IR 05000309/1987011

Emergency Preparedness Insp Rept 50-309/87-11 on 870608-10. No Violations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Annual Emergency Exercise Performed on 870609

ML20235M247
Person / Time
Site:	Maine Yankee
Issue date:	07/06/1987
From:	Lazarus W, Thomas W NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I)
To:
Shared Package
ML20235M235	List: IR 05000309/1987011 ML20235M232
References
50-309-87-11, NUDOCS 8707170121
Download: ML20235M247 (7)

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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION l REGION I ,

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Report N /87-11 Docket N i License No. DPR-36 Priority -

Category C l

Licensee: Maine Yankee Atomic Power Company  !

83 Edison Drive Augusta, Maine 04336 i

Facility Name: Maine Yankee Atomic Power Plant  :

Inspection At: Wiscasset, Main I

Inspection Conduc d: Jsn( 8-Itk 19S '

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[1 ,,/ Q l Inspectors:* A Nhreg[/ [ -// 9 W. Thomas, ' Tham Lefder, EPS( EP&RPEV, DRSS / da%

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C. Conklin, EP Specialist, EPS, EP&RPB, DR$$

C. Amato, EP Specialist, EPS, EP&RPB, DRSS G. Arthur, Battelle W. Herrington, Battelle E. Podolak, NRR

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M. Lamastra, NRR Approved by: _

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. J[)dizarusghief, EPS, EP&RPB, DRSS i Inspection Summary: Inspection on June 8-10, 1987 (Report No. 50-309/87-11)

Areas Inspected: Routine announced emergency preparedness inspection and observation of the licensee's annual emergency exercise performed on June 9, 1987. The intpection was performed by a team of seven NRC Region I, j Headquarters, and contractor personne '

Results: No violations were identifie Emergency response actions were l adequate to provide protective measures for the health and safety of the '

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DETAILS 1. Persons Contacted The following licensee representatives attended the exit meeting held on June 10, 198 J. Temple, Emergency Preparedness Exercise Coordinator W. Ball, Control Room Controller J. Brinkler, EOF Coordinator P. Anderson, Project Manager, YAEC S. Evans, EOF Controller J. Randazza, Vice President, Nuclear Operations C. Frizzle, Assistant Vice President / Manager of Operations J. McCumber, Radiation Protection Engineer YAEC D. Whittier, Licensing Section Head W. Riethie, Manager, Radiation Protection, YAEC T. Fuller, Radiation Protection Engineer, YAEC R. Meixell, Plant Shift Supervisor The team observed and interviewed several licensee emergency respons I personnel, controllers and observers as they performed their assigned functions during the exercis . Emergency Exercise The Maine Yankee Atomic Power Plant Full participation exercise was conducted on June 9, 1987 from 5:00 p.m. to 11:00 .1 Pre-exercise Activities Prior to the emergency exercise, NRC Region I representatives held meetings and had telephone discussions with licensee representatives to discuss objectives, scope, and content of the exercise scenari <

As a result, changes were made in order to clarify certain l objectives, revise certain portions of the scenario and ensure that (

the scenario provided the opportunity for the licensee to j demonstrate those areas previously identified by NRC as in need of )

corrective actio i NRC observers attended a licensee briefing on June 9, 1987, an participated in the discussion of emergency response actions expected during the various phases of the scenario. The licensee stated that controllers would intercede in exercise activities to prevent scenario deviation or disruption of normal plant operation The exercise scenario included the following events:

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Increasing leak rate from the reactor coolant system;

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Reactor coolant system piping rupture;

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Release of activity to the atmosphere via damaged containment airlock doors;

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Loss of all core cooling capability, with sube.equent core uncovery and major fuel damage;

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Declaration of Unusual Event, Alert, Site Area Emergency and )

General Emergency Classifications; j

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Calculation of offsite dose consequences; and

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Recommendation of protective actions to state official .2 Activities Observed l During the ccnduct of the licensee's exercise, seven NRC team  !

members made detailed observations of the activation and augmentation of the emergency organization, activation of emergency response facilities, and actions of emergency response personnel during the operation of the emergency response facilities. The  ;

following activities were observed: I Detectien, classification, and assessment of scenario events;  !

1 Direction and coordination of the emergency response; j Off-hours augmentation of the emergency organization and response facility activation; ,' Notification of licensee personnel and offsite agencies of j pertinent plant status information:

l Communications /information flow, and reco'rdkeeping; Assessment and projection of offsite radiological dos <. and consideration of protective actions; Provisions for inplant radiation protection; Performance of offsite and inplant radiological surveys; Maintenance of site security and access control; 1 Performan:e of technical support, repair and corrective actions; 11. Assembly, accountability, and evacuation of personnel; and 12. Management of recovery operations.

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3.0 Exercise Observations The NRC team noted that the licensee's activation and augmentation of the emergency organization, activation of the emergency response facilities, i and use of the facilities were generally consistent with their emergency i response plan and implementing procedure The team also noted the following actions that were indicative of their ability to cope with abnormal plant conditions: l

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The Emergency Response Facilities (ERFs) were staffed and activated in a timely manner, j

Control Room personnel maintained a positive aggressive attitude )

throughout the exercise. They were knowledgeable and participated in I numerous procedural and technical discussion l I

Analysis and classification of exercise events was timely. Good use {'

of procedures was demonstrated by the operators and good control room communications existed throughout the exercis *

Excellent command and control of the ERFs was demonstrated by the 3 ERF Coordinator '

Technical Support Center (TSC) Emergency Action Level (EAL)

classifications recommended to the Emergency Operations Facility were timely and correct for scenario situation *

TSC briefings were frequent and informative. Good use of the staff was demonstrated in discussing accident consequences and in prioritizing repair and corrective action task l

Very good technical briefings were observed in the Operations Support Center (OSC) prior to dispatch of plant repair teams and good ALARA practices were maintaine {1 l

Habitability surveys were routinely performed in all ERFs and plant '

entry team radiation doses were tracked very closel Excellent deployment and use of the Offsite Monitoring Teams (OMTs) l was demonstrated. Team members were conscientious and performed in a professional manner. The team communicator frequently reminded them to check their self reading dosimeter .1 Areas Requiring Followup l

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i The NRC team identified the following areas which could have degraded the response and need to be evaluated by the licensee for  ;

corrective action. These items are tracked as Inspector Followup l Items (IFI).

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No official record or log of significant events or times was maintained in the Control Room, EOF or OS (50-319/87-11-01)

Protective action recommendations were not included in the initial General Emergency notifications. (50-309/87-11-02)

The TSC Statusboard keeper is also responsible for performance of critical safety function analyse Although initially performed, for a period of over 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> they were not performed until prompted by the TSC Controller. (50-309/87-11-03)

• Initial staffing levels of the OSC and EOF should be evaluated in order tc assure timely facility activation and provision for full suppor of the plant Emergency Response Organizatio (50-309/87-11-04)

Radio communications between the OSC and in plant repair /

corrective action, and survey teams was not reliabl (50-309/87-11-05)

Controller radiological data maps for Offsite Monitoring Teams were difficult to use. The maps should have shown North and a scale as well as pre-designated sampling location (50-309/87-11-06)

In addition to the above the NRC Team also identified the following areas which should also be evaluated by the licensee in order to improve the conduct of future exercise *

Uncontrolled or drill copies of required procedures should be availab,le for ERF personnel to fill out during drill activitie *

Personnel should be advised of severe in plant radiological conditions by PA announcement and smoking, eating, and drinking prohibitions in ERFs should be enforced prior to habitability determination *

Personnel should obey the pager announcements.TSC personnel activated at the NOUE when the pager instruction was to standb *

Consideration should be given to providing dedicated communication lines between ERFs. Also, the addition of speakers and headsets in some locations would be helpfu *

Exercise players should make every attempt to assure that exercise observers are aware of the exercise activities that they are engaged in or have completed. During this exercise

observers were unaware that accountability had been completed,

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radiation surveys was in fact operabl _ - _ _ _ _ _ - _ -

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Consideration should be given to separating the State of Maine and the Maine Yankee radio net controller work stations to avoid interference with offsite communication f

Erroneous or confusing radiation data was provided tc OSC players by OSC controllers several times during the exercis ]i

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4.0 Licensee Actions on Previously Identified Items The following items were identified during previous exercises or inspections. Based upon observations made by the NRC team during this exercise the following Inspector Followup Items were not repeated and are closed: j l (CLOSED) 50-309/85-12-06: The primary dose assessment system does not

, include estimation of a source term for iodine and there is no methodology to estimate the iodine source term for different release pathways nor to estimate the effective filter efficiencies for different removal ,ystems. This resulted in an inappropriate decision to issue 4 potassium iodice during the exercis (CLOSED) 50-309/85-12-07: The OSC did not track cumulative exposure of corrective action team member (CLOSED) 50-309/86-14-01: The coordination and flow of information betwean the EOF, TSC and Control Room needs to be improved. As an example, a containment atmosphere sample was requested by the EOF, but an hour later, the TSC Manager cancelled the request as being unnecessar The EOF did not followup on the request since the exercise terminated approximately 30 minutes later.

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(CLOSED) 50-309/86-14-02: The Radiological Data Evaluator and the Radiological Data Evaluator Aide did not consult appropriate procedures for dose assessment and projection operations. They often consulted handwritten notes and the only copy of a procedure available was uncontrolled and filled with handwritten correction (CLOSED) 50-309/86-14-03: The licensee should evaluate the E0P's as they relate to the EAL's, and should further ensure consistency with the EAL guidelines in NUREG-065 .0 Licensee Critique The NRC observation team attended the licensee's post-exercise critique on June 10, 1987 during which licensee controllers presented and discussed their observations of the exercise. Their critique was adequate. Licensee participants highlighted areas for improvement which the licensee indicated would be evaluated and appropriate actions take h

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6.0 Exit Meeting and NRC Critique l The NRC team met with the licensee representatives listed in Section 1 of this report at the end of the inspectio The team leader summarized the observations made during the exercis ,

The licensee was informed that previously identified items were )

adequately addressed and no violations were observed. Although there were areas identified for corrective action, the NRC team determined that within the scope and limitations of the scenario, the licensee's performance demonstrated that they could implement their Emergency Plan and Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures in a manner which would adequately provide protective measures for health and safety of the publi Licensee management acknowledged the findings and indicated that appropriate action would be taken regarding the identified open item i At no time during this inspection did the inspectors provide any written information to the license ,

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