual Event further degradation of safety level.*

systems occurs.

and Purpose

3. Closeout event with verbal summary to Purpose of offsite notification is to offsite authorities (PEMA, LCEMA, CCEMA, (1) assure that the first step in and NRC) followed by written summary if any response later found to be required by 10 CFR 50.73.

necessary has been carried out, (2) bring the operating staff to a or state of readiness, and (3) provide systematic handling of 4. Escalate to higher emergency classification if unusual events information and appropriate.

decision-making.

• Letter dated February 25, 2002 from Samuel J. Collins, Director, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulations, to Robert G. Byram, Senior Vice President and Chief Nuclear Officer.

Subject:

Issuance of Order for Interim Safeguards and Security Compensatory Measures for - Susquehanna Steam Electric Station, Units 1 & 2.

n- - - -.7

Emergency Plan, Rev. 56, Page 52 of 312 TABLE 5.2 EMERGENCY ACTIONS BASED ON CLASSIFICATION Page 2 of 7 Classification j Licensee Actions ] Off-Site Agency Actions

2. Alert 1. Promptly notify state/local authorities and 1. Provide assistance, if requested and able.

NRC of Alert status and reason for alert.

Class Description and and Events are in process or have 2. Augment resources by activating EOC and occurred which involve an actual 2. Promptly notify PPL emergency any other primary response centers.

or potential substantial degradation management personnel of event particulars of the level of safety of the plant or and an assessment of the safety significance and a security event that involves of the event.

probable life threatening risk to site 3. Alert to Standby status key emergency personnel or damage to site and personnel including monitoring teams and equipment because of HOSTILE associated communications.

ACTION. Any releases are 3. Activate TSC and OSC, and dispatch expected to be limited to small monitoring team if radioactive effluent and fractions of the EPA Protective release involved.

Action Guideline exposure levels. 4. Prepare to provide confirmatory off-site and radiation monitoring and ingestion Purpose pathway dose projections if actual

4. Provide a dedicated individual for plant releases substantially exceed technical Purpose of offsite alert is to (1) status updates to offsite authorities and specification limits.

assure that emergency personnel periodic press briefings.

are readily available to respond if and situation becomes more serious or and to perform confirmatory radiation 5. Maintain alert status until verbal closeout.

monitoring if required, and (2) 5. Activate the Emergency Response Data provide offsite authorities current System (ERDS) within one hour. or status information.

and 6. Escalate to a more severe class.

_- r^ . -7

Emergency Plan, Rev. 56, Page 53 of 312 TABLE 5.2 EMERGENCY ACTIONS BASED ON CLASSIFICATION Page 3 of 7 Classification Licensee Actions Off-Site Agency Actions

2. Alert (continued) 6. Closeout or recommend reduction in emergency class by verbal summary to offsite authorities followed by written summary if required by 10 CFR 50.73.

or

7. Escalate to a more severe emergency class.

f% -. C ý

Emergency Plan, Rev. 56, Page 54 of 312 TABLE 5.2 EMERGENCY ACTIONS BASED ON CLASSIFICATION I

Page 4 of 7 Classification f Licensee Actions [ Off-Site Agency Actions

3. Site Area Emergency 1. Promptly inform off-site authorities of site 1. Provide, if able, any assistance required.

emergency status and reason for Class Description emergency, if known. and Events are in process or have and 2. Augment resources by activating primary occurred which involve actual or emergency response centers.

likely major failures of plant 2. Augment resources by activating TSC, OSC functions needed for protection of and EOF and near-site/off-site monitoring and the public or HOSTILE ACTION teams.

that results in intentional damage 3. Assure that systems for public notification or malicious acts; (1) toward site and of emergency status are in standby and personnel or equipment that could initiate preparation for subsequent public lead to the likely failure of or; (2) 3. Dispatch monitoring teams and associated periodic updates.

that prevent effective access to communications for instances where equipment needed for the radiation releases appear imminent or have and protection of the public. Any occurred.

releases are not expected to result 4. Alert to standby status other emergency in exposure levels that exceed and personnel and dispatch personnel to duty EPA Protective Action Guideline stations.

exposure levels beyond the site 4. Provide a dedicated individual for plant boundary. status updates to off-site authorities and and periodic press briefings.

Purpose 5. Provide off-site monitoring results to and licensee and others and jointly assess Purpose of the site area them.

emergency declaration is to (1) 5. Make senior technical and management staff assure that response centers are in the EOF available for consultation with and manned, (2) assure that monitoring NRC and state on a periodic basis.

teams are dispatched, (3) assure that personnel required for and evacuation of near-site areas are at duty stations if situation becomes more serious, (4) provide consultation with offsite authorities, and (5) provide updates for the public throuqh offsite authorities.

. r)--- A -4t -7

.1. __________________________________________________ L

Emergency Plan, Rev. 56, Page 55 of 312 TABLE 5.2 EMERGENCY ACTIONS BASED ON CLASSIFICATION Page 5 of 7 Classification L Licensee Actions Off-Site Agency Actions

3. Site Area Emergency (Continued) 6. Provide meteorological and dose estimates 6. Continuously assess information from to off-site authorities for actual releases via a licensee and off-site monitoring with dedicated individual or automated data regard to changes to protective actions transmission. already initiated for public and mobilizing evacuation resources.

and and

7. Provide release and dose projections based on available plant condition information and 7. Recommend placing milk animals within foreseeable contingencies. affected area radius on stored feed and assess need to extend distance.

and and

8. Close out or recommend reduction in emergency class by briefing of off-site 8. Provide press briefings.

authorities at EOF by phone followed by written summary if required by 10 CFR and 50.73.

9. Maintain site emergency status until close or out or reduction of emergency class.

9. Escalate to General Emergency class, or

10. Escalate to General Emergency class.

rn --- - 7

Emergency Plan, Rev. 56, Page 56 of 312 TABLE 5.2 EMERGENCY ACTIONS BASED ON CLASSIFICATION Page 6 of 7 Classification [ Licensee Actions ] Off-Site Agency Actions

4. General Emergency 1. Same as for "Site Area Emergency" 1. Provide requested assistance, if able.

classification.

Class Description and and Events are in process or have 2. Recommend protective actions for 10-mile occurred which involve actual or 2. Make a Protective Action Recommendation EPZ population and 50 mile EPZ imminent substantial core to the state based on an assessment of plant agricultural products.

degradation or melting with conditions and/or dose projections.

potential for loss of containment and integrity or HOSTILE ACTION that Note: The initial recommendations may be results in an actual loss of physical modified on the basis of subsequent plant 3. Dispatch key emergency personnel control of the facility. Releases can status assessments or dose projections. including monitoring teams and associated be reasonably expected to exceed communications.

EPA Protective Action Guideline exposure levels offsite for more and than the immediate site area.

4. Activate other emergency services Purpose personnel and dispatch to duty stations.

Purpose of the general emergency and declaration is to (1) initiate predetermined protective actions 5. Provide off-site monitoring results to PPL for the public, (2) provide and jointly assess these.

continuous assessment of information from licensee and and offsite organization measurements, (3) initiate additional measures as 6. Continuously assess information from indicated by actual or potential licensee and field-monitoring teams with releases, (4) provide consultation regard to changes to protective actions with offsite authorities and (5) already initiated for public and evacuation provide updates for the public resources.

through offsite authorities.

and rn -- r - Z-7

Emergency Plan, Rev. 56, Page 57 of 3 -1 TABLE 5.2 EMERGENCY ACTIONS BASED ON CLASSIFICATION Page 7 of 7 Classification Licensee Actions Off-Site Agency Actions

4. General Emergency (Continued) 7. Maintain General Emergency status until closeout or reduction of emergency classification.

Emergency Plan, Rev. 56, Page 58 of 312 PPL's Emergency Plan is based upon a four-phase approach to accident response and mitigation.

Phase I - Immediate Response (Reference Table 6.1.) Phase I consists of identification of the emergency condition, initiation of prompt corrective action and initiation of prompt notification to local, state and federal agencies as well as appropriate members of PPL's NERO. This initial phase is implemented by the on-shift organization. The on-shift organization has been staffed and trained to be capable of both safely operating the units and quickly and effectively responding to an emergency condition. Initially, the Shift Manager, the highest ranking management individual on-shift, will assume the role of Emergency Director and retain that role until relieved of that responsibility by the on-call Emergency Director.

The Shift Manager, as Emergency Director:

a) Classifies the condition.

b) Initiates corrective actions and coordinates emergency management activities.

c) Designates a communicator to notify off-site agencies and initiate call-in of selected personnel.

d) Ensures plant personnel are notified via the PA system or direct manual methods for accountability and/or evacuation, if required.

e) Notifies the on-call Emergency Director, informs him of the situation, and requests relief if appropriate. For conditions under a Notification of Unusual.

Event the Shift Manager may remain as ED through termination of the condition, due to probable short duration or low severity of the event.

f) Ensures that on-site emergency response individuals and groups are notified, using the PA system or direct manual communications. Depending on the nature and severity of the condition, TSC, OSC and EOF staffing may be called out.

Under certain security-related events, such as a site-specific credible threat, the TSC and EOF will be activated at the Notification of Unusual Event level.

g) Ensures that initial dose projections are done and makes resulting recommendations regarding off-site protective actions, if required.

h) Ensures that off-duty station personnel are notified to assist as necessary with emergency activities. These notifications are made, via the activation of NERO response pagers or by telephone backup, to individuals designated for off-duty availability status (i.e. on-call) to fill key emergency response positions. Those key positions are identified in Sections 6.2 and 6.3. Other off-duty personnel are called in as required.

Letter dated February 25, 2002 from Samuel J. Collins, Director, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulations, to Robert G. Byram, Senior Vice President and Chief Nuclear Officer.

Subject:

Issuance of Order for Interim Safeguards and Security Compensatory Measures for - Susquehanna Steam Electric Station, Units 1 & 2.

Page 1 of 18

Emergency Plan, Rev. 56, Page 59 of 312 Upon activation of Phase II, additional personnel are available, and control of the emergency and dissemination of in-plant teams shifts from the Control Room to the TSC.

Phase II - Activation of On-Site NERO - (Reference Table 6.1 and Figures 6.2 and 6.3.) Upon notification by the on-shift organization, the on-call Emergency Director reports to the site/Control Room to assume the role of Emergency Director. As specified in Figures 6.2 and 6.3, the minimum number of support coordinators and staffs also report to the site. These individuals form the nucleus of the ED's Team and activate the TSC and OSC. The TSC and OSC are fully functional within 60 minutes of event classification. As the on-call Emergency Director and his support coordinators arrive, they are briefed and assume responsibility for their particular areas of expertise. Emergency management activities, including communications, are under the control of the Emergency Director; dose projection and assessment activities are directed by the Radiation Protection Coordinator; technical expertise is directed by the Tech Support Coordinator; the Operations Coordinator oversees Operations activities; and the Damage Control Team Coordinator oversees in-plant damage control actions. The OSC Coordinator supports the operations and damage control team coordinators by managing personnel in the OSC (back up OSC in the event the OSC is not habitable). The TSC takes over all emergency management and support activities from the on-shift organization, freeing them to devote their efforts towards establishing and maintaining the plant in a safe, stable condition.

The onsite NERO may be further augmented as shown in Figures 6.2 and 6.3 by personnel filling TSC positions and OSC positions not designated as minimum requirements. Figures 6.2 and 6.3 also designate minimum requirements for the TSC and OSC respectively.

In the event of hazards preventing site access or certain security related events, personnel who normally report to the Technical Support Center and Operations Support Center will report to the Alternate TSC and OSC at the Emergency Operations Facility. OSC personnel can be sent to the site to mitigate site damage as soon as the site is secured. The alternate TSC will be activated as soon as possible to support the site; however, it is recognized that the activation time for the alternate TSC may exceed 60 minutes.

Phase III - Activation of Off-site NERO - (Reference Table 6.1 and Figure 6.4.) This organization staffs the Emergency Operations Facility to provide management of the overall emergency response as well as technical support, off-site radiological assessment, and communications.

Staffing of the EOF occurs following an Alert, a Site Area Emergency, or a General Emergency declaration. The EOF is required to activate following a Site Area Emergency or General Emergency classification and take over management of the emergency from the TSC within 90 minutes of the Site Area Emergency or higher classification. Activation of the Emergency Operations Facility requires the minimum staff as identified in Figure 6.4. When the initial emergency classification is a Site Area Emergency or higher, the EOF will take over the management of the emergency within 90 minutes of the declaration of a Site Area Emergency.

Due to the site response during a daytime security event that starts at the SAE level, the EOF may not be staffed within 90 minutes. With an event in progress, station personnel may be directed to take cover and therefore be unable to respond to the EOF until cleared by plant security. At the discretion of the Emergency Director, the EOF can be activated and take over management of the emergency earlier.

Letter dated February 25, 2002 from Samuel J. Collins, Director, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulations, to Robert G. Byram, Senior Vice President and Chief Nuclear Officer.

Subject:

Issuance of Order for Interim Safeguards and Security Compensatory Measures for - Susquehanna Steam Electric Station, Units 1 & 2.

Page 2 of 18

Emergency Plan, Rev. 56, Page 60 of 312 Functional operation will include:

• Management of overall emergency response

" Coordination of radiological and environmental assessment

• Determination of recommended protective actions

" Communications

• Coordination of emergency response activities with Federal, State, local county and municipal agencies The offsite NERO may be further augmented as denoted in Figure 6.4 by personnel filling EOF positions not designated as minimum requirements. Figure 6.4 designates minimum staffing.

Phase IV- Restoration - This phase leads ultimately to the return to service of the unit. The organizational and philosophical concepts that are utilized during this phase are highly dependent upon the nature of the emergency. The restoration phase does not begin until there is complete assurance that the plant is in a stable shutdown condition and that there is no inadvertent or unplanned significant release of radioactivity to the environment.

6.1 NORMAL OPERATING ORGANIZATION FSAR Section 13.1.2 defines the normal operating organization for SSES as illustrated in FSAR Figure 13.1-3. Minimum shift response during off-hours is as follows:

1 Shift Manager (SRO) 1 Unit Supervisor (SRO) 3 Plant Control Operators (RO) 4 Non-Licensed Operators 1 Shift Technical Advisor 2 Health Physics Technicians 1 Chemistry Technician 1 Emergency Plan Communicator 1 NRC Communicator Fire Brigade response personnel per Technical Requirements Manual Security Personnel as specified in the SSES Security Plan Page 3 of 18

Emergency Plan, Rev. 56, Page 61 of 312 NOTE: On-shift staffing may be less than the minimum Emergency Plan requirement for a period of time not to exceed 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> in order to accommodate unexpected unavailability of on-duty shift individuals provided immediate action is taken to restore shift complement to within minimum requirements. This note applies to personnel who are on-duty, not oncoming shift relief.

6.2 ON-SITE EMERGENCY ORGAN IZATION-(PHASE II)

Technical Specification 5.2, FSAR Section 13.1, and FSAR Section 17.2 define qualification requirements for PPL Susquehanna LLC personnel. Department implementing procedures define specific qualification and training requirements for PPL NERO positions.

6.2.1 Emerqency Director The Shift Manager assumes the role of Emergency Director until he is relieved by a qualified Emergency Director.

The Emergency Director assumes full responsibility for the implementation and administration of the Emergency Plan and is responsible for assuring continuity of resources until those responsibilities are turned over to the Recovery Manager. The responsibility and authority of the ED are set forth in Appendix E of this plan.

The ED cannot relinquish any responsibilities until the arrival of and assumption of responsibilities by the Recovery Manager at the EOF. At that time, the ED may relinquish any responsibilities except those related to maintaining the Unit in a safe shutdown condition with adequate core cooling and no uncontrolled radioactive material releases.

If the Emergency Director cannot perform this function during the emergency, he will be succeeded by the Operations Coordinator until another qualified Emergency Director arrives to assume this responsibility.

Functional responsibilities of the ED include:

a. Immediately upon notification of an existing or potential emergency, report to the Control Room and initiate assessment activities, including classification of the emergency and dose projections if appropriate.

b. Manage overall implementation of the immediate on-site corrective and protective actions to bring the incident under control and mitigate its effects.

c. Assure that appropriate notifications of emergency classification and protective action recommendations to state and local agencies are made within 15 minutes of declaration of an EAL.

Page 4 of 18

Emergency Plan, Rev. 56, Page 62 of 312

d. Assure that appropriate notifications and recommendations to the NRC are made immediately after notification to state and local agencies, but not later than one hour after declaration of an emergency classification.

e. Augment the on-site NERO with duty roster personnel and other available station staff members as dictated by the emergency condition.

f.. Continue reassessment of emergency status and make appropriate recommendations including protective actions to off-site organizations.

g. Ensure that information released is accurate and released through the proper channels.

h. Activate Emergency Facilities described in Section 8.0, as required.

i. Assign a technical liaison to the state EOC when requested.

j. Communicate with and provide information to the Recovery Manager and the Public Information Manager.

k. Authorize issuance of Radioprotective Drugs in accordance with prescribed procedures. This should include consultation with the Radiation Protection Coordinator and medical consultants.

Authorize Emergency dose extensions. This should include consultation with the Radiation Protection Coordinator.

m. Authorize taking essential corrective action that may involve the risk of emergency radiation exposure to NERO personnel. Table 7.2 provides the basic criteria for this decision.

n. Implement RCA and site evacuations as required.

o. Request Federal assistance to augment NERO capabilities as necessary. Such requests should be coordinated with PEMA and/or DEP/BRP and are normally done through the Recovery Manager and the EOF staff.

6.2.2 Operations Coordinator Responsibilities:

a. Prepare the TSC for activation if the TSC ED has relieved the Control Room ED of responsibility.

b. Advise the Shift Manager in directing the Control Room and in-plant operational activities.

c. Direct activities of the Damage Control Team Coordinator, SAM Coordinator, and TSC Communicator.

Page 5 of 18

Emergency Plan, Rev. 56, Page 63 of 312

d. Advise the ED on plant operations and conditions.

e. Establish and set priorities for mitigation with the concurrence of the ED.

6.2.3 TSC Communicator Responsibilities:

a. Make proper notification to off-site organizations.

b. Initiate call-in procedures as requested by the ED.

c. Function as liaison for emergency-related communications between the ED and on-site and off-site emergency groups.

d. Maintain communications with the NRC.

e. Maintain records during the emergency.

6.2.4 Radiation Protection Coordinator Responsibilities:

a. Ensures dose projections are performed until relieved by the EOF.

b. Provide radiological advice to the ED concerning on-site emergency activities.

c. Provide protective action recommendations to the ED.

d. Maintain communication with and provide information to the EOF Dose Assessment Supervisor.

e. Maintain communication with and provide radiological information to DEP/BRP until relieved by the EOF.

f. Provide on-site radiation monitoring personnel for effluent release assessment.

g. Provide radiation monitoring personnel for emergency team efforts.

h. Direct personnel and area contamination control and decontamination activities.

Provide dose projections to the Dose Assessment Supervisor until relieved of that responsibility by the EOF.

j. Perform initial off-site environmental assessment until relieved by the EOF.

k. Ensure radiological data is communicated to the NRC via the Health Physics Network.

Page 6 of 18

Emergency Plan, Rev. 56, Page 64 of 312 I. Advise the Emergency Director and organization on use of KI and emergency dose extensions.

6.2.5 Technical Support Coordinator Responsibilities:

a. Analyze mechanical, electrical, and instrument and control problems; determine alternate solutions, design and coordinate the installation of short-term modifications.

b. Analyze thermohydraulic and thermodynamic problems and develop solutions.

c. Assist in the development of procedures necessary for conducting emergency operations and damage control.

d. Analyze conditions and develop guidance for the ED and operations personnel.

e. Resolve questions concerning Operating License requirements with NRC representatives.

f. Maintain lead technical responsibility, coordinate technical information with the EOF as appropriate, and request technical support from the EOF or other engineering/technical resources.

g. Maintain communication with and provide technical information to DEP/BRP Technical, as required, until relieved by the EOF.

h. Provide core damage estimates.

i. Until relieved, provide direction to Chemistry Technician to perform emergency plan actions.

6.2.6 Security Coordinator Responsibilities:

a. Maintain plant security and institute appropriate contingency measures.

b. Account for personnel as directed by EP-PS procedures.

cm Act as liaison with outside groups in providing additional resources such as manpower, equipment, supplies, and transportation.

d. Coordinate provisions for transportation, food, and other logistical support for emergency personnel.

e. Provide personnel and work schedules for relieving emergency personnel.

Page 7 of 18

Emergency Plan, Rev. 56, Page 65 of 312 6.2.7 OSC Coordinator Responsibilities:

a. Report to the OSC.

b. Organize, brief, dispatch, and direct, as necessary, the onsite damage control teams.

c. Coordinate the availability and assignment of personnel supporting activities for the ED and other NERO managers.

d. Organize and manage emergency response personnel in the OSC.

6.2.8 Damage Control Team Coordinator Responsibilities:

a. Participate in briefings with the TSC ED and helping to set priorities.

b. Ensure damage control resources are allocated on the correct priorities by providing priorities to the OSC Coordinator and monitoring INDIA Team assignments.

c. Communicate with Operations Coordinator, the Technical Support Coordinator, and the OSC Coordinator.

6.2.9 Radio Communicator Responsibilities:

a. Maintain radio communications with all in-plant teams.

b. Maintain an up-to-date status of in-plant radiological conditions.

6.2.10 Severe Accident Management (SAM) Coordinator Responsibilities:

a. Make recommendations to the Operations Coordinator for mitigation of the effects of a severe accident at SSES.

6.2.11 HP Specialist Responsibilities:

a. Determine radiological conditions in the plant.

b. Assess on-site habitability.

c. Provide guidance and brief teams on radiological and ALARA considerations.

Page 8 of 18

Emergency Plan, Rev. 56, Page 66 of 312

d. Monitor in-plant team exposures.

6.2.12 Non-Operations Support Personnel Maintenance Technicians, Chemistry Technicians, and HP trained personnel are called out per Table 6.1 to support damage control, chemistry, and radiological functions. Table 6.1 designates personnel who report in 60 minutes and 90 minutes.

6.2.13 Engineering Staff (Core Thermal Hydraulic Engineer, Electrical Engineer, Mechanical Engineer)

Responsibilities

a. Provide core damage estimates. (Core Thermal Hydraulic Engineer)

b. Analyze mechanical problems and other discipline related issues and determine solutions and provide support for implementation of required mechanical actions. (Mechanical Engineer)

c. Analyze electrical and instrumentation and control problems and other discipline related issues. Determine alternate solutions and provide support for implementation of required electrical/l&C actions. (Electrical Engineer)

All responders are notified to provide for full augmentation of resources at the TSC and OSC for the positions in Figures 6.2 and 6.3. The augmented response may be greater than 60 minutes and may occur after the TSC has activated.

6.3 OFF-SITE RESOURCES AND ACTIVITIES (PHASE III)

Technical Specification 5.3, FSAR Section 13.1, and FSAR Section 17.2 define the qualification requirements for PPL Susquehanna LLC personnel. Department implementing procedures define specific qualification and training requirements for PPL NERO positions.

Notification of the Recovery Manager is made via notification of key managers for the Notification of Unusual Event and via NERO activation for higher levels by the Communicators in the Control Room or TSC. An on-call duty roster is available in the CR and TSC.

At the discretion of the Emergency Director, the EOF can be manned or activated at a Notification of Unusual Event level.

Staffing of the EOF occurs following an Alert, a Site Area Emergency, or a General Emergency declaration. The EOF is required to activate following a Site Area Emergency or General Emergency classification for the purpose of taking over management of the emergency from the TSC within 90 minutes of the Site Area Emergency or higher classification. NERO is notified of the need for facility staffing by the on-shift staff activating pagersand a Telenotification System that activates both pagers and telephones.

Page 9 of 18

Emergency Plan, Rev. 56, Page 67 of 312 When these responders are briefed on the emergency situation and verify that necessary equipment is functioning properly, the Recovery Manager will assume responsibility for overall management of the emergency response. The following functions are provided:

" Management of overall emergency response

" Coordination of radiological and environmental assessment

• Determination of recommended protective actions

" Communications

• Coordination of emergency response activities with Federal, State, local county and municipal agencies.

All responders are notified to provide for full augmentation of resources at the EOF for the positions in Figure 6.4. The augmented response may be greater than ninety minutes and may occur after the EOF has activated.

6.3.1 EOF Organization 6.3.1.1 Recovery Managqer If the Recovery Manager cannot perform this function during the emergency, he will be succeeded by the Engineering Support Supervisor until another qualified Recovery Manager arrives.

Responsibilities:

a. Upon activation of the EOF, initiate assessment activities, including classification of the emergency and dose projections if appropriate.

b. Provide continuous coordination and evaluation of PPL activities during an emergency having or potentially having environmental consequences.

c. Manage overall PPL emergency response and assuring continuity of resources.

d. Act as lead interface with off-site government agency officials.

e. Assure appropriate notifications and recommendations to offsite organizations are timely.

f. Continue reassessment of emergency status and make appropriate recommendations including protective actions to off-site organizations.

g. Ensure that information released is accurate and made through proper channels.

h. Direct the activities of all other EOF managers.

Page 10 of 18

Emergency Plan, Rev. 56, Page 68 of 312 L. Request Federal assistance to augment NERO capabilities as necessary. Such requests should be coordinated with PEMA and/or DEP/BRP.

j. Notify PEMA Emergency Operations Center of Protective Action Recommendations.

k. When requested, send a representative to the State EOC. If conditions result in implementation of the Federal Radiological Emergency Response Plan, assign a representative to the Federal Response Center, to the Federal Radiological Monitoring and Assessment Center, and to the Joint Information Center (most likely the PIM).

6.3.1.2 Enqineerinq Support Supervisor Responsibilities:

a. Manage engineering support resources in the EOF.

b. Provide technical support to aid in decision making process.

c. Keep BRP informed concerning technical status of the plant and any mitigating actions being considered or in progress.

d. Provide technical information concerning plant status and mitigating actions to the off-site agencies.

6.3.1.3 EOF Support Supervisor Responsibilities:

a. Provide support to the Recovery Manager in review of plant data.

b. Oversee formal communications leaving the EOF.

c. Oversee proper facility set up.

d. Provide administrative support.

e. Support the Recovery Manager with off-site agency interface.

6.3.1.4 Dose Assessment Supervisor Responsibilities:

a. Ensure dose projections are performed.

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Emergency Plan, Rev. 56, Page 69 of 312

b. Evaluate the magnitude and effects of actual or potential radioactive releases from the plant.

c. Recommend appropriate off-site protective measures to the Recovery Manager.

d. Recommend appropriate emergency classifications to the Recovery Manager.

e. Communicate with the Radiation Protection Coordinator in the TSC and with DEP/BRP radiological personnel.

f. Control field monitoring teams.

g. Perform off-site environmental assessment.

6.3.1.5 EOF Communicator Responsibilities:

a. Assume responsibility from the TSC for off-site notifications (except ENS communications).

b. Transmit information about the emergency to off-site organizations.

c. Function as liaison for questions received from other organizations.

d. Maintain a record of emergency notifications.

6.3.1.6 Radioloqical Support Staff (Dose Assessment Staffer, Field Team Director, Radiological Monitoring Team)

Responsibilities:

a. Perform dose calculations, as required. (Dose Assessment Staffer)

b. Monitor and control field teams. (Field Team Director)

c. Perform monitoring of areas around the plant as directed. (Radiological Monitoring Team) 6.3.2 Joint Information Center The ED ensures that the JIC (Figure 6.4) is promptly notified and provided with available details of the emergency. The JIC staff provides information regarding the emergency and items of public interest to municipal groups, initiates appropriate news releases, and responds to questions from the media officials. After the Recovery Manager assumes control of the EOF, the Public Information Manager reports to the Recovery Manager.

Page 12 of 18

Emergency Plan, Rev. 56, Page 70 of 312 6.3.2.1 Public Information Manager Responsibilities:

a. Serve as official company spokesperson.

b. Prepare and disseminate SSES information to the public via the news media.

c. Interpret plant status information for the news media and other agencies.

d. Arrange for news media conferences.

e. Manage rumor control.

f. Establish interfaces and coordinates news releases with the federal and state agencies in the JIC.

6.3.3 Local Off-Site Support Services The Emergency Director, and the Recovery Manager as appropriate, ensures that appropriate off-site emergency support groups are contacted to provide the type and level of assistance that may be necessary to deal with the existing emergency condition. Organizations that may be contacted for assistance during an emergency condition at SSES are listed in Appendix A, Letters of Agreement. Methods available for contacting these support groups include direct telephone communications with individual organizations, use of the 911 telephone system for emergency services, and message relay through LCEMA or CCEMA.

6.3.4 Off-Site Support Services An emergency at SSES may require additional technical services and equipment. This type of assistance may be obtained from the organizations listed in Table 6.2 and Appendix A.

6.4 COORDINATION WITH PARTICIPATING GOVERNMENT AGENCIES The ED and the RM ensure that off-site authorities are notified and apprised of emergency events at SSES when their respective facilities are managing the emergency.

Notification of a NOUE (Notification of Unusual Event) is primarily to ensure that the authorities are cognizant of the details of events that may arouse public concern and initiate inquiries by news media or members of the public.

6.4.1 County Agencies LCEMA and CCEMA provide for:

• Planning and coordination with municipal, State, and Federal authorities.

Page 13 of 18

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Emergency Plan, Rev. 56, Page 71 of 312

• Initial response to notification by SSES.

• Alert and warning of local populations within the 10 mile EPZ.

• Evacuation and other protective measures for local populations within the 10 mile EPZ.

• Emergency services.

• Situation analysis.

" Operation of county EOC.

LCEMA and CCEMA also provide direction for the local organizations that are assigned action or support responsibilities under their plans.

The primary method of notification to LCEMA and CCEMA is via the Centrex Telephone Network (CTN). Secondary methods are radio and regular telephone.

6.4.2 State Agencies PEMA provides for:

• Issuance of planning guidance.

• Coordination of State response to nuclear incidents.

• Coordination of multi-county Emergency Response Planning.

• Operation of PEMA EOC.

• Provision for emergency public information.

• Coordination of State agencies and departments.

DEP/BRP provides for:

" Technical consultation on Radiological and Plant conditions.

• Accident assessment.

• Recommendations for protective actions.

• Recommendations for protection of potable water and food.

• Recommendations for recovery and re-entry (off-site).

• Operation of DEP/BRP EOC.

Initially, SSES notifies PEMA, who, in turn, notifies DEP/BRP. DEP/BRP calls back to SSES to obtain radiological and plant condition information and establishes a communication link with SSES via CTN. Ifthe emergency warrants, DEP/BRP responds to the EOF.

Page 14 of 18

Emergency Plan, Rev. 56, Page 72 of 312 The primary method of notification to PEMA is via the Centrex Telephone Network (CTN). CTN communications between SSES and DEP/BRP are used for transmitting radiological and technical information/recommendations.

6.4.3 Federal Agencies As detailed in the Federal Radiological Emergency Response Plan (FRERP), the Federal government maintains extensive capabilities to assist states and licensees in responding to radiological emergencies.

The ED and, upon EOF activation, the RM are authorized to request Federal assistance. Such requests should be coordinated with PEMA and/or DEP/BRP.

NRC - designated Lead Federal Agency (LFA) under the National Response Plan (NRP).

The primary method of notification to the NRC is via the Emergency Notification System (ENS). Upon notification of an emergency classification, the NRC will enter one of several response modes based on the severity of the event. Response modes include:

Normal (Increased Regional Monitoring)

Monitoring Activation Expanded Activation In the Normal and Monitoring modes, NRC site presence is provided by the Resident Inspectors who typically observe activity in the Control Room and TSC. Upon Activation, a site team will be dispatched that can arrive at the site within several hours. Response assignments are primarily at the EOF, with a few individuals located at the JIC, TSC, Control Room and OSC. Ifconditions warrant, the NRC can go to Expanded Activation that has a much larger response to staff shift type operations and additional team support personnel.

DOE - provides radiological monitoring and assessment assistance.

The primary method of notification to DOE is by telephone, although assistance is typically requested through the.Lead Federal Agency (NRC) or through the State (DEP/BRP). Initial DOE response is by a Radiological Assistance Program (RAP) team dispatched from the DOE Brookhaven Area Office. This team can arrive within eight hours and would operate primarily out of the EOF.

If the situation necessitates additional technical assistance, DOE can set up and staff a Federal Radiological Monitoring and Assessment Center (FRMAC) in the vicinity of SSES. A FRMAC, which draws DOE resources and personnel from its Nevada Operations Office, can be operational within about 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />. The location of such a center would be selected based on actual radiological deposition patterns. The Federal FRMAC team is initially managed by DOE, with personnel also provided by NRC, EPA, USDA, HHS, and other agencies. The State and PPL would assign personnel to the FRMAC to coordinate monitoring activity.

Page 15 of 18

Emergency Plan, Rev. 56, Page 73 of 312 DHS - FEMA - responsible for coordinating all Non-technical Federal response.

If the emergency situation has warranted implementation of the National Response Plan (NRP), DHS-FEMA will set up and staff a Federal Response Center in the vicinity of SSES. The location of such a center would be selected based on current needs and conditions. Access to all Federal non-technical assistance is through the Federal Response Center where representatives of participating agencies are based.

Other Federal Agencies In addition to NRC, DOE, and DHS-FEMA, other Federal agencies are available to provide assistance under the National Response Plan (NRP).

The extent of participation depends on the nature and magnitude of the event. A full listing of these agencies and description of their missions is found in the National Response Plan (NRP).

Additional information on available resources can be found in NUREG-1442/ FEMA-REP-17, "Post-Emergency Response Resources Guide."

Joint Information Center (JIC)

The National Response Plan (NRP) provides for each participating agency to be represented at a Joint Information Center, along with the State and the facility licensee. For Susquehanna, it is expected that these parties will agree to utilize PPL's JIC to fulfill this on-scene Joint Information Center role.

Resources Available to Support Federal Response A. Lodging and Food Service - Lodging and food service for personnel operating from the FRMAC, Federal Response Center, and JIC are available from local commercial resources in the Wilkes-Barre, Hazleton, and Bloomsburg areas.

B. Communications - Capability provided by DOE and DHS-FEMA, supplemented by standard telephone-service to be established when facilities are selected, are adequate for the FRMAC and Federal Response Center.

C. Security - Security arrangements for the FRMAC and Federal Response Center can be made by the DOE and DHS-FEMA, respectively, with local resources.

D. Transportation - Federal response personnel will provide their own transportation by renting commercially available vehicles.

E. Airport - Wilkes-Barre/Scranton International Airport, Avoca, Pennsylvania.

Page 16 of 18

- - - "'L_- -__I ..

Emergency Plan, Rev. 56, Page 74 of 312 6.5 RESTORATION The PPL NERO continues to provide appropriate emergency response functions until such time as the emergency has been terminated or the PPL Corporate Leadership Council (CLC) has approved the implementation of a long-range restoration organization. Termination from an emergency condition is through joint evaluation by the organizations involved. In the case of a severe emergency involving off-site consequences, this would include the Recovery Manager, DEP/BRP, and NRC. The Senior Vice President and Chief Nuclear Officer requests that the PPL Corporate Leadership Council establish a restoration organization when the following guidelines have been met:

• In-plant systems are stable, adequate core cooling established and contingency systems and plans available.

• In-plant radiation levels are stable or are decreasing with time.

• Releases of radioactive material to the environment are under control or have ceased.

• Any fire, flooding or similar emergency conditions are under control or have ceased.

Although planning for restoration varies according to the emergency, a long-term restoration organization that is general in nature has been defined. The restoration organization is a project-type organization with their major activities conducted from the EOF. This organization is depicted in Figure 6.6 and major responsibilities are defined below.

• Restoration Manager - A designated officer or senior manager from PPL qualified to manage SSES restoration operations.

• Plant Operations Manager - A designated manager from PPL qualified to control plant operations including security.

• Technical Support Manager - A designated manager from PPL qualified to manage a technical group.

• Radiological Manager - A designated manager qualified to manage the radioactive waste and radiological control aspects.

• Maintenance Manager - A designated manager qualified to coordinate the activities of PPL, NSSS supplier, and construction forces on proposed plant modifications or other construction support.

• Advisory Support Function - Advisory support consists of senior representatives of the NSSS supplier, the NRC, and special consultants.

• Scheduling/Planning Manager - A designated manager to coordinate plans and schedules for the Restoration Manager.

• Administration and Logistics Manager - A designated manager who is responsible for providing administrative, logistic, communications and personnel support.

Page 17 of 18

.I I-r -'.I Emergency Plan, Rev. 56, Page 75 of 312

• Public Information Manager - A designated manager qualified to manage public relations activities.

During restoration operations, the radiation exposure limits of 10CFR20 apply.

Compliance with those limits is the responsibility of the Restoration Manager via the applicable Health Physics organization.

At the time of declaring that an emergency has entered the restoration phase, the Restoration Manager is responsible for providing notification to all applicable agencies.

Restoration actions that plan for, or may result in, radioactive release are evaluated by the Restoration Manager as far in advance of the event as is possible. Such events and data are reported to the appropriate off-site emergency response organizations and agencies prior to initiating release.

Page 18 of 18

Table 6.1 Emergency Plan, Rev. 56, Page 76 of 312 STATION EMERGENCY PLAN MINIMUM STAFFING REQUIREMENTS Capability for Additions Major Functional Area Major Tasks Position Title or Expertise On Shift 60 min 90 min Plant Operations and Shift Manager (SRO) 1 ....

Assessment of Operational Unit Supervisor (SRO) 1## ....

Aspects Plant Control Operators 3 @..

Non-Licensed Operators 4 ....

Emergency Direction and Control Emergency Director 1* 1 --

(Emergency Director)

Notification/Communication Notify licensee, State, Local, and Communicators 1 2 1 Federal personnel & maintain EOF Support Supervisor .... 1 communication NRC communicator 1 Radiological Accident Emergency Operations Facility Recovery Manager .... 1 Assessment and Support of _(EOF) Director Operational Accident Radiation Protection & Dose Radiation Protection Assessment Assessment Coordinator -- 1 --

Dose Assessment Supervisor .... 1 Rad Assessment Staff -- 1 2 Offsite Surveys (Field Teams) Survey Team Personnel -- 2# 2

_Onsite [out-of -plant (HP Tech)] .......... Survey Team Personnel --------- -- 1 1 Radiation Protection & Dose Assessment: HP Technicians 2 3 3

a. Access Control

b. HP coverage for repair, corrective actions, search and rescue, first aid, & firefighting

c. Personnel Monitoring

d. Dosimetry

e. Dose Assessment

f. In-Plant Surveys Chemistry/Radiochemistry Chemistry Technicians 1 1 --

Note: The Capability for Additions column refers to reporting times. Reporting location may be the OSC, TSC, or EOF.

1. 1. As a result of having a common control room, the Unit Supervisor is shared between the two units.

@ One PCO will be assigned to each unit.

• Indicates the minimum number of individuals onshift with the capabilities of performing these functions. These individuals may also fulfill other responsibilities identified in this table.

Rad monitoring team personnel (see Figure 6.3) - 2 are dispatched from the vicinity of the plant at 60 minutes.

• • Fulfilled by NLO's on-shift to provide initial damage control repair activities until additional support arrives. Such activities include racking breakers, changing fuses manipulating valves, moving equipment, and starting equipment locally.

Page 1 of 2

Table 6.1 Emergency Plan, Rev. 56, Page 77 of 312 STATION EMERGENCY PLAN MINIMUM STAFFING REQUIREMENTS Capability for Additions Major Functional Area Major Tasks Position Title or Expertise On Shift 60 min 90 min Plant System Engineering Technical Support Shift Technical Advisor 1 ....

Operations Coordinator -- 1 --

Core/Thermal Hydraulics Engr. -- 1 --

Electrical Engr. -- 1 --

Mechanical Engr -- 1 --

Technical Support Coordinator -- 1 --

Severe Accident Management Coordinator 1 --

Engineering Support Supervisor 1 Repair and Corrective Actions Management of Damage Control Damage Control Team Teams Coordinator -- 1 --

OSC Coordinator -- 1 --

Communications with In-plant Teams Radio Communicator -------------- -- 1 --

Repair and Corrective Actions Mechanical Maintenance/ 1" 1 --

(onshift requirements may be fulfilled Rad Waste Operator by NLOs) ** Electrical Maintenance/ 11 Instrument and Control Technician Firefighting Firefighting communications -- Fire Brigade Local per Technical Support Requirements Manual Rescue Operations and First Aid -- 2* Local Support ______

Security Personnel All per Site Access Control and Security, personnel accountability Personnel Accountability Security plan Security Coordinator -- 1 --

15 24 14 Plus Fire Brigade and Security Plan Required Personnel Note: The Capability for Additions column refers to reporting times. Reporting location may be the OSC, TSC, or EOF.

Note: An on-shift staffing analysis, using the staffing shown in Table 6.1, was completed on 14DEC12 lAW 10CFR50 APP E IV.A.9. The results of the analysis showed that the on-shift staff was able to perform the assigned emergency plan functions. The analysis is contained in Appendix K.

Page 2 of 2

Emergency Plan, Rev. 56, Page 78 of. 312

, TABLE'6.2, Name/Address Emergency Function Availability Reporting Location (Hours)

1. Committed Resources

• General Electric Engineering advise and analysis for N/A GE Facilities NSSS equipment Operations and Maintenance 48 EOF expertise on NSSS equipment

• INPO Operations and Maintenance On call 24 hrs a day INPO HQ in Atlanta Atlanta, GA expertise Dissemination of information N/A INPO HQ in Atlanta 0 Other Nuclear Utility Operations, Maintenance, 4 EOF Support Radiological personnel for augmenting emergency staffing NOTE: The Administrative Coordinator maintains the information necessary to contact appropriate vendors in case of an emergency.

Page 1 of 1

Emergency Plan, Rev. 56, Page 79 of 312 TSC ORGANIZATION 4-- - - - -- - -

'EMERGENCY:

I DIRECTOR* I

• .. . . . I..

I L---------------

, Operations :

Admin Staff  : Security : , Rad Prot :

Coordinator*: .Coordinator*: 'Coordinator*:I

-- ... - - -- - -a 16.--- ---- -- -- --- a ---

0, TSC .- -------......

Severe Accident i

Damage Control

........ I Communicators Management DiTeam Coord.*

o1 Communicator* Coordinator ,

La...............--

......... L. --u ,--1

OSC Coordinator** Tec Sunator*

Additional a.--------- a---------------- Rad Staff

• Core Thermal -- - - - -

SHydraulic Engineer' Electrical Engineer Susquehanna Steam Electric Station Units 1 and 2 Mechanicalr"',

Emergency Plan

• Engineer TSC ORGANIZATION Engineering Support FIGURE 6.2

, Deslicnates minimum requirements in accordance with Table 6.1 for 60-minute response.:

---

Individuals may be located in the OSC, TSC, or Field.

• Designates positions required for TSC activation.

• • Located in the OSC. See Figure 6.3 Page 1 of 5

Emergency Plan, Rev. 56, Page 80 of 312 OSC ORGANIZATION

-- - - -- - - - I COORDINATOR I T i Non-Operations 9 I-----------I IHP Specials Engineering a Radio a Chemistry Support 1 Support Personnel (9) I I Communicator I I Rad Assess Staff -I Coordinator I Ref. Sec. 6.2.12 1 t9 report @ 60 minutes I Non-Operations ISupport PersonnelI I Ref. Sec. 6.2.12 I I 5 report @ 90 minutesI I Susquehanna Steam Electric Station Units 1 and 2 Emergency Plan Designates positions required for OSC activation. OSC ORGANIZATION I Desi.nates minimum requirements in accordance with Table 6.1 for 60-minute response.I FIGURE 6.3 Page 2 of 5

Emergency Plan, Rev. 56, Page 81 of 312 EOF ORGANIZATION

- I I RECOVERY MANAGER* I I I L--------------

I' I EOF .

DOSE ASSESSMENT

-~I LIAISON SUPPORT 1 COMMUNICATOR-

• STAFFER* SUPERVISOR

-agIIe OFFSITE AGENCY LIAISONS RAD MONITORING l

• TEAM (2)* I a ---

ENVIRONMENTAL SAMPLING TEAM Susquehanna Steam Electric Station p -------------- rum-------------------------. . .. . Units 1 and 2 Designates minimum requirements in accordance with Table 6.1 for 90 minute response. I Emergency Plan

• Designates positions required for EOF activation.

EOF ORGANIZATION NOTE: RAD Monitoring Team (2) refers to 1 Team with 2 people. A second Team with 2 additional people is part of "Additional RAD Staff" FIGURE 6.4 Page 3 of 5

Emergency Plan, Rev. 56, Page 82 of 312 PPL CORPORATE HEADQUARTERS Susquehanna Steam Electric Station Units 1 and 2 Emergency Plan LONG TERM RESTORATION ORGANIZATION FIGURE 6.6 Page 4 of 5

Emergency Plan, Rev. 56, Page 83 of 312 COMMUNICATION INTERFACES WITH OFF - SITE AGENCIES 0..4 .. ...

Control Room Control Room Communicator Communicator

• TSC TSC Communicator Communicator EOF EOF Communicator Communicator

• Responsible for Interface with Agencies located in EOF Emergency Director( PAR) Susquehanna Steam Electric Station Units 1 and 2 Emergency Plan Recovery Manager COMMUNICATION INTERFACES PAR)

WITH OFF-SITE AGENCIES FIGURE 6.7 Page 5 of 5

- ,. I : - - _-__ . ý _ .

Emergency Plan, Rev. 56, Page 84 of 312

- 7a0 EMERGENCY MEASURES--

7.1 ASSESSMENT ACTIONS FOR ALL EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATIONS Provisions are made for assessment through the course of an emergency to ensure effective coordination, direction and upgrading of emergency activities in a timely manner. The assessment actions are described in detail in Emergency Plan Position Specific Instructions (EP-PSs).

Continuous assessment of the status of plant systems and radiological conditions is provided by plant instrumentation and is supplemented by routine surveillance functions.

The occurrence of an Unusual Event is recognized by instrument alarms or indications, surveillance results, or other observation of an off-normal condition by an individual at the station.

Assessment actions are described below. For a Notification of Unusual Event, one or more of the actions listed below will be initiated; for higher emergency classifications, actions are continued, intensified, and increased in frequency.

Table 7.1 provides a Summary of Notification & Response Actions outlined in Section 7.1.

" Perform surveillance of in-plant instrumentation.

" Initial and continued observation of off-normal conditions.

" Obtain assistance from off-duty personnel and/or off-site support groups.

• Perform dose calculation activities. Correlate with field team data.

" Deploy field radiological monitoring teams to perform direct radiation measurements and air sampling.

• Perform sampling and analysis of environmental media.

• Deploy on-site damage control teams.

• Perform reactor coolant sampling and analysis.

7.1.1 Off-Site Dose Calculations The Emergency Director is responsible for initiating off-site dose calculation and assessment activities. These activities are performed by health physics trained personnel who report to the Technical Support Center (TSC) (or the Control Room for all initial entries into the Emergency Plan). Data from the vent effluent monitors and the meteorological towers serve as inputs for the off-site dose calculation methods.

The ED is responsible for calling in personnel to the TSC to perform off-site dose assessment activities. The Radiation Protection Coordinator reports to the TSC within 60 minutes of notification.

Page 1 of 9

Emergency Plan, Rev. 56, Page 85 of 312 Field monitoring teams are directed to selected monitoring location(s) by either the Radiation Protection Coordinator, Dose Assessment Supervisor, Dose Assessment Staffer, or Field Team Director via radio and/or phone communication. The results of the teams' surveys are used to update projected doses and dose calculational assumptions. In addition, an independent Remote Monitoring System can be used, if desired, to supplement the information obtained by field monitoring teams. This Remote Monitoring System uses fixed radiation detectors which are located near the site perimeter and mobile monitoring equipment to locate and assess elevated radiation levels. This system is not required, but can be used, if desired, to supplement the existing monitoring capabilities.

Terminals for this system are located in both the TSC and EOF.

The initial field monitoring team(s) are staffed within 60 minutes.

Additional team(s) are dispatched upon activation of the EOF.

Each radiological monitoring team is supplied with a survey meter and low volume air sampler. TLDs are located at 17 sites around the station to provide early information on accumulated off-site doses. Two sets of TLDs are provided at each of these sites; one set for dose accumulation during the period of releases and one set maintained for the normal monitoring period or exchanged early at the Dose Assessment Supervisor's discretion to meet information needs.

The ED and Recovery Manager recommend appropriate protective actions to PEMA Operations Center, Harrisburg, based upon the results of the off-site dose assessment activities.

7.1.1.1 Meteorology The SSES on-site meteorological measurement system is based upon an on-site primary meteorological tower located to the east southeast of the station. The primary tower provides measurements of wind speed, wind direction, and wind variability at its 10 and 60-meter levels, temperature differential between the 10 and 60-meter levels, and ambient temperature and dew point at the 10-meter level. Precipitation is measured at ground level. In case of primary tower failure, a 10-meter on-site backup meteorological tower will provide measurements of wind speed, wind direction, and wind variability.

A permanent supplemental tower is installed in the river valley near the station to provide additional meteorological data to more accurately model the effects of surrounding terrain on atmospheric dispersion and transport. The tower is located approximately 3.6 miles SW of the station off Route 93 just east of Nescopeck.

The tower measures wind speed, wind direction, and sigma theta at the 33-foot level. The tower also measures temperature at a height of approximately 6.6 feet. The meteorological data collected from this tower is used only to support assessment and restoration efforts in the event there is an accidental release of radioactive material from SSES.

Page 2 of 9

Emergency Plan, Rev. 56, Page 86 of 312 The meteorological systems are instrumented to provide continuous data to the control room and the Plant Integrated Computer System (PICSY) for utilization in the TSC and EOF.

Data that enters PICSY is viewable through various display formats and is also transmitted to the NRC via ERDS. Digital dataloggers are present at all of the SSES meteorological towers. All data is stored locally and is available for acquisition by interrogation across telephone lines. Primary and backup tower strip chart recorders are located in the control room.

Site specific, meteorological information for emergency dose assessment purposes can be obtained by contacting either a meteorologist or the National Weather Service Station using the phone numbers provided in the SSES Emergency Telephone Directory.

7.1.1.2 Health Physics Considerations In the event of an unplanned radioactive release from either the reactor building vents, the turbine building vents, or the standby gas treatment vent; continuous gross noble gas readings are available from the vent monitors. Each monitor is also equipped with in-line iodine and particulate sampling capability. These in-line samples are periodically removed and analyzed in order to provide iodine and particulate release rate information.. Event declarations are based on Noble Gas readings or iodine and particulate sample results.

The following Health Physics considerations are taken into account:

selection of the accident type to closely approximate the isotopic mix and average gamma energies of the release occurring, radioactive decay from time of reactor shutdown, plume decay-in-transit and iodine and particulate depletion due to precipitation.

7.1.1.3 Dose Calculations for Airborne Releases A dose calculation model is used to make current, site specific estimates and predictions of atmospheric effluent transport and diffusion during and immediately following an accidental airborne radioactivity release. The purpose of the prediction is to provide an input to the assessment of the consequences of accidental radioactive releases to the atmosphere and to aid in the implementation of emergency response decisions.

Page 3 of 9

Emergency Plan, Rev. 56, Page 87 of 312 The dose calculation model used is a fast running, time-dependent, variable trajectory plume segment "B" model with the following capabilities:

NOTE: A class "B" model is a numerical model that represents the actual spatial and temporal variations of plume distribution.

" Computes atmospheric dispersion at the site based on atmospheric stability as a function of site specific terrain conditions with 15-minute upgrades of source term and meteorological. conditions.

" Provides estimates of deposition and relative concentration of radioactivity within the plume exposure and ingestion EPZs for the duration of the release.

" Incorporated in the calculations is wet and dry deposition which enables dose estimates from three pathways - plume, ground shine, and ingestion.

The dose program complies with the "Manual of Protective Action Guides and Protective Actions for Nuclear Incidents," (EPA-400),

adopting the dose calculation methodology in ICRP #26/30. The accident dose assessments are based on the adult physiology per EPA 400, except for one case-that is, child thyroid dose conversion factors are used in calculating thyroid CDE. However adult physiology is used in calculating thyroid CDE for purposes of evaluating the need for a sheltering only PAR and evaluating controlled venting of containment. Calculations of TEDE are made using the (adult) dose factors provided in EPA-400. The following calculational options are available:

" TEDE (Total Effective Dose Equivalent) integrated doses consisting of the sum of external doses from plume shine, 50 year committed effective dose equivalent from inhalation (CEDE), and 4 day ground shine.doses.

• EDE and CDE dose rates for field team management.

" Fifty year thyroid committed dose (CDE), from inhalation of radioactive materials.

" Population dose (person rem) out to 50 miles.

" Summary print of projected doses for each of four projection times.

" Integrated ground dose for projected times specified by the user.

Page 4 of 9

I I Emergency Plan, Rev. 56, Page 88 of 312 The dose calculation program is a stand alone program running on PCs located in the TSC and EOF.

7.1.1.4 Liquid Release Calculations Estimates of downstream river water concentrations are made by employing effluent sample analysis or discharge monitor data, discharge flow rates and river elevation readings. The river elevation is used to estimate the travel time to the point of interest.

The calculated degree of mixing, together with the discharge monitor data and the discharge flow rates are used to calculate downstream concentrations.

7.2 CORRECTIVE ACTIONS Detailed operating procedures and plant procedures are utilized by the plant operating personnel to assist them in recognizing emergency events and taking the corrective actions necessary to place the plant in a safe condition. Table 6.1 shows personnel available to respond to an emergency. Additionally, EP-PSs describe subsequent and supplemental corrective actions for the scope of potential situations within each of the emergency classifications. These procedures are designed to guide the actions of the personnel to correct or mitigate the condition as early and as near to the source of the problem as feasible.

Some essential corrective actions may involve the risk of emergency exposure to NERO personnel. Such actions could involve preventing the release of large quantities of radioactive material, reducing damage to major equipment or life saving actions.

Table 7.2 specifies the limits for emergency exposure and other relevant criteria to be considered. The ED is responsible for all corrective actions taken to mitigate the consequences of the accident on-site.

7.3 PROTECTIVE ACTIONS Protective actions are implemented to prevent or mitigate consequences to individuals during or after a radiological incident. Protective action recommendations within the SSES Exclusion Area are the responsibility of the ED, but may include assistance by the EOF. Protective actions outside the SSES Exclusion Area are primarily the responsibility of State and local emergency organizations, but may include coordination of activities, dissemination of appropriate data, and recommendations by the ED or Recovery Manager. Effective integration of SSES procedures and implementation plans with State and local implementation plans ensure that all members of the public, including those located on PPL property but outside the emergency plan boundary, will be notified of protective actions to be taken and that the actions can be implemented in a timely manner. Protective action recommendations are outlined in Table 7.3.

7.3.1 On-Site Protective Actions The primary protective measure for on-site personnel in an emergency is prompt evacuation from areas that may be affected by significant radiation, contamination, or airborne radioactivity.

Respiratory protective equipment and clothing are provided at the plant and in the various emergency equipment kits for personnel who may be required to perform emergency activities.

Page 5 of 9

Emergency Plan, Rev. 56, Page 89 of 312 Control of in-plant contamination is in accordance with SSES Health Physics procedures. In the event of radioactive contamination outside fenced security areas, but within the exclusion area, access to such areas is controlled by PPL with assistance from the PSP.

7.3.1.1 Local Area Evacuation This category refers to evacuation from one area to another area within the same building. The initiation of a Local Area Evacuation results from ARM or CAM alarm(s) sounding in the same area within a building or from observed conditions such as smoke or toxic gas, which may indicate a possible habitability problem. The initial response for individuals is to evacuate to an unaffected area of the building, notify the plant Control Room of the conditions, and await further instruction.

The ED assesses the situation, activates appropriate procedures to rectify the condition and informs the personnel when to return to their respective work area via the PA system or direct manual communication.

7.3.1.2 Radiologically Controlled Area Evacuation The initiation of a Radiologically Controlled Area Evacuation results from ARM, CAM, or other applicable monitor alarms, (i.e., fire alarms). Notification for personnel to proceed with a Radiologically Controlled Area Evacuation is announced over the plant PA system. If all or part of the PA system is unavailable then alternate manual methods may be used to notify personnel of the need for evacuation and/or accountability. The initial mandatory response by individuals is evacuation to an unaffected area. In this case, however, the nearest such area may not be in the same building, and multiple ARM, CAM, or fire alarms are probable.

The decision to implement a Radiologically Controlled Area Evacuation is the responsibility of the ED. Factors to be considered include the apparent levels of radiation and/or airborne radioactivity involved and the exposure to personnel that would result from evacuating to Accountability Areas.

7.3.1.3 Security and Accountability Accountability of on-site personnel during an emergency is accomplished through the use of the physical security system and station procedures. The physical security system clearly establishes who is within the protected area. Personnel are notified to report to accountability areas during an emergency via an alert signal transmitted over the PA system. If all or part of the PA system is unavailable then alternate manual methods may be used to notify personnel of the need for evacuation and/or accountability. The names of the personnel reporting in are compared to those logged through the security system in order to ensure total accountability.

Page 6 of 9

Emergency Plan, Rev. 56, Page 90 of 312 If not completed earlier, accountability will be initiated upon declaration of a Site Area Emergency and will be completed within 30 minutes of the initiation of the accountability alert signal.

For certain security-related events, an evacuation of non-essential personnel may be conducted prior to performing accountability.*

7.3.1.4 Site Evacuation A Site Evacuation requires that all individuals within the SSES Exclusion Area, except for Control Room operations personnel and others with specific emergency assignments, leave the site.

If the ED requires off-site assembly, personnel will go to the Remote Assembly Area. The Primary Remote Assembly Area is the Susquehanna Energy Information Center (NE Sector), as shown in Figure 8.1. The alternate Remote Assembly Area is the West Building (WSW Sector). Assembly area leaders will coordinate accountability at Remote Assembly Areas.

Implementation of a Site Evacuation is the responsibility of the ED. That decision is based on the severity of the incident, the likelihood of escalation, and the radiation and airborne radioactivity levels throughout the station. Notification is made via the PA system. If all or part of the PA system is unavailable then alternate manual methods may be used to notify personnel of the need for evacuation and/or accountability.

Accountability is accomplished in passage through the security gate. Personnel and vehicle contamination surveys are performed at the Remote Assembly Area, using portable survey instruments.

For certain events such as some security events, on-site personnel may be directed to remain in place due to personal safety concerns until a more appropriate time for accountability and evacuation.

Station procedures specify those security contingencies.

• 7.3.2 Off-Site Protective Actions The responsibility for actions to protect off-site individuals rests with the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania.

DEP/BRP is responsible for evaluating information obtained from SSES and other sources and recommending appropriate off-site protective actions to PEMA. Such recommendations include:

" Shelter for affected populations

• Evacuation of affected populations

• Administration of thyroid prophylaxis

• Control of contaminated agricultural products Letter dated February 25, 2002 from Samuel J. Collins, Director, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulations, to Robert G. Byram, Senior Vice President and Chief Nuclear Officer.

Subject:

Issuance of Order for Interim Safeguards and Security Compensatory Measures for - Susquehanna Steam Electric Station, Units 1 &2.

Page 7 of 9

Emergency Plan, Rev. 56, Page 91 of 312 The principal off-site local coordinating agency is LCEMA. Since the area and population inside the ten-mile EPZ are partially within Columbia County, parallel emergency response functions are provided by CCEMA.

Upon notification by PEMA of a situation that may require protective actions for off-site populations, LCEMA and CCEMA initiate appropriate actions. If PEMA has lost communication or is otherwise unavailable, it is possible that the ED or Recovery Manager may contact LCEMA and CCEMA directly with protective action recommendations. If time permits, LCEMA and CCEMA obtain a review and verification by PEMA of recommendations made by the ED or Recovery Manager.

LCEMA and CCEMA protective actions include:

" Prompt alerting of the population within ten miles of the SSES through the use of the Alert Notification System (described in Section 8.0) and Route Alerting Teams, a supplement to the siren system that is implemented, as necessary, in the event of siren failure or to alert persons or areas that may not be within the sound of the sirens.

Route alerting is a municipal responsibility and is accomplished by municipal route alert teams traveling in vehicles along preplanned routes delivering the following message: "There is an emergency at the Susquehanna Steam Electric Station; please tune to your Emergency Alert Station."

" Transmission of specific instructions to potentially affected populations via the Emergency Alert System.

" Assistance for evacuation of the population within the ten-mile EPZ.

Appendix G includes the estimated times to evacuate all or segments of the population from the 10-mile EPZ, identifies potential problem areas and provides contingencies for dealing with adverse conditions. It was utilized in the development of detailed evacuation plans by PEMA, LCEMA, and CCEMA.

7.4 AID TO AFFECTED PERSONNEL 7.4.1 Emergency Exposure All reasonable measures are taken to maintain the radiation exposure of emergency personnel who provide rescue, first aid, decontamination, ambulance, fire fighting, law enforcement or medical treatment services within applicable limits specified in Table 7.2. "Guidance on Dose Limits for Workers Performing Emergency Services". Table 7.2 summarizes the emergency exposure criteria for entry or re-entry into areas for purposes of undertaking protective or corrective actions. Actions taken to provide the support activities listed above are considered commensurate with the activities listed in Tale 7.2. Methods and conditions for permitting volunteers to receive emergency radiation exposures are described in EP-PS procedures, and provide for expeditious decisions with consideration to known and reasonable balance of associated risks.

Page 8 of 9

Emergency Plan, Rev. 56, Page 92 of 312 7.4.2 Decontamination and First Aid Personnel contamination in emergency situations is controlled to the extent feasible by the normal methods of using protective clothing and surveying for contamination following the removal of such clothing.

Personnel decontamination areas are available in-plant and decontamination efforts involving significant amounts of contamination are performed under the direction of Health Physics personnel.

At least two persons who are qualified in first aid methods are on-site at all times. First aid to injured personnel can be performed in conjunction with any necessary decontamination methods. However, if immediate treatment of the injury is vital, that treatment takes precedence over decontamination. This philosophy also extends to off-site emergency assistance involving radioactive contamination. For that purpose, measures are established to ensure timely off-site medical treatment.

7.4.3 Medical Transportation and Treatment Arrangements and agreements have been made for the transportation and treatment of patients from SSES, who may have injuries complicated with radioactive contamination or who may have been involved in a radiation incident.

Page 9 of 9

Emergency Plan, Rev. 56, Page 93 of 312 CODE: Notification of Unusual Event = 1 Alert = 2 Site Area Emergency = 3 General Emergency = 4

-TABLE 7.1*

SUMMARY

OF IMMEDIATE NOTIFICATION AND RESPONSE FOR ALL CLASSIFICATIONS ONSITE OFFSITE IMMEDIATE NOTIFICATIONS ACTIONS IMMEDIATE NOTIFICATIONS ACTIONS Fire Brigade (1-4) Fight Fire (1-4) Fire Units (1-4) Fight Fire (1-4)

Damage Control Team (1-4) Repairs (1-4)

First Aid/Rescue Team (1-4) Rescue (1-4) Rescue Assistance (1-4) Rescue (1-4)

First Aid (1-4) Ambulance (1-4) Transport (1-4)

Hospital (1-4) Treatment (1-4)

Security Force (1-4) Security Measures (1-4) PSP (1-4) Assist Security (1-4)

Personnel Evacuation (1-4)

Dose Assessment Personnel (1-4) Dose Calculations (1-4) PPL Headquarters (1-4) Confirmatory Calculations (2-4)

Dose Assessment (1-4) Maintain Communications (2-4)

Field Monitoring Teams (1-4) Field Monitoring (1-4) Field Monitoring and Continuous Evaluation of Dose Projections (2-4)

All Other Station Personnel (1-4) Augment Shift General Off ice(1 -4) Alert Key Personnel (1)

Resources/Activate Site personnel designated as Activate and Staff Offsite NERO TSC (2,3,4) off-site response (2,3,4)* (2,3,4)

Augment Resources/Activate Recommend Offsite Action (4)

Offsite NERO (2,3,4)*

Personnel Evacuation (as appropriate ) (3,4)

TSC and EOF (or alternate TSC) will be activated for certain security events such as a site-specific credible security threat.

Letter dated February 25, 2002 from Samuel J. Collins, Director, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulations, to Robert G. Byram, Senior Vice President and Chief Nuclear Officer.

Subject:

Issuance of Order for Interim Safeguards and Security Compensatory Measures for - Susquehanna Steam Electric Station, Units 1

& 2.

Page 1 of 2

Emergency Plan, Rev. 56, Page 94 of 312 TABLE 7.1

SUMMARY

OF IMMEDIATE NOTIFICATION AND RESPONSE FOR ALL CLASSIFICATIONS ONSITE OFFSITE IMMEDIATE NOTIFICATIONS ACTIONS IMMEDIATE NOTIFICATIONS ACTIONS SEIC/JIC Provide Info to Public via Media (1-4) (1-4)

LCEMA, CCEMA, PEMA, NRC Place ANS & Procedures on (1-4) Standby (2)

Activate and Staff Response Centers (2-4)

Activate the Emergency

Response

Data System (2-4)

Implement Off-site Protective Measures (4)

NOTES: 1. Notification is required to LCEMA, CCEMA, and PEMA within 15 minutes of indicatio'n and verification of the event for Unusual Event, Alert, Site Area, and General Emergency.

2. Initial notification for all levels of emergencies are to LCEMA, CCEMA, PEMA, and NRC.

Page 2 of 2

Emergency Plan, Rev. 56, Page 95 of 312

~~~JI ~EMERGENCY EXPOSURE CRITERIA .:2K.$

Planned exposure to the whole body and/or specific organs should not exceed the following recommendations of the National Council on Radiation Protection and Measurements and the Manual of Protective Action Guides and Protective Actions for Nuclear Incidents (EPA-400).

Guidance on dose limits for workers performing emergency services is summarized in tabular format below.

NOTE: These limits apply to doses incurred over the duration of an emergency, treated as a once in a lifetime exposure, and not added to occupational exposure accumulated under non-emergency conditions.

Doses to all workers including local offsite support agencies such as fire fighting, ambulance services or Local Law Enforcement Agencies during emergencies should, to the extent practical, be limited to 5 rem. There are some emergency situations for which higher exposure limits may be justified. The need for authorization of potential doses greater than 5 rem should be evaluated based on the criteria specified below under "Guidance on Dose Limits for Workers Performing Emergency Services." Justification of any such exposure must include the presence of conditions that prevent the rotation of workers or other commonly used dose reduction methods.

NOTE: Exposure of workers that is incurred for the protection of large populations may be considered justified for situations in which the collective dose avoided by the emergency operation is significantly larger than that incurred by the workers involved.

Persons undertaking any emergency operation in which the dose will exceed 25 rem to the whole body should do so only on a voluntary basis and with full awareness of the risks involved, including the numerical levels of dose at which acute effects of radiation will be incurred and numerical estimates of risk of delayed effects.

Guidance on Dose Limits for Workers Performing Emergency Services 5 rem All 10 rem Protecting Valuable Property Lower Doses Not Practicable 25 rem Life saving or protection of large Lower Doses Not Practicable populations

>25 rem Life saving or protection of large Only on a voluntary basis to persons populations fully aware of the risks involved (see attached tables) a Sum of external effective dose equivalent and committed effective dose equivalent to non-pregnant adults from exposure and intake during an emergency situation. Workers performing services during emergencies should limit dose to the lens of the eye to three times the listed value and doses to any other organ (including skin and body extremities) to ten times the listed value. These limits apply to all doses from an incident, except those received in unrestricted areas as members of the public during the intermediate phase of the incident.

Page 1 of 3

Emergency Plan, Rev. 56, Page 96 of 312 E- 6 -z'i6X'A.QWR Additional General Criteria

" Only volunteers are given planned emergency exposure.

• Attached tables provide information concerning acute and delayed health effects.

" Whenever practical, consideration is given to dividing exposure among as many personnel as possible.

" Potassium Iodide utilization for iodide prophylaxis requires the approval of the Emergency Director or the Recovery Manager in consultation with the Radiation Protection Coordinator or the Dose Assessment Supervisor and medical consultants, if available. It is recommended that potassium iodide be administered in situations where potential exposure of the thyroid is anticipated to exceed 10 rem or at lower dose levels if judged as needed by the RPC or DASU.

• All reasonable measures must be taken to control contamination and internal exposure.

• Persons performing emergency activities should be familiar with exposure consequences.

• Women capable of reproduction should not take part in these actions.

• Retrospective doses are evaluated on an individual case basis.

• To the extent reasonable, persons with high lifetime cumulative radiation exposure should not take part in these actions.

• As in the case of normal occupational exposure, doses received under emergency conditions should be maintained as low as reasonably achievable.

Health Effects Associated with Whole Body Absorbed Doses Received Within a Few Hours(a)

Whole Body Absorbed Dose Early Fatalities(b) Prodromal Effects(c)

(rad) (percent) (percent affected) 05-- 2 100 -- 15 140 5 --

150 -- 50 200 15 85 250 -- 98 300 50 --

400 85 --

460 95 --

a Risks will be lower for protracted exposure periods.

b Supportive medical treatment may increase the dose at which these frequencies occur by approximately 50 percent.

c Forewarning symptoms of more serious health effects associated with large doses of radiation.

Page 2 of 3

.1 s Emergency Plan, Rev. 56, Page 97 of 312

~EMERGENC-Y..;EXPOSURE'CRITERIAý..",

i.ýý Approximate Cancer Risk to Average Individuals from 25 rem Effective Dose Equivalent Delivered Promptly Average Years of Life Lost if Age at Exposure Approximate Risk of Premature Death Premature Death Occurs (years) (deaths per 1,000 persons exposed) (years) 20 to 30 9.1 24 30to 40 7.2 19 40 to 50 5.3 15 50 to 60 3.5 11 Page 3 of 3

Emergency Plan, Rev. 56, Page 98 of 312

-.- '.-T BL -7 7.

.... C

..... d , .,. ... A i ... Reo m-a-n

_Emergency Conditions PPL Actions IPPL Recommendations A. Airborne Release Determine the following:

SSES will provide an initial PAR to the Senior State Official within 15 minutes from the

1. General Public 1. Plant status and prognosis. declaration of a General Emergency as follows:

• Degree of fuel damage 1. For a Rapidly Progressing Severe Accident (RPSA):

• Containment integrity a. Evacuate 2 mile radius;

• Decay heat removal b. Evacuate affected sectors 2-10 miles downwind.

" Ventilation systems

• Remedial, mitigating 2. For a Hostile Action Based (HAB) GE event:

actions in progress a. Shelter 5 mile radius.

2. Status of radioactive releases. 3. For all other General Emergencies:

a. Evacuate 2 mile radius;

• Release path, monitored, b. Evacuate affected sectors 2-5 miles downwind.

unmonitored, both 3.1 When there is a Controlled Containment Venting of less than an hour AND a valid

• Duration of release dose assessment projects doses less than 1000 mrem TEDE and less than 5000 mrem

• Trend of release, Adult Thyroid CDE at EPB AND the PAR is issued by extended ERO (TSC or EOF):

increasing, decreasing, a. Shelter 2 mile radius; constant b. Shelter affected sectors 2-5 miles downwind.

• Treatment availability, filtered, unfiltered Initial PAR shall also advise citizens to take KI in accordance with the state's emergency plans

• Type of release, gap, fuel and advise remainder of the EPZ to monitor and prepare.

melt

• Prognosis for changes in Continue assessment based on available plant and field monitoring information and evaluate above for subsequent PARs in accordancewith:

1. Until RPSA conditions do not apply any more, ERO shall consider the following subsequent PARs based on dose assessment results or changes in wind direction affecting new sectors, if conditions exist which would require classification of a General Emergency per EALs:

a. Evacuate additional affected sectors 2-10 miles downwind

b. Evacuate all sectors where PAGs were exceeded or are expected to be exceeded.

2. Until HAB conditions do not apply any more, ERO shall consider the following subsequent PARs based on dose assessment results:

a. Evacuate 2 mile radius

b. Evacuate all sectors where PAGs were exceeded.

Page 1 ,nf 3

Emergency Plan, Rev. 56, Page 99 of 312 K-I>......4#ABIE QM W;.qON Emergency Conditions PPL Actions PPL Recommendations A. Airborne Release (Cont'd) Determine the following:

3. If RPSA or HAB conditions do not apply, or for all other General Emergencies,

1. General Public (Cont'd) 3. Weather Conditions, affect on ERO shall consider the following subsequent PARs based on dose assessment dose projections. results or changes in wind direction affecting new sectors, if conditions exist which would require classification of a General Emergency per EALs:

4. Dose projections and avoided a. Evacuate additional affected sectors. 2-5 miles downwind dose. b. Evacuate all sectors where PAGs were exceeded or are projected to be exceeded.

When there is a Controlled Containment Venting of less than an hour AND a valid dose assessment projects doses less than 1000 mrem TEDE and less than 5000 mrem Adult Thyroid CDE at EPB AND the PAR is issued by extended ERO (TSC or EOF):

a. Shelter additional affected sectors 2-5 miles downwind.

The PAR methodology described above complies with 10CFR50.47(b)(10),

Appendix E to Part 50,Section IV Paragraph 3 and NUREG-0654, Supplement 3, Rev 1.

Emergency Conditions PPL Action Results PPL Recommendations A. Airborne Release (Cont'd.) 1. Determine the following:

2. Dairy Cows a. Peak activity for 1131 a. Forage Concentration .05 micro Ci/kg Milk .015 micro Ci/I 1.5 Rem projected dose to the infant thyroid whichever is first.

b. Meteorological b. Known sectors potentially DEP/BRP to recommend appropriate protective Conditions affected active to affected farmers.

(1) Wind Speed (2) Precipitation (3) Stability Class (4) Wind Direction Page 2 of 3

Emergency Plan, Rev. 56, Page 100 of 312

-:,:TABLE 73

. ..=.-[:. . .. i, .:, " i -* .:* *:. :. , "[:: , *. I .,-,* , . ., ,. '... .. -.

O ,-N*FR,-E,,:7

.. .. 1;

[Emergency Conditions [PPL Action [Results PPL Recommendations B. Liquid Radioactive Release 1. Determine the following: If the equivalent of an EC fraction 1. Recommend to DEP/BRP that consideration Into Susquehanna River of 0.85 is exceeded at Danville be given to termination of user intake of all

a. Source of release where an EC (effluent downstream users.

b. Quantity of release concentration) is the radionuclide

c. Anticipated length of specific concentration value from 2. Assess additional results of sampling and time release will Column 2 of Table 2 of analyses of radionuclide activity continue Appendix B to 10CFR20. concentrations of SSES liquid, effluent and/or Susquehanna River water upstream of the

2. Notify: Danville Water Authority, and provide appropriate updated recommendations to

a. DEP/BRP DEP/BRP based on that assessment.

b. Danville Water aut hority

c. NRC

• 3. Initiate sampling of:

a. Release point

b. Susquehanna River

4. Initiate projections of radionuclide activity concentrations at the Danville Water Authority.

Page 3 of 3

Emergency Plan, Rev. 56, Page 101 of 312 8.1 ON-SITE EMERGENCY CENTERS 8.1.1 Control Room The Control Room is the primary location for the initial assessment and coordination of corrective actions for all emergency conditions. The Control Room is equipped with the display and controls for all critical plant systems, radiological and meteorological monitoring systems, and all station communication systems. Reference Appendix D, Enclosure 7.

Off-site emergency functions initially served by the Control Room are transferred to the TSC or EOF for an Alert, a Site Area Emergency, or a General Emergency as deemed appropriate by the ED. If the TSC and/or EOF are staffed, the functions may also be transferred at the Notification of Unusual Event level. The primary consideration is to ensure that the number of personnel involved with the emergency in the Control Room shall not impair the safe and orderly shutdown of the reactor or the operation of plant safety systems.

8.1.2 Operations Support Center The OSC is the primary on-site assembly area for operations support team personnel during an emergency. There are 2 OSC areas-a primary OSC located separate from the TSC and Control Room and a backup OSC located in the Control Structure. The primary OSC is located on the first floor of the South (Administrative) Building. The backup OSC occupies 340 square feet adjacent to the Control Room on Elevation 729'-1" of the control structure.

The OSC is utilized initially as the central location for assembly and accountability of on-shift emergency team personnel required to perform such functions as: fire fighting, first aid, search and rescue, damage control, and on-site radiation monitoring. If and when the TSC is activated, all non-operations support team personnel assemble and are accounted for in the OSC (or TSC if the backup OSC is being utilized.) TSC personnel assess the need for emergency team personnel and based on this assessment, the OSC dispatches available team personnel and call in additional personnel as needed. The OSC and TSC assembly areas will be monitored continuously for habitability. If these areas become uninhabitable, retained personnel will be directed to alternate holding areas. Control and dispatch of these teams is the responsibility of the Radio Communicator. The OSC Coordinator manages operations and other support personnel.

Equipment required for these teams to perform their functions, as outlined in Appendix D is stored and maintained in the Control Room, Operations Support Center, Health Physics access control points and Maintenance tool areas.

Page 1 of 15

Emergency Plan, Rev. 56, Page 102 of 312 In the event of hazards preventing site access such as certain security events, personnel who normally report to the Operations Support Center will report to the Alternate OSC at the Emergency Operations Facility. The alternate OSC will be activated as soon as possible to support the site; however, it is recognized that the activation time in the alternate OSC may exceed 60 minutes.

• 8.1.2.1 The Primary OSC The primary OSC is located on the first floor of the South (Administration) Building. The OSC facilities may be used for normal daily activities that do not degrade OSC emergency preparedness.

8.1.2.1.1 Habitability 8.1.2.1.1 .a Allowable Post-Accident Radiation Doses The primary OSC is monitored for radiation exposure using a local ARM and Continuous Air Monitor. The radiation dose will be limited to less than 5 Rem TEDE, at which time the primary OSC will be relocated to the backup OSC.

Applicable criteria are specified in General Design Criterion 19, Standard Review Plan NUREG 0800 Section 6.4, and NUREG-0737, Item ll.B.2.

8.1.2.1.1 .b Postulated Post Accident Radiation Doses The primary OSC is monitored for radiation exposure using a local ARM and Continuous Air Monitor. The radiation dose will be limited to less than 5 Rem TEDE, at which time the OSC will be relocated to the backup OSC. Applicable criteria are specified in General Design Criterion 19, Standard Review Plan NUREG 0800 Section 6.4, and NUREG-0737, Item ll.B.2.

8.1.2.1.1.c Radiation Monitorinq A portable ARM will be installed in the primary OSC area and a Continuous Air Monitor is installed in the South (Administration) Building cafeteria, which is adjacent to the primary OSC. This area serves as an accountability area and a holding area for essential personnel.

Letter dated February 25, 2002 from Samuel J. Collins, Director, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulations, to Robert G. Byram, Senior Vice President and Chief Nuclear Officer.

Subject:

Issuance of Order for Interim Safeguards and Security Compensatory Measures for - Susquehanna Steam Electric Station, Units 1 &2.

Page 2 of 15

Emergency Plan, Rev. 56, Page 103 of 312 8.1.2.1.2 HVAC The primary OSC is subject to normal South (Administration) Building ventilation.

8.1.2.1.3 Shielding There is no special shielding installed. The primary OSC is located in an area with no outside walls.

8.1.2.1.4 Occupant Accommodations Since the primary OSC is located in an administration building, toilet facilities and water are available.

8.1.2.1.5 Communications The primary OSC communication system includes the plant PA system, dedicated lines to other facilities and telephone lines tied through the plant switchboard.

8.1.2.1.5.a Telephone The normal telephone service for the primary OSC uses the plant ETN system, and can reach on and offsite locations.

8.1.2.1.5.b Hotlines Hotlines (dedicated phone lines) are provided in the primary OSC. The primary OSC hotline connects with the TSC or the Control Room.

8.1.2.1.5.c Public Address System The PA system is part of the plant PA system.

The system provides two-way communications at handset stations. Each station may originate and receive communications by switching to either a page channel or to one of five non-interfering party line channels.

Page 3 of 15

Emergency Plan, Rev. 56, Page 104 of 312 8.1.2.2 Backup OSC A backup OSC area exists in the Control Structure and would be used in the event the primary OSC becomes uninhabitable. During normal plant operations, this area serves as an operations staff work area for shift changeover purposes as well as shift work assignment area. The Non-Emergency use of the OSC does not degrade its primary purpose.

8.1.2.2.1 Habitability 8.1.2.2.1.a Allowable Post-Accident Radiation Doses Back-up OSC personnel are protected from radiological hazards, including direct shine and airborne activities for postulated accident conditions to the same degree as Control Room personnel. Applicable criteria are specified in General Design Criterion 19, Standard Review Plan NUREG 0800 Section 6.4, and NUREG-0737, Item ll.B.2 8.1.2.2.1.b Postulated Post Accident Radiation Doses The radiation dose to personnel occupying the backup OSC is the same as the Control Room personnel. The doses from controlling accidents are summarized in Chapter 15.0 of the FSAR.

8.1.2.2.1.c Radiation Monitoring To ensure adequate radiological protection of the backup OSC personnel, a commercial grade monitor located in the center of the Control Room alarms on high gross gamma radiation dose rates.

8.1.2.2.2 HVAC The backup OSC HVAC system is a part of the Control Room HVAC system which is described in FSAR Section 9.4.1.

Page 4 of 15

Emergency Plan, Rev. 56, Page 105 of 312 8.1.2.2.3 Shieldinq Shielding requirement for the backup OSC is the same as for the Control Room for total dose to occupants from direct shine and airborne. Exposure does not exceed 5 Rem TEDE for the duration of the accident. This is in accordance with General Design Criterion 19, USNRC Standard Review Plan NUREG 0800 Section 6.4, and NUREG-0737, Item ll.B.2. Duration of occupancy and method of analysis is the same as that used for the Control Room. Access control may need to be applied within five feet of the east wall of the Control Structure (including the backup OSC) as described in Emergency Plan position specific procedures.

8.1.2.2.4 Occupant Accommodations No toilet facilities are provided in the backup OSC.

Facilities are available in the Control Room and at grade level of the control structure for washing and toilet accommodations.

8.1.2.2.5 Communications The backup OSC communication system includes priority access voice links-hotlines, the plant PA system and telephone lines tied through the plant switchboard.

8.1.2.2.5.a Telephone The normal telephone service for the backup OSC uses the plant ETN and CTN systems.

Both systems have the capability to reach on and offsite locations.

8.1.2.2.5.b Hotlines Priority access voice communication links with automatic signaling is provided in the backup OSC. The backup OSC hotline connects with the TSC or the Control Room.

8.1.2.2.5.c Public Address System The PA system is part of the plant PA system.

The system provides two-way communications at handset stations. Each station may originate and receive communications by switching to either a page channel or to one of five non-interfering party line channels.

Page 5 of 15

Emergency Plan, Rev. 56, Page 106 of 312 8.1.3 Technical Support Center The TSC is a controlled access area that provides working space and facilities for approximately 25 NERO personnel. These personnel provide guidance to plant operations personnel for management of emergency conditions and accident mitigation.

The TSC is located in the existing Control Room mezzanine above the Control Room at elevation 741'-1" of the control structure and occupies approximately 2500 square feet. The TSC is within approximately two minutes travel time of the Control Room by elevator or stairs.

The TSC facilities may be used for normal daily activities that do not degrade TSC emergency preparedness. The TSC provides office space for Operations and Technical personnel. Other station personnel may also use the facilities as a research or reference area.

In the event of hazards preventing site access such as certain security events, personnel who normally report to the Technical Support Center will report to the Alternate TSC at the Emergency Operations Facility.

The alternate TSC will be activated as soon as possible to support the site; however, it is recognized that the activation time in the alternate TSC may exceed 60 minutes.

8.1.3.1 Spatial Layout Description The TSC includes areas for work, conferencing (NRC & PPL),

document control, and computer monitoring. Housed components are PICSY terminals, associated copiers, and SPING monitor panel. (Reference Figure 8.2.)

8.1.3.2 Fire Protection Smoke detection and automatic pre-action sprinkler system are provided.

8.1.3.3 Structural Desiqn Criteria The TSC is part of the control structure that is a Seismic Category I structure, as defined in NRC Regulatory Guide 1.29. It is designed in accordance with Chapter 3.0 of the FSAR.

Letter dated February 25, 2002 from Samuel J. Collins, Director, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulations, to Robert G. Byram, Senior Vice President and Chief Nuclear Officer.

Subject:

Issuance of Order for Interim Safeguards and Security Compensatory Measures for - Susquehanna Steam Electric Station, Units 1 & 2.

Page 6 of 15

Emergency Plan, Rev. 56, Page 107 of 312 8.1.3.4 Habitability 8.1.3.4.1 Post-Accident Radiation Doses 8.1.3.4.1.a Allowable TSC personnel are protected from radiological hazards, including direct shine and airborne activities for postulated accident conditions to the same degree as control room personnel. Applicable criteria are specified in General Design Criterion 19, Standard Review Plan NUREG 0800 Section 6.4, and NUREG-0737, Item Il.B.2.

8.1.3.4.1.b Postulated The radiation dose to personnel is the same as the Control Room personnel.

The doses from controlling accidents are summarized in Section 15 of the FSAR.

8.1.3.4.1.c Radiation Monitoring Commercial grade monitors are provided to alarm on high gross gamma radiation dose rates. In addition, airborne radioactivity concentrations are monitored by portable monitors. Iodine detection capability is provided.

8.1.3.4.2 HVAC The TSC HVAC system is a part of the Control Room HVAC system which is described in FSAR Section 9.4.1.

8.1.3.4.3 Shielding Shielding is the same as for the Control Room for total dose to occupants from direct shine and airborne.

Exposure will not exceed 5 Rem TEDE for the duration of the accident. This is in accordance with General Design Criterion 19, USNRC Standard Review Plan NUREG 0800 Section 6.4, and NUREG-0737, Item ll.B.2.

Duration of occupancy and method of analysis is the same as for the control room. Access control may need to be applied within five feet of the east wall of the Control Structure (including impacted TSC areas) as described in Emergency Plan position specific procedures.

Page 7 of 15

Emergency Plan, Rev. 56, Page 108 of 312 8.1.3.4.4 Occupant Accommodations No sleeping accommodations or toilet facilities are provided.

Use of the plant's existing facilities at grade level of the control structure for washing and toilet accommodations is available. Self-contained breathing apparatus are available for personnel who are qualified in their use.

8.1.3.5 Communication Links The TSC communications system is comprised of three telephone networks (ETN, CTN, and FTS), VHF and UHF radios, and the plant PA system. They provide reliable primary and back-up communication links to emergency response facilities on- and off-site.

8.1.3.5.1 Telephones The TSC uses the CTN system as primary communications with the ETN system available at various locations and the FTS 2001 reserved for federal government agencies.

8.1.3.5.2 Radio The TSC has a four-channel 450 MHz UHF and a two-channel 150 MHz VHF radio system with digital voice privacy capability. The VHF radio is an emergency backup for communication with LCEMA and CCEMA, and to communicate with the field monitoring teams. The UHF radio provides primary and backup security, emergency, operational and maintenance communication links.

8.1.3.5.3 Public Address System The system provides two-way communications at handset stations. Each station may originate and receive communication by switching to either a pager channel or to one of five non-interfacing party-line channels.

8.1.3.6 Power Supply The TSC is part of the existing power block as described in Chapter 8.0 of the FSAR.

8.1.3.7 Instrumentation The TSC utilizes the same field sensors and signal conditioning equipment that is provided to monitor plant systems. TSC instrumentation is identical to the field instrumentation used to operate the plant. A detailed description of this instrumentation is provided in Chapter 7.0 of the FSAR.

Page 8 of 15

Emergency Plan, Rev. 56, Page 109 of 312 8.1.3.8 TSC Data Presentation The TSC includes human factors engineered man-machine capabilities to allow personnel to determine:

• plant conditions during normal operation

• plant steady-state conditions prior to an accident

• transient conditions producing an initiating event

• plant system dynamic behavior during an accident

• projected behavior and effects of offsite airborne radioactivity releases.

The man-machine interface is provided by the Plant Integrated Computer System (PICSY), located in the TSC. (Reference Figure 8.2.)

8.1.3.9 Records and Documents The TSC contains up-to-date records and references for use during emergency conditions. (Reference Appendix D.)

Records are updated and managed by DCS utilizing Plant Administrative Procedures.

8.1.3.10 Security The TSC is located within a plant vital area and is subject to the vital area access controls as identified in the Security Plan.

8.2 PPL OFF-SITE EMERGENCY CENTERS 8.2.1 Joint Information Center For a Notification of Unusual Event, the Susquehanna Energy Information Center, located on U.S. Route 11, is utilized as the Joint Information Center. For other event classifications, the East Mountain Business Center, Plains Township, will be activated as the Joint Information Center.

8.2.2 Emergency Operations Facility The EOF is an emergency response facility that provides continuous management of PPL activities during radiological emergencies that may have offsite impact.

The EOF is located on East Mountain Boulevard in Plains Township, off PA Route 115 five miles north of exit 105 of the Northeast Extension of the Pennsylvania Turnpike and one mile south of exit 170A of:Interstate 81. As the EOF is located beyond 10 miles from the site, the NRC Commission approval was required prior to the relocation. This was granted April 17, 1996 (see REFERENCES, Section 3.19).

The non-emergency activities of the EOF are such that its main function is not degraded.

Page 9 of 15

Emergency Plan, Rev. 56, Page 110 of 312 8.2.2.1 Architecture The EOF is a one-story, rectangular structure. The building was constructed using standard building codes.

8.2.2.1.1 Spatial Layout Description Reference Figure 8.3.

8.2.2.1.2 Fire Protection Automatic wet pipe sprinklers are provided throughout the building.

8.2.2.2 Structural Classification The EOF is classified as a structure, the failure of which would not result in release of significant radioactivity, and is not required for reactor shutdown. This structure is classified as Non-Category I.

8.2.2.3 Habitability The EOF is located outside the EPZ; therefore, no special habitability needs are required.

8.2.2.4 Communications The EOF communications system is comprised of three telephone networks (ETN, CTN, and FTS), VHF radios, and a PA system.

They provide a reliable primary and back-up communications network.

8.2.2.4.1 Telephones The EOF uses a combination of the CTN and ETN systems with the FTS system available for federal governmental agencies. Cellular telephones may also be used as needed.

8.2.2.4.2 Radio The EOF has a two-channel 150 MHz VHF radio system that is used as an emergency backup to the telephone system to communicate with the field monitoring teams, the TSC, CCEMA, and LCEMA.

8.2.2.5 Power Reliability Power is supplied to the EOF via two independent underground power lines that supply the industrial park complex. Upon experiencing a loss of power from the normal supply, a diesel generator starts and supplies power to the building.

Page 10 of 15

Emergency Plan, Rev. 56, Page 111 of 312 8.2.2.6 EOF Data Presentation The EOF includes human factors engineered man-machine interface capabilities to allow personnel to:

• access environmental conditions

• coordinate radiological monitoring activities

• recommend implementation of off-site emergency plans

• monitor Emergency Response Data System 8.2.2.7 Records and Documents The EOF contains up-to-date references and records.

Documents are managed by DCS using plant administrative procedures.

8.2.2.8 Security EOF access during an emergency is limited to authorized personnel. Intrusion detection devices monitor the EOF during unoccupied periods.

8.3 COUNTY AND STATE EMERGENCY CENTERS 8.3.1 County Emergency Centers Both LCEMA and CCEMA have EOCs that meet or exceed the minimum Federal criteria for sufficient space, communications, warning systems, self-sufficiency in supplies and accommodations and radiological protection factor. Both counties maintain full-time employees, providing 24-hour per day coverage either at their EOC or their "911" Centers, to coordinate emergency planning and evaluation. "CTN" telephone connections exist between SSES and each County EOC.

Location of the county EOCs:

• Luzerne County Emergency Management Building Wilkes-Barre, Pennsylvania

• Columbia County Columbia County Courthouse 911 Annex Bloomsburg, Pennsylvania 8.3.2 State Emergency Center The State EOC is located at the PEMA headquarters, located on Interstate Drive, one mile north of the Progress Avenue exit on Interstate 81. This center is equipped with a reliable communications system that includes "CTN" telephone connections between the EOC and SSES, and ties to all area and county EOCs. During an emergency, representatives from appropriate State agencies will assemble at the State EOC to manage and support the emergency response activities. Facilities are also available at the EOF for PEMA personnel.

Page 11 of 15

Emergency Plan, Rev. 56, Page 112 of 312 8.4 ASSESSMENT CAPABILITIES 8.4.1 Radiation Monitorinq System This on-site system, consisting of ARMs, CAMs, and process monitors, contributes to personnel protection, equipment monitoring and accident assessment by measuring and recording radiation levels and concentrations at selected locations throughout the station. Reference Appendix D.

8.4.2 Fire Protection Fire protection at SSES is provided by a network of fire detection, suppression, and extinguishing systems. These systems and associated fire alarms are activated by a variety of fire and smoke detection devices throughout the plant. Types of detectors include combustion product, smoke, thermal, and flame. For more detail, reference the SSES Fire Protection Review Report.

8.4.3 Natural Phenomena Monitors Monitors are provided for detecting and recording natural phenomena events that could result in plant damage due to ground motion or structural vibration. Reference Appendix D.

8.4.4 Environmental Monitoring This program establishes the pre-operational background levels, detects any gradual buildup of long-lived radionuclides, and verifies that operation of the plant has no detrimental effect on the health and safety of the public or the environment. Reference Appendix D.

8.4.5 Emergency Monitoring Team Equipment Reference Appendix D.

8.5 PROTECTIVE FACILITIES 8.5.1 Control Room Protective features (Reference the SSES FSAR):

a. Adequate shielding by concrete walls.

b. CREOASS.

c. ARM system indications.

d. Emergency and essential lighting and power.

e. Basic protection equipment for emergency teams (Appendix D),

and listings/locations of additional emergency supplies/equipment.

f. Communications systems.,

Page 12 of 15

Emergency Plan, Rev. 56, Page 113 of 312 8.5.2 Station Accountability Areas Specific locations are designated for accountability of all station personnel. They are located on the basis of logical access routes and physical separation from likely areas of radiation and/or airborne radioactivity.

8.5.3 Remote Assembly Areas Upon declaration of a Site Evacuation, the ED may send personnel to their homes or to Remote Assembly Areas. These areas are designated for assembly of personnel who can be used to augment the plant staff.

Locations were selected on the basis of:

a. Space availability for all personnel who may be within the exclusion area at the time of an evacuation.

b. Assurance of a controlled area for contamination surveys and for possible establishment of decontamination stations.

8.5.4 Alert Notification System An ANS consisting of sirens with ratings of 121 dB at 100' exists within the ten-mile EPZ around SSES. Siren location was determined by a detailed study including field surveys, actual determination of average background noise level, and consideration of population distribution within the 10-mile EPZ.

Activation of the ANS is via radio control from either the LCEMA Emergency Operations Center or CCEMA Emergency Operations Center.

A back-up satellite system can also activate the sirens from LCEMA or CCEMA. A redundant control station located at PPL Susquehanna LLC has full radio control capabilities and will be used for the purpose of testing and maintenance activities. Direct Current (DC) batteries provide a back-up source of power to the normal Alternating Current (AC) supply.

The Nuclear Emergency Alert signal is a steady 3-5 minute steady tone.

Public response to this signal is to proceed indoors and tune their radio or television to the Emergency Alert System Network serving their local area for additional information.

Testing of the system takes place annually and includes verification of the system's ability to alert the general public.

Page 13 of 15

Emergency Plan, Rev. 56, Page 114 of 312 8.6 ADDITIONAL COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEMS 8.6.1 Commercial Telephone System Two independent telecommunications networks exist to provide primary and backup telephone communications between ERFs and offsite agencies. These systems are the Centrex Telephone Network (CTN) and Electronic Tandem Network (ETN).

CTN extension locations include: Control Room, TSC, EOF, JIC, SEIC, DEP/BRP, PEMA, LCEMA, and CCEMA. This is the primary system for emergency communications.

8.6.2 Plant Emergency Alarm System A plant emergency alarm system provides audible warning of emergency conditions to plant personnel. The system consists of a multi-tone generator, tone selector switch, area selector switch, and message tape recorder. The Emergency Alarm System is integral to the PA System and is powered via the Vital AC UPS. The Plant Emergency Alarm System is tested at least weekly.

8.7 ON-SITE FIRST AID AND MEDICAL FACILITIES A first aid treatment facility, equipped with normal industrial first aid supplies, is located on the first floor of the S&A Building. Standard first aid kits are at designated locations throughout the station. Inventories are performed regularly.

8.8 DAMAGE CONTROL EQUIPMENT Damage control equipment consists of normal and special purpose tools and devices used for maintenance functions throughout the station. The ED has access to keys for maintenance tool cribs, shops and other locations where damage control equipment is stored. Inventories are performed regularly.

8.9 INFORMATION SYSTEMS 8.9.1 Plant Integrated Computer System The PICSY is used for emergency data configuration for the following reasons:

• It contains graphic and trending capabilities.

• It provides for historical data recording and retrieval.

" It has flexibility to permit interfacing to additional I/O equipment and other sources of data.

" Its design provides for a high degree of reliability.

• It is capable of scanning and processing all of the data needed in the EOF and TSC.

• It is located in a secure area within the control structure.

• It has a redundant system design.

• The ERDS and SPDS functions are integrated into its design.

• All of the PICSY data and functions are easily made available at locations remote from SSES.

Page 14 of 15

Emergency Plan, Rev. 56, Page 115 of 312 8.9.1.1 Data Acquisition Data is acquired from I/O hardware in the plant as well as over data interfaces to various other plant equipment. All data is checked for validity and errors before being displayed to the user. Isolation is applied to all safety-related inputs. All data is archived. Both short term and long term data are available for retrieval at any PICSY SDS. Long term data is available for at least the previous fuel cycle.

8.9.1.2 Data Preparation Display formats needed by the ERF are generated and stored within the PCS using standard proven PICSY software. A configuration management software system is employed to track changes to all formats and the database itself.

Proven system and application software has been developed which performs data display and system security. The database includes raw data, data converted to engineering units, data checked on a real-time basis, and various types of calculated data.

User interaction from the PICSY SDS is independent from each station and controlled by multiple copies of the identical software.

8.9.1.3 Data Presentation Three SDSs are available in the TSC for display of Unit 1, Unit 2, and Common data. Procedures and methods for call-up and error indications of TSC function are identical to those used in the control room with one exception. Control Room monitors are usually fitted with touch screens in lieu of track balls and keyboards.

Data is presented in formats that are easy to understand and interpret.

an indication of that not Variables in a normal condition. condition Alarms are presented are represented with by using the same color coding techniques as in the control room.

Output formats are designed according to human factors engineering criteria, and include pattern and coding techniques.

8.9.1.4 Availability A minimum system availability of 99% or greater can be expected, based on analytical calculations.

Page 15 of 15

Emergency Plan, Rev. 56, Page 116 of 312

!ýRELATO HI OFREPRMAYPARMtTER(.'.

SEO!JiSPLYýDSAY'ýAND,,ALGORITHMS ý:"

to Vt:

4 . ~c.} y 42,..-,'1.,- t~ rhl .. i4 H t .. *4-4~ r.,e.-,~in.+/- , ',.. ,,,..,fl t,-,tt-,,.

Primary Secondary Parameter Display Algorithm Reactor Power 1. Reactor Core Status a. Reactivity Monitoring

b. Core Flow

c. Core Spray Reactor Water 1. Reactor Water Level History a. Reactor Water Level Level Reactor Pressure 1. Reactor Pressure History a. Reactor Pressure

2. S/R Valve Lifts a. S/RV Positions (non-ADS)

Drywell Pressure 1. Drywell Pressure and Temperature a. Drywell Pressure History b. Drywell Temperature

2. Containment Status a. Suppression Pool Water Level

b. Suppression Chamber Pressure

c. Suppression Pool Water Temperature

d. Suppression Chamber Atmosphere Temperature

e. S/RV Positions (ADS)

3. Containment Hydrogen/Oxygen Limits a. Containment Atmosphere Control Noble Gas 1. Radioactive Effluent Release a. Off-Gas, Pretreatment Effluent Release b. Primary Containment Activity

c. Reactor Building Vent

d. Turbine Building Vent

e. Liquid Effluent

f. Standby Gas Treatment

2. Containment Isolation a. Containment Isolation Page 1 of 1

Emergency Plan, Rev. 56, Page 117 of 312 I-:

---

L 11 c,rom'LtTRo1 ',n RemotIe Aisernbly Area

-*--- irste V.iorrgTeam Ek-undc~y althe1w C 7Oj 60 I -J SUSOUEHANNA STEW, ELECTRIC STAI'ON

• (4 UNITS I AND 2 EUkEi40LNC'Y Pt.fN MAP OF SQUSLIEHANNA 5E5 E MIFEk'JC.Y 8AGIITIE S FIGU]RE 8.1 Page 1 of 1

Emergency Plan, Rev. 56, Page 118 of 31:

SUSQUEHANNA STEAM ELECTRIC STATION UNITS I AND 2 EMERGENCY PLAN Technical Support Center FLOOR PLAN FIGURE 8.2 09 Typical work station including desk, chair, 04 cm telephone as necessary for emergency response for Indicates telephone-may be a standard telephone. May also represent FTS phone.

the listed positions.

UMJ Vent Monitor Administrative Coordinator Security Coordinator TSC Dose Calculator with MIDAS 09 HPN Communicator Radiation Protection Coordinator Emergency Director TSC Emergency Plan Communicator cm TSC NRC Communicator Operations Coordinator SAM Coordinator Technical Support Coordinator Damage Control Team Coordinator ruk I [FBI I

@1

, r-- nic 0 U

040 M11 Engineering Support Area NSSS Engineer Core thermal Hydraulic Engineer Electrical/I& C Engineer Symbol for Computer j--1 Computer Station-WS PICSY SPDS Power MIDAS Suoplyý (Symbol is not necessarily Engineering indicative of the specific Support Area number of computer installations. The symbol Librar designates a typical coo Radio Comm installation)

Elevator Page 1 of 1

Emergency Plan, Rev. 56, Page 119 of 312 East Mountain Business Center/ Floor Plan EOF/JIC

~USQUEHANNA S STEAM ELECTRIC STATION UNITS 1lAND2 EMERGENCY PLAN

~1'tdo~A ~ofo'~ FI]R 83 S,.uppO t

• Cmrnt Lo c Page 1 of 1

Emergency Plan, Rev. 56, Page 120 of 312 tiusquena'nna uvvi-' Corpo(tfatn Prepared for~American S~ignShal Legend S~1 0 Mile Radius

@ Plant 0 1 2 I 4 A- I 6 8 10 A ASC T-121 SOVPM Contours 0 2 4 8 12 16 SUSQUEHANNA STEAM ELECTRIC STATION Units 1 and 2 EMERGENCY PLAN SIREN LOCATION Figure 8.4 Page 1 of 1

Emergency Plan, Rev. 56, Page 121 of 312 9.1 ORGANIZATIONAL PREPAREDNESS 9.1.1 Training

a. All unescorted personnel entering or working within the SSES Radiologically Controlled Area receive as a minimum, the following instruction:

" Appropriate portions of the SSES EP.

• Use of emergency facilities and equipment, familiarization with station alarms and personnel response, and station communications systems.

• Personnel accountability, evacuation, and radiation exposure criteria.

• Radiation protection, emphasizing protective clothing, equipment, and personnel dosimetry.

b. Those individuals working on the SSES site, inside the protected area, but outside the Radiologically Controlled Area, are provided with instructions on warning signals, accountability areas, and evacuation routes.

c. Personnel assigned to the PPL NERO receive specialized training for their respective assignments. (Reference Table 9.1)

d. PEMA conducts a training program throughout the State and assists the counties in developing training policy for disaster operational readiness. The county and local EMAs are responsible for planning and conducting disaster preparedness training of respective emergency response personnel. PPL works closely with PEMA and the county EMAs in coordinating training programs. In addition, orientation training for State and county agencies and personnel involved in SSES emergency planning efforts is made available by PPL.

e. Annually, DEP/BRP and state, county, and municipal EMAs are invited to participate in a training program conducted by PPL. The initial training program relates the importance of emergency planning and the interface between the PPL and offsite emergency organizations with an emphasis on classification; EALs; reporting requirements; assessment, protective, and corrective actions; and communications networks. In addition, DEP/BRP is offered a specific review of dose calculations/projections, protective actions guides, and reportable information.

Page 1 of 6

Emergency Plan, Rev. 56, Page 122 of 312

f. The State Police, annually, are invited to participate in a training program on appropriate EP-PSs, with emphasis on the classification of emergencies, communications, and specific areas of responsibility.

g. PPL provides training annually to local off-site support organizations. These local organizations are encouraged to become familiar with the SSES, key station personnel, and are invited to attend training conducted by or for PPL.

Initial core training for local fire companies and ambulance associations includes:

lnterface I with the Site Security Force

• Basic health physics indoctrination and training

• SSES facility layout Fire companies also receive training in the following areas:

• On-site fire protection system equipment

• Differences between on-site fire fighting equipment and fire company supplied equipment

• Communications system

• Review of sections of the SSES EP and EP-PSs

• The on-site NERO with emphasis on the interface between the SSES fire brigade and fire company personnel

h. Personnel assigned to the Emergency Planning Organization receive training as required by EP administrative procedures.

Emergency Planning experience may be used in lieu of training.

Each year a fire drill, which includes local fire company support, is held to test these areas.

Annually local ambulance associations are invited to attend specialized training regarding the handling of contaminated/injured victims.

9.1.2 Drills and Exercises Each drill or exercise is conducted to: (1) ensure that the participants are familiar with their respective duties and responsibilities, (2) verify the adequacy of the SSES EP procedures, (3) test communications networks and systems, (4) determine availability and operability of emergency supplies and equipment, and (5) every two years verify the adequacy of off-site agency plans.

Page 2 of 6

Emergency Plan, Rev. 56, Page 123 of 312 Drills and exercises are conducted to simulate actual emergency conditions as closely as possible and may be scheduled such that more than one type of the following drills or exercises can be conducted simultaneously to meet the guidance of NUREG-0654 and the requirements of 1 OCFR50:

• Annual medical drill involving offsite support

• Annual fire drill involving off site support

• Annual radiological drill to site area or general emergency level with offsite participation biennially

• Annual full-scale ANS test

• Annual environmental monitoring drill

• Semi-annual Health Physics drill testing survey sampling and analysis techniques

• Annual drill that tests ability to obtain and analyze a post accident coolant sample

• Perform augmentation drills every six years

• Terrorist-based scenario drill every six years Additional non-integrated drills and tests are conducted as follows:

• Bi-weekly Silent Tests for sirens

" Quarterly Growl Tests for sirens

• Quarterly fire drills

• Monthly communications drills with state and county agencies

• Monthly communications tests with the NRC Drill scenarios for major drills are prepared to involve participation of several emergency teams and all or specific parts of the NERO including varying degrees of participation of State, County, and Federal agencies and local off-site support organizations.

Following the conduct of drills, critiques are held to clearly identify deficiencies and action plans for resolution. Procedures are established to assure the timely implementation of corrective actions.

Ingestion pathway exercises are conducted by the offsite agencies in accordance with PEMA Annex E. Susquehanna Steam Electric Station personnel provide support as required.

Page 3 of 6

Emergency Plan, Rev. 56, Page'124 of 312 9.1.3 Overall Coordination of Nuclear Emergency Preparedness The Manager-Emergency Preparedness is responsible for the overall coordination of all nuclear emergency planning activities. The Manager-Emergency Preparedness is assisted in this effort by: the Plant Manager for activities involving the Susquehanna Site, the General Manager-Nuclear Engineering for engineering issues, the Manager-Nuclear Training for on-site training, the Community Relations Manager-Susquehanna for communications with the public and news media, and the Manager-Quality Assurance for audits of Emergency Planning.

The Manager-Emergency Preparedness is typically responsible for:

• Revising of the SSES Emergency Plan

• Revising of EP-PSs and other Emergency Planning Administrative procedures

• Conducting of integrated drills and exercises and communication drills

" Defining EP training scope for NERO

• Defining EOF and JIC EP Training

• Coordinating EP interface between State and Federal agencies

• Coordinating maintenance and testing of ANS

" Coordinating interface between state, county, municipal, and PPL EPs

• Assuring operational readiness of Emergency Response Facilities 9.2 REVIEW AND UPDATING 9.2.1 SSES Emergency Plan The Manager-Emergency Preparedness is responsible for the review and revision of the SSES Emergency Plan, ensuring:

• A review of the SSES Emergency Preparedness Program is performed periodically by persons who have no direct responsibility for implementation of the program in accordance with 10CFR50.54t.

• Annual review of the SSES Emergency Plan.

• Recommendation of Emergency Plan changes to PORC.

• PORC review of Emergency Plan changes and submission of changes to SRC.

• Revisions or a report of change to the Emergency Plan that do not change the effectiveness of the plan are submitted to the NRC within 30 days from the implementation of such change(s).

Page 4 of 6

Emergency Plan, Rev. 56, Page 125 of 312 9.2.2 Emerqency Plan Position Specific Procedures The Manager-Emergency Preparedness is responsible for the review and revision(s) of the Emergency Plan Position Specific Procedures, ensuring:

• A review of EP-PS Procedures is conducted every two years. The periodic review is accomplished in accordance with established plant procedures.

, Revisions to EP-PS Procedures are done in accordance with established plant procedures.

" Controlled copies of EP-PS Procedure revisions are issued by station document control programs.

• Nuclear Emergency Response Organization (NERO) personnel are briefed on revisions.

9.2.3 Emerciency Plan Technical Procedures The Manager-Emergency Preparedness is responsible for the review and revision(s) of the Emergency Plan Technical procedures, ensuring:

0 A review of EP-TP Procedures is conducted every two years. The periodic review is accomplished in accordance with established plant procedures.

• Revisions to EP-TP Procedures are done in accordance with established plant procedures.

• Controlled copies of EP-TP Procedure revisions are issued by station document control programs.

• Nuclear Emergency Response Organization (NERO) personnel are briefed on revisions.

9.3 MAINTENANCE AND INVENTORY OF EMERGENCY EQUIPMENT/SUPPLIES The Manager-Emergency Preparedness is responsible for periodic inventory and inspection of emergency equipment and supplies, and for periodic surveillance testing of emergency communications systems. This testing includes verification of phone numbers that are contained in Emergency Plan procedures.

These activities are detailed in PPL Emergency Planning Instructions. Equipment, supplies, and parts having limited shelf lives are checked and replaced as necessary. Monthly communications drills and tests are also conducted from PPL ERFs and offsite agencies.

Any deficiencies found during these activities are either cleared immediately or documented for corrective action.

Page 5 of 6

Emergency Plan, Rev. 56, Page 126 of 312 9.4 PUBLIC EDUCATION AND INFORMATION Under the direction of the Manager-Emergency Preparedness, the following methods are utilized to ensure that emergency planning information and education is provided and transmitted to residents and transients in the EPZ annually.

9.4.1 Telephone Directory Inserts With the cooperation of Pennsylvania Emergency Management Agency, Luzerne County Emergency Management Agency, and Columbia County Emergency Management Agency, emergency information is provided in all telephone directories distributed within the ten mile EPZ. This information includes:

• explanation of Emergency Classifications

• what to do when you hear the sirens

• public Protective Actions

• student pick-up points

• evacuation routes to reception centers

• evacuation Plan Map

• callback number for special needs 9.4.2 Proqrams are Offered to Acquaint the News Media With:

" SSES Emergency Plan

• information concerning radiation

• points of contact for the release of public information during an emergency 9.4.3 Educational Training Programs Educational training programs on emergency preparedness are made available to the general public through the staffs of the Susquehanna Energy Information Center and Nuclear Emergency Preparedness.

Page 6 of 6

TABLE 9.1 Emergency Plan, Rev. 56, Page 127 of 312 TRAINING OF SUSQUEHANNA SES EMERGENCY RESPONSE PERSONNEL 1ý4_ 1. ifis "xi Pý ejOdit.4

1. Emergency Directors Shift Managers, and currently assigned Initial training: EP and EP PSs.

Emergency Directors Retraining: Changes in responsibilities.

Frequency: Annual

2. Personnel responsible for Emergency Director; Emergency Coordinators Initial training: EP and EP PSs.

accident assessment/

management Retraining: Applicable EP PSs and changes.

Frequency: Annual

3. Radiation Monitoring Health Physics Supervision; Health Physics Initial training: Radiation monitoring EP PSs and applicable Health Teams Technicians; and Site Personnel Physics Procedures Retraining: Hands-on instrument usage.

Frequency: Annual

4. Fire Brigade Unit Supervisors - Fire Brigade Leader, Training and retraining are outlined in the SSES Fire Protection Effluents personnel - Fire Brigade Members Review Report.

5. Damage Control Teams Non-Licensed Operators; Maintenance Repair and Damage Control are a normal part of the job functions.

Supervision; Maintenance Personnel; Health Physics Technicians; I&C Supervision; I&C Initial training: Availability of damage control equipment, use of Personnel communication systems; and interfaces with other.

emergency teams.

Retraining: Review of the above topics.

1 1 Frequency: Annual Page 1 of 2

TABLE 9.1 Emergency Plan, Rev. 56, Page 128 of 312 TRAINING OF SUSQUEHANNA SES EMERGENCY RESPONSE PERSONNEL Peiso4 Jidvied ,&,Wf ý '-M  ;~iMTfra inin~

6. First Aid and Rescue Work Groups-having 24-hour coverage at Personnel (Emergency Susquehanna: (supplemental team members Medical Response directed by Team Leader)

Teams) Security Force Members Training and retraining: Communication system and interfaces with local medical support personnel.

Non-Licensed Operators Training and retraining: First Aid, CPR Training, and availability of on-site -medical treatment supplies and equipment; (see Note)

Health Physics Training and retraining: CPR Training and radiological hazards (see Note)

Chemistry Training and retraining: CPR Training (see Note)

Effluents Retraining freauencv: Annual

7. Fire Support Personnel Local Fire Companies Training and retraining are outlined in Section 9 of the SSES EP.

8. Medical Support Berwick Hospital Staff; Ambulance Companies; Initial training: Treatment and handling of Personnel Geisinger Medical Center Staff contaminated/injured personnel, communication systems, radiological hazards and interfaces with SSES personnel.

Retraining: Review of the above topics.

Retraining frequency: Annual

9. Corporate Support Corporate Management Personnel; including Initial training: EP and appropriate EP PS's.

Personnel Nuclear Fuel and Analysis, Nuclear Design Engineering and Technology Retraining: Applicable EP-PSs and changes.

Retraining frequency: Annual "

10. Security Personnel Security Supervision; Security Force Members Training is outlined in the SSES Training and Qualification Plan.

11. Public Information Special Office of the President; Information Initial training: EP and Public Information EP PS.

Personnel Services Personnel

-Retraining: Applicable EP-PSs and changes.

Retraining frequency: Annual NOTE: Specific training requirements are identified in the Training Matrices for Emergency Planning, Security, Health Physics, Chemistry, Operations, Effluents and all NERO members.

Page 2 of 2

- - I -1 1-ý Emergency Plan, Rev. 56, Page 129 of 312 APPENDIX A LETTERS OF AGREEMENT Page 1 of 3

Emergency Plan, Rev. 56, Page 130 of 312

.- - G REM E "NT s.

Letters of Agreement have been established with those State and Local agencies as well as local and industry support service groups that are responsible to ensure a high level of emergency preparedness for the SSES. These agreements have been established to assure all parties are aware of their commitment to SSES and the public in the vicinity of the SSES during an emergency.

The following list of agencies and support groups have signed letters of agreement:

Agency/Support Group Berwick Ambulance Association Berwick Hospital Center Berwick Volunteer Fire Department Columbia County Commissioners Department of Energy Department of Environmental Protection/Bureau of Radiation Protection Federal Radiation Monitoring and Assessment Center (FRMAC)

GE BWR Emergency Support Geisinger Medical Center Hobbie Volunteer Fire Co. - EMS Hunlock Creek Ambulance Association Institute of Nuclear Power Operations Lackawanna County Commissioners Latona Trucking Luzerne County Council Medico Industries Mocanaqua Volunteer Fire Company Nanticoke Fire Department National Weather Service Nescopeck Volunteer Ambulance Assoc.

Pennsylvania Emergency Management Agency Pond Hill-Lily Lake Ambulance Association PPL Electric Utilities Salem Township Volunteer Fire Co. #1 Shickshinny Volunteer Fire Department Shickshinny Volunteer Ambulance Assoc.

Stell Enterprises Wilkes Barre Scranton International Airport Page 2 of 3

Emergency Plan, Rev. 56, Page 131 of 312 These letters of agreement provide for:

• Coordination of planning efforts by State and local agencies; industry support groups; fire ambulance and hospital support services; and PPL.

• Appropriate emergency response to assure employee and public safety during an emergency condition at SSES.

• Mutual notification capabilities.

• Appropriate training and exercising of emergency response capabilities.

• Fire, first aid and medical support.

• Environmental monitoring and assessment support.

• Other emergency support services as deemed necessary The Manager-Emergency Preparedness is responsible for renewing letters of agreement every two years where applicable. In some instances, where the letter of agreement is for a specified duration longer than 2 years, letters need not be renewed until the end of the specified duration.

Copies are maintained and controlled within Document Control Services to assure appropriate review and updating takes place.

Page 3 of 3

Emergency Plan, Rev. 56, Page 132 of 312 APPENDIX B WIND ROSES, DOSE/DISTANCE PLOTS AND JOINT FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTION Page 1 of 17

I I -

Emergency Plan, Rev. 56, Page 133 of 312 ORIGINAL DOCUMENT ISSUED 01/1992 SPECIFIC FIGURES MAY HAVE OTHER ISSUE DATES.

ORIGINA OCUETISE 119 Perhaps the best way to discuss the interpretation is to take a specific example. Let us consider the wind rose for Spring (Figure I). This wind rose represents the average wind conditions at the 10 meter level for a total of 4 Springs (1973-1976). Spring is defined as the months of March, April, and May. Similarly Summer consists of June, July, and August, Autumn is September, October, and November, and Winter is December, January, and February.

In looking at Figure I we see that the winds are most frequently from the West. Thus they will carry plant effluents towards the East. We also see that 11.5% of all the winds are from the West. Winds from the West at speeds of 0-1.5 meters per second (mps) comprise 1.6% of all winds; winds from the West at speeds of 1.5-5.0 mps comprise 6.9% of all winds; winds from the West at speeds of greater than 5 mps comprise 3.0% of all winds.

We can also see that 0.8% of all the winds are calm and therefore are not assigned a direction.

In addition the least frequent winds are from the Southeast.

It is also apparent that the lightest winds (0-1.5 mps) most frequently are associated with winds from the East-Northeast and East while the strongest winds (greater than 5 mps) are most frequently associated with winds from the West.

Page 2 of 17

Emergency Plan, Rev. 56, Page 134 of 312 The dose/distance plots have been removed and reference to the use of MIDAS as the approved methodology/tool for determining magnitude of and for continually assessing the impact of the release.

MIDAS has the capability to provide assessments using event-specific fuel damage estimates.

Additionally, MIDAS can provide information at additional distances than were provided in the deleted Dose/Distance nomographs. The system performs estimates and predictions of atmospheric effluent transport and diffusion during and immediately following an accidental airborne radioactive. release from the facility.

Page 3 of 17

Emergency Plan, Rev. 56, Page 135 of 312

-ER-INTERRRT-ATIOLF-iITWR U N KT-Ii The data in Tables B-6 through B-1 3 are from meteorological measurements taken at the Susquehanna site during the time period from 1999 through 2003.

Examples are provided of the way that a joint frequency distribution may be interpreted.

The first example relates to the likelihood of a specific stability class occurring on the Susquehanna site. Table B-7 for Stability Class B shows that this Moderately Unstable class occurs about 1363/43823 (=0.031) or 3.1% of the time. Table B-9 for Stability Class D shows that this Neutral class occurs about 17841/43823 (=.407) or about 40.7% of the time. Looking at all of the information, the reader will see that the more common stability classes that occur at Susquehanna are the D (Neutral) and E (Slightly Stable) stability classes.

The second example relates to the wind speeds that are more common for specific stability classes occurring on the Susquehanna site. Table B-7 for Stability Class B shows that for this Moderately Unstable class, the most common wind speed is in the range from 3.1-5.0 m/s (6.9-11.2 mph), a relatively high wind speed. Table B-1 0 for Stability Class E shows that for this Slightly Stable class, the most common wind speed is in the range from 1.1-1.5 m/s (2.5-3.4 mph), a relatively lower wind speed.

The third example relates to the wind directions that are more common for the Susquehanna site. The Table B-13 of the Joint Frequency Distribution presents a summary for all stability classes observed at the Susquehanna site. The most common wind direction is ENE, meaning that most commonly, the wind is blowing from the ENE over the Susquehanna site. The second most common wind direction is SW, meaning that next most commonly, the wind is blowing from the SW over the Susquehanna site.

As can be seen from review of the table, upriver and downriver winds occur quite commonly at the site.

Page 4 of 17

Emergency Plan, Rev. 56, Page 136 of 312 N

NW NE 10%

WNV ENI W - -,  :.80/6,,,,,

0,-

E S

Rev. 11, 10/8R SUSQUEHANNA STEAM ELECTRIC STATION UNITS 1 AND 2 EMERGENCY PLAN WIND FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTION IN PERCENT LEGEND: PERIOD OF RECORD-1973-1976 (SPRING SEASON)

FIGURE B-i 0-1.5 1.5-5.0 >5 Meters Per Second Page 5 of 17

Emergency Plan, Rev. 56, Page 137 of 312 N

WNW ENE W E WSW ESE Rev. 11, 10/88 SUSQUEHANNA STEAM ELECTRIC STATION UNITS 1 AND 2 EMERGENCY PLAN WIND FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTION IN PERCENT LEGEND: PERIOD:OF RECORD-1973-1976 (SUMMER SEASON) 0-1.5 1.5-5.0 .'5 Meters Per Second FIGURE B-2 Page 6 of 17

Emergency Plan, Rev. 56, Page 138 of 312 N

WNW ENE W E WSW ESE s

Rev. 11, 10/88 SUSQUEHANNA STEAM ELECTRIC STATION UNITS 1 AND 2 EMERGENCY PLAN WIND FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTION IN PERCENT PERIOD OF RECORD-1973-1976 LEGEND:

(AUTUMN SEASON)

FIGURE B-3 0-1.5 1.5-5.0 >5 Meters Per Second.

Page 7 of 17

Emergency Plan, Rev. 56, Page 139 of 312 N

WNW ENE WK E Wsw ESE S

Rev. 11, 10/88 SUSQUEHANNA STEAM ELECTRIC STATION UNITS 1 AND 2 EMERGENCY PLAN WIND FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTION IN PERCENT PERIOD OF RECORD-1973-1976 LEGEND:

(WINTER SEASON) 0-1.5 1.5-5.0 >5 Meters PerSecond FIGURE B-4 Page 8 of 17

Emergency Plan, Rev. 56, Page 140 of 312 N

W Rev. 11, 10/88 _

SUSQUEHANNA STEAM E LE'CTRIC STATION UNITS 1 AND 2 EMERGENCY PLAN WIND FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTION IN PERCENT LEGEND: PERIOD OF RECORD-1973-1976 (ANNUAL AVERAGE) 0-1.5 1,5-5.0 >5 Meters Per Second ,FIGURE B-5 Page 9 of 17

Emergency Plan, Rev. 56, Page 141 of 312 Joint Frequency Distribution Hours at Each Wind Speed and Direction Period of Record = 01/01/99 1:00 - 12/31/03 23:00 Total Period Elevation: Speed: 1OM SPD Direction: 1OM WD Lapse: DT60-1 0 Stability Class: A Delta Temperature: Extremely Unstable Wind Speed (m/s)

Wind 0.23- 0.51- 0.76- 1.1- 1.6- 2.1- 3.1- 5.1- 7.1- 10.1- 13.1-Direction 0.50 0.75 1.0 1.5 2.0 3.0 5.0 7.0 10.0 13.0 18.0 >18.0 Total from N 1 0 0 2 3 11 28 4 0 0 0 0 49 NNE 0 0 0 3 1 28 58 4 0 0 0 0 94 NE 0 0 0 7 15 45 23 0 0 0 0 0 90 ENE 0 0 1 8 17 11 4 0 0 0 0 0 41 E 0 4 26 8 4 1 0 0 0 0 43 0 0 ESE 0 1 7 12 7 8 6 0 0 0 0 0 41 SE 0 0 2 6 14 33 20 0 0 0 0 0 75 0 2 6 19 36 14 1 0 0 0 0 78 SSE 0 63 1 0 0 0 166 S 0 0 2 10 28 62 0 SSW 0 0 0 12 38 105 88 4 0 0 0 0 247 SW 0 0 1 10 38 177 261 28 1 0 0 0 516 WSW 0 0 0 4 7 29 125 35 2 0 0 0 202 W 0 0 0 1 2 4 48 5 0 0 0 0 60 WNW 0 0 0 1 2 6 12 0 0 0 0 0 21 NW 0 0 0 0 1 0 6 3 0 0 0 0 10 NNW 0 0 0 1 0 1 12 4 0 0 0 0 18 Totals 1 1 19 109 200 560 769 89 3 0 0 0 1751 Number of Calm Hours for this Table 18 Number of Variable Direction Hours for this Table 0 Number of Invalid Hours 297 Number of Valid Hours for this Table 1751 Total Hours for the Period 43823 SUSQUEHANNA STEAM ELECTRIC STATION UNITS 1 AND 2 EMERGENCY PLAN JOINT FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTION Page 10 of 17 FIGURE B-6

Emergency Plan, Rev. 56, Page 142 of 312 Joint Frequency Distribution Hours at Each Wind Speed and Direction Period of Record = 01/01/99 1:00- 12/31/03 23:00 Total Period Elevation: Speed: 10M SPD Direction: 1OM WD Lapse: DT60-1 0 Stability Class: B Delta Temperature: Moderately Unstable Wind Speed (m/s)

Wind 0.23- 0.51- 0.76- 1.1- 1.6- 2.1- 3.1- 5.1- 7.1- 10.1- 13.1-Direction 0.50 0.75 1.0 1.5 2.0 3.0 5.0 7.0 10.0 13.0 18.0 > 18.0 Total from N 0 1 0 1 5 9 42 8 0 0 0 0 66 NNE 0 0 0 3 20 47 34 3 0 0 0 0 107 NE 0 0 12 16 46 24 0 0 0 0 0 98 ENE 0 0 1 24 13 10 2 0 .0 0 0 0 50 E 0 0 9 15 7 10 3 0 0 0 0 0 44 ESE 0 0 4 11 14 5 5 0 0 0 0 0 39 SE 0 0 2 10 11 16 11 0 0 0 0 0 50 SSE 0 0 0 4 11 11 6 0 0 0 0 0 32 S 0 0 2 11 14 38 21 0 0 0 0 0 86 SSW 0 0 1 11 39 55 28 3 0 0 0 0 137 SW 0 0 0 4 36 105 175 31 4 0 0 0 355 WSW 0 0 1 1 7 23 100 43 2 0 0 0 177 W 0 0 0 0 1 8 34 4 0 0 0 0 47 WNW 0 0 0 0 1 1 18 1 0 0 0 0 21 NW 0 0 0 0 1 5 10 2 0 0 0 0 18 NNW 0 0 0 0 4 8 19 3 2 0 0 0 36 Totals 0 1 20 107. 200 397 532 98 8 0 0 0 1363 Number of Calm Hours for this Table 18 Number of Variable Direction Hours for this Table 0 Number of Invalid Hours 297 Number of Valid Hours for this Table 1363 Total Hours for the Period 43823 SUSQUEHANNA STEAM ELECTRIC STATION UNITS 1 AND2 EMERGENCY PLAN JOINT FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTION FIGURE B-7 Page 11 of 17

Emergency Plan, Rev. 56, Page 143 of 312 Joint Frequency Distribution Hours at Each Wind Speed and Direction Period of Record= 01/01/99 1:00- 12/31/03 23:00 Total Period Elevation: Speed: 10M SPD Direction: 1OM WD Lapse: DT60-1 0 Stability Class: C Delta Temperature: Slightly Unstable Wind Speed (m/s)

Wind 0.23- 0.51- 0.76- 1.1- 1.6- 2.1- 3.1- 5.1- 7.1- 10.1- 13.1-Direction 0.50 0.75 1.0 1.5 2.0 3.0 5.0 7.0 10.0 13.0 18.0 > 18.0 Total from N 0 0 0 3 7 23 73 6 0 0 0 0 112 NNE 0 0 1 8 21 52 59 6 0 0 0 0 147 NE 0 0 0 12 24 45 20 0 0 0 0 0 101 ENE 0 0 2 25 20 14 4 0 0 0 0 0 65 E 0 1 7 19 8 8 3 0 0 0 0 0 46 ESE 0 1 6 15 16 10 3 0 0 0 0 0 51 SE 1 0 7 9 17 13 11 0 0 0 0 0 58 SSE 0 1 4 12 18 21 12 0 0 0 0 0 68 S 0 0 4 26 28 50 28 0 0 0 0 0 136 SSW 0 0 1 24 35 76 17 2 0 0 0 0 155 SW 0 0 1 18 43 146 186 37 1 0 0 0 432 WSW 0 0 1 3 11 38 139 61 7 0 0 0 260 W 0 0 0 8 7 7 51 21 1 0 0 0 95 WNW 0 0 0 0 2 14 31 1 0 0 0 0 48 NW 0 0 1 0 3 9 30 4 0 0 0 0 47 NNW 0 0 0 1 1 19 31 16 2 0 0 0 70 Totals 1 3 35 183 261 545 698 154 11 0 0 0 1891 Number of Calm Hours for this Table 18 Number of Variable Direction Hours for this Table 0 Number of Invalid Hours 297 Number of Valid Hours for this Table 1891 Total Hours for the Period 43823 SUSQUEHANNA STEAM ELECTRIC STATION UNITS 1 AND 2 EMERGENCY PLAN JOINT FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTION Page 12 of 17 FIGURE B-8

Emergency Plan, Rev. 56, Page 144 of 312 Joint Frequency Distribution Hours at Each Wind Speed and Direction Period of Record = 01/01/99 1:00- 12/31/03 23:00 Total Period Elevation: Speed: iOM SPD Direction: 1OM WD Lapse: DT60-1 0 Stability Class: D Delta Temperature: Neutral Wind Speed (m/s)

Wind 0.237 0.51- 0.76- 1.1- 1.6- 2.1- 3.1- 5.1- 7.1- 10.1- 13.1-Direction 0.50 0.75 1.0 1.5 2.0 3.0 5.0 7.0 10.0 13.0 18.0 > 18.0 Total from N 2 7 23 74 119 433 716 98 0 0 0 0 1472 NNE 1 16 64 214 267 519 324 15 0 0 0 0 1420 NE 9 33 119 276 281 418 164 6 0 0 0 0 1306 ENE 8 51. 130 219 153 158 54 3 0 0 0 0 776 E 10 85 158 202 124 119 32 5 0 0 0 0 735 ESE 15 67 144 144 117 146 58 7 3 1 0 0 702 SE 7 53 110 219 169 200 121 14 1 0 0 0 894 SSE 10 38 74 163 158 179 89 9 1 0 0 0 721 S 3 26 84 210 204 257 106 7 0 0 0 0 897 SSW 0 15 54 220 242 368 139 2 b 0 0 .1040 0

SW 1 8 29 193 242 594 864 170 7 0 0 0 2108 WSW 0 3 15 87 132 254 627 425 90 1 0 0 1634 W 0 1 6 38 80 196 396 172 35 0 0 0 924 WNW 0 2 4 23 49 157 314 108 19 0 0 0 676 NW 1 2 11 31 45 225 632 178 6 0 0 0 1131 NNW 0 4 8 33 52 268 752 280 8 0 0 0 1405 Totals 67 411 1033 2346 2434 4491 5388 1499 170 2 0 0 17841 Number of Calm Hours for this Table 18 Number of Variable Direction Hours for this Table 0 Number of Invalid Hours 297 Number of Valid Hours for this Table 17841 Total Hours for the Period 43823 SUSQUEHANNA STEAM ELECTRIC STATION UNITS 1 AND 2 EMERGENCY PLAN JOINT FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTION Page 13 of 17 FIGURE B-9.

I :2.>K-9 I-Emergency Plan, Rev. 56, Page 145 of 312 Joint Frequency Distribution Hours at Each Wind Speed and Direction Period of Record = 01/01/99 1:00- 12/31/03 23:00 Total Period Elevation: Speed: 10M SPD Direction: 1OM WD Lapse: DT60-1 0 Stability Class: E Delta Temperature: Slightly Stable Wind Speed (m/s)

Wind 0.23- 0.51- 0.76- 1.1- 1.6- 2.1- 3.1- 5.1- 7.1- 10.1- 13.1-Direction 0.50 0.75 1.0 1.5 2.0 3.0 5.0 7.0 10.0 13.0 18.0 > 18.0 Total from N 1 14 28 90 138 144 53 2 0 0 0 0 470 NNE 3 33 112 324 269 254 79 1 0 0 0 0 1075 NE 13 124 289 551 197 159 54 0 0 0 0 0 1387 ENE 20 279 467 493 87 29 7 3 0 0 0 0 1385 E 41 378 361 154 33 29 5 0 0 0 0 0 1001 ESE 45 265 207 99 30 24 8 5 0 0 0 0 683 SE 37 201 229 152 48 50 23 10 4 0 0 0 754 SSE 19 109 183 213 95 63 40 6 0 0 0 0 728 S 10 75 216 413 193 151 49 18 0 0 0 0 1125 SSW 3 42 126 397 334 309 84 4 0 0 0 0 1299 SW 2 14 39 188 209 343 210 10 1 0 0 0 1016 WSW 0 4 12 64 80 83 61 14 3 0 0 0 321 W 2 1 9 36 33 37 19 4 0 0 0 0 141 WNW 0 2 7 16 23 34 13 0 0 0 0 0 95 NW 1 2 4 19 42 87 24 2 0 0 0 0 181 NNW 0 5 6 21 41 116 35 2 0 0 0 0 226 Totals 197 1548 2295 3230 1852 1912 764 81 8 0 0 0 11887 Number of Calm Hours for this Table 18 Number of Variable Direction Hours for this Table 0 Number of Invalid Hours 297 Number of Valid Hours for this Table 11887 Total Hours for the Period 43823 SUSQUEHANNA STEAM ELECTRIC STATION UNITS 1 AND 2 EMERGENCY PLAN JOINT FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTION Page 14 of 17 FIGURE B-10

Emergency Plan, Rev. 56, Page 146 of 312 Joint Frequency Distribution Hours at Each Wind Speed and Direction Period of Record = 01/01/99 1:00- 12/31/03 23:00 Total Period Elevation: Speed: 10M SPD Direction: 1OM WD Lapse: DT60-10 Stability Class: F Delta Temperature: Moderately Stable Wind Speed (m/s)

Wind 0.23- 0.51- 0.76- 1.1- 1.6- 2.1- 3.1- 5.1- 7.1- 10.1- 13.1-Direction 0.50 0.75 1.0 1.5 2.0 3.0 5.0 7.0 10.0 13.0 18.0 > 18.0 Total from N 1 5 6 25 11 5 2 0 0 0 0 0 55 NNE 5 21 34 66 32 9 1 0 0 0 0 0 168 NE 13 92 198 257 50 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 612 ENE 21 361 806 994 149 6 0 0 0 0 0 0 2337 E 44 371 356 149 9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 929 ESE 23 160 122 15 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 320 SE 14 82 82 25 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 205 SSE 8 32 78 49 6 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 174 S 2 29 78 121 14 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 246 SSW 1 16 24 81 37 4 1 0 0 0 0 0 164 SW 1 4 15 38 21 19 2 0 0 0 0 0 100 WSW 0 0 5 6 4 3 1 0 0 0 0 0 19 W 2 2 3 5 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 13 WNW 1 0 0 2 2 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 6 NW 0 0 2 1 1 2 1 0 0 0 0 0 7 NNW 1 0 3 2 5 2 2 0 0 0 0 0 15 Totals 137 1175 1812 1836 343 55 12 0 0 0 0 0 5370 Number of Calm Hours for this Table 18 Number of Variable Direction Hours for this Table 0 Number of Invalid Hours 297 Number of Valid Hours for this Table 5370 Total Hours for the Period 43823 SUSQUEHANNA STEAM ELECTRIC STATION UNITS 1 AND 2 EMERGENCY PLAN JOINT FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTION Page 15 of 17 FIGURE B-1i1

Emergency Plan, Rev. 56, Page 147 of 312 Joint Frequency Distribution Hours at Each Wind Speed and Direction Period of Record = 01/01/99 1:00- 12/31/03 23:00 Total Period Elevation: Speed: 10M SPD Direction: 1OM WD Lapse: DT60-1 0 Stability Class: G Delta Temperature: Extremely Stable Wind Speed (m/s)

Wind 0.23- 0.51- 0.76- 1.1- 1.6- 2.1- 3.1- 5.1- 7.1- 10.1- 13.1-Direction 0.50 0.75 1.0 1.5 2.0 3.0 5.0 7.0 10.0 13.0 18.0 > 18.0 Total from N 1 2 2 3 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 9 NNE 1 16 17 17 3 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 55 NE 2 71 168 162 19 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 423 ENE 8 167 690 1065 186 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 2120 E 13 120 219 102 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 457 ESE 4 63 55 9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 131 SE 3 31 35 12 2 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 84 SSE 0 14 23 15 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 55 S 0 5 12 17 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 34 SSW 1 2 8 7 5 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 24 SW 0 2 3 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 7 WSW 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 W 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 WNW 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 NW 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 NNW 0 2 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 Totals 33 497 1232 1411 222 10 0 0 0 0 0 0 3405 Number of Calm Hours for this Table 18 Number of Variable Direction Hours for this Table 0 Number of Invalid Hours 297 Number of Valid Hours for this Table 3405 Total Hours for the Period 43823 SUSQUEHANNA STEAM ELECTRIC STATION UNITS 1 AND 2 EMERGENCY PLAN JOINT FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTION Page 16 of 17 FIGURE B-12

Emergency Plan, Rev. 56, Page 148 of 312 Joint Frequency Distribution Hours at Each Wind Speed and Direction Period of Record = 01/01/99 1:00- 12/31/03 23:00 Total Period Elevation: Speed: 10M SPD Direction: 1OM WD Lapse: DT60-1 0 Summary of All Stability Classes Delta Temperature Wind Speed (m/s)

Wind 0.23- 0.51- 0.76- 1.1- 1.6- 2.1- 3.1- 5.1- 7.1- 10.1- 13.1-Direction 0.50 0.75 1.0 1.5 2.0 3.0 5.0 7.0 10.0 13.0 18.0 > 18.0 Total from N 6 29 59 198 284 625 914 118 0 0 0 0 2233 NNE 10 86 228 635 613 910 555 29 0 0 0 0 3066 NE 37 320 774 1277 602 715 286 60 0 0 0 0 4017 ENE 57 858 2097 2828 625 232 71 6 0 0 0 0 6774 E 108 955 1114 667 192 170 44 5 0 0 0 0 3255 ESE 87 557 545 305 184 193 80 12 3 1 0 0 1967 SE 62 367 467 433 263 313 186 24 5 0 0 0 2120 SSE 37 194 364 462 310 311 161 16 1 0 0 0 1856 S 15 135 398 808 481 559 268 26 0 0 0 0 2690 SSW 5 75 214 752 730 918 357 1 0 0 0 0 3066 SW 4 28 88 452 589 1385 1698 276 14 0 0 0 4534 WSW .0 8 34 165 241 430 1053 578 104 1 0 0 2614 W 4 4 18 88 123 254 548 206 36 0 0 0 1281 WNW 1 4 11 42 79 213 388 110 19 0 0 0 867 NW 2 5 18 51 93 328 703 189 6 0 0 0 1395 NNW 1 11 17 59 103 414 851 305 12 0 0 0 1773 Totals 436 3636 6446 9222 5512 7970 8163 1921 200 2 0 0 43508

.Number of Calm Hours for this Table 18 Number of Variable Direction Hours for this Table 0 Number of Invalid Hours 297 Number of Valid Hours for this Table 43508 Total Hours for the Period 43823 SUSQUEHANNA STEAM ELECTRIC STATION UNITS 1 AND 2 EMERGENCY PLAN JOINT FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTION FIGURE B-13 Page 17 of 17

Emergency Plan, Rev. 56, Page 149 of 312 APPENDIX C SSES EMERGENCY PLAN POSITION SPECIFIC PROCEDURES (TYPICAL)

Page 1 of 2

Emergency Plan, Rev. 56, Page 150 of 312 APPENDIX C SSES EMERGENCY PLAN POSITION SPECIFIC PROCEDURES (TYPICAL)

TSC Procedures EOF/JIC Procedures Emergency Director/CR Recovery Manager Emergency Director/TSC County Liaison Technical Support Coordinator NEP Duty Planner Operations Coordinator EOF Communicator Radiation Protection Coordinator Dose Assessment Supervisor TSC Dose Calculator EOF Dose Calculator HP Specialist Dose Assessment Staffer HP Radioman Field Team Director.

HP Tech I (Oscar) Environmental Sampling Director TSC Lead Engineer Environmental Sampling Team Security Coordinator Emergency Monitoring Team Administrative Support Coordinator Liaison Support Supervisor Control Room E Plan Communicator EOF Support Supervisor TSC E Plan Communicator Administrative Assistant HPN Communicator Engineering Support Supervisor HP Tech II Dose Calculator Fuels Lead Engineer Damage Control Team Coordinator Systems Lead Engineer Severe Accident Management Coordinator Electrical Support Engineer Control Room NRC Communicator Mechanical Support Engineer TSC NRC Communicator Public Information Manager Core Thermal Hydraulics Engineer News Manager Public Information Tech Briefer OSC Procedures Support Services Manager JIC Communicator OSC Coordinator Media/Public Officials Contact Radio Communicator JIC Writer Maintenance Foreman/Field Unit Supervisor JIC Administrative Coordinator Chemistry Coordinator Chemistry Sampling Team Page 2 of 2

Emergency Plan, Rev. 56, Page 151 of 312

.APPENDIX D EQUIPMENT INFORMATION LISTINGS Page 1 of 16

Emergency Plan, Rev. 56, Page 152 of 312 CONTENTS OF APPENDIX D Eguihment Information Listings Typical Station Decontamination Area Equipment Typical Damage Control Equipment Storage Box Contents Onsite Search and Rescue/First Aid, Typical Ambulance and Hospital Radiation Emergency Equipment and Supplies Natural Phenomena Monitors Radiological Monitors Environmental Monitoring Systems Typical Health Physics Van Radiation Emergency Monitoring Equipment Emergency Classification Dependent Instrumentation Typical Initial Emergency Equipment for Initial Incident Response Typical TSC Equipment Typical EOF Equipment Page 2 of 16

Emergency Plan, Rev. 56, Page 153 of 312 ENCLOSURE 1 TO APPENDIX D Typical Station Decontamination Area Equipment Decontamination Procedures Lotion Skin Cleaner Cotton Gloves Masking Tape Coveralls (Disposable) Paper Towels Decontamination Soap Shoe Covers, paper Disposable Bath Towels Spare Frisker Cable Disposable Gloves Spare Frisker Probe Frisker Sponges Hand Brushes Hand Cream Typical Damage Control Equipment Storage Box Contents Amprobe Plugs, Wood, 1'" & 6" Bars, Pry, Large Plugs, Wooden Box, 1", 1 /', 11/2',2", 21/2", 3" Bars, Pry, Rolling Lead Rubber, Roll 1/16" thick, 10' X 3' Black Wire, 1/4 lb. Rolls, 16 Gauge Screwdrivers, Large Standard Box, Tool, 23" Screwdrivers, Medium Standard Bucket, 14 quart, Plastic Screwdrivers, Phillips, Large Cable Cutters Screwdrivers, Phillips, Medium Clamps, C, Medium String, Ball Clamps, C, Large Twine, Bale Clamps, C, Small Wedges, Wooden Electricians Pouch with Miscellaneous Hand Tools Wrench, Adjustable, 12" Enerpac, Rescue Unit Wrench, Adjustable, 8" Flashlight, 5 cell Wrench, Allen Pac 3/16", 7/32", 1/4", 5/16", 3/8" Hammer, Ball Peen, 16 oz. Wrench, Allen Pac .050", 1/16", 5/64", 3/32",

Hammer, Sledge, 10 lb. 7/64", 1/8", 9/64", 5/32", 3/16", 7/32" Hammer, Sledge, 8 lb. Wrench, Chain Multimeter Wrench, Hex, #110 Nylon Rope, 100' coils, 3/4" Wrench, Hex, #17 Nylon Rope, 25' coils, 3/8" Wrench, Hex, 24" Nylon Rope, 50' coils, 3/8" Wrench, Pipe, 18" Nylon Rope, 50' coils, 3/4" Wrench, Pipe, 14" Plastic Sheet, 20' X 20', Fire Retardant Pliers, Lineman Pliers, Water Pump Page 3 of 16

Emergency Plan, Rev. 56, Page 154 of 312 ENCLOSURE 2 TO APPENDIX D Tyvical Onsite Search and Rescue/First Aid, Ambulance. and Hospital Radiation Emergency Eguipment and Supplies Onsite Search Rescue/First Aid:

Adjustable Litter Folding Litter Basket Stretcher (Stokes) Portable Oxygen-Demand Valve (size D tank First Aid Team Initial Response Kit with With assorted airways, cannulas, and masks)

Inventory Sheet Scoop Stretcher Trauma Kit Assorted Splinting Devices Ambulance Kit:

Tape roll Plastic Sheeting, 8' X 20' Misc. Plastic Bags Plastic Shoe Covers Plastic Gloves Portable Frisker and Probe Set of Anti-contamination Clothing Hospital:

Dosimeter Charger Self Reading Dosimeters Survey Meter Set of Radiation Signs and Ribbon Frisker with Probe Stanchions Herculite - white, green and yellow Step-off Pad Lead Container, high activity samples Thermoluminescent Dosimeters, badge type Thermoluminescent Dosimeters, ring type Page 4 of 16

Emergency Plan, Rev. 56, Page 155 of 312 ENCLOSURE 3 TO APPENDIX D Natural Phenomena Monitors METEOROLOGICAL MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION

1. Wind Speed Instrument

a. Elevation 10 meters and 60 meters.

2. Wind Direction Instrument

a. Elevation 10 meters and 60 meters.

3. Air Temperature Difference Instrument

a. Elevation 10/60 meters.

4. Ambient Temperature Gauge Instrument

a. Elevation 10 meters.

5. Dew Point Gauge Instrument

a. Elevation 10 meters.

6. Rainfall Gauge Instrument

a. Ground level.

SEISMIC MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION INSTRUMENTS AND SENSOR LOCATIONS

1. Triaxial Accelerometers and Triggers

a. Reactor Equipment, Unit 1

b. Reactor Bldg. Floor (RHR), Unit 1

c. ESSW Pumphouse Floor (a)

d. Containment Foundation, Unit 1 (a)

e. Containment Structure, Unit 1

f. Containment Foundation, Unit 2 (a)

Page 5 of 16

Emergency Plan, Rev. 56, Page 156 of 312 ENCLOSURE 3 TO APPENDIX D (cont'd)

2. Peak Accelerographs

a. Reactor Equipment, Unit 2

b. Reactor Piping, Unit 2

c. RHR Pump Room, Unit 2 3 Response-Spectrum Analyzer/Recorders (a) The Unit 1 Containment Foundation, Unit 2 Containment Foundation and ESSW Pumphouse Floor Accelerometer Channels have associated triggers. These triggers provide control room indication and annunciation.

Page 6 of 16

Emergency Plan, Rev. 56, Page 157 of 312 J_.*,**.=_*,*.-,. dS* .... a,4. 'p........ . . . .÷ ..- *....., .:. ..

• Instrument Type Individual Detectors Function & Sensitivity Air Sampling Equipment Continuous Air Monitors Particulate, Iodine Equipment &

Gas Monitor High volume samplers Particulate, Iodine Low volume samplers Particulate, Iodine Breathing zone samplers Particulate, Iodine Personnel Dosimetry Electronic Dosimetry 0 - 100,000 mrem TLD's Portable Survey Instruments GM survey instruments 0 - 2 R/hr Ion chamber survey instruments 0 - 5 Rem/hr Ion chamber survey instruments 0 - 50 Rem/hr Telescoping GM survey instruments 0 - 1,000 R/hr GM count rate meters 0 - 50,000 cpm Meter with alpha scintillation probe 10 CPM to 100,000 CPM Neutron detector 0 - 5 Rem/hr Portal monitors Counting Room Low background gas N/A proportional counters Liquid scintillation counter scintillation - alpha scintillation - beta High Purity Ge Spectrometer GM End Window Scaler Page 7 of 16

Emergency Plan, Rev. 56, Page 158 of 312

-hi dEdfIs~ue,4 IApj3endixD (Cdnt'd)

. , *-. ,,*.** .. AREARADIATION

• ,,* ,.,*. L

,n.'T* * * ,'. ..* "MONITORS, ocation * [,,

. 9,p**.*,- :iL (ARM

,, """-* R n aT"ge.. Local1',..."

=**

Channel # SLocationBuilding and Area Elev. Range (mR/hr) Local Alarm 1 1R/2R Resid Heat Removal Area 645' 0.1-1000 Yes 2 1 R/2R RCIC Pump Turbine Room 645' 0.01-100 Yes 3 1R/2R HPCI Pump Turbine Room 645' 0.01-100 Yes 4 1R/2R Radwaste Sump Area 645' 0.1-1000 Yes 5 1R/2R Control Rod Drive (North) 719' 0.1-1000 Yes 6 1R/2R Control Rod Drive (South) 719' 0.1-1000 Yes 7 1 R/2R Offgas By Pass Line 656' 0.1-1000 Yes 8 1 R/2R Cleanup Recirc. Pump Access Area 749' 0.01-100 Yes 9 1R/2R CRD Repair Area 719' 0.1-1000 Yes 10 1R/2R Fuel Pool Room 749' 0.1-1000 Yes 11 1 R/2R Sample Station Room 749' 0.01-100 Yes 12 1R/2R Recirc. Fan Room 799' 0.01-100 Yes 13 1 R/2R New Fuel Storage Vault 817' 0.1-1000 Yes 14 1R/2R Spent Fuel Pool 818' 0.1-1000 Yes 15 *1R/2R Refueling Floor Area 818' 0.01-100 Yes 16 .1R/2R Access to Remote Shutdown 670' 0.01-100 Yes 17 1T/2T Cond. Pumps Area 656' 0.01-100 Yes 18 1T/2T RFPT Area at Reactor Bldg Access 676' 0.01-100 Yes 19 1T/2T Air Ejector Room 682' 0.1-1000 Yes 20 1T/2T Feedwater Heater Area 699' 0.1-1000 Yes 21 1T/2T Rx Recirc. MG Set Area 729' 0.01-100 Yes 22 1T/2T Generator Bay Area 729' 0.01-100 Yes 23 1T/2T H&V Equip. Room 762' 0.01-100 Yes 24 1T/2T Turbine Front End 729' 0.01-100 Yes 25 1 R/2R Resid. Heat Removal Area 645' 0.1-1000 Yes 26 1R/2R TIP Drive Area 719' 0.1-1000 Yes 27 S&A Bldg. Entrance to Turbine Floor 729' 0.01-100 Yes 28 S&A Bldg. 2nd Floor Corridor 691' 0.01-100 Yes 29 RW Corr. Pers. Access Area 646'. 0.1-1000 Yes 30 RW Opt. Surveil. Contr. Area 646' 0.1-1000 Yes 31 RW Corr. to Collection Tank 646' 0.1-1000 Yes 32 RW Controlled Zone Shop 676' 0.1-1000 Yes 33 RW Control Room 676' 0.1-1000 Yes 34 RW Storage and Equip. Area 676' 0.1-1000 Yes 35 RB Sampling Cask Storage Area 818' 0.01-100 Yes 36 RB Railroad Access Area 670' 0.01-100 Yes Page 8 of 16

..-I Emergency Plan, Rev. 56, Page 159 of 312 Encosue 4toAppendiki* -Cot)

Location Range Local Building and AreaEev. (mR/hr) Alarm 37 Standby Gas Treatment Room 806' 0.01-100 Yes 38 Control Structure Rad Chem Lab. 676' 0.01-100 Yes 39 Control Structure Control Room 729' 0.01-100 Yes 40 S&A Access to Unit 1 Turbine Bldg. 676' 0.01-100 Yes 41 RB Tip Chamber Shield Area 719' 100-1,000,000 Yes 42 RB Refueling Floor Area 818' .01-100 Yes 46 (43 U-2) RB New Fuel Storage Vault 817' 0.1-1000 Yes 47 (44 U-2) RB Spent Fuel Pool Area 818' 0.1-1000 Yes 48 1 R/2R HPCI Pump & Turbine Room 645' 100-1,000,000 No 49 1R/2R Refueling Floor Area 818' 100-1,000,000 No 50 1R/2R Control Rod Drive North 719' 100-1,000,000 No 51 1R/2R Control Rod Drive South 719' 100-1,000,000 No 52 1 R/2R RWCU Recirc. Pump Access Area 749' 100-1,000,000 No 53 1 R/2R Access to Remote Shutdown Panel 670' 100-1,000,000 No 54 1R/2R Fuel Pool Pump Room 749' 100-1,000,000 No 55 1R/2R RHR Room - Loop A 645' 100-1,000,000 No 56 1R/2R RHR Room - Loop B 645' 100-1,000,000 No 57 1R/2R RCIC Pump Turbine Room 645' 100-1,000,000 No Page 9 of 16

Emergency Plan, Rev. 56, Page 160 of 312 17:t

• ~

6~'~~jnIsr DE~~EC I~fhITEIQ e4oApniD(oi'.

System Det. Types Range Location Main Steam Line ION 1_106 mR/hr Near main steamlines Chambers between primary and (IC) secondary containment walls, just downstream of MSIVs Refueling Floor Wall GMs 0.01-100 Exhaust ducting upstream Exhaust Duct mR/hr of inboard isolation damper, prior to discharge through reactor building vent Refueling Floor High GMs 0.01-100 Exterior to fuel pool Exhaust Duct. mR/hr ventilation exhaust duct Railroad Access GMs 0.01-100 Exhaust duct prior to Rx Exhaust Duct mR/hr building vent Emergency Outside GMs 0.01-100 In the outside intake air Air Intake mR/hr plenum Offgas Pretreatment ICs 1-10 6 mR/hr Discharge of the delay (SJAE) pipe after SJAE Liquid Radwaste Scintillation --- Off-line on liquid waste Effluent (SCIN) effluent discharge Service Water (FPC) SCIN 10-1 _ 106 Downstream of fuel pool HX prior to discharge to cps cooling towers RHR Service Water SCIN 10-1 _ 106 On the downstream piping of each RHR HX cps RX Building Closed SCIN 10-1 _ 106 Suction piping of the

____ ____cpm____

Water RBCCW pumps Standby Gas GM 0.01-100 Inside exhaust ductwork Treatment mR/hr SGTS Vent Exhaust Containment Monitor IC 1-10 8 R/hr Drywell Page 10 of 16

Emergency Plan, Rev. 56, Page 161 of 312 4'-VENT'MMON] Liz.~~~

Type I Minimum Location GM & SCIN 10-6 micro Ci/cc gas. Five locations in turbine building, reactor building, and SGTS vents Iodine Sampling NA*

Cartridge Particulate Filter NA*

• Sensitivity dependent on sample size and count time. Sensitivities equal to or better than l0E-11 micro Ci/cc are achievable.

Page 11 of 16

Emergency Plan, Rev. 56, Page 162 of 312

- t~~,' ~o, ppend ix LP2 ..

1. Environmental Monitoring Systems Instrument System Individual Detectors Purpose A. Radiological off-site fixed air sampling sample particulates Environmental stations sample iodine Monitoring System direct radiation measure gamma dose monitor stations B. Analytical Facilities near-site radiation radiochemical analysis of chemistry laboratory environmental and bioassay samples off-site environmental analysis as above, and also very contractor low-level activity analysis

2. Typical Radiological Monitoring Team Equipment Emergency Planning and Grid Coordinate Maps Stopwatch, tweezers, masking tape Survey Meter with current calibration Low Volume Air Sampler and Head Potassium Iodide Tablets Radioactive Material Stickers Particulate Filters, box Silver Zeolite Cartridges Disposable Plastic Gloves Plastic sample bags and labels Flashlight Spare Battery and Fuse kit Self Reading Dosimetry

3. Typical Emergency Environmental Sample Kit Contents Assortment of Sampling Bags Rubber/Plastic Gloves Flashlight Sample Containers Grid Coordinate Map Sample Labels Low and High Range Dosimeters Scale Pliers Scissors Self Reading Dosimetry Spare Batteries Page 12 of 16

Emergency Plan, Rev. 56, Page 163 of 312 ENCLOSURE 6 TO APPENDIX D Typical Health Physics Van Radiation Emergency Monitoring EguiDrment Survey Meter with current calibration Stopwatch

.Portable Frisker with probe Tape Low Volume Air Sampler with head (AC powered) Survey Data Labels Low Volume Air Sampler with DC power plug Microfiber Wipes Spare Frisker Cable Smear Papers DC to AC Inverter Plastic bags for samples VHF mobile radio Extension cord Respirators Work light Iodine Canister Flashlight Potassium Iodide Tablets First Aid Kit Sets of Anti-contamination Clothing Spare batteries Protective gloves Spare fuses for Air Sampler Calculator Safety Vests Emergency Planning Map Self reading Dosimetry Check source Silver Zeolite cartridges Particulate Filters Tweezers Page 13 of 16

Emergency Plan, Rev. 56, Page 164 of 312 ENCLOSURE 7 TO APPENDIX D Emergencv Classification Dependent Instrumentation Vent Stack Monitors Meteorological Tower Indication Remote Monitoring System Airborne Sampling System Liquid Radwaste Sampling Liquid Discharge Radiation Monitors Spent Fuel Pool Level Indication Area Radiation Monitors Primary Containment Isolation Valve Position Indication Reactor Coolant System Sampling Reactor Pressure Vessel Level Indication (Fuel Zone, Shutdown Range, Extended Wide Range)

Main Steam Isolation Valve Position Indication Main Steam Line Flow Indication Main Steam Line Tunnel Temperature Indication Drywell Sump Level Indication Reactor Building Temperature Indication Containment Pressure Indication Containment Hydrogen / Oxygen Analyzers Containment High Range Radiation Monitor AC Power - 13.8KV (Downstream Loads / Breaker Position)

AC Power - 4KV (Downstream Loads / Breaker Position) 125 VDC Power (Downstream Loads / Breaker Position)

Nuclear Instrumentation (APRM, SRM)

Suppression Pool Temperature Indication Suppression Pool Level Indication Reactor Pressure Vessel Pressure Indication Drywell Equipment Drain Tank Level Indication Offgas Pretreatment Radiation Monitor Seismic Monitor Instrumentation Station Flooding Instrumentation Simplex Fire Detection Reactor Coolant System Temperature Indication Reactor Building Sump Level Indication Reactor Protection System Trip Indication Page 14 of 16

Emergency Plan, Rev. 56, Page 165 of 312 ENCLOSURE 8 TO APPENDIX D Tvyical Emeraencv Eguipment for Initial Incident Response Portable frisker with probe Low volume Air Sample with Head High Volume Air Sampler with Head Survey Meter Spare frisker cable and probe Particulate filter paper Silver Zeolite Cartridges Spare Batteries and fuses Portable Worklight Extension Cord Self Reading Dosimetry*

Potassium Iodine Tablets Anti-contamination Clothing Full face Respirator Iodine Filter Canisters SCBA Equipment Emergency Plan Emergency Plan Position Specific Instructions Emergency Planning Map with offsite sampling locations Qnsite Monitoring Locations Map First Aid Kit Keys to Health Physics Van Emergency Plan Keys Food and potable water adequate to support 10 people for 5 days.

• Available at OSC and at HP control point to the RCA.

Typical Technical Support Center Equipment Plant Technical Specifications Operating Procedures Manual Emergency Operating Procedure Manual Final Safety Analysis Report EP and EP-PSs Safety Procedure Manual Offsite Dose Calculation Manual Plant as built drawings Emergency Phone Directory Copy Machine and Telecopier Page 15 of 16

Emergency Plan, Rev. 56, Page 166 of 312 ENCLOSURE 9 TO APPENDIX D TVDical Emerqency Operations Facility Equipment Plant Technical Specifications Operating Procedures Manual Emergency Operating Procedures Manual Final Safety Analysis Report Emergency Plan Emergency Plan Position Specific Instructions Current Emergency Plans for PEMA, LCEMA, CCEMA Rad Health Handbook Offsite Dose Calculation Manual Emergency Phone Directory Emergency Planning Map with Offsite Monitoring Locations Calculators Flashlight First Aid Kit Page 16 of 16

.2--, - -.. I Emergency Plan, Rev. 56, Page 167 of 312 APPENDIX E PPL Susquehanna, LLC Policy Statement:

SUSQUEHANNA SES EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT Page 1 of 2

Emergency Plan, Rev. 56, Page 168 of 312 I j Timothy S. Rausch PPL Susquehanna, LLC -

Sr. VP and CNO 769 Salem Boulevard Berwick, PA 18603 Tel. 570.542.3445 p l TSRausch@ pplweb.com December 3, 2009 PPL SUSQUEHANNA LLC POLICY STATEMENT:

SUSQUEHANNA STEAM ELECTRIC STATION EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT Immediate response, assessment, and the implementation of protective and corrective measures pertaining to an emergency condition at the Susquehanna Steam Electric Station shall be the responsibility of the SSES Emergency Director until relieved of this function by the Recovery Manager. The individuals who shall act in the capacity of SSES Emergency Managers are determined as follows:

Immediately upon the occurrence of an emergency, the Shift Manager on duty at the station shall assume the role of SSES Emergency Director, as described in the SSES Emergency Plan, until relieved of that responsibility by the Emergency Director or his designated alternate.

If the emergency requires activation of the Emergency Operations Facility (EOF),

the SSES Recovery Manager shall assume responsibility for overall management of the emergency and off-site Protective Action Recommendations: The SSES Emergency Director retains responsibility for on-site operations.

The SSES Emergency Managers shall implement applicable portions of the SSES Emergency Plan to prevent or mitigate the consequences of emergencies at the Susquehanna Steam Electric Station. They shall have the authority to act on behalf of PPL Susquehanna, LLC, in all matters concerning an emergency, at least until such time as the scope, severity, and potential radiological consequences have been assessed, and the appropriate protective and corrective 'actions have been implemented. Following that critical period, but still with complete regard for health and safety, major decisions and Corporate commitments are the responsibility of PPL Susquehanna, LLC, Management.

Throughout the course of an emergency condition, all expertise and support available within the PPL Susquehanna, LLC organization shall be provided at the request of the SSES Emergency Managers.

Page 2 of 2

I - -----------

I  : - . - -- -: .., 1 1 -- 1. - - ---:. - - - - -ý

.. ..... i Emergency Plan, Rev. 56, Page 169 of 312 APPENDIX F DEVIATIONS TO NEI 99-01 REV. 4 Page 1 of 13

Emergency Plan, Rev. 56, Page 170 of 312 Susquehanna Deviations to NEI 99-01 Rev 4 INITIATING CONDITIONS and Emergency Actions Levels This document contains a table listing all of the NEI INITIATING CONDITIONS along with a correlation to the corresponding Susquehanna SES ICs. A description to any deviations from the NEI EALs is given.

Page 2 of 13

Emergency Plan, Rev. 56, Page 171 of 312 usij e a-6-,!:,

jANITIATING CONDITION 4:r~

if i ~{C<Deiii~

Definitions Definitions

• The listing of SIGNIFICANT TRANSIENTS was changed due to SSES design.

" The definitions of CIVIL DISTURBANCE WAS MODIFIED to be consistent with the latest definition contained in the SSES Security Plan.

• A definition of STRIKE ACTION was added and is consistent with regulatory guidance as contained in NEI guidance. The definition was added because the definition of STRIKE ACTION is no longer part of the Security Plan definitions.

" Added a definition of INSTRUMENT SPECIFIED

• Added a definition of sustained winds.

• Added definitions in addition to those specified in the NEI guidance.

• Added a definition of Security Condition to be consistent with change to Security Plan.

Page 3 of 13

I - I -.-

Emergency Plan, Rev. 56, Page 172 of 312

~~}%r

• Ren fer e;. INITIAIN CODTINsQ *' "**"D ,eGs atiD

,.. . ... , y tin . ..

A- ion_ Z1 AU1 Any UNPLANNED Release of RU1

• EAL 4 The perimeter Gaseous or Liquid Radioactivity monitoring system to the Environment that Exceeds (RMS) is not used as a Two Times the Radiological threshold for EAL RU1.

Effluent Technical Specifications

• EAL 5 is not used at for 60 Minutes or Longer. Susquehanna.

Op. Modes: All

• Added the term liquid" to the EAL threshold for effluent releases.

AA1 Any UNPLANNED Release of RA1

• EAL 4 The (RMS)

Gaseous or Liquid Radioactivity perimeter monitoring to the Environment that Exceeds system is not used as a 200 Times the Radiological threshold for EAL RAl.

Effluent Technical Specifications 0 EAL #5 is not used at for 15 Minutes or Longer. Susquehanna.

Op. Modes: All AS1 Offsite Dose Resulting from an RS1

• NEI EAL #4 is divided Actual or Imminent Release of into two EALs #4 and Gaseous Radioactivity Exceeds #5 for Susquehanna.

100 mR TEDE or 500 mR

• EAL #5 utilizes Child Thyroid CDE for the Actual or Thyroid CDE as Projected Duration of the directed by the State of Release. Pennsylvania instead of Op. Modes: All Adult Thyroid.

• This EAL utilizes the EMERGENCY PLAN BOUNDARY for dose projections.

• Particulate and Halogen levels are included in Noble Gas threshold by calculation rather than with a specific value for those parameters.

Page 4 of 13

Emergency Plan, Rev. 56, Page 173 of 312 D**. iati.-.

.. r**r,*"ev .,ons . .-

.4*,;f1-

,,* *' **;L*

-. , -r . .:"-::.*, o Offsite Dose Resulting from an

• NEI EAL #4 is divided Actual or Imminent Release of into two EALs #4 and Gaseous Radioactivity Exceeds #5 for Susquehanna.

1000 mR TEDE or 5000 mR

• EAL #5 utilizes Child Thyroid CDE for the Actual or Thyroid CDE as Projected Duration of the directed by the State of Release Using Actual Pennsylvania instead of Meteorology. Adult Thyroid.

Op. Modes: All

• This EAL utilizes the EMERGENCY PLAN BOUNDARY for dose projections.

• Particulate and Halogen levels are included in Noble Gas threshold by calculation rather than with a specific value for those parameters.

AU2 Unexpected Increase in Plant RU2 None Radiation.

Op. Modes: All AA3 Release of Radioactive Material RA2 None or Increases in Radiation Levels Within the Facility that Impedes Operation of Systems Required to Maintain Safe Operations or to Establish or Maintain Cold Shutdown.

Op. Modes: All AA2 Damage to Irradiated Fuel or RA3 NEI EAL #2 is divided Loss of Water Level that Has or into two EALs, #2 and Will Result in the Uncovering of #3 for Susquehanna.

Irradiated Fuel Outside the Reactor Vessel.

Op. Modes: All CUl RCS Leakage. CU4 None Op. Mode: Cold Shutdown CA1 Loss of RCS Inventory. CA4 None Op. Modes: Cold Shutdown CS1 Loss of RPV Inventory Affecting CS4 None Core Decay Heat Removal Capability.

Op. Modes: Cold Shutdown Page 5 of 13

Emergency Plan, Rev. 56, Page 174 of 312 WIITIW -WTIN L,-DLevia ions, CG1 Loss of RPV Inventory Affecting CG4 None Fuel Clad Integrity with Containment Challenged with Irradiated Fuel in the RPV.

Op. Modes: Cold Shutdown, Refueling CU2 UNPLANNED Loss of RCS CU5 None Inventory with Irradiated Fuel in the RPV.

Op. Mode: Refueling CA2 Loss of RPV Inventory with CA5 None Irradiated Fuel in the RPV.

Op. Modes: Refueling CS2 Loss of RPV Inventory Affecting CS5 None Core Decay Heat Removal Capability with Irradiated Fuel in the RPV.

Op. Modes: Refueling CU3 Loss of All Offsite Power to CUl , NEI condition "b" is Essential Busses for Greater conservatively not Than 15 Minutes. included.

Op. Modes: Cold Shutdown, Refueling CA3 Loss of All Offsite Power and CAl

• The SSES EAL states Loss of All onsite AC Power to "Failure to restore Essential Busses. power to at least two Op. Modes: Cold Shutdown, 4.16 kV ESS busses on Refueling, Defueled each unit within fifteen minutes from the time of loss of both offsite and onsite AC power."

CU4 UNPLANNED Loss of Decay CU3 None Heat Removal Capability with Irradiated Fuel in the RPV.

OP. Modes: Cold Shutdown, Refueling CA4 Inability to Maintain Plant in Cold CA3 None Shutdown with Irradiated Fuel in the RPV.

Op. Modes: Cold Shutdown, Refueling CU5 Fuel Clad Degradation. CU6 None Op. Mode: Refueling Page 6 of 13

Emergency Plan, Rev. 56, Page 175 of 312 UNPLANNED Loss of All onsite CU7 None or Offsite Communications Capabilities.

Op. Modes: Cold Shutdown, Refueling UNPLANNED Loss of Required CU2 None DC Power for Greater than 15 Minutes.

Op. Modes: Cold Shutdown, Refueling Inadvertent Criticality. CU8

• Only EAL #1 applies to Op Modes:, Cold Shutdown, Susquehanna.

Refueling E-HU1 Damage to a loaded cask EU1

• Natural Phenomena CONFINEMENT BOUNDARY. EAL #1 not included as Op. Mode: Not Applicable the Susquehanna ISFSI is within the PROTECTED AREA boundary. This IC would therefore be covered by OU5.

• NEI EAL #2 is divided into two EALs, #1 and

1. 2 for Susquehanna.

• FIRE Damage to the ISFSI is covered by EAL OU6.

• Justification for radiological readings specified in SSES EAL EUl.

E-HU2 Confirmed security event with None

• EAL Threshold deleted potential loss of level of safety of by NRC bulletin the ISFSI. 2005-02. ISFSI events Op. Mode: Not Applicable are covered by EAL OA3 (HA8) or OS2 (HS4).

Page 7 of 13

.. - - I -. ý--_ ý -N ---. ,- .I -- . I  ! - _

Emergency Plan, Rev. 56, Page 176 of 312 INIfIATING CONDITION -6I6vla' -1Dei~i~oAs

. .... ion ~t- .n,

~-..e.i 4- -.A.t

• FU1 ANY Loss or ANY Potential Loss FU1

• In the loss or potential of Containment. loss of Primary Op. Modes: Power Operation, Containment added the Hot Standby, Startup, Hot term breach to the Shutdown INITIATING CONDITION. The term breach provides additional indication of the fact that containment is or may be lost.

FA1 ANY Loss or ANY Potential Loss FA1 None of EITHER Fuel Clad OR RCS Op. Modes: Power Operation, Hot Standby, Startup, Hot Shutdown FS1 Loss or Potential Loss of ANY FS1 None Two Barriers.

Op. Modes: Power Operation, Hot Standby, Startup, Hot Shutdown FG1 Loss of ANY Two Barriers AND FG1 None Loss or Potential Loss of Third Barrier.

Op. Modes: Power Operation, Hot Standby, Startup, Hot Shutdown FU1 "Site Specific" other indications of FU1 through

• Documentation of site through loss/potential loss of Fuel Clad, FG1 specific analysis.

FG1 RCS or Containment Barrier RCS Drywell Pressure Indication of 2.d.1 0 Added-the qualifier Barrier Loss of RCS Barrier "AND indication of a leak inside the drywell".

RCS Drywell Radiation Monitoring 2.e

• Added the qualifier Barrier "AND indication of a leak inside the drywell".

HU1 Natural and Destructive OU5

• Added the qualifier Phenomena Affecting the "sustained" to the EAL PROTECTED AREA. designation for wind Op. Modes: All speeds.

• EAL #7 is not used as there are no unique site specific phenomena for Susquehanna.

Page 8 of 13

Emergency Plan, Rev. 56, Page 177 of 312 ns . , :

Natural and Destructive " Added the qualifier Phenomena Affecting the PLANT "sustained" to the EAL VITAL AREA. designation for wind Op. Modes: All speeds.

" Clarified the site specific list of structures impacted in EAL 2 and 3 HU2 FIRE Within PROTECTED AREA OU6 None Boundary Not Extinguished Within 15 Minutes of Detection.

Op. Modes: All HA2 FIRE or EXPLOSION Affecting OA6 None the Operability of Plant Safety Systems Required to Establish or Maintain Safe Shutdown.

Op. Modes: All HU3 Release of Toxic or Flammable OU7 None Gases Deemed Detrimental to Safe Operation of the Plant.

Op. Modes: All HA3 Release of Toxic or Flammable OA7 None Gases Within or Contiguous to a VITAL AREA Which Jeopardizes Operation of Safety Systems Required to Establish or Maintain Safe Shutdown.

Op. Modes: All HU4 Confirmed Security Condition or OU1

• The specific EAL for the Threat Which Indicates a ISFSI was deleted by Potential Degradation in the NRC bulletin 2005-02.

Level of Safety of the Plant. ISFSI events are Op. Modes: All covered by EAL OA3 (HA8) or OS2 (HS4)

Security Condition or Threat used to match Terminology of SSES Physical Security Plan HA4 Confirmed Security Event in a OA1 None Plant PROTECTED AREA.

Op. Modes: All HS1 Confirmed Security Event in a OS1 None PLANT VITAL AREA.

Op. Modes: All Page 9 of 13

I I, ---.jz. - - I- -. 1-11 ...I I.

Emergency Plan, Rev. 56, Page 178 of 312

.~+/-~U~ii~

~Thi~EW~~ w~UsqUehanna.~

R f`,,"INITIA*ING C,.OND.ITIO1N. ,'-, ; .' , , .. . viations **

HG1 Security Event Resulting in Loss OG1

• EAL #1 is divided into of Physical Control of the Facility. two EALs, #1 and #2 for Op. Modes: All Susquehanna.

HS4 Site Attack OS2 None Op. Modes: All HA7 Notification of an airborne attack OA2 None th reat Op. Modes: All HA8 Notification of HOSTILE ACTION OA3 None within the OCA Op. Modes: All HU5 Other Conditions Existing Which OU8 None in the Judgment of the Emergency Director Warrant Declaration of a NOUE.

Op. Modes: All HA6 Other Conditions Existing Which OA8 None in the Judgment of the Emergency Director Warrant Declaration of an Alert.

Op. Modes: All HS3 Other Conditions Existing Which OS8 None in the Judgment of the Emergency Director Warrant Declaration of Site Area Emergency.

Op. Modes: All HG2 Other Conditions Existing Which OG8 None in the Judgment of the Emergency Director Warrant Declaration of General Emergency.

Op. Modes: All HA5 Control Room Evacuation Has OA4 None Been Initiated.

Op. Modes: All HS2 Control Room Evacuation Has OS4 None Been Initiated and Plant Control Cannot Be Established.

I Op. Modes: All Page 10 of 13

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Emergency Plan, Rev. 56, Page 180 of 312 Failure of Reactor Protection System Instrumentation to Com-plete or Initiate an Automatic Reactor Scram Once a Reactor Protection System Setpoint Has Been Exceeded and Manual Scram Was NOT Successful.

Op. Modes: Power Operation, Startup SG2 Failure of the Reactor Protection MG3 None System to Complete an Auto-matic Scram and Manual Scram was NOT Successful and There is Indication of an Extreme Challenge to the Ability to Cool the Core.

Op. Modes: Power Operation, Startup SU2 Inability to Reach Required MU9 None Shutdown Within Technical Specification Limits.

Op. Modes: Power Operation, Startup, Hot Standby, Hot Shutdown SA3 Deleted None SS4 Complete Loss of Heat Removal MS4 None Capability.

Op. Modes: Power Operation, Startup, Hot Standby, Hot Shutdown SU3 UNPLANNED Loss of Most or All MU5 None Safety System Annunciation or Indication in The Control Room for Greater Than 15 Minutes Op. Modes: Power Operation, Startup, Hot Standby, Hot Shutdown Page 12 of 13

Emergency Plan, Rev. 56, Page 181 of 312 UNPLANNED Loss of Most or All Safety System Annunciation or Indication in Control Room With Either (1) a SIGNIFICANT TRANSIENT in Progress, or (2) Compensatory Non-Alarming Indicators are Unavailable.

Op. Modes: Power Operation, Startup, Hot Standby, Hot Shutdown SS6 Inability to Monitor a MS5 None SIGNIFICANT TRANSIENT in Progress.

Op. Modes: Power Operation, Startup, Hot Standby, Hot Shutdown SU7 Deleted None SA1 Deleted None SS3 Loss of All Vital DC Power. MS2 None Op. Modes: Power Operation, Startup, Hot Standby, Hot Shutdown SU4 Fuel Clad Degradation. MU7 None Op. Modes: Power Operation, Startup, Hot Standby, Hot Shutdown SU5 RCS Leakage. MU6 None Op. Modes: Power Operation, Startup, Hot Standby, Hot Shutdown SS5 Deleted None SU6 UNPLANNED Loss of All ON MU8 None SITE or Offsite Communications Capabilities.

Op. Modes: Power Operation, Startup, Hot Standby, Hot Shutdown SU8 Inadvertent Criticality. MU10

• SSES does not have Op Modes: Hot Standby, Hot installed startup rate Shutdown meters.

Page 13 of 13

-ci ~ -

. Emergency Plan, Rev. 56, Page 182 of 312 APPENDIX G SSES EVACUATION TIME ESTIMATES ORIGINAL DOCUMENT ISSUED 11/2012 Page 1 of 23

Emergency Plan, Rev. 56, Page 183 of 312 NOTE: The information contained in Appendix G is a copy of the executive summary of the November 2012 Evacuation Time Estimate. The entire Evacuation Time Estimate can be found in the PPL Susquehanna Information Management System under 2012 Evacuation Time Estimate.

Page 2 of 23

Emergency Plan, Rev. 56, Page 184 of 312 Susquehanna Steam ElectricStation Development of EvacuationTime Estimates Work performedfor PPL Susquehanna,LLC, by:

KLD Engineering, P, C.

.43 Corporate Drive Hauppauge, NY I11788 mailto:kweinisch~kldcompanies.com November, 2012 Final Report, Rev. 0 KLDTR.- 527 Page 3 of 23

Emergency Plan, Rev. 56, Page 185 of 312 EXECUTIVE

SUMMARY

This report .describes the analyses undertaken and the results obtained by a study to develop Evacuation Time Estimates. (EtE) for the Susquehanna Steam Electric Station (SSES) located in Luzerne County, Pennsylvania. ETE are part of the required planning basis and provide PPL Susquehanna, LLC (PPL) and state and local governments with site-specific information needed for Protective Action decision-making.

In.the, performance of this. effort, guidance is provided by documents published by Federal Governmental agencies. Most important of these are:,

• Criteria for Development of Evacuation Time Estimate Studies, NUREG/CR-7002, November 2011.

• Criteria foir Preparation and EValuation of Radiological Emergency Response Plans and Preparedness in Support of Nuclear Power Plants, NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-tl, Rev. 1, November 1980.

• Development of Evacuation. Time Estimates for Nuclear Power Plants, NUREG/C.R-6863, January 2005.

• 10CFRSO, Appendix E - "Emergency Planning and Preparedness for Production and Utilization Facilities" Overview of Proiect Activities This project began in March, 2012 and extended over a period of 6 months. The major activities performed are briefly described in chronological sequence:

• Attended "kick-off" meetings with PPL personnel.

• Accessed U.S. Census Bureau data files for the year 2010. Studied Geographical Information Systems, (GIS) maps of the area in the vicinity of the SSES, then conducted a detailed field survey of the highway network.

• Synthesized this information to create an analysis network representing the highway system topology and capacities within the Emergency Planning Zone (EPZ), plus a Shadow Region covering the region between the EPZ boundary and approximately 15 miles radially from the plant.

Designed and sponsored a telephone survey of residents within the EPZ to gather focused data needed for this ETE study that were not contained within the census database. The survey used was carried out in 2008; it is still Valid since there has not been a significant change in EPZ demographics. The. survey instrument had, been reviewed ahid modified by the licensee and offsite response organization (ORO) personnel prior to conducting the survey.

Data collection forms (provided to PPL at the kickoff meeting) were returned with data Suisquehianna Steam Electric Station ES-1 KLD Engineering, P.C Ev*acuation Time Estimate Rev. o Page 4 of 23

Emergency Plan, Rev. 56, Page 186 of 312 pertaining to employment, transients, and special facilities in each county.

• . The traffic demand and trip-generation rates of evacuating vehicles were estimated from the gathered data. The trip generation rates reflected the estimated mobilization time (i.e., the time required .by evacuees to prepare for the evacuation trip) computed

• usingthe results of the telephone survey of EPZ residents.

a Following federal.,guidelines, the EPZ is subdivided into 27 ERPA. These ERPA are then grouped within circular areas or "keyhole" configurations (circles plus radial sectors) that define a.total of 30 Evacuation Regions.

• The time-varying external circumstances are represented as Evacuation Scenarios, each described in terms of the following factors: (1) Season (Summer, Winter); (2) Day of Week (Midweek, Weekend); (3) Time of Day (Midday, Evening); and (4) Weather (Good,

,Rain, Snow). One special event scenario - refueling at the plant - was considered. One roadway impact scenario was considered wherein a single lane was closed :on Interstate 80 westbound for the duration of the evacuation.

0 Staged evacuation was considered for those regions wherein the 2 mile radius and sectors downwind to 5 miles were evacuated.

• As per NUREG/CR-7002, the planning basis for the calculation of ETEis:.

• A rapidly escalating accident at the SSES that quickly assumes the status of General Emergency such that the Advisory to Evacuate is virtually coincident With the siren alert, and no early protective actions have been implemented.

While an unlikely accident scenario, this planning basis -will yield ETE, measured as the elapsed time from the Advisory to Evacuate until the stated percentage of the population exits the impacted Region, that represent "iupper bound" estimates. This conservative Planning Basis is applicable for all initiating events.

0 If the emerge.ncy occurs while schools are in session, the ETE study.assumes that the children -will be -evacuated by bus directly to reception centers or host schools located outside the EPZ. Parents, relatives, and neighbors are -advised to not pick up their children at school prior to the arrival of the buses dispatched for that purpose. The ErE for .schoolchildren are calculated separately.

i Evacuees who do not have access. to a private vehicle' will either ride-share with relatives, friends or neighbors, or be evacuated by buses provided as specified in the county evacuation plans. Those in special facilities will likewise be evacuated with public transit, as needed: bus, van, or ambulance, as required. Separate ETE are calculated for the transit-dependent evacuees, for homebound special needs population, and for those evacuated from spetial facilities.

Coriputation of ETE A total of 420 ETE were computed for the evacuation of the general public. Each ETE quantifies the aggregate evacuation time estimated for the. population within one of the 30 :Evacuation Susquehanna Steam Electric Station ES-2 KLD Engineering, P.C.

Evacuation Time Estimate Rev. 0 Page 5 of 23

I -~ . ... a Emergency Plan, Rev. 56, Page 187 of 312 Regions to evacuate from that Region, under the circumstances defined for one of the 14 Evacuation Scenarios (30 x 14 = 420). Separate ETE are calculated for transit-dependent

.evacuees, including school children for applicable scenarios.

Except for Region R03, which is the evacuation of the entire .EPZ, only a portion of the pepple within the EPZ would be advised to evacuate. That is, the Advisory to Evacuate applies only to those people occupying the specified impacted region. It is assumed that 100 percent of the people within the impacted region will evacuate in response to this Advisory. The people occupying the remainder of the EPZ outside the impacted region may be advised to take shelter.

The computation of ETE assumes that 20% of the population within the EPZ but outside the impacted region, will elect to "vol.untarily" evacuate. In addition, 20% of the population in the

.Shadow Region will also elect to evacuate. These voluntary evacuees could impede those who are evacuating from within the impacted region. The impedance that. could be caused by voluntary evacuees is considered in the computation of ETE for the "impacted region.

Staged evacuation is considered wherein those people within the 2-mile region evacuate immediately, while those beyond 2 miles, but within the EPZ, shelter-in-place. Once 90% of the 2-mile region is evacuated, those people beyond 2 miles begin to evacuate. As per federal guidance, 20% of people beyond 2 miles will evacuate (non-compliance) even though they are advised to shelter-in-place.

The computational procedure is outlined as follows:

A link-node representation of the highway network is coded. Each link represents a unidirectional length of highway; each node Usually represents an intersection or merge point. The -capacity of each link is estimated based on the field survey observations and on established traffic engineering procedures.

• The evacuation trips are generated at locations called "zonal centroids" located within the EPZ :and Shadow Region. The trip generation rates vary over time reflecting the

• mobilization process, and from one location (centroid) to another depending on population density and on whether a centroid is within, or outside, the impacted area..

a The evacuation model computes the routing patterns for evacuating vehicles that are

.compliant.with federal guidelines (outbound relative to. the location of the plant), then simulate the traffic flow movements over space and time. This :simulation process estimates the rate that traffic flow exits the impacted region.

The ETE statistics provide the elapsed times for 90 percent and 100 percent, respectively, of the population within the impacted region, to evacuate from within the impacted region. These statistics. are presented in tabular and graphical formats. The 9 0 th percentile ETE have been identified as the values that should be considered. when making protective action decisions because the 1 0 01h percentile ETE are prolonged .by those relatively few people who take longer to mobilize. This is referred to as the "evacuation tailI" in Sectioon 4.0 of NUREG/CR-7002.

The use of a. public outreach (information) program to emphasize the need for evacuees to Susquehanna Steam Electric Station ES-3 KLD Eng.ineering, P.C.

EVacuation Time Estimate Rev. 0 Page 6 of 23

Emergency Plan, Rev. 56, Page 188 of 312 minimize the time needed to prepare to evacuate (secure the home, assemble needed clothes, medicines, .etc.) should also be considered.

Traffic Management This study references the comprehensive traffic management plans provided in the Luzerne and Columbia County Radiological Emergency Response Plans. Due to the detailed plans already in place and the limited traffic congestion within the EPZ, no additional traffic or access control measures have been identified as a result of this study.

Selected Results A compilation of selected information is presented on.the following pages in the form of figures and tables extracted from the body of the report; these are described below.

• Figure 6-1 displays a map of the SSES EPZ showing the layout of the 27 ERPA that comprise, in aggregate, the EPZ..

• Table 3-1 presents the estimates of permanent resident population in each ERPA based on the 2010 Census data.

• Table. 6-1 defines each of the 30 Evacuation Region.s in terms of their respective groups of ERPA.

• Table 6_2 listý the Evacuation Scenarios.

• Tables 7-1.and 7-2 -are compilations of ETE. These data are the times needed to clear the indicated regions of 90 and 100 percent of the population occupying these regions, respectively. These computed ETE include consideration of mobilization time and of estimated voluntary evacuations from other regions within the EPZ and from the Shadow Region.

• Tables 7-3 and 7-4 presents ETE for the 2-mile region for un-staged and staged evacuations for the 9 0 th and 1 0 0 th percentiles, respectively.

- Table'8-7 presents ETE for the schoolchildren in good weather.

Table 8-11 presents ETE for the transit-dependent population in good Weather.

• Figure. H-8 presents an example of an Evacuation Region (Region R08) to be evacuated under the circumstances defined in Table 6-1. Maps of all regions are provided in Appendix H.

Conclusions

• General population ETE were computed for 420 unique cases - a combination of 30 unique Evacuation Regions and 14 unique Evacuation Scenarios. Table 7-1 and Table 7-2 document these ETE for the 9 0 th and 1 0 0 th percentiles. These ETE range. from 1:40 (hr:min) to 3:35 at the 9 0 th percentile.

Inspection of Table 7-1 and Table 7-2 indicates that the ETE for the 1 0 0 th percentile are significantly longer than those for the 9 0 th percentile. This is the result of the relatively

.long mobilization time of a small proportion of the resident population and congestion within the EPZ. When the system becomes congested, traffic exits the.

EPZ at rates somewhat below capacity until some evacuation routes have cleared. As more routes Suspquehjanha steam Electric Stat.i~on ES-4 KLD Engineering, P.C.

Evacuation Time Estimate Rev. 0 Page 7 of 23

Emergency Plan, Rev. 56, Page 189 of 312 clear, the aggregate rate of egress slows since many vehicles have already left the EPZ.

Towards the end of the process, relatively few evacuees (those with the longest mobilization times) travel freely out of the EPZ. See Figures 7-8 through 7-21.

Inspection of Table 7-3 and Table 7-4 indicates that a staged evacuation provides no benefits to evacuees from within the 2 mile region and unnecessarily delays the evacuation of those beyond 2 miles (compare Regions R25 through R30 and Regions R04 through ROS and R02, respectively, in Tables 7-1 and 7-2). See Section 7.6 for additional discussion.

Comparison of Scenarios 6 and 13 in Table 7-1 indicates that the Special Event -

refueling outage at the plant - does not have a significant impact on the ETE for the 9 0 th percentile. See Section 7.5 for additional discussion.

Comparison of Scenarios 1 and 14 in Table 7-1 indicates that the roadway closure - one lane westbound on 1-80 from the interchange with SC 339 to the EPZ boundary - does not change the ETE, indicating that there is excess capacity on the highway. See Section 7.5.

• Nanticoke City and Briar Creek Borough and Township are the most congested areas during an evacuation. The last roadway in the EPZ to exhibit traffic congestion is SC 93.

All links within the EPZ are at LOS A (free-flowing traffic :conditions) at 3 hours3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> and 20 minutes after the Advisory to Evacuate. See Section 7.3 and Figures 7-3 through 7-7, e Separate ETE were computed for schools, medical facilities, transit-dependent persons, homebound special needs persons and correctional facilities. The average single-wave ETE for these sources are within a similar range as the general population ETE at the 9 0 th percentile. See Section 8.

0 Table 8-5 indicates that there are -enough buses and wheelchair vans available to evacuate the transit-dependent population within the EPZ in a single wave; however, aid agreements with other counties will need to be activated in order to provide enough ambulances to evacuate the bedridden population in a single wave. See Sections 8.4 and 8.5.

a The general population ETE at the 90th percentile .is insensitive to reductions in the base trip generation time of 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> since the mobilization time of the bulk of evacuees is Unchanged by the truncationh. See Table M-1.

0 The general population ETE is. relatively insensitive to the voluntary evacuation of Vehicles in the Shadow Region (tripling the shadow evacuation percentage only increases 90th percentile ETE by 5 minutes). See Table M-.2.

0 Population changes between +30% or -46% are needed to result in ETE changes which meet the criteria for updating ETE between decennial Censuses. See Section M.3.

Susquehanna Steam Electric station ES-5 KLD Engineering, P.C.

Evacuation Time Estimate Aev. 0 Page 8 of 23

-D CD 0.4, N)

CA) m 3

CD (D

CD CF)

CD CD 0-0)

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Emergency Plan, Rev. 56, Page 191 of 312 Table 3-1. EPZ Permanent Resident Population ERPA '.. . U n*

1 21:132 2,024 2 2,227 2,107 3 2,100 2,041 4 2,1.17 2,241 5 203 225 6 703 766 7 4,270 4,287

.8 959 838 9 1,385 1,453 10 10,552 10,387

.1 645 646 12 1,532 1,569 13 1,092 1,166 14 1,247 1,196 15 3,613 4,213 16 1,956 1,912 17 2,105 2,188 18 1,112 1,115 19 671 679

.20 5,02I 5,377 21 10,-930 10,462 22 4,614 5,826 23 609 -652 24 2,251 .2,324 25 9.10 973 26 _1,501 1,520 27 39288 3,088 EPZ Population Growth: 1 2.19%

Susquehahna Steam Electric Station .ES-7 .KLD Engineering, P.C.

Evacuation Time Estimate Rev. 0 Page 10 of 23

Table6-1. Description of.Evacuatioh Regions 0-4' Reglon Descriptibn RO1. 2-Mile Ring RO2 5-Mile Ring R03 NN.... 1 2 a 7¶I ERPA Region Wind Direction To:

NE,.W,.WNWNW Refer to R01 R05 I ENEJ*.,. EE ...

R06. SE; SSE..

R0 . 1. 2 3 4 5 -6 37 18 19 110 1.1 1121.13 114 . 115 .116 ..117 18g119 120 1211 22 123 124 125T26 127 ROT R04 SSjSWW NNNNE

- ERPA Region. Wind Direction To: CD 1: 2 9 4 5 6. 1 7 81. 01 1 1 415 61 8 9 20 11 !22 23 '242 26. 27 CID 1111 NE * "I CD 0

R14 ESE.g R15 SE.*I R16 SSE **'"

R*7 ~~s  !:

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P,*,, n

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ERPA Region Description 0 k0 I. .2 3 14 5]6 178.1. 1M111112 113 1I14 I ý15 116 117 1 .IS 1 91 0 2 m

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_0 CD (n

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Emergency Plan, Rev. 56, Page 194 of 312 Table 6-2. Evacuation Scenario Definitions Scnai Sesn Wee Day Wethr Speia 1 Summer Midweek Midday Good None 2 Summer Midweek Midday Rain None 3 Summer Weekend Midday Good None 4 Summer Weekend Midday Rain None 5 5 Summer Summer Weekend Midweek, Evening Good None 6 Winter Midweek Midday Good None 7 Winter Midweek Midday Rain None 8 Winter Midweek Midday Snow None 9 Winter Weekend Midday Good None 10 Winter Weekend Midday Rain None 1I Winter Weekend Midday snow None 12 Winter Midweek, Evening Good None Weekend 13 Winter Midweek Midday Good Refueling SSES RoadWay Impact - Lane 14 Summer Midweek Midday Good Closure on 1-80 WB 3 Winter assumes that school is in session (also appjlies. to spring and autumn). Summer assumes that school Is not in session.

Susquehanna Stea(m EleCtric Station ES-1O KLD Enigineerinig, P.C.

Evacuation Time Estimate Rev. .C Page 13 of 23

r CD Table 7-1. Time to Clear the.lndkcated Area of 90.Percent ofltheAffected Population

_L 0

Summer Summer Summer Winter Winter Winter Winter Summer

-A) Midweek Weekend Midweek Weekend Midweek Weekend Midweek Midweek

.Weekend.I Midweek Midday. Midday Evening Midday Midday Evening Midday. Midday Region Good Ralin Good Ran Good Good Rn Sow Good Rai nw Good Special Roadway Weather Weather r Weather Weather WWeather SEvent either Impact

__ea-eeter Weather _dpt

.Entire2-Mile.Region,. 5-Mile Region, and EPZ ____________

R02 2:00 2:10 1:55 2:00 1:55 2:05 2:10 2:40 1:55 2:00 2:30 L55 2:05 2:00 R03- 2:.220- *. .2:301 I1. 2:10-' 2;-:2125. 2:

i.*215:.-** '. i.; 42:'20:'" '_;*:0; *3.O0t;, :X*;i2.i"0*: 71W,2:.15' ;6: :1. :2- 220I____

R03 , .,"29 - - ,i . ' . . :6 . .. , .. .. . ...

2-Mile Region and Keyhole to 5,Miles R04 1:55 1:55 1:40 1:45 1:40 1:55 1:55 2:35 1:40 1:45 2:25 1:40 1:50 1:55

R 5 *.5....

2:00- 1 0f.- . 4. >..

' 1:5,.=...  : 55. " 2.. . ,*If4 _ .._ 2,2. . A... . . ,:5 50 5 R06 2:00 2:00 1:40 1:40 1:40 '2:00 2:00 2:40 1:40 1:40 2:25 1:40 1:55 2:00 ROB 2:00 2:00: 1:40 1:40 1:40 22: 2:00 2:40 1:40 1:40 2:25 1:40, 1:55 2:00 5-Mile Regionmand.Keyhole to EPZBoundary _

'RU9 .2:10-. `-2:15 1:55: -2:0 ~23~

5; W2~5 ~~~5<~:i~5_ 4i05'>ý ~3  :~~'~00 s~ .2:15 -% ;-2.U0 m RIO 2-15 225 2:05 2:15 2:05 :2:15 2:25 3:00 2:10 2:15 2:50 2:10 2:25 2:15 R11 2:10 2'.20. 2:00 2:10' 2:05' 2:20. :50;-. 2:00 ;0-:,-':

• '>220 :4O.i o.,2:05~ ' L2':1':21 (D R1Z 2:05 2:10 1:55 2:60 2:00 2:05 2:10 .2:45 1:55 2:00 2:30 2:00 2:05 2:05 R13 1':.

55 15 155'. 10D?,. .:",2,30:'

. -.-.-.. .. , --:55.

,PIS R14 R1 -iss5 1:55

5i:0 2:90-2:00  !,4s:

1:50 1:5 ".1 5 ..

1:50 150, . .1.50 i.5 150 1:..5.1.*'2i*O.:: i--2.:30.

1:55 "I.55.:'

2:00 2:30

':4 1:50

• ,5-*!,

1:50

• - 1:50'-

2:20 i2:20. :-.-:'":.50-*

1:50 155 1:]55*.

1i55 1:.55-."

(D Ri6 1:55 2:00 1:50 1;50 1:50 i:55 2:00 2:30 1:45 1:50 2:20 1:50 1:55 1:55

. ." - '; " . "'  :.'"' . .*_55-- .1: 0%- :5..

R17 1:55. '2:00. 145' ' . t '1 :!0 :..50-. ' -2:00i ,.',,,c2:30r .. ,1 5.--'

J'1.552$. 5 . 1: ' :_.5 RIB 2:05 2:10 1:55 2:00 2:00 2:05 21.0 .:2:40 1:55 2:00: :2:30 2:00 2:05 2:05. 0)

R19 ' ' 2:30 2:45 2:20 :25 "2:25 *- . 2:30 2::5. -.3.10' 2:2 -'-2:25 . -3:00 -. 2:25 2.230 . 2:3.0:

R20 2:35 2:40 2:20 2:30 2:25 2:35 2:50 ,3:15 2:20 2:30 3:05 2:25 2:30 2:352 R21: 1 2:35 . .2:45 ' .2:25 1 :2:30 .

1. -:30- '. 2:35:' 2:451 :3.15: - 2:5- .2:30_ý. '-..:3:05- 230: -2:35 2:35 CD R22 2:30 2:40 2.20 2:30 2:20 2:30 2:40: .3:10 2:20 2:25 *3:00 2:20. 2:30 2:30 ('1

-R23* 2:25 2:35 .2:10'o -2:'

40... ..2:25r-... '. ..... T1-:2'1225,. 01 0,

R24 2.'10 2:15' 1:55 2:05 1:55 2:10 2:15 2:45 1:55 2:05 2:35 1:55 2:10 2:10' h, Station ES-lI

.Susquehanna Stearn Electric SusquehannaISteam ElectricStation ES-11 KLD Engineering, P.C.

Pa n

-0 03 Summer Summer Summer Winter Winter Winter Winter Summer

. Midweek.

• Midweek Midweek Weekend MidWeek Midweek Weekend M Midweek Midweek iWeekend Weekend c,:

Midday Midday Evening Midday "Midday Evening Midday Midday Region Good Ran Good Ran Good Good Ri Snw Good Ri Snw Good Special Roadway Weather -Weather Weather Weather Rain Snow Weather Rain Snow Weather Event Impact

... _ .. Staged Evacuation MileRegion:andKl(eyhole:to 5Miles

..R25' " 2: 00,2 2 155 155 155 200*2 2' "00.... " * :23555,'50 . -"155 200 R. 2:05 205 20.0 200200.2,00.:.0 2.00 2:35 200 2:00 2-.35 200 200 205 R27 . 2:05 2:051. 2:05 ,2:00 - 2:00 :2:0 2:00 I 2:35 i O5!0 .2:35 2:05 X-2:00 2:00 2:05 R28 2:05 2:05 2:00 2:00 2:00 2:05 2:05 2:40 2:00 2:00 2:35 2:;00 2:00 2:05 R29 2:10 2:10 r2:50 2:05 2:45. 2:50 2:55 3:35 2'.5 2:50 3:30 2 :45 2:10 2:10 R30 2:50 2:55 2:45 2.:5 2:45 2:50 2:55 3:5 2:5 20 3:30 2:5 250 25 m

CD a.)

01 CD 03 M

CD CD

.L, CD 0

--h Susquehanna:Steam Electric:Station ES-12 KLD Engineering, P.C.

Evacuation Time'Estimate Rev. 0

(D Table 7-2. T"ime to Clear the:lndicated Area of 100 Percent Of.the Affected Population 0

CA)

Region Good Ran Good Ran Good Good: Ri SInw Go Ran sw Good Special Roadway mWeather Weath r Weather Weather Weather Weather Event Impact o d . oEntire 2-Mile Region,5-Mile Region, and EoZ O1 0R i 4 .:00 4:0 0 .460 ! 4 - 00 4b . ..... . ... .. .. ........

R02 4:05 .4:05. 4: 4:05 4:05 4:05 4:05 4:35. 4:05 4:05 4:35 4:05 4:05 40*o 6z-,,.,4.*40.M K.4l-4::1010. -...

i....- 10 ...I,,0410 1 4 6 1.. :. .i4. I I.

l. '4*410:ll 0 .".... "....

1. -':,~-O-*

-.. 4, -._,* .,. 4zF!- 4 10.

l 2-Mile*Region* and Keyhole to.5 Miles R04 4:05 4:05: 4:05 4:05 4:05 4:05 ... 4:05 4:35 4:05 4:05. 4:35 4:05 4:05 4:05

,ROS 4:05. 4:.05. 405 . :05ý  : J*,..-05 5 t }4.5 . . . . . . . .. ... . . .:05 40 R06 4:05 4:05 4:05 4:05 4:05 4:05 .4:05 4:35 4:05 4:05 4:35 4:05 4:05 4:05 607 4.:05 . 4:05 4:05 4:05 -4:0.5 * .. -4:'O5 . 405 -4 }:;35"..: .: 4;05!,- 5-, 4:35*/ "4 4:"

05 - 405"5405.

RO 4:05 4:05 4:05 4:05 4:05 4:05 4:05 4:35 4:05 4:05 4:35 4:05 4:05 4:05 S-Mile Region and Keyhole to EPZ Boundary .-* 7i0-;-: *4'10..

41. :

R6 4:0 0 4: 10,.- -3ý: 1-'..,i4*O

'N*.';

,-:*.... ...:.* .4:4 ; ... 4:lO,n> -L4 410;.-,

RIO 4:10 4:10 4:10 4:10 4:10. 4:10 4:10 4:40 4:10 4:10 4:40 4:10 4:10 4:10 m R11 -.4:10 40 41 410 4*4 -4:1 ' :10i . , 41*0GW.: K44 4"0

.......... -. 4* -. -,i64'W 1

(D 4:10 4:10 4:40 14:10 4:10 4:10 R"2.

..... 4:10 410 4:10

0 4:10 4:0 4:10 4:0 4:10 4:0.... 4:10 ' 410.~ 4:40 4:10 44 4,i0' DO:, 4:40.-. i:4b<i: ;4,10* 4i10" CD R13- 4:10 4:0 4, 4:10 4: 4: 4:10 4:0 4:10- 4 4:10::- 4:.- 4...: 4:"10 4:10 441.6. 4:1.0., . .....kT4:40

.4.;0~ 40 .. .'4:100 10 --

.~. 44.~ 4:10 :0 411 41

. -4:10.

RiS. 4:10. . ~~4:10-4:10. ;4:10 4:10 4:40 4:10 4:10 R14 R 4:10 4:,10. 4:10 -4:10 4:10 4:10 4:1*0* 4:10

41. '"**10:4:10:

...4:10 4:1 4 ...... 4:

(0 R 4:10 " "..10 .4:10 "4:10 -410.- '..-40.- .  :.0,.. 4:40, .. .4"10, *4: 4. 4: 4:10 . 410.

R16 :4:10 *4:10 4:10 4:10 .4:10. 4:10. 4:10 .4:40 4:10 4:10 4:40 4:10 4:10 4:10.

RI 4:10 *4:10 4:10 4:10 4:4:1 0:1 4:10 44:1 0:10 4:10 4: 4:10

• 2.:" 4:10, . .. .4:1 :1 :1. .- 410-. ' 1."410 ' 4 :,1,A A ,- -,-,1,A;.<" A.160. 4100 R21 :4:10 .4:10 4:10 4:10 .4:10 4:10 4:10 4:40 4:10 4:10 4:40 4:10 4:10 4:10 0')

R22 4:10 4:10 4:10 4:10 4:10 4:10 4:10 4:40 4:10 4:10 4:40 4:10 4:10 4:10

-R22-. .4:10; .4:10 4:10 4:10 .-*41. 4:i104.- 10i*0 "4:40" .. 1.0 4:10i'- *'24:40.*o*, :4:10 - 44 . .0.4:10 (D

-. L CD R24 4:10 4:10. 4:10 4:10 4:10 4:10 4:10 4:40: 4:10 4:10 4:40 4:10. 4:10 4:10 0

Susquehanna.Steam ElectricStation ES-13 KLD Engineering, P.C.

Evacuation Time EBtimate Rev. 0

CD

.0 Summer Summer Summer Winter Winter Winter Winter Summer Midweek Midweek Midweek Weekend Midweek WeekendWeekend Weekend Weekend Midweek Midweek Midday Midday -Evening Midday Midday Evening Midday Midday Region G d Good Good Good I"Good Good. Special Roadway Weatoer Rain Rain good i IRin Snow Weather Wateetr WRn Weatherr Sther , Impact Staged Evacuation- 2-MileRegion and.Keyhole to 5Miles

• . .......405 .. 4.5 4:05

.. .......... - 4:o ........... - -! .4 o .

4-.4:os.

176 A4:05 4:05 4:05 4:05 4:05 4:05 4:05 4:35 4:05 4:05 4:35: 4:05 4.05 4:05 R27 4:.

-T5:5  ::0ýI 40 :5 AS 0 0

.- .:S:~45 . W-,'r7

~0'~ 5` .405 5-4:0

4:05 40 R28 4:05 4:05 4:05 4:05 405 4:05 4:05 4:35 4:05 4:05 4:35 4:05 4:05 4:05 R29 4:05 ' 4:05 4:05 4;4:0 "4.05-.4',"*,:35- '4:35 -: 5.. .05. :35 4:05 4.

4-0. 4.05

-::5d4:05, R30 4:05 4:05 4:05 4:05 4.05 1 4:05 4:05: 4:35 4:05 4:05 4:35 4i05 4:05 4:05 m

(D CD 0

CD CD Susquehanna Steam Electric Station ES-14 KLD Engineering, P.C. CD Evacuation Time Estimate. Rev. 0 0 h4 CA)

_0 (D Table 7-3. Tie:Milear 90RPercent of t the 2-Mile Region

-L.

.0 Summer Summer :Summer winter Winter Winter Winter summer CJ) Midweek Weekend Midweek Midweek Weekend Midweek Midweek Midweek Weeen Weekend Midday Midday . Evening Midday Midday Evening Midday Midday Region Good Good Good Good od S a Weather Weather a"Weather W eatW er rW hr Event. Impact Entire 2-Mile Region, S-Mile-Region, and-EPZ R011 . .i1:55- .1:55 -: 40 . 1.-45i; ... . -J14,& 1i .. t'5

___ . . . . `* ;50' 1R02 1:55 1s5 :1: 1:45, 1:40 1:55 1:55 2:35 1:40 1:45 2:25 1:40 1:50 1-:55 2-Mile Region-and Keyhole to 5S Miles R04 1:55 1:55 1:40 1:45 1:40 1:55 1:55 .2:35 1:40 V45 2:25 1:40 1:50 1:55 RO5- 1:5 " - 1:55 140 11.:45. --1`40A'-- 55 -. 145.1:50 1* 1:5**..55

.R06 1:55 1:55 1:40 .1:45. 1:40 155 1:55 2:35 1:40 1:45 2:25 1:40 .1:50 1:55 R07. ' .. 1:55 1:55' 1:40, ... 14 " ý ý-4 " "

ROB 1:55 1:55. 1:40 .1:45 1:40 1:55 1:55 2:35 1:40 1:45 2:25 1:40 1:50 1:55 Staged Evacuation . 2-MileiRegion and Keyhole to.SMiles R25 1:55 1:55 1:40 1:45 1:40 1:55 155. :2:35 1:40. 1:45 2:25 1:140 1:50 1:55 1R26 1:55 -1:55 1:40 :45 1~0 :5F 155 31A '1:55, m R27 -1:55 1:55 1:40 1:45 1:40: 1:55 1:55 2:35 -1:40 -1:45 2:.25 1:40 1:50 .1:55 55 .1 :55 . -1:40.

. ..1:4 5 . .. . .. . 2...., .. ... .,. ....-. .2 25...

.....- , 1:5. (D R29 1:55 1:55 1:40 1:45 140 1:55. 1:55 2:35 1:40 1:45 2:25 1:40 1:50 1:55 CD SR39 - .1:55 . 1:55 . 1:40 .1:45 . . 55.: 11 2:356. .I: 40K:!

155: .1:45- ;225P 1:40 150 1:55 0 CD (D1 (0

-h CA)

Susquehanna Steam Electric Station ES-15 KLD Engineering, P.C. N)

Evacuation'Time: Estimate Rev..0

(0 (0 Table.7-4. Time to: Clear 100Percent of the 2-Mile Region Summer Summer Summer Winter Winter Winter Winter Summer 0 Midweek Midweek CA Midweek WWeekend Ikd Midweek Weekend W kd Midweek Midweek icena rl-o-*.,

I Midday Midday Evening Midday Middjyl Eening Midday Midday.

Region Good bin Good Rain Good Good R Good i So God Special Roadway Weather Weather Weather Weather Rain now Weather Rain now Weather Event Impact Entire.2-Mile Region, 5-Mile'Region, and EPZ

-ROl- .:4:00'. 4:00, ,> :4:00 - 4:. :0: ý O- ' "..,. *4"00:-,4:301:_ 4:00, 4:00.. - 4:00.

R02 4:00 4:00 4:00 4:00 4:0040 4:00 4 4:00 4430 4:00 4-:00 4:00

2-Mile Region~and Keyhole to SMiles R04 4:00 4:00 4:00 4:00 4:00 4:00 4:00 4:35 4:00 4:00 4:30 4:00 4:00 4:00 ADS. 40...0 A4,. 40O ' ":: , ",

4' " "35 -&.".,.* -2 0,'4 4:..r 1;,0..

4:00 4:00 4:35 4:00 4:00 4:0 I--C....430 4:00 4:00 4:00

. 4:00 R06 4:00 4:00 4:00 4:00 4:00 -,.-.- 4;30 4 4 4:00.

'. I :,:.

Rski :0 -

.40 :0.00--

0:A;, P4:&- 0~~4~0~ 45 (0430- A.-400. - 4A:00 -

ROB 4:00 4:00i 4:00 4:00 -4:00 4:00 4!00 4:35 4:00 4:00 4:30 4:00 4:00 4:00 Staged Evacuation -,2-Mile Region:and Keyhole to 5 Miles R25 4:00 4:00 4:00 4:00 4:00 4:00 4:00 4:35 4:00 4:00 4:30 4:00 4:00 4:00

R27 ' .R26 ..- 4:00 . .... 4 . 00 -. '(o 4:00 4:00 4:00..4:00 4:00 4:00

• 4*:4:0 0:00 4:00 4:30 4:00 4:00 4:00 R28 00.

.4*:

""0** * . 4:o0. "4:00 4:00 4:00 4:00 4 -3 4:0  :-_.4:00- .. 4:30 2 .4:00< . 4:000- .4:00.

R29 4:00 4:00 4:00 4:00 4:00 4:00 4:00 4:35 4:00 4:00 4:30 4:00 4:00 4:00 (D

.0. 4:00 4:05 4:00.  ! -4:00- .. 4:00 -4:-.. -4; - .4,4: *.. 4:00

-4:0. -- 4::30.- 4:00 4:00 . .4:00 (0 (D

01 (D

N) 0 0

0 C,,

Susquehanna Steam Electric Station ES-16 KLD Engineering, P.C.

Evacuation TimeEstimate Rev. 0

CD Table".8-7. School Evacuation Time Estimates -Good Weather 0

CA BeaverMain Elementary School 90 "1 15 D.6 41.4 1 5o 91 14 14O*

Berwick'Middle'Sch ool 90 15 7.7 13.2 36 *-2.20, 16-2 25 O.

I BerwickkSenior.HighKSchool 90 15 7.7 112 36 Wz~s~a15.0 23 I

.Columbia-DayCare:.Program 90 15 7.7 13.2 36. , 2ý-54 19 29

.2,  ; J2.-950--- .

I

• Fourteenth %StreetElementary 90 15 7.3. 123 36 *2s2U. .14.7 .23 -.-245-Holy Family Consolidated School. .90 15 6.2 8.3 45 40t30 19 .0 29 3:00"-

New:Story Elementary :90 15 6.7 12.3 33 , 15.4. 24 ,2:45' Nescopeck ElementarVySchool 90 15: 8. 33.2 15. *2:OO* 15.4 24 .1225

.Orange.StElementarySchod .90 15 6 15;1 25: 2 16.2 25 2:'35 Salem Elementary School . . . :90 15 7.7 13.2 .36. 1*!2*1 19.0 29  ;. 2:50 Drums Elementary/Middle School 90 15 .1. 443 3 ~IVM01 0 8.1 13 ~

i i5 i

GNA:Educational:Center 90 15 0.5 6.5 5 2.1 4 J2:55 GNA Elementary, School 90 .15 ý0.5 6.5 5 E15O 2.1 4 -1:55-Greater'Nanticoke High School 90 15 ,6.5: S 15O~2.1 0 4 1:55 m Hunlock Creek.Elementary School Huntington:Mills Elementary School 90 90 15 15 4.7 5.7.

21M17.4 9.5 .30 20

-A2N15*t5 k

• .2;05*

17.9 15.2 27 23  :-.L30.

CD JFKElementary.School 90 15 0.5 6.5 5 ~1~~ 2.1 4 15~

(0 K.M. Smith..Elernentary School 90 15 2.4 *5.1 29 2.1 2,2'15: 4 2:..

.15

.eystone Jib Corp High School 90 137 *44.3 3 8.1. 13 205"° 15

-I 9.7 15 . : ..Q ,1521

• Muhlenberg.Christian Academy :90 15 2.3 23 2:2 .

• Northwest Area High:Schooi :90 5.7 *42.1 I9 A 19.7 30 -41.225:.'

15 (D Penn.State Hazelton. 90 :0.8 32.4 2 -ýj 24.1 37 <:5 90 15 PopeJohn Paul IICatholic School I I 1.4 I 43 .. I 19 K21S 2.1 4 _2:10 0~)

Rice Elementary 90 15 .. Located.outside:of the EPZ 5.7 .9 _ -'i55 i.

-0 The Learning;Station School 90 15 .2.0 5.1 25 r421OI 2.1 4 {2'15. (a Valley Elementary/Middle.School .90 15 2.7 37.2 5 . 15% I 8.0 12 I (D

-ai .M .. nv. M R~iqJ ~ W ,

______.- _iM0-75muI-v g r-0 CA)

Susqriehanna Steam Electric.Station ES-17 KID Engineering, P.C.

Evacuation Time Estiiflate Rev. 0

-u CD Table 8-11. Transit-De pe ndent EvacuatlonTime: Estimates - Good*Weather 0-N)

CA

.1 . I. 4.4 zl3.1 b LU.!I b 'U -44

+ I. I.

80 7.4 10.9 41 30 .45.4 68 5. 10.. 91 I 30 '6N0r 3A 90 7.4 11.2 40 30 45.4 68 5 10 91 . 30 .,6 i 2 5,6 100 7.4 12.6 35. 30 454 68 5 10 9i 30 .

7,8 1 10 7A .12.9 34 30 45.4 68 5 10 91 30 9110O11 120 7.4 13.2 34 30 45.4 68 5 10 91 30 .6!30.

333 1 90 7:4 40.9 1.1 30 -14.8 22 5 10 44. 30 1-4?4`,'ý-,

2 :120 7.4 41.5 11 30 .14.8 .22 :5 10 43 30 " .4:44.

4 1 90 4.2 26.7 9 30 '43.2 65 5 10 76 30 5N20 1 90 10.1 13.0 46 30 30.2 45 5 10 76 30 ,:4; 5 2 105 10.1 15.2 40 30 30.2 45 5 10 76 30 . 57,5.

3 L 120 16.5 37 30 302 45 5 .10 76 30  ::6Oo.0 1,2 90 4.6 I42.3 7 30 16.1 .24 5 37 30 40 6 3,4 105 .416. 1 42.1 7 30 16.1 24 5 10 37 30 415 m 5,6 120 4.,6 1 42.1 7 .30 16.1 24 I5 10 37 30 45,301 *3 (D

1 90 2.5 32.8 4___ 30: 14.8 22 5 10 30 30 3;45. (D 2__ __ 12012.5 34.4 4 30 14.8 .22 5 10 30. 30 415< 0 8 _ 9_ 10.31 4271 15 30. 2917 .45 5 .10 .74: 30 50

.9 1 90 4V :1 37.7 +

.7 30' 29.7 .45 5 .10 59 30 J4.., 13 2 120 4.7 I 37.7 .7 30 Ik2 29.7 45 5 10 59 30 15`.M1,

()

.10 1 90 4.2 40.5 6 30 34.3 51 5 10 64 30 A:'.55, tI 11 1 90 17.0 36.5 28 30 17.0 .26 5 10 73. 30 .4.5" .

-u 12 21 9.0 4.3 .13.0 .20 30 28.1 42 5 10 54 30 .4:5'.. m

10. 4.3 16.0 16 30 28.1 42 5 10 54 30 CD 31 90 4.0 44.1 5 30 34.2 51 5 10 63 30 4:50y N1)

CD

____ 2 120 4.0 44.2 5 30 34.2 51. 5 10 63 30 '5~ZO 00 ft i-)

Susquehanrna Steam.Electric.Station ES-18 KLD Engineering, P.C.

Evacuatioh Time Estiihnate Rev. 0

CD 0

CIO

.1 90 .5.5 I 43:5 :8- 30 34.4 52 5. 10. 66 30 14

.2 120 5.5* 46.9 7 30 34.4 j 52 :15 j 10 j 66 30 . 5`25~'P 1,2. .80. 0.9. 6.0 30

• 28.9 43 5 10 46 30 3,A 90 0.9 6.6 8 .30 28.9 43 5 10 46 30 .

i5 5,6 100 0.9 6.7 & 30 28.9 43 5 10 .46 30 _:__""__

7,8 110 03 7:3 7 30

• 28;9 43 5 10 46 30 A'45 9,10,11 120 019 72 8 .30 28*9 43 S. 10 46 30 _,_,_4__s__

1 90 8.1 29.7 16 30 f- 34.4 52- 5 10 73 30 .5!,15 16 2 120 8,1 34.8 14 30 34. 52 5 10 73 30 15.:40k'

1,2 90 4.4 17.2 15 30 284 43 5 10 56 30 '4:45-:

17 3,4 105 4.4 19.7 13 30 28.4 43 5 10 I 56 30 455 5 120 4.4 25.0 11. 30 28.4 43 5 10 56 . 30 ,"-

1s 1 90 .1.1 55.0 1 .30 28.4 43 5 10 45 30 420..

19 1 90 1.0 35.2 2 30 t 30.3 45 5 10-49 30 5

1. 90 8.0 11.7 41, 30 34.4 52 . 5 10 76 . 30 :5:46;-j m 2 120 8.0 13.8 35 30 344 52 5 10 76 30 6 *3 CD 21 *_ 1 90 7.1 14.4 30. 30 34. 52 5 10 72 30 (D)

"0 22 i. 90 6.1 42.3 9 30 30.1 45 5 . 10 .63 . 30 44A5ý.

23 ___ 90 2.3 55.0 30 30 344 52 5 58 .30 .10 40'40 C) xCD U, 90 6.0 41.7 9 30 13.3 20 5 10 38 30 ,

24 3A4. 120 6.0 43.3 8 .30 13.3 20 5 10 37 30 415";

4 4 + 4 (D

1,2 90 7.0 18.9 22 30 29.7 44 5 10 64. 30 500'Ob 25 3,4 120. 7.0 23.8 18 30 29.7 44 S. 10 64T. 30 55 01 CA) f.*, .. ~ *Va~mfbLI ýTE` .~~~~~,Mj M

.~,. .. .

"'r.~~.'-- .-

veragWETEi, W-0921111 0D 0.

('h Susquehanna:SteamrElectric Station ES-19 *(LD Engineering, P.C.

Evacuation Time Estimate Rev. 0

(D 0

-h CA) m CD (0

CD CY)

CD (0

Figure H.S. Region RO8 CA C,)

Susquehanna'Steam Eleetric Station ES-20 KLD Engineering, P.C.

-EvacUationvTime Estimate Rev. 0

Emergency Plan, Rev. 55, Page 205 of 312 APPENDIX H DOWNSTREAM SUSQUEHANNA RIVER WATER USAGE Page 1 of 3

Emergency Plan, Rev. 55, Page 206 of 312 Quantity User's Name Location-River Miles Use Class (Mgd) Comment

1. Keystone Water Co. Berwick - 8.0 M Sb None For emergency use only. Not used for 8 years. Pump removed. Serves about 20-25 thousand people.

2. Bloomsburg Water Co. Bloomsburg - 19.4 M Sb 0

3. Campbell Soup Co. Bloomsburg - 19.4 I None None No use of river water.

4. Danville Borough Danville - 27.4 M Pr 1.8 Will expand use. Serves about 8,000 people.

5. Merck & Co. Danville - 27.4 1 Pr 7-9 Serves about 500 people. Large quantity for cooling, small for process.

6. Danville State Hospital Danville - 27.4 Pu Pr NA Serves about 4,000 people. Receives water from Danville Borough. Only in emergencies.

8. Celotex Corp. Sunbury - 38.5 1 None None Receives water from Sunbury Municipal Authority.

9. Sunbury (SES) - WPS Sunbury - 38.5 I Pr 245

10. Shamokin Dam Municipal Shamokin Dam - 44.4 M Pr NA Serves about 2,000 people

11. Millersburg Water Co. Millersburg - 69.4 M Sb NA

12. Harrisburg Mun. Auth. Harrisburg - 91.0 M Sb NA

13. Bethlehem Steel Co. Harrisburg - 91.0 I NA NA

14. Borough of Steelton Water Steelton - 93.4 M Pr 1.7 Allocated 5.0 Mgd Co.

15. Metropolitan Edison (SES) Middletown -100.2 I Pr 245

16. Metropolitan Edison (HES) York Haven - 105.2 I Pr 11,782

17. PPL (SES) Brunner Island - 108.0 I Pr 745

18. Wrightsville Water Co. Wrightsville - 119.0 M Pr NA

19. Columbia Water Co. Columbia - 119.0 M Pr 1.8

20. Lancaster Water Auth. Lancaster -

• M Pr 8.0 Based on old data, allocated 24.0 Mgd.

21. York Water Co. York -

• M Sb NA

22. Safe Harbor Water Safe Harbor - 129.7 M Pr 79,527

23. PPL (HES) Holtwood - 137.9 I Pr 21,337

24. Phila. Electric (PS) Muddy Run - 140.4 I Pr 12,931

25. Phila. Electric (NS) Peach Bottom - 143.0 I NA 0.03 Page 2 of 3

Emergency Plan, Rev. 55, Page 207 of 312 LýzL Quantity User's Name Location-River Miles Conowingo - 154.3 Use 1

Class Pr (Mgd) 53,018 Comment J

26. Phila. Electric &

Susquehanna Power Co.

(HES)

27. Chester Water Auth. Chester -

• M Sb NA

28. Baltimore Water Authority Baltimore, MD -

• M Sb NA

29. Havre-de-Grace Municipal Havre-de-Grace, M Pr 1.4 Auth. Md -_*

NOTE: River miles are from Susquehanna SES Site

• Not on River NA Not Available (SES) Steam Electric Station (HES) Hydroelectric Station (PS) Pumping Station (NS) Nuclear Station I Industrial M Municipal Pu Public Pr Primary Sb Standby Mgd Million gallons per day Page 3 of 3

Emergency Plan, Rev. 56, Page 208 of 312 APPENDIX I POPULATION UPDATE FOR SSES EMERGENCY PLANNING ZONE Page 1 of 2

Emergency Plan, Rev. 56, Page 209 of 312 REFER TO THE EVACATION TIME ESTIMATE IN APPENDIX G FOR THE CURRENT POPULATION INFORMATION Page 2 of 2

Emergency Plan, Rev. 56, Page 210 of 312 APPENDIX J NUREG-0654 PLANNING STANDARDS AND EVALUATION CRITERIA CROSS REFERENCE TO SSES EMERGENCY PLAN Page 1 of 10

Emergency Plan, Rev. 56, Page 211 of 312 Chapter 6, Section 6.0 Chapter 4 Chapter 6 Chapter 6, Figures 6.2, 6.3, 6.6, 6.7 FSAR Figure 13.1-3 Chapter 6, Sections 6.2, 6.2.1, 6.3, 6.3.1, 6.3.1.1 Chapter 6, Sections 6.0, 6.1,.6.2, 6.2.3, 6.2.4, 6.2.5, 6.3, 6.3.1.2, 6.3.1.4, 6.3.1.5 Appendix A Chapter 6, Sections 6.2.6, 6.3.1.3

'N. N Chapter 6, Sections 6.0 Phase 1,11, 111, 6.1, Tables 6.1, Figure 6.2, Figure 6.3 Chapter 6, Sections 6.0, 6.1 Appendix E Chapter 6, Section 6.2.1 Chapter 6, Section 6.2.1 Chapter 6, Tables 6.1 Chapter 6, Figure 6.7 Chapter 6, Section 6.2.6 Chapter 6, Section 6.2.5, 6.5 Chapter 6, Section 6.2.1 Chapter 6, Section 6.3.2.1 Chapter 6, Table 6.2 Appendix A Chapter 6, Table 6.2 Appendix A Page 2 of 10

- I Emergency Plan, Rev. 56, Page 212 of 312 7< ~--NURE 54P.ANGSTNDARDS AN'D'EVALUATION,$VYj'.

T4-

"- 7 -

APPLICABLE NUREG-0654 SECTION I SSES EMERGENCY PLAN

___mfleq up -

1.a. Chapter 6, Sections 6.2.1, 6.3.1.1, 6.4.3 1.b. Chapter 6, Section 6.4.3 1.c. Chapter 6, Section 6.4.3 2.b. Chapter 6, Sections 6.2.1, 6.3.1.1

3. Chapter 6, Section 6.4.3

4. Appendix A, Table 6.2

1. Em erqe~nc lassificato s ; ..... Rd .,=, .. ,.,, .. ,,... .. : .... * :.,;,., . ,** **

1. Chapter 5, Sections 5.1,5.2, Appendix D, Appendix F, Tables F, R, M, E, 0, C.

2. Chapter 5, Table F, R, M, E, 0, C.

1. Chapter 6, Figure 6.7 Appendix C, Position Specific Instructions for:

• Control Room Emergency Plan Communicator

• TSC Emergency Plan Communicator

• EOF Communicator

• Radiation Protection Coordinator

" Technical Support Coordinator

• Recovery Manager

• Dose Assessment Supervisor

2. Appendix C, Position Specific Instructions for:

• Emergency Director

• Control Room Emergency Plan Communicator

• TSC Emergency Plan Communicator

• Security Coordinator

3. Appendix C, Position Specific Instructions for:

• Control Room Emergency Plan Communicator

" TSC Emergency Plan Communicator

• EOF Communicator 4.a., b., c., k., n. Appendix C, Position Specific Instructions for:

• Control Room Emergency Plan Communicator

• TSC Emergency Plan Communicator

• EOF Communicator Page 3 of 10

Emergency Plan, Rev. 56, Page 213 of 312 APPLICABLE NUREG-0654 SECTION SSES EMERGENCY PLAN 4.d., e., f., g., h., i., j., I. Appendix C, Position Specific Instructions for:

• Radiation Protection Coordinator

• Dose Assessment Supervisor 4.m. Appendix C, Position Specific Instructions for:

• Control Room Emergency Plan Communicator

" TSC Emergency Plan Communicator

" EOF Communicator

6. Chapter 6, Sections 6.2.1, 6.3.1.1 Chapter 7, Sections 7.1.1, 7.3.2 Chapter 8, Section 8.5.4

7. Chapter 6, Sections 6.2, 6.2.1, 6.2.3, 6.3.1.1, 6.3.1.5 Chapter 7, Section 7.3.2, Table 7.3

1. Chapter 6, Figure 6.7 Chapter 8, Sections 8.1.3.5, 8.2.2.4 1.a. Chapter 6, Sections Phase Ic), 6.2.3, 6.2.4e), 6.2.5g),

6.3.1.1i), 6.3.1.4e), 6.3.1.5 Appendix C, Position Specific Instruction for:

• Control Room Emergency Plan Communicator

• TSC Emergency Plan Communicator

" EOF Communicator

• Radiation Protection Coordinator

• Tech Support Coordinator

• Recovery Manager

• Dose Assessment Supervisor 1.b. Chapter 8, Sections 8.3.1, 8.3.2 1.c. Chapter 6, Sections Phase Ic), 6.2.3, 6.2.4, 6.3.1.5 Chapter 8, Sections 8.1.3.5, 8.2.2.4, 8.2.2.4.1, 8.2.2.4.2 Appendix C, Position Specific Instructions for:

0 Control Room Emergency Plan Communicator

• TSC Emergency Plan Communicator

• EOF Communicator 1.d. Chapter 6, Sections 6.2.1j), 6.2.3c), 6.2.4d), 6.2.5g)

Chapter 8, Sections 8.1.3.5, 8.1.3.5.1, 8.1.3.5.2, 8.2.2.4, 8.2.2.4.1, 8.2.2.4.2 Page 4 of 10

Emergency Plan, Rev. 56, Page 214 of 312 APPLICABLE NUREG-0654 SECTION SSES EMERGENCY PLAN 1.e. Chapter 6, Sections Phase I, Phase II, Phase III, 6.2, 6.3 1 .f. Chapter 8, Sections 6.2.1d, 6.3.1.1c, 6.3.1.1j, Figure 6.7

2. Chapter 7, Sections 7.4.2, 7.4.3 Chapter 8, Sections 8.1.3.5.1, 8.2.2.4 Appendix C, Position Specific Instruction for:

9 Security Coordinator

3. Chapter 9, Sections 9.1.2, 9.3 G. !ubhicEducatonand:Ihfdormtion., -,:,.

1. a., b., c., d. Chapter 9, Sections 9.4, 9.4.1, 9.4.2, 9.4.3

2. . Chapter 9, Sections 9.4, 9.4.1, 9.4.2, 9.4.3 3.a. Chapter 6, Section 6.3.2 Chapter 8, Section 8.2.1 3.b. Chapter 8, Section 8.2.1 4.a. Chapter 6, Section 6.3.2.1 4.b. Chapter 6, Sections 6.3.2, 6.3.2.1 4.c. Chapter 6, Section 6.3.2.1 e)

5. Chapter 9, Section 9.4.2 "H. ergenc biiti-alltes1andEqulpment .....................-.......

1. Chapter 8, Sections 8.1.2.1, 8.1.1.2, 8.1.3

2. Chapter 8, Section 8.2.2

4. Chapter 6, Sections Phase I, Phase II, Phase III

5. Appendix D, Enclosures 3, 4, 5, 7 5.a. Appendix D, Enclosure 3 5.b. Appendix D, Enclosure 4 5.c. Appendix D, Enclosures 4, 7 5.d. Appendix D, Enclosure 7 6.a., b. Chapter 7, Section 7.1, 7.1.1 Page 5 of 10

Emergency Plan, Rev. 56, Page 215 of 312

~c~tR7EG-t 654.PLNNI AA AN EAUAIN d;

~~GSTANDAWS

'0 ."..PLN.j.j MMEAUTO

~~. Ž ~ ~ ~ i ~SSSw MEOSRGEN - ~ eiA ¶'

APPLICABLE NUREG-0654 SECTION SSES EMERGENCY PLAN 6.c. Appendix C, Position Specific Instructions for:

• Chemistry Coordinator 0 Field Team Director Table 6.2

7. Appendix D, Enclosures 4, 5

8. Chapter 7, Section 7.1.1.1, Appendix D, Enclosure 3

9. Chapter 8, Section 8.1.2

10. Chapter 9, Section 9.3

11. Appendix D

12. Chapter 6, Sections 6.2.4f), 6.3.1.4f)

__~ ~ ~ ~ ZN-g Yff-

-jV;~~- 1

1. Chapter 5, Table F, R, M, E, 0, C Appendix F

2. Chapter 7, Section 7.1 3.a., b. Chapter 7, Section 7.1, 7.1.1.3

4. Chapter 7, Section 7.1, 7.1.1, 7.1.1.3

5. Chapter 7, Section 7.1.1.1

6. Chapter 7, Sections 7.1.1.3, 7.1.1.4

7. Chapter 7, Section 7.1, 7.1.1

8. Chapter 7, Section 7.1,.7.1.1.3

9. Chapter 7, Section 7.1.1.3 Appendix D, Enclosures 4, 5, 6

10. Chapter 7, Section 7.1.1, Table 7.3, 7.1.1.3 1.a., b., c., d. Chapter 7, Section 7.3, 7.3.1, 7.3.2 Appendix C, Position Specific Instruction for:

• Control Room Emergency Plan Communicator e TSC Emergency Plan Communicator

• Radiation Protection Coordinator

2. Chapter 7, Section 7.3.1.4 Page 6 of 10

Emergency Plan, Rev. 56, Page 216 of 312 APPLICABLE NUREG-0654 SECTION SSES EMERGENCY PLAN

3. Chapter 7, Section 7.3.1.4

4. Chapter 7, Sections 7.3.1.3,7.3.1.4

5. Chapter 7, Sections 7.3.1,7.3.1.3,7.3.1.4 Appendix C, Position Specific Instructions for:

• Emergency Director

• Security Controller 6.a. Chapter 7, Section 7.3.1 6.b. Chapter 7, Section 7.3.1 6.c. Chapter 6, Section 6.2.1k, 6.2.41 Chapter 7, Table 7.2

7. Chapter 6, Sections, 6.0, 6.2.1, 6.3.1.1 Chapter 7, Tables 7.1, 7.3 Appendix C, Position Specific Instructions for:

• Emergency Director 0 Radiation Protection Coordinator 0 Control Room Emergency Plan Communicator

• TSC Emergency Plan Communicator

• Recovery Manager

• Dose Assessment Supervisor

• Liaison Support Supervisor

• EOF Communicator

8. Appendix G 10.a. Appendix C, Position Specific Instructions for:

• HP Tech I (OSCAR)

• Field Team Director

• Monitoring Team

• Environmental Sampling Team Appendix G Appendix H 10.b. Appendix G Appendix I 1O.c. Chapter 7, Section 7.3.2 Chapter 8, Section 8.5.4 10.m. Chapter 7, Sections 7.3.2, Appendix G Page 7 of 10

Emergency Plan, Rev. 56, Page 217 of 312 NUREG9! -654TPLANNiTD AND VLU ATI 0N~ F!'1~,

47 --. -- '

. .-,., .- , . , . . ...... - C TO

-* r' "- *--"*-"

t .-- *- **.

.. ".-: " :; .. .. . *,. * - *.4.;  :' r* .. . .* * . * ,. ,*,* .. * ,* *,., r.* .., _

APPLICABLE NUREG-0654 SECTION I SSES EMERGENCY PLAN IN -'Qc'ý2 .

1 .a., b., c., d., e., f., g. Chapter 7, Section 7.4.3, Table 7.2 Appendix C, Position Specific Instructions for:

• Security Coordinator

• Radiation Protection Coordinator

• HP Specialist

2. Chapter 6, Section 6.2.11, 6.2.1 k, 6.2.41 Chapter 7, Section 7.2, Table 7.2 Appendix C, Position Specific Instructions for:

• Radiation Protection Coordinator 3.a. Chapter 7, Section 7.3 Appendix C, Position Specific Instructions for:

• Health Physics Specialist

• Radiation Protection Coordinator Appendix D, Enclosures 5,6,8 3.b. Appendix C, Position Specific Instructions for:

• Health Physics Specialist

• Radiation Protection Coordinator

• Field Team Director

• Monitoring Team

• Environmental Sampling Team 5.a., b. Chapter 7, Section 7.3.1, 7.4.2 6.a., b., c. Chapter 7, Section 7.3.1, 7.4.2

7. Chapter 7, Section 7.3.1.4, 7.4.2 L;~Medic~t and-Rub ricd 5Ith.u ot;' i;j~~ * . . . .

1. Appendix A

2. Table 6.1

4. Chapter 7, Section 7.4.3 Appendix A Appendix C, Position Specific Instructions for:

• Security Coordinator Page 8 of 10

Emergency Plan, Rev. 56, Page 218 of 312 Page 9 of 10

Emergency Plan, Rev. 56, Page 219 of 312 Page 10 of 10

Emergency Plan, Rev. 56, Page 220 of 312 On-Shift Staffing Analysis APPENDIX K.

On-Shift Staffing Analysis Page 1 of 93.

Emergency Plan, Rev. 56, Page 221 of 312 On-Shift Staffing Analysis SusqLuehanna Steam Electric Station On-Shift Staffing Analysis Report Revision 0 December 14, 2012 Page 2 of 93

Emergency Plan, Rev. 56, Page 222 of 312 On-Shift Staffing Analysis Table of Contents Title Page Number Introduction 1 Executive Summary 1 Conclusion 2 Table 1, Susquehanna On-Shift Staffing 2 Table 2, Susquehanna DBA/ISG Analyzed Events 3 Appendix A, Phase II Analysis Results 4 Phase II Preliminary Conclusions 5 Phase II Recommendations 6 Appendix B, Phase II Event Analysis Tables 7 Phase II Event Analysis Table Index 8 On-Shift Personnel Assignments Used During Phase II Analysis 9 Appendix C, Phase III Results 86 Phase Ill Time Motion Study Results 95 Page 3 of 93

Emergency Plan, Rev. 56, Page 223 of 312 On-Shift Staffing Analysis Introduction 10 CFR 50 Appendix E, effective on December 23, 2011 directed that a detailed study be performed by December 24, 2012, to ensure on-shift staffing was adequate to perform critical functions until relieved by the augmented Emergency Response Organization (ERO). The NRC in the published staff guidance (Reference 2) endorsed NEI 10-05 as an acceptable means of performing the required staffing analysis. This report documents the result of that analysis for Susquehanna Steam Electric Station (SSES).

References

1. 10 CFR 50 Appendix E

2. NSIR/DPR-ISG-01, Interim Staff Guidance, Emergency Planning for Nuclear Power Plants

3. NEI 10-05, Revision 0, Assessment of On-Shift Emergency Response Organization Staffing and Capabilities

4. SSES Emergency Plan, Revision 53, Table 6.1, Station Emergency Plan Minimum Staffing Requirements

5. SSES FSAR, Chapter 15 Executive Summary A detailed staffing analysis performed in accordance with NEI 10-05 was conducted to document the adequacy of shift staffing as required by 10 CFR 50 Appendix E.

The minimum staff described in Table 6.1 of the SSES Emergency Plan, Revision 53, was used to perform the on-shift staffing analysis. Table 1 of this report lists the on-shift staffing as described in Revision 53 of the SSES Emergency Plan.

NRC staff guidance directs the scenarios that must be used to demonstrate the adequacy of on-shift staffing to perform required functions for event mitigation, radiation protection response, firefighting, chemistry and Emergency Plan functions. Those scenarios include specific design basis events as described in the FSAR as well as specific scenarios defined in the staff guidance document. Table 2 identifies the scenarios that were examined.

The next phase required of NEI 10-05 requires a dedicated team using tabletop techniques examine the scenarios for conflicts between the functional areas that must be resolved by detailed procedural analysis. For those scenarios where no conflicts are identified in the specified areas no further actions are required. Table 2 also identifies the scenarios that required detailed analysis due to conflicts in response functions. Appendix A to this report documents the results of the procedural analysis. Appendix B includes the completed event scenario analysis tables.

The final phase of NEI 10-05, Time Motion Study (TMS), identifies any staffing conflicts with the minimum shift that must be resolved. The TMS for Susquehanna Steam Electric Station determined that staffing conflicts do not exist. Appendix C of this report summarizes the results of the TMS.

Page 4 of 93

Emergency Plan, Rev. 56, Page 224 of 312 On-Shift Staffing Analysis Conclusion The minimum staff identified in Table 6.1 of the Susquehanna Steam Electric Station Emergency Plan, Revision 53, was adequate to respond to the scenarios identified in the regulations until relieved by the augmented ERO.

Table 1 Susquehanna Steam Electric Station On-Shift Staffing SSES Emergency Plan, Rev 53 Table 6.1, Station Emergency Plan Minimum Staffing Requirements Position On-Shift Shift Manager (SM) ' 1 Unit Supervisor (SRO) z 1 NRC Communicator (SRO) I'7 1 Plant Control Operators 7 3 E Plan Communicator 2,7 1 Shift Technical Advisor (STA) "7 1 Nuclear Plant Operator 4 HP Technician 3 2 Chemistry Technician 4 1 Total: 15 Fire Brigade 5 TRM Rescue Operations/First Aid 6 2 Security Sec plan 1 One Unit Supervisor assigned to each unit. The unaffected Unit Supervisor or STA assumes the role of NRC Communicator.

2 Two (2) Control Room Operators per unit. This number includes two (2) OATC Reactor Operators and two (2) BOP Reactor Operators. The unaffected unit BOP assumes the role of E Plan Communicator.

3 Two (2) HP Technicians on shift. One (1) HP Technician provides support as Dose Calculator (Offsite Dose Assessment). One (1) HP Technician provides support by providing In-plant surveys, job coverage, and personnel monitoring.

4 One (1) Chemistry Technician provides chemistry sampling support.

5 Fire Brigade is a collateral duty of Effluents Management requiring 5 personnel without safe shutdown responsibilities. The Fire Brigade consists of 1 Fire Brigade Leader (Field Unit Supervisor) and 4 Fire Brigade Members. Refer to NDAP-QA-0640, Attachment B - Effluents Management Responsibilities.

6 Rescue Operations/First Aid is a collateral duty of Fire Brigade and Security personnel.

7 Licensed Operators are trained and qualified as E Plan and NRC Communicators.

Page 5 of 93

_. : . - -1 Emergency Plan, Rev. 56, Page 225 of 312 On-Shift Staffing Analysis Table 2 Susquehanna Steam Electric Station DBAIISG Analyzed Events TMirS DBAEISG Summary Description of Event or Accident Required Event #

YES 1 Land and/or waterborne HOSTILE ACTION directed against the Protected Area by a HOSTILE FORCE. Adversary characteristics defined by the Design Basis Threat (DBT).

NO 2 Recirc Pump Shaft Seizure (No Classification - Phase IIAnalysis not required per NEI 10-05 guidance)

NO 3 Recirc Pump Shaft Break 1 NO 4 Control Rod Drop NO 5 Instrument Line Break 2 NO 6 Steam System Piping Break Outside Containment (MSLB)

NO 7 Loss of Coolant Accident inside Containment (with release exceeding PAGs and resulting PARs) 3 NO 8 Feedwater Line Break Outside Containment 2 NO 9 Fuel and Equipment Handling Accident 4 NO 10 ATWS NO 11 Response actions for an "aircraft probable threat" in accordance with 10 CFR 50.54(hh)(1) and as discussed in RG 1.214 YES 12 Control room fire leading to evacuation and remote shutdown, as referenced in IN 95-48.

YES 13 Station Blackout (Current Licensing Basis)

NO 14 Appendix R Fire Response NO 15 SAMG 1 The SSES FSAR states that the Recirc Pump Shaft Break event is bounded by Event 2, Recirc Pump Shaft Seizure. Therefore, no Phase IIAnalysis is required.

2The SSES FSAR states that the Steam System Piping Break Outside Containment is more limiting than the Feedwater Line Break Outside Containment and the Instrument Line Break.

Therefore, Event 6, Steam System Piping Break (MSLB), bounds these events and no Phase II Analysis is required.

3DBA event designated as proceeding non-mechanistically to GE with release exceeding Protective Action Guides.

4 Fuel and Equipment Handling accident is not analyzed with the existing on-shift staff. The SSES FSAR states that this event involves fuel that is conditioned at least 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> after shutdown; therefore it is applicable to refueling conditions. Refueling operations are staffed for the evolution with additional operations, HP and support personnel.

Per SSES personnel, the Control Room fire with evacuation and remote shutdown is the bounding Appendix R fire scenario; therefore, no further analysis of this event is required.

Page 6 of 93

Emergency Plan, Rev. 56, Page 226 of 312 On-Shift Staffing Analysis Appendix A Phase II Analysis Results Page 7 of 93

Emergency Plan, Rev. 56, Page 227 of 312 On-Shift Staffing Analysis A multi-disciplined team of subject matter experts from Susquehanna Steam Electric Station was assembled September 10-12, 2012 to provide input into the shift staffing analysis of events identified by NSIR/DPR-ISG-01, Interim Staff Guidance, Emergency Planning for Nuclear Power Plants. This team consisted of: a Shift Technical Advisor (SRO Certified); Chemistry Foreman; an HP Supervisor; a Fire Protection Engineer; a Security Coordinator; and Emergency Planning staff (station and consultants). The team provided analysis support during the Phase II analysis as follows:

On-Shift Staffing Analysis Team Team Member Subject Matter Expertise Shift Technical Advisor Emergency Operating Procedure (EOP) actions for SROs, NPOs, and PCOs Off-Normal Operating Procedure (ONOP) actions for SROs, NPOs, and PCOs Operating Procedure actions Site Emergency Director (E Plan) Actions Fire response actions Control Room Communicator (NRC Communications) actions Fire Protection Fire Brigade Response actions Engineer Chemistry Foreman Chemistry Technician response actions HP Supervisor HP Technician response actions Security Coordinator Security Response actions Accountability Response actions Emergency Planning Emergency Plan response actions Site Emergency Director (E Plan) Actions The Phase II Analysis was conducted in three steps: identification of events for analysis; minimum shift staffing complement determination; and, a table top analysis of the on-shift staffing resources required for response to the identified events. The team reviewed a total of nine (9) events. The results and recommendations of the Phase II Shift Staffing Analysis are documented in this report.

Phase II Preliminary Conclusions

1. Operations Conflicts - Time Motion Study (TMS) is required for the STA position due to competing ON/EOP procedure actions and assigned Emergency Plan functions/tasks.

The TMS will determine if these functions can be performed by the STA during an event.

Phase II Recommendations:

1. Determine the most effective methodology to perform remaining scenarios requiring detailed time motion studies (Simulator based Drill, timed in-plant response, combinations, other).

2. Schedule and conduct Phase III analysis for the following events:

a. Design Basis Threat

b. Control Room Fire with Evacuation and Remote Shutdown

c. Station Blackout Page 8 of 93

Emergency Plan, Rev. 56, Page 228 of 312 On-Shift Staffing Analysis Appendix B Phase II Event Analysis Tables Page 9 of 93

Emergency Plan, Rev. 56, Page 229 of 312 On-Shift Staffing Analysis Phase IIEvent Analysis Table Index Analysis FSAR DBA/ Page (Scenario ISG Event # Title Source Number Number) (Appendix A) 1 1 Design Basis Threat ISG 11 2 4 Control Rod Drop FSAR 20 Limiting Fault Event 3 6 Steam System Piping Break Outside FSAR 29 Containment (MSLB) Condition IV Event 4 7 Loss of Coolant Accident inside ISG/FSAR 388 Containment (with release exceeding Limiting Fault PAGs and resulting in PARs) Event 5 10 ATWS ISG/FSAR 46 Limiting Fault Event 6 11 Response actions for an "aircraft ISG 54 probable threat" in accordance with 10 CFR 50.54(hh)(1) and as discussed in RG 1.214 7 12 Control room fire leading to ISG .62 evacuation and remote shutdown, as referenced in IN 95-48.

8 13 Station Blackout (Current Licensing ISG 71 Basis) 9 15 SAMG ISG 80 Page 10 of 93

Emergency Plan, Rev. 56, Page 230 of 312 On-Shift Staffing Analysis On-Shift Personnel Assignments Used During Phase IIAnalysis Position Designation Assignment Shift Manager Shift Manager Shift Manager/Emergency Director Unit Supervisor SRO #1 Unit 1 Shift Supervisor Unit Supervisor SRO #2 Unit 2 Shift Supervisor Field Unit Supervisor FBL Fire Brigade Leader Shift Technical Advisor STA Shift Technical Advisor Plant Control Operator PCO #1 Unit 1 Operator At Controls (OATC)

Plant Control Operator PCO #2 Unit 1 Balance of Plant (BOP - Communicator)

Plant Control Operator PCO #3 Unit 2 Operator At The Controls (OATC)

Plant Control Operator PCO #4 Unit 2 Balance of Plant (BOP - Communicator)

Nuclear Plant Operator NPO #1 Unit .1 Reactor Building NPO Nuclear Plant Operator NPO #2 Unit 2 Reactor Building NPO Nuclear Plant Operator NPO #3 Unit 1 Turbine Building NPO Nuclear Plant Operator NPO #4 Unit 2 Turbine Building NPO Other On-Shift Assignments Used During Analysis Position Designation Assignment HP Technician HP #1 Offsite Dose Assessment HP Technician HP #2 HP Support Chemistry Technician Chem #1 Chemistry Sampling Effluents Handyman #1 FBM #1 Fire Brigade Member/Effluents Effluents Handyman #2 FBM #2 Fire Brigade Member/Effluents Effluents Handyman #3 FBM #3 Fire Brigade Member/Effluents Effluents Handyman #4 FBM #4 Fire Brigade Member/Effluents Page 11 of 93

Emergency Plan, Rev. 56, Page 231 of 312 On-Shift Staffing Analysis Event Timelines and Assumptions Event #1 Design Basis Threat Initial Conditions:

Time: Sunday @0230 Unit @ 100% Power RCS @ normal operating temperature and pressure Sequence of Events:

0235 Adversary force assaults SSES and attempts to breach the protected area fence Security engages adversaries and notifies Shift Manager 0236 CR personnel initiate Security Event response AOP Rx manually tripped On-site protective actions initiated Emergency Plan entered 0240 Security informs Shift Manager that PA has been breached 0245 Security informs Shift Manager that adversaries have been neutralized No injuries to site personnel No fires or collateral damage to plant equipment No adverse consequences to plant safety Page 12 of 93

Emergency Plan, Rev. 56, Page 232 of .3.12 On-Shift Staffing Analysis Appendix B Analysis #1: DBA/ISG Event #1 - Design Basis Threat ECL: Site Area Emergency TABLE 1 - On-shift Positions Augmentation Role in Unanalyzed TMS Line On-shift Position Emergency Plan Reference Elapsed(mn~Table#/Line#

Time Task? Required? ,

" ~(min)_

1. Shift Manager SSES E Plan Table. 6.1 N/A T2/L1 NO NO T5/L1 T5/L3 T5/L8

2. Unit Supervisor (SRO #1) 1 SSES E Plan Table 6.1 N/A T2/L2 NO NO

3. Unit Supervisor (SRO #2)1 SSES E Plan Table 6.1 N/A T2/L3 NO NO

4. Shift Technical Advisor (STA) SSES E Plan Table 6.1 N/A T2/L4 NO YES T5/L6 T5/L7 T5/L10 T5/L11 T5/L13

5. Plant Control Operator (PCO #1) SSES E Plan Table 6.1 N/A T2/L5 NO NO

6. Plant Control Operator (PCO #2) 2 SSES E Plan Table 6.1 N/A T2/L6 NO NO T5/L5 3

T5/L9

7. Plant Control Operator (PCO #3) SSES E Plan Table 6.1 N/A T2/L7 NO NO Page 13 of 93

Emergency Plan, Rev. 56, Page 233 of .312 On-Shift Staffing Analysis Augmentation Role in Unanalyzed TMS Line On-shift Position Emergency Plan Reference Elapsed Time Table#/Line# Task? Required?

(min)

8. Plant Control Operator (PCO #4) 2 SSES E Plan Table 6.1 N/A T2/L8 NO NO

9. Nuclear Plant Operator (NPO #1) SSES E Plan Table 6.1 N/A T2/L9 NO NO

10. SAS Operator SSES E Plan Table 6.1 N/A T5/L14 NO NO Notes: 1Unaffected Unit Supervisor functions as the NRC Communicator 2 Unaffected Unit Plant Control Operator functions as E Plan Communicator 3 Refer to Table 2A - PCO available to perform Emergency Plan actions after ON/EOP actions Page 14 of 93

Emergency Plan, Rev. 56, Page 234 of 312 On-Shift Staffing Analysis TABLE 2 - Plant Operations & Safe Shutdown Analysis # 1 Two Units - One Control Room (Shared) Applicable to unit 1 &2 Minimum Operations Crew Necessary to Implement ONs and EOPs, or SAMGs if applicable Task Performance Line Generic Title/Role On-Shift Position Validatio Validation

1. Shift Manager Shift Manager Operator Training

2. Shift Supervisor Unit Supervisor (SRO #1) Operator Training

3. Shift Supervisor Unit Supervisor (SRO #2) Operator Training

4. Shift Technical Advisor Shift Technical Advisor (STA) Operator Training

5. Reactor Operator #1 Plant Control Operator (PCO #1) Operator Training

6. Reactor Operator #2 Plant Control Operator (PCO #2) Operator Training

7. Reactor Operator #3 Plant Control Operator (PCO #3) Operator Training

8. Reactor Operator #4 Plant Control Operator (PCO #4) Operator Training

9. Auxiliary Operator #1 Nuclear Plant Operator (NPO #1) Operator Training Notes: See Table 2A for ON/EOP actions Page 15 of 93

Emergency Plan, Rev. 56, Page 235of 312 On-Shift Staffing Analysis Analysis #1, Table 2A - ON/EOP Actions Design Basis Threat Procedure Step/Actions Performance Time (mins) After Procedure Implementation Assigned 0-5 5-10 10-15 15-20 20-25 25-30 30-35 35-40 40-45 45-50 '50-55 55-60 Proc/Step Task Resource ON-000-101 Intruder Flow Cart Attach C SRO 1 X, Step 3.9 PA Announcement PC02 Step 3.7 Notify NRC STA -'

Step 3.11 Rx Scram PCO1 -

Attach C Staff RS/DP SR02

___________ PC04- x EO-100-102 RPV Control - - -"

EO-200-102 SR01 .'; " -

Step RC2 Verify Control PCO 1 Rods In PCO 3 RC/L-1 Isolations PCO 2 ECCS Initiations PCO 4."

PCO 4 ,*.::.

DGs Start RC/L-8 Reset Main Gen PCO 2 Lockouts PCO 4 RC/L-4 Control Rx Water PCO 1 Level PCO 3 ,

RC/P-7 Cool down/Lower PC1-Pressure Using PC3-BPV ' -

ON-100-101 Scram Imminent PC01,2,3,4 ON-200-101 Actions Perform Scram P01-Actions untilx

________ ~transition to SD PC3 X Page 16 of 93

Emergency Plan, Rev. 56, Page 236 Of 312 On-Shift Staffing Analysis Design Basis Threat Procedure Step/Actions Performance Time (mins) After Procedure Implementation Assigned 0-5 5-10 10-15 15-20 20-25 25-30 30-35 35-40 40-45 45-50 50-55 55-60 Proc/Step Task Resource ON-000-010 Max CRD PCO 1 Attach C PCO33.._._

ON-000-010 Isolate RWCU PCO 1 Attach C PCO3 ..... -..

Eval EPlan Entry SM and STA .

Attach G Start ESW and PCO 2 Mitigation List DGs .

Start SCC DG NPO 1 -" .

Start Supp Pool P, 0 2 Cooling PCO 2_ _ _ ___ _ _

Page 17 of 93

Emergency Plan, Rev. 56, Page 237 of 312 On-Shift Staffing Analysis TABLE 3 - Firefighting Analysis # 1 Task Analysis Line Performed By Controlling Method

1. N/A N/A

2. N/A N/A

3. N/A N/A

4. N/A N/A

5. N/A N/A Notes: No Fire Brigade response required for this event Page 18of 93

Emergency Plan, Rev. 56, Page 238 of 312 On-Shift Staffing Analysis TABLE 4 - Radiation Protection & Chemistry Analysis # 1 Performance Time Period After Emergency Declaration (minutes)

Line Position Performing Function/Task 0 10- 15 25 35 45 55 65 75 85-5 1015 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 55 60 65 70 75. 80..85 90

1. In-Plant Survey (OSC)

On-Shift Position: HP

2. In-Plant Survey (TSC)

On-Shift Position: HP

3. Personnel Monitoring On-Shift Position:

4. Job Coverage On-Shift Position:

5. Offsite Radiological Assessment On-Shift Position: HP #1

6. Other Site-Specific HP - Describe:

On-Shift Position:

7. Chemistry function/task #1 - Describe: Support Field Monitoring Team On-Shift Position: Chem #1

8. Chemistry function/task #2 - Describe:

On-Shift Position: Chem #1 Notes: No HP/Chemistry actions due to "Duck and Cover" mode Page 19 of 93

Emergency Plan, Rev. 56, Page 239 of 312 On-Shift Staffing Analysis TABLE 5 - Emergency Plan Implementation Analysis # 1 Line Function/Task On-Shift Position Task task Analysis Anaysi Controlling Method

1. Declare the Emergency Shift Manager EP/Ops Training and Classification Level (ECL) EP Drill Program

2. Approve Offsite Protective N/A N/A Action Recommendations

3. Approve content of State/local Shift Manager EP/0ps Training and notifications EP Drill Program

4. Approve extension to allowable N.A N.A dose limits

5. Notification and direction to on- PCO #2 EP/Ops Training and shift staff (e.g., to assemble, EP Drill Program evacuate, etc.)

6. ERO notification STA EP/Ops Training and EP Drill Program

7. Abbreviated NRC notification STA EP/Ops Training and for DBT event EP Drill Program

8. Complete State/local Shift Manager EP/Ops Training and notification form EP Drill Program

9. Perform State/local notifications PCO #2 EP Training and EP Drill Program

10. Complete NRC event STA EP/Ops Training and notification form EP Drill Program

11. Activate ERDS STA EP/Ops Training and EP Drill Program

12. Offsite radiological assessment N/A N/A

13. Perform NRC notifications STA EP/Ops Training and EP Drill Program

14. Perform other site-specific SAS 1 EP/Security Training event notifications (e.g., INPO, and EP Drill Program ANI, etc.)

15. Personnel accountability N/A N/A Notes: Site Area Emergency EAL OS2 EP-PS-1 00 Emergency Director, Control Room

'Security notifies LLEA/FBI Page 20 of 93

Emergency Plan, Rev. 56, Page 240 of 312 On-Shift Staffing Analysis Event Timelines and Assumptions Event #4 Control Rod Drop Initial Conditions:

Time: Tuesday @ 0430 Unit 2 Hot Standby, NOP & NOT Sequence of Events:

0430 Mechanical failure causes central Control Rod to drop Valid off-gas pre-treatment High/High RAD Alarm received in Control Room ARM 50 & 51 (CRD North & South) High Alarms received ARM 48 (HPCI Turbine Room) in Alarm ARM 57 (RCIC Room) in Alarm Upgrade to Alert based on ARM 48 & 57 Alarms Page 21 of 93

Emergency Plan, Rev. 56, Page 241 of 312 On-Shift Staffing Analysis Appendix B Analysis #2: DBAIISG Event #4 - Control Rod Drop ECL: Unusual Event -- Alert TABLE 1 - On-shift Positions Augmentation Role in Unanalyzed TMS Line On-shift Position Emergency Plan Reference Elapsed (m) Time Table#/Line# Task? Required?

(min)

1. Shift Manager SSES E Plan Table 6.1 N/A T2/L1 NO NO T5/L1 T5/L3 T5/L8

2. Unit Supervisor (SRO #1) 1 SSES E Plan Table 6.1 N/A T5/L6 NO NO T5/L10 T5/L11 T5/L13

3. Unit Supervisor (SRO #2)1 SSES E Plan Table 6.1 N/A T2/L2 NO NO

4. Shift Technical Advisor (STA) SSES E Plan Table 6.1 N/A T2/L3 NO NO

5. Plant Control Operator (PCO #2) 2 SSES E Plan Table 6.1 N/A T5/L5 NO NO T5/L9

6. Plant Control Operator (PCO #3) SSES E Plan Table 6.1 N/A T2/L4 NO NO

7. Plant Control Operator (PCO #4)2 SSES E Plan Table 6.1 N/A T2/L5 NO NO

8. Nuclear Plant Operator (NPO #2) SSES E Plan Table 6.1 N/A T2/L6 NO NO

9. Nuclear Plant Operator (NPO #4) SSES E Plan Table 6.1 N/A T2/L7 NO NO

10. HP Technician (HP #11) SSES E Plan Table 6.1 60 T4/L5 NO NO

11. HP Technician (HP #2) SSES E Plan Table 6.1 60 T4/L2 NO NO

12. Chemistry Technician (Chem #1) SSES E Plan Table 6.1 60 T4/L7 NO NO Notes: ' Unaffected Unit Supervisor functions as the NRC Communicator 2 Unaffected Unit Plant Control Operator functions as E Plan Communicator Page 22 of 93

Emergency Plan, Rev. 56, Page 242 of 312 On-Shift Staffing Analysis TABLE 2 - Plant Operations & Safe Shutdown Analysis # 2 Two Units - One Control Room (Shared) Applicable to unit 2 Minimum Operations Crew Necessary to Implement ONs and EOPs, or SAMGs if applicable Line Generic Title/Role On-Shift Position Validatio n Validation

1. Shift Manager Shift Manager Operator Training

2. Shift Supervisor Unit Supervisor (SRO #2) Operator Training

3. Shift Technical Advisor Shift Technical Advisor (STA) Operator Training

4. Reactor Operator #3 Plant Control Operator (PCO #3) Operator Training

5. Reactor Operator #4. Plant Control Operator (PCO #4) Operator Training

6. Auxiliary Operator #2 Nuclear Plant Operator (NPO #2) Operator Training

7. Auxiliary Operator #4 Nuclear Plant Operator (NPO #4) Operator Training Notes: See Table 2A for ON/EOP actions Page 23 of 93

Emergency Plan, Rev. 56, Page 243 of 312 On-Shift Staffing Analysis Analysis #2, Table 2A - ON/EOP Actions Control Rod Drop (Unit #2)

Procedure Step/Actions Performance Time (mins) After Procedure Implementation Proc/Step Task AssignedI Psource Resource 0-5 5-10 10-15 15-20 20-25 25-30 30-35 35-40 40-45 1 45-50 50-55 55-60 ON-200-102 Place Mode C .-

PC. .3.

Switch in S/D and 00104 ,0 RPV Control. .- '..

GO-200-004 S0 v Step RC2 Verify Control PCO 3 -

Rods In RC/L-1 Isolations PCO4 ECCS Initiations DGs Start _....___

RC/L-8 Reset Main Gen PCO 3 37_ý::7ý Lockouts ON-279-001 Close MSIV and P004 4 =

MSL Drains ON-279-001 Remove SJAE PC0 4 from service RC/L-4 Control Rx Water PC0 4 "

Level with HPIC RCIC . ...

RC/P-6 Maintain Pressure with.P004. . ' . . . . . . . ' . : " ' .

SRVs . .. ..--. * , . . , ...

RC/P-7 Lower pressure P004 using SRVs ý RC/L-4 Restore Condensate injection and PC03 .X.

control RPV  :

water level EO-200-103 Place RHR in P003 X __

PCO 3 _____-_

supp pool cooling ON-200-101 Perform Scram PCO3 "3 . """.-

.Actions until P00 4 X ON-159-002 transition to S D.

Verify Isolations PCO3 ?7.!i. __.__

____I GO-200-004 Performing SD NPO 2 ,... 7 ...

actions NPO 4 . " .

• x P003.. _.. .r"

___-_"_.__,__ " _-.. *CO:3.:.. .':._ .'. *1- ..

Page 24 of 93

Emergency Plan, Rev. 56, Page 244 of 312 On-Shift Staffing Analysis Control Rod Drop (Unit #2)

Procedure Step/Actions Performance time (mins) After Procedure Implementation Assigned 0-5 510 10-15 15-20 20-25 25-30 30-35 35-40 40-45 45-50 50-55 55-60 Proc/Step Task Resource PCO 4  ;* . .. *; . . *..,*- *,. .* ,::,* "

E0,200-104 Monitoring Rx SRO 2 Bldg RAD levels PC03 "

and Temp _ :.,.. . - * . "" ..___ ... .__ ..

Start ESW and All coolers with PCO33 cooling sources __ ._

Announce Evac PCO 2 '

of U2 Rx Bldg II __I__"_I___ __

Page 25 of 93

--- !- : . - _- - - -- I  : - - , L- -Z%: __

Emergency Plan, Rev. 56, Page 245 of 312 On-Shift Staffing Analysis TABLE 3 - Firefighting Analysis # 2 Line Performed By Task Analysis Controlling Method

1. N/A N/A

2. N/A N/A

3. N/A N/A

4. N/A N/A

5. N/A N/A Notes: No Fire Brigade response required for this event.

Page 26 of 93

Emergency Plan, Rev. 56, Page 246 of 312 On-Shift Staffing Analysis TABLE 4 - Radiation Protection & Chemistry Analysis # 2 Performance Time Period After Emergency Declaration (minutes)

Line Position Performing Function/Task 0 10- 15 25 35 45 55 65 75- 80- 85-5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 55 60 65 70 75 80 85 90

1. In-Plant Survey On-Shift Position: HP

2. Out of Plant Survey X X X X X X X X X X X On-Shift Position: HP #2

3. Personnel Monitoring On-Shift Position:

4. Job Coverage On-Shift Position:

5. Offsite Radiological Assessment x x x x x x x x x x On-Shift Position: HP #1

6. Other Site-Specific HP - Describe:

On-Shift Position: HP

7. Chemistry function/task #1 - Describe:

Sample and analyze RCS X X X X X X X X X X X X On-Shift Position: Chem #1

8. Chemistry function/task #2 - Describe:

On-Shift Position: Chem #1 Notes: Chemistry self monitors during sampling. No HP support required.

Chemistry sampling of RCS is from PASS due to isolation of normal sample point.

HP #2 relocates Sample Van outside protected area and prepares for monitoring/sampling. Note that HP#2 may be asked to provide radiological monitoring /survey by Shift Manager depending upon actual emergency conditions. This is acceptable since On-site (out-of-plant) HP Tech is not required until 60 minutes lAW Emergency Plan Table 6.1.

CH-ON-007, Chemistry Sampling Team EP-PS-1 08, HP Tech 1 (OSCAR)

EP-PS-130, HP II Dose Calculator Page 27 of 93

Emergency Plan, Rev. 56, Page 247 of 312 On-Shift Staffing Analysis TABLE 5 - Emergency Plan Implementation Analysis # 2 Line Function/Task On-Shift Position Task Analysis Controlling Method

1. Declare the Emergency Shift Manager EP/Ops Training and Classification Level (ECL) EP Drill Program

2. Approve Offsite Protective N/A N/A Action Recommendations

3. Approve content of State/local Shift Manager EP/Ops Training and notifications EP Drill Program

4. Approve extension to allowable N/A N/A dose limits

5. Notification and direction to on- PCO #2 EP/Ops Training and shift staff (e.g., to assemble, EP Drill Program evacuate, etc.)

6. ERO notification SRO #1 EP/Ops Training and EP Drill Program

7. Abbreviated NRC notification N/A N/A for DBT event

8. Complete State/local Shift Manager EP/Ops Training and notification form EP Drill Program

9. Perform State/local notifications PCO #2 EP Training and EP Drill Program

10. Complete NRC event SRO #1 EP/Ops Training and notification form EP Drill Program

11. Activate ERDS SRO #1 EP/Ops Training and EP Drill Program

12. Offsite radiological assessment N/A N/A

13. Perform NRC notifications SRO #1 EP/Ops Training and EP Drill Program

14. Perform other site-specific N/A N/A event notifications (e.g., INPO, ANI, etc.)

15. Personnel accountability N/A N/A Notes: Unusual Event EAL MU7 -4 Alert EAL RA2 or FA1 EP-PS-100 Emergency Director, Control Room Page 28 of 93

Emergency Plan, Rev. 56, Page 248 of 312 On-Shift Staffing Analysis Event Timelines and Assumptions Event #6 MSL Break outside containment isolation Initial Conditions:

Time: Tuesday @ 0430 Unit 2 100% Power, NOP, NOT, NOL Sequence of Events:

0430 Double-ended guillotine MSLB occurs outside secondary containment on A MS Line Break is downstream of the MSL Isolation Valves Rx Scram occurs MSIVs closed in 5.5 seconds 0432 SRVs open on high vessel pressure SRVs Cycle to maintain pressure at = 1200 psig 0435:30 Rx water level above core begins to drop slowly Pressure = 1200 psig 0505 RxV Level at -161" -ADS initiated 0508 Low pressure ECCS systems initiated Page 29 of 93

Emergency Plan, Rev. 56, Page 249 of 312 On-Shift Staffing Analysis Appendix B Analysis #3: DBA/ISG Event #6 - Steam System Piping Break (MSLB) ECL: Alert -4 Site Area Emergency TABLE 1 - On-shift Positions Augmentation Role in Unanalyzed TMS Line On-shift Position Emergency Plan Reference Elapsed Time

• (min) Table#/Line# Task? Required?

1. Shift Manager SSES E Plan Table 6.1 N/A T2/L1 NO NO T5/L1 T5/L3 T5/L8

2. Unit Supervisor (SRO #1) 1 SSES E Plan Table 6.1 N/A T5/L6 NO NO T5/L9 T5/L10 T5/L11 T5/L13

3. Unit Supervisor (SRO #2)1 SSES E Plan Table 6.1 N/A T2/L2 NO NO

4. Shift Technical Advisor (STA) SSES E Plan Table 6.1 N/A T2/L3 NO NO

5. Plant Control Operator (PCO #2) 2 SSES E Plan Table 6.1 N/A T2/L4 NO NO

6. Plant Control Operator (PCO #3) SSES E Plan Table 6.1 N/A T2/L5 NO NO

7. Plant Control Operator (PCO #4)2 SSES E Plan Table 6.1 N/A T2/L6 NO NO

8. Nuclear Plant Operator (NPO #2) SSES E Plan Table 6.1 N/A T2/L7 NO NO

9. Nuclear Plant Operator (NPO #3) SSES E Plan Table 6.1 N/A T2/L8 NO NO

10. Nuclear Plant Operator (NPO #4) SSES E Plan Table 6.1 N/A T2/L9 NO NO

11. HP Technician (HP #1) SSES E Plan Table 6.1 60 T4/L5 NO NO

12. HP Technician (HP #2) SSES E Plan Table 6.1 60 T4/L2 NO NO

13. Security Officer #1 SSES E Plan Table 6.1 N/A T2/L10 NO NO

14. Security Officer #2 SSES E Plan Table 6.1 N/A T5/L15 NO NO Notes: 1 Unaffected Unit Supervisor functions as the NRC Communicator 2Unaffected Unit Plant Control Operator functions as E Plan Communicator Page 30 of 93

Emergency Plan, Rev. 56, Page 250 of 312 On-Shift Staffing Analysis TABLE 2 - Plant Operations & Safe Shutdown Analysis # 3 Two Units - One Control Room (Shared) Applicable to unit 2 Minimum Operations Crew Necessary to Implement ONs and EOPs, or SAMGs if applicable Task Performance Line Generic Title/Role On-Shift Position Validation Validation

1. Shift Manager Shift Manager Operator Training

2. Shift Supervisor Unit Supervisor (SRO #2) Operator Training

3. Shift Technical Advisor Shift Technical Advisor (STA) Operator Training

4. Reactor Operator #2 Plant Control Operator (PCO #2) Operator Training

5. Reactor Operator #3 Plant Control Operator (PCO #3) Operator.Training

6. Reactor Operator #4 Plant Control Operator (PCO #4) Operator Training

7. Auxiliary Operator #2 Nuclear Plant Operator (NPO #2) Operator Training

8. Auxiliary Operator #3 Nuclear Plant Operator (NPO #3) Operator Training

9. Auxiliary Operator #4 Nuclear Plant Operator (NPO #4) Operator Training SNotes: See Table 2A for ON/EOP actions Other (non-Operations) Personnel Necessary to Implement ONs and EOPs, or SAMGs if applicable Task Performance Line Generic Title/Role On-Shift Position Validation

10. Security Officer Security Officer #1 Security Training Notes: Validate steam release from RX building using cameras Page 31 of 93

Emergency Plan, Rev. 56, Page 251 of 312 On-Shift Staffing Analysis Analysis #3, Table 2A - ON/EOP Actions Steam System Piping Break Outside Containment - MSLB (Unit #2)

Procedure Step/Actions Performance Time (mins) After Procedure Implementation Assigned 0-5 5-10 10-15 15-20 20-25 25-30 30-35 35-40 40-45 45-50 50-55 55-60 Proc/Step Task Resource ON-200-102 Place Mode PCO 3 Switch in S/D P3 * .. I E0-200-102,103 RPV Control and 104 SRO02- ...

G0-200-004 ,......',,.,_ ' ,_._.' . . .. . - . . o ... .

Step RC2 Verify Control PCO 3 Rods In ..-.. _"__

RC/L-1 Isolations ECCS Initiations P.04

........ J*_._ _ _

DGs Start RC/L-4 Control Rx Water PC04 Level with HPIC O.O,4 RCIC  ;:.*

RCfP-6 Maintain Pressure with P04x .

RC/P-7 Lower pressure P0 injection and P0 RC/P-6~

EO-200-102 ~Pressureintanwt Attempt to g..

teed P0 C 4 .... ., .. * ".:. . .. . - .. . X ,: . * .- :.,:. .:*".."*: ** .*'*  :. - .*.::.:.

RC/L-5 using table 5 P0 RC/L-10 Line up Low pressure EGOS P00 4 EO-200-103 Place RHR in P0 SP/T-2 su p pool cooling _____

Restore supp P0 4_._.___._..__-:..____"_"_._.___*

Page 32 of 93

Emergency Plan, Rev. 56, Page 252 of 312 On-Shift Staffing Analysis Steam System Piping Break Outside Containment - MSLB (Unit #2)

Procedure Step/Actions Performance Time (mins) After Procedure Implementation Assigned 0-5 5-10 10-15 15-20 20-25 25-30 30-35 35-40 40-45 45-50 50-55 55-60 Proc/Step Task Resource EO-200-112 Minus 161 enter SRO 2 EO-200-112 RO2_..

Prevent uncontrolled P O3;-*',,'

condensate P0"3 ejection Verify supp pool PC04 level _ ______...__

Open all ADS PC04 valves _ _' ,__

Recover level P003 with low pressure PCO 4 EC CS _ _ _ _. ,,,__ ...

ON-200-101 Perform Scram PCO 33- . -- , " . . ', .

Actions until PC04 .": , " -.

transition to SD ."o__' " _' ___-' . . .. .

ON-159-002 Verify Isolations PCO3 1_-. ___ ______'  :,

GO-200-004 Performing SD acftons NPO NP0 4 2

PCO 3 ... '* * * " . .*  :' ;.:

EO-200-104 Mon ito ring Rx - , --...- -

Bldg and Turbine SRO 2  :

Bldg RAID levels P00 3 and Temp Start ESW and All coolers with P00 3x cooling sources Announce Evac P0

___________of U2 Rx Bldg _____ __.__

EO-200-105 Notify HP to Perform Oftsite SM Dose Cabcs____

Perform post start

___________checks on DG NPO 3 .<._ _

Page 33 of 93

Emergency Plan, Rev. 56, Page 253 of 312 On-Shift Staffing Analysis TABLE 3- Firefighting Analysis # 3 Line] Performed By Task Analysis Controlling Method

1. N/A N/A

2. N/A N/A

3. N/A N/A

4. N/A N/A

5. N/A N/A Notes: No Fire Brigade response required for this event.

Page 34 of 93

Emergency Plan, Rev. 56, Page 254 of 312 On-Shift Staffing Analysis TABLE 4 - Radiation Protection & Chemistry Analysis # 3 Performance Time Period After Emergency Declaration (minutes)

Line Position Performing Function/Task 0- 5- 10- 15 25 35 45 55 65 75- 80 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 55 60 65 70 75 80 85 90

1. In-Plant Survey On-Shift Position: HP

2. Out of Plant Survey Relocation Field Monitoring Team Sample Van outside x x x x x protected area On-Shift Position: HP #2

3. Personnel Monitoring On-Shift Position:

4. Job Coverage On-Shift Position:

5. Offsite Radiological Assessment On-Shift Position: HP #1

6. Other Site-Specific HP - Describe:

On-Shift Position:

7. Chemistry function/task #1 - Describe: Support Field Monitoring Team On-Shift Position: Chem #1

8. Chemistry function/task #2 - Describe:

On-Shift Position: Chem #1 Notes: Chemistry post trip sampling after ERO augmentation EP-PS-108, HP Tech 1 (OSCAR)

EP-PS-130, HP 11Dose Calculator Note that HP#2 may be asked to provide radiological monitoring /survey by Shift Manager depending upon actual emergency conditions.

This is acceptable since On-site (out-of-plant) HP Tech is not required until 60 minutes lAW Emergency Plan Table 6.1.

Page 35 of 93

Emergency Plan, Rev. 56, Page 255 of 312 On-Shift Staffing Analysis TABLE 5 - Emergency Plan Implementation Analysis # 3 Line Function/Task On-Shift Position Task Analysis Controlling Method

1. Declare the Emergency Shift Manager EP/Ops Training and Classification Level (ECL) EP Drill Program

2. Approve Offsite Protective N/A N/A Action Recommendations

3. Approve content of State/local Shift Manager EP/Ops Training and notifications EP Drill Program

4. Approve extension to allowable N/A N/A dose limits

5. Notification and direction to on- PCO #2 EP/Ops Training and shift staff (e.g., to assemble, EP Drill Program evacuate, etc.)

6. ERO notification SRO #1 EP/Ops Training and EP Drill Program

7. Abbreviated NRC notification N/A N/A for DBT event

8. Complete State/local Shift Manager EP/Ops Training and notification form EP Drill Program

9. Perform State/local notifications SRO #1 EP Training and EP Drill Program

10. Complete NRC event SRO #1 EP/Ops Training and notification form EP Drill Program

11. Activate ERDS SRO #1 EP/Ops Training and EP Drill Program

12. Offsite radiological assessment N/A N/A

13. Perform NRC notifications SRO #1 EP/Ops Training and EP Drill Program

14. Perform other site-specific N/A N/A event notifications (e.g., INPO, ANI, etc.)

15. Personnel accountability Security Officer #2 EP/Security Training and EP Drill Program Notes' Alert EAL FA1 -4 Site Area Emergency EAL FS1 EP-PS-1 00 Emergency Director, Control Room Page 36 of 93

Emergency Plan, Rev. 56, Page 256 of 312 On-Shift Staffing Analysis Event Timelines and Assumptions Event #7 Large break LOCA with release exceeding PAGs and resulting in PARs Initial Conditions:

Time: Tuesday @ 0430 Unit 2 100% Power, NOP & NOT Sequence of Events:

0430 Large Break LOCA occurs - Recirc Line Break Loss of Normal AC power occurs coincident with break 0435 Reactor Level -205 inches. Drywell pressure 18.5psig 0500 Dose Projection indicates 1.1 R/hr at Emergency Plan Boundary (EPB)

Page 37 of 93

Emergency Plan, Rev. 56, Page 257 of 312 On-Shift Staffing Analysis Appendix B Analysis #4: DBNISG Event #7 - Large Break LOCA with release and PARs ECL: Site Area Emergency - General Emergency TABLE 1 - On-shift Positions Augmentation Role in Unanalyzed TMS Line On-shift Position Emergency Plan Reference Elapsed Time (mi) Table#/Line# Task? Required?

1. Shift Manager SSES E Plan Table 6.1 N/A T2/L1 NO NO T5/L1 T5/L2 T5/L3 T5/1L4 T5/L8

2. Unit Supervisor (SRO #1) 1 SSES E Plan Table 6.1 N/A T5/L5 NO NO T5/L6 T5/L9 T5/L10 T5/L11 T5/L13

3. Unit Supervisor (SRO #2)1 SSES E Plan Table 6.1 N/A T2/L2 NO NO

4. Shift Technical Advisor (STA) SSES E Plan Table 6.1 N/A T2/L3 NO NO

5. Plant Control Operator (PCO #2) 2 SSES E Plan Table 6.1 T2/L4 NO NO N/A T5/L9 3

6. Plant Control Operator (PCO #3) SSES E Plan Table 6.1 N/A T2/L5 NO NO N/A T2/L6 NO NO 7.

8. Plant Nuclear Operator (PCO Plant Operator Control (NPO #4)2

1. 4) SSES SSES EE Plan Plan Table 6.1 Table 6.1 N/A T2/L7 NO NO

9. HP Technician (HP #1) SSES E Plan Table 6.1 60 T4/L6 NO NO

10. HP Technician (HP #2) SSES E Plan Table 6.1 60 T4/L2 NO NO T4/L3

11. CAS Operator SSES E Plan Table 6.1 N/A T5/L1 5 NO NO Notes: 1 Unaffected Unit Supervisor functions as the NRC Communicator 2

Unaffected Unit Plant Control Operator functions as E Plan Communicator 3 PCO is available to make offsite communications at GE (See Table 2A)

Page 38 of 93

Emergency Plan, Rev. 56, Page 258 of 312 On-Shift Staffing Analysis TABLE 2 - Plant Operations & Safe Shutdown Analysis # 4 Two Units - One Control Room (Shared) Applicable to unit 2 Minimum Operations Crew Necessary to Implement ONs and EOPs, or SAMGs if applicable TaskValidatio Performance Line Generic Title/Role On-Shift Position Validation

1. Shift Manager Shift Manager Operator Training

2. Shift Supervisor Unit Supervisor (SRO #2) Operator Training

3. Shift Technical Advisor Shift Technical Advisor (STA) Operator Training

4. Reactor Operator #2 Plant Control Operator (PCO #2) Operator Training

5. Reactor Operator #3 Plant Control Operator (PCO #3) Operator Training

6. Reactor Operator #4 Plant Control Operator (PCO #4) Operator Training

7. Auxiliary Operator #4 Nuclear Plant Operator (NPO #4) Operator Training Notes: . See Table 2A for ON/EOP actions Page 39 of 93

Emergency Plan, Rev. 56, Page 259 of 312 On-Shift Staffing Analysis Analysis #4, Table 2A - ON/EOP Actions Loss of Coolant Accident Inside Containment (Unit #2)

Procedure Step/Actions Performance Time (mins) After Procedure Implementation Assigned 0-5 5-10 10-15 15-20 20-25 25-30 30-35 35-40 40-45 45-50 50-55 55-60 Proc/Step Task Resource 0N-200-102 Place Mode Switch PCO3 in~~~fO 3 _

E0-200-1 02, RPV 103 .

Control 103 Step RC2 Verify Control Rods PCO33 In -

RC/L-1 Isolations .

ECCS Initiations PCO 4 DGs Start E0-200-112 Minus 161 enter E0- SRO 2 .

200-112 Prevent uncontrolled rP X.-

O3 ..

condensate injection Verify supp pool PCO 4 level Verify that all ADS PC04 valves are open Recover level with PCO 3 iX", :

low pressure ECCS PCO4 4_",:.

Start standby Liquid control and PCO 3 r_.."

maximize CRD EO-200-103 Commence Dry Well P003 Sprays X Commence Supp P00:2 Pool cooling PCO 2" Start H2 Analyzers PCO 3 EO-200-102 Line up RHR service water to RHR heat P00 .

exchangers DG post start checks NPO 4 -____

Page 40 of 93

Emergency Plan, Rev. 56, Page 260 of 312 On-Shift Staffing Analysis TABLE 3 - Firefighting Analysis # 4 Line Performed By Task Analysis Controlling Method

1. N/A N/A

2. N/A N/A

3. N/A N/A

4. N/A N/A

5. N/A N/A Notes: No Fire Brigade response required for this event.

Page 41 of 93

Emergency Plan, Rev. 56, Page 261 of 312 On-Shift Staffing Analysis TABLE 4 - Radiation Protection & Chemistry Analysis # 4 Performance Time Period After Emergency Declaration (minutes)

Line Position Performing Function/Task 0- 5- 10- 15 25 35 45 55 65 75- 80- 85-5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 55 60 65 70 75 80 85 90

1. In-Plant Survey On-Shift Position: HP

2. Out of Plant Survey Move Field Monitoring Team Van outside PA X X X X X X On-Shift Position: HP #2

3. Out of Plant Survey Perform surveys (Near Site) X X X X On-Shift Position: HP #2

4. Personnel Monitoring On-Shift Position:

5. Job Coverage On-Shift Position:

6. Offsite Radiological Assessment x x x x x x On-Shift Position: HP #1

7. Other Site-Specific HP - Describe:

On-Shift Position:

8. Chemistry function/task #1 - Describe: Support Field Monitoring Team On-Shift Position: Chem #1

9. Chemistry function/task #2 - Describe:

On-Shift Position: Chem #1 Notes: EP-PS-108, HP Tech I (OSCAR)

EP-PS-130, HP II Dose Calculator Note that HP#2 may be asked to provide radiological monitoring /survey by Shift Manager depending upon actual emergency conditions.

This is acceptable since On-site (out-of-plant) HP Tech is not required until 60 minutes lAW Emergency Plan Table 6.1.

Page 42 of 93

Emergency Plan, Rev. 56, Page 262 of 312 On-Shift Staffing Analysis TABLE 5 - Emergency Plan Implementation Analysis # 4 On-Shift Position Task Analysis TrollnMh Line Function/Task Controlling Method

1. Declare the Emergency Shift Manager EP/Ops Training and Classification Level (ECL) EP Drill Program

2. Approve Offsite Protective Shift Manager EP/Ops Training and Action Recommendations EP Drill Program

3. Approve content of State/local Shift Manager EP/Ops Training and notifications EP Drill Program

4. Approve extension to allowable Shift Manager EP/Ops Training and dose limits EP Drill Program

5. Notification and direction to on- SRO #1 EP/Ops Training and shift staff (e.g., to assemble, EP Drill Program evacuate, etc.)

6. ERO notification SRO #1 EP/Ops Training and EP Drill Program

7. Abbreviated NRC notification N/A N/A for DBT event

8. Complete State/local Shift Manager EP/Ops Training and notification form EP Drill Program

9. Perform State/local notifications SRO #1 @ SAE EP Training and EP Drill PCO #2 @ GE Program

10. Complete NRC event SRO #1 EP/Ops Training and notification form EP Drill Program

11. Activate ERDS SRO #1 EP/Ops Training and EP Drill Program

12. Offsite radiological assessment N/A N/A

13. Perform NRC notifications SRO #1 EP/Ops Training and EP Drill Program

14. Perform other site-specific N/A1 N/A event notifications (e.g., INPO, ANI, etc.)

15. Personnel accountability CAS Operator EP/Security Training and EP Drill Program Notes: Site Area Emergency EAL FS1 -4 General Emergency EAL RG1 EP-PS-1 00 Emergency Director, Control Room

' Shift Manager notifies Senior State Official of PARs. Completion of notification within approximately 1 minute.

Page 43 of 93

Emergency Plan, Rev. 56, Page 263 of 312 On-Shift Staffing Analysis Event Timelines and Assumptions Event #10 ATWS Initial Conditions:

Time: Tuesday @ 0430 Unit 1 100% Power, NOP & NOT Sequence of Events:

0430 MSIVs close. Reactor does not trip.

Supplemental and/or manual trip actions are successful.

Page 44 of 93

Emergency Plan, Rev. 56, Page 264 of 312 On-Shift Staffing Analysis Appendix B Analysis #5: DBA/ISG Event #10 - ATWS ECL: Alert TABLE 1 - On-shift Positions Augmentation Role in Unanalyzed TMS Line On-shift Position Emergency Plan Reference Elapsed(m)

Time Table#/Line# Task? Required?

(min)

1. Shift Manager SSES E Plan Table 6.1 N/A T2/L1 NO NO T5/L1 T5/L3 T5/L8

2. Unit Supervisor (SRO #1) 1 SSES E Plan Table 6.1 N/A T2/L2 NO NO T5/L5

3. Unit Supervisor (SRO #2)1 SSES E Plan Table 6.1 N/A T5/L6 NO NO T5/L10 T5/L11 T5/L13

4. Shift Technical Advisor (STA) SSES E Plan Table 6.1 N/A T2/L3 NO NO

5. Plant Control Operator (PCO #1) SSES E Plan Table 6.1 N/A T2/L4 NO NO

6. Plant Control Operator (PCO #2) 2 SSES E Plan Table 6.1 N/A T2/L5 NO NO

7. Plant Control Operator (PCO #4) 2 SSES E Plan Table 6.1 N/A T5/L9 NO NO

8. Nuclear Plant Operator (NPO #1) SSES E Plan Table 6.1 N/A T2/L6 NO NO

9. Nuclear Plant Operator (NPO #3) SSES E Plan Table 6.1 N/A T2/L7 NO NO Notes: 1 Unaffected Unit Supervisor functions as the NRC Communicator 2 Unaffected Unit Plant Control Operator functions as E Plan Communicator Page 45 of 93

Emergency Plan, Rev. 56, Page 265 of 312 On-Shift Staffing Analysis TABLE 2 - Plant Operations & Safe Shutdown Analysis # 5 Two Units - One Control Room (Shared) Applicable to unit 1 Minimum Operations Crew Necessary to Implement ONs and EOPs, or SAMGs if applicable Task Performance Line Generic Title/Role On-Shift Position Validatio Validation

1. Shift Manager Shift Manager Operator Training

2. Shift Supervisor Unit Supervisor (SRO #1) Operator Training

3. Shift Technical Advisor Shift Technical Advisor (STA) Operator Training

4. Reactor Operator #1 Plant Control Operator (PCO #1) Operator Training

5. Reactor Operator #2 Plant Control Operator (PCO #2) Operator Training

6. Auxiliary Operator #1 Nuclear Plant Operator (NPO #1) Operator Training

7. Auxiliary Operator #3 Nuclear Plant Operator (NPO #3) Operator Training Page 46 of .93

Emergency Plan, Rev. 56, Page 266 of 312 On-Shift Staffing Analysis Analysis #5, Table 2A - ON/EOP Actions ATWS Procedure Step/Actions Performance Time (mins) After Procedure Implementation Assigned 0-5 5-10 10-15 15-20 20-25 25-30 30-35 35- 40- 45-50 50-55 55-60 Proc/Step Task Resource 40 45 E0-100-113 Place Mode Switch inS/D P.. X.

Verify all rods .X-IN Transition to SR01 X EO-100-102 "-____

EO-100-102 RPV Control SR01 Step RC2 Verify Control PCO 1 Ix.

Rods In RC/L-1 Isolations .

ECCS PCO 2 Initiations DGs Start _-"_ __,_*_._:._

RC/L-8 Reset Main PCO 2 Gen Lockouts X-RC/L-4 Control Rx . .

Water Level PCO 2 ..

with HPIC RCIC RC/P-6 Maintain Pressure with P.02., x .

SRVs r ". ._- .

RC/P-6 Maintain , . ,  % , ..-. .,,, *. . .:. * .. .., - . * ,

Pressure with PCO 2 Ix-.

HPIC RC/P-7 Cool down using HPCI P002 , . .- ..

RC/L-4 Restore . . ".. ,.-.- . ,---.

• Condensate * -,. 4....

injection and PCO1 . . , *-* p*.-*-

control RPV water level _ _.-..__-.__'___ _ _ _- _ - .

EO-100-103 Place RHR in L supp pool PCO 1 .'  : .- ... -.

cooling . .- . - .. - .

Page 47 of 93

Emergency Plan, Rev. 56, Page 267 of 312 On-Shift Staffing Analysis ATWS Procedure Step/Actions Performance Time (mins) After Procedure Implementation Assi gned 35- 40-° 45-0 055 556 ProAStep Task Resource 0-5 5-10 10-15 15-20 20-25 25-30 30-35 403 45 ON-100-101 Perform Scram Actions PO ..

until transition P0 ON-159-002 Recover from PCO 1...

Isolations NPO1 .

GO-100-004 Performing NPO 1 "

SD actions NP03 Page 48 of 93

Emergency Plan, Rev. 56, Page 268 of 312 On-Shift Staffing Analysis TABLE 3 - Firefighting Analysis # 5 Line Performed By Task Analysis Controlling Method

1. N/A N/A

2. N/A N/A

3. N/A N/A

4. N/A N/A

5. N/A N/A Notes: No Fire Brigade response required for this event.

Page 49 of 93

Emergency Plan, Rev. 56, Page 269 of 312 On-Shift Staffing Analysis TABLE 4 - Radiation Protection & Chemistry Analysis # 5 Performance Time Period After Emergency Declaration (minutes)

Line Position Performing Function/Task 0 10- 15 25 35 45 55 65 75- 80 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 55 60 65 70 75 80 85 90

1. In-Plant Survey On-Shift Position: HP

2. Out of Plant Survey On-Shift Position: HP #2

3. Personnel Monitoring On-Shift Position:

4. Job Coverage On-Shift Position:

5. Offsite Radiological Assessment On-Shift Position: HP #1

6. Other Site-Specific HP - Describe:

On-Shift Position:

7. Chemistry function/task #1 - Describe: Support Field Monitoring Team On-Shift Position: Chem #1

8. Chemistry function/task #2 - Describe:

On-Shift Position: Chem #1 Notes: HP & Chemistry report to Control Room for direction from Shift Manager Chemistry Post Trip Sampling after ERO augmentation (required within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> of shutdown)

Page 50 of 93

Emergency Plan, Rev. 56, Page 270 of 312 On-Shift Staffing Analysis TABLE 5 - Emergency Plan Implementation Analysis # 5 Line Function/Task On-Shift Position Task Analysis Controlling Method

1. Declare the Emergency Shift Manager EP/Ops Training and Classification Level (ECL) EP Drill Program

2. Approve Offsite Protective N/A N/A Action Recommendations

3. Approve content of State/local Shift Manager EP/Ops Training and notifications EP Drill Program

4. Approve extension to allowable N/A N/A dose limits

5. Notification and direction to on- SRO #1 EP/Ops Training and shift staff (e.g., to assemble, EP Drill Program evacuate, etc.)

6. ERO notification SRO #2 EP/Ops Training and EP Drill Program

7. Abbreviated NRC notification N/A N/A for DBT event

8. Complete State/local Shift Manager EP/Ops Training and notification form EP Drill Program

9. Perform State/local notifications PCO #4 EP Training and EP Drill Program

10. Complete NRC event SRO #2 EP/Ops Training and notification form EP Drill Program

11. Activate ERDS SRO #2 EP/Ops Training and EP Drill Program

12. Offsite radiological assessment N/A N/A

13. Perform NRC notifications SRO #2 EP/Ops Training and EP Drill Program

14. Perform other site-specific N/A N/A event notifications (e.g., INPO, ANI, etc.)

15. Personnel accountability N/A N/A Notes: Alert EAL MA EP-PS-100 Emergency Director, Control Room Page 51 of 93

".-_ -1 ___ý -_..

Emergency Plan, Rev. 56, Page 271 of 312 On-Shift Staffing Analysis Event Timelines and Assumptions Event #11 Response actions for an "aircraft probable threat' in accordance with 10CFR50.54(hh)(1)

Initial Conditions:

Time: Monday @ 2100 Unit 1&2 100% Power, NOP & NOT Sequence of Events:

2100 Aircraft probable threat call received from NRC Headquarters.

Call is verified.

Aircraft is = 25 minutes from site Page 52 of 93

Emergency Plan, Rev. 56, Page 272 of 312 On-Shift Staffing Analysis Appendix B Analysis #6: DBA/ISG Event #11 - Aircraft Probable Threat ECL: Alert TABLE 1 - On-shift Positions Augmentation Role in Unanalyzed TMS Line On-shift Position Emergency Plan Reference Elapsed Time (min) Table#/Line# Task? Required?

1. Shift Manager SSES E Plan Table 6.1 N/A T2/L1 NO NO T5/L1 T5/L3 T5/L8

2. Unit Supervisor (SRO #1)1 SSES E Plan Table 6.1 N/A T2/L2 NO NO

3. Unit Supervisor (SRO #2)1 SSES E Plan Table 6.1 N/A T5/L6 NO NO T5/L10 T5/L11 T5/L13

4. Shift Technical Advisor (STA) SSES E Plan Table 6.1 N/A T2/L3 NO NO

5. Plant Control Operator (PCO #1) SSES E Plan Table 6.1 N/A T2/L4 NO NO

6. Plant Control Operator (PCO #2) 2 SSES E Plan Table 6.1 N/A T2/L5 NO NO T5/L5

7. Plant Control Operator (PCO #3) SSES E Plan Table 6.1 N/A T2/L6 NO NO

8. Plant Control Operator (PCO #4) 2 SSES E Plan Table 6.1 N/A T2/L7 NO NO

______________________ _____N/A __ T5/L93 ______

9. Nuclear Plant Operator (NPO #1) SSES E Plan Table 6.1 N/A T2/L8 NO NO

10. Security Officer #1 SSES E Plan Table 6.1 N/A T2/L9 NO NO

11. Security Officer #2 SSES E Plan Table 6.1 N/A T5/L1 4 NO NO Notes: 1 Unaffected Unit Supervisor functions as the NRC Communicator 2 Unaffected Unit Plant Control Operator functions as E Plan Communicator 3 Refer to Table 2A - PCO available to perform Emergency Plan actions after ON/EOP actions.

Page 53 of 93

Emergency Plan, Rev. 56, Page 273 of 312 On-Shift Staffing Analysis TABLE 2 - Plant Operations & Safe Shutdown Analysis # 6 Two Units - One Control Room (Shared) Applicable to unit 1 &2 Minimum Operations Crew Necessary to Implement ONs and EOPs, or SAMGs if applicable Task Performance Validation Line Generic Title/Role On-Shift Position Validation

1. Shift Manager Shift Manager Operator Training

2. Shift Supervisor Unit Supervisor (SRO #1) Operator Training

3. Shift Technical Advisor Shift Technical Advisor (STA) Operator Training

4. Reactor Operator #1 Plant Control Operator (PCO #1) Operator Training

5. Reactor Operator #2 Plant Control Operator (PCO #2) Operator Training

6. Reactor Operator #3 Plant Control Operator (PCO #3) Operator Training

7. Reactor Operator #4 Plant Control Operator (PCO #4) Operator Training

8. Auxiliary Operator #1 Nuclear Plant Operator (NPO #1) Operator Training Notes: See Table 2A for ON/EOP actions Other (non-Operations) Personnel Necessary to Implement ONs and EOPs, or SAMGs if applicable Notes: Extinguish interior (PA) plant lighting and preps to extinguish exterior plant lighting Page 54 of 93

Emergency Plan, Rev. 56, Page 274 of 312 On-Shift Staffing Analysis Analysis #6, Table 2A - ON/EOP Actions Aircraft Threat Procedure Step/Actions Performance Time (mins) After Procedure Implementation Assigned 0-5 5-10 10-15 15-20 20-25 25-30 30-35 35-40 40-45 45-50 50-55 55-60 Proc/Step Task Resource ON-000-010 PA PCO 2 Step 3.9 Announcement P0 2 ..

• ON-000-010 Direct ON-000- SRO 1 - .

010 actions .............

ON-000-010 Establish Attach D Communications STA with NRC _ _ :_"_'

Isolate RWCU PCO 1 7iXC (both Units) PCO 3 Perform Scram Imminent Actions ,.4 -

Maximize CRD PCO 2 }

PCO44 ..-

Place CREOASS *c"-2 X

in Recirc P 2____ ___X_

Eval E Plan Entry SM and X ..

STA _

• Extinguish Interior (PA)

Lights and Prep SAS .X.

to Extinguish Exterior Lights . _-_..,_,_

ON-000-010 Start ESW and PCO 2 X Attach G DG StartSCCDG NP01 Supp Pool PCO 2 . ... __..____________________________._____ _,_

Cooling inP

_______________Service O4 .'_____, ____

Page 55 of 93

1 *i

• • *..- .t-*'--

Emergency Plan, Rev. 56, Page 275 of 312 On-Shift Staffing Analysis TABLE 3 - Firefighting Analysis # 6 Task Analysis Line Performed By Controlling Method

1. N/A N/A

2. N/A N/A

3. N/A N/A

4. N/A N/A

5. N/A N/A Notes: No Fire Brigade response required for this event. Personnel evacuate target buildings.

Initiate."Duck and Cover" Page 56 of 93

Emergency Plan, Rev. 56, Page 276 of 312 On-Shift Staffing Analysis TABLE 4 - Radiation Protection & Chemistry Analysis # 6 Performance Time Period After Emerency Declaration (minutes)

Line Position Performing Function/Task 0 10- 15 25 35 45 55 65 75- 80 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 55 60 65 70 75 80 85 90

1. In-Plant Survey On-Shift Position: HP

2. Out of Plant Survey On-Shift Position: HP #2

3. Personnel Monitoring On-Shift Position:

4. Job Coverage On-Shift Position:

5. Offsite Radiological Assessment On-Shift Position: HP #1

6. Other Site-Specific HP - Describe:

On-Shift Position:

7. Chemistry function/task #1 - Describe: Support Field Monitoring Team On-Shift Position: Chem #1

8. Chemistry function/task #2 - Describe:

On-Shift Position: Chem #1 Notes: HP/Chemistry are in "Duck and Cover" Mode.

Page 57 of 93

Emergency Plan, Rev. 56, Page 277 of 312 On-Shift Staffing Analysis TABLE 5 - Emergency Plan Implementation Analysis # 6 Line Function/Task On-Shift Position Task Analysis Controlling Method

1. Declare the Emergency Shift Manager EP/Ops Training and Classification Level (ECL) EP Drill Program

2. Approve Offsite Protective N/A N/A Action Recommendations

3. Approve content of State/local Shift Manager EP/Ops Training and notifications EP Drill Program

4. Approve extension to allowable N/A N/A dose limits

5. Notification and direction to on- PCO #2 EP/Ops Training and shift staff (e.g., to assemble, EP Drill Program evacuate, etc.)

6. ERO notification SRO #2 EP/Ops Training and EP Drill Program

7. Abbreviated NRC notification N/A N/A for DBT event

8. Complete State/local Shift Manager EP/Ops Training and notification form EP Drill Program

9. Perform State/local notifications PCO #4 EP Training and EP Drill Program

10. Complete NRC event SRO #2 EP/Ops Training and notification form EP Drill Program

11. Activate ERDS SRO #2 EP/Ops Training and EP Drill Program

12. Offsite radiological assessment N/A N/A

13. Perform NRC notifications SRO #2 EP/Ops Training and EP Drill Program

.14. Perform other site-specific Security Officer #2 EP/Security Training event notifications (e.g., INPO, and EP Drill Program ANI, etc.)

15. Personnel accountability N/A N/A Notes: Alert EAL OA2 EP-PS-100 Emergency Director, Control Room Page 58 of 93

Emergency Plan, Rev. 56, Page 278 of 312 On-Shift Staffing Analysis Event Timelines and Assumptions Event #12 Control room fire leading to evacuation and remote shutdown Initial Conditions:

Time: Monday @ 0330 Unit 1&2 100% Power, NOP & NOT Sequence of Events:

0330 Smoke, sparks and flames observed coming from back of control board Fire Brigade activated 0332 Fire Operations attempt to extinguish flames without success - fire and smoke affects operation of both units 1&2 0340 Decision to evacuate Control Room 1&2 Page 59 of 93

Emergency Plan, Rev. 56, Page 279 of 312 On-Shift Staffing Analysis Appendix B Analysis #7: DBNISG Event #12 - Control Room Fire w/Evacuation &.Remote -Shutdown. ECL:-Alert TABLE 1 - On-shift Positions Augmentation Role in Unanalyzed TMS Line On-shift Position Emergency Plan Reference Elapsed(m)

Time Table#/Line# Task? Required?

(min)

1. Shift Manager SSES E Plan Table 6.1 N/A T2/L1 NO NO T5/L1 T5/L3 T5/L8

2. Unit Supervisor (SRO #1)1 SSES E Plan Table 6.1 N/A T2/L2 NO NO T5/L5

3. Unit Supervisor (SRO #2) 1 SSES E Plan Table 6.1 N/A T2/L3 NO NO

4. Shift Technical Advisor (STA) SSES E Plan Table 6.1 N/A T2/L4 NO YES T5/L6 T5/L9 T5/L10 T5/L13

5. Field Unit Supervisor (FBL) 2 SSES E Plan Table 6.1 N/A T3/L1 NO NO

6. Plant Control Operator (PCO #1) SSES E Plan Table 6.1 N/A T2/L5 NO NO

7. Plant Control Operator (PCO #2) 3 SSES E Plan Table 6.1 N/A T2/L6 NO NO

8. Plant Control Operator (PCO #3) SSES E Plan Table 6.1 N/A T2/L7 NO NO

9. Plant Control Operator (PCO #4)3 SSES E Plan Table 6.1 N/A T2/L8 NO NO

10. Nuclear Plant Operator (NPO #1) SSES E Plan Table 6.1 N/A T2/L9 NO NO

11. Nuclear Plant Operator (NPO #2) SSES E Plan Table 6.1 N/A T2/_1 0 NO NO

12. Nuclear Plant Operator (NPO #3) SSES E Plan Table 6.1 N/A T2/L1 1 NO NO Page 60 of 93

Emergency Plan, Rev. 56, Page 280 of 312 On-Shift Staffing Analysis Augmentation Role in Unanalyzed TMS Line On-shift Position Emergency Plan Reference Elapsed Time T ole#in Task? R Ired (i) Table#/Line# Task? Required?

(min) 13, Nuclear Plant Operator (NPO #4) SSES E Plan Table 6.1 N/A T2/L12 NO NO

14. Effluents Handyman #1 (FBM #1) SSES E Plan Table 6.1 N/A T3/L2 NO NO

15. Effluents Handyman #2 (FBM #2) SSES E Plan Table 6.1 N/A_ T3/L3 NO NO

16. Effluents Handyman #3 (FBM #3) SSES E Plan Table 6.1 N/A T3/L4 NO NO

17. Effluents Handyman #4 (FBM #4) SSES E Plan Table 6.1 N/A T3/L5 NO NO Notes: 1 Unaffected Unit Supervisor functions as the NRC Communicator 2 Functions as Fire Brigade Leader during fire related response events 3 Unaffected Unit Plant Control Operator functions as E Plan Communicator Page 61 of 93

Emergency Plan, Rev. 56, Page 281 of 312 On-Shift Staffing Analysis TABLE 2 - Plant Operations & Safe Shutdow Analysis # 7 Two Units - One Control Room (Shared) Applicable to unit 1 &2 Minimum Operations Crew Necessary to Implement ONs and EOPs, or SAMGs if applicable TaskValidatio Performance Line Generic Title/Role On-Shift Position Validation

1. Shift Manager Shift Manager Operator Training

2. Shift Supervisor Unit Supervisor (SRO #1) Operator Training

3. Shift Supervisor Unit Supervisor (SRO #2) Operator Training

4. Shift Technical Advisor Shift Technical Advisor (STA) Operator Training

5. Reactor Operator #1 Plant Control Operator (PCO #1) Operator Training

6. Reactor Operator #2 Plant Control Operator (PCO #2) Operator Training

7. Reactor Operator #3 Plant Control Operator (PCO #3) Operator Training

8. Reactor Operator #4 Plant Control Operator (PCO #4) Operator Training.

9. Auxiliary Operator #1 Nuclear Plant Operator (NPO #1) Operator Training

10. Auxiliary Operator #2 Nuclear Plant Operator (NPO #2) Operator Training.

11. Auxiliary Operator #3 Nuclear Plant Operator (NPO #3) Operator Training

12. Auxiliary Operator #4 Nuclear Plant Operator (NPO #4) Operator Training Notes: See Table 2A for ON/EOP actions Page 62 of. 93

Emergency Plan, Rev. 56, Page 282 of 312 On-Shift Staffing Analysis Analysis #7, Table 2A - ON/EOP Actions Control Room Fire with Evacuation Procedure Step/Actions Performance Time (mins) After Procedure Implementation Assigned 0-5 5-10 10-15 15-20 20-25 25-30 30-35 35-40 40-45 45-50 50-55 55-60 Proc/Step Task Resource ON-1 (2)00-009 Notify Security and SRO 1 PA announcement Step 3.2 Activate NERO or STA T_  :..7 Alt NERO Insert Scram and verify Control Rods PCO 1 SRM and IRMs PCO 3 Inserted Close MSIVs PCO 2 PC0 4, ,..o Placing FW in P00 1 startup level P003 control Isolate RWCU PCO 1 PCO 3 I.P*;*

Startup HPCI and PCO 2 RCIC PCO4 4 Obtain keys and SRO 1 take EOP boards SRO 2 ***(':

currently in use ON-1 (2)00-009 Evac CR All x Step 3.3 All ,

,_,x.-_,.,

Step 4.3.1 Start Laptop PCO 1 PCO 3 .,.v Step 4.3.2 Transfer Switch PCO 2 Lineup PCO44*. .. .

4.3.3 Notify SM when SRO 1 transferred SRO 2 i N/A SM and STA report SM / STA x.0 0-toOCC /

4.3.4 Isolate A- D ESS bus feeder NPO 1 breakers fromCR NP- .

4.3.5 Isolate RSR "'

Service water flow NPO 3 X.

thru appropriate NPO 4 RHR heart exchangers _________ ____________________________________________

Page 63 of 93

Emergency Plan, Rev. 56, Page 283 of 312 On-Shift Staffing Analysis Control Room Fire with Evacuation Procedure Step/Actions Performance Time (mins) After Procedure Implementation Assigned 0-5 5-10 10-15 15-20 20-25 25-30 30-35 5 45-50 50-55 55-60 Proc/Step Task Resource 4.3.6 - 4.3.7 Verify MSIV and PCO 1 .. ,.

MSL drains are PCO 3 closed Monitor Plant PCO 1 Parameters PCO 3 4.5.1 Disable CR HMIS NPO 1  ;' *

• j interfaces -. _i. _.

4.5.2 Verify Control Structure HVAC NP0 2 x I operating ........

4.6 Control Rx Press PCO 1 '.-

from Remote SDP PC03 .

Verify Instrument NPO 3 ga s in se rv ice NPO 4 , .:. . _ _. _._-.

Verify all Turbines NPO 3 " "- "'V" tripped NPO 4 , . .A-.._,

EO-i(2)00-102 Maintain Rx Water '-'

PCO0 . .,*. d; 42*.. .,

OP-1(2)50-001 Level with RCIC Step 2.15 P003 . . . . . -- '- ... .

EO-1(2)00-102 Take Scram P00 1-4 ON-1(2)00-101 Actions . .

Page 64 of 93

Emergency Plan, Rev. 56, Page 284 of 312 On-Shift Staffing Analysis TABLE 3 - Firefighting Analysis # 7 Line Performed By Task Analysis Controlling Method

1. Field Unit Supervisor (FBL) Fire Brigade Training

2. Effluents Handyman #1 (FBM #1) Fire Brigade Training

3. Effluents Handyman #2 (FBM #2) Fire Brigade Training

4. Effluents Handyman #3 (FBM #3) Fire Brigade Training

5. Effluents Handyman #4 (FBM #4) Fire Brigade Training Notes:

Page 65 of 93

Emergency Plan, Rev. 56, Page 285 of 312 On-Shift Staffing Analysis TABLE 4 - Radiation Protection & Chemistry Analysis # 7 Performance Time Period After Emergency Declaration (minutes)

Line Position Performing Function/Task 0- 5- 10- 15 25 35 45 55 65 75- 80 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 55 60 65 70 75 80 85 90

1. In-Plant Survey On-Shift Position: HP

2. Out of Plant Survey On-Shift Position: HP #2

3. Personnel Monitoring On-Shift Position:

4. Job Coverage On-Shift Position:

5. Offsite Radiological Assessment On-Shift Position: HP #1

6. Other Site-Specific HP - Describe:

On-Shift Position:

7. Chemistry function/task #1 - Describe: Support Field Monitoring Team On-Shift Position: Chem #1

8. Chemistry function/task #2 - Describe:

On-Shift Position: Chem #1 Notes: HP Technicians report to OSC for this event and take direction from Shift Manager.

Chemistry Technician reports to OSC for this event and takes direction from Shift Manager.

Chemistry Post Trip Sampling after ERO augmentation (required within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> of shutdown)

Page 66 of 93

I .-

Emergency Plan, Rev. 56, Page 286 of 312 On-Shift Staffing Analysis TABLE 5 - Emergency Plan Implementation Analysis # 7 Line Function/Task On-Shift Position Task Analysis Controlling Method

1. Declare the Emergency Shift Manager EP/Ops Training and EP Classification Level (ECL) Drill Program

2. Approve Offsite Protective Action N/A N/A Recommendations

3. Approve content of State/local Shift Manager EP/Ops Training and EP notifications Drill Program

4. Approve extension to allowable N/A N/A dose limits

5. Notification and direction to on- SRO #1 EP/Ops Training and EP shift staff (e.g., to assemble, Drill Program evacuate, etc.)

6. ERO notification STA EP/Ops Training and EP Drill Program

7. Abbreviated NRC notification for N/A N/A DBT event

8. Complete State/local notification Shift Manager EP/Ops Training and EP form Drill Program

9. Perform State/local notifications STA EP Training and EP Drill Program

10. Complete NRC event notification STA EP/Ops Training and EP form Drill Program

11. Activate ERDS Will occur in the EOF EP Training and EP Drill after augrnentation* Program

12. Offsite radiological assessment N/A N/A.

13. Perform NRC notifications STA EP/Ops Training and EP Drill Program

14. Perform other site-specific event N/A N/A notifications (e.g., INPO, ANI, etc.)

15. Personnel accountability N/A N/A Notes: Alert EAL OA4/OA6 EP-PS-1 00 Emergency Director, Control Room

• At the time of the Phase II On-shift Staffing Analysis, ERDS activation would occur in the EOF. As of DEC 2012, ERDS can be started from any nuclear PPLNET Computer (such as those in the OSC where the SM and STA could evacuate to) lAW EP-PS-1 35, NRC Communicator. ERDS activation time is -1 minute Page 67 of 93

..I --I I-I-`L;.--

Emergency Plan, Rev. 56, Page 287 of 312 On-Shift Staffing Analysis Event Timelines and Assumptions Event #13 Station Blackout Initial Conditions:

Time: Monday @ 0330 Unit 1 100% Power, NOP & NOT Unit 2 100% Power, NOP & NOT Emergency Diesel Generator E was declared inoperable at 0300 and isolated for maintenance due to failure of the Woodward governor.

Sequence of Events:

0330 Total LOOP Startup Transformers T10 and T20 are unavailable Emergency Diesel Generator A fails to start Emergency Diesel Generator B fails to start Emergency Diesel Generator C fails to start Emergency Diesel Generator D fails to start Page 68 of 93

Emergency Plan, Rev. 56, Page 288 of 312 On-Shift Staffing Analysis Appendix B Analysis #8: DBA/ISG Event #13 - Station Blackout ECL: Site Area Emergency TABLE 1 - On-shift Positions Augmentation Role in Unanalyzed TMS Line On-shift Position Emergency Plan Reference Elapsed Time (min) Table#/Line# Task? Required?

1. Shift Manager SSES E Plan Table 6.1 N/A T2/L1 NO NO T5/L1 T5/L3 T5/L8

2. Unit Supervisor (SRO #1)1 SSES E Plan Table 6.1 N/A T2/L2 NO NO

3. Unit Supervisor (SRO #2)1 SSES E Plan Table 6.1 N/A T2/L3 NO NO

4. Shift Technical Advisor (STA) SSES E Plan Table 6.1 N/A T2/L4 NO YES T5/L5 T5/L6 T5/L9 T5/L10 T5/L1 1 T5/L13

5. Field Unit Supervisor (FBL) 2 SSES E Plan Table 6.1 N/A T2/L5 NO NO

6. Plant Control Operator (PCO #1) SSES E Plan Table 6.1 N/A T2/L6 NO NO

7. Plant Control Operator (PCO #2) 3 SSES E Plan Table 6.1 N/A T2/L7 NO NO

8. Plant Control Operator (PCO #3) SSES E Plan Table 6.1 N/A T2/L8 NO NO

9. Plant Control Operator (PCO #4) 3 SSES E Plan Table 6.1 N/A T2/L9 NO NO

10. Nuclear Plant Operator (NPO #1) SSES E Plan Table 6.1 N/A T2/L10 NO NO

11. Nuclear Plant Operator (NPO #2) SSES E Plan Table 6.1 N/A T2/L1 1 NO NO Page 69 of 93

Emergency Plan, Rev. 56, Page 289 of 312 On-Shift Staffing Analysis Augmentation Role in Unanalyzed TMS Line On-shift Position Emergency Plan Reference Elapsed Time Table#/Line# Task? Required?

(min)

12. Nuclear Plant Operator (NPO #3) SSES E Plan Table 6.1 N/A T2/L12 NO NO

13. Nuclear Plant Operator (NPO #4) SSES E Plan Table 6.1 N/A T2/L13 NO NO

14. Security Officer #1 SSES E Plan Table 6.1 N/A T2/L14 NO NO

15. Security Officer #2 SSES E Plan Table 6.1 N/A T5/L15 NO NO Notes: 1 Unaffected Unit Supervisor functions as the NRC Communicator Functions as Fire Brigade Leader during fire related response events 3 Unaffected Unit Plant Control Operator functions as E Plan Communicator Page 70 of 93

Emergency Plan, Rev. 56, Page 290 of 312 On-Shift Staffing Analysis TABLE 2 - Plant Operations & Safe Shutdown Analysis # 8 Two Units - One Control Room (Shared) Applicable to unit 1 &2 Minimum Operations Crew Necessary to Implement ONs and EOPs, or SAMGs if applicable TaskValidatio Performance Line Generic Title/Role On-Shift Position Validation

1. Shift Manager Shift Manager Operator Training

2. Shift Supervisor Unit Supervisor (SRO #1) Operator Training

3. Shift Supervisor Unit Supervisor (SRO #2) Operator Training

4. Shift Technical Advisor Shift Technical Advisor (STA) Operator Training

5. Shift Supervisor Field Unit Supervisor (FBL) Operator Training

6. Reactor Operator #1 Plant Control Operator (PCO #1) Operator Training

7. Reactor Operator #2 Plant Control Operator (PCO #2) Operator Training

8. Reactor Operator #3 Plant Control Operator (PCO #3) Operator Training

9. Reactor Operator #4 Plant Control Operator (PCO #4) Operator Training

10. Auxiliary Operator #1 Nuclear Plant Operator (NPO #1) Operator Training

11. Auxiliary Operator #2 Nuclear Plant Operator (NPO #2) Operator Training

12. Auxiliary Operator #3 Nuclear Plant Operator (NPO #3) Operator Training

13. Auxiliary Operator #4 Nuclear Plant Operator (NPO #4) Operator Training Notes: See Table 2A for ON/EOP actions Other (non-Operations) Personnel Necessary to Implement ONs and EOPs, or SAMGs if applicable Notes: Support 'Blue Max' connection activities - officer posted near location Page 71 of 93

Emergency Plan, Rev. 56, Page 291 of 312 On-Shift Staffing Analysis Analysis #8, Table 2A - ON/EOP Actions Station Blackout Procedure Step/Actions Performance Time (mins) After Procedure Implementation ProdtStep Task Assigned Resource 0-5 II 5-10 1 10-15 T 15-20 20-25 I 25-30 I 30-35 I 35-40 I 40.45f 45-50 1 50-55 1 55-60 EO-100-030 Attempts to start DG NPO 4 Cycle ESW pump NPO 1 DC power knife NPO.2 '

switches .:. __..

Presslocal on --:-.- - -=

emergency stop for NPO 4 each DG S : '... .i Monitor plantCPC: .1- . . . . .. . . . ..

available p arao-nmeters, 1.r--.. * ..

~~--,,O ,.*

• instrumentation -- -c$ ...... ..... . ..

- 2. ..

Establish ES SRO 1 ' ~-~~*.

priorities SRO 2 -. ..- . . , . . . .. . . .  : ."

Operate HPIC and P00 1 '*-

RCIC IAW Attach A P00 3 X.

Use SRVs to maintain pressure Operate HPIC to P00 1 P03 PCOl3-----"-,-

-X_______z z z. _____________

maintain press PCO33 ' ." . :..  :.__. __ _..._

Contact TCC for .. STA system statusSTA_"_._..__".._,_...'_.--._

Align busses to PCO 2 _ _ _ "_-'_."."_ -" ..

_I_ _ __ ___

Attach I PCO 4 Vent Hydrogen from NPO 1 .

main generator NPO 2 .-i....

Connecting Blue NO3.-~X ~  ;~

Max per ES-002-001. '- -

Secure non-class NPO11 250 volt DC loads NPO 2 L. -....-

Bypass HPIC High NPO4  : . -  :

Dry Well Press FBL - _ _ _

Initiation Lineup fires system NPO 2 . ,.,

to RHR SW 2_X Bypass RCIC Low NPO 4 . .

Steam Supply Press Isolation FBL Bypass RCIC High NPO 4 G Turbine Exhaust FBL Page 72 of 93

Emergency Plan, Rev. 56, Page 292 of 312 On-Shift Staffing Analysis Station Blackout Procedure Step/Actions Performance Time (mins) After Procedure Implementation ProcStep Task Resource 0-5 5-10 10-15 15-20 20-25 25-30 30-35 3540 40-45 45-50 50-55 55-60 Press Trip Ii2530 _ .___ ___"

Bypass HPIC CST NPO 4

• Low Water Level FBL i Swap FBL Bypass HPIC High NPO 4 Turbine Exhaust X Pressure Trip FBL __ ,,_

Crosstie RWST with CSTs .P.  :

Page 73 of 93

Emergency Plan, Rev. 56, Page 293 of 312 On-Shift Staffing Analysis TABLE 3 - Firefighting Analysis # 8 Task Analysis Line Performed By Controlling Method

1. N/A N/A

2. N/A N/A

3. N/A N/A

4. N/A N/A

5. N/A N/A Notes: No fire Brigade response required for this event.

Page 74 of 93

Emergency Plan, Rev. 56, Page 294 of 312 On-Shift Staffing Analysis TABLE 4- Radiation Protection & Chemistry Analysis # 8 Performance Time Period After Emergency Declaration (minutes)

Line Position Performing Function/Task 0 10- 15 25 35 45 55 65 75 85-5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 55 60 65 70 75 80 85 90

1. In-Plant Survey I On-Shift Position: HP

2. Out of Plant Survey On-Shift Position: HP

3. Personnel Monitoring On-Shift Position:

4. Job Coverage On-Shift Position:

5. Offsite Radiological Assessment On-Shift Position: HP #1

6. Other Site-Specific HP - Describe:

On-Shift Position:

7. Chemistry function/task #1 - Describe:

Support Field Monitoring Team On-Shift Position: Chem #1

8. Chemistry function/task #2 - Describe:

On-Shift Position: Chem #1 Notes: No HP or Chemistry response required prior to ERO augmentation.

Page 75 of 93

Emergency Plan, Rev. 56, Page 295 of 312 On-Shift Staffing Analysis TABLE 5 - Emergency Plan Implementation Analysis # 8 Line Function/Task On-Shift Position Task Analysis task Anaysi

______ControllingMethod

1. Declare the Emergency Shift Manager EP/Ops Training and Classification Level (ECL) EP Drill Program

2. Approve Offsite Protective N/A N/A Action Recommendations

3. Approve content of State/local Shift Manager EP/Ops Training and notifications EP Drill Program

4. Approve extension to allowable N/A N/A dose limits

5. Notification and direction to on- STA EP/Ops Training and shift staff (e.g., to assemble, EP Drill Program evacuate, etc.)

6. ERO notification STA EP/Ops Training and EP Drill Program

7. Abbreviated NRC notification N/A N/A for DBT event

8. Complete State/local Shift Manager EP/Ops Training and notification form EP Drill Program

9. Perform State/local notifications STA EP Training and EP Drill Program

10. Complete NRC event STA EP/Ops Training and notification form EP Drill Program

11. Activate ERDS STA EP/Ops Training and EP Drill Program

12. Offsite radiological assessment N/A N/A

13. Perform NRC notifications STA EP/Ops Training and EP Drill Program

14. Perform other site-specific N/A N/A event notifications (e.g., INPO, ANI, etc.)

15. Personnel accountability Security Officer #2 EP/Security Training and EP Drill Program Notes: Site Area Emergency EAL MS1.

EP-PS-100 Emergency Director, Control Room Page 76 of 93

Emergency Plan, Rev. 56, Page 296 of 312 On-Shift Staffing Analysis Event Timelines and Assumptions Event #15 SAMG Response Initial Conditions:

Time: Tuesday @ 0500 Unit 2 in accident condition requiring entry into SAMG (refer to Event #7)

Sequence of Events:

0525 SAMG entry conditions met; SAMG entered Page 77 of 93

Emergency Plan, Rev. 56, Page 297 of 312 On-Shift Staffing Analysis Appendix B Analysis #9: DBA/ISG Event # 15 - SAMG ECL: General Emergency Conditions Exist TABLE 1 - On-shift Positions Augmentation Role in Unanalyzed TMS Line On-shift Position Emergency Plan Reference Elapsed Time Table#ILine# Task? Required?

(min) T eLe aq

1. Shift Manager SSES E Plan Table 6.1 N/A T2/L1 NO NO

2. Unit Supervisor (SRO #2)1 SSES E Plan Table 6.1 N/A T2/L2 NO NO

3. Shift Technical Advisor (STA) SSES E Plan Table 6.1 N/A T2/L3 NO NO

4. Field Unit Supervisor (FBL) 2 SSES E Plan Table 6.1 N/A T2/L4 NO NO

5. Plant Control Operator (PCO #4) 3 SSES E Plan Table 6.1 N/A T2/L5 NO NO

6. Nuclear Plant Operator (NPO #2) SSES E Plan Table 6.1 N/A T2/L6 NO NO

7. Nuclear Plant Operator (NPO #3) SSES E Plan Table 6.1 N/A T2/L7 NO NO

8. HP Technician (HP #1) SSES E Plan Table 6.1 60 T4/L3 NO NO

9. HP Technician (HP #2) SSES E Plan Table 6.1 60 T4/L6 NO NO

10. Effluents Handyman #1 (FBM #1) SSES E Plan Table 6.1 N/A T2/L8 NO NO

11. Effluents Handyman #2 (FBM #2) SSES E Plan Table 6.1 N/A T2/L9 NO NO

12. Effluents Handyman #3 (FBM #3) SSES E Plan Table 6.1 N/A T2/L10 NO NO

13. Effluents Handyman #4 (FBM #4) SSES E Plan Table 6.1 N/A T2/L11 NO NO Notes: 1Unaffected Unit Supervisor functions as the NRC Communicator 2 Functions as Fire Brigade Leader during fire related response events 3 Unaffected Unit Plant Control Operator functions as E Plan Communicator Page 78 of 93

Emergency Plan, Rev. 56, Page 298 of 312 On-Shift Staffing Analysis TABLE 2 - Plant Operations & Safe Shutdown Analysis # 9 Two Units - One Control Room (Shared) Applicable to unit 2 Minimum Operations Crew Necessary to Implement SAMGs if applicable TaskValidatio Performance Line Generic Title/Role On-Shift Position Validation

1. Shift Manager Shift Manager Operator Training

2. Shift Supervisor Unit Supervisor (SRO #2) Operator Training

3. Shift Technical Advisor Shift Technical Advisor (STA) Operator Training

4. Shift Supervisor Field Unit Supervisor (FBL) Operator Training

5. Reactor Operator #4 Plant Control Operator (PCO #4) Operator Training

6. Auxiliary Operator #2 Nuclear Plant Operator (NPO #2) Operator Training

7. Auxiliary Operator #3 Nuclear Plant Operator (NPO #3) Operator Training Notes: See Table 2A for SAMG actions Other (non-Operations) Personnel Necessary to Implement SAMGs if applicable Task Performance Line Generic Title/Role On-Shift Position 8Validation

8. Effluents Handyman #1 Fire Brigade Member #1 Fire Brigade Training

9. Effluents Handyman #2 Fire Brigade Member #2 Fire Brigade Training

10. Effluents Handyman #3 Fire Brigade Member #3 Fire Brigade Training

11. Effluents Handyman #4 Fire Brigade Member #4 Fire Brigade Training Notes: See Table 2A for SAMG actions Page 79 of 93

Emergency Plan, Rev. 56, Page 299 of 312 On-Shift Staffing Analysis Analysis #9, Table 2A - ON/EOP Actions SAMG (Unit #2)

Procedure Step/Actions Performance Time (mins) After Procedure Implementation Assigned 0-5 5-10 10-15 15-20 20-25 25-30 30-35 4- 40-45 45-50 50-55 55-60 Proc/Step Task Resource 40 EP-DS-003 Using low pressure ECCS to control injections to PC04 maintain steam-lin e s flo ode d . -. .. ,

EP-DS-002 Effluents provide Steps: portable pump .

RC/F-1 1 truck -" .,*' -,

RC/F-23 Effluents RC/F-31 RC/F-31 Handyman . . ..

RC/F-47R 1,2,3,4 RC/F-48 RC/F-55 RC /F-56 __._._ _ ___ __ _-..-_ _. ___.,_ _._,_.".._,__ .__

Page 80 of 93

Emergency Plan, Rev. 56, Page 300 of 312 On-Shift Staffing Analysis TABLE 3 - Firefighting Analysis # 9 Task Analysis Line Performed By Controlling Method

1. N/A N/A

2. N/A N/A

3. N/A N/A

4. N/A N/A

5. N/A N/A Notes: No Fire Brigade response required for this event.

Page 81 of 93

Emergency Plan, Rev. 56, Page 301 of 312 On-Shift Staffing Analysis TABLE 4 - Radiation Protection & Chemistry Analysis # 9 Performance Time Period After Emer ency Declaration (minute ) I Line Position Performing Function/Task 0- 5- 10 20 30 40 50 60 65 75 85-5

__ 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 55 60 65 70 75 80 85 90 In-Plant Survey On-Shift Position: HP Out of Plant Survey On-Shift Position: HP Out of Plant Survey ._ -

Perform surveys (Near Site) Xx x On-Shift Position: HP V-. . .. .

Personnel Monitoring On-Shift Position:

Job Coverage On-Shift Position:

Offsite Radiological Assessment ..

On-Shift Position: HP #1 ___.!" x x Other Site-Specific HP - Describe:

On-Shift Position:

Chemistry function/task #1 - Describe: Support Field Monitoring Team On-Shift Position: Chem #1 Chemistry function/task #2 - Describe:

On-Shift Position: Chem #1 Notes: HP continue performing actions from Event #7 EP-PS-1 08, HP Tech 1 (OSCAR)

EP-PS-130, HP II Dose Calculator Note that HP#2 may be asked to provide radiological monitoring /survey by Shift Manager depending upon actual emergency conditions.

This is acceptable since On-site (out-of-plant) HP Tech is not required until 60 minutes lAW Emergency Plan Table 6.1.

Page 82 of 93

Emergency Plan, Rev. 56, Page 302 of 312 On-Shift Staffing Analysis TABLE 5 - Emergency Plan Implementation Analysis # 9 Task Analysis TrollnMh Line Function/Task On-Shift Position Controlling Method

1. Declare the Emergency N/A N/A Classification Level (ECL)

2. Approve Offsite Protective N/A N/A Action Recommendations

3. Approve content of State/local N/A N/A notifications

4. Approve extension to allowable N/A N/A dose limits

5. Notification and direction to on- N/A N/A shift staff (e.g., to assemble, evacuate, etc.)

6. ERO notification N/A N/A

7. Abbreviated NRC notification N/A N/A for DBT event

8. Complete State/local N/A N/A notification form

9. Perform State/local notifications N/A N/A

10. Complete NRC event N/A N/A notification form

11. Activate ERDS N/A N/A

12. Offsite radiological assessment N/A N/A

13. Perform NRC notifications N/A N/A

14. Perform other site-specific N/A N/A event notifications (e.g., INPO, ANI, etc.)

15. Personnel accountability N/A N/A Notes: Emergency Plan Actions taken during Event #7 EP-PS-100 Emergency Director, Control Room Page 83 of 93

Emergency Plan, Rev. 56, Page 303 of 312 On-Shift Staffing Analysis Appendix C Phase III Time Motion Study Analysis Results Page 84 of 93

Emergency Plan, Rev. 56, Page 304 of 312 On-Shift Staffing Analysis The results of the Phase IIOn-Shift Staffing Analysis conducted September 10-12, 2012 identified three (3) events with potential conflicts requiring further Phase III Time Motion Study analysis. These events are listed in Table 1 below.

Table 1 Susquehanna - Phase III Time Motion Study Events Event/Scenario Functions to be Evaluated Affected Position TMS Method Design Basis Threat NRC Abbreviated Call Shift Technical Simulator Run Evaluate E Plan entry with SM Advisor ERO Notification Complete NRC Form NRC Notification Control Room Fire Report to OSC/OCC for E Plan Shift Technical Simulator Run/

with Evacuation and Implementation Advisor Walkthrough Remote Shutdown ERO Notification Perform State/Local Notifications Completed NRC Form NRC

_ _ _ Notification Station Blackout Contact TCC Shift Technical Simulator Run ERO Notification Advisor Perform State/Local Notifications Complete NRC Form NRC Notifications On November 12, 2012, the selected scenarios for Time Motion Study (TMS) were conducted in the Susquehanna Station Operations Training Center on the simulator and using walkthroughs as appropriate. In attendance to conduct the TMS Scenarios were:

Dave Walsh Operations - Shift Manager Doug LaMarca Operations- Unit Supervisor- U1 (SRO #1)

Robert Bingman Operations - Unit Supervisor - U2 (SRO #2)

David Borger Operations - Unit Supervisor (STA)

Arnold Avery Operations - Plant Control Operator- OATC U1 (RO

1. 1)

Gordon Operations - Plant Control Operator- BOP U1 (RO #2)

Shellenberger Patrick Bone Operations - Plant Control Operator L-BOP U2 (RO #4)

Ian Missien EP Rodney Brown EP Consulting, LLC Rex Krohn EP Consulting, LLC Judi Sanquist EP Consulting, LLC The following tables document the results of the TMS for the identified events.

Page 85 of 93

Emergency Plan, Rev. 56, Page 305 of 312 On-Shift Staffing Analysis APPENDIX D Function / Responsibility (Task) Analysis Template Event: Desian Bases Threat (Event #1) Position: Shift Technical Advisor Line #: T2/L4. T5/L6. T5/L1 0. T5/L1 3 Function Responsibility (Task) Action Step Duration

1. Notifications 1.1 ERO Notifications 1.1.1 STA activates Alt NERO @0948 lAW EP-PS- < 1 minute 135 1.2. Complete NRC form 1.2.1 STA uses EP-PS-135, Tab 10 for initial NRC N/A notification as a guide to answer questions 1.3. Perform NRC Notifications 1.3.1 STA initiates NRC 50.72 Notification 7 minutes

@1001 1.3.2 NRC notification completed - NRC open line maintained @1007

2. ON/EOP Function 2.1. NRC Abbreviated Call 2.1.1 STA perform immediate notification to NRC - 1 minute OS2 - Rapid Notification @0943 2.2. Evaluate E Plan entry with Shift Manager 2.2.1 Shift Manager entering E Plan - Directs STA 4 minutes to look at Attachment G and EP-TP-001 @0941 F2.2.2 EAL - OS2 SAE declared @0945 Conflicts for the STA were adequately demonstrated during the Time Motion Study (TMS). The location of the Emergency Notification System (ENS) phone allows the STA to monitor plant data on the Plant Process Computer. This enables the STA to maintain continuous communication while continuing to monitor plant conditions/status (STA function). Note that cordless SpectraLink phones are available to on-shift personnel, if desired.

2 NRC Form 361 completed and provided to NRC HOO lAW EP-PS-1 35 and NDAP-QA-0720 within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> of event classification.

0N/EOP Functions are related to Emergency Plan Implementation - not a conflict.

Page 86 of 93

Emergency Plan, Rev. 56, Page 306 of 312 On-Shift Staffing Analysis Design Basis Threat (Event #1) - Timeline Time Task 0938 Crew has "shift"/Unit 0940 Control Room Shift Manager receives phone call from security Adversaries attempting to breach PA fence Update provided to Control Room Personnel Unit 1 Control Room Supervisor and Unit 2 Control Room Supervisor entering ON-000-010 0941 Shift Manager entering E Plan - Directs STA to look at Attachment G Inside/Outside isolation zone - attempting to breach inner fence SM and STA review EALs 0942 Control Room crew start Plant Shut Down Unit 1 & 2 performing SCRAM actions - imminent scram RO notifies Generation - units going offline OATC calls TCC to report trip 0943 Reactor Trip STA perform immediate notification to NRC Shift Manager begins to complete State/Local Notification Form 0945 PCOs dispatched to RSDP - Unit 1 and Unit 2 Site Area Emergency (SAE) declared (EAL OS2)

Adversaries have breached PA fence - in PA STA will have to perform communications - State/NRC 0946 Unit 2 CRS notified Security that 2 PCOs going to Remote Shutdown Panel (RSDP) 0947 Shift Manager provides completed State/Local form (ENR) to STA for peer check 0948 Peer check completed STA activates Alt NERO (Alternate NERO activation process) lAW EP-PS-135, NRC Communicator Shift Manager reviewing Plant conditions - oversight 0949 Unit 1 using DIV2 for SD cooling - Unit 2 DIV2 - Unit 2 PCO monitoring EDG Start-up Shift Manager working thru EOP 0951 STA begins review of ENR form with State/Locals 0953 ENR notification completed w/State/Locals Shift Manager updates crew - E-Plan entry - Now Site Emergency Director (SED) 0955 Completes State/Local Notifications Security informs Shift Manager that adversaries have been neutralized - immediate threat is clear STA validating ERO activation Duck and cover still in effect 0956 Unit 2 CRS makes PA announcement - SAE STA notifying Generation Plant Dispatch of plant condition status (security event)

Both units offline 0957 Shift Manager getting update on plant status from Control Room Supervisor 0958 Unit 1 Control Room Supervisor and Shift Manager discussing plant condition Page 87 of 93

Emergency Plan, Rev. 56, Page 307 of 312 On-Shift Staffing Analysis Time Task 0959 Discussion ends 1000 Control Room Supervisor and Shift Technical Advisor discussing prognosis STA and SM reviewing current conditions prior to contacting NRC 1001 STA initiates NRC 50.72 Notification - follow up information CRS updating SM - no more mitigating actions are being taken at this time 1002 CRS and SM reviewing on-going actions. SM reviewing SPDS/Plant Status Computer 1003 Review completed 1005 SM and CRS reviewing current status on unit 1006 Review completed 1007 NRC notification completed - NRC open line maintained 1009 TMS Terminated Page 88 of 93

Emergency Plan, Rev. 56, Page 308 of 312 On-Shift Staffing Analysis APPENDIX D Function / Responsibility (Task) Analysis Template Event: Control Room Fire w/evacuation (Event #12) Position: Shift Technical Advisor Line #: T2/L4, T5/L6. T5/L9. T5/L1_0 T5/L13 Function Responsibility (Task) Action Step Duration

1. Notifications 1.1 ERO Notification 1.1.1 STA activities alternate NERO notification 1 minute

@1051 lAW EP-PS-135 1.1.2 STA calls Security to verify NERO activation

@1052 1.2 Perform State/Local Notification 1.2.1 STA starts ENR notification-to PEMA @ 1104 3 minutes 1.2.2 Complete PEMA notification @ 1107 1.2.3 STA starts ENR notification to CCEMA @1107 3 minutes 1.2.4 Completes CCEMA notification @ 1110 1.2.5 STA starts ENR notification to LCEMA @1110 3 minutes 1.2.6 Completes LCEMA notification @1113 Total time for State/Local notifications 9 minutes 1.2.7 STA starts ENR notification to PIM @1113 4 minutes 1.2.8 Completes PIM notification @ 1117 1.3 Complete NRC Form 1.3.1 STA uses EP-PS-1 35, Tab 10 as guide N/A 1.4 Perform NRC Notification 1.4.1 STA calls NRC about the Alert classification <1 minute

@1123 1.4.2 NRC requests an open line for communications N/A

2. ON/EOP Implementation 2.1 Report to OCC/OSC for E-Plan 2.1.1 Shift Manager (SM) and STA travel to 5 minutes Implementation OCC/OSC @1052 2.1.2 SM and STA arrive at OCC/OSC @1057 TMS analysis started in the Simulator Control Room until evacuation by Control Room personnel. Upon evacuation, the Control Room Supervisors and Reactor Operators report to the Remote Shutdown Panels to complete assigned actions. During the TMS these individuals reported to the Remote Shutdown Panels located in the simulator. Upon evacuation, the Shift Manager and STA report to the OCC/OSC to complete assigned actions. A transit time of 5 minutes from the Control Room to the OCC/OSC has been determined by Susquehanna personnel. This time was used during this TMS analysis. To complete the walkthrough activities, the Shift Manager and STA remained in the Simulator Control Room and used only the equipment available in the OCC/OSC to complete notifications (the OCC/OSC has regular phones (i.e., no ringdown phone) and EPIPs available for use as well as computers with access to the plant data system). During this event, the STA primary function is notifications with the Shift Manager maintaining oversight and monitoring plant conditions/status. ERO notification was initiated prior to Control Room evacuation. State/Local Notifications were completed Within 9 minutes with the NRC notification being initiated 10 minutes afterwards. Use of the 'Spectra Link' phones in the OCC/OSC enables the STA to maintain.

continuous communication with the NRC while still monitoring plant conditions/status. All conflicts were resolved during the TMS.

Page 89 of 93

Emergency Plan, Rev. 56, Page 309 of 312 On-Shift Staffing Analysis Control Room Fire with Evacuation and Remote Shutdown (Event #12) - Timeline Time Task 1048 Control Room (CR) crew has the shift 1050 Simplex Fire alarm in CR on control board 1C601 -flames & smoke observed CR crew attempts to extinguish fire 1051 PA announcement for CR evacuation, by Unit 1 Control Room Supervisor (CRS)

STA calls Security to inform that the CR is evacuating the CR and moving to the remote Shutdown Panels - CR crew scrams both units 1051 STA activates alternate NERO lAW EP-PS-135 1052 PA announcement for Unit 1 & Unit 2 Rx scrams STA calls Security to verify NERO activation 1052 Shift Manager (SM) and STA travel to OCC/OSC to perform their duties 1057 SM and STA arrive at OCC/OSC, discuss E-Plan classification, and start working through their procedures (SAE if fire control not establish in 15 minutes) 1059 Both Unit 1 & Unit 2 CR crews arrive at remote Shutdown panels 1101 SM declares an Alert (EAL OA4) 1102 SM receives call from remote Shutdown panels that they have control of the plant as of 1100 1102 SM hands STA Emergency Notification Report (ENR) for State/Local notifications 1104 STA starts ENR notification to PEMA 1107 Complete PEMA notification 1107 STA starts ENR notification to CCEMA 1107 SM receives update from both remote Shutdown panels on plant conditions 1108 Both CRS announce to crews about Alert classification 1110 Completes CCEMA notification 1110 STA starts ENR notification to LCEMA 1113 Completes LCEMA notification 1113 STA starts ENR notification to Public Information Manager (PIM) 1117 Completes PIM notification 1117 STA calls TCC about Rx trips and CR Fire 1117 STA calls Generation Power Dispatch about Rx trips and CR Fire 1117 CRS update SM on plant conditions from Shutdown panels 1118 STA progressing through his procedure 1119 STA performs PA announcement for Alert classification 1120 STA reviews SPDS before NRC notification 1121 SM and STA discuss plant conditions 1123 STA calls NRC about the Alert classification and plant conditions NRC request that STA maintain an open line of communications - with headset, speaker on mute 1129 SM receives update from both Shutdown panels 1133 TMS terminated Page 90 of 93

Emergency Plan, Rev. 56, Page 310 of 312 On-Shift Staffing Analysis APPENDIX D Function / Responsibility (Task) Analysis Template Event: Station Blackout (Event #13) Position: Shift Technical Advisor Line #: T2/L4. T5/L6. T5/L9. T5/L10. T5/L13 Function Responsibility (Task) Action Step Duration

1. Notifications 1.1 ERO Notification 1.1.1 SRO #2 activates NERO (Nuclear Emergency 1 minute Response Organization) @ 0825 lAW EP-PS-135 1.1.2 ERO Pager activation verified by SRO #2

@ 0826 1.2. Perform State/Local Notification 1.2.1 STA initiates State/local Notifications @0823 4 minutes 1.2.2 STA completes State/Local Notifications

@ 0827 1.3. Complete NRC Form 1.3.1 No NRC Form completed based on.Shift Manager N/A decision to notify NRC and follow-up later with completed ENS form (using EP-PS-1 35, Tab 10) 1.4. Perform NRC Notification 1.4.1 SRO #2 notifies NRC - reviews information 11 minutes contained in EP-PS-135 @ 0840 1.4.2 SRO #2 directed by NRC to maintain continuous communication @ 0851

2. ON/EOP Implementation 2.1. Contact TTC 2.1.1 U2 Control Room Supervisor (SRO #2) contacts 1 minute TCC (Transmission Control Center) @0814 Conflicts for the Shift Technical Advisor were resolved by the Shift Manager assigning ERO and NRC notifications to the U2 Control Room Supervisor (SRO #2) once unit was stabilized. STA performed State/Local Notifications within 4 minutes and was available to provide support as directed by the Shift Manager as well as monitoring plant status/conditions.

Page 91 of 93

Emergency Plan, Rev. 56, Page 311 of 312 On-Shift Staffing Analysis Station Blackout (Event #13) - Timeline Time Task 0809 Control Room Crew has shift 0811 Station Blackout/Rx Trip (both units)

Rx Trip PA Announcement (RO #2)

Entering ON/EOP based on low reactor water level and Station Blackout 0812 Shift Manager (SM) directs Shift Technical Advisor (STA) to review E Plan (enter EP-TP-001, ERO Independent Verification Procedure) 0812 U1 Control Room Supervisor (SRO #1) implementing actions from Reactor Water Low flowchart- providing direction to Plant Control Operators (PCO) as needed 0813 Unit 1 PCO (OATC - RO #1) directed to start Emergency Diesel Generators (EDGs)

RO #1 directs Nuclear Plant Operator (NPO) to manually start all EDGs SRO #1 updates SM on ES Flowchart status 0814. U2 Control Room Supervisor (SRO #2) contacts TCC (Transmission Control Center) concerning loss of offsite power and anticipated return to service - call completed in less than 1 minute 0815 STA reviewing plant conditions SRO #2 updates SRO #1 on securing EDG.emergency start logic - conserve battery 0816 SM determines Emergency Classification, receives concurrence from STA SM starts to complete State/Local Notification Form 0819 Site Area Emergency declared (EAL MS1) 0820 SM completes and approves State/Local Notification Form 0821. STA directed to complete Offsite Agency notifications (State/Local/NRC) 0823 STA initiates State/local Notifications 0825 SRO #2 activates NERO (Nuclear Emergency Response Organization) by pressing applicable button on phone lAW EP-PS-135, NRC Communicator (<1 minute to complete) 0826 ERO Pager activation verified by SRO #2 0827 STA completes State/Local Notifications 0830 SM and STA reviewing current plant status and conditions (oversight) 0833 SM, STA, SRO #2 discuss ERDS capability/activation (in this scenario ERDS would not be available to transmit data due to loss of Process Computer - discussed with crew during debrief) 0836 SM determines need to conduct Site Accountability - directs STA to initiate 0837 SRO #2 announces event classification (PA Announcement) 0838. Site Accountability initiated by STA (alarm) and SRO #2 (PA Announcement) 0840: SRO #1 provides crew update - exiting EOP within 1/2 minute 0840 SRO #2 notifies NRC - reviews information contained in EP-PS-135, NRC Communicator (no NRC Form completed based on Shift Manager decision to notify NRC and follow-up later with completed form) 0842 Crew Brief initiated 0844. Crew Brief completed 0848 SM and STA review current plant status/conditions 0850 SM updates SRO #2.on current priorities based on NRC request 0851: SRO #2 directed by NRC to maintain continuous communication 0854 TMS Terminated Page 92 of 93

Emergency Plan, Rev. 56, Page 312 of 312 On-Shift Staffing Analysis Phase III Time Motion Study Results

1. Design Basis Threat - The identified conflicts for the Shift Technical Advisor were adequately demonstrated during the TMS.

2. Control Room Fire with Evacuation and Remote Shutdown - The identified conflicts for the Shift Technical Advisor were adequately demonstrated during the TMS.

3. Station Blackout - The identified conflicts for the Shift Technical Advisor were adequately demonstrated during the TMS Page 93 of 93

Attachment 3 to PLA-7279 10 CFR 50.54(q) Screening and Evaluation

Attachment A, 10CFR50.54q Screening Form Screening Number: S2014-10-09-01, Rev 1 Part I. Description of Activity Being Reviewed (event or action, or series of actions that may result in a change to the Emergency Plan or affect the implementation of the Emergency Plan):

Reviewed and updated procedures as a result of new PAR scheme development and implementation for SSES.

These changes affected the following procedures or special instructions:

1. EP-RM-005;

2. EP-PS-001, Attachment MM, Protective Action Recommendation (PAR) Determination.

3. EP-PS-001, Attachment NN, Protective Action Recommendation State Notification Form

4. EP-PS-101 (editorial);

5. EP-PS-104 (editorial);

6. EP-PS-105 (editorial);

7. EP-PS-200 (editorial);

8. EP-PS-244 (editorial);

9. EP-PS-245 (editorial);

10. EP-PS-307 (editorial).

A summary of the changes is presented in Attachment A. Note that the non-highlighted portions in Attachment A rc~nr*£*nt Afh*=r rhinnnr£ thnit nr nnfl~I7~d in

• _*n~r,-tfA 1 fl(,FRFO_34n c.rimninn (R201 4-fl9-2.9-O11 Part I1.Activity a Change to the Emergency Plan? lMYES El NO Does the activity constitute a change to the Emergency Plan? Continue to next Enter justification and Justification: part complete Part V, Emergency Planning Table 7.3 in the PPL Susquehanna, LLC, Emergency Plan Rev 55 (E- Element / Function Plan) describes the Protective Action Recommendations the SSES are Screen.

issuing to the State of PA after a General Emergency is declared. The change described in Part I proposes a new PAR scheme based on NUREG-0564, Supplement 3. Therefore this represents a change to the E-Plan.

Part Ill. Activity Previously Reviewed? E]YES U NO Is this activity fully bounded by an NRC approved 10 CFR 50.90 submittal 10 CFR 50.54(q) Continue to next part Evaluation is NOT or Alert and Notification System Design Report (44 CFR 350.14)? required. Enter justification and If YES, identify bounding source document number/approval reference complete Part VI.

and ensure the basis for concluding the source document fully bounds the proposed change is documented below:

Justification:

El Bounding document attached (optional)

Part IV. Editorial Change EIJYES NO Is this activity an editorial or typographical change such as formatting, paragraph 10 CFR 50.54(q) Continue to numbering, spelling, or punctuation that does not change intent? Evaluation is NOT next part required. Enter justification and com lete Part VI.

Justification:

Part V. Emergency Planning Element/Function Screen (Associated 10 CFR 50.47(b) planning standard function identified in brackets.) If this activity affects any of the following, including program elements from NUREG-0654/FEMA REP-1 Section II,then place a check in the appropriate box.

1. Responsibility for emergency response is assigned. [1] []

2. The response organization has the staff to respond and to augment staff on a continuing basis (24/7 El staffing) in accordance with the Emergency Plan. [1]

3. The process ensures that on shift emergency response responsibilities are staffed and assigned. [2] [L Electronic Form EP-102-1, Rev. 1, Page 1 of 3

4. The process for timely augmentation of onshift staff is established and maintained. [21 El

5. Arrangements for requesting and using off site assistance have been made. [3] El

6. State and local staff can be accommodated at the EOF in accordance with the Emergency Plan. [3] LI

7. A standard scheme of emergency classification and action levels is in use. [4] LI

8. Procedures for notification of State and local governmental agencies are capable of alerting them of El the declared emergency within 15 minutes after declaration of an emergency and providing follow-up notifications. [5]

Electronic Form EP-102-1, Rev. 1, Page 2 of 3

Attachment A, 10CFR50.54q Screening Form, Continued Part V. Emergency Planning Element/Function Screen (cont.) (Associated 10 CFR 50.47(b) planning standard identified in brackets.) If this activity affects any of the following, including program elements from NUREG-0654/FEMA REP-1 Section II, then place a check in the appropriate box.

9. Administrative and physical means have been established for alerting and providing prompt LI instructions to the public within the plume exposure pathway. [5]

10. The public ANS meets the design requirements of FEMA-REP-1 0, Guide for Evaluation of Alert and []

Notification Systems for Nuclear Power Plants, or complies with the licensee's FEMA-approved ANS design report and supporting FEMA approval letter. [5]

11. Systems are established for prompt communication among principal emergency response El organizations. [61

12. Systems are established for prompt communication to emergency response personnel. [6] El

13. Emergency preparedness information is made available to the public on a periodic basis within the LI plume exposure pathway Emergency Planning Zone (EPZ). [7]

14. Coordinated dissemination of public information during emergencies is established. [7] El

15. Adequate facilities are maintained to support emergency response. [8]

16. Adequate equipment is maintained to support emergency response. [8] El

17. Methods, systems, and equipment for assessment of radioactive releases are in use. [9] El

18. A range of public PARs is available for implementation during emergencies. [10] 10

19. Evacuation time estimates for the population located in the plume exposure pathway EPZ are 10 available to support the formulation of PARs and have been provided to State and local governmental authorities. [10]

20. A range of protective actions is available for plant emergency workers during emergencies, including El those for hostile action events.[1 01

21. The resources for controlling radiological exposures for emergency workers are established. [11] El

22. Arrangements are made for medical services for contaminated, injured individuals. [12] E]

23. Plans for recovery and reentry are developed. [13] El

24. A drill and exercise program (including radiological, medical, health physics and other program areas) El is established. [14]

25. Drills, exercises, and training evolutions that provide performance opportunities to develop, maintain, El and demonstrate key skills are assessed via a formal critique process in order to identify weaknesses.

[141

26. Identified weaknesses are corrected. [14] El

27. Training is provided to emergency responders. [15]

28. Responsibility for Emergency Plan development and review is established. [16] El

29. Planners responsible for Emergency Plan development and maintenance are properly trained. [16] El APPLICABILITY CONCLUSION El Ifno Part V criteria are checked, a 10 CFR 50.54(q) Evaluation is NOT required; complete Part VI.

Z Ifany Part V criteria are checked, complete Part VI and perform a 10 CFR 50.54(q) Evaluation.

Part VI. Signatures: _

Adrian Miron . 41 ............... 10/09/14 Preparer Name (Print) Preparer Signature Date Reviewer Name (Print) *ev0 er Sig tu'.i.6 V

Electronic Form EP-102-1, Rev. 1, Page 3 of 3

Attachment 1 Summarized Changes to Procedures

1. EP-RM-005 Modified as a result of implementing Multi-Source, Multi-Unit Menu in MIDAS-NU Added description of Page 2 of MIDAS summary report as a result of MIDAS-NU code changes to report sectors and distances where PAGs were exceeded in Section P. [Due to PAR changes]

Performed other editorial and clarification changes.

2. EP-PS-001 2.1 Reviewed and updated Attachment S, EOF Dose Assessment Flowchart, as a result of adding Multi-user, Multi-unit menu in MIDAS-NU

- Removed Pg. 3 and added in the first box in the first page "Dose & Dose Rates EAL criteria: see RG1, RS1, RA1, RA2, RA3, RUl, RU2, CS5, MU7, EU1, CU6 EALs" to direct the user to EP-RM-004 procedure where the EAL criteria are located (AR-2014-26942) and eliminate the need for Notes 2, 3, 4 and 5. Consolidated information on Page 1 and 2 as described below.

- Removed the first two paragraphs from the first box in the first page and added release in progress criteria from Note 1 in the second page. Set default ratios for filtered release in the "Forward Calculation MIDAS Menu A" box.

- On Page 1, Removed connection from "> RMS or Field Team Triggers" decision box to "MIDAS B-W Back Calculation" box and replaced it with connection from "> RMS or Field Team Triggers" decision box to before "For Field Dose Rates > Threshold values" box because a Back calculation should be the last resort for dose assessment, per industry benchmarking. Following this change, the user is directed to compare field dose rates with a Valid Dose assessment from a Forward calculation instead of performing a Back calculation (AR-2014-15160, AR-2014-23153, DI-2014-19769). In alignment with Attachment FF, MIDAS Field to Projection Measurement Comparison, the main purpose for comparing field to projected dose rates is to is to identify an unmonitored or unfiltered release path and Back calculations are to be performed only when field to projected ratios exceed I or when there are no other valid information to perform other MIDAS menu calculations.

On page 1, removed "Sum Results as appropriate" box On page 1, changed text in the box from "when there are two significant release pathways (filtered from SBGT vent AND unfiltered from one or both TB vents) sum the TB unfiltered vent release and perform both paths below" to "when there are two.

significant release pathways (ex. filtered from SBGT vent AND unfiltered from one or both TB vents) use Multiple Accident Run option to perform both paths below" to accommodate Multi-user, Multi-unit menu in MIDAS-NU.

On page 1, removed box to approve ESR form since the communication with DEP/BRP is not made through this form. Added "Inform DEP/BRP of EAL and PAR changes" to the previous box.

On page 2, removed all paths following "Filtered Design Basis Leakage Release?"

decision box since it is already covered on the middle section under the "If Exceeded Triggers for ..." box.

Delete path underneath "Return to Page 1" Terminator box in page 2 since it is covered on Page 1.

On page 2 removed "CHRR > 7 R/h or" from the Default Accident Triggers criteria since this value corresponds to a coolant leak in primary containment with no fuel cladding damage and the Default calculation needs fuel cladding damage information.

Added "and fuel cladding damage as indicated by Engineering" under Default Accident Triggers.

Consolidated Blowout Panel and Multi-unit, Multi-source Triggers into the upper right hand side box on page 2.

Added "Multi-unit, Multi-source Releases" box on page 2.

2.2 Reviewed and updated Attachment AA, TSC Dose Assessment Flowchart, as a result of adding Multi-user, Multi-unit menu in MIDAS-NU:

Removed Pg. 2 and added in the first box in the first page "Dose & Dose Rates EAL criteria: see RGI, RSI, RAI, RA2, RA3, RUI, RU2, CS5, MU7, EUl, CU6 EALs" to direct the user to EP-RM-004 procedure where the EAL criteria are located (AR-2014-26942) and eliminate the need for Notes 2, 3, 4 and 5. Consolidated information on Page 1 as described below.

Removed the first two paragraphs from the first box in the first page and added release in progress criteria from Note 1 in the third page. Set default ratios for filtered release in the "Forward Calculation MIDAS Menu A" box.

On page 1, removed connection from "> RMS or Field Team Triggers" decision box to "MIDAS B-W Back Calculation" box and replaced it with connection from "> RMS or Field Team Triggers" decision box to before "For Field Dose Rates > Threshold values" box because a Back calculation should be the last resort for dose assessment, per industry benchmarking. Following this change, the user is directed to compare field dose rates with a Valid Dose assessment from a Forward calculation instead of performing a Back calculation (AR-2014-15160, AR-2014-23153, DI-2014-19769). In alignment with Attachment FF, MIDAS Field to Projection Measurement Comparison, the main purpose for comparing field to projected dose rates is to is to identify an unmonitored or unfiltered release path and Back calculations are to be performed only when field to projected ratios exceed I or when there are no other valid information to perform other MIDAS menu calculations.

- Removed "Sum Results as appropriate" box on the first page

On page 1, changed text in the box from "when there are two significant release pathways (filtered from SBGT vent AND unfiltered from one or both TB vents) sum the TB unfiltered vent release and perform both paths below" to "when there are two significant release pathways (ex. filtered from SBGT vent AND unfiltered from one or both TB vents) use Multiple Accident Run option to perform both paths below" to accommodate Multi-user, Multi-unit menu in MIDAS-NU.

- On page 1, removed box to approve ESR form since the communication with DEP/BRP is not made through this form. Added "Inform DEP/BRP of EAL and PAR changes" to the previous box.

2.3 Deleted last paragraph in Step I in Attachment FF, MIDAS Field to Projection Measurement Comparison, on default 6 hour6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> release for back calculation since MIDAS-NU can adjust the release duration for Back calculation. Adjusted the third sentence of second paragraph in Step I in Attachment FF, MIDAS Field to Projection Measurement Comparison, on default 6 hour6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> release for back calculation since MIDAS-NU can adjust the release duration for Back calculation.

2.4 Deleted Attachment E, Commentary on Filling Out the Event Status Report (Radiological) and Attachment W, Event Status Report (Radiological) per AR-2014-23319. Re-alphabetize all attachments per NDAP-QA-0008 procedure. (Note: RPC/DASU does not communicate with DEP/BRP through the ESR form per latest confirmation from DEP/BRP).

2.5 Changed Attachment MM, Protective Action Recommendation (PAR) Determination, in accordance with NUREG-0564, Supplement 3 and. NEI 12-10. [Due to PAR changes]

- Changed Controlled Containment Venting criteria to align with more conservative EP-DS-004 procedure criteria until investigation by ACT-01-CR-2014-29678 is completed.

[Due to PAR changes]

2.6 Changed Attachment NN, Protective Action Recommendation State Notification Form, in accordance with NUREG-0564, Supplement 3 and NEI 12-10. [Due to PAR changes]

2.7 Included directions to obtain Met data from Control Room Panels if PSS is unavailable in Attachment EE, Met/Vent Data Acquisition Options (AR-2014-28318)

3. EP-PS-130 3.1 Added EP-RM-004 as Performance Reference.

3.2 Added "TSC Dose Assessment Flowchart" to step 5.2.6.

3.3 Modified Steps 5.2.6.b, 5.2.8 and 5.2.10 to align with EP-PS-001, Attachment S, TSC Dose Assessment Flowchart and all other EP-PS dose assessment procedures 3.4 Modified Step 5.2.9 to align with similar step in EP-PS-104 procedure.

3.5 Modified Note before Step 5.2.2 and added information on PSS data unavailability (AR-2014-29130).

3.6 Marked Section 5.3 as Reference Use since it is associated with dose assessment function.

3.7 Updated Section 6, Records.

3.8 Performed other editorial changes.

3.9 Aligned EP-PS-130-1 form with changes in procedure

4. EP-PS-105 4.1 Added EP-RM-004 as Performance Reference.

4.2 Modified Note before Step 5.2.2.a and added information on PSS data unavailability (AR-2014-29130).

4.3 Added "(White board in RP/ED area)" to PAR Determination in Step 5.1.5.

4.4 Deleted Note before Step 5.2.9.a and added information in the Note before Step 5.2.9.

4.5 Added "Wind changes" to Steps 5.4.1 and 5.5.1.

4.6 Modified Step 5.2.5 to align with EP-PS-001, Attachment S, TSC Dose Assessment Flowchart, and all EP-PS dose assessment procedures.

4.7 Added steps 5.2.4.a and 5.2.4.b to align with EP-PS-001, Attachment S, TSC Dose Assessment Flowchart, and EP-PS-244 procedure.

4.8 Removed conditional from Step 5.5.2.a and added conditional in Step 5.5.2.a(1) 4.9 Updated Section 6, Records 4.10 Modified Steps 5.2.7 and 5.2.9 and deleted Step 5.2.8 in accordance with the new SSES PAR scheme based on NUREG-0654, Supplement 3, and NEI 12-10 and associated MIDAS code changes. [Due to PAR changes]

4.11 Performed other editorial changes.

4.12 Aligned EP-PS-105-1 form with changes in procedure

5. EP-PS-104 5.1 Align step 5.3.2 with similar step in EP-PS-245 procedure. Added Steps 5.3.3 through 5.3.5 to align with similar steps in EP-PS-245 procedure.

5.2 Modified Note before Step 5.3.2.a and added information on PSS data unavailability (AR-2014-29130).

5.3 Modified Section 5.4 to align with similar section in EP-PS-245 procedure.

5.4 Modified Step 5.5.5 on communicating Classification changes to DEP/BRP through the ESR form (AR-2014-23319).

5.5 Deleted Step 5.7.4 on communicating PAR to DEP/BRP via ESR form (AR-2014-23319).

5.6 Deleted Step 5.7.5.b(1)(c) on communicating PAR to DEP/BRP via ESR form (AR-2014-23319). Added "and DEP/BRP" to Step 5.7.5.b(1)(b).

5.7 Deleted Section 5.8 on communicating with DEP/BRP via ESR form (AR-2014-23319). The procedure continues to ensure communication with DEP/BRP in Classification and PAR sections.

5.8 Modified Step 5.10.2 (current Step 5.9.2) to "TRANSFER communications with DEP/BRP" since communicating with DEP/BRP is not performed via ESR form (AR-2014-23319).

5.9 Deleted Event Status Report (ESR) form from Step 5.1.5 and Section 6 (AR-2014-23319).

5.10 Deleted Commentary on Filling Out Event Status Report (Radiological) from Step 5.1.5 (AR-2014-23319) 5.11 Phrase "or in support of EAL entries" was added to Step 5.2.2 (AR-2014-22062).

5.12 Added word "initial" in Step 5.7.2 to align with the new PAR process. [Due to PAR changes]

5.13 Modify Step 5.7.5 to align with similar steps to continue to evaluate PARs following the new PAR process. [Due to PAR changes]

5.14 Aligned EP-PS-104-1 form with changes in procedure

6. EP-PS-244 6.1 Added explanatory note before Step 5.3.1 to indicate that Forward calculation is the preferred valid calculations for dose assessment and redefined the valid calculation concept, per industry benchmarking.

6.2 Rewrote Step 5.3.8.b(1) to align it with Attachment S, EOF Dose Assessment Flowchart, in EP-PS-001 and EP-PS-245 procedure.

6.3 Adjusted note before Step 5.2.1.b to include reference to EP-RM-004, EAL Classification Bases. Added EP-RM-004 to Performance References.

6.4 Modified Note before Step 5.2.2 and added information on PSS data unavailability (AR-2014-29130).

6.5 Deleted Step 5.3.3.b since MIDAS currently has that that information in the Summary Report and file name, as specified by user.

6.6 Changed step 5.3.5 to add reference to EP-RM-004 for consulting the potential EAL changes and align with the changes in EP-PS-001, Attachment S, EOF Dose Assessment Flowchart.

6.7 Rewrote Steps 5.3.9.d and 5.3.9.e into current Step 5.3.9.c to align with EP-PS-001, Attachment S, EOF Dose Assessment Flowchart 6.8 Rewrote Attachment C to account for MIDAS code changes and to align with EP-PSa001, Attachment S, EOF Dose Assessment Flowchart and changes in this procedure 6.9 Updated Section 6, Records.

6.10 Modified Steps 5.3.5 and 5.3.7 and deleted Step 5.3.6 in accordance with the new SSES PAR scheme based on NUREG-0654, Supplement 3, and NEI 12-10 and associated MIDAS code changes. [Due to PAR changes]

6.11 Deleted 5.3.9.b since PAR information are in the Summary Report (see Step 5.3.9.a) per MIDAS code changes[Due to PAR changes]

6.12 Aligned EP-PS-244-1 form with changes in procedure

7. EP-PS-245 7.1 Modified Note before Step 5.8.1.a and added information on PSS data unavailability (AR-2014-29130).

7.2 Deleted Step 5.8.1.a(3) since vent data is declared valid per step 5.8.5 and to align with EP-PS-104 procedure.

7.3 Added Steps 5.8.1a(1)(a) and 5.8.1a(1)(b) to align with EP-PS-104 procedure.

7.4 Added Step 5.8.1.b to align with EP-PS-104 procedure.

7.5 Added "or unfiltered release, until Chemistry sample or field team data are confirmed" in Step 5.8.1.d(6) (current 5.7.1.d.(6)) to align with EP-PS-104 procedure 7.6 Changed note before Step 5.8.4 to indicate that Forward calculation is the preferred valid calculations for dose assessment and redefined the valid calculation concept, per industry benchmarking, and to align with EP-PS-244.

7.7 Step 5.5.3;a(4)(a) was deleted since communication with DEP/BRP is not performed via ESR anymore (AR-2014-23319). Current Step 5.5.3.a(4) modified to "IF RM issues a PAR beyond 10 mile EPZ THEN ENSURE approved PAR is communicated to PIM, RPC and DEP/BRP."

7.8 Step 5.5.4.d(2) was deleted since communication with DEP/BRP is not performed via ESR anymore (AR-2014-23319). Step 5.5.4.d(3) (current 5.5.4.d(2)) was modified to "COMMUNICATE liquid PAR to PIM, RPC and DEP/BRP."

7.9 Deleted Commentary on Filling Out Event Status Report (Radiological) and Event Status Report (ESR) form from Step 5.1.7 since communication with DEP/BRP is not performed via ESR form any more (AR-2014-23319).

7.10 Added "(White Board in DA and EOF Command and Control areas)" following PAR Determination in Step 5.1.7 7.11 Deleted Section 5.6 on communicating with DEP/BRP via ESR (AR-2014-23319).

The procedure continues to ensure communication with DEP/BRP in Classification and PAR sections.

7.12 Deleted Step 1.2.2.a(1) on communicating on ESR form with DEP/BRP (AR-2014-23319). Modified Step 1.1.2.a(4) (current Step 1.1.2a(3) to "Works with DASU IIto ensure that queries from agencies are being answered, communicates with DEP/BRP and provides additional commentaries to the State and other agencies."

7.13 Deleted Step 5.3.2.d on communicating release in progress to DEP/BRP via ESR form (AR-2014-23319). Current Step 5.3.2.d includes communication of release in progress to PIM, RPC and DEP/BRP.

7.14 Deleted "and maintains alternate radiological signature authority on ESR" from Step 1.2.2.b(5) (AR-2014-23319) 7.15 Deleted "and Section 5.6, Communications with DEP/BRP" from Step 1.2.2f(2)

(AR-2014-23319).

7.16 Update section numbers in Step 1.2.2f(3) and 1.2.2f(1).

7.17 Deleted next to last bullet in Step 5.1.9 on communicating with DEP/BRP on ESR form (AR-2014-23319).

7.18 Changed Step 4.2.1 to "An emergency has been declared at SSES".

7.19 Step 5.5.2 modified to:

- Deleted Step 5.5.2.b(1) on communication to DEP/BRP for PAR and PAR changes via ESR form (AR-2014-23319). Step 5.5.2b(2) (current 5.5.2.b(1)) was modified to "COMMUNICATE approved PAR changes to PIM, RPC and DEP/BRP."

- Enhanced statement that, following GE declaration, both initial PAR and subsequent PARs need to be continuously evaluated; [Due to PAR changes]

7.20 Added Step 5.4.5 to align with similar step in EP-PS-104 procedure.

7.21 Step 5.5.3.a(1) was modified to align with the new PAR scheme and associated MIDAS code modifications [Due to PAR changes]

7.22 Step 5.5.3.a(3)(a) deleted since does not correspond to the new PAR scheme.

[Due to PAR changes]

7.23 Reference to PAR Determination flow chart was added to 5.5.5. [Due to PAR changes]

7.24 Performed other editorial changes 7.25 Aligned EP-PS-245-1 form with changes in procedure

8. EP-PS-242 (PEC) 8.1 Steps 5.2.1b(i), 5.2.1b(2) and 5.2.1b(3) were deleted since the communication with DEP/BRM is nor performed through ESR form any more (AR-2014-23319). These steps were replaced by Step 5.2.1b(i) "DISCUSS dose assessment results and release characteristics."

8.2 Deleted Commentary on Filling Out Event Status Report (Radiological) and Event Status Report (ESR) form from Step 5.1.5 since communication with DEP/BRP is not performed via ESR form any more (AR-2014-23319).

8.3 Changed Step 4.2.1 to "An emergency has been declared at SSES".

8.4 Deleted third bullet in Step 5.2.15.c(1); PAR is reviewed in Step 5.2.19 (redundant step) 8.5 Performed other editorial changes

Attachment B, 10CFR50.54q Evaluation Checklist Evaluation Number: E2014-10-29-01 Rev. 2 Screen Number: S2014-10-09-01 Part I. Description of Proposed Change:

PPL Susquehanna developed a new PAR scheme (see Attachment 1 in this document) in accordance with NUREG-0654, Supplement 3 and NEI 12-10 guidance. The new SSES PAR scheme is based on Evacuation Time Estimates (ETE) (see Appendix G of SSES Emergency Plan, Rev 55) and NEI 12-10, Appendix A (see Attachment 2 in this document) that was developed and agreed upon with Pa State representatives. The new PAR scheme affected the following code and procedure changes (see Attachment 3 for a detailed description of the procedure changes):

1. Changed MIDAS-NU code to report sectors and distances where Protective Action Guidelines (PAGs) (1000 mrem TEDE and 5000 mrem child Thyroid CDE) were exceeded.

2. EP-RM-005 (editorial)

3. EP-PS-001, Attachment MM, Protective Action Recommendation (PAR) Determination (Attachment 1 in this document)

4. EP-PS-001, Attachment NN, Protective Action Recommendation State Notification Form (Attachment 4 in this document)

5. EP-PS-101 (editorial)

6. EP-PS-104 (editorial)

7. EP-PS-105 (editorial)

8. EP-PS-200 (editorial)

9. EP-PS-244 (editorial)

10. EP-PS-245 (editorial)

11. EP-PS-307 (editorial)

ACT-01 -CR-2014-31605 that evaluated the changes to the SSES Emergency Plan, Rev 55 (E-Plan) as a result of implementing NUREG-0654, Supplement 3 (changes 1 through 4 above) showed that only Table 7.3 needs to be changed in the E-Plan. The following E-Plan changes are proposed and evaluated in this document for Table 7.3, First Row (A.1), Last Column:

"SSES will provide an initial PAR to the Senior State Official within 15 minutes from the declarationof a General Emergency as follows:

1. For a Rapidly ProgressingSevere Accident (RPSA):

a. Evacuate 2 mile radius;

b. Evacuate affected sectors 2-10 miles downwind.

2. Fora Hostile Action Based (HAB) GE event:

a. Shelter 5 mile radius.

Electronic Form EP-102-2, Rev. 1, Page 1 of 5

3. Forall other GeneralEmergencies:

a. Evacuate 2 mile radius;

b. Evacuate affected sectors 2-5 miles downwind.

3.1 When there is a Controlled Containment Venting of less than an hourAND a valid dose assessment projects doses less than 1000 mrem TEDE and less than 5000 mrem Adult Thyroid CDE at EPB AND the PAR is issuedby extended ERO (TSC or EOF):

a. Shelter 2 mile radius;

b. Shelter affected sectors 2-5 miles downwind.

Initial PAR shall also advise citizens to take KI in accordance with the state's emergency plan and advise remainderof the EPZ to monitor andprepare.

Continue assessment based on availableplant and field monitoring information and evaluate for subsequent PARs in accordance with:

1. Until RPSA conditions do not apply any more, ERO shall consider the following subsequent PARs based on dose assessment results or changes in wind direction affecting new sectors, if conditions exist which would require classification of a GeneralEmergency per EALs:

a. Evacuate additionalaffected sectors 2-10 miles downwind.

b. Evacuate all sectors where PAGs were exceeded or are expected to be exceeded.

2. Until HAB conditions do not apply any more, ERO shall consider the following subsequent PARs based on dose assessment results:

a. Evacuate 2 mile radius

b. Evacuate all sectors where PAGs were exceeded.

3. If RPSA or HAB conditions do not apply, or for all other General Emergencies,ERO shall consider the following subsequent PARs based on dose assessment results or changes in wind direction affecting new sectors, if conditions exist which would require classificationof a GeneralEmergencyper EALs:

a. Evacuate additionalaffected sectors 2-5 miles downwind.

b. Evacuate all sectors where PAGs were exceeded or are projected to be exceeded.

When there is a Controlled Containment Venting of less than an hour AND a valid dose assessment projects doses less than 1000 mrem TEDE and less than 5000 mrem Adult Thyroid CDE at EPB AND the PAR is issued by extended ERO (TSC or EOF):

a. Shelter additionalaffected sectors 2-5 miles downwind.

The PAR methodology described above complies with 10CFR5O.47(b)(10), Appendix E to Part50,Section IV Paragraph3 and NUREG-0654, Supplement 3, Rev 1."

In addition:

• The footnotes associated with First Row (A.1), Last Column were deleted.

• The last row (C) in Table 7.3 was deleted.

The changes proposed above are aligned with changes in EP-PS-001, Attachment MM, Protective Action Recommendation (PAR) Determination, and EP-PS-001, Attachment NN, Protective Action Recommendation State Notification Form, which were developed in accordance with NUREG-0654, Supplement 3 and NEI 12-10 guidance. The MIDAS-NU code changes were performed to enhance and support the SSES ERO to issue the initial and subsequent PARs.

The rest of the changes above (see Changes 5 through 11 in Part I) are editorial in nature and are not analyzed in this evaluation. They include addition of "initial" to the step in the procedure to perform the first PAR after GE or addition of steps in procedure to perform subsequent PARs.in accordance with EP-PS-001, Protective Action Recommendation (PAR) Determination chart.

Electronic Form EP-102-2, Rev. 1, Page 2 of 5

Part II. Review of Emergency Planning Functions, Elements, and Commitments affected by the Proposed Change and the Licensing Basis for those Functions, Elements, and Commitments:

10CFR50.47(b)(9) requires use of adequate methods, systems, and equipment for assessing and monitoring actual or potential offsite consequences of a radiological emergency condition. 10CFR50.47(b)(10) requires licensees to develop a range of Protective Actions for the plume exposure pathway EPZ for the emergency workers and public. 10CFR50.47(b)(15) requires licensees to ensure that radiological emergency response training is provided to Emergency Response Organization (ERO).

To comply with 10CFR50.47(b)(1 0), ACT-01 -CR-2014-31605 evaluated the changes to the SSES Emergency Plan, Rev 55 (E-Plan) as a result of implementing NUREG-0654, Supplement 3. The analysis showed that only Table 7.3 needs to be changed in the E-Plan. The proposed E-Plan changes for Table 7.3 are shown in Part I.

In addition, the following supporting procedures were changed to comply with 10CFR50.47(b)(10) and to implement NUREG-0654, Supplement 3: Protective Action Recommendation (PAR) Determination and Protective Action Recommendation State Notification Form in EP-PS-001 procedure.

To comply with 10CFR50.47(b)(1 0), Appendix E to Part 50,Section IV Paragraph 3, requires licensees to use NRC-approved ETE and updates to ETE in the formulation of PARs.

To comply with 10CFR50.47(b)(9), Section 5 (Emergency Conditions), Section 6 (Organizational Control of the Emergencies), Section 7 (Emergency Measures), and Appendix B (Wind Roses, Dose/Distance Plots, and Joint Frequency Distribution) in the E-Plan describe PPL Susquehanna, LLC's commitments with regards to dose assessment software / hardware. Section 5 shows that the results of the dose assessment calculations may be used to enter the Emergency Plan (reference Emergency Action Level RG1 and RS1). Section 7.1 (Assessment Actions for all Emergency Classifications) describes the various aspects of dose assessment.

Specifically in Section 7.1.1.3 (Dose Calculations for Airborne Releases) the E-Plan states that a dose calculation model is used to make current, site specific estimates and predictions of atmospheric effluent transport and diffusion during and immediately following an accidental airborne radioactivity release, for the purpose of providing an input to the assessment of the consequences of accidental radioactive releases to the atmosphere and to aid in the implementation of emergency response decisions. Emergency Plan Appendix B states that the dose/distance plots have been removed and reference use of MIDAS as the approved methodology/tool for determining the magnitude of and for continually assessing the impact of the release.

The responsibility for dose assessments resides in Chapter 6 and is reiterated in Chapter 7 of the E-Plan. The responsibility for dose assessment is not being changed by updating the MIDAS software / hardware.

As part of complying with 10CFR50.47(b)(1 5), Section 9.1.1.c and Table 9.1 in the E-Plan describe the need for specialized retraining for emergency personnel when there are changes in their responsibilities or methods.

In addition, applicable sections in RG 1.219 were also reviewed for compliance.

Besides changes in Table 7.3 of the E-Plan, the 10CFR50.54(q) screening S2014-10-09-01 indicated that 10CFR50.45(b)(9), 10CFR50.47(b)(1 0) and 10CFR50.47(b)(1 5) planning standards are potentially affected by the change described in Part I.

Electronic Form EP-102-2, Rev. 1, Page 3 of 5

Part Ill. Evaluation of the Proposed Change for Compliance with the requirements of 10 CFR 50.47(b) and 10 CFR 50 Appendix E:

10CFR50.47(b)(10) requires licensees to ensure that "A range of protective actions has been developed for the plume exposure pathway EPZ for emergency workers and the public. In developing this range of actions, considerationhas been given to evacuation, sheltering, and, as a supplement to these, the prophylactic use of potassium iodide (KI), as appropriate.Evacuation time estimates have been developed by applicants and licensees. Licensees shall update the evacuation time estimates on a periodicbasis. Guidelines for the choice of protective actions during an emergency, consistent with Federalguidance, are developed and in place, and protective actions for the ingestion exposure pathway EPZ appropriateto the locale have been developed" In addition, Appendix E to Part 50,Section IV Paragraph 3, requires licensees to "use NRC approved evacuation time estimates (ETEs) and updates to the ETEs in the formulation of protective action recommendations."

Protective Action Recommendation (PAR) Determination (Attachment 1in this evaluation) and Protective Action Recommendation State Notification Form (Attachment 4 in this evaluation) in EP-PS-001 procedure (see changes 3 and 4 in Part I) were changed based on the following documents:

- NUREG 0654, Supplement 3, Rev 1;

- NEI/NRG EPFAQ 2013-004;

- NEI 12-10, Rev 1;

- NEI 12-10, Rev 1, Attachment A for SSES, developed and agreed upon with Pa State representatives (Attachment 2 in this evaluation).

These changes were performed to comply with the requirements of 10CFR50.47(b)(10) and Appendix E to Part 50,Section IV, Paragraph 3.

10CFR50.47(b)(9) requires licensees to ensure that "adequatemethods, systems, and equipment for assessing and monitoring actualor potentialoffsite consequences of a radiologicalemergency condition are in use".

MIDAS-NU dose assessment code was enhanced to report sectors and distances where PAGs are exceeded in support of the implementation of the new PAR flowchart (see Change 1 in Part I). In addition, EP-RM-005, SSES MIDAS-NU User Manual, and several other procedures (EP-PS104, EP-PS-1 05, EP-PS-244 and EP-PS-245) were changed to reflect the new functionality of the code. The code and the procedure changes are enhancements to the dose assessment methodology and therefore, these changes maintain compliance with 10CFR50.47(b)(9).

10CFR50.47(b)(1 5) requires licensees to ensure that "Radiologicalemergency response trainingis provided to those who may be called on to assist in an emergency'. A training needs analysis was performed and training materials were developed to train the affected responders. The procedures will be issued after all training and remediation, if necessary, are completed. Therefore, by providing training on all these changes, SSES continues to comply with the requirements of 10CFR50.47(b)(1 5).

The following sections of RG 1.219 were also reviewed and the changes discussed in Part I do not conflict with the guidance in this document: Sections 1.2, 1.4, 3.6.d, 3.7.b, 4.5.f(2), 4.9.c(1)(a) and 4.10.

Electronic Form EP-102-2, Rev. 1, Page 4 of 5

Part IV. Evaluation of the Impact of the Proposed Change on the Effectiveness of Emergency Plan Functions:

As discussed in Parts I and Il1,Changes 1, 2 and 5 through 11 represent either enhancements to the current dose assessment methodology in support of implementing the new PAR flowchart or editorial changes to supporting procedures. Therefore, by implementing these changes the E-Plan effectiveness is expected to improve.

The deletion of the last row (C) in Table 7.3 was necessary to align the new PAR methodology developed in accordance with NUREG0654, Supplement 3, Rev 1, NEI 12-10 and the SSES and State of Pa agreed upon PAR basis (see Attachment 1, 2, and 4 in this document). For the airborne releases, the PARs in the last row in Table 7.3 is not aligned with the new PAR scheme (see Changes 3 and 4 described in Part I and Attachments 1 and 4 in this document), while the PARs in the last row in Table 7.3 is not appropriate. For liquid releases, the appropriate PAR for the SSES is providing to the offsite authorities is to divert the Danville drinking water supply from the Susquehanna river, if appropriate (see row B in Table 7.3 in E-Plan and Attachment 4 in this document). The footnotes associated with First Row (A.1), Last Column were deleted since they are no longer applicable to the new PAR methodology described in Part I of this evaluation.

Changes 3, 4 and the rest of E-Plan change (first row (A.1) and last column in Table 7.3) discussed in Parts I and III may represent a challenge to the ERO proficiency because they replace a few PARs and a relative simple 1-page PAR flowchart with multiple PARs, based on various plant condition, and a relatively more complex, 4-page PAR flowchart. However, the E-Plan effectiveness will not be affected by implementing these changes because:

- Although SSES is replacing a 1-page PAR flowchart with a 4-page PAR flowchart, the new flowchart is designed such that the user is at all times on only one page when assessing PARs.

- Every page in the new flowchart is comparable in complexity, if not simpler, than the current 1-page flowchart.

- Training for the key responders will provide the necessary knowledge to successfully implement the new PAR flowchart.

- Exercises and tabletops will further allow the key responders to gain necessary experience with the new PAR flowchart implementation.

Therefore, it is concluded that, by implementing Changes 3 and 4 discussed in Parts I and Ill, the E-Plan effectiveness is expected to remain the same.

Part V. Evaluation Conclusion Answer the following questions about the proposed change.

1. Does the proposed change comply with 10 CFR 50.47(b) and 10 EYES Fj NO CFR 50 Appendix E?

2. Does the proposed change maintain the effectiveness of the EYES [I NO Emergency Plan (i.e., no reduction in effectiveness)?

3. Does the proposed change constitute an emergency action level -IZYES 0 NO scheme change?

If questions 1 or 2 are answered NO, or question 3 answered YES, obtain prior NRC approval under provisions of 10 CFR 50.90. If questions 1 and 2 are answered YES, and question 3 answered NO, implement applicable change process(es). A Part VI. Signatures:

Adrian Miron 12/9/14 Preparer Name (Print) Preparer Date Signature Joe Meter QAi / b-Reviewer Name (Print) 7' V .viewer bignature bale Electronic Form EP-102-2, Rev. 1, Page 5 of 5

A ý iyý -ýýj I K- -

I Page 1 INITIAL PAR ONLY Table 1 Wind DirectiorFrom AlfectedSectors 350 Io 011o SSE / Set SSW 012 to 03 S1 SSWSW 35W to s seW ISWI WSW 0S7l to 1079' SWtWSWIW 080Q to 101* WSW/WtWNW 102 . to 124' WtWNWt NW 125' to 1146 WNWINWINNW 147- to 169- NW /NNW/N 17C0 to 191 NNWNINNNE 192o to 214- NNNE /NE 215- to 237' NNEI NEt ENE 236a to 2599 NE/ENEIE 260- tO 261' ENE/EIE/E 282' to 304' EIESE /SE 305' to 326' ESE/SEI SE 327- to 349' SE/SSEIS Protective Action Recommendation Tracking Mark Affected Areas and Current Wind Direction fromt E = Evacuate S = Shelter Clarifyilg Notes:

t. IF the conditions for a Rapidly Progressing Severe Accident (RPSA) cannot be itrmediately confirmed, THEN ANSWER No.

2. IF the State has informed SSES of impediments to evacuation, THEN

a. RECOMMEND Shelter instead of Evacuate for any affected area.

b. KEEP TRACK of initial PAR using the chart at right

c. When the State informs the impediment is removed, RECOMMEND Evacuation again, ifapplicable at that time (CONTINUE to Page 2 or 3 entry points AND DO NOT RETURN to this page)

I Page 2 All Other General Emergencies I

TableA Wind DirectionFro AffectedSectots 350' to 0110 SSEISISSW 012- to 0340 S I SSWISW 035- to 056o SSW/SW I WSW 0570 to 0790 SW I WSW /tW 0900 to 101- WSW IWIWNW 102* to 124' W/WNWINW 125- to 1460 0 WNWtNWINNW 1470 to 16S NW /NNWtN 1710 to 1910 NNWtNtNNE 192- to 214' N INNEINE 215- to 237° 1 Nt4 NEIENE 238' to 59 NE I ENE/E 2600 to 29 ENE10E I0 E 2829 to 3040 E I ESE I SE 3055 to 3265 ESE I SE I SSE 3270 to 349I SEISSEIS Protective Action Recommendation Tracking Mark Affected Areas and Current Wind Direction from E = Evacuate S = Shelter Clarifying Notes:

1. IF the state has informed SSES of impediments to evacuation, THEN:

a. RECOMMEND Shelter instead of Evacuate for any jewaly affected area

b. MAINTAIN sheltering for all currently sheltered areas.

c. DO NOT REDUCE any previously evacuated areasto shelter.

d. KEEP TRACK of PARs using the chart at right

e. When the State informs the impediment is removed, RECOMMEND Evacuation again, if applicable at that time

2. Validdose projeclions of GREATERTHANOR EQUAL TO 1000 mrem TEDE ORGREATER THANOR EQUALTO 5000 mrem 5000 mrem Child Thyroid CDE in any given sector in chart to the right

a. IF dose projections are exceeded at a distance beyond 10 mile EPZ, COLLABORATE with the State. VALIDATE results, ANDRECOMMEND Evacuation in any Sector where the PAGexceeded to nearest 5 mileincrement where dose projection is less than PAGs

I Page 3 Rapidly Progressing Severe Accident ONLY EntryPointsForlSusequent PARsForRPSA I

Conditions for RPSA (Note 1) Do Changes in wind direction affecting Dose Assessment Results for Actual new dowowind sectors Release Exceed or Are Projected to Table A

-'3 NOT apply may more (Table A) Exceed PAGs (Note 3) Wind Dnectiun Fero Atfected Sentors 350* to 0161 SEn/S/SSW

'1 503 S / SSW/SW 0350 to 1055 SSW nSW !WSW 057' to 079w SW I WSW I W 080c to 101' WSW/W/WNW 102' to 124' WtWNWI NW Do conditions currently exist 125' to 146' WNWiNWINNW EXtT to Page 2 which would require the 147' to 169' NW/NNWON

-- No f . " 170' to 191' NNW/NINNE DO NOT RETURN to this Page classification of a General 192' to 214' NINNE/NE S Emesrgen per the EALs? 215' to 237' NNE / NE IENE Yea 238' -o 259' NEIENEIE 260' to 281' ENE I EIESE 2a8' to 304* E i ESE ISE 305' to 326' ESc/rEI SSE 327' to 349' SEnSSE/S 1.Evacuate additional affected sectors 2- 10 miles downwind

-- (Table A)

Evacua te all sectors willere PAGs were exceeded or are expected to be ... eedd. (Note 3) Protective Action Recommendation Tracking Mark Affected Areas and Current Wind Direction from E = Evacuate S = Shelter CONTINUE to Evaluate Entry Conditions on this page.

Cltavttriyg Notes;

1. a. Loss ofPrmary Conlainment perthe EALs AND

b. CHRMGREATERTHAN40,000 Rmhr(this corresponds to approximately 20% fuelclad damage and leakage in primary containment)

OR AnyInitiatingCondition for EALRG1 have been met OR are projected to be met withinan hour

2. IF the state has informed you of impediments to evacuation, THEN:

a. RECOMMIEND Shelter instead of Evacuate for any neiwy affected area

b. MAINTAIN sheltering for all currently sheltered areas.

c. DO NOT REDUCE any previously evacuated areas to shelter.

d. KEEP TRACK of PARs using the chart at right

e. When the State informs the impediment is removed, IOECOMNIAtEND Evacuation again, if applicable at that time

3. Validdose projections of GREATERTHANOR EQUALTO 1000 mrem TEDE OR GREATER THANOR EQUALTO 5000 mrem 5000 mrem Child Thyroid CDE in any given sector in chart to tire right

a. IFdose projections are exceeded at a distance beyond 10 mileEPZ, COLLABORATE withthe State. VAUDATEresults, ANDRECOMMEND Evacuation in any Sector where the PAGexceeded tonearest 5 mile increment where dose projection is less than PAGs

Page 4 Hostile Action Accident ONLY EntryPoints ForSubssequent PARsFat HostileActionAccident Conditions SecurityofEvent Hostile GEAction (initialBased or / D Dose A Assessment Results for Actual EvedotGOT concurrint (tatl or Release Exceed or Are Projected to 4 concurremt EAT,) do NOT utsy any Exceed PAGs (Note 2)

(See Note 1)

1. Evacuste 2 mile radius

2. Evacuate all sectors wh ere PAGs were exceeded (Note 2)

Protective Action Recommendation Tracking Mark Affected Areas:

E = Evacuate S = Shelter CONTINUE to Evaluate Entry Conditions on this page.

REXIT t PageO 2 QONOTRETURN to thisPg Clarifyiug Notes:

I. IF the state hassinformed you of impediments to evacuation, THEN:

a. RECOMMEND Shelter instead of Evacuate for any newly affected area

b. MAINTAIN sheltering for all currently sheltered areas.

e. DO NOT REDUCE any previously evacuated areas to shelter.

d. KEEP TRACK of PARs using the chart at right

e. When the State informs the impediment is removed, RECOMMIEND Evacuation again, ifapplicable at that time

2. Validdose pmjections of GREATER THANOR EQUALTO1000 mrem TEDEORGREATER THANOR EQUALTO 5000 mrem 5000 mrem Child Thyroid CDE in any given sector in chart to the right

APPENDIX A - PAR STRATEOV DEVELOPMEM/EVALUATO (SSES)

(9/17/14)

.1 Developer Instruction This page provides a template for an approval chain process. Licensees may use another established approval process for this document, including those used for procedures or emergency plan review and approval.

V.

Approved: _Stan Davis____________ (Site EP Manager)

Approved: _DEP/BRI. (ORO)

Approved: _PIEMA (ORO)

Approved: (ORO)

A-1

Developer Instruction For the General Response Questions, the left column corresponds to Supplement 3 sections 2.1-2.7. The remainder of the questions refer to the logic diagram from Supplement 3 that is reproduced as Appendix C of this document. The right hand column of the table is for ORO/licensee use in developing the final site-specific PAR procedure requirements.

GENERAL RESPONSE QUESTIONS LICENSEE AND ORO RESPONSE 2.1: Development of Site-Specific Protective Action Recommendation and Decision Logic Question #1 Are OROs participating in the development Developere Instruction rn.Ls atcptn ofased the protective on Splmn action 7Ase recommendations Answer yes or no. List participating based onSupplement 3? OROs, or when OROs are not If yes, list participating OROs. Also participating in the PAR strategy include approval OROwhen this Appendix on the signaturesisguane development process, list documents cover sheet icl sheetwhenthisiAtprendis over onthobtained to develop the site-specific completed. guidance.___

If no, then list documents obtained from Yes. Pennsylvania Bureau of Radiation non-participating OROs used to develop Protection; the site-specific guidance. Pennsylvania Emergency Management Agency Date of Response: 4/23/14 2.1: Development of Site-Specific Protective Action Recommendation and Decision Logic Question #2 Will separate gutidance be developed for Developer Instruction on-shift and augmented ERO7 Answer yes or no. "N/A" may be used if appropriate. If separate guidance for If yes, describe the differences.

control room and augmented ERO are provided, then list the differences (e.g.,

"control room not required to implement second stage of staged evacuation," etc.)

and incorporate as applicable in the site-specific PAR procedure.

No, one set of PAR charts for all facilities.

Date of Response:_9/12/14 A

GENERAL RESPONSE QUESTIONS1 LICENSEE AND ORO RESPONSE 2.2: Notification of Protective Action Recommendations at a General Emergency Read and understand the element in N/A Supplement 3 - no new action is needed. Note: Section 2.2 in Supplement 3 states: "The GEW notification is expected to include a PAR."

SSES delivers PAR on a separate form.

2.3: Termination of Protective Actions Read and understand the element in N/A Supplement 3 - no new action is needed. Termination criteria included in SSES EP-000-003 procedure.

2.4: Precautionary Protective Actions at Site Area Emergency Do precautionary PARs prior to declaration Developer Instruction of a General Emergency currently exist in Answer yes or no. If PARs prior to the the licensee's Emergency Plan? General Emergency (e.g.,

recommendations to be provided at a If yes, describe how they will be addressed Site Area Emergency) are currently used, in the site-specific PAR procedure, describe how they will be addressed in If the answer is yes, incorporate the protective action strategy (e.g.,

approrifth ans

e. ry pises) in oathe sretained or not retained, etc.) and how appropriate entry point(s) in the site- they will be incorporated into the specific protective action strategy protective action strategy as applicable development PARs. tool for these precautionary (e.g., procedure note at SAE,, logic egroeuentatS gi diagram entry point, etc.). "N/A" may be used where there are no precautionary PARs prior to the General Emergency.

Incorporate appropriate information in the site-specific PAR procedure.

No. SSES only generates PARs after a General Emergency is declared.

Date of Response:9/112/14 A-3

GENERAL RESPONSE QUESTIONS LICENSEE AND ORO RESPONSE 2.5: Wind Persistence issues D

Developer Instruction Developer Instruction This question is related to Note 4 Provide answer. Provide reference to of the Supplement 3 Attachment wind persistence study as applicable.

(Note also provided in Appendix There is no intent to require licensees to C). conduct wind persistence studies to Does typical site meteorology include wind implement Supplement 3, No that is a time scale fdefault justification is required to stay within the directionthan shrterthan shorter the.on shifts sfth (ongatiescalat)

(longest) ETE for iT permissiveguidance. Thewind regarding guidance is persistence downwind 2-5 mile sectors? A wind issie regding w persisec direction shift as used here is defined as a issues not directive. Developers may shift that would impact another compass alsoUIESAR to to simply include chooseinformation, reviewreference of sector or emergency response planning historical National Weather Service area. (NWS) information or discussions with If yes, consider a wind persistence study. NWS representatives. Incorporate appropriate information in the site-specific PAR procedure.

SSES will propose to perform wind persistence studies in the next fiscal year. Meanwhile, SSES will develop the initial downwind PARs only for 3 Sectors as recommended in EPA-400 and allowed by NUREG-0654, Supplement 3. Based on the wind persistence study's conclusions, SSES would adjust the PAR procedure, if necessary.

Date of Response:_9/17/14

-A-4

L2.5: Size of Emergency Response Areas [

Developer Instruction Developer Instruction This question is related to Note 4 Provide answer. Provide technical of the Supplement 3 Attachment justification if an area larger than the 3 to (Note also provided in Appendix 4 22.5 degree compass sectors will be C). used to define the term "downwind." If a wind persistence study or some other method was used to determine the size of ERPAs are typically larger than the downwind compass sectors in a PAR and the downwind area, reference it in this may negate the need to expand the number column. The use of entire radii, such as of sectors recommended. For sites with "5 mile radius" or "10 mnile radius" to smaller ERPAs, this item may be relevant. define "downwind" is not acceptable.

Licensees should defer to the ORO strategy "N/A" may be used when the site-when performing the assessment for this specific use of "downwind" is the same as that found in Supplement 3.

area.

Incorporate appropriate information in the site-specific PAR procedure.

SSES recommends PARs in sector format ai nU does not use ERPAs.

Should an expanded description of t The initial downwind PAR for the site will be "downwind" be used (e.g., greater than 3 or based on 3 sectors until the Wind Persistence 4 22.5 degree compass sectors, including studies performed during next fiscal year direc all of the impacted emergency response otherwise.

planning areas)7 Date of Response: 9/17/14 If yes, provide justification.

If no, no additional action is needed.

2.6: Expansion of Initial Protective Action Recommendations tDeveloper Instruction N/A This item is related to Note 11 of the Supplement 3 Attachment (Note also provided in Appendix C).

Read and understand the element in "ipplement 3 and Appendix B of this

ýocument - no new action is needed.

A-5

GENERAL RESPONSE QUESTIONS LICENSEE AND ORO RESPONSE 2.7: Strategy for Rapidly Progressing Scenarios Developer Instruction Developer Instruction This item informs on Block B of Provide the site-specific definition for a Appendix C and Note 9 of the rapidly progressing severe accident and Supplement 3 Attachment (Note the basis for this definition. Incorporate also provided in Appendix C). appropriate information in the site-specific PAR procedure. The licensee-Define a rapidily progressing severe specific definition may he used to accident for your site. Refer to Supplement replace the term "rapidly progressing severe accident" as it is used in 3 Attachment, Appendix C).Nte 1 (Note also provded Supplement 3.

in I

Developer Instruction Rapidly Progressing Severe Accident is defined as.

Review NRC question EPFAQ one before 2013-004, proceeding2 1. This protective action recommendation is the first after a General Emergency has been declared i AND Developer Instruction The questions below assist with 2. There is loss of the containment barrier per the determining the site-specific Emergency Action Levels definition severe of a rapidly progressing accident. 3. AND EITHER of the following:

severe __accident._a.

Containment High Range Radiation Monitor is greater than 40,000 R/h*

A rapidly progressing severe accident may OR be defined as: b. Initiating Dose Projection Conditions for RGI (release of gaseous radioactivity

1. This protective action recommendation resulting in offsite dose greater than 1,000 is the first after a General Emergency mrem TEDE or 5,000 mrem child thyroid has been declared CDE at EPB) is projected in about an hour.

AND

2. There is loss of the containment barrier

• This value corresponds with a 20 % fuel clad per the Emergency Action Levels damage and a potential loss of Primary AND Containment Barrier

3. EITHER of the following:

a. Greater than or equal to Note 1: the 40,000 R/h CHRM reading needs to be Containment High Range Area revalidated or adjusted per the new EAL scheme Radiation Monitor Potential Loss based on NEI 99-01, Rev 6.

EAL Threshold (20% Clad Damage) Note 2: RGI may change to a different EAL OR designator when the new EAL scheme based on

b. A significant radiological release NET 99-01, Rev 6 is implemented at SSES.

A-6

GENERAL RESPONSE QUESTIONS LICENSEE AND ORO RESPONSE 2.7: Strategy for Rapidly Progressing Scenarios I (greater than PAGs at boundary) in

.about an hour (Initiating Condition >lote3 3: The. child thyroid CDE criteria may be.

AGI, Release of gaseous ,liniinated when the new EPA PAG Manual is radioactivity resulting in offsite pproved.

dose greater than 1,000 mrem TEDE or 5,000 mrem thyroid CDE' )ate of Response: 9117114 declared).

Notes:

o If the above criteriacannotbe immediately confirmed, assume a rapidlyprogressingsevere accident is not occurring.

o Licensees may choose to substitute a loss of core cooling with an identifiable instrumentationvalue such as greaterthan or equal to ContainmentHRA PotentialLoss EAL Threshold (20% Clad Damage.

Developer Instruction Extreme weather conditions or other impediments to evacuation do not need to be considered for development of the licensee's PAR strategy for rapidly progressing severe accidents.

A-7

Developer Instruction Refer to the logic diagram in Appdndix C to address the rest of the questions in this Appendix.

QUESTIONS REGARDING LICENSEE AND ORO RESPONSE SUPPLEMENT 3 PROTECTIVE ACTION STRATEGY DEVELOPMENT TOOL AND NOTES BLOCK A. General Emergency Declared Read and understand related element in N/A Supplement 3 - no new action is needed unless modifications of entry conditions are required based on the response to previous question for Suplement 3 Section 2.4.

BLOCK B. Rapidly Progressinlg Severe Accident I Refer to General Response Question 2.7, N/A Strategy for Rapidly Progressing Scenario.

Use the definition provided in the right hand column of Section 2.7 to replace the term "rapidly progressing severe accident" when the site-specific PAR procedure is developed.

BLOCK C. Continue Assessment As long as the impediment remains in place, NIA new plant or dose assessment conditions would not result in a different PAR unless conditions in Appendix B apply.

AR

QUESTIONS REGARDING LICENSEE AND ORO RESPONSE SUPPLEMENT 3 PROTECTIVE ACTION STRATEGY DEVELOPMENT TOOL AND NOTES BLOCKS D, E, and F. Impediments Question #1 (Evacuation Support)

Developer Instruction Developer Instruction Evacuation support not yet in Answer yes or no. If any answers are place - For example, the GE is the yes, list the time required to provide the initial notification to offsite evacuation support resources (time response organizations or if there period for the impediment) and the is a previous emergency "clock start" for this activity (NOUE, classification notification, the GE Alert, etc.) and incorporate in the site-notification occurs before specific PAR procedure.

preparations to support evacuation can be completed. Many sites have a low population density Developer Instruction within 2 miles and evacuation If the ORO identified time for evacuation support readiness may not be support preparations has elapsed because considered an impediment. the site was in prior declaration before the GE, an initial GE declaration is not Is "evacuation support in place" considered required to consider the impediment.

Incorporate this information as applicable impediment to evacuation for your site? in the site-specific PAR procedure.

No. The state did not want the utility to include Evacuation Support as part of the PAR Describe impediment (Block D):

process.

N/A since all answers in Question 1 are no.

Is such support needed for the 2 mile radius, 5 mile downwind sectors and 10 mile downwind Describe PAR (Block E):

sectors?

N/A since all answers in Question 1 are no.

No. The state did not want the utility to include Evacuation Support as part of the PAR Describe duration of the impediment (Block F):

process.

N/A since all answers in Question 1 are no..

How long should this impediment last?

Date of Response: 4/23/14 No. The state did not want the utility to include Evacuation Support as part of the PAR process.

all answers are no, no additional action is needed.

A-9

QUESTIONS REGARDING LICENSEE AND ORO RESPONSE SUPPLEMENT 3 PROTECTIVE ACTION STRATEGY DEVELOPMENT TOOL AND NOTES If yes, OROs define the duration of the "evacuation support in place" impediment and the emergency classification when mobilization of evacuation support (and the clock) would start. Provide the information obtained from OROs in the right hand column.

A-10

QUESTIONS REGARDING LICENSEE AND ORO RESPONSE SUPPLE11VNT 3 PROTECTIVE ACTION STRATEGY DEVELOPMENT TOOL AND NOTES BLOCKS D, E, and F. Impediments Question #2 (Hostile Action)

What is the best protective action rni-nlmn.nd;nnin wU1if- q dal-nrorl hnzfli.

action is occurring or has occurred? Do OB Developer Instruction Provide answers:

-3 a SIP or evacuation want the licensee to recommend SIP or o Duration (e.g., consult with your ORO evacuation for a hostile action event? How long should this impediment last? Note tha or Law Enforcement Agency (LEA) staged evacuation may still be appropriate i: on what should be included in the site evacuation is selected as the PAR. specific PAR procedure that informs when to no longer SIP).

Some examples of PARs that may be select Incorporate in the site-specific PAR for hostile action events are: procedure.

o SIP 0-2 mile radius and 2-5 miles downwind Describe hostile action as an impediment in the o Evacuate 0-2 mile radius and 2-5 site-specific PAR procedure (Block D):

miles downwind A hostile action event will result in a sheltering o SIP 0-2 mile radius and evacuate 2-5 PAR to 5 miles in all directions. This allows miles downwind the emergency responders free access to the site I PAR strategy determined during pre-planning from all directions during the hostile action meeting with ORO. event.

Specify the selected PAR for hostile action events in the Licensee and ORO Response It was decided not to use a key-hole approach

,column, for hostile actions since the downwind direction at the beginning could be any direction. This makes it harder for the responders to predict what areas within the 2 - 5 mile region will be in shelter and which will have members of the public roaming about. It also allows the OROs to implement a PAR without the need to upgrade it unless a significant release occurs resulting in dose to the.public exceeding the EPA PAGs.

Describe PAR (Block E):

The initial PAR for a hostile action is to shelter a 5 mile radius Describe duration of the impediment (Block F):

A-11

SUPPLEMENT 3 PROTECTIVE ACTION LICENSEE AND ORO RESPONSE QUESTIONS REGARDING STRATEGY DEVELOPMENT TOOL AND NOTES',

The shelter PAR will remain in place until:

o The State of Pa determines that the public no longer needs to shelter based on the plant conditions relative to the Hostile Action event.

o The event is terminated.

o The PAR can be subsequently changed to evacuate a 2 mile radius and all areas where the PAG's have been exceeded based on dose assessment results. This is done to provide a threshold where the protection of the public takes precedence over neutralizing the hostile action threat at the site.

Date of Response:_.4/23/14 A-12

• QUESTIONS REGARDING LICENSEE AND ORO RESPONSE SUPPLEMENT 3 PROTECTIVE ACTION STRATEGY DEVELOPMENT TOOL AND NOTES BLOCKS D, E, and F. Impediments Question #3 (Other)

Developer Instruction Developer Instruction

-I "Other" impediments for licensee Provide answers. Define all the consideration should be limited as much conditions that apply, the required PAR as possible. Consideration should be and describe the duration of the limited to weather-related impediments. impediment. Incorporate information as applicable in the site-specific PAR procedure.

OROs may determine whether or not the licensee needs to be involved in weather-If no "other" impediments are to be related determinations. This determination is considered, "N/A" may be placed in this made in advance during this assessment and column.

not at the time of an event. During an event, licensees need only consider this contingency if they have been informed of impediments Describe impediment (Block D):

(e.g., highways closed by governor's order).

Impediments to evacuation other than Hostile What weather-related or additional Action events (see BLOCKS D, E, and F.

impediments to evacuation should be Impediments Question #2) and Containment considered by the licensee and the ORO? How Venting (see BLOCKS D, E, and F.

long should this impediment last? Impediments Question # 4) will be determined solely by the OROs (PEMA or DEP/BRP) and If other impediments are to be considered, not by SSES. At this time, the State of PA has define the conditions in the right hand column. indicated that impediments will be for large area issues such as adverse weather. As such, If no "other" impediments are to be when informed by the OROs that impediments considered, no additional action is needed. to evacuation exist; the impediments will be.

implemented across the entire EPZ and not just Note: Impediments are intended to represent a portion of the EPZ. SSES will implement the inabilityto evacuate a largeportion of the impediments other than the ones listed above populationof a given area vs. an individual only if the OROs inform the utility that such roadblockage. impediments exist. SSES will not be required to seek out the information or make the Note: The considerationfor impediment determination than other impediments exist.

questions 1, 2 and 3 above may collapse into one simple guidance statementfor the Control Describe PAR (Block B):

Room after consulting the OROs during PAR

--ategy development (e.g,. SIP 0-2 mile Ifthe State of PA indicates that impediments radiusand 2-5 miles downwind if a general exist, SSES will change any area that is emergency declaredwithin 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> of initial ndicated as Evacuate to Shelter in their PARs.

A-13

LICENSEE AND ORO RESPONSE SUPPLENMENT 3 PROTECTIVE ACTION STRATEGY QUESTIONSDEVELOPMENT REGARDING TOOL AND NOTES classification, a Hostile Action Event is This applies for any new PARs once the utility occurring,or [specific road]is closed by the is informed by the OROs. Any existing PARs State). will remain as previously provided to the OROs.

These examples are contingent upon thb ORO decision and could be temoved if so agreed. Describe duration of the impediment (Block F):

Impediments to evacuation other than a hostile action event or a containment venting at SSES will last until the OROs make the determination that such impediments no longer exist. Per Supplement 3, Page A-5 Note 8, Bullet 3:

"Licensees have no responsibility for PAR modification unless a PAR change is necessauy because of Plant conditions or radiological assessment. OROs determine when it is safe for the public to evacuate."

Date of Response: 4/23/14 I

A-14

QUESTIONS REGARDING LICENSEE AND ORO RESPONSE SUPPLEMENT 3 PROTECTIVE ACTION STRATEGY DEVELOPMENT TOOL AND NOTES BLOCKS D, E, and F. Question #4 (Short Term Release) 1 ~i-1 Developer Instruction Developer Instruction Review NRC EPFAQ 2013-004, question Define likely sources of short term two before proceeding. releases.

It is recommended that controlled venting Note: Short termn release considerationsapply from containment be identified as a short only to the augmentedERO and not to the term release if it is considered a mitigative control room strategy.

strategy for your reactor type.

Licensee may wish to consider controlled A PAR of SIP 2-mile radius and 5 miles venting as a short term release scenario.

downwind, all others monitor and prepare should be recommended for short term releases.

Describe venting strategy if used (Block D):

The SSES methodology uses the following standard for a short term release.

o The release is via a Controlled direct containment vent with a duration < 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> o Valid dose projections > 500 mrem TEDE and < 5000 mrem TEDE and < 5000 mrem Adult CDE Thyroid at EPB*

These values may change to align with urrent SSES EIOPs. In addition, in onsultation with the State of Pa, the thyroid 2DE criteria may be eliminated when. the new

,PA PAG Manual is approved.

'hese conditions must also be the first PAR fter the declaration of a General Emergency Luce evacuation may afready be implemented ae to previously issued PAR's.

these conditions are met then the preferred A-15

QUESTIONS REGARDING LICENSEE AND ORO RESPONSE SUPPLEM1INT 3 PROTECTIVE ACTION STRATEGY DEVELOPMENT TOOL AND NOTESI option is to shelter versus evacuation.

A controlled direct containment vent of the primary containment would have to result in the initial declaration of a General Emergency and the initial PAR otherwise another PAR would have been issued which may include evacuations that are already in progress.

Using criteria in NIJREG-0654, Supplement 3, since this must be the initial PAR, the first criteria to be evaluated would be for a Rapidly Progressing Severe Accident (RPSA). See criteria for a RPSA (Question 2.7: Strategy for Rapidly Progressing Scenarios).

Meeting the EAL RG1 Threshold for dose assessment would be controlling since the sheltering criteria for the controlled direct containment vent established with the State of Pa are that the PAGs have not been exceeded.

If the PAG's are not exceeded, then the need to shelter or evacuate would depend on the length of the expected controlled containment venting, which must be less than 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> in duration.

Another set of criteria is related to a hostile action event. Since the Hostile Action PAR is to shelter a 5 mile radius, individuals downwind would already be in the same configuration as would be set for a short term release.

Based on this evaluation, The controlled containment venting sheltering considerations would only be applicable to a non-RPSA event and only if the release is expected to last less than 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />.

Describe PAR (Block E):

SIP 2-mile radius and 5 miles downwind A 1i4

QUESTIONS REGARDING LICENSEE AND ORO RESPONSE SUPPLEMENT 3 PROTECTIVE ACTION STRATEGY DEVELOPMENT TOOL AND NOTES Describe duration of the impediment (Block F):

Approximately 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />.

Date of Response: 9/17/14 A-17

QUESTIONS REGARDING LICENSEE AND ORO RESPONSE SUPPLEMENT 3 PROTECTIVE ACTION STRATEGY DEVELOPMENT TOOL AND NOTES BLOCK G., Rapidly Progressing Severe Accident PARs Question #1 (ETE for full EPZ)

Will the PARs for a rapidly progressing severe accident be different than those identified in Supplement 3 Attachment Not S9 Developer Instruction If applicable, provide answer with (Note also provided in Appendix C)?

justification as necessary and incorporate appropriate information in the site-If yes, provide justification.

specific PAR procedure.

Using the ETE for the site, determine the 9(

percent ETE value for the full EPZ and recc)rd See evaluation on the left side.

it below:

Specify the 0-2 mile PAR:

90% ETE full EPZ: 2:20*

• Note that the larger of 2 values were used to Evacuate obtain the 90% ETE value used for the comparison. TheNUREG-0654, Supplemei it Specify the 2- 10 mile downwind PAR:

3, guidance does not provide instructions foi which ETE scenario to use for this Evacuate determination. The SSES ETE report, Table 7.1 has several scenarios for different times )f Date of Response: 9115/14 the year, week, day time and weather conditions. The worst conditions were not used because it would be inappropriate to bas;a an entire PAR process on conditions that occur for a minor portion of the year.

The 90% SSES ETE value is being compared to the table in section 2.7 of NUREG-0654, Supplement 3. That table was developed based on studies performed by the NRC.

Within this regulation, it states:

"The analysisderived the travel speedsfrom currentestimatesfor evacuating90 percent of the generalpublic under normal weekday conditions" 4s such, the Summer, Midweek, Midday, lood Weather AND Winter, Midweek, Midday, Good Weather scenarios, as defined in SSES ETE report in Table 7.1, were used.

A-19R

QUESTIONS REGARDING LICENSEE AND ORO RESPONSE SUPPLEMENT 3 PROTECTIVE ACTION STRATEGY DEVELOPMENT TOOL AND NOTES These conditions are going to be most typical of conditions during an event and avoid making general PAR processes on less frequent events or conditions.

Is the 90% ETE for the full EPZ less than 3 hours3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br />?

Yes. The ETh values used are as follows:

Summer / Midweek / Midday / Good Weather:

2:20 Winter I Midweek / Midday / Good Weather:

2:20 If yes, than the PAR is to evacuate 2 mile radius and 2 to 10 miles down wind.

If no, proceed to :

BLOCK G. Rapidly Progressing Severe Accident PARs Question #2 (0-2 mile radius PAR)

BLOCK G. Rapidly Progressing Severe Accident PARs Question #2 (0-2 mile radius PAR)

Will the PARs for a rapidly progressing Developer Instruction severe accident be different than those Provide answer with justification as identified in Supplement 3 Attachment Note 9 necessary and incorporate appropriate (Note also provided in Appendix C)? information in the site-specific PAR No. See the write up in Block G Rapidly procedure.

Progressing Severe Accident PAR's Question 1 for the selected scenarios from the SSES See evaluation on the left side.

ETEs.

Specify the 0-2 mile PAR:

See RPSA Question 1. Because 90% of the tire EPZ can be evacuated in <3 hours this Evacuate questions is N/A Date of Response: 9/1 5/14.

A-19

QUESTIONS REGARDING LICENSEE AND ORO RESPONSE SUPPLEMEENT 3 PROTECTIVE ACTION STRATEGY DEVELOPMENT

'TOOL AND NOTES If yes, provide justification. Use the worksheet below to determine PAR:

Supplement 3 Process Worksheet:

0-2 miles Using the ETE for the site, determine the 90 percent ETE value for the 0-2 mile area.

When considering day and night, select the largest value (V) in each time slot. Consider the weekday and weekend values together.

Select the largest of the day and night values.

0-2 miles: Day Night_

Is V <= 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />?

, If yes, evacuate 0 - 2 miles.

Is V > 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />?

o If yes, SIP 0 - 2 miles then evacuate 0 - 2 miles when "safer to do so". (Refer to BLOCK J)

- A-20

QUESTIONS REGARDING LJICENSJEE AND ORO RESPONSE SUPPLEMIENT 3 PROTECTIVE ACTION STRATEGY DEVELOPMENT TOOL AND NOTES BLOCK G. Rapidly Progressing Severe Accident PARs Question #3 (2-5 miles downwind PAR)

IDeveloper Instruction Developer Instruction Provide answer with justification using Review NRC EPFAQ 2013-004, Worksheet 1, Appendix D as necessary.

question three before proceeding. See evaluation on the left side.

Will the PARs for a rapidly progressing severe Specify the 2 - 5 mile down wind PARs:

accident be different than those identified in Supplement 3 Attachment Note 9 (Notes also Evacuate. N/A. See RPSA Question 1.

provided in Appendix C)?

Date of Response: 9/15/14 No. See RPSA Question 1. Because 90% of the entire EPZ can be evacuated in <3 hours this questions is N/A If yes, provide justification.

If no, use Worksheet 1 in Appendix D, Supplemental Worksheets, to determine appropriate PARs.

A-21

F QUESTIONS REGARDING LICENSEE AND ORO RESPONSE SUPPLEMENT 3 PROTECTIVE ACTION STRATEGY DEVELOPMENT TOOL AND NOTES BLOCK G. Rapidly ProgressingSevere Accident PAR Question #4 (5-10 miles downwind PAR)

Developer Instruction Developer Instruction For a rapidly progressing severe accident Incorporate a SIP PAR for the 5-10 mile Supplement 3 Attachment Note 9 (Note sectors for a rapidly progressing severe also provided in Appendix C) requires a accident in the site-specific PAR PAR of SIP for the 5-10 downwind procedure.

sectors..3 See RPSA Question 1. Because 90% of the N/A entire EPZ can be evacuated in <3 hours this questions is N/A Date of Response:_9115/14 BLOCK G. Rapidly Progressing Severe Accident PARs Question #4 (Impediments)

Developer Instruction Developer Instruction Read and understand Supplement Answer yes or no.

3 Attachment Note 9 (Note also provided in Appendix C) for a List the impediments and durations as discussion of impediments necessary. No justification is necessary (extreme weather conditions, when determining that impediments will paragraph 8) during a rapidly not be considered for rapidly progressing progressing severe accident. severe accidents.

WIncorporate appropriate information in the Will impedim ents be considered? st -p cfcP site-specific PARRpprocedure.

o e ue If yes, describe the impediments and their durations in right hand column. Impediments to be considered:

If no, no additional action is needed. No. SSES will not consider any impediments other than Hostile Action and containment venting as part of their PAR process. In addition, the State of Pa did not want the utility to include Evacuation Support as impediment.

A-9.2

QUESTIONS REGARDING LICENSEE AND ORO RESPONSE SUPPLEMENT 3 PROTECTIVE ACTION STRATEGY DEVELOPMENT TOOL AND NOTES If State informs utility of other impediments, SSES will convert Evacuation into SIP and evacuation is to be recommended again, if applicable, after impediment is removed.

Modified 0- 2 mile PAR: N/A, see above Modified 2 - 5 mile downwind PAR: N/A, see above Date of Response: 9/17/14 A-23

QUESTIONS REGARDING LICENSEE AND ORG RESPONSE SUPPLEMENT 3 PROTECTIVE ACTION STRATEGY DEVELOPMENT TOOL AND NOTES BLOCKS HI and M PARs Developer Instruction Developer Instruction Read and understand ETEs for 0- Complete Worksheet 2, Appendix D.

2 mile radius and 2-5 mile downwind and discuss with If the staged evacuation process as O

OROs. described in Supplement 3 will be used, provide the staged evacuation process in

..Dthe site-specific PAR procedure.

,Developer Instruction Review NRC EPFAQ 2013-004, If staged evacuation will not be used, question four before proceeding. provide the appropriate PARs in the site specific PAR procedure.

Complete Worksheet 2, Appendix D to determine applicability of staged evacuation.

Worksheet 2 was completed and is included within this document.

Staged evacuation is NOT recommended and will NOT be included in the PAR process. This is also in complete agreement with the SSES ETE study.

Date of Response:_9/15/14 A IA

QUESTIONS REGARDING I LICENSEE AND ORO RESPONSE 1 SUPPLEMENT 3 PROTECTIVE ACTION STRATEGY DEVELOPMENT TOOL AND NOTES BLOCKS I and K. GE Conditions Remain iti I Developer Instruction Developer Instruction Read and understand Supplement Using the considerations contained in 3 Attachment Note 6 (Note also Supplement 3 Attachment Note 6 (Note provided in AppendLx C). This also provided in Appendix C), provide note refers to completion of the site-specific information to explain the initial staged evacuation. This terin "GE conditions remain" and means completion of the first 11 incorporate in the site-specific PAR phase of the staged evacuation of procedure.

the 2-mile radius (e.g., time to evacuate 90% of the population). If not using staged evacuation (refer to questions for BLOCKs H and M), the term "GE Conditions remain" is not Note: The current GE condition could be required to be used. This block is not reached through an EAL that was not the applicable and "N/A" may be placed in cause of the initial GE declaration,(e.g.,

this column.

coolantlevel at TAF was the basisfor the initialGE and level is restored,but now the high range containmentmonitor is indicating Staged evacuation is NOT used and therefore, this

/

a level thatcorrespondsto a GE condition.) block is N/A.

Date of Response: 9115114 A _9 I

I I

QUESTIONS REGARDING LICENSEE AND ORO RESPONSE SUPPLEMENT 3 PROTECTIVE ACTION STRATEGY DEVELOPMENT TOOL AND NOTES BLOCK J. When "Safer to do so" Developer Instruction I)eveloper Instruction When the augmented ERO is staffed, oeview NRC EPFAQ 2013-004, evacuation should be considered if the tuestion five before proceeding. release has significantly decreased, assess 1*

the radiological conditions offsite, and (1) if the 0-2 mile radius was sheltered in Developer Instruction place, determine if the 0-2 -mileradius

1. If using separate site-specific should remain sheltered in place or be PAR logic for the control evacuated; (2) if the 2-5 mile zones were room (e.g., a procedure or sheltered in place, determine if they flow chart), the instructions should iemain sheltered in place or be for a rapidly progressing evacuated; (3) determine if the 5-10 mile severe accident for the control downwind sectors should be evacuated.

room end at Block G.

Z. It is "Safer to do so" when the Develop guidance to aid the assessment of augmented Emergency radiological conditions for the site and Response Organization (ERO) provide the guidance in the Licensee and is staffed for both the licensee ORO Response column.

and OROs. No further protective actions are initiated Incorporate the guidance in the site-by the control room (except specific PAR procedure.

for a wind shift) until the augmented ERO is present to evaluate conditions and Because SSES's time to evacuate the entire EPZ is less than 3 hours3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> (see Question 1,Block perform assessments.

G), the initial and all subsequent PARs will be to evacuate. The considerations of "Safer to do so" do not apply for SSES.

Date of Response:. 9/15/14 A-26

QUESTIONS REGARDING I LICENSEE AND ORO RESPONSE SUPPLEMENT 3 PROTECTIVE ACTION STRATEGY DEVELOPMENT TOOL AND NOTES BLOCK L.. Expand PAR Only to Areas Where PAGs Could be Exceeded Read and understand the element in Developer Instruction Supplement 3 ahd the guidance in Appendix B Incorporate appropriate information in the of this document. site-specific PAR procedure.

PARs will be expanded based on dose assessment results exceeding the EPA PAGs for those sectors/areas, including beyond 10 mile EPZ PARs.

BLOCK N. Continue Assessment Read and understand the element in D veloper Instruction Supplement 3, Attachment Note 11 and the Incorporate appropriate information in the guidance in Appendix B of this document. site-specific PAR procedure. I PARs will be expanded based on dose assessment results exceeding the EPA PAGs for those sectors/areas, including beyond 10 mile EPZ PARs.

Assessment will continue after GE conditions do not apply any more or GE is terminated in the Intermediate/Late Phase, per SSES EP 003 procedure.

A-27

Worksheet 1: Block G. Rapidly Progressing Severe Accident (RI*SA) -PARs for the 2-5 miles downwind PAR Because 90% of the entire EPZ can be evacuated in < 3 hours3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> this evaluation is not required for SSES Before proceeding review NRC EPFAQ 2013-004, question 3.

1. List each downwind zone or sector in column 1.

2. In Column 2, list the 90 th percentile ETE for each 2-5 mile sector or zone.

3. Compute V:

V= (average of all ETEs that are less than 3 hours3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> in Colunm 2) X 1.25=

OR V=0 IF all of the ETE values in Column 2 are 3 hours3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> or greater.

4. Determine Yes(Y) or No(N) in Column 3.

5. Determine Yes(Y) or No(N) in Column 4.

6. Determine zone or sector PAR in Column 5.

Table 1. RPSA PARs for the 2-5 mile downwind zone or sectors Column 1 Column 2 Column 3 Column 4 Column 5 2-5 Mile 90o" 90t 90t Sector PAR Sector or Percentile Percentile Percentile If both Zone ETE for the ETE is ETE is Column 3 Impacted' 2-5 Mile greater than greater than and 4 are Sector or 3 hours3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> V Y: Enter Zone (Y or N) (Y or N) SIP Otherwise Enter Evacuate*

o *~If the PAR is SIP then evacuate "when safer to do so."

'Zone Impacted is defined as the zone the wind is blowing toward when a PAR decision ismade for the General Emergency.

D-1

Table Justification J

The goal of the above table is to simplify the PAR strategy for a RPSA where appropriate and either recommend SIP or evacuate for all zone or sector directions. NRC EPFAQ allows a 25%

variance (NRC EPFAQ 2013-004) factor when determining if evacuation or SIP is appropriate.

For example, assume:

o All but two zone or sector ETEs are less than 3 hours3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br />.

o Two of the zone or sector ETEs is just over 3 hours3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br />, both 3.2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />.

o All other ETEs are the same at 2.8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br />. Therefore, following the above instructions V 3.5 o Since all the ETEs are less than 3.5 then for this situation there would be only one PAR for all zones or sectors - evacuate; a simplified PAR strategy for RPSA.

Worksheet 2: Staged Evacuation Before proceeding review NRC EPFAQ 2013-004, question 4.

Evaluation Step 1: Impact of StagedEvacuationon the 2-Mile Zone

1. List each downwind zone or seqtor in column 1.

2. In Column 2, list the 90' percentile ETE for the 2 mile zone assuming concurrent evacuation of the 2 mile zone plus the downwind zone.

3. In Column 3, list the 90th percentile ETE for the 2 mile zone.

4. In Column 4, multiply the ETE in Column 3 by 1.25 (A significant change in ETE is assumed to be a 25% or greater increase).

5. Question 1: Is the time in Column 2 greater than the time in Column 4?

6. If Column 5 is answered yes then answer Column 6 yes.

Table 2*: Impact of Staged Evacuation on the 2-Mile Zone Column 1 Column 2 Column 3 Column 4 Column 5 Column 6 2-5 Mile 90th 90t Column 3 x Question 1 Staged Sector or Percentile Percentile 1.25 Column 2 > evacuation Zone ETE for the ETE for the Column 49 should be Impacted 2 2 mile zone. 2 mile zone utilized for concurrent evacuation of 2 mile zone plus the impacted zone R04 1:55 1:55 2:24 No R05 1:55 1:55 2:24 No R06 1:55 1:55 2:24 No R07 1:55 1:55 2:24 No R08 1:55 1 1:55 2:24 No Column 2 values from Second Table in Table 7.3; Column 3 values from RO1 entry in first Table of Table 7.1. The value selected was the greeter between Summer, Midweek, Midday, Good Weather (1) and Winter, Midweek, Midday, Good Weather (6) scenarios 2Zone Impacted is defined as the zone the wind is blowing toward w.hea a PAR decision is made for the General Emergency. If staged evacuation is employed this zone would SIP until 90% of the 0-2 Mile Zone is evacuated.

D-3

Evaluation Step 2: Impact of StagedEvacuation on the 2 to 5 Mile Downwind Zone:

7. List each downwind zone or sector in column 1.

8. In Column 2, list the 90t"percentiIe ETE for the keyhole (2 mile zone + downwind zone to 5 miles) assuming concurrent evacuation of the 2 mile zone plus the downwind zone.

9. In Column 3, list the 90 percentile ETE for the keyhole (2 mi'le zone + downwind zo.ne to 5 miles) assuming staged evacuation is employed (those in the downwind zone do not begin evacuation until 90% of the 2 mile zone has evacuated).

10. In Column 4, multiply the ETEh in Column 2 by i.25 (A significant change in ETE is assumed to be 25% or greater increase).

11. If Column 3 is greater than Column 4, answer yes in Column 5 (as the 2 to 5 mile downwind zone is increased by >25% by using staged evacuation).

I Table 3*. Impact of Stazed Evacuation on the 2 to 5 Mile Downwind Zone I Column 1 Column 2 Column 3 -Column 4 Column 5 2-5 Mile 90m 9gto, Column 2 x Column 3 >

I Sector or Percentile Percentile 1.25 Column 4?

Zone ETE for the ETE for Impacted 3 Keyhole for Keyhole for Concurrent Staged Evacuation Evacuation R04 1:55 2:00 2:24 No R05 1:55 2:05 2:24 No R06 2:00 2:05 2:30 No R07 2:00 2:05 2:30 No R08 2:00 2:10 2:30 No

• Column 2 values from Second Table in Table 7.1; Column 3 values from last Table of Table 7.1. The value selected was the greeter between Summer, Midweek, Midday, Good Weather (1) and Winter, Midweek, Midday, Good Weather (6) scenarios ZoneImpacted is defined as the zone the wind is blowing toward when a PAR decision is made for the General Emergency. It means that for this event if the wind is blowing toward this sector such that if staged evacuation is employed this zone or sector would SIP until 90% of the 0-2 Mile Zone is evacuated.

T', A

Evaluation Step 3: Analyzing Results There are 4 possible outcomes:

1. All rows in Column 6 of Table 2 are answered No and all rows in Column 5 of Table 3 are answered No. This indicates that staged evacuation is not beneficial to the 2-mile radius and staged evacuation does not delay those from 2 to 5 miles by more than 25%. Conclusion-STAGED EVACUATION IS NOT RECOMMENDED.

2. All rows in Column 6 of Table 2 are answered No and some or all rows in Column 5 of Table 3 are answered Yes. This indicates that staged evacuation is not beneficial to the 2-mile radius and staged evacuation does delay those from 2 to 5 miles by more than 25%.

Conclusion - STAGED EVACUATION IS NOT RECOMMENDED.

3. Some rows in Column 6 of Table 2 are answered Yes and the corresponding rows (same sectors) in Column 5 of Table 3 are answered No. This indicates that staged evacuation is beneficial to the 2-mile radius and does not delay those from 2 to 5 miles by more than 25%.

Conclusion - STAGED EVACUATION IS RECOMMENDED.

4. Some rows in Column 6 of Table 2 are answered Yes and the corresponding rows in Column 5 of Table 3 are answered Yes. This indicates that staged evacuation is beneficial to the 2-mile radius and staged evacuation does delay those from 2 to 5 miles by more than 25%.

Conclusion - SITE SPECIFIC DOSE ASSESMENT NEEDED to assess whether the dose benefits to the 2-mile evacuees outweigh the increased dose to those from 2 to 5 miles.

7N 1Z

Attachment 3 Summarized Changes to Procedures

1. EP-RM-005

- Added description of Page 2 of MIDAS summary report as a result of MIDAS-NU code changes to report sectors and distances where PAGs were exceeded in Section P. [Due to PAR changes]

2. EP-PS-0O01 2.1 Changed Attachment MM, Protective Action Recommendation (PAR) Determination, in accordance with NUREG-0564, Supplement 3 and NEI 12-10. [Due to PAR changes]

- Changed Controlled Containment Venting criteria to align with more conservative EP-DS-004 procedure criteria until investigation by ACT-01-CR-2014-29678 is completed.

[Due to PAR changes]

2.2 Changed Attachment NN, Protective Action Recommendation State Notification Form, in accordance with NUREG-0564, Supplement 3 and NEI 12-10. [Due to PAR changes]

3. EP-PS-105 3.1 Modified Steps 5.2.7 and 5.2.9 and deleted Step 5.2.8 in accordance with the new SSES PAR scheme based on NUREG-0654, Supplement 3, and NE! 12-10 and associated MIDAS code changes. [Due to PAR changes]

4. EP-PS-104 4.1 Added word "initial" in Step 5.7.2 to align with the new PAR process. [Due to PAR changes]

4.2 Modify Step 5.7.5 to align with similar steps to continue to evaluate PARs following the new PAR process. [Due to PAR changes].

5. EP-PS-244 5.1 Modified Steps 5.3.5 and 5.3.7 and deleted Step 5.3.6 in accordance with the new SSES PAR scheme based on NUREG-0654, Supplement 3, and NEI 12-10 and associated MIDAS code changes. [Due to PAR changes]

5.2 Deleted 5.3.9.b since PAR Information are in the Summary Report(see Step 5.3.9.a) per MIDAS code changes[Due to PAR changes]

6. EP-PS-245 6.1 Step 5.5.2 modified to enhance statement that, following GE declaration, both initial PAR and subsequent PARs need to be continuously evaluated; [Due to PAR changes]

6.2 Added Step 5.4.5 to aligh with similar step in EP-PS-104 procedure.

I 6.3 Step 5.5.3.a(1) was modified to align with the new PAR scheme and associated MIDAS code modifications [Due to PAR changes]

6.4 Step 5,5.3.a(3)(a) deleted since does not correspond to the new PAR scheme. [Due to PAR changes]

6.5 Reference to PAR Determination flow chart was addedto 5.5.5. [Due to PAR changes]

7. EP-PS-101 7.1 Added Steps 5.2.16 and 5.3.5e that directs: "Following INITIAL PAR, CONTINUE to evaluate subsequent PARs per Protective Action Recommendation Determination AND NOTIFY Senor State Official of any changes to the PAR." Added "initial" in Step 5.2.5.a and 5.3.5.d(!). [Due to PAR changes]

7.2 Added "(White Board in ED area)" to sixth and eleventh bullet in Step 5.1.8.

7.3 Changed Step 4.2.1 to "An emergency has been declared at SSES".

7.4 Added "Review and approve the ENR form" to step 5.2.3 and 5.3.4a. Changed 5.2.4 to "ENSURE ENR is transmitted within 15 minutes of Emergency Declaration, TSC and plant announcements are made, AND other concerned offsite agencies are notified." Changed 5.3.4.b to "ENSURE ENR is transmitted within 15 minutes of Emergency Declaration, TSC and plant announcements are made, AND other concerned offsite agencies are notified."

7.5 Added "as confirmed by the TSC Security Coordinator" to Steps 5.3.5b and 5.3.Sc.

7.6 Performed other editorial changes 7.7 Aligned EP-PS-101-I with changes in the procedure.

8. EP-PS-200 8.1 Added "initial" to step 5.2.4.a. Added step 5.2.12 "Following INITIAL PAR, CONTINUE to evaluate subsequent PARs per Protective Action Recommendation Determination AND NOTIFY Senior State Official of any changes to the PAR." Added "or PAR" in Step 5.2.18 (currently 5.2,19). [Due to PAR changes]

8.2 Clarified Step 5.2.3 by braking up in 5.2.3 and 5.2.3b. Added 5.2.3a to "Review and approve th.e ENR form."

8.3 Added "(White Board in EOF Command and Control Area)" to fifth bullet in Step 5.1.8.

8.4 Aligned EP-PS-200-1 with changes in the procedure.

9. EP-PS-307 9.1 Step 5.3.2.c modified to align with new PAR scheme [Due to PAR changes]

10.

EMERGENCY PLANNING FORMS AND SUPPLEMENTARY INSTRUCTIONS Attachment NN EP-PS-001 Revision 5 Page 176 of 214 Unit 0 PROTECTIVE ACTION RECOMMENDATION STATE NOTIFICATION FORM Call the Senior State Official at 717-651-2148 (Alternate phone is PEMA Duty Officer at 717-651-2001)

El THIS IS A DRILL II THIS IS AN ACTUAL EVENT This is at PPL Susquehanna. I am providing a Protective Action Recommendation.

Do I have the Senior State Official on the line?

Name of Senior State Official:

AIRBOFZNE RELEASES i FOR INITIAL PAR ONLY FOR SUBSEQUENT PARS Note: IF PEMA has informed SSES of an impediment Note: Do not reduce any previously evacuated areas to evacuation, THEN RECOMMEND shelter instead of Note: Do not repeat any previously recommend PARs.

evacuation. Do not recommend evacuating the same sector When PEMA informs SSES the impediment is more than once.

removed, RECOMMEND evacuation, if applicable, at that time. Note: IF PEMA has informed SSES of an impediment to evacuation, A General Emergency was declared at THEN RECOMMEND shelter instead of due to (EAL designation) evacuation.

When PEMA informs SSES the impediment is Susquehanna's Protective Action Recommendation is: removed, RECOMMEND evacuation, if applicable, at that time.

LI SHELTER IN PLACE 3600 radius from 0 to 5 miles OR In addition to previously communicated L] SHELTER IN PLACE/ [I EVACUATE recommendations, Susquehanna's Protective Action Recommendation is:

L] 3600 radius from 0 to 2 miles AND LI SHELTER IN PLACE / El EVACUATE L1 The following sectors from 2 to 5 miles:

LI The following additional sectors from 2 to 5 miles:

AND LI The following sectors from 5 to 10 miles: AND nI The following additional sectors from 5 to 10 miles:

AND AND Advise citizens to take KI in accordance with the state's LI The following additional sectors from 10 to __ miles emergency plans and advise remainder of the EPZ to monitor and prepare.

LIQUID RELEASES I EL Divert Danville drinking water supply from the Susquehanna River.

The wind direction is from: 0 and wind speed is mph.

I Date / Time:

El THIS IS A DRILL F1 THISIS AN ACTUAL EVENT FORM EP-PS-001-18, Rev. 1, Page 1 of 1 (Electronic Form)