IR 05000309/1987002
| ML20206H262 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Maine Yankee |
| Issue date: | 04/01/1987 |
| From: | Lester Tripp NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20206H241 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-309-87-02, 50-309-87-2, NUDOCS 8704150307 | |
| Download: ML20206H262 (7) | |
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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION I
Docket / Report: 50-309/87-02 License:
DPR-36 Licensee:
Maina Yankee Atomic Power Inspection At: Wiscasset, Maine Dates:
February 1 to March 16, 1987 Inspectors:
Cornelius F. Holden, Senior Resident Inspector Ri hard reudenberger, Resident Inspector Approved:
M t/87
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L4 E. Tripp, Chief, Reactor Projects Section 3A
' D' ate Summary:
Inspection on February 1 to March 16, 1987 (Report No. 50-309/87-02 Areas Inspected:
Routine resident inspection (180 hours0.00208 days <br />0.05 hours <br />2.97619e-4 weeks <br />6.849e-5 months <br />) of the control room,.
accessible parts of plant structures, plant operations, radiation protection, physical security, fire protection, plant operating records, maintenance and sur-veillance.
Result:
No violations were identified. Two areas requiring further attention were identified.
The first was the untimely review of Engineering Design Change Re-quests (section 3.e). The other was the completeness of safety system locked valves administrative controls (section 3.b).
C704150307 870409 PDR ADOCK 05000309 O
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DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted Within this report period, interviews and discussions were conducted with various licensee personnel, including plant operators, maintenance technicians and the licensee's management staff.
2.
Summary of Facility Activities At the beginning of the report period the plant was operating at 94 percent power in cold leg temperature (Tc) coastdown.
Power continued to be reduced using Tc control throughout the period, ending at 75 percent power.
3.
Routine Periodic Inspections a.
Daily Inspection During routine facility tours, the following were checked: manning, ac-cess control, adherence to procedures and LC0's, instrumentation, recor-der traces, protective systems, control rod positions, control room annunciators, radiation monitors, emergency power source operability, control room logs, shift supervisor logs, and operating orders.
b.
System Alignment Inspection Operating confirmation was made of the High Pressure Safety Injection (HPSI) system. Accessible valve positions and status were examined.
Power supply and breaker alignments were checked.
Visual inspection of major components was performed.
Operability of instruments essential to system performance was assessed.
One deficiency was identified.
Two header drain valves, one associated
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with each train of the HPSI system, were not administratively controlled.
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These two valves, HSI-19 and HSI-111, were not included in valve lineup procedures and the valves were not locked.
The valves were in fact in the proper closed position and blank flanges were installed.
Since the valves were in their proper position with blank flanges installed it is not considered a violation.
The licensee reviewed the HPSI system to determine if any other valves were not being administrative 1y controlled.
None were found.
Future plans call for rewriting Procedure 3.1.2, Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) Routine Testing, to remove system lineups which are not specific-ally ECCS and place them in other lineup procedures.
The inspector had no further questions.
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c.
Biweekly Inspections During plant tours, the inspect'or observed shift; turnovers, chemistry sample results.and the use of radiation work permits and Health Physics procedures.
Area radiation and air monitor use and operational status-i were reviewed.
Plant Housekeeping and cleanliness were evaluated.
One concern was identified regarding the. storage of a portable electric
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pump.
The pump, motor and controller are mounted on a small frame with~
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wheels.
This was chained to conduit.
The conduit in that area contains cables which, among other things, provide power supplies and position
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indication of'the Refueling Water Storage Tank (RWST) suction valves.
Since the portable pump was. chained to the conduit it was possible that
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during a seismic event the conduit and cable could have been damaged
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impairing the capability of the safety'related valves. The concern was
promptly resolved by moving the portable pump to another storage location.
The inspector had no further questions.
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d.
Plant Maintenance The inspector observed and reviewed maintenance and problem investigation activities associated with the repair of the diesel-driven fire pump and normal maintenance to Emergency Diesel Generator 1A to verify compliance with regulations,-administrative and maintenance procedures, codes and
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standards, proper QA/QC involvement, safety tag use, equipment alignment,-
jumper use, personnel qualifications, fire protection, retest require-
. No areas of con-ments, and reportability per Technical Specifications.
cern were identified.
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e.
Surveillance Testing
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The inspector observed parts of tests to assess performance in accordance with approved procedures and LC0's, test results, removal and restoration of equipment, and deficiency review and resolution.
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Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) Surveillance Testing.
Emergency Diesel Generator - Monthly Surveillance Testing
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Post Accident Purge System Monthly Surveillance Testing.
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On February 4, while performing the Post Accident: Purge-(PAP) System
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Monthly Surveillance Test the installed flow meter was found to be in-
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An investigation by the licensee determined that another flowmeter performing the same function was located in the Primary Auxili-
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ary Building (PAB).
By verifying the flow utilizing this gauge, the surveillance test was completed satisfactorily.
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Further investigation by the licensee revealed that an_ Engineering Design Change Request (EDCR) 80-44 was partially complete and remained open.
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Under this EDCR, a new flow instrument was installed in the PAP system
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in the Emergency Feedwater Room. -The-intent of the EDCR was subsequently
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changed to include both flow detectors in the' system instead of replacing one detector as originally planned.. System prints show both flow detec-tors.
However, both flow detectors.were identically labeled.
Conse-
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quently only one. flow detector was controlled and calibrated.
This flow
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detector was installed in the PAB.
The flow indicator installed in the
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Emergency Feed Pump Room (which failed on February 4) was the indicator used by operators during routine surveillances. A review of release permits indicated that conservatisms were applied to the flow; rates and
therefore routine surveillances~were well within the. Technical Specifi-
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cation release limits.
L The licensee conducted a review of outstanding EDCR's.and identified twenty-two outstanding packages.
Of those, eighteen were awaiting review-
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i by the. Engineering Department.
The reviews were conducted and packages-were closed out.
Four other packages remain open.
One package remains
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open pending. approval of revised Technical Specifications.
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three packages have been reviewed =to ensure all affected plant equipment
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is accurately. reflected.in plant drawings and procedures. -Administrative review of these packages remains to be completed.
All of these EDCR's were_ implemented at a time when controls did not adequately ensure timely review of EDCR packages.
Additionally, changes in personnel resulted in a lack of continuity _in the review process.
Although these actions assure that no other similar problems exist, the inspector expressed concern that twenty-two design changes would remain open for such a long period of time, i
Changes made to the EDCR program in 1983 no longer allow EDCR packages to remain open pending review.
Work orders are used to control the im-plementation of EDCR's and retesting. _ Print revisions and procedures are revised prior to turnover of the system to operations.
f.
Flange Leak from the Refueling Water Storage Tank l
On February 25, 1987 a leak was identified in the Refueling Water Storage Tank (RWST) heater.
The leak was isolated after approximately 3400 ' gal-lons was lost from the RWST to a storm drain which leads to.the normal
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plant discharge.
The activity of the water was determined to be 2.33E-4 uCi/ml for a total of 0.087 curies released.
This release is-well within Technical Specification Limits.
After investigating the cause of-the leak the licensee determined that the gasket on the heater flange failed and that several of the bolts securing the flange were loose.
However, the gasket was properly com-
- pressed when installed and was of the specified material.
The licensee
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concluded that the cyclical thermal forces exerted on the flange by the
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heater caused the. bolts to work loose.
The bolts had lockwashers in-l stalled. The licensee instituted a~ program to identify and monitor-simi-lar applications at the plant.
Additional measures were taken to ensure
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the bolts stayed locked in their required positions. The inspector had
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no further questions.
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4.
' Observations-of Physical Security F
Checks were made to' determine whether security conditions met regulatory re-
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quirements, the physical security plan, and approved procedures. Those checks included security. staffing, protected and vital _ area barriers, vehicle searches.
I and personnel identification, access control, badging, outage preparations and compensatory measures when required. No areas of concern were identified.'
5.
Radiological Controls Radiological' controls were observed on a routine basis during the reporting period.. Standard industry radiological work practices, conformance to radio-logical control procedures and 10.CFR Part 20 requirements were observed.
Independent surveys of radiological boundaries and random surveys of nonradio-logical points throughout the facility were taken by the inspector.
No areas of concern were identified.
6.
Low Pressure Safety Injection (LPSI) System Inspection The inspector reviewed IE Information Notice number 87-01, "RHR Valve Mis -
i alignment Causes Degradation of ECCS in PWR's", with respect to its_applica-bility to Maine Yankee's Low Pressure Safety Injection (LPSI) system;
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The_ design of the LPSI system is such that the. redundant LPSI pumps discharge-
into a common header which then divides to supply the three reactor coolant system cold legs.
This configuration prevents the possibili_ty of inadver-
tently isolating flow to any of the RCS cold legs through the crossconnect valves as described in the Information Notice. Therefore it was determined
that IE Information Notice 87-01 does not apply to Maine Yankee.
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7.
Feedwater Piping
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As a result of the feedwater line break at'Surry, Unit 2'on December 9, 1986 and IE Inftivation Notice 86-106, '!Feedwater Line Break," the licensee has
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started a program to determine if similar conditions exist at Maine Yankee.
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The licensee utilized a contractor to determine which areas of the feedwater.
piping are susceptible to corrosion as experienced at Surry.
Approximately thirty areas were identified as requiring further evaluation.
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It was determined that the piping is constructed of the same material (A106 j '
Grade B carbon steel) and that similar fluid conditions exist as. existed in.
the Surry plant.
The approximate fluid conditions are: a flow rate of 18 feet i
per second, temperature of 370 degrees F, a pressure of 300 psig, and an oxygen concentration of less that 5 ppb.
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Of the thirty areas identified, three fittings were accessible during power-i operations.
Ultrasonic inspection of these fittings resulted in no indica -
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j tions of wall thinning.
The remaining' areas will be scheduled for examination
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during the refueling outage beginning in late March. The number.of. areas to be inspected will be increased or decreased based on the results of the pre-liminary examinations.
There will also be visual examinations _ performed on
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internal sections of the piping made-accessible by feedwater heater replace-ment scheduled for the outage.
The inspector will review the results of this.'
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testing during the outage.
8.
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During a routine review of the Auxiliary Feedwater. System the, inspector ques-
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tioned the capability of the steam driven auxiliary feedwater pump to, remain
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on line during a cold fast start.
Maine Yankee's routine monthly surveillance-test warms the steam driven auxiliary feedwater pump (P-25B) manually prior.
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to conducting an operability r:m.
Some current industry experien~ce has dis-covered problems with=overspeed trips and lifting of the inlet' steam safety valve during cold fast starts of steam _ driven auxiliary feedwater. pumps.
The licensee reviewed the design and operation of other auxiliary feEdwaterL systems and compared them to the Maine Yanke.e design.
Those plants experienc-
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ing overspeed trips of the. pump during cold' fast starts had identified the
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long: length of steam supply pipe as the root cause. With a long pipe run, condensed steam had accumulated in the steam piping resulting in overspeed.
trips of the pump. Maine Yankee's design for steam inlet piping. involves a short run of piping which is primarily vertical with four steam traps for re-c moving condensation from the line.
A review of the plant which experienced lifting of the inlet steam safety valve revealed several design changes which resulted in lowering of the relief J
i setpoint and elimination of a " staggered" opening signal to'the steam supply
valves.
The combination of these changes along with.some inoperable steam'
traps led to the lifting of the steam relief.
Corrective actions included
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a return to the staggered inlet steam valve arrangement, return to normal
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relief valve setpoint and corrective maintenance to the steam traps.
Yankee's design does not appear.to be susceptible to similar problems since
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thert is only one inlet valva and one governor valve.
No changes have been
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made to the relief valve setpoint.
Experience has shown no relief setpoint t
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. Based on the above, the inspector concluded that the problems noted -in other
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plants do not appear to be reflected in the M4 w Yankee design.
The inspec-tor had no further questions.
9.
New Fuel Inspection %
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In' preparation for the upcoming outage the plant received new fuel onsite.
The inspectors witnessed portions of unloading and storage of new fuel in-
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cluding Quality Control and Radiological Control involvement.
Shipping con-
tainers were noted to be properly sealed upon arrival.
Personnel were knowl-edgeable in procedures governing the handling of new fuel.
The inspector had
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no additional comments.
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Exit Interview-Meetings were periodically held-with senior. facility management to discuss the inspection scope and findings.
A summary of findings for the report period was also discussed at the conclusion of the inspection.
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