ML21029A057
| ML21029A057 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Susquehanna  |
| Issue date: | 12/17/2020 |
| From: | Susquehanna |
| To: | Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| Download: ML21029A057 (18) | |
Text
1.Jt::L.. .LI 1 ,,C. V.G V Page 1 of 2
- MANUAL HARD COPY DISTRIBUTION DOCUMENT TRANSMITTAL 2020-21117 USER INFORMATION:
GERLACH*ROSEY M EMPL#:028401 CA#: 0363 Address: NUCSA2 Phone#: 542-3194 TRANSMITTAL INFORMATION:
TO: GERLACH*ROSEY M 12/17/2020 LOCATION: USNRC FROM: NUCLEAR RECORDS DOCUMENT CONTROL CENTER (NUCSA-2)
THE FOLLOWING CHANGES HAVE OCCURRED TO THE HARDCOPY OR ELECTRONIC MANUAL ASSIGNED TO YOU. HARDCOPY USERS MUST ENSURE THE DOCUMENTS PROVIDED MATCH THE INFORMATION ON THIS TRANSMITTAL. WHEN REPLACING THIS MATERIAL IN YOUR HARDCOPY MANUAL, ENSURE THE UPDATE DOCUMENT ID IS THE SAME DOCUMENT ID YOU'RE REMOVING FROM YOUR MANUAL. TOOLS ARoM THE HUMAN PERFORMANCE TOOL BAG SHOULD BE UTILIZED To ELIMINATE THE CHANCE OF
~RRORS.
ATTENTION: "REPLACE" directions do not affect the Table of Contents, Therefore no TOC will be issued with the updated material.
TSBl - TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION BASES UNIT 1 MANUAL REMOVE MANUAL TABLE OF CONTENTS DATE: 09/03/2020 ADD MANUAL TABLE OF CONTENTS DATE: 12/16/2020 CATEGORY: DOCUMENTS TYPE: TSBl
LJC:L, * .L/ 1 L.VL.U Page 2 of 2
- ID: TEXT 3.6.4.1 REMOVE : REV: 15 ADD: REV: 16 ANY DISCREPANCIES WITH THE MATERIAL PROVIDED, CONTACT DCS@ X3171 OR X3194 FOR ASSISTANCE. UPDATES FOR HARDCOPY MANUALS WILL BE DISTRIBUTED WITHIN 3 DAYS IN ACCORDANCE WITH DEPARTMENT PROCEDURES. PLEASE MAKE ALL CHANGES AND ACKNOWLEDGE COMPLETE IN YOUR NIMS INBOX UPON COMPLETION OF UPDATES. FOR ELECTRONIC MANUAL USERS, ELECTRONICALLY REVIEW THE APPROPRIATE DOCUMENTS AND ACKNOWLEDGE COMPLETE IN YOUR NIMS INBOX .
SSES MANUAL Manual Name: TSBl
- .anual
Title:
TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION BASES DNIT 1 MANUAL Table Of Contents Issue Date: 12/16/2020 Procedure Name Rev Issue Date Change ID Change Number TEXT LOES 134 01/03/2019
Title:
LIST OF EFFECTIVE SECTIONS TEXT TOC 25 03/05/2019
~
Title:
TABLE OF CONTENTS TEXT 2.1.1
Title:
SAFETY LIMITS 6 01/22/2015 (SLS) REACTOR CORE SLS --- _
- ?/>~
-~-- - 7 TEXT 2.1.2 1 10/04;2007 G.~
Title, SAFETY LIMITS (SLS) REACTOR COOLANT SYS:.wia:BSSURE S TEXT 3.0 4 01/03/~
,. Titl0, LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERA;r~~ffO.l._ll!lPLICABILITY TEXT 3.1.1 1 //o~'/~~
Title:
REACTIVITY CONTROL SYST/4~'-~o~ MAR~IN- (SDM)
TEXT 3.1.2 ~2>~15/2002
Title:
REACTIVITY c o r ~ \ V s REACTIVITY ANOMALIES TEXT 3.1.3 /::")~ 3 11/16/2016 Titl~: REACTIVIf-(~oL SYSTEMS CONTROL ROD OPERABILITY TEXT 3 .1.4
~ 5 . - 11/16/2016
Title:
REAC'.]:'IVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS CONTROL ROD SCRAM TIMES TEXT 3.1.5 2 1_1/16/2016 .
Title:
REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS CONTROL ROD SCRAM ACCUMDLATORS TEXT 3.1.6 4 11/16/2016
Title:
REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS ROD PATTERN CONTROL Page 1 of B Report Date: 12/18/20
SSES MANUAL Manual Name: TSBl I
( fanual
Title:
TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION BASES UNIT 1 MANUAL ,
TEXT 3 .1. 7 4 11/16/2016
Title:
REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS STANDBY LIQUID CONTROL (SLC) SYSTEM TEXT 3.1.8 4 11/16/2016
Title:
REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS SCRAM DISCHARGE VOLUME (SDV) VENT AND DRAIN VALVES TEXT 3.2.1 3 11/16/2016
Title:
POWER DISTRIBUTION LIMITS AVERAGE PLANAR LINEAR HEAT GENERATION RATE (APLHGR)
TEXT 3.2.2 4 11/16/2016
Title:
POWER DISTRIBUTION LIMITS MINIMUM CRITICAL POWER RATIO (MCPR)
TEXT 3.2.3 3 11/16/2016
Title:
POWER DISTRIBUTION LIMITS LINEAR HEAT GENERATION RATE (LHGR)
( .:'EXT 3 . 3 . 1 .- 1 7 11/16/2016
Title:
INSTRUMENTATION REACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEM (RPS)
TEXT 3.3.1.2 4 01/23/2018 INSTRUMENTATION*
Title:
INSTRUMENTATION SOURCE RANGE MONITOR (SRM) INSTRUMENTATION TEXT 3.3.2.1 5 11/16/2016
Title:
INSTRUMENTATION CONTROL ROD BLOCK INSTRUMENTATION TEXT 3.3.2.2 3 11/16/2016
Title:
INSTRUMENTATION FEEDWATER MAIN TURBINE HIGH WATER LEVEL TRIP INSTRUMENTATION TEXT 3.3.3.1 10 11/16/2016
Title:
INSTRUMENTATION POST ACCIDENT MONITORING (PAM) INSTRDMENTATION TEXT 3.3.3.2 2 11/16/2016
Title:
INSTRUMENTATION REMOTE SHUTDOWN SYSTEM TEXT 3.3.4.1 3 11/16/2016
(
Title:
INSTRUMENTATION END OF CYCLE RECIRCULATION PUMP TRIP (EOC-RPT) INSTRUMENTATION.
Page 2 of 8 Report Date: 12/18/20
SSES MANUAL V
Manual Name: 'TSB~
~ u a l
Title:
TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION BASES ONIT 1 MANOAL TEXT 3.3.4.2 1 11/16/2016
Title:
INSTRUMENTATION ANTICIPATED TRANSIENT WITHOUT SCRAM RECIRCULATION PUMP TRIP (ATWS-RPT) INSTRUMENTATION TEXT 3.3.5.1 5 03/05/2019
Title:
INSTRUMENTATION EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEM (ECCS) INSTRUMENTATION TEXT 3.3.5.2 2 03/05/2019
Title:
REACTOR PRESSURE VESSEL (RPV) WATER INVENTORY CONTROL INSTRUMENTATION TEXT 3.3.5.3 0 03/05/2019
Title:
INSTRUMENTATION REACTOR CORE ISOLATION COOLING (RCIC) SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION
- PREVIOUSLY TEXT 3.3.5.2 REV 1**
TEXT 3.3.6.1 9 03/05/2019
Title:
INSTRUMENTATION PRIMARY CONTAINMENT ISOLATION INSTRUMENTATION
.EXT 3.3.6.2 6 03/05/2019
Title:
INSTRUMENTATION SECONDARY CONTAINMENT ISOLATION INSTRUMENTATION TEXT 3.3.7.1 4 03/05/2019
Title:
INSTRUMENTATION CONTROL ROOM EMERGENCY OUTSIDE AIR SUPPLY (CREOAS) SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION TEXT 3.3.8.1 3 11/16/2016
Title:
INSTRUMENTATION LOSS OF POWER (LOP) INSTRUMENTATION TEXT 3.3.8.2 1 11/16/2016
Title:
INSTRUMENTATION REACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEM (RPS) ELECTRIC POWER MONITORING TEXT 3.4.1 5 11/16/2016
Title:
REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM (RCS) RECIRCULATION LOOPS OPERATING TEXT 3.4.2 4 11/16/2016
Title:
REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM (RCS) JET PUMPS TEXT 3.4.3 3 01/13/2012
Title:
REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM RCS SAFETY RELIEF VALVES S/RVS Page 3 of 8 Report Date: 12/18/20
SSES MANUAL Manual Name: TSBl
!anual
Title:
TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION BASES UNIT 1 MANOAL TEXT 3.4.4 1 11/16/2016
Title:
REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM (RCS) RCS OPERATIONAL LEAKAGE TEXT 3.4.5 2 04/13/2016
Title:
REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM (RCS) RCS PRESSURE ISOLATION VALVE (_PIV)_ __ L~GE TEXT 3.4.6 5* 11/16/2016
Title:
REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM (RCS) RCS LEAKAGE DETECTION INST~UMENTATION TEXT 3.4.7 3 11/16/2016
Title:
REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM (RCS) RCS SPECIFIC ACTIVITY TEXT 3.4.8 3 11/16/2016
Title:
REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM (RCS) RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL (rum) SHOTDOWN COOLING SYSTEM
- HOT SHUTDOWN 7EXT 3.4.9 2 11/16/2016
Title:
REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM (RCS) RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL (RHR) SHUTDOWN COOLING SYSTEM.
- COLD SHUTDOWN TEXT 3.4.10 6 05/14/2019
Title:
REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM (RCS) RCS PRESSURE AND TEMPERATURE (P/T) LIMITS TEXT 3 .4 .11 1 11/16/2016
Title:
REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM (RCS) REACTOR STEAM DOME PRESSURE TEXT 3.5.1 6 03/05/2019
Title:
EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS (ECCS) REACTOR PRESSURE VESSEL (RPV) WATER INVENTORY CONTROL AND REACTOR CORE ISOLATION COOLING (RCIC) SYSTEM ECCS OPERATING TEXT 3.5.2 3 03/05/2019
Title:
EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS (ECCS) REACTOR PRESSURE VESSEL (RPV) WATER INVENTORY CONTROL AND REACTOR CORE ISOLATION COOLING (RCIC) SYSTEM ECCS OPERATING TEXT 3.5.3 6 03/05/2019
Title:
EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS (ECCS) REACTOR PRESSURE VESSEL (RPV) WATER INVENTORY CONTROL AND REACTOR CORE ISOLATION COOLING (RCIC) SYSTEM ECCS OPERATING Page 4 of 8 Report Date: 12/18/20
SSES MANUAL Manual Name: TSBl
. a n u a l
Title:
TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION BASES UNIT 1 MANUAL TEXT 3.6.1.1 6 11/16/2016
Title:
PRIMARY CONTAINMENT TEXT 3.6.1.2 2 11/16/2016
Title:
CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS PRIMARY CONTAINMENT AIR LOCK TEXT 3.6.1.3 16 03/03/2020
Title:
CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS PRIMARY CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES (PCIVS)
TEXT 3 . 6 . 1. 4 2 11/16/2016
Title:
CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS CONTAINMENT PRESSURE TEXT 3.6.1.5 2 11/16/2016
Title:
CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS DRYWELL AIR TEMPERATORE
-~EXT 3.6.1.6 1 11/16/2016
Title:
CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS SUPPRESSION CHAMBER-TO-DRYWELL VACUUM BREAKERS TEXT 3.6.2.1 3 11/16/2016
Title:
CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS SUPPRESSION POOL AVERAGE T~~~ERATURE TEXT 3.6.2.2 2 03/05/2019
Title:
CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS SUPPRESSION POOL WATER LEVEL TEXT 3.6.2.3 2 11/16/2016
Title:
CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL (rum) SUPPRESSION POOL COOLING TEXT 3.6.2.4 1 11/16/2016
Title:
CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL (RHR) SUPPRESSION POOL SPRAY TEXT 3.6.3.1 2 06/13/2006
Title:
CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS PRIMARY CONTAINMENI' HYDROGEN RECOMBINERS TEXT 3.6.3.2 4 04/22/2020
Title:
CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS DRYWELL AIR FLOW SYSTEM Page 5 of B Report Date: 12/18/20
SSES MANUAL Manual Name: TSBl
! <<anual
Title:
TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION BASES DNIT 1 MANUAL TEXT 3.6.3.3 3 09/29/2017
Title:
CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS PRIMARY CONTAINMENT OXYGEN CONCENTRATION TEXT 3.6.4.1 16 12/16/2020
Title:
CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS SECONDARY CONTAINMENT TEXT 3.6.4.2 14 03/05/2019
Title:
CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS SECONDARY CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES (SCIVS)
TEXT 3.6.4.3 7 03/05/2019
Title:
CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS STANDBY GAS TREATMENT (SGT) SYSTEM TEXT 3.7.1 6 03/03/2020
Title:
PLANT SYSTEMS RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL SERVICE WATER (RHRSW) SYSTEM AND THE ULTIMATE HEAT SINK (UHS)
I £EXT 3.7.2 4 03/03/2020
Title:
PLANT SYSTEMS EMERGENCY SERVICE WATER (ESW) SYSTEM TEXT 3.7.3 4 03/05/2019
Title:
PLANT SYSTEMS CONTROL ROOM EMERGENCY OUTSIDE AIR SUPPLY (CREOAS) SYSTEM TEXT 3.7.4 2 03/05/2019
Title:
PLANT SYSTEMS CONTROL ROOM FLOOR COOLING SYSTEM TEXT 3.7.5 2 11/16/2016
Title:
PLANT SYSTEMS MAIN CONDENSER OFFGAS TEXT 3.7.6 3 11/16/2016
Title:
PLANT SYSTEMS MAIN TURBINE -BYPASS SYSTEM TEXT 3.7.7 2 11/16/2016
Title:
PLANT SYSTEMS SPENT FUEL STORAGE POOL WATER LEVEL TEXT 3.7.8 1 11/16/2016
Title:
PLANT SYSTEMS Page 6 of 8 Report Date: 12/18/20
SSES MANUAL Manual Name: TSBl
.fanual
Title:
TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION BASES UN+T 1 MANUAL TEXT 3.8.1 13 01/28/2020
Title:
ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS AC SOURCES - OPERATING TEXT 3.8.2 1 03/05/2019
Title:
ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS AC SOURCES - SHlJTDOWN TEXT 3.8.3 7 08/07/2019
Title:
ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS DIESEL FUEL OIL, LUBE OIL, AND STARTING AIR TEXT 3.8.4 4 11/16/2016
Title:
ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS DC SOURCES - OPERATING TEXT 3.8.5 2 03/05/2019
Title:
ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS DC SOURCES - SHUTDOWN
. E X T 3.8.6 2 11/16/2016
Title:
ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS BATTERY CELL PARAMETERS TEXT 3.8.7 3 09/04/2019
Title:
ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS DISTRIBUTION SYSTEMS - OPERATING TEXT 3:8.8 2 03/05/2019
Title:
ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS DISTRIBUTION SYSTEMS - SHUTDOWN TEXT 3.9.1 1 11/16/2016
Title:
REFUELING OPERATIONS REFUELING EQUIPMENT INTERLOCKS TEXT 3.9.2 2 11/16/2016
Title:
REFUELING OPERATIONS REFUEL POSITION ONE-ROD-OUT INTERLOCK TEXT 3.9.3 1 11/16/2016
Title:
REFUELING OPERATIONS CONTROL ROD POSITION TEXT 3.9.4 0 11/15/2002
Title:
REFUELING OPERATIONS CONTROL ROD POSITION INDICATION Page 7 of 8 Report Date: 12/18/20
SSES MANUAL Manual Name: TSBl
!anual
Title:
TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION BASES UNIT 1 MANUAL TEXT 3.9.5 1 11/16/2016
Title:
REFUELING OPERATIONS CONTROL ROD OPERABILITY - REFUELING TEXT 3.9.6 2 11/16/2016
Title:
REFUELING OPERATIONS REACTOR PRESSURE VESSEL (RPV) WATER LEVEL TEXT 3.9.7 1 11/16/2016
Title:
REFUELING OPERATIONS RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL (RHR) - HIGH WATER LEVEL TEXT 3.9.8 1 11/16/2016
Title:
REFUELING OPERATIONS RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL (RHR) - LOW WATER LEVEL TEXT 3.10.1 2 03/05/2019
Title:
SPECIAL OPERATIONS INSERVICE LEAK AND HYDROSTATIC TESTING OPERATION
.:'EXT 3 .10 .2 1 11/16/2016
Title:
SPECIAL OPERATIONS REACTOR MODE SWITCH INTERLOCK TESTING TEXT 3.10.3 1 11/16/2016
Title:
SPECIAL OPERATIONS SINGLE CONTROL ROD WITHDRAWAL - HOT SHUTDOWN TEXT 3.10.4 1 11/16/2016
Title:
SPECIAL OPERATIONS SINGLE CONTROL ROD WITHDRAWAL - COLD SHUTDOWN TEXT 3.10.5 1 11/16/2016
Title:
SPECIAL OPERATIONS SINGLE CONTROL ROD DRIVE (CRD) REMOVAL - REFUELING TEXT 3.10:6 1 11/16/2016
Title:
SPECIAL OPERATIONS MULTIPLE CONTROL ROD WITHDRAWAL - REFUELING TEXT 3.10.7 1 04/18/2006
Title:
SPECIAL OPERATIONS CONTROL ROD TESTING - OPERATING TEXT 3.10.8 2 11/16/2016
Title:
SPECIAL OPERATIONS SHUTDOWN MARGIN (SDM) TEST - REFUELING Page 8 of 8 Report Date: 12/18/20
Rev. 16 Secondary Containment B 3.6.4.1 B 3.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS B 3.6.4.1 Secondary Containment BASES BACKGROUND The secondary containment structure completely encloses the primary containment structure such that a dual-containment design is utilized to limit the spread of radioactivity to the environment to within limits. The function of the secondary containment is to contain, dilute, and hold up fission products that may leak from primary containment into secondary containment following a Design Basis Accident (OBA). In conjunction with operation of the Standby Gas Treatment (SGT) System and closure of certain valves whose lines penetrate the secondary containment, the secondary containment is designed to reduce the activity level of the fission products prior to release to the environment and to isolate and contain fission products that are released during certain operations that take place inside primary containment, when primary containment Is not required to be OPERABLE, or that take place outside primary containment (Ref. 1) .
- The secondary containment is a structure that completely encloses the primary containment and reactor coolant pressure boundary components.
This structure fom,s a control volume that serves to hold up and dilute the fission products. It is possible for the pressure in the control volume to rise relative to the environmental pressure (e.g., due to pump and motor heat load additions).
The secondary containment boundary consists of the reactor building structure and associated removable walls and panels, hatches, doors, dampers, sealed penetrations and valves. Certain plant piping systems (e.g., Service Water, RHR Service Water, Emergency Service Water; Feedwater, etc.) penetrate the secondary containment boundary. The intact piping within secondary containment provides a passive barrier which maintains secondary containment requirements. Breaches of these piping systems within secondary containment will be controlled to maintain secondary containment requirements. The secondary containment is divided into Zone I, Zone II and Zone Ill, each of which must be OPERABLE depending on plant status and the alignment of the secondary containment boundary. Specifically, the Unit 1 secondary containment boundary can be modified to exclude Zone II. Similarly, the Unit 2 secondary containment boundary can be modified to exclude Zone I. Secondary containment may consist of only Zone Ill when in MODE 4 or 5 during CORE ALTERATIONS, or during handling of irradiated fuel within the Zone Ill secondary containment boundary .
SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT 1 3.6-84
Rev. 16 Secondary Containment B 3.6.4.1 BASES BACKGROUND To prevent ground level exfiltration while allowing the secondary containment (continued) to be designed as a conventional structure, the secondary containment requires support systems to maintain the control volume pressure at less than the external pressure. Requirements for the safety related systems are specified separately in LCO 3.6.4.2, "Secondary Containment Isolation Valves (SCIVs)," and LCO 3.6.4.3, "Standby Gas Treatment (SGT) System."
When one or more zones are excluded from secondary containment, the specific requirements for support systems will also change (e.g., required secondary containment isolation valves).
APPLICABLE There are two principal accidents for which credit is taken for secondary SAFETY containment OPERABILITY. These are a loss of coolant accident (LOCA)
ANALYSES (Ref. 2) and a fuel handling accident inside secondary containment (Ref. 3).
The secondary containment perfonns no active function in response to either of these limiting events; however, its leak tightriess is required to ensure that the release of radioactive materials from the primary containment is restricted to those leakage paths and associated leakage rates assumed in the accident analysis and that fission products entrapped within the secondary containment structure will be treated by the SGT System prior to discharge to the environment.
Secondary containment satisfies Criterion 3 of the NRC Policy Statement (Ref. 4). ,
LCO An OPERABLE secondary containment provides a control volume into which fission products that bypass or leak from primary containment, or are released from the reactor coolant pressure boundary components located in secondary containment, can be diluted and processed prior to release to the environment. For the secondary containment to be considered OPERABLE, it must have adequate leak tightness to ensure that the required vacuum can be established and maintained. The leak tightness of secondary containment must also ensure that the release of radioactive materials to the environment is restricted to those leakage paths and associated leakage rates assumed in the accident analysis. For example, secondary containment bypass leakage must be restricted to the leakage rate required by LCO 3.6.1.3. The secondary containment boundary required to be OPERABLE is dependent on the operating status of both units, as well as the configuration of walls, doors, hatches, SC IVs, and available flow paths to the SGT System .
- SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT 1 3.6-85
Rev. 16
- BASES Secondary Containment B 3.6A.1 APPLICABILITY In MODES 1, 2, and 3, a LOCA could lead to a fission product release to primary containment that leaks to secondary containment. Therefore, secondary containment OPERABILITY is required during the same operating conditions that require primary containment OPERABILITY.
In MODES 4 and 5, the probability and consequences of the LOCA are reduced due to the pressure and temperature limitations in these MODES.
Therefore, maintaining secondary containment OPERABLE is not required in MODE 4 or 5 to ensure a control volume, except for other situations for which significant releases of radioactive material can be postulated, such as during CORE ALTERATIONS or during movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the secondary containment.
ACTIONS A.1 If secondary containment is inoperable, it must be restored to OPERABLE status within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />. The 4 hour4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> Completion Time provides a period of time
- to correct the problem that is commensurate with the importance of maintaining secondary containment during MODES 1, 2, and 3. This time period also ensures that the probability of an accident (requiring secondary containment OPERABILITY) occurring during periods where secondary containment is inoperable is minimal.
B.1 and 8.2 If secondary containment cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within the required Completion Time, the plant must be brought to a MODE in which the LCO does not apply. To achieve this status, the plant must be brought to at least MODE 3 within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> and to MODE 4 within 36 hours4.166667e-4 days <br />0.01 hours <br />5.952381e-5 weeks <br />1.3698e-5 months <br />. The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required plant conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.
C.1 and C.2 Movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the secondary containment and CORE ALTERATIONS can be postulated to cause fission product release to the secondary containment. In such cases, the secondary containment is the only barrier to release of fission products to the environment. CORE ALTERATIONS and movement of irradiated fuel assemblies must be immediately suspended if the secondary containment is inoperable.
- SUSQUEHAN NA - UNIT 1 3.6-86
Rev. 16 Secondary Containment B 3.6.4.1 BASES ACTIONS C.1 and C.2 (continued)
(continued)
Suspension of these activities shall not preclude completing an action that involves moving a component to a safe position.
Required Action C.1 has been modified by a Note stating that LCO 3.0.3 is not applicable. If moving irradiated fuel assemblies while in MODE 4 or 5, LCO 3.0.3 would not specify any action. If moving irradiated fuel assemblies while in MODE 1, 2, or 3, the fuel movement is independent of reactor operations. Therefore, in either case, inability to suspend movement of irradiated fuel assemblies would not be a sufficient reason to require a reactor shutdown.
SURVEILLANCE SR 3.6.4.1.1 REQUIREMENTS This SR ensures that the secondary containment boundary is sufficiently leak tight to preclude exfiltration under expected wind conditions .
- The SR is modified by a Note which states the SR is not required to be met for up to 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> if an analysis demonstrates that one SGT subsystem remains capable of establishing the required secondary containment vacuum. Use of the Note is expected to be infrequent but may be necessitated by situations in which secondary containment vacuum may be less than the required containment vacuum, such as, but not limited to, wind gusts or failure or change of operating normal ventilation subsystems. These conditions do not indicate any change in the leak tightness of the secondary containment boundary.
The analysis should consider the actual conditions (equipment configuration, temperature, atmospheric pressure, wind conditions, measured secondary containment vacuum, etc.) to determine whether, if an accident requiring secondary containment to be OPERABLE were to occur, one train of SGT could establish the assumed secondary containment vacuum within the time assumed in the accident analysis. If so, the SR may be considered met for a period up to 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />. The 4 hour4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> limit is based on the expected should duration of the situation when the Note would be applied.
The Surveillance Frequency is controlled under the Surveillance Frequency Control Program .
- SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT 1 3.6-87
Rev. 16
- BASES Secondary Containment B 3.6.4.1 SURVEILLANCE SR 3.6.4.1.2 and SR 3.6.4.1.3 REQUIREMENTS (continued) Verifying that secondary containment equipment hatches, removable walls and one access door in each access opening required to be closed are closed ensures that the infiltration of outside air of such a magnitude as to prevent maintaining the desired negative pressure does not occur.
Verifying that all such openings are closed also provides adequate assurance that exfiltration from the secondary containment will not occur.
In this application, the tenn "sealed" has no connotation of leak tightrless.
An access opening typically contains one inner and one outer door.
Maintaining secondary containment OPERABILITY requires verifying one door in each access opening to secondary containment zones is closed.
In some cases (e.g., railroad bay), secondary containment access openings are shared such that a secondary containment barrier may have multiple inner or multiple outer doors. The intent is to maintain the secondary containment barrier intact, which is achieved by maintaining the inner or outer portion of the barrier closed at all times. However, brief, inadvertent, simultaneous opening of the inner and outer secondary containment doors for personnel enby and exit is allowed. Intentional or extended opening of both doors simultaneously, even for personnel entry and exit, is not pennitted and will result in Secondary Containment being declared INOPERABLE. All secondary containment access doors are normally kept closed, except when the access opening is being used for entry and exit or when maintenance fs being perfomied on an access opening.
When the railroad bay door (No. 101) is closed; all Zone I and Ill hatches, removable walls, dampers, and one door in each access opening connected to the railroad access bay are closed; or, only Zone I removable walls and/or doors are open to the railroad access shaft; or, only Zone Ill hatches and/or dampers are open to the railroad access shaft. When the railroad bay door (No. 101) is open; all Zone I and Ill hatches, removable walls, dampers, and one door in each access opening connected to the railroad access bay are closed. The truck bay hatch is closed and the truck bay door (No. 102) is closed unless Zone 11 is isolated from Zones I and 111 .
- SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT 1 3.6-88
Rev. 16 Secondary Containment B 3.6.4.1 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.6.4.1.2 and SR 3.6.4.1.3 (continued)
REQUIREMENTS (continued) The access openings between secondary containment zones which are not provided with two doors are administratively controlled to maintain secondary containment integrity during exit and entry. This Surveillance Is modified by a Note that allows access openings with a single door (i.e., no airlock) within the secondary containment boundary (i.e., between required secondary containment zones) to be opened for entry and exit. Opening of an access door for entry and exit allows sufficient administrative control by individual personnel making the entries and exits to assure the secondary containment function is not degraded. When one of the zones is not a zone required for secondary containment OPERABILITY, the Note allowance would not apply.
The Surveillance Frequency is controlled under the Surveillance Frequency Control Program .
- SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT 1 3.6-89
Rev. 16
- BASES Secondary Containment B 3.6.4.1 SURVEILLANCE SR 3.6.4.1.4 and SR 3.6.4.1.5 REQUIREMENTS (continued) The SGT System exhausts the secondary containment atmosphere to the environment through appropriate treatment equipment. To ensure that all fission products are treated, SR 3.6.4.1.4 verifies that the SGT System will rapidly establish and maintain a pressure in the secondary containment that is less than the pressure external to the secondary containment boundary.
This is confirmed by demonstrating that one SGT subsystem will draw down the secondary containment to ~ 0.25 inches of vacuum water gauge in less than or equal to the maximum time allowed. This cannot be accomplished if the secondary containment boundary is not intact. SR 3.6.4.1.5 demonstrates that one SGT subsystem can maintain ~ 0.25 inches of vacuum water gauge for at least 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> at less than or equal to the maximum flow rate permitted forthe secondary containment configuration that is operable. The 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> test period allows secondary containment to be in thermal equilibrium at steady state conditions. As noted, both SR 3.6.4.1 .4.,
and SR 3.6.4.1.5 acceptance limits are dependent upon the secondary containment configuration when testing is being performed. The acceptance criteria for the SRs based on secondary containment configuration is defined as follows:
SECONDARY MAXIMUM DRAWDOWN TIME(SEC) MAXIMUM FLOW RATE (CFM)
CONTAINMENT (SR 3.6.4.1.4 (SR 3.641.5 TEST CONFIGURATION ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA) ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA)
Group1 Zones I, II and Ill (Unit 1 s 300 Seconds s6400 CFM Railroad Bay aligned to (Zones I, II, and Ill) (From Zones I, II, and Ill)
Zones I and Ill (Unit 1 s 300 Seconds s6200 CFM Railroad Bay aligned to (Zones I and Ill) (From Zones I and Ill)
Group 2 Zones I, II and Ill (Unit 1 s 300 Seconds s6400 CFM Railroad Bay not aligned to (Zones I, 11, and Ill) (From Zones I, II, and Ill)
Secondarv Containment).
Zones I and Ill (Unrt 1 s 300 Seconds s6000 CFM Rallroad Bay not aligned to (Zones I and Ill) (From Zones I and Ill)
Secondary Contamment).
Only one of the above listed configurations needs to be tested to confirm secondary containment OPERABILITY .
SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT 1 3.6-90
Rev. 16 Secondary Containment B 3.6.4.1 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.6.4.1.4 and SR 3.6.4.1.5 (continued)
REQUIREMENTS (continued) The secondary containment testing configurations are discussed in further detail to ensure the appropriate configurations are tested. Three zone testing (Zones, I, II and Ill aligned to the recirculation plenum) should be perfonned with the Railroad Bay aligned to secondary containment and another test with the Railroad Bay not aligned to secondary containment.
Each test should be performed with each division on a STAGGERED TEST BASIS.
Two zone testirig (Zones I and Ill aligned to the recirculation plenum) should be perfonned with the Railroad Bay aligned to secondary containment and another test with the Railroad Bay not aligned to secondary containment.
Each test should be performed with each dMsion on a STAGGERED TEST BASIS. The normal operating fans of the non-tested HVAC zone (Zone II fans 2V202A&B, 2V205A&B and 2V206A&B) should not be in operation.
Additionally, a controlled opening of adequate size should be maintained in Zone II Secondary Containment during testing to assure that abnospheric conditions are maintained in that zone.
The Unit 1 Railroad Bay can be aligned as a No Zone (isolated from secondary containment) at as part of secondary containment (Zone I or Ill).
Due to the different leakage pathways that exist in the Railroad Bay, the Railroad Bay should be tested when aligned to secondary containment and not aligned to secondary containment. It is preferred to align the Railroad Bay to Zone Ill when testing with the Railroad Bay aligned to secondary containment since Zone Ill is included in all possible secondary containment isolation alignments. Note that aligning the Railroad Bay to either Zone I or Ill is acceptable since either zone is part of secondary containment The Surveillance Frequency is controlled under the Surveillance Frequency Control Program.
REFERENCES 1. FSAR, Section 6.2.3.
- 2. FSAR, Section 15.6_
- 3. FSAR, Section 15.7.4.
- 4. Final Policy Statement on Technical Specifications Improvements, July 22, 1993 (58 FR 39132) .
- SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT 1 3.6-91