IR 05000309/1989001
| ML20248H903 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Maine Yankee |
| Issue date: | 03/28/1989 |
| From: | Eselgrath P, David Silk NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20248H886 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-309-89-01OL, 50-309-89-1OL, NUDOCS 8904140256 | |
| Download: ML20248H903 (5) | |
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U.S.' NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION I E1
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OPERATOR'~ LICENSING EXAMINATION REPORT-
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EXAMINATION REPORT NO.
50-309/89-01(OL)
i FACILITY DOCKET NO.
50-309
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FACILITY LICENSE NO.
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Ji LICENSEE:
Maine Yankee Atomic Power Company i
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83 Edison' Drive
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Augusta, Maine. 04336
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k FACILITY:
Maine. Yankee Atomic Power Station
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EXAMINATION DATE:
January 18, 1989 CHIEF EXAMINER:.
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S-z e,- 6J David M. Silk, Operations Engineer Date
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3-2 6-51
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APPROVED BY:
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Peter.W. Esel th, Chief, PWR Section Date
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i SUMMARY: One simulator examination was administered to one senior reactor
- .d operator (SRO) retake candidate who failed the examination. Also, the l
portion;of the requalification training program pertaining to requal lecture attendance and documentation of same were reviewed. The inspector determined that completion of makeup training for operators is not being tracked.
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DETAILS-
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.tTYPE OF. EXAMINATIONS:
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CHIEF EXAMINER AT SITE:
D. Silk.
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-OTHER EXAMINERS:
D. Wallace 3.
PERSONNEL PRESENT AT EXIT INTERVIEW.
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NRC Personnel
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David Silk, Operations Engineer David Wallace, Operations Engineer y
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a Facility Personnel
. Robert Lawton, Manager,-Safety Engineering and Operations Support
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A. J. Cayia, Asst. Manager, Operations Dept.
Arthur Sheon, Manager Training Mike Evringham, Operations Training Section Head Bill Ball, Simulator Operations Coordinator i
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4; SUMMARY OF NRC COMMENTS MADE' AT EXIT! INTERVIEW:
- The NRC expressed appreciation for the licensee's cooperation in'
reviewing and running the. simulator' scenarios.for the examination.
- The_NRC acknowledged the difficult-role of the " rabbit" operators i
who participated in the scenarios and complemented them for performing as directed to' aid in the evaluation process.
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- The NRC questioned the purpose of. steps 11'7 and 19 of E-0.
Step l17 has' the operator check if any steam generator (SG) should be isolated. Step 19 ' checks if emergency, feedwater (EFW) pumps should
.be running.
The questions arose as'a result of a simulator scenario in which a steam line. break of-25% severity occurred inside containment. At step 17, the candidate ordered the B0P to isolate the faulted SG.
Even though the criteria'of step 17 were not met, which is to isolate the SG at 400'psig (actual SG pressure was
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between 500 and 600 psig'and decreasing), the examiner stated that
'the candidate took the prudent action to isolate the.SG based upon-plant conditions. The appropriateness of permitting SG isolation before waiting until pressure reaches 400 psig when an automatic
feedwater isolation occurs should be reviewed. However, despite
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l initially isolating the SG, the candidate re-established EFW flow to the faulted SG as'per step 19 c. which states, " Ensure EFW flow to H
all SG(s) with pressure greater than 380 psig." When EFW flow was-
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re-established to the faulted SG, its pressure was above 500 psig but was still decreasing. The examiner noted that the appropriate-ness of changing the word "all".in step 19 c. to "non-faulted" so
that an identified faulted SG will not be fed, thereby reducing the j
extent of the RCS cooldown, should be reviewed.
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SUMMARY OF NRC COMMENTS MADE AT EXIT INTERVIEW:
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The licensee acknowledged the inconsistency of the procedure and stated that action would be taken to address the wording of the procedure.
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REQUALIFICATION REVIEW A review was conducted to determine how certain aspects of the Requalification Training Program are administered and controlled. The inspector reviewed the requalification training schedule to determine how makeup of missed training is controlled, and how exemptions to i
training are approved.
Because of the relatively low number of weeks of requalification training that were being reported on operator license renewal
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applications, the training schedule was reviewed.
It was determined
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that the low number of weeks of training reported was due to an overly
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conservative. recording of time spent in-training and also due to an extended refueling outage that deleted'one block (six weeks) of training
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for that requalification training cycle.
Operators are permitted by procedure to miss up to 25% of their scheduled requalification training classroom'. lectures, but this training must be made up as required by the Requalification Program. The inspector
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determined that makeup. training for operators in the. requalification
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program is not being tracked. Although this documentation.is not specifically required by the Requalification Program, it is an important.
indicator of the overall program effectiveness. The inspector discussed the above concern with training management, who. recognized that documentation to verify makeup training did not exist. The Operator Training Section Head stated that attention would be focused on this I
facet of-the program so that the performance of makeup-training will be documented in some manner.
Specifics of these actions were not available at the close of the inspection.
The Requalification Training Program permits instructors to be granted exemptions from requalification training if they receive equivalent training from their instructor duties. Two personnel have been granted exemptions'who do not actually teach requalification classes, but who-i participate in training related work such as simulator' software-f validation. testing.
These exemptions are not specifically described in j
the Requalification Training Program, but were determined by the
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inspector to be within the intent of the procedure.. Management stated l
that administrative control over these exemptions will be clarified in i
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the revised Requalification Training Program that is being developed.
Training Management also stated their intention to document the reasons for each exemption allowed. The inspector reviewed a sampling of the
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simulator software validation tasks for which exemptions-from specific
classroom sessions were granted and found that the knowledge required-for these tasks met the learning objectives for the' exempted classroom sessions, i
l Attachment:
Simulation Facility Fidelity Report i
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ATTACHMENT
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SIMULATION FACILITY FIDELITY REPORT
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' Facility. Licen see: -Maine Yankee Atomic Power
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FacilityfDocket No.:
50-309
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Facility License-No. :
' Operating Tests administered at:
Maine Yankee Atomic Power Station
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Operating' Tests'Given On:, January 18, 1989-3.
During the conduct _of the simulator portion.of the-operating test identified-above,.the following apparent performance and/or-human factors discrepancies were observed:
For malfunction CV10A, High Pressure Letdown Leak, the Malfunction j
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Cause and Effects book says possible HELB (High Energy.Line Break)
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actuation may occur.
The examiner was told that the simulator.
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does.not simulate the HELB actuation because the software modeling
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is incomplete.
l The Channel.B pressurizer pressure channel was to be in its tripped
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condition as a turnover item for the scenarios. 'In'the plant, the
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channel is ensured.to be tripped by pulling.the channel bin from
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the RPS panel'. -The simulator RPS panel does not permit the bins to be pulled..However, the simulator software can model the l
I tripped condition of the channel.
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The simulator's plant computers was not functioning the day of the simulator examination.' This computer has a. randomly dispensed j
failure rate due to occassional hardware and software problems.
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Training personnel stated that the simulator's plant computer i
behaves in much the same way as the plant computer in this' regard.
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