IR 05000482/2002004

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IR 05000482-02-004; 06/30/02-09/21/02; Wolf Creek Nuclear Operating Corporation; Wolf Creek Generating Station. Integrated Resident/Regional Report. Event Followup
ML022800172
Person / Time
Site: Wolf Creek Wolf Creek Nuclear Operating Corporation icon.png
Issue date: 10/04/2002
From: Graves D
NRC Region 4
To: Maynard O
Wolf Creek
References
IR-02-004
Download: ML022800172 (21)
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Text

ber 4, 2002

SUBJECT:

NRC INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 50-482/02-04

Dear Mr. Maynard:

On September 21, 2002, the NRC completed an inspection at your Wolf Creek Generating Station. The enclosed report documents the inspection findings which were discussed with Ms. D. Jacobs and other members of your staff on September 25, 2002.

This inspection examined activities conducted under your license as they relate to safety and compliance with the Commissions rules and regulations and with the conditions of your license.

Within these areas, the inspection consisted of selected examination of procedures and representative records, observations of activities, and interviews with personnel.

Based on the results of this inspection, the NRC has identified issues that were evaluated under the risk significance determination process as having very low safety significance (Green). The NRC has also determined that violations are associated with these issues. These violations are being treated as noncited violations (NCVs), consistent with Section VI.A of the Enforcement Policy. These NCVs are described in the subject inspection report. If you contest the violation or significance of these NCVs, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your denial, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001, with copies to the Regional Administrator, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Region IV, 611 Ryan Plaza Drive, Suite 400, Arlington, Texas 76011; the Director, Office of Enforcement, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001; and the NRC Resident Inspector at the Wolf Creek Generating Station facility.

The NRC has increased security requirements at Wolf Creek Generating Station in response to terrorist acts on September 11, 2001. Although the NRC is not aware of any specific threat against nuclear facilities, the NRC issued an Order and several threat advisories to commercial power reactors to strengthen licensees capabilities and readiness to respond to a potential attack. The NRC continues to monitor overall security controls and will issue temporary instructions in the near future to verify by inspection the licensee's compliance with the Order and current security regulations.

In accordance with 10 CFR 2.790 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter, its enclosure, and your response will be made available electronically for public inspection in the

Wolf Creek Nuclear Operating Corporation -2-NRC Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of NRCs document system (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).

Sincerely,

/RA/

David N. Graves, Chief Project Branch B Division of Reactor Projects Docket: 50-482 License: NPF-42

Enclosure:

NRC Inspection Report 50-482/02-04

REGION IV==

Dockets: 50-482 Licenses: NPF-42 Report No: 50-482/02-04 Licensee: Wolf Creek Nuclear Operating Corporation Facility: Wolf Creek Generating Station Location: 1550 Oxen Lane, NE Burlington, Kansas 66839 Dates: June 30 through September 21, 2002 Inspectors: F. L. Brush, Senior Resident Inspector J. Cruz, Resident Inspector B. D. Baca, Health Physicist Approved By: D. N. Graves, Chief, Project Branch B ATTACHMENT: Supplemental Information

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS Wolf Creek Generating Station NRC Inspection Report 50-482/02-04 IR 500482/02-04; on June 30 - September 21,2002; Wolf Creek Nuclear Operating Corporation; Wolf Creek Generating Station. Integrated Resident/Regional Report. Event Followup.

The report covers a 12-week period of resident inspection and an announced inspection by a Region IV inspector. The significance of issues is indicated by their color (Green, White, Yellow, Red) and was determined by the Significance Determination Process in Inspection Manual Chapter 0609. Findings for which the significance determination process does not apply are indicated by the severity level of the applicable violation. The NRCs program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is described at its Reactor Oversight Process website at http://www.nrc.gov/NRR/OVERSIGHT/index.html.

A. Inspector-Identified Findings Cornerstone: Mitigating Systems

This issue was considered more than minor because, if left uncorrected, the finding would result in a more significant safety concern. Additionally, the issue affected the operability, availability, reliability, and function of accident mitigation equipment. This issue was determined to be of very low safety significance because it did not result in the loss of the safety function of a Technical Specification train or system (Section 4OA3).

B. Licensee Identified Findings Violations of very low safety significance which were identified by the licensee have been reviewed by the inspectors. Corrective actions taken or planned by the licensee appear reasonable. These violations are listed in Section 4OA7.

Report Details Summary of Plant Status The plant operated at essentially 100 percent power for the report period.

1. REACTOR SAFETY Cornerstones: Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, Barrier Integrity 1R01 Adverse Weather (71111.01)

a. Inspection Scope The inspectors performed a walkdown of the essential service water pump house to verify that adverse weather would not affect mitigating systems. The inspectors discussed aspects of severe weather preparations with licensee personnel.

b. Findings No findings of significance were identified.

1R04 Equipment Alignment (71111.04)

a. Inspection Scope The inspectors performed the following partial walkdowns:

C Auxiliary feedwater system Train B and the turbine-driven auxiliary feedwater system during an auxiliary feedwater system Train A outage C Safety injection Pump B during a safety injection Pump A outage, August 8 The inspectors performed the walkdowns to verify equipment alignment and identify discrepancies that could impact redundant system operability. The inspectors used the Updated Safety Analysis Report, system drawings, and system lineup checklists to perform the walkdowns. The inspectors also discussed the walkdowns with various licensee personnel.

b. Findings No findings of significance were identified.

1R05 Fire Protection (71111.05)

a. Inspection Scope The inspectors performed a walkdown of the following areas to determine whether the licensee implemented a fire protection program for the control of combustibles that maintained the fire detection and suppression equipment and passive fire protection

-2-features, and adequately compensated for inoperable or degraded fire protection equipment, systems, or features:

C Auxiliary boiler room C Auxiliary building 2000 foot level, auxiliary feedwater pump Room A, and feedwater pump valve Compartments 3 and 4, September 3 C Auxiliary building 2000 foot level, auxiliary feedwater pump Room B, and feedwater pump calve Compartment 1 and 2, July 8 C Auxiliary building 2026 foot level, south electrical penetration room, July 22 Fuel building 2000 foot, fuel pool cooling heat exchanger Room A, August 6 C Turbine building lube oil reservoir room 2033 foot level, August 28 b. Findings No findings of significance were identified.

1R11 Licensed Operator Requalification (71111.11)

a. Inspection Scope The inspectors observed control room operator simulator training to verify that the licensed operator requalification program ensured safe operation of the plant by adequately evaluating how well the operators and crews mastered the training objectives. The inspectors used Simulator Guide LR 50 010 02, Loss of Coolant Accident and ATWT, Revision 4. The scenario included a main turbine generator runback due to a temporary loss-of-stator cooling water flow followed by a reactor coolant system leak and an anticipated transient without trip.

The inspectors also attended the training critique and discussed various aspects of operator performance with various licensee personnel.

a. Findings No findings of significance were identified.

1R12 Maintenance Rule Implementation (71111.12)

a. Inspection Scope The inspectors reviewed the licensees maintenance rule implementation for the following structures, systems, or components to assess the effectiveness of maintenance efforts in accordance with 10 CFR 50.65.

-3-C Main steam isolation and bypass valves C Service water system pumps The inspectors reviewed work practices, scoping in accordance with 10 CFR 50.65(b),

performance, 10 CFR 50.65(a)(1) or (a)(2) classification and reclassification goals, and identification of common cause failures. The inspectors reviewed various documentation and discussed maintenance rule items with licensee personnel.

b. Findings No findings of significance were identified.

1R13 Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Evaluation (71111.13)

a. Inspection Scope The inspectors reviewed the licensees risk assessment for equipment outages as a result of planned and emergent maintenance to evaluate the licensees effectiveness in assessing risk for planned and emergent maintenance. The inspectors also discussed the planned and emergent work activities with planning and maintenance personnel.

The inspectors review included the following:

C Operational risk assessments for planned maintenance for the weeks of July 15 and August 5, C Actual, planned, and emergent work schedules for the same weeks b. Findings No findings of significance were identified.

1R15 Operability Evaluations (71111.15)

a. Inspection Scope The inspectors reviewed the following operability evaluations to ensure that operability was properly justified and the component or system remained operable:

C Containment Cooler SGN01D, July 24 C Foreign objects in steam Generator D, July 26 The inspectors also discussed the evaluations with licensee personnel and reviewed applicable portions of the Updated Safety Analysis Report.

b. Findings No findings of significance were identified.

-4-1R16 Operator Workarounds (71111.16)

a. Inspection Scope The inspectors reviewed operator workarounds to determine the following:

C Effect of the workarounds on system reliability, availability, and potential for misoperation C Whether the cumulative effects of the workarounds could affect multiple mitigating systems C The cumulative effects of the workarounds on operator response to plant transients and accidents The inspectors reviewed licensee Administrative Procedure AI 22A-001, Operator Work Arounds, Revision 1, and the licensees operator workaround/burdens list.

The inspectors discussed with licensee operations personnel long-term equipment problems that were not included in the workaround list. The inspectors reviewed nine deficiencies that were not on the list and did not meet the licensees definition of a workaround or operator burden. The inspectors reviewed the cumulative effects of the operator workarounds, burdens, and long-term equipment problems to determine whether they could affect mitigating system response during normal and emergency plant operations.

b. Findings No findings of significance were identified.

1R19 Postmaintenance Testing (71111.19)

a. Inspection Scope The inspectors reviewed or observed the postmaintenance testing on the following equipment to verify that procedures and test activities are adequate to verify system operability:

C Auxiliary feedwater Pump B C Emergency diesel Generator B, August 23 C Safety injection Pump A, August 13 C Safety injection Pump B, July 3 In each case, the associated work orders and test procedures were reviewed to determine the scope of the maintenance activity and determine if the test adequately tested components affected by the maintenance. The Updated Final Safety Analysis Report, design basis documents, and selected calculations were also reviewed to determine the adequacy of the acceptance criteria listed in the test procedures.

-5-b. Findings No findings of significance were identified.

1R22 Surveillance Testing (71111.22)

a. Inspection Scope The inspectors reviewed or observed all or part of the following surveillance activities to verify that risk significant structures, systems, and components are capable of performing their intended safety functions and assessing their operational readiness:

C STS AL-210A, MDAFW Pump A Inservice Check Valve Test, Revision 2, August 16 C STS EJ-100B, RHR System Inservice Pump B Test, Revision 20, July 31 C STS EN-100B, Containment Spray Pump B Inservice Pump Test, Revision 15, July 3 C STS KJ-013A, Hot Restart of Emergency D/G NE01, Revision 0, July 11 b. Findings No findings of significance were identified.

1R23 Temporary Plant Modifications (71111.23)

a. Inspection Scope The inspectors reviewed a temporary modification to the high pressure nitrogen system to verify that the modification had not affected the safety functions of the emergency core cooling system accumulators, the auxiliary feedwater control valves, and the steam generator atmospheric relief valve accumulators.

b. Findings No findings of significance were identified.

Cornerstone: Emergency Preparedness 1EP6 Drill Evaluation (71114.06)

a. Inspection Scope The inspectors observed and reviewed emergency drill activities primarily in the simulator control room. The inspectors also observed activities in the technical support

-6-center and the emergency offsite facility. The inspectors attended the control room simulator postdrill critique. The inspectors reviewed associated documents and information and discussed the drill activities with various licensee personnel.

b. Findings No findings of significance were identified.

2. RADIATION SAFETY Cornerstone: Occupational Radiation Safety 2OS2 As Low As Reasonably Achievable (ALARA) Planning and Controls (71121.02)

a. Inspection Scope The inspector interviewed radiation protection personnel involved in high dose rate and high exposure jobs in the radiologically controlled areas during routine operations for radiation worker practices and work activity results. No high exposure jobs or work activities in high radiation or airborne areas were performed during the inspection.

Therefore, this aspect of the above procedure could not be evaluated. The following items were reviewed and compared with regulatory requirements to assess the licensees program to maintain occupational exposures ALARA:

  • Processes used to estimate and track exposures
  • Plant collective exposure history for the past 3 years, current exposure trends, and 3-year rolling average dose information
  • Five ALARA postjob reviews and associated radiation work permit packages from Refueling Outage 12 activities which resulted in the highest personnel collective exposures during the inspection period (RWP 02-3220, Eddy Current Testing of the Steam Generators; RWP 02-3230, Install/Remove Nozzle Dams; RWP 02-4200, Secondary Side Steam Generator Activities; RWP 02 4420, Scaffold Erection/Removal Inside the RCA, and RWP 02-6060, Refueling Activities)

C Use of administrative and engineering controls to achieve dose reductions

  • Individual exposures of selected work groups (health physics, operations, and mechanical maintenance)
  • Hot spot tracking and reduction program
  • Plant related source-term data, including source-term control strategy

-7-C Refueling Outage 12 ALARA Successes Report C Quality Assurance Audits (K-559 and K-569), quality evaluation (OB 02-1104),

and self-assessment (SEL 02-002) reviewing ALARA performance C Selected corrective action documentation involving exposure tracking, higher than planned exposure levels, and radiation worker practice deficiencies since the last inspection in this area (Performance Improvement Requests 2001-2576, 2002-0768, 2002-0776, 2002-0873, 2002-0887, 2002-0917, 2002-0961, 2002-1022, 2002-1029, 2002-1083, 2002-1106, 2002-1277, and 2002-1684)

C ALARA Committee meeting minutes and presentations

  • Declared pregnant worker and embryo/fetus dose evaluation, monitoring, and controls b. Findings No findings of significance were identified.

3. SAFEGUARDS Cornerstone: Physical Protection 3PP3 Response to Contingency Events (71130.03)

The Office of Homeland Security developed a Homeland Security Advisory System to disseminate information regarding the risk of terrorist attacks. The Homeland Security Advisory System implements five color-coded threat conditions with a description of corresponding actions at each level. NRC Regulatory Information Summary 2002-12a, dated August 19, 2002, NRC Threat Advisory and Protective Measures System, discusses the Homeland Security Advisory System and provides additional information on protective measures to licensees.

a. Inspection Scope On September 10, 2002, the NRC issued a Safeguards Advisory to reactor licensees to implement the protective measures described in Regulatory Information Summary 2002-12a in response to the Federal government declaration of threat level orange.

Subsequently, on September 24, 2002, the Office Homeland Security downgraded the national security threat condition to yellow with a corresponding reduction in the risk of a terrorist threat.

The inspector interviewed licensee personnel and security staff, observed the conduct of security operations, and assessed licensee implementation of the threat level orange protective measures. Inspection results were communicated to the Region and Headquarters security staff for further evaluation.

-8-b. Findings No findings of significance were identified.

4. OTHER ACTIVITIES 4OA1 Performance Indicator Verification (71151)

a. Inspection Scope The inspectors verified the following performance indicators using inspection Procedure 71151 to determine the accuracy and completeness of the performance indicator:

C Reactor coolant system leakage - July 2001 through June 2002 C Safety system functional failures - July 2001 through June 2002 C Safety system unavailability, emergency ac power - July 2001 through June 2002 C Unplanned scrams per 7000 critical hours - July 2001 through June 2002 The inspectors discussed system status with various licensee personnel. The inspectors also reviewed licensee information and the applicable Technical Specifications.

b. Findings No findings of significance were identified.

4OA2 Identification and Resolution of Problems (71152)

a. Inspection Scope The inspectors reviewed the licensees response to a question concerning what constituted the standby condition for the emergency diesel generators. The licensee determined that some of the Technical Specification required surveillance procedures did not specify the standby condition temperatures for the lube oil and jacket water systems. The licensee determined that the standby condition temperature bands were:

Lube oil to the engine between 120EF and 140EF.

Jacket water from the engine between 135EF and 167EF The licensee initiated Performance Improvement Request 2002-007 to document the evaluation and corrective actions. The licensee also performed a Reportability Evaluation Request, 2002-006, to determine if this was reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72.

-9-The licensee determined that some of the emergency diesel generators technical specification-required surveillance tests had been performed following a postmaintenance or other run. As such, the lube oil and/or jacket water temperatures were higher than the standby condition temperature range. The licensee determined that the surveillance tests did not always meet the intent of the Technical Specification surveillance requirement of starting from a standby condition.

However, this is historical, and the licensee had performed routine surveillances from a valid standby condition following instances when surveillances had been conducted with the temperatures above the standby limit. The licensee changed the appropriate emergency diesel generator surveillance procedures to ensure that the temperatures were within the standby condition limits prior to the test.

b. Findings No findings of significance were identified.

4OA3 Event Followup (71153)

.1 (Closed) Licensee Event Report (LER) 50-482/2002-003-00: Unit trip due to a feedwater regulating valve control card failure. The inspectors reviewed the LER and no significant findings were identified. The licensee initiated Performance Improvement Request 2002-1180 for this issue.

.2 (Closed) Unresolved Items (URI) 50-482/2002-006-01, -02, -03: These unresolved items involved the failure to: (a) Implement corrective action for past indications of emergency diesel generator heat exchanger tube degradation; (b) provide acceptance criteria for eddy current testing of emergency diesel generator heat exchanger tubes; and (c) promptly identify significantly degraded emergency diesel generator heat exchanger tubes. The details of these unresolved items were previously identified in a special inspection and documented in NRC Inspection Report 50-482/2002-006.

A violation was not issued at the time of the special inspection pending licensee metallurgical analysis of the emergency diesel generator heat exchanger tubes. This was necessary to determine the significance of the observed performance deficiencies.

Analysis of the degraded tubes by an independent laboratory and the licensee determined that the observed tube degradation did not affect diesel operability.

These issues were considered more than minor because, if left uncorrected, the findings would result in a more significant safety concern. Additionally, these issues affected the operability, availability, reliability, and function of accident mitigation equipment. These issues were determined to be of very low safety significance because they did not result in the loss of the safety function of a Technical Specification train or system.

The failure to: (a) implement corrective action for past indications of emergency diesel generator heat exchanger tube degradation, (b) provide acceptance criteria for eddy current testing of emergency diesel generator heat exchanger tubes, and (c) promptly identify significantly degraded emergency diesel generator heat exchanger tubes is a

-10-violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI. This violation is being treated as a noncited violation consistent with Section VI.A.1 of the NRC Enforcement Policy and is in the licensees corrective action system as Performance Improvement Request 2002-0048 (50-482/2002-04-01).

.3 (Closed) URI 50-482/2002-006-04: Evaluate past operability of emergency diesel Generator B following analysis of heat exchanger tubes. Emergency diesel Generator B potential inoperabilty in excess of the Technical Specification allowed outage time due to degraded heat exchanger tubes. The results of the analysis by an independent laboratory and the licensee stated that the tubes degredation did not affect diesel operability. This unresolved item is closed.

4OA6 Meetings

.1 Exit Meeting Summary The inspectors presented the resident inspector inspection results to Ms. D. Jacobs, Plant Manager, and other members of licensee management on September 25, 2002.

The inspector presented the ALARA planning and controls inspection results to Mr. M. W. Hicks, Operations Manager, and other members of licensee management at the conclusion of the inspection on July 19, 2002.

The inspectors asked the licensee whether any materials examined during the inspection should be considered proprietary. No proprietary information was identified.

4OA7 Licensee-Identified Violations The following violation of very low safety significance (Green) was identified by the licensee and is a violation of NRC requirements, which meets the criteria of Section VI of the NRC Enforcement Policy, NUREG-1600, for being dispositioned as a noncited violation (NCV).

10 CFR 20.1904(a) requires each container of licensed material bear a durable, visible label which provides sufficient information to permit individuals handling or using the container, or working in the vicinity of the containers, to take precautions to avoid or minimize exposures. On April 3, 2002, a radioactive sample container was identified with incorrect dose rate information on the label in a low dose waiting area of Penetration Rooms 57 and 64, as described in the licensees corrective action program Performance Improvement Request 2002-0811. Because there was no overexposure, substantial potential and ability to assess dose was not compromised, this violation is of very low significance, and is being treated as a noncited violation.

ATTACHMENT Supplemental Information PARTIAL LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED Licensee K. A. Harris, Manager, Regulatory Affairs M. W. Hicks, Manager, Operations D. Jacobs, Plant Manager O. L. Maynard, President and Chief Executive Officer B. T. McKinney, Vice President Operations and Plant Manager C. R. Younie, Manager, Performance Improvement and Assessment ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED Opened 50-482/2002-04-01 NCV Failure to implement appropriate corrective actions for degraded emergency diesel generator heat exchanger tubes (Section 4OA3)

Closed 50-482/2002-003-00 LER Unit trip due to a feedwater regulating valve control card failure (Section 4OA3)

50-482/2002-006-01 URI Failure to implement corrective action for past indications of emergency diesel generator heat exchanger tube degradation (Section 4OA3)

50-482/2002-006-02 URI Failure to provide acceptance criteria for eddy current testing (Section 4OA3)

50-482/2002-006-03 URI Failure to promptly identify significantly degraded emergency diesel generator heat exchanger tubes (Section 4OA3)

50-482/2002-006-04 URI Evaluate past operability of emergency diesel Generator B following analysis of heat exchanger tubes (Section 4OA3)

50-482/2002-04-01 NCV Failure to implement appropriate corrective actions for degraded emergency diesel generator heat exchanger tubes (Section 4OA3)

-2-LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED Drill Evaluation C 02-SA-02, 2002 Semi-Annual Drill, Revision 0 Equipment Alignment C CKL AL-102, Auxiliary Feedwater Normal Lineup, Revision 31 C CKL EM-120, Safety Injection System Lineup Checklists, Revision 21 C M-12EM01, Piping and Instrumentation Diagram, High Pressure Coolant Injection System, Revision 26 C M-12EM02, Piping and Instrumentation Diagram, High Pressure Coolant Injection System, Revision 14 Fire Protection C FPP AB-1, Auxiliary Boiler Room, Revision 5 C FPP A-13, 29, Auxiliary Building 2000 Foot Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Room B, Feedwater Pump Valve Compartment No. 1 and 2, Revision 3 C FPP A-14, Auxiliary Building 2000 Foot Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Room A, Revision 5 C FPP A-17, Auxiliary Building 2026 Foot, South Electrical Penetration Room, Revision 5 C FPP A-30, Auxiliary Building 2000 Foot Valve Compartments 3 and 4, Revision 3 C FPP F-3, Fuel Building 2000 Foot, A Fuel Pool Cooling Heat Exchanger Room, Revision 5 C FPP T-10, Turbine Building Lube Oil Reservoir Room 2033 Foot, Revision 4 Identification and Resolution of Problems C Maintenance rule bases information for KJ-01, Emergency 4160 VAC power C Performance Improvement Request 2002-0707 C Reportability Evaluation Request 2002-006 C STS KJ-005A, Manual/Auto Start, Synchronization & Loading of Emergency D/G NE01, Revision 40

-3-C STS KJ-005B, Manual/Auto Start, Synchronization & Loading of Emergency D/G NE02, Revision 40 C STS KJ-011A, DG NE01 24 Hour Run, Revision 11 C STS KJ-011B, DG NE02 24 Hour Run, Revision 11 C STS KJ-013A, Hot Restart of Emergency D/G NE01, Revision 0 C STS KJ-013B, Hot Restart of Emergency D/G NE02, Revision 0 Maintenance Rule Documents C Functional failure evaluations for AB-05, main steam system C Functional failure evaluations for WS-01, plant service water system C Maintenance rule bases information for AB-05, main steam system C Maintenance rule bases information for AB-06, main steam system C Maintenance rule bases information for WS-01, plant service water system C Maintenance rule (A1) disposition checklist and document summary for WS-01, plant service water system C Maintenance rule expert panel meeting minutes for AB-05, main steam system C Maintenance rule expert panel meeting minutes for AB-06, main steam system C Maintenance rule expert panel meeting minutes for WS-01, plant service water system C Maintenance rule performance evaluation for AB-05, main steam system C Maintenance rule performance evaluation for AB-06, main steam system C Maintenance rule performance evaluation for WS-01, plant service water system C Performance Improvement Requests 2000-2258; 2001-0196, -1267, -2624; and 2002-0032, -0333, -0849, -0894, and -1162 C System Health Report for WS-01, plant service water system C Work Orders 00-216374-000, 00-216375-000, 00-216718-000, 00-217193-000, 00-217193-007, 00-219674-000, 00-220939-000, 01-230382-000, 01-232601-000, 02-233227-000, 02-235703-000, and 02-235480-000

-4-Operability Evaluations C Control room shift managers log C Engineering disposition for Work Orders 02-236442-000 and 02-236443-000 C Evaluation of nonconforming conditions of installed plant equipment for Work Request 02-032466 Performance Indicator Verification C Licensee Event Report 2001-001-00 C Licensee performance indicator worksheets C Performance indicator summary reports C Selected NRC inspection reports C Selected control room operator logs C STS BB-004, RCS Water Inventory Balance, Revision 25 Postmaintenance Testing C STS AL-102, MDAFW Pump B Inservice Pump Test, Revision 27 C STS EM-100B, Safety Injection Pump B Inservice Pump Test, Revision 18 C STS KJ-015B, Manual/Auto Fast Start, Sync & Loading of EDG NE02, Revision 16 C STS KJ-124, Post Maintenance Run of Emergency Diesel Generator B, Revision 15 C STS PE-053A, B Train Auxiliary Feedwater Pressure Test, Revision 2 C Work Order 00-219451-407, NG001BGR3, safety injection pumps to hot legs motor operated valve C Work Order 00-219451-443, NG001ABF3, safety injection Pump A Room cooler C Work Order 00-219451-513, NG002ABR5, EMHV8807B suction header cross connection C Work Order 01-231065-001, EMHV8807B, residual heat removal heat Exchanger A chemical and volume control system to safety injection Pump A C Work Order 01-232710-000, PEM01B, safety injection Pump B C Work Order 02-232967-000, PEM01B, safety injection Pump B C Work Order 00-234000-001, BNHV8806A, reactor water storage tank to safety injection pump suction

-5-Temporary Modification C Temporary Modification Order 02-020-KH for high pressure nitrogen C Work Order 02-237015-009, installation of a blind flange on the 1-inch nitrogen line at the 1993 foot elevation in the auxiliary building C Work Order 02-237015-010, removal of a blind flange on the 1-inch nitrogen line at the 1993 foot elevation in the auxiliary building C Work Order 02-237015-012, installation of nitrogen bottles to service gas system

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